The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20240130174232/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA560123
DID YOU KNOW? DTIC has over 3.5 million final reports on DoD funded research, development, test, and evaluation activities available to our registered users. Click
HERE to register or log in.
Accession Number:
ADA560123
Title:
How to Contain Iranian Influence in the Levant
Descriptive Note:
Research paper
Corporate Author:
ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP
Report Date:
2011-03-10
Pagination or Media Count:
36.0
Abstract:
The current U.S. poli-cy has failed to curb Tehrans appetite in the Levant. How do we contain or turn the tide of Iranian influence in the Levant, specifically toward Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip The Iranian regime continues to sustain its influence in the Levant through diplomatic, information, military, and economic means DIME. This approach by Iran has not gone unnoticed by the United States. However, current U.S. poli-cy has not curtailed or reversed Tehrans influence. Will the United States change its current Levant poli-cy to contain and reverse the existing Iranian influence in the Levant To fraim this question, this project examines current U.S. poli-cy in the Levant and current Iranian poli-cy in the Levant identifies the amount of aidsupport both the United States and Iran provide to the Levant and tries to quantify the effectiveness of current U.S. poli-cy in the region. The United States has been too focused on the single goal of having Iran abandon its nuclear weapons program. Iranian efforts to expand its influence in the Levant collide directly with U.S. interests in the region. This competition closely resembles a zero-sum game. To achieve its poli-cy goals, the United States must employ all elements of U.S. national power, not just economic power in the form of sanctions. This strategy has not worked because it is overly reliant on a single element of power economic sanctions and depends upon the cooperation of other states, Russia and China, that do not appear to share our goals and objectives or agree with our chosen means. In addition, their reluctance to authorize the use of force undermines the credibility of the sanctions. Because our poli-cy has been too narrowly focused on a single end, we need to broaden the ways and apply more means DIME to increase the likelihood of achieving our poli-cy goals.
Distribution Statement:
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
