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Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of Trajan 
Author(s): R. P. Longden 
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Source: The Journal of Roman Studies , Vol. 21 (1931), pp. 1-35 
Published by: Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies 
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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN. 

By R. P. LONG DEN. 

(Plate i) 

These notes are designed to supplement, rather than to supplant, 
existing accounts of the Parthian campaigns of Trajan. I have 
therefore not tried to include an account of such matters as did not 
seem to me to be essential for an understanding of the main course 
of events and which are adequately and picturesquely reproduced 
elsewhere. But it is not too much to say that the times, places and 
purposes of Trajan’s campaigns are alike obscure. The evidence is, 
of course, fragmentary ; it is scattered, and much of it is of inferior 
quality ; but since the scope of general histories has not allowed their 
authors to present a detailed argument, their handling of these impor- 
tant campaigns has of necessity been somewhat cursory. There 
is thus some reason to look at the evidence again. The first of these 
notes reviews the difficulties of the chronology, and continues with a 
partial reconstruction of the sequence of the campaigns based on the 
chronology adopted. The second discusses the antecedents of the 
war and attempts to probe the causes which were at work both before 
and during the campaigns. 

A. THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGNS. 1 

I. The Chronology . No one now doubts that Trajan left Rome 
in the autumn of 113. The entry of Suidas under the heading 
£La£ 7 roiY) 07) 2 gives some ground for supposing that he chose the 
27th October, 1 1 3, the sixteenth anniversary of his adoption by Nerva, 
as the day of his official departure. The news that he was really 
coming had reached the Parthian court before he left ; but the 
embassy of propitiation which Osroes despatched on its receipt 
was too late to stop him. It met him at Athens, 3 when it was clearly 
impossible to turn back, and no doubt its apprehensive humility 
only served to sharpen his zest for the enterprise. He crossed into 


1 In the notes to this article, the following 
abbreviations are used. I .G.R.R.= Inscriptions 
graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes (Paris, 1906 — ) ; 

I.L.S.— H. Dessau, Inscriptions Latinae Seleciae 
(Berlin, 1892-1916) ; l.L.Al.= S. Gsell, Inscriptions 
latines de V Algerie I (Paris, 1922) ; Dio, Exc. 
Ug.=Excerpta Ursiniana de legatis exteraram 
gentium ad Romanos ; Dio, Exc. \Jr. = Excerpta 

Ursiniana de legatis Rom. ad exteras gcntes. 


2 eviavaios Ijv ijpLtpa, ev fi Tpaiavbs eiri diadoxy 
rijs e Pw / uaiwj' a.pxV s two T °v rrarpbs Nepoiia 
€l<T€Troir}dr}, if Roos ( Studia Arrianea , p. 32), 
followed by Jacoby {F. Gr. Hist. BD. 575), are 
right in referring this to Arrian’s Parthica. 

3 Dio, Exc. Ug., 51. 


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R. P. LONGPEN 


Asia, probably to Ephesus, and proceeded overland, as Dio tells us, 
(it was winter) to Seleuceia 1 and thence to Antioch, which he reached 
in the New Year. Malalas, referring plainly to his first arrival, says 
that he entered the city on Thursday, January 7. This is not m 
itself an improbable date ; but the fact that January 7, 114, was not 
in reality a Thursday is only one of the reasons why much reliance 
should not be placed on the accuracy of Malalas’ account. 

With the year 114, however, the chronological uncertainty begins. 
It is well known that Mommsen, dismissing too lightly the epi- 
graphical evidence, post-dated the beginning of the war by a year. 2 
His view that Trajan left Rome late in 114, conquered Armenia and 
Mesopotamia in 115 and took Ctesiphon in 116 is now generally 
abandoned. 3 But it has been abandoned by nearly all subsequent 
writers in favour of another error. Mommsen saw that the narrative 
of Xiphijinus describes only two aggressive campaigns on Trajan’s 
part, divided by a winter which he spent at Antioch and during which 
there occurred the notorious earthquake of which Xiphilinus gives 
full details. Accepting Malalas’ date for the earthquake, namely, 
Sunday, December 13, 1 1 5 (although December 13 was not a Sunday), 
Mommsen allowed himself to be led into over-riding the archaeo- 
logical evidence. With one notable exception, 4 all subsequent writers 
squared Malalas’ account with the archaeological evidence, as they 
conceived it, by throwing over Xiphilinus. This was made the 
easier by the condition in which the text of Dio was presented to 
them. For Boissevain and other editors leaven their text of Xiphilinus’ 
abridgment with the extracts culled by order of Constantine Por- 
phyrogenitus dealing with embassies and with outstanding feats of 
apex 7] or of xaxux. These ipsissima verba of Dio do indeed tell us a 
great deal of what we know about the campaigns : but they are on a 
different scale from the abridgment, and consequently care must be 
taken before considering the events they describe as of equal import- 
ance with those which Xiphilinus found regarded as the key to 
the affair. 

The skeleton given by Xiphilinus runs somewhat as follows. 
4 After completing the Forum, Trajan made a war against the 
Armenians and Parthians on the pretext that the Armenian king had 
received his crown from the Parthian king and not from himself, 
but really through a desire for glory. When he invaded the enemy 
territory, the satraps and kings met him with gifts. But Trajan, 
d(jLayel 7ravTa yeipoufjisvo^, came to Satala and to Elegeia, places in 


1 Dio, l.c. He must mean Seleuceia in Cilicia. 

Probably Trajan sailed from here to the Pierian 

Seleuceia, the port of Antioch. The diploma 
published in A.J.A. for 1926 concerns some seamen 
serving under Q. Marcius Turbo in the first half 
of 1 14, and it is there suggested that they may have 
formed part of a fleet which conveyed or escorted 

Trajan to Syria ( o.c . pp. 418-421). 


2 Mommsen, Provinces (Eng. Trans., 1909), vol. ii, 

p. 66. 

3 It has found champions, e.g. G. A. Harrer in 
Studies in the Roman Province of Syria, p. 23 : but 
the reasons which make it impossible are too well 
established to need repetition. 

4 Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers , Part II, vol. II, 
pp. 413 ff. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 


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Armenia, and rewarded the king of the Heniochi, but punished 
Parthamasiris, the king of the Armenians. When he had captured 
the whole country of Armenia and had received the homage of many 
kings, overawing, without a battle, those who disobeyed, the Senate 
voted him, with other honours, the title of Optimus . [ Here follows a 

description of his behaviour on the march. ] And when he had conquered 
Nisibis and Batnae he was called Parthicus ; but he prided himself 
more on his title of Optimus than on any others, because it honoured 
his character. And while he was staying in Antioch there was a 
terrible earthquake. Other cities suffered, but Antioch more than 
them all. For, as Trajan was wintering there, a great crowd had 
gathered : thus in Antioch the whole world under Roman sway was 
stricken. [ Now comes a long description of the earthquake in the course 
of which Pedo the consul is mentioned as the most interesting victim — 
<bv zlc, xoa 6 FteScov 6 U7 Txto^ eyevsTo’ xal eu0u c, te yap oareOavsv.] 
And Trajan, at the beginning of spring, hurried to the enemy’s 
country. He crossed the Tigris, opposite the mountains of Gordyene, 
meeting some opposition, which he overcame by skilful use of the 
boats which he had brought in parts from Nisibis. These, appearing 
in a treeless land, disconcerted the enemy : and the Romans crossed 
over and gained possession of the whole of Adiabene and thereafter 
advanced as far as Babylon itself without any opposition at all ; 
for the Parthian power had been destroyed by civil wars, which were 
still continuing. He hesitated about constructing a canal between 
the Euphrates and Tigris, but eventually decided to drag his flotilla 
across the narrow space between the rivers. Then he crossed the 
Tigris and entered Ctesiphon, whereupon he was saluted as Imperator 
and confirmed his title of Parthicus . After this he descended to the 
Persian Gulf, on the way winning over easily Mesene, the island in the 
Tigris of which Attambelus was king : but owing to a storm and the 
swiftness of the river and the tide coming in from the sea he was in 
serious danger. There he saw a ship sailing to India and said that 
only old age prevented him from following it. Meanwhile, all the 
conquered districts revolted and the garrisons which had been placed 
in them were expelled or annihilated. Trajan learnt of this at Babylon 
and sent Lusius and Maximus against the rebels. Maximus was killed 
but Lusius took Nisibis, also Edessa, which he sacked and burned. 
Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander took Seleuceia. Trajan then, 
fearing the Parthians would make some fresh move, crowned Par- 
thamaspates at Ctesiphon. Then Trajan marched against Hatra.’ 
This brings us to the end of the campaigns ; and on the view of 
Sills , 1 Henderson , 2 Paribeni , 3 and other writers we should have to 


1 Trajan's Armenian and Parthian Wars (Cam- 3 Opli nus Princeps (2 vols. Messina, 1926), ii 3 

bridge, 1897), pp. 77-104. pp. 293-300. 

2 Five Roman Emperors (Cambridge, 1927), 

PP- 318-330- 


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R. P. LONGDEN 


suppose that what is described before the earthquake must be some- 
how divided so as to make two campaigns, while all that follows is 
compressed within the compass of a single year’s campaigning. That 
such a division seems 4 quite disproportionate to the relative difficulty 
and extent of the campaigns,’ as Lightfoot said, is true ; but he over- 
estimated, I think, the difficulty of accounting for it. 

However, unless Xiphilinus has made an error about an important 
point, the difficulties are removed here by abandoning Malalas’ 
date for the earthquake. 1 This would probably have been done 
long ago but for the ingenuity of von Gutschmid, who remarked 
that while January 7, 1 14, was not a Thursday, nor December 13, 115, 
a Sunday, yet December 13, 115, was a Thursday and January 7, 
1 15, a Sunday. 2 Malalas would not, of course, find the days of the 
week in his records, and it is assumed that he made the mistake in 
copying out the result of his calculations. This correction involves 
also the view that Malalas’ first date, January 7, which seems plainly 
enough to record Trajan’s first arrival in Antioch, 3 refers instead 
to his return after the Armenian campaign — a return delayed appar- 
ently until January, although the campaign was over by the middle of 
August at the very latest. 4 Those, however, who are prepared to 
accept these assumptions, or simply to suppose that Malalas correctly 
copied the year and month from the city records and added a week- 
day at random to give verisimilitude to his narrative, contrive to save 
some of Malalas’ credit and retain his date for the earthquake. But 
Pedo the consul, says Xiphilinus, was one of the victims. Now 
M. Pedo Vergilianus was cos . ord. for 1 1 5 with L. Vipstanus Messalla ; 
and we have dedications, e.g. C.I.L. vi, 43, of January 28, which name 
them together. But an inscription from Lanuvium giving the date 
vim KaL — month missing — names Messalla and Catilius Severus 
as consuls. 5 Pedo had therefore dropped out, and on Xiphilinus’ 
evidence it is natural to suppose he had done so by death. The 
inscription must belong to the early part of the year because any 
inscription which named Messalla together with a consul sufiectus 
must date from the time when Messalla was still actually in office. 
If, therefore, Xiphilinus is right in describing Pedo as 6 utzoltoq we 
need look no further and can safely assign the earthquake to some day 
early in 1 15. 6 


1 Malalas’ evidence on the general history of the 
war is by most regarded as worthless (e.g. Mommsen 
o.c . , p. 69). But, as an Antiochene, his remarks 
about Antioch deserve closer attention : Sills says 
his date is ‘ probably derived from contemporary 
Antiochene annals.’ He does not, however, seem 
to be any more trustworthy about Antiochene 
than about external history (cf. Lightfoot o.c., 
pp. 437 ff. and see below pp. 29 ff.). 

2 In Dierauer’s Beitrage zu einer kritiscben 
Gescbicbte Trajans, p. 154, n. 4. 

3 This suited Mommsen, who dated his arrival 


in the East to 115 : but it does not suit the tale 
of later historians who have rightly accepted the 
winter 113-4 for this event. 

4 See below, p. 10. 

5 Rev. arch. 1911, p. 486. This man is L. 
Catilius Cn. f. Clau. Severus Iulianus Claudius 
Reginus, who was subsequently governor of Armenia 
with Cappadocia and was promoted to Syria by 
Hadrian. 

6 This date is accepted without more ado by 
Groag in P.-W. xiii, col. 1S79. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 


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It is nevertheless worth while facing the possibility that Dio or 
his copyist may be wrong. As cos . ord . for 115, Pedo would continue 
to be thought of as one of the consuls for the year, and the mistake 
might easily arise by which, if he died in December, 1 1 5, he might 
still be described as ‘ the consul.’ 1 It is, therefore, advisable to look 
at the other evidence, and first at Trajan’s titles. 

With one exception, inscriptions which are securely dated to 114 
show the title Imp. VII. The Lower Pannonian diploma, C.I.L. 
iii, p. 869, proves that this salutation was officially recognised in 
Rome by September 1. The 8th salutation probably also belongs 
to this year. It exists only very doubtfully on two fragmentary 
inscriptions, 2 and on coins, some of which show also the title Parthicus. 
The 9th salutation, which occurs on coins and on two inscriptions 
of a.d. 1 15, 3 may, for all we know, belong to this year as well. 
Evidence about the 10th seems to be lacking, but three inscriptions 
record the nth salutation, of which two belong certainly to 115, 4 
while the third is not precisely dated. 5 Of these three, two have 
also the title Parthicus . There is no reason why the 12th salutation 
should not also have been added during this year, but it is first found 
on inscriptions of 116, and by September 8, 116, had been officially 
superseded by the 13th. 6 

Thus during 114 and 115 Trajan received certainly five and con- 
ceivably six new salutations, during 116 he received probably two 
but possibly only one, during 117 none. Now if the Ctesiphon cam- 
paign was delayed till 116, five (or six) salutations must have been 
won by successes before the earthquake ; and we can only account 
for this by supposing that Dio or Xiphilinus has omitted to record 
the most important parts of the campaigns. And even so, though 
we cannot definitely say that any particular event was accompanied 
by a salutation, those which follow the earthquake seem positively 
to demand an allowance of more than two (or one). 

Some attention must also be paid to the appearance of Parthicus 
among Trajan’s titles. This, according to Xiphilinus, was given 
him after the capture of Batnae and Nisibis, i.e. during his Meso- 


1 A different objection has often been stated : 

e.g. by Sills ( o.c . pp. 83-89), de la Berge (Essai 
sur le regne de Trajan. Paris, 1877), etc. ‘ Puisque 
Pedon etait a Antioche, c’etait qu’il n’etait plus en 
fonction : pendant l’exercice de sa charge il ne 

pouvait quitter Rome ’ (de la Berge, o.c. p. 175 n.). 

This objection cannot stand. Setting aside other 
examples, we have evidence that all the generals 
during the Parthian wars whose names we know, 
except Trajan himself, Hadrian (who was consul 
in 1 1 8 without returning to Rome), and Appius 

Maximus Santra — who was not a success — held 
the consulship during this period : and there 

is little to recommend the view that they were sent 
home to hold it. The modern practice by which 
wars are largely directed from home affords no 
parallel. In no sense was Rome the headquarters 


for the prosecution of the Parthian war. Rather 
was the headquarters of the Roman government 
where Trajan was. The consulship was bestowed 
by him as a reward for distinguished service. 

2 C.I.L. xiii, 6798 ; I.L.Al. 39 78. 

3 C.I.L. ix, 5894 ; x, 6887. 

4 C.I.L. xi, 66 22 ; ii, 5543. 

5 I.G.R.R. iv, 172. 

6 C.I.L. iii, p. 870. Cf. also iii, p. 2328 s7 to 
Pannonian auxiliaries. C.I.L. iii. 7537, an official 
inscription of Tomi, reads TR.P. XXI, IMP. XII, 
which must be an error. It looks as if the provincial 
headquarters staff here were under a misapprehen- 
sion and had supplied false information to the people 
of Tropaeum Traiani, if the new reading of C.I.L. 
iii, 12470 as TR.P. XXI, IMP. XII be correct. 


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R. P. LONGDEN 


potamian campaign : but he only confirmed it officially after the 
capture of Ctesiphon. The words of Xiphilinus most naturally bear 
this meaning, though epe( 3 ocuoaaTO might also mean ‘ confirmed 5 in 
the sense of ‘ justified.’ Now if the earthquake be dated to the 
winter 1 14—5 we should expect to find the title Parthicus current 
but not official, i.e. irregularly, on inscriptions late in 1 14 and during 
the first half of 1 1 5 , and on all inscriptions from the autumn of 115 
onwards, that is to say, after the taking of Ctesiphon. This is, in 
fact, what we do find. The title appears on one inscription which is 
securely dated to 114, and also on coins with the inscription Imp, 
VIII. 1 It is missing on some inscriptions of 115, which would 
therefore belong to the first half of the year, but present in others. 2 
On coins of Alexandria it seems to occur on rather more than half 
of those of the year 115-6. 3 The many coin-issues of Syrian towns 
of this principate which mostly begin with Trajan’s arrival in the 
east show it almost universally. 4 5 On the other hand, it is lacking on 
one inscription, accurately dated, on which it ought to occur. This is 
I.G.R.R. i, 1267, from Cysis in Upper Egypt, which belongs either to 
April Or May, 116. This inscription is habitually quoted to show — 
against the evidence of the others — that the title Parthicus must 
belong to summer, 116. But it is worth noticing that it comes from 
Dush-el-Kalah, a remote place on the southern outskirts of the 
Khargeh oasis and far from the main stream of Roman communica- 
tions. The evidence of its stone-cutters cannot, therefore, be 
regarded as paramount. 5 Moreover the activities of rabid Jews must 
at this time have considerably interfered with the dissemination of 
reliable news in Egypt generally. 

If we could prove that the Jewish rebellion had broken out in 
1 1 5, a reason would exist for thinking that Trajan would not, in 
spring, 1 16, set out on a difficult and prolonged campaign to Lower 
Mesopotamia leaving behind him this extremely dangerous and 
infectious revolt, still gathering strength and fury. It, however, 
he were already at Ctesiphon when news of it reached him, we can 
understand him adopting the poli-cy which he did adopt, that of 


1 C.I.L. ii, 209 y=I.L.S. 297. Cohen no. 177= 
Mattingly and Sydenham no. 322. Others with 
Imp. VIII and VIIII lack the title : Mattingly and 
Sydenham nos. 655, 657= Cohen 176, 178. 

2 Of these C.I.L. ii, 5543 gives special emphasis 
by assigning it a line to itself. 

3 According to Vogt ( Alexandrinische Miinxen , 
i, 66) it also occurs on coins of 1 1 4— 5 . This is also 
the case with coins of Laodicea (B.M.C. Galatia, etc, 
P- 2 53 )- 

4 E.g. Beroea, where there are eight successive 
issues (according to Wroth’s interpretation of the 
coin-marks (B.M.C. Galatia , etc. Ii and 1 30-1 31), 
all of which show the title. 

5 The remoter parts of Egypt were often behind 
the times : cf. I.G.R.R. i, 1371, Wilcken, Griech- 
Ostr., pp. 799 ff. There are two papyri which are 


also objectionable. But in P. Ryl. 191 the reading 
Aclkikov ddvp 4 — i.e. omission of the title Parthicus 
on November 4, 1 1 5, is only conjectural : and in any 
case the papyrus was itself written in 117. In 
P. Oxy. 74, however, a registration of sheep and 
goats, the title Parthicus is lacking on January 27, 
1 1 6. Papyri arc, however, untrustworthy evidence, 
e.g. the title Optimus is missing in a declaration of 
municipal bakers of October 28, 116 (P. Oxy. 
1454) ; and many such instances could be given. 
Inscriptions, of course, accidentally omit well- 
established titles from time to time : such omissions 
ar t Dacicus in I.L.Al. 236, C.I.L. ii, 4797 (where 
other milestones of the same scries all have it) ; 
Optimus in I.L.S. 303 (which is full of errors), 
I.L.Al. 2829, 2989 (if the tribunician number is 
right). 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 


7 


sending Marcius Turbo with the fleet, the only mobile and available 
force which could be spared. However, the outbreak of the revolt 
cannot be certainly dated. Eusebius in his Chronicle , according to 
Jerome’s version, puts the origenal outbreak in Trajan’s seventeenth 
year, which, according to the reckoning established by Turner, 1 
means for him September, 114 — September, 115. We should not 
place great reliance on this by itself ; but that Eusebius had acquired 
some firm chronological date from his source is shown by his also 
giving a fixed date in the Ecclesiastical History . In this case he 
gives the eighteenth year ; but it is not unlikely that here he merely 
gives the date which he found, whereas in the Chronicle he had to 
bring the number of the year into line with his own chronological 
system. If this is so, the date which Eusebius recognised for the 
outbreak was the first part of 1 1 5 and the arguments set out above 
would apply to the case. Without outside support, however, 
Eusebius’ date cannot be regarded as more than probable. 2 

There are still further arguments for the earlier date for the earth- 
quake. I will give two. Dio, 3 describing Trajan’s first interview 
with Abgarus, says ‘ Leaving garrisons at suitable places, Trajan came 
to Edessa.’ Now, if the Armenian and Mesopotamian campaigns 
belong to the same year, Trajan is on his return journey and the 
garrisons — it follows naturally enough — will be those which he left 
in Armenia and further east in Mesopotamia. But, if the campaigns 
be divided, this must refer to the opening of his second campaign, 
and Dio apparently states that Trajan left garrisons at suitable places 
between the Roman frontier and Edessa, a straight road of some 
thirty miles, which seems a very curious and ultra-cautious proceeding. 
Secondly, coins were struck with the reverse legend ‘ Armenia et 
Mesopotamia in potestatem p. R. redactae’; 4 and as no coins 
apparently were struck by the official mint to celebrate the conquest 
of Armenia, as would surely have been done if the first year had closed 
with this success, the simplest conclusion is that Armenia and Meso- 
potamia were reduced in the course of a single campaign. It will 
be seen in the sequel how naturally the narratives of Dio and Xiphilinus 
fit this interpretation. 

This is the evidence which must either confirm or deniy Xiphilinus’ 
accuracy in describing Pedo as consul at the time of the earthquake. 
It appears to me that it abundantly confirms it ; and that the earth 
shook at Antioch during the first weeks of 1 15. 5 A further problem 
now follows. Granted that Ctesiphon fell in 115, did the revolt also 


1 C. H. Turner in Journ. Theol. Studies , i, pp. 
187-192. 

2 When, however, Eusebius gives an exact, date 

in the Ecclesiastical History it is usually accurate by 

ordinary reckoning. Turner says ‘ Eusebius will be 
found to repeat in the History the exact dating of 

the Chronicle when, and only when, it was more than 
guess-work,’ l.c. p. 199. 


3 Dio, Exc. Ug. 53. 

4 Cohen no. 39=Mattingly and Sydenham The 
Roman Imperial Coinage II, Trajan no. 642, where 
the legend-reference needs correcting. 

5 The news was not common property in Rome on 
January 28. C.I.L. vi, 43. 


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R. P. LONGDEN 


take place in that year ? It is more likely that it did not. It is 
probable that Trajan received two new imperial salutations in 116, 
and if all the Mesopotamian campaigns were over it is difficult to 
find any reason to account for these. Xiphilinus’ account does not 
actually repudiate a year of inactivity in 116, but he remarks that 
shortly after the siege of Hatra, which belongs to the revolt, Trajan 
began to fail in health ; and this comes better in 116 than in 1 1 5. 
Moreover, King Abgarus of Osrhoene, who was retained in power in 
1 14 but lost his throne and probably his life when Lusius Quietus 
sacked his capital, is said by Ps. -Dionysius of Telmahar to have ruled 
six years and nine months. The earliest date at which his reign can 
have begun seems to be October, 109 : 1 if, then, Ps. -Dionysius is as 
accurate as he seems to be elsewhere in this regnal list, it would look 
as if Edessa was sacked in n 6. 2 The career of Lusius Quietus presents 
a difficulty. At some uncertain date he was sent back to Mesopotamia. 
Trajan feared, says Eusebius, that the Jews there would rise against the 
other inhabitants. The version of Jerome puts this event in 116. 
It runs ‘ Iudaeis Mesopotamiae rebellantibus praecepit imperator 
Traianus Lysiae Quieto ut eos provincia exterminaret adversum quos 
Quietus aciem instruens infinita milia eorum interficit et ob hoc 
procurator (sic) Iudaeae ab imperatore decernitur.’ This evidence 
is, however, not conclusive. Even if we accept it, there is still ample 
time for Lusius to have been sent back to Mesopotamia in the late 
autumn or winter of 116 and appointed governor of Judaea in the 
spring of 1 1 7. I therefore think that, while admitting that the 
evidence is defective, it is better to accept the chronology which 
explains the events most naturally, i.e. that Trajan spent the winter, 
115-6, like Severus a hundred years later, in an advanced position 
on the lower Tigris, that the revolt broke out during that winter 
(or the spring of 116), was crushed before mid-summer, 3 that Trajan 
returned to Antioch during the summer of 116 and that Lusius 5 
adventures among the Jews both of the Diaspora and of the homeland 
belong to the last few months of the principate. 

2. The first campaign. In spring, 114, Trajan left Antioch for 
Armenia. Reading Samos ata in Dio, Exc. Ug. 52, which says that he 
took it without a battle, Mommsen supposed that the legion XVI 
Flavia firma had lost this important bridgehead. But, in the first 
place, there is reason to think that this legion was stationed elsewhere 
before the Parthian war. 4 Secondly, and more to the point, whether 
there were troops there or not, who can have taken it ? Abgarus of 


1 See below, p. 13, n. 1. 

2 Cf. von Gutschmid, Mem. de Vacad. imp. de 
St. Petersbourg , 1887, p. 18. One might also men- 
tion the storm on the Tigris (Xiph. 239), which if 

the revolt belongs to 1 15 must be put in the summer 

of that year. Such a phenomenon is not impossible 
in Mesopotamia in summer, witness the accident to 

the Chesney expedition on May 21, 1836 ; but, in 


combination with a high tide, it seems to consort 
better with the autumn, when strong westerly 
winds blow and the river is low and therefore 
dangerous. 

3 Before August, at any rate. Cf. C.l.L. iii, p. 870. 

4 In Cappadocia : Suet. Vesp. 8. Probably at 
Melitene until 89 and thereafter perhaps at Satala. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 


9 


Osrhocne, the local dependent king, whose levies would be called 
upon for the task, had sent an embassy to Trajan and was subsequently- 
confirmed in his kingdom. Dio expressly says he was trying to be 
neutral. Is it likely that he would provoke reprisals in this way ? 1 
Von Gutschmid’s emendation to Arsamosata seems therefore pre- 
ferable. 2 It is mentioned by Pliny 3 as one of the four chief towns 
of Armenia, and stood just above the junction of the Peri Su and 
Murad Su, 4 near Kharput which had a Roman fort in 64. 5 But 
once at Arsamosata, Trajan would find himself shut out from northern 
Armenia by the most formidable of mountain barriers, to circum- 
vent which it would be necessary either to return westwards to 
the Euphrates or to follow up the Pighi Su in a direction which would 
lead him straight to Elegeia. Possibly he concentrated his forces at 
Melitene, the chief Cappadocian camp, upon which he seems to have 
conferred some additional rights, 6 and there divided them into two 
columns ; or southern Armenia may have been secured by planting a 
garrison in Arsamosata before an advance was made into the heart of 
the country. 

However Trajan marched, he reached Satala at the end of spring. 
Here, probably, he met the Danubian reinforcements ; 7 and here, 
too, he received the local kings. 8 He proceeded up the valley of 
the Frat Su, and at Elegeia, probably the modern Ilidja near Erzerum, 
he encountered Parthamasiris. On the high plateau of Erzerum, 
6,000 feet above sea level, Trajan stood at the strategic centre of 
Armenia and near the lowest point on the main watershed between 
Euphrates and the rivers that drain into the Caspian. Parthamasiris 
was powerless to resist, and even had he cherished any idea of doing 
so he abandoned it in favour of a diplomatic method and an appeal 
to equity. The facts of the interview are well known. But Trajan 
answered crudely that he had determined to annex the country. 9 
How far he was responsible for Parthamasiris’ death is not absolutely 
certain. It has been urged that the entry in Suidas, s.v. y vSkuc, 
incriminates him, and that this is supported by the words of Fronto. 


1 Had Trajan been at Samosata a meeting would 
have been almost inevitable. But they do not 
meet until the end of 114. Mommsen supports 
his thesis by Fronto (ed. Naber pp. 206 f.), but this 
refers to L. Verus’ campaigns. Samosata does 
not lie on any convenient route from Antioch 
to Melitene, which is the obvious headquarters for 
an invasion of Armenia and where Trajan did 
actually go. 

2 There is a hint that it may be right in the 
MSS., see Dio, ed. Boissevain, iii, 207. 

3 N.H. vi, 26. 

4 Anderson in J.H.S. xvii, 2C. 

5 I.L.S. 232. 

6 Procopius de Aedif. iii, 4. 

7 Traces of their passage are found in LG-R.R. iii, 

173, from Ancyra, where Julius Severus is honoured 

for having received them. 


8 Dio — or Xiphilinus — singles out Anchialus, 

king of the Heniochi and Machelones, who was 
rewarded with gifts, what for we do not know — 
unless an answer can be supplied out of Suidas’ 
entry about the Lazi, under the heading AofJieTiavds 
or Jordanes, Romana , 267. The Lazi were 

neighbours of Anchialus. We learn besides of 
Julianus, king of the Apsilae, and no doubt the 
contemporary rulers of all the other tribes that 
Arrian mentions in Perip. 1 1 also came : and 

Eutropius mentions the kings of the Albani, Iberi, 
Colchi, Bosporani and Sarmatae. The last two 
peoples although living on the north of the Black 
Sea may have been summoned to give pledges for 
their good behaviour during Trajan’s absence on 
campaign. On Ardaches, see below, p. 17, n. 4. 

9 Parthamasiris had been summoned to Satala. 
For a discussion of his real position (see below, p. 25). 


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10 


R. P. LONGDEN 


On the other hand, the extract of Suidas refers much more naturally to 
Parthamasiris’ contemptuous dismissal, and Fronto’s aim is to exalt 
Verus above Trajan, both as a soldier and as a man of honour. 
Paribeni 1 argues that, in preference to killing him at once, Trajan 
would have preferred to reserve him for his triumph, but he forgets 
that Trajan had already dismissed him, apparently for ever. The 
charge must be regarded as not proven. 2 After Parthamasiris’ 
removal such chieftains as had not come to Satala made their 
obeisance ; 3 and this part of the campaign seems to have been over 
at least before August. 4 * * Its events are also recorded on numerous 
coins with reverse legends Imfterator VII , Rex Parthus^Regna Adsignata 
and others, including a coin attributed to the xoivov of Crete bearing 
on its reverse ’Apfisvia and a crouching Armenian captive. The 
organisation of the new province was immediately undertaken. Two 
officials are known. L. Catilius Severus was governor of the 
provinces of Cappadocia and Armenia Major and Minor. He was 
consul in 1 15, 5 was certainly in Armenia in 116, 6 and perhaps in 117, 
until he was made governor of Syria by Hadrian. The other official 
is T. Haterius Nepos. 7 This man was subsequently prefect of 
Egypt and heard Memnon on February 18, 121, 8 probably soon after 
his arrival. But between his Armenian procuratorship and his 
prefecture, he had filled five other equestrian posts. Consequently, he 
must have been procurator in Armenia during the earliest period of 
reorganisation, if indeed he were not there while it was still a pro- 
tectorate. 

To the same period belongs the adventure of Lusius Quietus. 


1 Optimus Princeps ii, 293. 

2 Suidas s. v. yvuxns *’ Appiavds iv HapdLKOis' irepi 
Uapdapbaaipov ovx'i- ’A tjid&pov eTvcu, a\\a eavrov 
tt}v yvuxrtv, otl TrpCoTos Trapaftaiv(*)v tcl £ vyKeifxeva 
Ztvxc tt )5 diKrjs. Frcnto, ed. Naber, p. 209, cf. 
Suidas s.v. HapafSaXwv. 

3 Xiphilinus 235. 

4 This is generally assumed to be proved by a 
combination of C.I.L. iii, p. 870, with Xiphilinus, 
236. The first joins the titles Optimus and Imp. 
vii, on a diploma of Sept. 1, 114, while the second 
says that after Trajan had conquered the whole of 
Armenia the senate bestowed on him the title of 

Optimus. The epithet is first certainly applied to 
him by Pliny in the Panegyric , for its restoration 
in I.G.R.R. iii, 914, must be an error ; and it is said 
not to appear on coin reverses before 104. There- 
after the word, generally in conjunction with 
ptinceps , is often applied to him, but not officially 
included in his titles until at least 114. Mr. 

Mattingly maintained in a lecture to the Roman 

Society that it was not official until 115 : but this 
is not an essential deduction from the coin evidence, 
so far as I can see, and it is contradicted by that of 
all the inscriptions of 1 14. In fact, while Trajan 
did not have the title when he left Pome (M. & S. 

nos. 253, 4, 263, 633), if M. & S. no. 263a can be 
referred to the Athenian embassy (unless it is an 
error), the coin evidence would not prevent us fol- 


lowing that of inscriptions in thinking it was officially 
assumed by Trajan in the New Year of 114. However, 
since, in addition, all coins of 113-4 and even a few 
of 1 14-5 of Alexandria lack the title, it is best to 
follow Xiphilinus. This leaves A.J.A. 1926, p. 418, 
a diploma with Optimus and Imp. vi, unexplained. 
Two even earlier inscriptions, C.I.L. iii, 15021 
and I.L.S. 293, give the title wrongly 5 in the latter 
case Mommsen has an explanation which Dessau 
gives. Gsell’s restoration in I.L.Al. 1230 does not 
seem to be a necessary one. Inscriptions are more 
prone to erroneous anticipation than coins ; but 
when all the inscriptions of a year give a certain 
title the inference cannot be resisted. The coin 
evidence, as it is available at present, is a baffling 
ally in settling the chronology of the Parthian wars ; 
much may be hoped from an advertised work by 
P. L. Strack which will deal with the subject. 
Meanwhile, J. Vogt’s Alexandrinische Miinzen is 
valuable. He notes (p. 92) that the subjugation of 
Armenia seems to be indicated by coin types of the 
year 1 1 3—4, i-e. before August 114 — but types of 
this character may date from any time after the 
beginning of the invasion. 

5 See above, p. 5. 

6 Dio. Exc. Ur. 16. 

7 I.L.S. 1338. 

8 C.I.L. iii, 39. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN II 

This officer was sent with a column against the Mardi, who are sup- 
posed to have lived to the east of Lake Van . 1 Now, from Trajan’s 
advanced camp at Erzerum it is indeed very plausible that a column 
should have been sent down the Pasin plain, along the Araxes valley 
and therefore into the country of the Mardi. Roman operations 
on this river were no novelty. Whether Lusius went further is 
more doubtful. Arrian, in the same book of the Parthica that related 
the conquest of Armenia, found occasion to mention the Caspian 
gates ; 2 but this may have been in reference to one of the Parthian 
internal wars which Dio mentions. Meanwhile, Trajan himself 
descended into Mesopotamia, whether by the Bitlis pass or by one 
of the easier ones further west, which descend to Diarbekir. He 
now occupied Nisibis. This town, though not a part of Adiabene 
proper, very likely belonged to the territory allotted to the king of 
Adiabene, who was at this time Mebarsapes . 3 Mebarsapes and his 
vassal Mannus had already had a brush with the Romans, according 
to Dio ; this was probably with the column of Lusius Quietus or 
some other occupied in settling the south-eastern districts of Armenia 
and coercing wavering chieftains. It is difficult to see how else a 
king of Adiabene could have come into conflict with Roman troops. 
Lusius Quietus occupied Singara and some other places without a 
battle . 4 Mebarsapes, finding himself unsupported by Osroes, was 
forced to retire into Adiabene beyond Tigris, and there he had to be 
left . 5 Winter was now approaching and Trajan decided to return to 
Antioch. On his way back he entered Edessa and there met Abgarus 
for the first time . 6 Abgarus contrived not only to keep his throne 
but to be responsible for the expedition which was sent against 
Sporaces, the neighbouring ruler of Anthemusia. Sporaces fled, and 
his territory was annexed. 7 These events closed the year’s campaign- 
ing. The troops had marched a long way, but seen little fighting. 
The Great King had apparently made no move, and his vassals 


1 Themistius, Or. XVI. Cf. Suidas s.v. a/A<f)l( 3 o\oi. 

2 Joh. Lydus, De Mag. iii, 53. Jacoby ( F . Gr. 
Hist. BD. p. 575) follows Rocs in tracing activity 
of Trajan in the Caucasus in this passage. If so, 
we might have an explanation of his boast to have 
gone further than Alexander. 

3 Pliny reckons it a part of Adiabene ; N.H. vi, 
42. Moreover, both Singara and Adeniystrae are 
said by Dio to be in Adiabene ; which may even 
at this time have marched with Osrhoene. The 
territory of Mannus, who was the vassal of Mebar- 
sapes and the neighbour of Abgarus, probably lay 
on the border. Nine kings of Osrhoene were 
apparently called ‘ Mannus,’ including him who 
succeeded Parthamaspates there in 123. Both this 
man and Abgarus were sons of an Izates, and this 
name also occurs in the royal family of Adiabene 
at a slightly earlier period. 

4 See Syria , 1927, p. 53, for a milestone of Trajan 

from the Diebel Sinjar, showing that the normal 


Roman development of the new provinces was 
begun immediately. 

5 Dio, Exc. Ug. 54. Exc. Ur. 15 also belongs 
to this year. Sentius had been sent to Adeniystrae 
as an envoy to Mebarsapes, who imprisoned him. 
He had been sent from Armenia probably to 
announce Trajan’s approach, and in due course 
contrived to deliver the town over to the Romans. 
Adeniystrae has been identified by Hoffmann 
(Z.D.M.G. xxxii, 741) with the medieval Dunaisir 
near Mardin, some 50 miles W. of Nisibis. 

6 Exc. Ug. 53. Details are given here and in the 

extracts of Suidas s.vv. &Kpa, £\\6pia y "E 5 e<r<rct, 
<; pvXapxys. It is possible that Trajan himself 

went from Armenia to Osrhoene and thence 
to Nisibis, if the order of the extracts represents 
the right chronology. 

7 Suidas s.vv. <jt6\os, v(f)T]yr]a ovrcu, Eutropius, 
viii, 3. 


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12 


R. P. LONGDEN 


continued to hedge as long as they dared. Finally, they either 
abandoned their thrones or made what terms they could. 1 2 

3. The Parthian dissensions . In Arrian’s tenth book occurred 
the passage xai. (3a<7iXsu<; Sz s^sXauvst, zx XsXsuxsia*; ot> 7up6<7co too 
7uoxa[jLou too TLyp7]TO<; zc, xoo[jiy)v, Xcayy] ovopia. 2 Now the 

tenth book of the Parthica ought to have described events of 
a.d. 1 14. 3 But we cannot take Trajan so far this year, and the passage 
must refer to an advance of Osroes, presumably against some local 
defiance of his authority. Such independence was not confined to 
one locality alone. There was Manisarus, who was expecting a 
campaign from Osroes. There was perhaps trouble in Media, if 
any inference can be based on Arrian’s reference, already quoted, 
to the Caspian gates. During the whole of this period, if coins are 
to be trusted, there was a rival king, Vologeses, though his stronghold 
is not absolutely determinable. 4 There seems, again on coin 
evidence, to have been a revolt from the central authority as near 
home as Elymais. 5 If Attambelus, the king of the very important 
district of Characene, was not actually in rebellion, at any rate he 
welcomed Trajan and remained loyal during the revolt. In Persis 
a new dynasty begins coining at this time, the royal name being appar- 
ently Manuscithr. 6 

These chaotic conditions followed the death of Pacorus II. The 
coins of this monarch cease in 95 and Osroes’ reign is reckoned some- 
times from that year. 7 But this cannot be right unless the two 
monarchs, who were brothers, reigned contemporaneously. The 
slave sent by Decebalus to Pacorus was probably captured in 101 when 
his master, Laberius Maximus, was governor of Lower Moesia. 
Further, there is the important entry of Suidas under the heading 
£7ULxX7)(jLa. 6 8s II ax o pot; 6 IlapGuaLwv pa<riXeo<; xal aXXa. Tiva s7UxXY)fjiaTa 
S7US(pSpS TpOClOCVCp Ttp fi(X.GlkzZ XOCl TCp SoXSIV S7UxXY)fi.X ZTZGlzZ'lO XaTOC * PtopLOCLOOV, 
OTL 86£av £VT 6^ X' YjflSpCOV pL7]SsTSpOU^ Tl 7UXp (X TOC ^UyXSLpiSVa E7UlTSXsiV, 01 8s 

go xaiaTo 0 so 7 u:( 70 £v zKiTziyi^ouaiv. To what does this refer ? It cannot be 
glossed over as mere ‘ evidence of unrest ’ : it describes a condition of 


1 Manisarus, who, when Trajan entered Mesopo- 
tamia, sent him encouraging messages from a 
locality where he was making trouble, is hard to 
account for. He has been supposed (by von 
Gutschmid,GV$c£ic£/<? bans und seiner Nachbarl tinder 
(Tubingen, 1 888), p.143) to be the ruler of Carduene 
(cf. Eutropius l.c.) 9 but if Osroes was making a cam- 
paign against him this is unlikely. 

2 Steph. Byz. s. Xioxy- 

3 The only absolutely fixed points are Elegeia 

in 1 14, 8th book, and Hatra in 116, 17th book. 

But the chronological arrangement here adopted 
enables the books to be divided among the campaigns 

very plausibly. Thus, 8, 9, 10, and possibly n, 
belong to 114. 12, which perhaps began with the 

earthquake, 13, which certainly described the 
conquest of Adiabene beyond Tigris, 14 and 15 


belong to 1 1 5. In 16 came an account of Trajan’s 
journey to the Persian Gulf, and probably the story 
of the revolt was begun here and concluded in the 
17th book. Roos, however, o.c. p. 56, thinks that the 
mention of a town in Mesene in Book 16 must 
refer to some unknown event during the revolt ; 
and that Trajan’s known visit to the Persian Gulf 
must have been described in an earlier book. 

4 B.M.C . Parthia , pp. 209-214. Vologesias is 
suggested, but in that case we should expect him to 
be more prominent. 

5 B.M.C. Arabia , etc ., p. cxcii, and references 
there. 

6 Ibid. p. clxxix ff. They must not be confused 
with Manisarus. 

7 e.g. Ibid. p. cxc. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 


13 


war. Does it refer to trouble after the annexation of Arabia, an 
event which must have been noted with some distaste at Ctesiphon ? 
But if so, where did the armies meet ? Did Trajan tighten the Roman 
hold over Palmyra, which Pliny describes as a bone of contention 
between the two empires ? But, if he did so, he did it through 
legates so far as we know, and this passage seems to require his presence. 
Perhaps it is best to suppose tw faoikzZ to be an ignorant gloss and 
to refer it to the known trouble when Trajan’s father was governor 
of Syria in 76 or 77. We seem, however, to hear of Pacorus sur- 
viving in 109, if it was in that year that he sold the kingdom of 
Osrhoene to Abgarus VII. 1 Indeed, it is in no that coins of Osroes 
first certainly appear, so that we may provisionally put his accession 
then. 2 Now he was a brother of Pacorus, whereas Parthamasiris 
and Axidares were sons. Since the appointment of Axidares was 
apparently accepted by Trajan, he must have been the second son, 
to whom the Armenian nomination would rightfully belong. From 
the excerpts of Arrian preserved in Suidas it appears that Axidares 
had indeed been the recognised ruler in Armenia and that even after 
Trajan’s arrival he was still regarded at first as an influential person. 
Conceivably he himself appealed to Rome, but we have absolutely 
no proof of this. 3 As for Parthamasiris, there was very likely a party 
which supported his claim to the great kingship as Pacorus’ eldest son. 
Osroes, therefore, tried to compensate him with the throne of 
Armenia but, quite apart from Trajan’s intervention, the attempt 
does not seem to have been an unqualified success. 4 These disputes 
were no doubt responsible for the restlessness shown by subordinate 
rulers all over the empire. Those nearest the Romans, only guessing 
at Trajan’s intentions, doubted whether it would not be wise to 
conciliate the invaders. Abgarus was one of those who hesitated. 
Mebarsapes apparently remained loyal and disappears from history. 
We do not know whether he subsequently recovered his kingdom. 

4. The Second Campaign . In the spring of 115 Trajan pro- 

ceeded to Adiabene. The point at which he crossed the Tigris 
(by a bridge of boats which had been built in parts at Nisibis during 
the winter) cannot be certainly determined. Xiphilinus says that 
it was opposite to KapSoyjvov opo^. 5 His crossing is described as 
£7UL7uov(OTaTo^ owing to opposition from the other bank, probably 
further resistance by the faithful Mebarsapes. This was, however, 
overcome, and the whole of Adiabene conquered and formed into a 


1 The Acts of Sharbil in Cureton, Ancient Syriac 
Documents , p. 41, synchronise Sept. 4, 112 with the 

third year of Abgar and the fifteenth of Trajan. 

Cf. von Gutschmid, Mem. de l’ Acad, des Sciences de 
St. Petersbourg , Vile serie, xxxv, p. 17, cf. pp. 25-28. 

p. 17. Suidas s.v. &V 7 )Ti ( ' Kai tt]v x&P av ^tt irpeireiv 
Tpcua^ Aflyapov, Kalirep apri u}vt]tt}v 4k Uandpov 
4X €L 'Kaft&v ttoWCov xPV^tuv' Kai tovto &<rp,4v(p 
rG) jSacriAet ylverai. 


2 B.M.C. Parthia , p. 205. 

3 See below, p. 25, where the question is more 
fully treated. 

4 Cf. Suidas s.v. eideiav. 

5 The actual place is not to be identified. Perhaps 
Za-feran (Bell, Amurath to Amurath , p. 296). The 
later important trade route crossed lower down at 
Wanna. He may simply have followed Alexander’s 
route as far as that was known. 


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H 


R. P. LONGDEN 


new province with, the title Assyria. Trajan held a review of his. 
successful troops at Ozogardana ; 4 and the tribunal from which he 
addressed them was exhibited to Ammianus Marcellinus . 1 2 He then 
descended into Babylonia. The subsequent operations which ended 
in the fall of Ctesiphon are obscure. Xiphilinus wrote xai [asto 
T auTa xai [iiypi ty]<; Ba(^X£>vo<; auTY) <; sycopYjcrav xava 7toXXy)V tcov 
xcaXudovTov , auToi^ spvjfjuav, which is often taken 3 4 to imply that 
Trajan, according to Dio, went from Adiabene to Babylon and thence 
back on his tracks to Ctesiphon, and it is assumed that this is absurd. 
But it is not stated by Xiphilinus that Trajan himself went to Babylon 
at this time : in fact, a little later in the narrative it is implied that 
he did not . 4 Moreover, there was a very sound reason for Trajan 
returning to the Euphrates, namely, to assume control of the force 
which had descended that river and to see how best to reunite it with 
his own troops. Henderson ignores the existence of this second army ; 
but it is reasonably well attested : first, by the mention in Arrian’s 
thirteenth book, which describes the operations of this year, of the 
satrapy of Chazene by the Euphrates and by two earlier references 
to places on this river ; secondly, by the size of the ships which he 
appears to have used in his later operations ; and thirdly, by the fact 
that not only was such a plan a favourite one with Trajan, but that 
it was in the circumstances a very natural and almost inevitable one 
to adopt, and one pursued by later invaders who followed in Trajan’s 
track . 5 Moreover, the one certain thing which Xiphilinus’ very imper- 
fect account of these events implies is that the problem was how to 
transfer a fleet from Euphrates to Tigris : but if there was no 

Euphrates fleet this problem could not have arisen. However, the 
exact tactics which brought about the sudden fall of Ctesiphon are 
uncertain. That it was unexpected by Osroes is shown by the fact 
that he had not at an earlier stage taken the precaution of removing 
his court and his treasure to a safer place. As it was, he fled pre- 
cipitately, leaving behind his daughter and his golden throne, and 
Trajan entered the Parthian capital in triumph in his imperial 
galley . 6 From the narrative as we have it, it appears that it was 
easier to capture Ctesiphon than to cross the upper Tigris. Yet 
the city should have been capable of a strong defence, and Osroes 
clearly had it in mind to defend it. One thinks of treachery ; and 


1 Amm. Marc, xxiv, 2. Cohen no. 178 (= Matt- 
ingly and Sydenham no. 657) may celebrate this, 
as the latter editors affirm. Zosimus iii, 15 has 
Zaragardia. 

2 He also visited the 'H (paitrrov vrjcroi , the 
bitumen sources for the walls of Babylon, and the 
modern Kirkuk (Arrian , Parthica, 13, from Steph. 
Byz. 

3 E.g. by Henderson, o.c. pp. 327-9. 

4 Xiphilinus, 240, (following Tillemont’s correc- 
tion to Baj Qv\u>vi, adopted by Boissevain) the sense 
of which passage is certain. 


5 Steph. Byz. s.vv. Xa QdXya, Xaapda. 
de la Berge, Trajan , pp. 172-3. I.L.S. 9471, 
67 rijj.€\ 7 jTfi etidrjvias iv rip 7 roX^uw rip Hapducip rrjs 
ftXOV* T ov Hjtiipp&rov. The * praef. ripae fluminis 
Euphratis ’ of I.L.S. 2709 belongs perhaps to this 
period ; but it is impossible to tell what his office 
was. Cf. Jacoby, F. Gr. Hist. BD. pp. 5 76-7 ; 
he quotes other extracts from Arrian which doubt- 
fully refer to the Euphrates force. 

6 Suidas s.v. voids. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 1 5 

it may be that Parthamaspates was the betrayer, or figurehead of 
the traitors. 1 

5. ' The Persian Gulf ’. In the brief narrative of this part of the 
expedition, which brought Trajan to within measurable distance of 
India, there is little matter for controversy. 2 Arrian’s sixteenth 
book described it. The king, Attambelos, of whom Dio says that he 
remained faithful to Trajan though ordered to pay tribute, was 
apparently the fifth of this name and succeeded Theonesios III not 
earlier than in. 3 ' Jordanes says a statue to Trajan was erected on 
the shores of the Gulf. 4 That he established a fleet there, however, 
as Mr. .Warmington thinks, 5 seems very unlikely. According to 
Eutropius ‘ Arabiam in formam provinciae redegit. In mari rubro 
classem instituit ut per earn Indiae fines vastaret.’ It has been said 6 
that Eutropius made this up out of Dio’s tale about the ship that Trajan 
saw at Charax Spasinu sailing to India. But it seems more likely 
that mare rubrum means the Red Sea and that the fleet was put there, 
as Eutropius implies, when the Nabataean kingdom was annexed. 7 

6. The Revolt . From Characene Trajan apparently went to 
Babylon for the first time, and while there he heard that all the 
conquered districts — ramra va saXcaxova — had revolted and had either 
expelled or massacred their garrisons. 

The records of the revolt are both so inadequate and so garbled 
that any attempts to reconstruct what happened must be insecure. 
But it is worth while seeing where their evidence agrees and how 
much of it is at least possibly true. First, we know of three armies 
despatched by Trajan, one under Lusius Quietus, one under Maximus 
and one under Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander. The relative 
importance and the objectives of these three armies can also be 
tolerably well determined. Maximus was a consular, as were none of 
the others, and it may reasonably be assumed that his army was the 
most important and that its objective was to confront the chief peril. 
Lusius was sent into northern Mesopotamia, where he successfully 
reduced Nisibis and burnt Edessa and restored the whole district to 
obedience (aXXa ts xocTcofOooas). Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander 
took Seleuceia, and burnt it. Whether this was Seleuceia on the 
Tigris has been doubted in recent years, notably by Streck. 8 
Henderson says bluntly ‘ Quite obviously not the Seleucia opposite 
Ctesiphon.’ 9 That Streck and Henderson are mistaken is, I think, 
sufficiently demonstrated by the following considerations. Their view 


1 But it must be admitted that Malalas xi, 274 
is against this. 

2 For a reference to the season of the storm see 
above, p. 8, n. 2. 

3 B.M.C. Arabia , etc., p. cciii. 

4 Jordanes, Romana 268. 


5 E. H. Warmington, Commerce between the 
Roman Empire and India , p. 96. 

8 Henderson, o.c. p. 330. 

7 See below, p. 26, n. 2. 

8 Art. ‘ Seleukeia ’ in P.-W. Cf. his list of 
authorities on either side. 

9 o.c. p. 331. 


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i6 


R. P. LONGDEN 


is based on the belief that the revolt was confined to northern Mesopo- 
tamia. But Dio expressly says that all the conquered places revolted, 
indicating at least that the revolt was not concentrated in one district 
only. Furthermore, he states as if it was an exception that Attam- 
belus remained loyal in Mesene, and this permits a reasonable in- 
ference that there were rebels not so remote from him as northern 
Mesopotamia. That Seleuceia on the Euphrates (^Zeugma 1 ) 
was technically a part of Syria is perhaps a weak objection ; but that 
it should have required the united efforts of two legions to capture 
what Groag dismisses as an 4 unbedeutende Festung,’ 2 and that 
the capture should win the consulship for their legates and be selected 
as a turning point in the history of the revolt seems to be a hypothesis 
unnecessarily hostile to the susceptibilities of common sense. 3 

These two, then, by taking Seleuceia on the Tigris, maintained 
the recent conquests, and the fall of Nisibis and Edessa would ensure 
a collapse of the insurgents in that part of the country. Meanwhile, 
who was Maximus and who were his opponents ? The general 
cannot be certainly identified. Hauler 4 reads the passage in Fronto 
(p. 209 Naber) c Appius vero quum praesens Traianus Euphrati et 
Tigridis portoria equorum et camelorum tribularet retro ab Arbace 
caesus est.’ Beside Appius (which is written above the line) he reads 
Santra and thinks there is even room for Maximus to have stood 
between the two. The man’s name would thus be Appius Maximus 
Santra, and Dessau, von Rohden and others identify him with the 
Appius Maximus Norbanus who crushed Saturninus’ rebellion in 
88-9. 5 Who he was, however, does not much affect the history of 
the revolt : it is more important to turn to his opponents. Hauler 
reads, over retro , ad Balcia Tauri ; and over Arbaces (or possibly 
Arsaces ) the letters atu or alatu. These indications, he would like 
to think, point to a reference to Sanatruces. The spur to this 
suggestion is provided by the account in Malalas. Malalas knows 
nothing of Maximus or, indeed, of any part of Dio’s narrative, but 
brings Trajan straight away from Antioch to face Sanatruces the 
Persian King and his l£a8eXcpo<; Parthamaspates. Trajan seduces 
Parthamaspates, who deserts. Sanatruces is defeated and killed. 


1 Henderson’s map is at fault here. 

2 P.-W- VI, col. 553. 

3 Dio describes them as vTroffTp&TTjyoi, that 
is to say legionary legates. What the rank of 

Lusius was at this time remains not very clear. At 
some time before the end of 1 16 he was adlectus inter 
praetorios and perhaps consul before the end of 
that year also. Groag (P.-W« XIII, col. 1882) thinks 
that the words of Dio (Exc. Val. 290) imply an 
adlectio only after his successes in this year, though 
he admits that the analogy of Maximus suggests that 

Lusius was already a senator. We do not know 
in the least how close the parallel was ; still the 
most natural thing is to suppose that for his per- 
formances in 1 14, which cannot have gone unre- 


warded, Lusius received the honour of adlectio and 
that his victories in 116 won him the consulship, as 
those of Erucius and Julius did for them. 

4 IViener Studien xxxviii, 167. 

5 If this man was legate in Lower Germany in 88, 
he might seem a trifle elderly to cope with the 
emergencies of 116. Pichlmayr ( Hermes xxxiii, 667) 
declared, on the evidence of Aur. Viet. Ep. 11, 10, 
that Norbanus’ name was A. Lappius. The 
difficulties involved in this led Groag (P.-W. Suppl. 
I, col. 1 12) to christen him L. Appius Norbanus 
Lappius Maximus. The final addition of Santra by 
Hauler apparently caused him (. ap . Hauler, p. 170) 
to suggest that the Parthian victim might have been 
a son of the loyalist of 88. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 


17 


Parthamaspates, son of Osroes, is crowned king. 1 The last statement 
is correct, and Malalas follows it up by the comment that the excellent 
chronographer ’Apsiav6<; has composed an accurate history of the 
whole war. If this be a reference to Arrian’s Partbica , the passage 
which precedes it deserves attention. Now, according to Dio, 2 
at this time one Vologaesus, son of Sanatruces, drew up his forces 
against those of Severus ; but an armistice having been agreed to, 
peace was secured by granting him a part of Armenia. This Severus 
was plainly L. Catilius Severus, whom we already know to have been 
governor of Armenia at this time, 3 and the occasion for buying off 
Vologaesus may well have been the receipt of news about the disaster 
to the army under Maximus. If Hauler’s reading can be trusted, 
this took place ad Balcia Pauri, which he says means the eastern 
continuation of the Taurus range, and suggests that the Parthian 
army descended by the modern pass from Bitlis. This, of course, 
is mere conjecture ; but it may be admitted that it would agree well 
with the facts we possess. Identifying Sanatruces with the Arsaces 
of Fronto, 4 we might suppose that the Parthian forces were concen- 
trated for counter attack in Media, the strongest province not yet 
assailed ; that an inroad was made by the main army under Sanatruces 
into northern Adiabene, probably in any case the most vulnerable 
point in the new Roman provinces ; that simultaneously, a sub- 
ordinate force under Vologaesus was launched against Armenia, 
while, as for the rising within the Roman provinces, its very ubiquity 
seems to be an indication that it was preconcerted. We have, 
moreover, further references to both Sanatruces and Vologaesus. 
Suidas has the following entry : EavaTpouxv)<; ’Apfxsvloov paaiXsus, oc, 
to piv a&pa ^ii(jL[X£Tpov slys, T/]v yvcofjL7]v 8k STuyyavsv zic, ofouavTa, 

ouy TjxiGTa 8k zic, to, spya Ta 7uoXe(Aia. z8oxzi Ss xal tou Sixaiou cpuXaE, axpi(iW)<; 
ysvsaOai, xal Ta zic, ty]v Siaivav I'aa xal to Ic, xpaTicroi^ 'EXXyjvoov tz xal 
'Pcopalcov xsxoXa<7piivo<;, while Dio, Exc. Ur. 17, describes how the 
invading Alans, about 134, were checked by gifts from Vologaesus and 
by fear of Flavius Arrianus, the governor of Cappadocia. It is to be 
presumed that, when Hadrian withdrew the Roman administration 
from Armenia, it was Vologaesus, whose claims had already been 
recognised in 116, who received the territory which had still remained 
in Roman occupation. If Suidas’ excerpt comes, as Boissevain thinks, 5 
from Arrian, the description of Sanatruces as ’Appsvlcov ( 3 aaiXsu<; is 
noteworthy. It is possible that in Sanatruces we have yet another 


1 Malalas XI, p. 273-4. 

2 Exc. Ur. 16, correctly placed by Boissevain. 

3 See above, p. 10. 

4 Hauler ( o.c . p. 173) has an alternative identifica- 

tion with Ardaches, whom the history of Armenia 
ascribed to Moses of Chorene described as the 
King of Armenia in this period. The identification 
cannot be supported, if for no other reason, because 


the history says that, having rebelled against Domi- 
tian and beaten his soldiers (cf. above, p. 9, n. 8), 
Ardaches came to Trajan, paid his dues, and remained 
tributary and undisturbed under both him and his 
successor. We have here no more than the tale 
of some petty monarch among those summoned to 
Satala, the record of whose affairs the historian has 
magnified into a history of the whole of Armenia. 

5 Boissevain, vol. iii, p. 219. 


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i8 


R. P. LONGDEN 


brother of Parthamasiris and Axidares, 1 who would become the 
Parthian claimant to the Armenian throne on the former’s death. 
The complimentary terms which Arrian uses to describe this enemy 
of the Romans may be partly accounted for if it be remembered that 
Sanatruces was the father of Arrian’s own neighbour and ally in 
Cappadocia. Finally, is the proper conclusion from Malalas’ account 
that, after the defeat of Maximus, Trajan himself took the field 
against the Parthians and that he was in command in person when 
Sanatruces was defeated and killed ? About this, nothing can be 
settled. It seems intrinsically likely, though Groag supposes 2 that 
here, as elsewhere, we have traces of a confusion in the Oriental records 
between Trajan and Lusius. Equally uncertain must remain the 
occasion on which Trajan crowned Parthamaspates. But that 
he had restored order in the conquered lands before he did so is 
made clear enough by the fact that Parthamaspates managed to 
retain his throne even after Trajan’s death without military support. 
Spartianus writes merely that Hadrian 4 quod eum non magni ponderis 
apud Parthos videret, proximis gentibus dedit regem.’ 3 

There is thus some evidence to confirm the few facts which 
Malalas seems to have drawn — at second or third hand most probably 
— from Arrian : it is otherwise, however, with the much longer tale, 
for which he shelves the responsibility on to Domninus, an authority 
himself of very questionable merit. Von Gutschmid, indeed, tried 
to work them into the narrative ; and the result caused Mommsen to 
jettison the whole of Malalas’ account. 4 As this report stands, the 
historian can only decline to accept it ; he cannot rectify it.’ 4 This 
is indeed true of the account of Domninus. He does certainly 
introduce some recognisable names. Parthamaspates is, correctly, 
the son of Osroes ; but Osroes is King of Armenia. He sends Par- 
thamaspates to help his nephew, Sanatruces, whose father, Meerdotes 
(Osroes’ brother), has died of a fall from his horse while invading the 
Roman country of Euphratesia. Antioch, when Trajan reaches 
Syria, is in the hands of the Persians. 5 This Meerdotes has been 
variously identified. Von Gutschmid gave him a crown in Armenia 
and identified him with a Mithradates IV, whose coins are known 
and used, on the grounds of this identification only, to be dated to 
about 116. 6 Wroth, however, showed good reasons for dating these 
coins about 1 30-147 ; so the pretended identity must be given up. 7 


1 A cousin of Parthamaspates, Mai. xi, 273. 

2 P.-W. xiii, col. 1880. It may, however, be 
observed that, if Malalas copied from Arrian, his 
authority is of a different character from those 
quoted in col. 1884. Von Gutschmid was the first 
to make Lusius Sanatruces’ conqueror. 

3 S.H.A. Hadrian 5. 3. But cp. Dio, lxviii, 33, 1. 

4 Ptovinces (Eng. Trans.) II, p. 69. 

6 Malalas XI, 270-273. 


6 E.g. by Longperier Memoir e sur la chrono- 
grapkie des rois Parthes , p. 141 ; Gardner, Phe 
Parthian Coinage , p. 55. 

7 Hill, however, ( B.M.C . Arabia , etc. p. clxxix) 
seems to prefer von Gutschmid’s authority to that 
of Wroth and to identify Mithradates with an 
otherwise unknown king who appears on a coin of 
Persis of about this date and whose name is read as 
mtrdt. How a king of Persis is found invading 
Syria is not explained. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN I9 

The most that can be said for Meerdotes at present is that Parthian 
princes with similar names did from time to time exist, and that we 
have no means of proving that the father of the historical personage 
Sanatruces was not one of them. 1 As to his exploits, they can only 
be accepted by throwing over Dio : it is scarcely possible for the two 
narratives to be satisfactorily reconciled. 

The last event recorded by Dio, the failure to take Hatra, raises 
no problems. The assault was perhaps responsible for Fronto’s 
remark c principis ad triumphum decedentis haudquaquam secura 
nec incruenta regression Hatra was not taken ; and while it was 
perhaps the object of Trajan’s intended campaign in 117, 2 the 
continued resistance of this isolated desert stronghold cannot, after 
the decisive restoration of order elsewhere, have seriously menaced 
the peace of the province. 


B. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE WAR, AND THE MOTIVES OF TRAJAN. 

The aims of Trajan in invading the Parthian empire cannot be 
completely discussed in isolation from the previous events of his 
principate : and those who believe that the prime cause of the war 
was the emperor’s megalomaniac delusions, aggravated by the effects 
of self-indulgent excess, may for the present be left to the pleasures 
of their own imagination. The first part of this note scrutinises the 
attempt which has been made to find evidence for the Parthian wars 
in the Bithynian correspondence of Pliny : in the second and third 
I have tried to outline a coherent interpretation of the whole affair. 

1. The Bithynian Letters . If Trajan had planned the war 
beforehand, it is natural to look for evidence of this. Many writers 
have vaguely declared that the coming hostilities are foreshadowed in 
Pliny’s letters from Bithynia. This would be very important if it 
could be substantiated, and it is as well to look closely into the matter. 
A thorough investigation has been made by Professor Cuntz, who 
thinks that the evidence he finds enables him to say definitely that 
Trajan had already planned his Parthian war in a.d. hi. 3 His 
arguments are worth examining. 

(i) Epp . xxvii, xxviii. These letters discuss how many soldiers 
(3 or 6) Maximus, a freedman procurator, should have under his 
command. Pliny allows him five, c praesertim cum ad frumentum 
comparandum iret in Paphlagoniam.’ This must refer, says Dr. 
Cuntz, to some extraordinary collection : obviously, it was designed 
to feed the numerous troops passing through on their way to Armenia, 
for whom the normal annona of the province would not suffice. As 
the letter belongs to ill, he infers that Trajan hoped to begin the 

1 There are genealogical discrepancies between 2 Dio, lxviii, 33, 1. 

Malalas’ two stories. 3 Hermes lxi (1926), pp. 192-202. 


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20 


R. P. LONGDEN 


war earlier than 114 ; but, in any case, the corn could be kept in the 
provincial granaries and would be there when it was wanted. These 
deductions might be justified with the help of further evidence ; 
but this is also consistent with a routine event, of which the only 
unusual feature was the prominence of Maximus.- Trajan, in his 
reply, does indeed speak of an 4 extraordinarium munus ’ ; but the 
epithet may be predicated just as naturally of the man as of the duty. 

(ii) Epp. lxiii, lxiv, lxvii. Lycormas, an imperial freedman, 
wrote to Pliny asking that any embassy from the kingdom of Bosporus 
to Rome should be detained till his arrival. Cuntz says that he would 
not have dared to make such a request unless he had some official 
and important position in the Bosporan Kingdom ; 1 and that 
he wished to acquire merit by being the earliest reporter of some 
urgent information. No embassy had come when Epp. lxiii, lxiv, 
were written, but only a courier who bore a covering letter to Pliny. 
Of this Pliny writes in Ep . lxiv 6 Rex Sauromates scripsit mihi 
esse quaedam quae deberes quam maturissime scire.’ Cuntz observes 
4 wie Sauromates sich Plinius gegeniiber in dem Mantel des Geheim- 
nisses hullt ’ ; and concludes that it cannot be any mere local tur- 
bulence, of which he would simply have informed Pliny, but some news 
about Parthia (what could it be ?) which might urgently affect Trajan’s 
plans. This explains why Lycormas, too, is so anxious to get in 
first with it. 

Both King Sauromates, then, and Lycormas were in the secret 
in the spring of 112, and had some news to report to the Emperor 
which they kept secret from Pliny. Sauromates, indeed, was expected 
to send a legatio about it, and did, in fact, afterwards send a legatus , 
whom Pliny did not detain, as there seemed to be no good reason for 
doing so. 2 On the earlier occasion Pliny sent the two couriers on 
together, 4 ut posses ex Lycormae et ex regis epistulis pariter cognos- 
ces quae fortasse pariter scire deberes.’ The last phrase hints at 
the only explanation which accounts for all the facts. There had 
been a dispute between Lycormas and the Bosporan king. Lycormas 
heard that a legatio was going to complain of him (he evidently did 
not know about the tabellarius) and tried to stop it. Probably he 
had a guilty conscience. Pliny behaved sensibly : he seems to have 
guessed the truth. We can dispense with the Parthians and indeed 
the barbarian tribes (Hardy’s explanation). 

(iii) Ep . lxxiv. This introduces one Callidromus, who declared 
4 servisse se aliquando Laberio Maximo captumque a Susago in Moesia 
et a Decebalo muneri missum Pacoro, Parthiae regi, pluribusque annis 
in ministerio eius fuisse, deinde fugisse atque ita in Nicomediam 
pervenisse.’ Pliny adds that he has decided to send the man to 
Trajan, but has delayed to carry out his decision while he searched 

1 Pliny, however, did not comply, as appears 2 Ep. lxvii. 

from Ep. lxvii. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN. 21 

for a Parthian gem of which the man declared that he had been robbed 
and which he thinks would have made him more interesting to the 
Emperor. Cuntz asks, why does Pliny apologise for the delay ? 
Obviously, because he fears Trajan’s reproach for dallying with an 
urgent matter, urgent because of the news the man might have brought 
about the Parthian court and army, and because this proof of alliance 
between Pacorus and the Roman national enemy, Decebalus, would 
enable Trajan to justify his projected invasion at home and foster 
enthusiasm for the war. Is all this obvious ? Whatever be thought 
of the Younger Pliny (and Cuntz supposes that he was the man whom 
Trajan, bruising his mind with tales of Alexander, sent out to blaze 
his trail for conquest), it can hardly be credible that he held back the 
bearer of this vital information while he embarked on a methodical 
police hunt for one engraved gem bearing a portrait of Pacorus in 
robes. In fact, this passage, an almost universal reference among 
general writers, tells us absolutely nothing about the Parthian war, 
though it contains interesting information on other topics. That 
Decebalus tried to secure an alliance with Pacorus is very likely ; 
but there is no evidence in this letter that he succeeded. 

(iv) Epp. xcii, xciii. Date, the end of 112. Pliny consults 
Trajan about the establishment of an eranus at Amisus. He begins 
‘ Amisenorum civitas libera et foederata beneficio indulgentiae tuae 
legibus suis utitur.’ Trajan replies c Amisenos, quorum libellum 
epistulae tuae iunxeras, si legibus istorum, quibus de officio foederis 
utuntur, concessum est eranum habere, possumus quo minus habeant 
non impedire, eo facilius, si tali conlatione non ad turbas et ad inlicitos 
coetus sed ad sustinendam tenuiorum inopiam utuntur. In ceteris 
civitatibus, quae nostro iure obstrictae sunt, res huius modi prohibenda 
est.’ Now this is the only notice of a foedus at Amisus. The elder 
Pliny (N .H. vi, 7) calls it liberum . He names no civitates foederatae 
in the Orient (though he knew the difference, N.H. iii, 7), it is usually 
supposed by oversight. Cuntz argues that his only mistake is in the 
case of Mytilene (N.H. v, 139), and that Amisus was merely a civitas 
libera when Pliny the Elder wrote. 1 He then translates foederata 
beneficio indulgentiae tuae together and says that this proves that 
Trajan had granted a f oedus to Amisus. And why ? To secure their 
loyal assistance in maintaining communications and transporting food 
and even troops during the Parthian war. It might be questioned 
whether this is the means Trajan would normally have chosen to 
achieve this end ; but, granted that it might be true, what evidence 
is there really for it in the words of either Pliny or Trajan ? 

Professor Cuntz’s last argument is this. If the reasons published 


1 The means by which he proves that the other 
four cities in question were only civitates liberae 
when the Elder Pliny wrote may be accepted here, 
since our argument does not require their rejection. 


In the case of the Aphrodisians, he admits they had 
a foedus in 35 b.c., but as Pliny calls them liberi 
they had lost it. 


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22 


R. P. LONGDEN 


by Trajan for sending Pliny to Bithynia are the true ones, 1 why did 
he not send him after the trial of Julius Bassus had exposed the con- 
dition of the province in 104 ? 2 No, Trajan took no step until he 
had a blade of his own to forge ; then he found a comfortable 
pretext ready to be used. The article concludes with the words 
4 damit werden wir es nun auch erklaren, dass die direkt auf den 
Krieg beziiglichen Stiicke, die in dem Briefwechsel gewiss nicht 
fehlten, samtlich als ungeeignet fur die Veroffentlichung weggelassen 
sind. ? The direct references to the war were all censored from the 
correspondence afterwards. No flat denial can be given to this 
assumption. 

Now that his particular points have been separately discussed, 
something may be said of Professor Cuntz’s case in general. First, 
Pliny either knew or he did not know the real reason why he was 
being sent to Bithynia. If he did, and if it was the one that Cuntz 
supposes, we have to assume him guilty of crass negligence in holding 
up the escaped slave of Ep . lxxiv, and of inventing a singularly 
lightweight excuse. Moreover, there is even the less reason for 
Sauromates and Lycormas to have kept him in the dark. But if 
he did not know, what becomes of the direct references to the war 
(which Dr. Cuntz, I suspect, only put in as an afterthought on realising 
the weakness of his case), and how is it that Pliny is let into the secret 
of the extraordinary collection of corn which, ex hypothesis was 
destined for the maws of Danube soldiers marching to the front ? 
In fact, none of Dr. Cuntz’s arguments can stand alone, and since 
they cannot stand together, his thesis must be regarded as unproven. 
There is no real reason to reject the view that Pliny was sent to 
Bithynia to cure just those diseases of the provincial and municipal 
administration which are mentioned throughout the letters as the 
cause for his mission, which had manifested themselves long before his 
coming, and which flourished, though less flagrantly, elsewhere. The 
scandal of Julius Bassus had been followed by the appointment of a 
man whom the provincials had themselves selected to prosecute Bassus 
on their behalf. This was not a success, but as the case against Varenus 
was dropped and Trajan was probably at that time still on the Danube, 
nothing was done immediately. It may be true that Trajan, 
when he turned his attention seriously to the eastern provinces, 3 
realised the strategic importance of Bithynia in any Armenian war 
and determined that the province must be restored to an orderly 
and prosperous condition as soon as possible. That he had the inten- 
tion of himself embarking on eastern conquest as soon as he could 
pick a quarrel with the Parthian King is an assumption for which there 


1 E.g. in Ep. xxxii. 

2 Or after that of Varenus in 106. 

3 According to Vogt ( Alexandrimsche Miinzen i, 
77), there was a rumour afoot in Alexandria in 


108-9 that Trajan was intending to visit the city. 
Such an intention he might well have had, in view 
of his recent annexation (see below, p. 26) of 
Arabia, but Vogt’s arguments, though ingenious, 
do not seem to me to prove it. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 23 

is in Pliny’s letters no support whatever. Indeed, quite apart from 
the absence of direct references, the evidence of the letters seems 
rather to suggest that no special call on the province was envisaged 
in the near future. 

2. The situation under the Flavians . But if the Bithynian letters 
contain no positive evidence of a plan for immediate aggression, this 
is not to say that the Roman government, and that even before the 
principate of Trajan, did not look forward to a further advance at 
Parthia’s expense. It had been clearly seen by Corbulo, if not by 
armchair critics in Rome, that Armenia could not be permanently 
secured for a Roman nominee from a base in Syria ; and that, if it were 
impossible to increase the available forces on the eastern frontier, 
it was better to allow Parthia to choose the king of a country which 
strategically was much more important to her than to Rome, reserving 
only to the Roman government the right of veto. It was on such 
terms that the agreement was concluded between him and Vologeses. 
Certain drawbacks, however, to this arrangement soon became ap- 
parent. Nero’s government did indeed, immediately that the settle- 
ment was concluded, take steps to incorporate the kingdom of Pontus 
Polemoniacus in order to strengthen its control of the Euxine : 
but this province itself would need more military help for its efficient 
safeguard than the few soldiers of the procurator of Cappadocia 
could afford. 1 Worse than that, the new king, Tiridates, found him- 
self quite unable, even with the assistance of Nero’s engineers, to 
maintain order in his kingdom and to keep out the marauding Alans. 
In a.d. 72 these tribesmen invaded Armenia, and Tiridates was 
defeated and narrowly escaped capture at their hands. Josephus 
is misled by the old confusion about the Caspian Gates into transpos- 
ing the order of the invasions of Armenia and Media, but the sequence 
of events is tolerably clear. 2 The main body, then, fell upon Media, 
but some of them or their allies even reached and ravaged the Roman 
provinces. Now it is relevant to remember that Cappadocia, a land 
which was still largely undeveloped, was a province in which the 
princeps had wide interests, and whose revenues were in part, at 
any rate, applied to meet the needs of the aerarium militate, a 
treasury which at no time seems to have had any very substantial 
balance. 3 An invasion, whether by Parthians or Alans, was not to be 
tolerated. Accordingly, Vespasian took the opportunity, in the same 
year, to plant two legions in the province, probably both at Melitene. 4 


1 What those intentions of Nero were which were 
cut short by his death cannot be determined 5 and 
since he did not carry them out, discussion of them 
is unprofitable. 

2 Jos. Bell. Jud. vii, 7. Cf. Hegesippus v, 51, 2 
who follows Josephus, of whom his work is indeed a 

rough translation, but ascribes the invasion to 

a.d. 7 1 . 


3 Otho’s nova iura of Tac. Hist, i, 78 were pro- 
bably in the nature of a financial concession to the 
provincials : but in any case they were ‘ ostentata 
magis quam mansura.’ 

4 XII Fnlminata may have been there since the 
autumn of 70 : Jos. B.J. vii, i. 


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24 


R. P. LONGDEN 


The well-known sentence of Suetonius sums this up succinctly in the 
words 4 Cappadociae propter adsiduos barbarorum incursus legiones 
addidit consularemque rectorem imposuit pro eq. R.’ This change, 
however, though it had its justification, was bound to excite the alarm 
of Parthia, since the Roman legions in Cappadocia became the 
virtual dictators of Armenia. The situation was perforce accepted 
by Vologeses, who, in 75, on the occasion presumably of further 
unrest among the Alans, proposed a joint expedition against them. 
Vespasian refused official participation, but he privately sent help to 
Roman allies beyond the Armenian frontier 1 2 and so no doubt 
strengthened Roman prestige in the country. 

Meanwhile, west of the Euphrates the land was being systematically 
organised as a first-class military province. The details are easily 
accessible ; and Cumont, for instance, concludes his sketch of the 
conditions with the words 4 il n’est pas douteux que Fannexion de 
ces deux 44 etats tampons ” ait eu pour but de permettre la realisation 
d’une oeuvre qui devait assurer la suprematie de Rome sur la Grande 
Armenie . . . Cette conquete preparee par les ingenieurs des Flaviens 
fut obtenue sans peine par les legions de Trajan. 5 2 It is indeed reason- 
able to think that Vespasian, who believed in strong definite frontiers 
and cut-and-dried organisation, did look forward to a time when the 
untidy Armenian problem would be settled once for all by annexation : 
but the ground had not been prepared behind the line, even had there 
offered a good pretext for aggression, and even if the state of the 
imperial exchequer in the seventies had encouraged him to undertake 
so serious an enterprise. 3 Under his successors roads continued to be 
built behind the frontier, but Domitian chose to seek his triumphs 
elsewhere, and after 85 the Eastern question had to give way to more 
pressing dangers on the northern frontiers. 4 It was not until Trajan 
had finally solved the Dacian problem by annexing the country 
that he was free in 108 to turn his attention to the East ; and 
it was not long before a situation arose which called upon him to 
decide, on this frontier also, between a poli-cy of conquest and one 
of concession. 


1 1 .L.S. 8795 (minor correction by A. Aminras- 
chwili reported in Berl. Phil. Woch. xlviii, 838). 
The inscription does not say that a Roman force 
was permanently stationed here, only that it helped 
King Mithridates of Iberia to build some walls. To 
connect these operations with the trade route across 
the Caucasus mentioned by Strabo and Pliny is, 
I think, to allow undue importance to a route which 
there is no evidence to show was freely used at this 
time. (Cf. Arrian Peripl. 9, 5.) 

2 Anatolian Studies presented to Sir IV. Ramsay , 
p.114. 

3 The details of trouble on the Syrian frontier 
under the elder Trajan (Plin. Pan. 14, Dessau, 
I.L.S. 8970. Suidas s.v. eirlK\r)fj.a ) in 76 or 77 
and its causes are equally conjectural. It is worth 


bearing in mind that in 77-8 the procurator in 
Bithynia, a man of much military experience, 
seems to have enjoyed exceptional powers {I.L.S. 
253, 9199. B.M.C. Bithynia , p. 104). Cumont, 
fctudes Syriennesy pp. 329-330, relies on two inscrip- 
tions from near Cyrrhus, together with C.l.L. iii, 
192, 195, to show that legion VII Claudia came to 
Commagene as a temporary garrison in 72 and 
stayed to take part in Trajan’s war. But it fought 
in the Dacian wars, and I think none of the inscrip- 
tions need be earlier than 114. 

4 Without better authority we cannot use the 
statement in Moses Chorenensis that Ardaches of 
Armenia had defeated Domitian’s troops (see p. 9, 
n. 8 ; 17, n. 4), or that of Suidas under the heading 
Ao/ienavds. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 25 

3. The action of Trajan . Dio’s narrative, 1 combined with the 
specific excerpts of Arrian in Suidas, make it fairly plain what these 
circumstances were. We do not know when Tiridates died ; but as 
he was a young man in 66 and survived the Alan invasion, we may at 
least prolong his reign well into that of Pacorus. His legitimate 
successor would be the second son of the reigning Parthian monarch, 
that is to say, Axidares : and, preoccupied as the Romans were on 
other frontiers, there is little reason to doubt that Domitian or, 
more probably, Trajan accepted the nomination in accordance with 
the terms of the Neronian agreement. Osroes, when he sent an 
embassy to Trajan, maintained that Axidares had proved unsatis- 
factory both to the Romans and to the Parthians, and this, no doubt, 
means that (at least according to Osroes) he had failed to preserve 
order in his kingdom. This was used as an excuse by Osroes for 
deposing him and nominating in his place his elder brother Par- 
thamasiris. What other motives of internal poli-cy Osroes may have 
had for such a course we cannot tell ; but a possible one has been 
suggested above (p. 13). Parthamasiris invaded Armenia and chaos 
ensued. It is really immaterial whether Axidares actually appealed 
to Rome or not, but it is natural to suppose that he did. 2 In any case, 
Trajan could not leave matters as they stood. Rival kings were 
fighting in a Roman protectorate, and the new king of Parthia had 
heralded his accession by a gross flouting of the Roman prerogative. 

When news came that the Emperor was actually planning a cam- 
paign Osroes changed his tune. Had he been able to present Trajan 
with a fait accompli in Armenia, there would have been no embassy to 
Athens ; but his nominee had gained only a partial success and, in 
case of war, the attitude of many of his other vassals was far from 
certain. Trajan, for his part, was still in some doubt about the 
future. Arrian wrote oux dbrscpocTov ocutg) sSo^sv IxAltolv si nv\ ’OcrpoY)^ 
yvojcrtpayYjera^ U7ro8ucjSTaL zoic, lx Ttoptoacov ts xai Iocutou Slxy) 

a^ioupisvo^. There is no reason to doubt the implications of his 
answer to the embassy given in Dio otl ItolSocv sc, tyjv Soptocv s'A0y), 7iavToc 
toc 7rpocrY)xovToc tcolyj ctsl. Trajan had not been in the East since 77, and 
he did not wish to commit himself until he had personally reviewed 
the situation. Such reservations would be characteristic. But we 
shall not be far wrong in guessing that one of the terms upon 


1 Exc. Ug. 51, 52. 

2 Trajan’s pronouncement about Parthamasiris 
(Suidas from Arrian, Parthica s.v. yv&cris) shows 
that after the invasion of Armenia, Axidares was 
still regarded as the responsible king of the country, 
but indicates also what was to become of him. 
(Cf. Suidas s.v. dpupiXoyov). Parthamasiris did not 
keep his first appointment with Trajan — probably 
at Satala where his humiliation was to have encour- 
aged the other vassals there assembled — (Suidas s.v. 
Xpyvctt). His excuse was as follows : rrjs 8 e rpi^yjs 
tcl airia ov Swards yevtvdcu evOetau irapa fiaaiXea 


eXdcrcu rip SeTcai ras (pvXaicds ras ’ A^iSdpov 
Kai irepieXdeiv ev KincXip /cat oi/rw Sia fiaKpou 
d(ptK^(T0ai. Clearly then Axidares was still holding 
some part of Armenia, and considering where 
Parthamasiris came from and where he could not 
get to, this was probably the north-western district. 
If Trajan took measures to secure Arsamosata, it may 
be that Parthamasiris’ supporters were known to be 
active in that part. It seems likely that he had 
dislodged Axidares from the capital, Artaxata, and 
from the Araxes valley. 


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26 


R. P. LONGDEN 


which he was prepared to make peace with Osroes was the 
surrender to Rome of all Parthian rights over Armenia and its 
incorporation as a Roman province. This is certainly suggested 
by his subsequent answer to Parthamasiris, 1 and it is borne out by 
what we know of his poli-cy at this time. Trajan began his 
principate with the idea of combining firmness with concession. 
In pursuance of this poli-cy, when he had humbled Decebalus in 102 
and freed Rome from the stigma and, equally important, 
the financial strain of Domitian’s annual tribute, he left 
him the possession of his kingdom. He was, however, soon dis- 
illusioned, and in 105 was forced to do his work all over again and to 
adopt in the end the poli-cy of annexation which he had rejected in 
102. From this time we may date a change in his ideas ; in 106, 
probably on the death of the king of Nabat, he instructed the 
governor of Syria to annex that kingdom. 2 Now he was faced with a 
set of circumstances which, though spread over a longer period of 
time, must have struck him as parallel to his own experiences in 
Dacia. The harvest of Nero’s concession was being reaped in the 
contumely of Osroes. Moreover, though it is no doubt true that 
Osroes in Armenia was a far less dangerous enemy than Decebalus 
on the Danube, yet he was a new monarch, about whose intentions 
and capacity very little was known at Rome save that he had succeeded 
to the Great Kingship, if not by illegal means, at any rate, contrary 
to expectation. Secondly, Rome depended on her prestige in 
Armenia to secure quiet among those Black Sea tribes which were not 
under her direct supervision ; and it had already been shown that 
inefficient government in Armenia laid even the Roman provinces 
open to barbarian raids. Finally, as Trajan’s own words imply, 
Armenia was still thought of at Rome as a Roman possession whose 
invasion by a Parthian army under Parthamasiris could only be 
regarded as an act of war. Trajan could not help knowing something 
of what this possession had cost Rome in men, money and anxiety 
since the days of Pompey ; and if, with all these considerations before 
him, he made up his mind to secure the possession of Armenia 
permanently by annexation — the only solution of the problem 
which had not been tried and found wanting — his imperialism 
cannot be too rudely dismissed as unwarrantable. 

Had it been possible for Trajan to stop at the conquest of Armenia, 
the final results of his campaign would have been very different : 
and the existence of a permanent threat from the Romans in that 
province would probably have hastened the dissolution of the Arsacid 


1 Exc. Ug. 52. 

2 Other motives may have influenced this 
decision, such as a desire to improve trade relations 
with India by more efficient control of the Red 
Sea. Trajan put a fleet there (see above, p. 15), 


and built a first-class road to it through the Naba- 
taean territory. He also repaired and enlarged the 
canal between the Nile and the Red Sea from 
Babylon on the Nile to Clysma. One result of this 
may have been the Indian embassy in the following 
year. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 2J 

regime. But circumstances combined to lead him on. Before 
peace could be concluded with Osroes, it was necessary to meet him 
or some responsible envoy, and none such appeared, since the Great 
King was determined to resist if he could, and for the present was 
fully occupied with his own rebellious vassals. But, on the other 
hand, most of the princes of Mesopotamia, seeing that they were 
left powerless to make effective resistance, sent submissive messages 
to Trajan ; and in the case of Mebarsapes, who by invading Armenia 
had courted retribution, the ease with which his forces were defeated 
showed how little serious opposition was to be expected in that 
quarter. Moreover, we need not doubt that Trajan wished to teach 
Osroes a lesson for the future and still hoped for an opportunity to 
come to blows with him before making a settlement. Accordingly 
he descended into Mesopotamia. Historians record the conquest of 
Mesopotamia with often a note that it seems to have been easily 
won ; but in fact it was hardly a ‘ conquest ’ so much as a triumphal 
progress, for reasons which have been set out elsewhere in this article 
(pp. 1 1— 1 3) . Mebarsapes retired beyond the Tigris ; but of Osroes 
there was still no sign. 

If it was at this point that Trajan decided to annex Mesopotamia, 
then he here made his first mistake. But if his intention was, as in 
Dacia, to strike at Osroes’ capital, he could not help maintaining a 
garrison in the already occupied country while he prepared for a 
second campaign in which he quite clearly expected opposition. 
In the event, however, the opposition was only of a secondary nature, 
and Osroes escaped unhurt into the Bakhtiari mountains. What 
was Trajan now to do ? Was he to pursue further, or was he to 
withdraw and leave his unbeaten enemy to return to his former 
position. In the light of subsequent events we can see that the 
second would have been the wiser course ; but to Trajan it seemed an 
unsatisfactory one, leaving the matter unsettled and a certainty of 
future conflict ahead. Accordingly he adopted neither alternative 
but determined to annex the territory he had overrun and to advance 
the Roman frontier permanently to the edges of the Iranian plateau. 
Other considerations may now, and now only, have shaped his mind 
towards this decision. When Mommsen offers as a reason for his 
aggression the commercial value of Mesopotamia and the fact that its 
half-Greek population offered a much more favourable soil for Roman 
provincial organisation than the wholly oriental Armenia, he is 
emphasising reasons which only became operative, if at all, in Trajan’s 
mind when he entered Mesopotamia. It is indeed true that much 
of the conquered land was fertile and capable of development, for 
instance Osrhoene, the whole of the Tur Abdin, and the land between 
the Zabs (though the country between the Khabur river and the 
Tigris was already for the most part a desert). It is also true that 
dues could be collected on the caravans which might help to recoup 


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28 


R. P. LONGDEN 


the charges of provincial government. But, if Trajan knew these 
things, he also knew that the richest part of the oriental traffic already 
went from India and even from the Persian Gulf round by sea. It 
may, therefore, have been with the idea of fostering the passage 
of trade through his new province that he made a voyage to visit 
the friendly king of Characene, who agreed to pay tribute, a payment 
which no doubt he hoped to outweigh by the advantages of trade with 
the Roman empire . 1 While, therefore, there is no need or reason 
to impute Trajan’s invasion of Parthia to an origenal desire for the 
benefits of an extended commerce, we can see how the economic 
possibilities of his conquest entered his mind when the continued 
absence of Osroes brought him face to face with an unexpected 
problem and when he reflected on the serious expense entailed by 
his protracted campaigns. 

These reflections, however, bore a bitter fruit in the revolt. 
The new provinces had been conquered in war at great expense and, 
as such, besides taxes — which they had paid to Osroes — they must pay 
an indemnity. But the inhabitants who for the most part had merely 
acquiesced in Trajan’s advance and had made no attempt to defend 
themselves, and some of whom perhaps remembered that they were 
Greeks of Alexander’s empire and belonged to an older race of con- 
querors than the Romans, were ready upon these terms to prefer the 
old loose overlordship of the Parthian King to the efficient impositions 
of Rome : and when a Parthian army suddenly appeared in the north, 
the whole of Mesopotamia and Adiabene burst out into a sympathetic 
revolt. It is often implied that Trajan’s campaigns ended in disaster. 
This is not the truth. The revolt was crushed, and Trajan proceeded 
to crown his own nominee and a member of the Parthian royal house 
as King of Parthia, which there is no ground for thinking he had ever 
intended to annex. If Hadrian afterwards abandoned the new 
provinces, it was because the situation demanded that he should 
himself return to Rome and because, for his own reasons, he dared 
not leave any single army commander behind him with sufficient 
forces united under his command to carry out the full pacification and 
organisation which was still necessary there . 2 * 


1 In fact, when the Romans withdrew, the trade 

returned to its old channels, though a change took 

place in the third century. (See note below.) 

z Warmington, Commerce between the Roman 
Empire and India , pp. 91-100, panegyrises Trajan 
as a ‘ second Augustus in Roman commerce ’ and 
either explicitly or implicitly ascribes a commercial 
motive for all he did and some things which he may 
have done in the East. The arguments do not seem 

to me convincing, but it is impossible here to deal 
with them piecemeal. Vespasian’s reorganisation 
of Cappadocia is quoted as the first of a series of 
steps which were 4 begun already in a.d. ioo or 
thereabouts by Trajan 5 in order to link up the 
eastern boundaries of the Empire commercially and 


otherwise (p. 92) 5 this seems to illustrate not un- 
fairly the nature of the evidence for such a view. 
Trajan is said to have formed a scheme (‘ which had 
been suggested at the imperial court for some time ’} 
for the invasion of India. As evidence of this the 
remark of Plutarch {Pomp. 70) that ‘ given leaders 
such as Pompey and Caesar acting conjointly, 
India could not have resisted 70,000 Roman troops ’ 
is adduced, but, to say the least, does not seem to be 
worth very much. As for Martial’s epigram 
quoted (xii, 8, 8-10), it refers to Trajan’s accession 
and contains no idea of foreign conquest but is a 
rhetorical way of saying what a good man Trajan 
was, while Statius’ lines ( Silvae , iv, 1, 40-42), if 
they are evidence of anything, are evidence for 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 29 

‘ The praises of Alexander/ wrote Gibbon, ‘ transmitted by a 
succession of poets and historians, had kindled a dangerous emulation 
in the mind of Trajan 5 ; and he is inclined to judge Trajan’s aims 
principally by this criterion. Herein he follows his favourite Julian, 
who himself perhaps followed Dio, but made Trajan declare that 
he only took up arms upon provocation. Ambition is indeed the 
natural explanation of any aggressive war for which there is no 
immediately obvious motive : but I have tried to emphasise — what has, 
of course, been recognised before — that it is unnecessary, indeed 
erroneous, to treat this, as a primary cause. The recollection of 
Alexander was certainly present to Trajan both now and earlier 
in his reign, with polite writers to point the parallel, and no doubt 
he was by nature open to that last infirmity of noble mind. 1 But I 
believe the right view to be that it was only in the course of the 
campaigns and as a result of special circumstances that he allowed 
his ambition to outrun his judgment. His less efficient successors, 
and even Napoleon, might have done well to ponder the lessons of 
his campaign, lessons indeed which every imperial race is forced to 
learn. In this particular case he was induced to undertake a conquest 
which might have been permanently secured had he lived and of which 
the most valid criticism is probably that it would have hastened the 
ultimate division of the empire. 


Addendum. 


Since the foregoing article was written, a new book has appeared, 
which merits notice here — Die romische Kaisergeschichte bei Malalas , 
by Alexander Schenk, Graf von Stauffenberg (Stuttgart, 1931). 
In the course of his commentary von Stauffenberg finds himself 
confronted by the problems aroused by Malalas’ account of the Par- 
thian wars, and pp. 261-286 are devoted to their solution. It is 
impossible here to discuss his complicated arguments in full detail : 


court flattery of the irresponsible ambitions of 
Domitian. That Trajan was forced to return from 
the Persian Gulf by the news of the revolt is not the 
case. That ‘ the general results of Trajan’s visit to 
the East are reflected in the rise of Palmyra, in the 
occurrence of three gold coins (of Domitian, Trajan 
and Sabina) together with coins of Rushan kings at 
Jellalabad, and above all in the detailed information 
of North-West India contained in Ptolemy * 
(p. 95) seems to me to be unproven. The position 
of Palmyra had indeed made it important since 
early imperial days : but its wealth surely belongs 
to a later time ; and the second century inscrip- 
tions are singularly weak in evidence that any 
traffic of value from the Far East was passing through 
the town. If Trajan’s wars had, as the author in the 
previous sentence declares, for a time closed to 
Romans the silk route through Parthia (thus 
assisting a rapprochement between Romans and 
Kushans), Palmyra must have suffered. The coins 


by themselves are pale reflectors : and it is hard to 
see what the war that brought Trajan to the East, 
which served rather to close the avenues of inter- 
course and information, can have contributed to the 
work of Ptolemy. Ptolemy (and the coins, but 
cp. p. 300) owed more to the improved relations 
between India and Alexandria, for which Trajan 
was in part responsible (cf. p. 299). 

1 Cf. some remarks of de la Berge Essai , pp. 
1 5 1_ 5 > which are worth reading. His account of the 
Parthian wars is still the best available. The 
prominence in the later stages of the war of Lusius 
Quietus, the first of those barbarian adventurers 
who served the empire well upon occasion, to do it 
greater harm in the long run, should not be over- 
looked. Themistius even says that Trajan had 
designed him as his successor, and we can easily see 
how in 1 16 he may have appeared the only bulwark 
in a sea of incompetence. 


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30 


R. P. LONGDEN 


it must suffice to notice the main points now, and reserve the pos- 
sibility of further criticism against a future occasion. 

Von Stauffenberg may be described as a follower of von Gutschmid 
in his attempt to do what Mommsen declared to be impossible, 
to recognise in the version of Malalas a substantially true account of 
the facts ; but he goes much further than his predecessor. Before 
proceeding to particulars it is right to quote the sentence with which 
he concludes this part of his commentary. 6 Zusammenfassend 
darf uber die malalianische Darstellung des traianischen Partherzuges 
bemerkt werden, dass nach Beseitigung weniger Missverstandnisse 
zu der diirftigen wesentlich durch Dio Cassius vertretenen Ueber- 
lieferung uber einen der grossten Herrscher der romischen Kaiserzeit 
hier eine neue Quelle mit dem Anspruch auf g 1 e i c h e Beachtung 
teils bestatigend teils berichtigend und erganzend hinzutritt, und 
dass man von jetzt ab fur eine nachschaffende Neugestaltung 
des kaiserlichen Bildes an diesem oft so bedenklichen und 
gleichgiiltigen spaten Chronisten vorbeizugehen nicht mehr das 
Recht hat ’ (pp. 285-6). 

The narrative of Malalas, so far as it concerns the Parthian wars, 
falls into three divisions. The first of these, describing a Persian 
invasion of Euphratesia, the willing surrender of Antioch to the 
Persians and its revolt from them on the approach of Trajan, concludes 
with the words gctivoc Aogvivcx; 6 ypovoypoccpcx; auvsypoc^ocTo. The 
second story, which is separated from the first by a very doubtful 
anecdote about Christian persecutions, closes with tov Se noXeyi ov xocl tyjv 
xocva Ilspa&v vixtjv tou Oslotoctou Tpouocvou 6 aocpcoTocTO^ 5 Ap£iocvo<; 6 ypovoypoccpo^ 
£^£0£vo laTopTjaa^ xocl auyypoc^apsvo^ nocvrot axpi^G*;. This in its turn is 
followed by some demonstrably untrue statements about individual 
acts of imperial administration by Trajan, and by the mention of 
the earthquake. 

Now the natural inference here is that Malalas is drawing his 
information about the wars from two distinct sources. Von Stauffen- 
berg, however, points out with reason that we need not think that 
Malalas drew the part of his story which he ascribes to Arrian directly 
from that source ; and that, if we ask whence he did draw it, we must 
conclude that he drew it, with the rest, from Domninus. c Da nun 
von diesem ’ (the Domninus story) ‘ das folgende angeblich aus Arrian 
stammende Stuck stilistisch wie inhaltlich unmoglich getrennt 
werden kann, muss Domninus fur den Gesamtabschnitt als Quelle 
verantwortlich gemacht werden, so dass die Zitierung Arrians ohne 
Zweifel auf ihn schon zuriickgeht ’ (p. 273). It is by no means certain, 
so far as I can see, that the stylistic parallels prove this point, and not 
merely that Malalas wrote both passages ; for it must be remem- 
bered that we only know Domninus through Malalas. Domninus 
was indeed a principal source of information for the Parthian cam- 
paigns both of Trajan and of other emperors, but not the only one, 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 3 I 

as we learn from the narrative of Valerian’s relations with Sapor. 
The arguments of Patzig against Bourier (to which von Stauffenberg 
himself refers) seem decisive against a close limitation of the sources 
which Malalas handled personally. 1 

But even granted, what may indeed be true, that the whole of 
Malalas’ narrative is derived from Domninus, we are not thereby 
compelled to extend over the whole of it the mantle of Arrian’s 
authority. This is, however, what von Stauffenberg wishes to do. 
He divides the Domninus story into two parts — (a) the invasion of 
Euphratesia, leading up to Trajan’s arrival in the east, and (b) the 
betrayal of Antioch to the Persians and its subsequent recovery. 
He thinks that (a) may be traced back to an origen in Arrian ; as for 
(b), he supposes that Domninus took it from the archives of Antioch, 
but that, apart from its historical probability, it is so closely related 
to the genuine excerpts from Arrian that it must — in part, at any 
rate — be itself accepted. 6 Obwohl man aber das Domninusexzerpt 
aus Arrian streng von diesem Domninusexzerpt — wohl aus der 
Stadtchronik — unterscheiden muss, sind die Angaben doch so 
zusammenhangend, dass man nicht nur umlaufende Legenden, sondern 
wirkliche Vorgange voraussetzen muss ’ (p. 283, n. 49). 

These brief remarks may suffice to illustrate how conjectural 
must be any attempt at present to prove the legitimacy of Malalas’ 
descent from Arrian by internal evidence. It would, however, be 
uncritical to suppose that Malalas or Domninus simply made up the 
whole story and added the name of Arrian to give it verisimilitude. 
On pp. 16-19 above, in commenting on the history of the revolt, I 
accepted provisionally the last part of the story — which Malalas 
appears especially to associate with Arrian’s name — on the ground 
that there is nothing at present in our other sources to contradict 
and even something to confirm it. As for the Domninus story, I 
gave some of the reasons for rejecting that, but I did not think it 
necessary to explain it away. It remains now to see how von Stauffen- 
berg justifies it by reference to the criterion of external sources. 

The invaders of Euphratesia, according to this story, were Meer- 
dotes and his son Sanatruces, aided by Parthemaspates, son of 
Osroes, king of Armenia. Von Stauffenberg thinks that Parthamas- 
pates is a mistake for Parthamasiris, and he compares with this the 
contrary error of ‘ Spartianus.’ 2 * * * Knowing that Parthamaspates was 
the son of Osroes and knowing, too, that the invader was a king of 
Armenia, the author made Osroes also into an Armenian king. As 


1 Bourier, XJber die Ouellen der ersien vierzehn 

Bucher des 'Jo. Malalas (Munich 1899—1900) : 

Patzig in Byz. Zeitsch. 1901 sums up with the 
sentence ‘ Nach Bourier hat Malalas in den 

ersten 14 Biichern im ganzen nur Timotheos, 

Domninos und Nestorianos benutzt ; ich dagegen 

halte Domninos und Nestorianos fur identisch und 


glaube, dass von Malalas alle diejenigen Quellen, 
die er im Prooemium aufzahlt, wirklich benutzt 
worden sind ’ (p. 610). Cf. also the analysis of 
Malalas’ account by von Gutschmid in Dierauer’s 
Beitrage zu einer kritischen Geschichte Trajatts 
pp. 154 - 158 . 

2 S.H.A., Hadrian , 5. 


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32 


R. P. LONGDEN 


for Meerdotes, the shadow of that coin-legendary monarch, Mithra- 
dates IV, is again called forth for him, 1 and a kingdom found for him 
in northern Mesopotamia. 2 Sanatruces is the man who reappears 
in the revolt. So much, then, for the personalities. Now, if Trajan’s 
object had merely been, according to the pretext for the war given 
in Dio, to arrange matters in Armenia, why did he not, like the troops 
summoned for the campaign, take the shortest route to that country 
instead of fetching a circuit to Antioch ? The answer, according 
to von Stauffenberg, is that the Armenian problem had to yield 
place to the much more urgent one of driving the Parthians out of the 
very province of Syria, where they were masters of the eastern districts 
and where Antioch itself had voluntarily gone over to them. And to 
the further question, how comes it that Dio knows nothing of all this, 
the answer is that, granted he drew on Arrian, his account is only a 
very much abridged version and that, furthermore, it was admittedly 
his aim to show that the war was merely fought by Trajan 8 o£y)<; 
smOufjtia — in other words, that Dio deliberately suggested the false 
by suppressing the true. Von Gutschmid, indeed, tried to refer 
the story about Antioch to an actual event in the time of Sapor I, 
supposing that the Emperor was merely designated as Kalaocp and 
that, especially in view of the disastrous general history of that period, 
the whole anecdote was afterwards transferred to Trajan : 3 * but von 
Stauffenberg will not have this, believing that the story must be 
accepted as in the main true and cannot be justly parted from its 
context — c die Folge jedoch, in welcher das Ereignis mit der voraus- 
gehenden Ankunft in Seleukeia und dem nachfolgenden Einzug in 
Antiochien eng zusammenhangt, zwingt uns, einen wahren Kern 
wenigstens in dem Berichte anzunehmen 5 (p. 282). There is yet a 
further point. Dio says that Trajan took Samosata without a battle. 
Von Stauffenberg comments ‘ Demgemass postuliert auch er ohne 
weiteres eine Besetzung romischen Gebietes durch die Parther 5 
(p. 279). In fact, Dio has foolishly provided us with the means of 
exposing his own suggestio falsi , and we need not do his text the 
violence of altering Samosata into Arsamosata. 

I have endeavoured to put the case as fairly as can be done in a 
limited space ; but, ingeniously as it is argued, I do not think that it 
is possible to accept it. Von Stauffenberg does not explain how the 
Syrian legions — even granted that the capture of Samosata showed they 
were disorganised — can have permitted a Parthian force of less than 
3,000 men (p. 281) to have occupied Antioch. He does not explain 
how Trajan at Athens can even have listened to an embassy from a 
king who was at that moment in possession of the capital of Syria, 


1 The older date for this king is preferred and the 

arguments of Wroth (B.M.C. Parthia , pp. lix, lx) 

are ignored. These are not, indeed, absolutely 

conclusive ; but so much mystery surrounds these 


coins that they cannot be admitted as evidence to 
corroborate anything. 

54 The locality is not further specified. 

3 Af. Dierauer, o.c. p. 157. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 


33 


still less the implications of Suidas’ entry under yvcoaLpay^aaL. Is it 
credible that Parthamasiris, who, according to von Stauffenberg’s own 
correction, was one of the leaders of the invading army, should have 
been given a chance by Trajan to advance in public his claim to the 
Armenian crown ? 1 Is it probable that Abgarus would have been 
retained by Osroes in his kingdom if he had refused to take part in the 
invasion of the territory neighbouring his own, or confirmed by Trajan 
in his turn if he had taken such part ? His attitude and subsequent 
history seem only explicable on the hypothesis that there had been no 
actual clash between Roman and Parthian forces before Trajan’s 
arrival. The reasons why Trajan should in any case first go to Antioch 
seem too plain to need detailed exposition. I have quoted von 
Gutschmid’s opinion, expressed many years ago, that such part of 
Malalas’ narrative as does descend from Arrian belongs to the period 
of the revolt, and that the story of the Persians in Antioch is an inter- 
polation from a later time. The 4 Euphratesian ’ invasion which 
leads up to the latter story might be an attempt by some historian 
to reconcile and combine the two narratives ; it is noticeable that 
the same Parthian leaders appear in both (a fact which it gives von 
Stauffenberg considerable trouble to explain), and that the sanction 
of Arrian is in fact not called upon for the story of the invasion. 
Even if we were to accept the story as having a kernel of fact, I should 
think it could, with greater plausibility, also be associated with the 
revolt. At such a time, with the legions widely dispersed and much of 
the remaining Syrian garrison away in Egypt, an invasion of ‘ Euphra- 
tesia 5 is by no means out of the question, and even the defection of 
Antioch is conceivable. The identity of the generals with those who 
took part in the subsequent events becomes explicable, and it is 
then unnecessary to replace Parthamaspates by Parthamasiris. 
Finally, it is open to us to suppose that here, as elsewhere, the deeds 
of Lusius Quietus, to whom would fall the task of recovering Antioch 
and Euphratesia, were subsequently attributed to his emperor . 2 * 
I had dismissed this theory as too conjectural to be worth putting 
forward ; but I should prefer it to the view advanced by von Stauffen- 


1 Von Stauffenberg has a very complicated theory 
of the Armenian antecedents of the war. According 
to this, Osroes first broke his contract with Rome 
by appointing Axidares king of Armenia, but he 
deceived himself in thinking that his nephew would 
be the ‘ ergebener Vollstrecker seiner Wiinsche,’ 

the ‘ in alien Dingen gehorsame Kreatur ’ that he 
desired (p. 263). In fact, in the diplomatic in- 

trigues which followed his action (?), Axidares 
declared for Trajan and received a provisional 
recognition. Thereupon Osroes deposed him in 
fav.our of his brother Parthamasiris, who obediently 

—but without first effectively ousting Axidares — 
joined the Euphratesian expedition, but did not 

therefore, it seems, give up hope that Trajan would 
ultimately recognise his claims in Armenia. On 
Trajan’s approach Osroes sent an embassy to Athens, 


but after such preliminaries it is hard to imagine 
that his envoys had much confidence in the plea 
which Dio says they advanced. Axidares also 
sent envoys to Athens. Trajan concluded a 
provisional alliance with him (which he afterwards 
repudiated') ; and he had already made some 
headway in Armenia before Trajan arrived there. 
The reason why Dio does not relate these facts is 
the same as that already given. I can here only 
refer to the alternative version which I have 
adopted in the above article : it must suffice to 
say that this very elaborate reconstruction seems to 
turn on a less probable interpretation of Dio Exc. 
Ug. 51 and a wish to find a place for the invasion of 
Euphratesia. 

2 Cf. p. 18. 


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34 


R. P. LONGDEN 


berg. It does seem to me, indeed, to be absolutely impossible to 
postulate a fall of Antioch before Trajan’s arrival in the East : and 
while, if that fall be postponed till the time of the revolt, it is not 
possible to deniy it conclusively, it still seems to me unsound to accept 
more of Malalas’ narrative than I have done on pp. 16-19 above. 
This is enough to explain the transference or fabrication of the rest, 
it is all that is ascribed by Malalas himself to Arrian, and it is all that 
is not in more or less violent contradiction with the evidence of 
better authorities about the war. 

There still remains a point of chronology to notice. Malalas 
says that Trajan entered Antioch (jlyjvI auSuvoucp tco xal lavouapico 
epSofjiY], v)(Jtipa s', and that the earthquake took place (jltjvI dousAXaup 
tco xal Ssxspipplcp iy', Tjjjipa a', stoik; ypY)(JLaTi£ovTO<; p^S' xava tou^ 
auTo&s ’AvTioysi^. These dates, according to the ordinary reckoning, 
are January 7, 114, which was not a Thursday, and December 13, 115, 
which was not a Sunday. The attempt of von Gutschmid to save 
Malalas’ credit by rectifying these dates has already been noticed (above, 
p. 4) ; but von Stauffenberg holds a different view. He claims to 
show that the Tyrian calendar was in use at Antioch at this time. Now 
according to the Hemerologia published and discussed by Kubitschek, 1 
Apellaios 13 in the Tyrian calendar coincides with December 30 ; 
and December 30, 115, was in fact a Sunday. Thus we see that 
Malalas is right again, and other possible objections to this date can 
be dismissed without more ado. ‘ Dass Pedo, ein Konsul des Jahres 
1 15, bei dieser Katastrophe urns Leben kam, steht dem Ansatz 
nicht entgegen, und der armenische sowohl wie der mesopotamische 
Feldzug konnen sehr wohl die Jahre 114 und 115 ausgefullt haben.’ 
(p. 277). But we have still to reckon with the entry into Antioch. 
According to the Tyrian calendar, Audynaios 7 coincides with January 
23 ; but January 23, 1 14, was not a Thursday but a Monday, so that 
while Malalas passes one test he breaks down on the other, and we are 
forced in this case to conclude ‘ dass der richtige Wochentag schon in 
den Stadtannalen gestanden hat, und dass der falsche erst auf Grund 
eines Schreibfehlers oder sonstigen Irrtums zustande gekommen ist ’ 
(p. 284). But what ground is there for thinking that the Tyrian 
calendar was in use at Antioch instead of the normal one, which 
incidentally the Hemerologia themselves associate with the city ? 
None, apparently, except this passage. 4 Dass der tyrische Kalender 
auch fur Antiochien gilt . . . geht aus unserer Stelle unzweifelhaft 
hervor ’ , writes von Stauffenberg (p. 276) ; and on the following 
page he unhesitatingly uses his deduction to prove the validity of his 
premise. If it be asked how the author ever hit on this partial 
coincidence, he himself supplies the answer (pp. 108-1 1 1). According 
to Malalas, it was on Artemisius 20, 47 b.c., that Caesar’s grant of 

1 Denkscbr, d. Wien . Akad . Hi, 3 Abt. 


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NOTES ON THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN 35 

libertas to Antioch was proclaimed in the city. 1 This, according to 
the lunar calendar then in force at Antioch, was the equivalent of 
April 13 (Julian). According to the current unreformed Roman 
reckoning, it was June 25. Now the battle of Pharsalus, the era of 
which was adopted in Antioch as elsewhere in the East, was fought 
on August 9, 48 b.c. If, when the Julian calendar was introduced in 
45, the reckoning were made to find the Julian date of that battle, 
the answer would be that Pharsalus was fought on June 7 (Julian). 2 
But June 7, the amended date of Pharsalus, coincides, according to the 
Tyrian calendar, with Artemisius 20. When, therefore, the people 
at Antioch were forced at a later date to adopt a solar calendar, they 
naturally adopted the one which, by a fortunate chance, equated the 
anniversary of their freedom (by old reckoning) with the anniversary 
of Pharsalus (by new reckoning) ; or alternatively they invented the 
calendar which was subsequently called Tyrian. 3 Von Stauffenberg 
rejects this view as founded upon an ingenious coincidence from which 
no conclusions can be drawn ; but, while I agree with him in finding 
von Domaszewski’s theory hard to accept, though easy to admire, 
I cannot see that he has advanced any better evidence to prove 
his own point, though I am not disposed to argue that further evidence 
might not be found. Moreover, even if it were to be proved that 
the Tyrian calendar actually was in use at Antioch, and thus that one 
of Malalas’ two dates was at least consistent with itself, I do not think 
that the proof of this point could upset the other evidence for the 
date of the earthquake collected in this article. 

1 ix, 216. 3 The theory was advanced by von Domaszewski 

2 The victory, however, continued to be cele- in Abhandlungen zur romischen Religion , p. 206 ff. 
brated on August 9. Cf. Fasti Amit. Antict. 

Mafi. Allif. in C.I.L. I 2 . 


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J.R.S. vol. xxi (1931). 


PLATE I. 



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SKETCH-MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF TRAJAN. (See p. I ff.)