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Economic Factors and Constitution-Making: A Two-Way Relationship

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Encyclopedia of Contemporary Constitutionalism

Abstract

This entry examines how economists have analyzed the relationship between economic forces and constitutional norms, including the role of political processes. It draws on the recent literature on public choice, the new political economy, and constitutional economics, to examine the factors which determine the two-way causal relationship between constitutional norms, including electoral processes, and economic policies and economic performance. It also examines the literature on economic institutions and how these impact on economic performance and the dynamic interrelationship between economic and other institutions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Anton Muscatelli

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  1. Anton Muscatelli
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Correspondence to Anton Muscatelli .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Cremades & Calvo-Sotelo Abogados, Madrid, Madrid, Spain

    Javier Cremades

  2. Public Law II & Philology, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Madrid, Spain

    Cristina Hermida

Section Editor information

  1. University of Bari Aldo Moro, Bari, Italy

    Alessandro Torre

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Muscatelli, A. (2022). Economic Factors and Constitution-Making: A Two-Way Relationship. In: Cremades, J., Hermida, C. (eds) Encyclopedia of Contemporary Constitutionalism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31739-7_134-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31739-7_134-1

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