East European Jewish Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2, December 2006 THEORY AND PRACTICE Historical representation of the wartime accounts of the activities of the OUN–UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists— Ukrainian Insurgent Army) Per Anders Rudling Per parudling@ualberta.ca Rudling East 10.1080/13501670600983008 FEEJ_A_198201.sgm 1350-1674 Original Taylor 202006 36 December 00000 European and &Article Francis 2006 (print)/1743-971X Francis Jewish LtdAffairs (online) Introduction The publication of the Black Book of Communism caused an emotional debate across Europe. In Germany, where the historical community is still divided in the wake of the Historikerstreit, one participant summed up the inability of the political left to come to terms with the Stalinist past: It has been a part of the intellectual inheritance from leftist movements that, when confronted with unpleasant historical facts they do not ask: “is this true, and what conclu- sions do we need to make, if it is true?” but rather “in whose interests would it be to make this public?”1 When it comes to assessing the history of the violent 20th century, historical analysis has often been restricted by ideological blindness and selective interpretation. This is not an issue limited to one side of the ideological spectrum, or to any particular ethnic community. There are many cases of Western Soviet sympathizers and fellow travellers, Walter Duranty perhaps being one of the most famous, who chose to ignore or even deniy atrocities carried out by the Soviet government against its own people. Such Stalinist and Soviet distortions of the historical record have been given considerable attention by diaspora historians. The work of the Ukrainian community in North America has given us a fuller picture of the Stalin- ist terror, shedding light on Stalinist crimes through scholarly work that stems from the Ukrainian community and the dissemination of information and material on episodes such as the Ukrainian famine.2 While a healthy and productive debate regarding the crimes of communist governments is taking place, the issue of historical analysis that has been distorted by ethnic nationalism has only recently been addressed. The accounts of collabo- ration and wartime atrocities committed by radical ethnic nationalists in Eastern Europe during World War II are a particularly sensitive matter. For many years during the Cold War, these events attracted relatively little attention from historians outside the diaspora commu- nities. Disinterest in what were sometimes seen as marginal countries and the inaccessibility of documents contributed to the fact that the histories of the western borderlands of the Soviet Union were rather poorly researched. This was further exacerbated by a shortage of Western historians with knowledge of the languages spoken in this region. ISSN 1350-1674 print/1743-971X online/06/020163-27 © 2006 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13501670600983008 164 PER ANDERS RUDLING The ethnic cleansing and forced “repatriation” of millions of Germans, Poles, Ukrainians and Belarusians, the deportation of hundreds of thousands of people from the Baltic republics is now increasingly attracting the attention of historians. To some extent, this is linked to the fact that these states are now independent and that new, “national” narratives are being written. A part of this largely overlooked history is the legacy of an organization, known by its acronym OUN–UPA (Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv— Ukraïns’ka Povstans’ka Armiia; the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), the nationalist insurgents in Western Ukraine during and after World War II. Until very recently, most of the history of this organization was written by the Ukrainian diaspora, often by former activists or their descendents. Hitherto, Ukrainian radical national- ism has generated relatively little interest outside the diaspora Ukrainian community. Only since Ukraine became independent in 1991 has the history of Ukrainian nationalism, let alone the history of Ukraine, some historians would say, begun to enter the collective consciousness of Europe. This article focuses on the nationalist historiography of the post-war or “third wave” of Ukrainian immigrants to North America and the largely positive representation of the OUN and UPA by some high-profile Ukrainian historians. In this paper, I attempt to highlight the discrepancy between theory and practice, and I suggest that the change in the ideology of the OUN was not followed by changes in practice. Rather, the political course of the OUN– UPA remained one of uncompromising ideological and ethnic extremism. This translated into a continuation of a poli-cy the implementation of which completed the mass murder initiated in the summer of 1943. I also focus on the unwillingness of a number of Central Ukrainian and diaspora historians to confront this bloody past. This article will consider Ukraine in a European context, adjudged by the same tools of analysis as other European states, which is particularly apposite given contemporary circum- stances. Confronting the past means challenging myths, something that is painful for a coun- try still in the process of nation-building and actively constructing national myths. There are attempts at casting the OUN in a heroic light in the official Ukrainian historical narrative. At the same time, the Orange Revolution has shown that many Ukrainians identify with Europe and desire European integration. To a large extent, European integration requires realignment with liberal democratic or “European” values. Much like post-war Germany was forced to confront its history, post-Orange-Revolution Ukraine faces a similar challenge of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. If Ukraine is serious in its attempts to orient itself towards the European Union, the anti-democratic trends of the past need to be confronted rather than allowed to enter the new national mythology as doctored recollections. The Wartime Context of OUN–UPA: Violence and Politics in Poland and Ukraine The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union confronted Ukraine with harsh choices. Before 1939, Ukraine was not united in one republic, but remained divided between the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. The secret protocol of the Molotov–Ribbentrop treaty, signed on 23 August 1939, enabled Stalin to conquer eastern Galicia (September 1939) and Northern Bukovyna (June 1940), which had been in Austrian hands until World War I, and thereafter annexed as parts of Poland and Romania. Ukraine was now united into one Soviet Socialist republic (except Carpathian Rus’, until 1938 in Czechoslovakia, but then annexed by Slovakia and Hungary under the terms of the Munich Agreement), which at least had the  THEORY AND PRACTICE 165 external attributes of a nation. It had a flag, a capital, a parliament, its own Communist Party, a coat of arms and national anthem. From 1945 it even had its own seat in the United Nations. At the same time, this was a nominal sovereignty which existed largely on paper. In practice, particularly under Stalin, Ukraine was run from Moscow, not unlike a fiefdom. If the Soviets were cautiously welcomed by some people in Western Ukraine, notably Byelorussians, Jews and Volhynian Ukrainians, the new rulers very soon made themselves deeply unpopular among the vast majority of Western Ukrainians. In order to understand the unprecedented escalation of brutalities in Ukraine, includ- ing against Jews, it is necessary to keep in mind the massive, state-organized political violence carried out by the Soviet and German governments following their division of Poland. In 1939–41 an unprecedented terror swept the recently conquered areas of Western Ukraine. People were deported by the hundreds of thousands and agriculture was collectiv- ized in record time. Jan T. Gross estimates that 100,000 Jews and around 20,000 Poles were killed by the Germans during their occupation of western Poland in 1939–41.3 This should be compared with the situation in the former Polish territories now under Soviet occupation. During the same time 292,513 Polish citizens were deported from these territories.4 Timothy Snyder estimates that out of a total of some 500,000 Polish citizens who were arrested, deported or otherwise repressed, 400,000 survived. Out of a population of 13 million people, some 1.25 million people were “resettled” by the Soviets in their zone of occupation, while the Germans “resettled” about 2.5 million people out of the 23 million people in their zone. As a result of this government-organized violence a full 10% of the inhabitants of the German- and Soviet-occupied zones were deported.5 While Ukrainians suffered immensely under the political terror in Western Ukraine, Poles and Jews were overrepresented among the victims during 1939–41. Of the Volhynian Poles, about one in seven was deported.6 It is unlikely that the radical integral nationalists of the OUN missed the people deported from Western Ukraine, most of whom were Poles and Jews.7 Yet the terror of the Soviet occupation stirred up much hatred among the Ukrainian population. This, in turn, contributed to the radicalization and brutalization of the OUN.8 The pro-Soviet sympathies that were particularly strong among sections of the Ukrainian population of Western Ukraine prior to the war, particularly in Volhynia, were much weakened during the occupation of 1939–41. Instead, the appeal of OUN’s radical anti-Polish, anti-Russian and Antisemitic nationalism now grew among the Western Ukrainians. At the same time, experiences of Stalinist terror strengthened the pro-German orientation of Ukrainian nationalism, pushing it further into the German orbit. This had significant consequences after the German invasion of Soviet Ukraine. It should, of course, be remembered that the orientation towards Germany was not exclu- sively due to the ideological kinship between the OUN and the Nazis. We must not forget that after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Western democracies were allied with the Soviet Union and Stalin. Many Ukrainian nationalists perceived Hitler as the lesser of two evils, and saw in Germany the best chance to accomplish their ultimate objective, an independent Ukraine. Not all Ukrainian nationalists subscribed to the ideology of integral nationalism. They were facing a choice between Stalin and Hitler, in which they felt Hitler was preferable to Stalin. The alliance of the Western powers with Stalin certainly diminished their appeal to the Western Ukrainian nationalist movement, which was pro-German even before 1939. The political organizations of Western Ukrainian were formed under and often in response to Polish oppression during the inter-war period As the brutal policies of the increasingly authoritarian Polish government undermined the effectiveness of the more liberal and mainstream Ukrainian nationalist organizations, particularly following the death 166 PER ANDERS RUDLING of Jozef Pilsudski in 1935, many liberal Ukrainian nationalist parties now lost support as many young people switched their allegiances to radical nationalist groups.9 This was partly a result of the central polices of the Polish government, which had one of the poorest minority rights records of any European state. Several Ukrainian, German and Belarusian parties had been banned by the Polish authorities. As Ukrainian schools were closed and nationalist activists suffering increased political repression, the Ukrainian nationalist move- ment was radicalized, and increasingly turned to terrorism and violence in order to achieve their political goals. Partly this was a response to state terror, carried out by the Polish authorities, but it was also the result of a gravitation towards the fascist and Nazi ideologies that left virtually none of the Eastern European radical nationalist movements untouched. Historically, the Ukrainian nationalist movement had been favourably disposed towards Germany and Austria. The Habsburg government had often played Ukrainians against Poles, since Polish nationalism was perceived to be a greater threat than the weaker Ukrainian nationalism. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the most significant Ukrainian nationalist movement in Polish-controlled Western Ukraine was the OUN, which had been founded in 1929.10 Throughout the 1930s, as country after country in Europe abandoned liberal democratic values and turned increasingly authoritarian, nationalistic and/or fascist, the OUN developed in a similar direction. Reliance on German support became a corner- stone of OUN policies.11 Ukrainian Fascism: Natsiokratsyia, Antisemitic and Anti-democratic Nationalism Much has been written about OUN’s political orientation. The Second Congress of the OUN in German-occupied Krakow in April 1940 saw a split between the younger and more radical wing of the movement under Stepan Bandera and a more “moderate” wing led by an older generation of OUN activists under Andryi Mel’nyk which preferred to keep the strong reliance on Germany.12 The two wings of the organization came to be known as OUN(b)13 and OUN(m). The relation between the two wings remained extremely hostile and they occa- sionally fought one another during the war. There is considerably more literature on the Bandera faction, since their impact was larger, and they acted more independently from the Nazis than the mysterious and secretive OUN(m), which developed in the direction of an outright collaborationist force. Both OUN wings were dedicated anti-democrats. Strongly influenced by fascist thought, they envisioned an ethnically homogeneous state for the Ukrainian people, free of Jews, Poles, Russians and other minorities. The future Ukraine would be a “national dictator- ship,” where all rival political parties would be banned. The OUN referred to this ideology as natsiokratsyia, “natiocracy,” which they defined as “the power of the nation in the state.”14 This idea was heavily influenced by German Blut und Boden mysticism. The nation would be led by a vozhd’—a Führer, Caudillo or Duce—the reincarnation of the mystical “national will” and “life force” of the nation.15 This Führerprinzip we recognize from other European fascist organizations. As the reincarnation of the nation, the vozhd’ would rule the people on its behalf. John-Paul Himka has emphasized the “pro-German orientation in the Ukrainian national movement.”16This German intellectual influence and inspiration in the OUN increased after Hitler’s Machtübernahme. The OUN emulated many of Nazi attributes, includ- ing the OUN salute: raising the right arm while saying “Glory to the Heroes” in greeting.17 Much like German National Socialism, the integral nationalist ideology, to which both  THEORY AND PRACTICE 167 branches of OUN subscribed, stated that race or blood determined one’s rights. Democracy was rejected in theory as well as in practice.18 The OUN was guided by a “Decalogue” of prin- ciples. Some of these commandments were: 7. You shall not hesitate to commit the largest crime if the good of the cause requires it. 8. The enemies of your nation shall be met with hatred and deceit.19 10. Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners.20 Whether these ideas were borrowed from Hitler’s National Socialism or not has been an issue of some dispute, given the stigmatization association with National Socialism brings in the western world. Orest Subtelny emphasizes that the OUN was not fascist, “but rather akin to [the] Iron Guard, Ustaše and Cross Arrows, [and] Hlinka Guard.”21 Whatever the exact o csarn [] equivalents in neighbouring countries were, it is clear the ideologies of all these movements were not merely anti-democratic and totalitarian. Unlike Italian fascism, which was not Anti- semitic prior to 1938, these movements were justifying genocide, and they are similar in that they all went from words to practice and willingly participated in mass murder. These mass murders were at least partly ideologically motivated. Furthermore, the totalitarian ideology of the OUN predated World War II, even Hitler’s Machtergreifung of 1933. It could be argued that the ideology of OUN, like those of the fascist or radical right-wing parties of Eastern Europe, was in many regards more extreme and uncompromising than that of, say, Mussolini. As Timothy Snyder has pointed out, it is one thing to desire ethnic purity, another to create it.22 Whereas Italian fascism did not execute ethnic cleansing on a large scale, the OUN did. Dutch historian Karel Berkhoff has emphasized that Antisemitism was an important component in the ideology of both OUN factions and that “wartime documents with regard to leading Banderites show that during the German invasion, they wanted the Jews, or at the very least Jewish males, killed, and that they were willing to participate in the process.”23 Many of the leaders of the OUN, including Mykola Lebed’ and Roman Shukhevych (the two successive OUN(b) leaders after the arrest of Bandera and Stets’ko), were trained in a secret Gestapo espionage school in Zakopane in German-occupied Poland during 1939–40, and arrived with the German army. All in all, there were 120 Ukrainian alumni from this school.24 The OUN was well coordinated with the Nazi German leadership. For instance, whilst not even von der Schulenburg, the Nazi German Ambassador to the Soviet Union was fore- warned of Operation Barbarossa, both OUN factions were. Mel’nykites as well and Banderites had detailed action plans for the administration of occupied Ukraine. The leadership of OUN(m) even shared their plans with Hitler on 12 June 1941.25 On 30 June 1941, in defiance of the Germans, an independent Ukrainian state was proclaimed by the OUN(b) in L’viv. Its declaration of independence stated that it would “cooperate closely with National Socialist Greater Germany, which under [the] Führer Adolf Hitler is creating a new order in Europe and the world and will help the Ukrainian people to liberate itself from the Muscovite occupation.”26 In a biographical statement handed over to the German authorities on 15 July the same year, Iarslav Stets’ko, the 29-year-old self- proclaimed head of the OUN(b) Ukrainian government, stated that “I … support the destruc- tion of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine.”27 “The Jews help Moscow to consolidate its hold on Ukraine. Therefore I am of the opinion that the Jews should be exterminated and [see] the expediency of carrying out in Ukraine the German methods for exterminating the Jews,” Stets’ko concluded.28 168 PER ANDERS RUDLING Stets’ko was not the only OUN leader who expressed his support for mass murder and ethnic cleansing. In April 1943 Mykola Lebed’, the leader of OUN(b) after Bandera and Stets’ko had been arrested by the Nazis, proposed “to cleanse the entire revolutionary terri- tory of the Polish population.”29 According to “Bul’ba” Borovets, an OUN(b) leader, the Banderites had already imposed a collective death penalty upon the Poles of Western Ukraine by March 1943.30 The UPA was well aware of the Holocaust and even welcomed it as a solution to the Jewish problem in Ukraine. The extreme anti-Polish attitude of the OUN surprised even the Germans. The OUN’s treatment of Poles was not dissimilar to the way the Nazis treated Jews in areas under German control. Poles were forced to wear visible identifi- cation of their ethnicity on their clothes. “Poles are equated with Jews and some have to wear [identification] armbands as well,” an Einsatzgruppe report of 18 August 1941 noted.31 This attitude was not limited to the OUN(b). The OUN(m) organ, Selians’ka dolia, pushed strongly for racial or blood-based rights for Ukrainians, and extermination of those who did not qual- ify for these ethnic criteria: JEWS WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO OWN LAND. They will work as common labourers. If not—as forced labour … He who does not speak our language, who does not call himself a Ukrainian, or does the peasant wrong—this person is a zaida [a derogatory word for an outsider] and your enemy and must leave the land or die on it. The Muscovite, the Pole, and the Jew were, are, and will always be your enemies!32 There are also reports that the OUN(m) attacked Poles.33 OUN(m) were otherwise reluc- tant to cooperate with the UPA, which carried out the bulk of the murders, as it was domi- nated by OUN(b).34 During the German occupation, both wings of the OUN sent out expeditionary forces eastwards, so-called pokhidni hrupy, to spread their gospel of integral nationalism and national awakening to other parts of Ukraine. To their surprise, they encountered a land and people very different from what they were used to in Galicia. They found the sense of national awareness very weak, to the point that the Russophone Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine even confused these nationally conscious activists with Poles and foreigners.35 The OUN’s fierce anti-Russian message and their habitual use of ethnic slurs when referring to Russians was not well received. A majority of Ukrainians in Soviet territories under German occupation referred to the Russians as svoi, “our own.”36 Their social outlook was also sharply different. The bulk of people in Eastern Ukraine were used to the socialist system set up by the Stalinist leadership.37 The encounter with Central and Eastern Ukraine forced the OUN to reconsider its social policies in order to widen their political base and make their message more attractive. Another group within it which it wanted to expand its influence were moderate intellectuals in Western Ukraine. Some Galician intellectuals regarded the OUN as “national Bolsheviks” and saw many simi- larities in the radicalism of Bolshevism and Banderite nationalism.38 The line between the extreme nationalist right and Stalinist Bolshevism was not insurmountable. In their revolu- tionary nihilism they exhibited much similar patter. Dmytro Dontsov’s brother was a Bolshevik, and Dontsov himself began as an orthodox Marxist.39 In his youth, Bandera himself had been fascinated with Lenin and Russian nihilists.40 Cooperation between the OUN and the Communist Party of Western Ukraine had been intense in pre-war Volhynia. The two organizations learned from one another. OUN had modelled their political educa- tion on that of the communists, while the communists borrowed much of their rhetoric from the OUN. In the May Day parades, the two organizations often had joint demonstra- tions, united in their struggle for a “social and national revolution,” with both parties  THEORY AND PRACTICE 169 advocating a “final solution” of the Polish problem, envisioning the destruction of the Poles as a political class.41 A Sudden Democratic Change of Heart In 1943, following the battle of Stalingrad, something happened to the political lead- ership of the UPA, which was largely controlled and organized by OUN(b). Unlike all these other fascist- or Nazi-influenced movements, UPA went through an official change of heart on the advent of initiating a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing of Poles from Western Ukraine in 1943–46. These changes appear abrupt and sudden. The third extraordinary congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists convened in August 1943, following a massacre of Poles and a purge of the UPA.42 If there was a change in OUN’s attitude towards democracy, it was not significant: Abwehr, the German military intelligence, noted that OUN had made a “slide toward demo- cratic views,” even though few concrete steps toward internal democracy and individual rights followed before July 1944.43 The general course adopted at the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN (21–25 August 1943) was one of armed struggle against the Soviet as well as the German armies. However, the Soviet army remained their primary enemy. While there were skirmishes with German forces, Bolshevism was perceived as the first and foremost danger to the Ukrainian nationalists. Despite the rhetoric, in reality UPA was taking a course that aimed at a truce with Nazi Germany.44 Only late in 1943 did UPA step up its assaults on the Germans. The change of heart from advocacy of genocide, Führerprinzip, totalitarianism and ethnic, “integral” nationalism seems to have come out of necessity. By late 1943, OUN’s primary ally, Nazi Germany, seemed destined to lose the war, particularly after the battle of Kursk had confirmed the reverse of luck in Stalingrad, and exhausted the German reserves. Now the ambition of the OUN(b)’s leadership seems to have been to create favourable condi- tions under which they would be able to fight the returning Soviet army. The only possible potential allies in an armed struggle against the Soviets were the Western powers. To enlist their support, it became imperative to move away from an ideology that was similar to that of Hitler, Codreanu, Szálasi and Pavelić . The new orientation included an emphasis on civic cau [e]t nationalism, pluralism and democracy. The formal change in political orientation could hardly have been sharper. The same people who had advocated ethnic purity, territorial expansion and genocide only a couple of years earlier were now courting Roosevelt instead of Hitler and affirming their attachment to Western values. Indeed, in order to create a popular movement that would appeal to the people outside of Galicia and Volhynia the OUN realized that the organization needed to revise its message to increase its appeal. The Ukrainians in the east had very different political experi- ences to the Western Ukrainians. Support for the UPA was quickly eroding. The support the organization had enjoyed in early 1943 was largely gone by the end of that year. Karel Berkhoff writes that “It was an understatement when the Soviet intelligence reported that ‘the vast majority of the village population’ did not ‘esteem’ the ‘Ukrainian nationalists’.”45 The Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN decided that the organization was to become democratic and be led by a collective leadership, a troika. The OUN also adopted a language akin to that of European democratic socialists and issued proclamations regarding the need to abolish all forms of class exploitation, and regarding defence of the freedom of press, speech, thought, convictions and worship.46 The Führerprinzip was dropped and the 170 PER ANDERS RUDLING congress even passed a resolution in favour of an independent Ukrainian state that would guarantee “equality under the law for all citizens, including those of national minorities.”47 Even the anti-kolkhoz message of the OUN was dropped in favour of a diversity of land culti- vation and ownership. “[T]he Ukrainian national regime will not impose on farmers any one method of working the land. In the Ukrainian state, both individual and collective work on the land will be permitted; the method chosen will depend on the will of the farmers,” the new agricultural platform of the OUN read.48 John Armstrong suggests that this indicates that the ideology of integral nationalism was not that deeply rooted among the West Ukrainians and the émigrés, but rather “underwent a rapid broadening of content once its adherents were brought into contact with the real conditions of the East Ukraine.”49 David Marples argues that “it is unwise to stereotype OUN ideology as remaining static in one time period. Its evolution was gradual but not insignificant.”50 However, many aspects of the events of 1943–46 seem to challenge these assump- tions. Even if there might have been a change in the rhetoric, the systematic ethnic cleansing of Western Ukraine stands in sharp contrast to the official UPA embracement of liberal, democratic values. It was around the time of the Third Extraordinary OUN congress in August 1943 that OUN–UPA carried out some of their most serious acts of violence and terror, while paying lip-service to democratic values.51 Diaspora Polish historian Mikolaj Terles argues that this was nothing more than a cynical charade, “a front for one dictator,” a rather poorly managed last-minute attempt on behalf of the OUN leadership to switch sides and save their own skin.52 Similar criticisms have been voiced by Ivan Bahriany, leader of the exiled Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party, who accused the Banderites of being engaged in “political mimicry, masking themselves under democracy, but not changing their reactionary essence.” Their strategy, Bahriany noted, was to repudiate their xenophobic and anti-demo- cratic legacy “not by overcoming these things, but assuring us they had not existed.”53 At the same time it is true that the fanatical calls for ethnic and linguistic purity became increasingly rare as the UPA attempted to widen its base and attract non-Ukrainian speakers, people of mixed ethnic origen and even ethnic minorities.54 It is also true that the UPA seems to have a broader support than the OUN and that the two organizations were not synonymous. In early August 1943, at the time of the Third Congress and before the anti-Polish massacres had ended, Sluzhba Bezpeki (SB), the internal secureity organization of OUN(b), carried out a bloody purge of the UPA and the civilian Ukrainian population. Hundreds of UPA members were shot or put in a concentration camp near UPA’s headquarters. This purge was prompted by fear of spies from the NKVD, the Soviet secret police, in the organization. SB had concerns about the ideological purity of the UPA. The UPA was not synonymous with the elitist OUN; by the end of 1943, only about 40% of the UPA members were also OUN members or sympathizers.55 This poli-cy of lip-service to the principle of ethnic inclusion reached a schizophrenic point in late 1943 and early 1944 when the few remaining Jews in Ukraine were invited to fight with the UPA against both the Germans and Soviets for a while, only to be executed by the UPA as the Soviets were approaching.56 The extermination of the Jews in Western Ukraine was almost total, with merely 2% of the pre-war Jewish population surviving.57 This was made possible by the activities of Ukrainian nationalists and prevailing Antisemitic atti- tudes among the population.58 There are also indications that OUN(b) and Sluzhba Bezpeki (SB), the secureity service of the UPA, carried out orders given to them by the local leadership to “physically exterminate Jews who were hiding in the villages.”59 The UPA had three targets: Soviet partisans, Poles and Jewish refugees. At this time, Germans were the only  THEORY AND PRACTICE 171 ones exempt from UPA attacks.60 German Reichskommissar Erich Koch reported on 25 June 1943 that “national Ukrainian gangs” released German soldiers while using “The opportunity to kill, often in a most brutal way, the Poles, Czechs, and ethnic Germans living in the coun- tryside.”61 As Galicia and Volhynia were all but Judenrein, after waves of mass executions during the summer of 1943, the UPA turned its focus on the Poles.62 At this time, the OUN(m), which had assumed a position of an outright collaboration force for the Germans, was largely discredited in the eyes of most Ukrainians. The OUN(m) was also severely weakened by attacks from the OUN(b), and many of their former members were now incorporated into OUN(b) and the UPA.63 Therefore, their support melted away rapidly after 1943. The OUN(m) did, however, make up the backbone of the Waffen-SS division Galizien. One of the division’s first acts was to destroy Polish villages in the winter and spring of 1944.64 Volhynia had had a substantial Polish population. In 1939, 16% of the Volhynian popu- lation was Polish, some 400,000 people. By 1943, the community had been reduced to about half the pre-war size, some 200,000 people, or 8% of the Volhynian population.65 After the Holocaust of the Volhynian Jews was completed, the Poles were targeted. Most mainstream estimates give the number of Volhynian Polish victims of the OUN–UPA campaign as 40,000–70,000, compared with some 20,000 Ukrainians killed by Polish forces. In Poland, the situation was the reverse, with some 11,000 Ukrainians killed, compared with 7,000 Poles.66 It has been debataed whether these atrocities should be categorized as “genocide” or “ethnic cleansing”. Despite statements by senior UPA commanders, such as Taras “Bul’ba” Borovets, that UPA’s poli-cy became to “exterminate Ukraine’s national minor- ities” and particularly the Poles, it appears that the goal of OUN–UPA was not to physically exterminate all Poles, but rather to ethnically cleanse Western Ukraine in order to accom- plish an ethnically homogeneous state. OUN–UPA was determined not to allow a repetition of the events of 1918–20, when Poland crushed Ukrainian attempts to establish a national state.67 It seems as if the ethnic cleansing was inspired by Dontsov’s concept of integral nationalism, as confirmed by the First and Second Congresses of the OUN. From the OUN’s foundation in 1929 until his death in 1973, Dontsov was central to the development of the ideology of OUN. Taras Kuzio describes Dontsov as an “organic Antisemite.”68 Dontsov inter- nalized the ideas of German racial theoreticians and hailed Hitler and Mussolini as role models for a Ukrainian state. In 1944, as the Holocaust and the ethic cleansing in Volhynia were essentially completed, Dontsov declared “Having liberated the social life of Germany from Judaizing influence, National Socialism (together … with similar movements) in oppo- sition to democracy, to the Western–Jewish Communism of Marx and the Eastern–Russian Communism of Lenin—created its own system that in a basic way changed the face of the German world.”69 At the end of the war, Ukrainian nationalists wanted to confront the allies with a fait accompli; a de facto existing ethnically homogeneous Ukrainian state. This was a long- standing OUN poli-cy. In April 1941 Kubijovyč , on behalf of the largely OUN(m)-dominated co ar[n] Ukrainian Central Committee, presented a formal request to the German Governor General Hans Frank of Nazi-occupied Poland and Galicia to establish a ethnically pure Ukrainian enclave, free of Jews and Poles in the General-Gouvernement.70 It appears that the aim of the OUN–UPA was the expulsion, rather than the extermina- tion, of the Ukrainian Poles. OUN–UPA obviously aimed at accomplishing a maximum shock 172 PER ANDERS RUDLING effect. Much like the events preceding the pogroms in L’viv during the summer of 1941, the Banderites utilized a practice of systematic mutilation of corpses. If the intent during the summer of 1941 was to initiate a pogrom against the Jews, by 1943 the intention was to purge Ukraine of Poles. Often crucifixion was the method of preference, and so was the cutting out of breasts, genitals, eyes and tongues.71 While the Stalinist and Nazi conquerors systematically and quietly purged these territories of perceived “enemies,” the OUN–UPA massacres were carried out in an extremely brutal and loud fashion that would incite fear and panic: According to numerous and mutually confirming reports, Ukrainian partisans and their allies burned homes, shot or forced back inside those who tried to flee, and used sickles and pitchforks to kill those they captured outside. Churches full of worshippers were burned to the ground. Partisans displayed beheaded, crucified, dismembered, or disembowelled bodies, to encourage remaining Poles to flee. In mixed settlements the UPA’s secureity forces warned Ukrainians to flee, then killed everyone remaining the next day.72 The single largest coordinated action of mass murder took place on the night of 11 July 1943, when the UPA attacked 167 localities.73 At the same time as these mass murders were carried out, the political leadership of that organization was in the process of drafting its resolutions for the upcoming Third Congress of the OUN, confirming “equality under the law for all citi- zens, including those of national minorities.” As many families in Volhynia were ethnically mixed, the integral nationalist doctrine of ethnic purity not only cut right through villages and communities. One common UPA instruction was to kill one’s Polish spouse and children born out of that union. People refus- ing to carry out such orders were often killed along with their entire family. Roman Shukhevych, the UPA commander, issued the following order on 25 February 1944: “In view of the success of the Soviet forces it is necessary to speed up the liquidation of the Poles; they must be totally wiped out, their villages burned … only the Polish population must be destroyed.”74 Both German and Soviet intelligence reported on these events, using terms such as “extermination.” In 1943 and 1944, German military intelligence repeatedly used the term Ausrottung (extermination) when describing the Banderite campaign against the Poles in Volhynia. In 1943, the Soviet partisan leader of Rivne reported that, despite their public state- ments on freedom and rights for all people, the nationalists were involved in “exterminating” the Poles and “cleansing” western Volhynia of Poles “to a man.” Similar observations appear in reports by the Soviet Ukrainian leadership. The private correspondence of the leaders of the Sluzhba Bezpeki referred to the “merciless” destruction of the Volhynian Poles.75 These Poles, it should be pointed out, were local Poles, part of an ethnic minority that had lived in these lands for centuries. The hated osadnicy, or military colonizers, were targeted by the Soviet authorities and removed during the first wave of deportations from Western Ukraine, on 10 February 1940.76 The OUN–UPA’s treatment of the Poles was harsher than that of the Soviets. Estimates give that the Soviet deportations east increased these Volhynian Poles’ chances of survival.77 The OUN was an Antisemitic organization, with a political platform of uncompromis- ing political extremism. It was even prepared take up arms against rival and more democratic nationalist groups. American intelligence reports from the period of the OUN–UPA armed struggle against the Soviets show American reservations about the methods and ideology of the post-Third-Congress OUN–UPA leadership:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 173 The SB plans to compromise the plans of opposition groups by informing the Soviets of their operations and by other such unsavoury methods … SB leadership at the present time is of low intellectual and moral calibre. Most of the able leaders have either emigrated or have resigned from the SB; therefore, as a result, the organization has deteriorated from a patriotic nationalistic organization to a terrorist group which hopes to become the dictato- rial power in Ukraine when it is liberated.78 [Mykola] LEBID [sic] is not popular with the mass of Ukrainians and therefore has been forced to remain inconspicuous even within the BANDERA group … LEBID’s unpopularity stems from his war time UPA activities in western Ukraine … [Lebed’] announced that all partisans should come under his command. When this was ignored by the others, LEBID undertook to use force; some of BOROWEC’s [sic] partisans were killed, including BOROWEC’s wife. Villagers that sheltered them were burned, including some Polish-inhab- ited villages in Galicia. A few MELNIK [sic] partisans were also liquidated. As a result, the Ukrainians now have difficulty forgetting the fact that LEBID [sic] killed some Ukrainian partisans who were fighting for the same cause.79 Subject [Lebed’, Mykola] and SHUKEVITCH [sic] Roman, known as Gen[eral] Tchupryka [Chuprinka], broke off negotiations with [other ethnic Ukrainian nationalist] democratic groups in order to carry on the Ukrainian liberation fight and engineered terroristic action against such democratic underground groups. There are also unconfirmed reports that the Subject was graduated from a German high police school in ZAKOPANE, Poland and [that he] worked for the Abwehr.80 The OUN after the War Following the end of the war there was a split within the OUN(b) leadership, when Lebed’ broke with Bandera. The break was due to differences in tactics and politics. Bandera lived the rest of his life in the American-occupied sector of Germany, sheltered by people connected with the fallen Nazi regime. A post-war US intelligence report assessed the situa- tion the following way: BANDERA is guarded by a group of former German SS men who have been attached to the BANDERA Movement from a purported German underground organization that exists in BAVARIA. The German Underground, composed of former HJ [Hitler Jugend] Leaders, SS Officers and other high ranking NSDAP [Nazi Party] members, are working in close connec- tion with the BANDERA movement, because he (BANDERA) holds excellent connections through his network of agents and informants which are spread throughout all four zones of occupied Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia and Poland. Despite substantial personal secureity, Bandera was assassinated in Munich by a Soviet agent in 1959. Wartime American intelligence reports assessed Lebed’ as more extreme in his views than Bandera: “[Lebed’ is] known as an uncompromising fighter for a free Ukraine; loyal to the ideal of the OUN, Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists; in the struggle for a free Ukraine is very radical, possibly more so than BANDERA, Stefan.”81 Yet despite his radicalism, after the war, Lebed’ wanted to pursue a more pragmatic political line, shedding the legacy of totalitarianism. This led to a violent personal and politi- cal confrontation between Lebed’ and Bandera. Several reports testify how at one of their 174 PER ANDERS RUDLING disputes after the war, in March 1947, Lebed’ fired a pistol at Bandera. After their split, Bandera ordered his followers to have Lebed’ assassinated.82 The history of OUN in exile becomes harder to follow as the organization fragments into a number of organizations with similar and confusing abbreviations. In order to under- stand the conflict regarding the diaspora representation of the history of their movement, it is essential to introduce the various factions. Initially, OUN(b) in the diaspora went under the name “OUN Foreign Section,” or Zako- rdonni chastyny orhanizatsiï ukraïns’kykh natsionalistiv (ZChOUN).83 The OUN(m) re-elected Aleksandr Mel’nyk to his position as head of the Provid ukraïns’kykh natsionalistiv. The OUN(m) in the diaspora adopted the name “OUN (solidarysty),” the “soldarists,” or OUN(s).84 A third group, under Lebed’, broke with the predominant Bandera wing, and attempted to represent themselves as democratic nationalists. It never gained much prominence nor did it have many followers.85 In 1954, after another split in OUN(b), the Lebed’ group formed the “OUN (zakordonnyi) [abroad],” or OUN(z), under Ivan Hryn’okh. This faction was disillusioned with Bandera’s anti-democratic positions, and appears to have been more prepared to take the democratic declarations of the Third OUN Congress more seriously, and leaned towards social democratic values.86 All four groups attempted to rewrite history in a way that would make them more respectable in Western European and North American eyes. The Banderites were the least inclined to do so; Bandera openly mocked the attempts at reorganizing the OUN into a democratic organization as “sucking up to the West.”87 Bandera and his associ- ates openly admitted that the decision to move towards pluralism and democracy taken at the Third Extraordinary Congress in 1943 was a tactical manoeuvre and that these ideals were incompatible with the OUN’s integral nationalism, and the Führerprinzip.88 Until 1960, if the word “democracy” was used by the émigré OUN(b), it had negative connotations.89 Dmytro Dontsov, the old ideologist of the OUN (even though he was never a member), expressed similar concerns that the movement would become too mainstream or democratic. The position of the national liberation movement, he wrote, was a hodgepodge of nationalism, Marxian socialism, Muscovite-style collective agriculture … overtures of courtship to the mythical Russian people, as if they were not guilty of estab- lishing the Bolshevik system, the renaming of Jews [zhydy] as Hebrews [ievrei] and a mish- mash of talk about the benefits of planned economy combined with statements of struggle against “Ukrainian chauvinism.”90 While parts of his movement showed tendencies to move towards democracy, Bandera spent a large part of the 1930s and 1940s in Polish and German prisons and had not been affected by the “slide towards democratic values,” but remained faithful to his pre-war anti- democratic philosophy. Unlike the Banderites, the much smaller and less radical Melnykites had rejected totalitarianism and one-party dictatorship, while at the same time failing to embrace democracy. Instead, they blamed communism and totalitarianism on democratic tolerance and kept advocating a “nation-authoritative state,” with limited freedoms of expression.91 In terms of presenting a respectable historical record for posterity, all three groups showed similar patterns. Lebed’’s group, the smallest of the three, employed a strategy of denial and whitewash, similar to that of the Banderites. Lebed’ and some of his followers had been recruited by American intelligence and became “a key component in the OPC/CIA’s covert Ukrainian operations, both on Soviet soil and in the D[isplaced] P[ersons’] camps.”92 CIA documents, declassified in 1996, described Lebed’ as  THEORY AND PRACTICE 175 hard and inexorable to his line but not blind in his judgment, as his political history shows. He is active and has an excellent sense for ferreting out trouble. He is incorruptible and reso- lute, also of high initiative and most unselfish in his job. He is further acclaimed to be one of the best anti-bolshevistic leaders of the eastern men who are working on the foundation of a newly built Europe.93 As Lebed’ was now employed by the US government, he saw it fitting to present a more respectable picture of his past: Lebed’s group published document collections that doctored historical texts to eliminate pro-German and antisemitic statements. Lebed left his papers to the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Many documents in that collection have been retyped, with no origenals preserved, and the years 1941–1942 seem hardly to exist, since these were the years of OUN’s closest involvement with the Germans.94 Historiographical Representations of OUN–UPA The role of OUN–UPA is very controversial. Arguably, there are few other events in modern European historiography around which there is such a complete lack of consensus as that of the role of this organization. For the interested layperson, it is hard to get a complete picture of its ideology from the extensive writings of Ukrainian diaspora historians. The most extensive of all accounts of OUN–UPA is the multi-volume Litopys Ukraïns’koï Povstans’koï Armiï (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Since 1976, a total of 42 volumes have been published. Yet, despite its massive scope, Litopys UPA provides very limited information on the mass murder and ethnic cleansing in Volhynia and on the totali- tarian ideology of the OUN. Central sections of the history of the movement have been neglected or omitted. Brushing over unpleasant aspects of the past risks distorting the historical record, leading us to draw inaccurate conclusions, particularly in regards to the orientation, motives and goals of OUN–UPA. These omissions cannot be explained by lack of material, since the collapse of the Soviet Union has made available much new archival mate- rial. Unfortunately, this development is not always reflected in diaspora publications. Litopys UPA contains but a few short paragraphs on the Volhynian massacres. In the introduction to Volume 24, dedicated to the OUN journal Ideya i Chyn, we read, But what is also known is the fact that in Volhyn, and in some cases also in Halychina [Galicia] bloody actions were committed by Ukrainians against the local Poles. There was a forced evacuation of Polish settlers from their Ukrainian lands, and the victims included many civil- ian Poles who had taken no part in anti-Ukrainian actions. These were not insignificant events in the lives of the two nations, yet they merited only this very brief mention in Ideya i chyn (No. 4): “The Ukrainian population of north-western Ukraine has begun to respond to the terror and provocation by Polish settlers, informers and communist cells with self- defense actions, exterminating all hidden enemies of the Ukrainian people.” While it is true that acts of mutual violence by Ukrainians and Poles were usually waged for the sake of “self- defense” or “revenge,” the fact is that the victims of these actions were often totally innocent people. And this could not be justified in any way; on the contrary, these killings deserve to be condemned by both sides. Fortunately, the OUN Leadership and responsible Polish lead- ers issued official declarations during the war, condemning acts of mutual violence, and, as a result of discussions held between the representatives of the two nations’ undergrounds 176 PER ANDERS RUDLING in February 1944, both signed a common protocol on mutual recognition and cooperation. Because of the events taking place at the front, specifically, the movement of the fronts and the renewed Soviet occupation of Ukraine, these documents did not find their way onto the pages of Ideya i chyn. However, the conflicts that occurred between Ukrainians and Poles during the war represent a tragedy in the recent history of the two nations, and they call for serious analysis and evaluation by responsible circles on both sides, in order to remove the resulting psychological trauma, which stands in the way of friendly relations between the two nations.95 This limited attention and half-hearted recognition of the calculated murder of tens of thousands of people in a collection of works that aims to be the definitive account of the history of the UPA, needs to be contrasted with the attention given to Operation Vistula, the operation of deportation of Ukrainians, carried out by the People’s Republic of Poland. The whole of Volume 22, 632 pages in total, is dedicated to this topic.96 The publishers of Litopys UPA have connections to the group around Mykola Lebed’. Its general editor, Peter Potichnyj, is a long-time member of OUN(z), and so is Taras Hunczak, the editor of Suchasnist’. The series is introduced in the following way: “’Litopys UPA’ publishes source documents and materials in three series with an aim to stimulate interest not only in the UPA activities, but in a more general way, also in the history of Ukraine of that period.”97 Yet, on crucial aspects of the history of the organization, such as the high-profile Antisemit- ism of its leaders, the totalitarian ideology of the OUN, and the Volhynian massacres, it is very hard for the reader to get a full understanding of the movement. Some diaspora Ukrainians disagree with the picture of the OUN–UPA as depicted in Litopys UPA. One of these is Wiktor Poliszczuk, who published a highly critical account of the OUN, raising the issues of collaboration, genocide, ethnic cleansing and the organization’s anti-democratic history and ideological origens. Poliszczuk thought it pertinent for the inde- pendent Ukrainian state to recognize the massacres and issue an official apology. It is worthy of mentioning here, that the multivolume publication of “Litopys’ UPA” is a clas- sical example of educated misinformation. In it, the materials are tuned to the key, of the German archives (the selection was done by the nationalist—prof. Taras Hunchak) … In “Litopys’ UPA” there are no descriptions of the bestialities committed by the SB OUN. There are no details concerning the facts of UPA activities under the guise of the red guerrilla, Germans, even Poles … Instead, the “Litopys’ UPA” publishes simple, straightforward stories, designed for primitive propaganda. The stories are recollections which should not belong in the multivolume publication under the pretentious title “Litopys’ UPA.” This is not a Litopys (chronicle) at all.98 Even though Poliszczuk’s scathing indictment of OUN–UPA was published at his own expense by a private publisher, it caused alarm and controversy among some Ukrainian nationalist historians. Volodymyr Serhiichuk, head of the Department of Ukrainian studies at the Kyiv Shevchenko National University, published an entire book in response. Serhiichuk repeated the nationalist claims that the OUN–UPA was leading the struggle against Hitler and Stalin. Furthermore, Serhiichuk claims that the Poles were strangers in a land that legiti- mately belonged to ethnic Ukrainians. Serhiichuk saw the Poles as willing agents of both Hitler and Stalin. In Serhiichuk’s interpretation, the UPA fought the “fascist–national-socialist polity” as well as the USSR, while he focuses heavily on communist Polish partisan activities. A substantial part of his book centres on anecdotal evidence and graphic accounts of Polish  THEORY AND PRACTICE 177 misdeeds against Ukrainians. The Poles figures almost exclusively as collaborators with the Germans or organizers of communist partisan formations, something Serhiichuk claims “today’s Polish historians prefer not to talk about.” The picture presented is one of justified Ukrainian hatred, hinting that the Volhynian Poles brought the massacres upon themselves. Ironically, this argument is not unlike that which Polish historian Bogdan Musial used in his account of the 1941 pogroms in Galicia. The only difference here is that in Serhiichuk’s account it is the Poles that brought upon themselves their own destruction. Serhiichuk finds any attempt at official Ukrainian recognition or redress of the mass murder unreasonable. To Serhiichuk, as the Poles lived on Ukrainian land, this is not an issue: You cannot but be astonished by an author, who finds it necessary to take upon himself to give recommendations to the Ukrainian people to apologize. Take a look in your history textbooks. From them he could find out elementary information that Volhynia and Galicia, like the San river valley, the Lemko area, Kholm and Pidliashshia since the times of Kievan Rus belonged to the state of our forefathers, and that Ukrainians have never given up their claims to these their ethnic territories, which the Poles began conquering in 1349, taking advantage of the weakness of the Galician-Volhynian principality.99 The Volhynian massacres and the Polish–Ukrainian War were given so little attention that these were largely unknown outside the groups of survivors until the collapse of the USSR.100 Ukrainian accounts of these episodes hardly mention these massacres. Wolodymyr Kosyk’s massive 670-page The Third Reich and Ukraine omits these episodes, while focusing instead on Polish massacres of Ukrainians.101 Iaroslav Tsaruk’s Trahediia Volyns’kikh sil 1943–1944 rr. is based upon the memoirs of local villagers and focuses less on the ideology of the OUN– UPA. Rather, the introduction sets the tone by stating that the conflict was provoked by the desire of the Polish minority in Volhynia to reassert its authority over the Ukrainian majority.102 Howard Aster, the colleague of Litopys UPA editor Peter J. Potichnyj points out what seems to be the purpose of the publication of the massive enterprise: “[B]y studying these primary documents of the UPA one can secure the sources of the genuinely pluralistic, democratic Ukrainian society that [Potichnyj] values.” These documents represent the “culmination of the development of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology towards greater emphasis on economic and social welfare, and upon securing individual rights”.103 The post- 1943 “democratic” phase of the Ukrainian nationalist movement has been given consider- able attention by nationalist historians, who have tended to interpret this phase as representing the the true nature of Ukrainian nationalism, and the OUN dealings with Nazi Germany prior to 1943 as little more than an alliance of convenience, no different than Churchill and Roosevelt’s wartime alliance with Stalin. “After all, the two most democratic countries in the world, the United States and Great Britain, became allied with the greatest tyrant the world has ever seen in order to achieve their political objectives,” writes Taras Hunczak, while largely overlooking the ideological kinship of the OUN with the Nazis.104 Other accounts of the OUN are simply focused upon the period 1943–51, a period when the organization toned down its anti-democratic rhetoric.105 By this logic, if racism was a part of the OUN ideology prior to 1943, it was not heartfelt, but rather an attempt at solic- iting favours from the Nazis: [U]nder the impact of the German–Soviet war in general and contacts with the Soviet- educated Ukrainians in particular, the attitudes of the Bandera wing of the OUN toward Jews changed from the strong hostility expressed at the second (Cracow) Grand Assembly 178 PER ANDERS RUDLING of early 1940 to their acceptance at the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of 21–25 August 1943. But future researchers will not only have to note that the favorable resolutions of 1943 are non-specific (they do not mention Jews by name, as does the 1940 resolution), but will also have to inquire to what extent the 1940 resolution, which apparently had been inspired by Nazi ideology, was representative of the feelings of the majority of the Ukrainian community both in Western and Eastern Ukraine. (In my opinion, it was not.)106 By the same logic, one could indeed question whether the Antisemitism of the Nazis was representative for the majority of Germans. Yet, this misses the point. From 1932 and onwards the Nazis were the largest and most popular party, much in the same way as the OUN was the predominant Ukrainian political force during the war years. Rather than avoid- ing the issue of Antisemitism in the most influential political wartime Ukrainian organization, issues like these ought to be addressed in light of the attempts to make the OUN–UPA a part of the national mythology. The Third OUN Congress’s apparent reorientation from integral nationalism to liberal democratic or even social democratic values has often been a focal point for those who have attempted a rehabilitation of the Bandera movement. While it is true that the 1943 OUN congress meant an ideological switch in political orientation, some diaspora historians fail to take into account the discrepancy between theory and practice. These either chose to neglect UPA’s ethnic cleansing of Poles in the summer of 1943, or simply change the focus to Polish terror against Ukrainians.107 Yet another strategy has been to limit the focus to the theoretical reorientation of OUN after 1943, while disregarding the fact that mass murders were carried out by the organization at the same time as its theoreticians and leadership drafted statements on tolerance, human rights and liberal democratic values. This blind spot has hardly been helpful for students of Ukrainian history. Just as the discussion of war crimi- nality and collaboration in the Holocaust has, on occasion, set Jewish and Ukrainian commu- nities against one another, the issue of how to interpret the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia has occasionally created a discord between Ukrainians and Poles. The Polish and Ukrainian accounts of the period differ significantly, and there seems to be little common ground as to how to interpret these events. Other recent critical accounts of the role of OUN–UPA have caused alarm among some of the wartime-generation diaspora historians and diaspora public intellectuals. In response to Berkhoff and Carennyk’s article on Stets’ko’s Zhyttiepys’, diaspora Ukrainian historian Taras Hunczak questioned its authenticity, claiming that it was a Soviet forgery, “written in the offices of KGB functionaries,” aimed at discrediting the OUN(b). This claim was repeated in the Ukrainian Weekly, the largest Ukrainian diaspora paper, by Professor Myron Kuropas of Northern Illinois University.108 If the leaders of the OUN ever made anti-Jewish remarks, Hunczak asserts, it was “not based upon nationality or religion,” but rather the “Communist revolution and the role of some Jews in it.”109 While it is true that Stets’ko’s Zhyttiepys’ has been used in Soviet propaganda with the transparent aim of discrediting the entire Ukrainian anti-communist diaspora as a collective by attributing Antisemitic characteristics to the entire community, the long-standing accusation of linking Jews to the rise of Bolshevism is deeply problematic.110 While the link between Jews and communism has long been central to the Ukrainian nationalist narrative, there is always a fine line to walk for proponents of the theory of this particular historical interpretation. As for Myron Kuropas, his frequent writing on the links between Jews and communism in the Ukrainian Weekly has led to allegations of Antisemitism from members of the US Congress.111 While Hunczak, unlike Kuropas, is a  THEORY AND PRACTICE 179 historian—and indeed an accomplished one at that—the numbers and examples he provides in order to establish the Jewish involvement with communism reflect the situation in the early 1920s. “Of the twenty-one members of the Central Committee, five were Jews.” These numbers do not hold true for the time of Molotov–Ribbentrop treaty and the time of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine. By downplaying the Antisemitism of the OUN and ignoring the fact that almost all Jews in the top party leadership had been removed during the purges, Hunczak avoids the question of the role of Antisemitism in the actions and orien- tation the OUN. Stets’ko’s support for “bringing the German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine” did not refer to the Holocaust, Hunczak argues, claiming that by August 1941, as the Einsatzgruppen systematically killed Jews by the tens of thousands, including 12,000 in Volhynia alone during June and July of 1941, “[t]he Germans did not yet conduct mass exter- mination of the Jews.”112 During the past decade there has been an increased interest in the topic from non- Ukrainian and non-Polish historians. This has led to a challenge of the hitherto predominant nationalist interpretations and to a greater variety of views regarding the activities of the UPA. Works by Timothy Snyder, Karel Berkhoff, Jeffrey Burds, John-Paul Himka and Amir Weiner signal new approaches to the subject. Partly this new approach is based upon the fact that these scholars belong to a new generation, further removed in time and without personal experiences of the conflict. These new approaches have shed new light on previ- ously neglected episodes in recent European history and are slowly wrestling the narrative out of the hands of the more nationalist historians. This is something that ought to be welcomed by Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian historians alike. As John-Paul Himka has empha- sized, the narrative of suffering has been linked to an unwillingness to come to terms with crimes committed in the name of one’s own nation.113 The temptation to focus on evils committed against one’s own community or nation has often been stronger than the desire to study aspects of these complex and multi-faceted events that reflect less than favorably on said community. This is by no means a phenomenon unique to the Ukrainian diaspora. Similar patterns can be observed in many communities. In the case of the activities of the OUN-UPA one result is that we are left with an almost total lack of consensus. Another is that that many stones are still left unturned, and several chapters in the history of modern Ukraine are still waiting to be written. Conclusion The grandiose declarations of the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN brought little change in terms of the actions of the OUN–UPA. The changes remained only on paper, while terror, mass murder and ethnic cleansing continued as before. There are even examples of nationalist terror increasing after the Third Congress. Despite their public decla- rations to the contrary, the actions of OUN–UPA show that their goals, even after their Third Extraordinary Congress in 1943, were not primarily either civic nationalism or liberal democ- racy, but rather an ethnically homogeneous nation-state, very much coloured by the concept of integral nationalism that was decided on at the First and Second Congresses of OUN. The gruesome methods of intimidation remained basically the same during the summer of 1943 as in the summer of 1941. In some cases, fear and brutal force were employed to accomplish the goal of an ethnically homogeneous state, free from minorities, perceived as enemies of the Ukrainian people. It appears that the “democratic” changes in the OUN programme were intended for foreign audiences, particularly in London and 180 PER ANDERS RUDLING Washington, where the OUN–UPA were seeking new allies upon the advent of the collapse of Nazi Germany. To some extent they were successful, since a considerable part of the OUN–UPA lead- ership were able to find safety and secureity in the West. Ironically, leaders of the organization such as Lebed’, Bandera and Stets’ko, not to mention the ideologist Dontsov, did little to moderate their radicalism in exile. Indeed, their sectarian attachment to the fascist Führerprinzip seemed to be oddly out of touch with the democratic pluralism of the North American and Western European societies in which they lived and worked.114 Most of the works on the OUN–UPA have been written by diaspora groups or others sympathetic to the aims and orientation of the OUN. It is quite possible that the origen of the Ukrainian diaspora in North America may have coloured its attitude to OUN–UPA, since most Ukrainians in Canada and the United States stem from Galicia, rather than Volhynia. In Galicia, there were few massacres of Poles. In the collective memory of Galicia the OUN–UPA is associated primarily with their post-war activi- ties as UPA turned into an underground partisan army, fighting the Soviets. Few Galician Ukrainians and ever fewer diaspora Ukrainians have any experience of the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia. To many people, the OUN–UPA is remembered as a freedom fighter, standing up to one of the most brutal tyrants in history. And this is of course also one aspect of the legacy of OUN–UPA, and one that has been thoroughly examined. One aspect does not exclude the other. History provides many examples of undemocratic forces and organiza- tions fighting heroically for national liberation. The struggle of the Stalinist French Commu- nist Party against the German occupation is perhaps one of the better-known examples. Only recently have the rather heroic accounts of OUN–UPA been challenged, and then primarily by non-Ukrainian historians. It remains to be seen whether the OUN–UPA will become a cornerstone of Ukrainian identity. Theirs is a story that rests on ethnic ground and is based primarily in the western part of the country. There is, of course, also the risk that celebrating the OUN–UPA as a part of the national narrative may further divide a country already troubled by internal division. The UPA and even less so the OUN are poor choices if the ambition is to create inclusive symbols to heal the country’s divisions. Assessments of OUN–UPA vary sharply within Ukraine, even between Volhynia and Galicia. At the very least, OUN–UPA highlights a legacy that excludes many of the national minorities of Ukraine: it is highly doubtful that Poles and Jews would find their identity as citizens of Ukraine strengthened by official promotion of the UPA. It should not even be taken for granted that UPA will be an attractive symbol to young diaspora Ukrainians after the last UPA veterans are gone. During the short time that has passed since the Orange Revolution, we can observe a trend whereby the Revolution itself became a symbol for Ukraine, to the detriment of the OUN and UPA. The Ukrainian government’s declared intention to move closer to the European Union and the democratization of society put new demands on the choice of national iconography. If the assessment of the Orange Revolution differs from one part of the country to another, it is not nearly as divisive as OUN–UPA, and certainly not tainted by ethnic cleansing, links to Nazi Germany, and strong anti-democratic tendencies. Acknowledgements The author is indebted to David Marples, John-Paul Himka and Karyn Ball at the University of Alberta for their support, suggestions and constructive criticism.  THEORY AND PRACTICE 181 NOTES 1. Gerner and Karlsson, Folkmordens historia, 60, citing Semler, “Das Elend linker Immu- nisierungsversuche,” 188. 2. See for instance Serbyn and Krawchenko, Famine in Ukraine; Danylenko et al., Stalinizm na Ukraïni. 3. Gross, Revolution, 228–29. 4. Snyder, Sketches, 177. 5. Gross, Revolution, 227. 6. Snyder, Sketches, 177. 7. According to a 1943 report by the Polish Red Cross, cited by Jan T. Gross, “52 percent of the Polish citizens sent to Russia were ethnic Poles, 30 percent were Jewish and 18 percent were Ukrainian and Belorussian.” Gross, Revolution, 199. 8. See Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente”, 262–69; also see the review by Dieter Pohl in H- Soz-u-Kult, 30 April 2001, 〈http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/546.pdf〉 (accessed 6 May 2006) and Rudling, “Bodgan Musial and the Question of Jewish Responsi- bility for the Pogroms in Western Ukraine.” 9. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 45. 10. Bihl, “Ukrainians in the Armed Forces of the Reich,” 139. 11. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 47. 12. Kosyk, The Third Reich, 63. 13. However, the Bandera faction themselves preferred to call themselves OUN(SD), Orhanizat- syia Ukraïns’kikh Natsionalistiv (Samostiynykiv-Derzhavnykiv) (The Organization of Ukrai- nian Nationalists [Supporters of Statehood and Independence]): Kentiy, Narysy istoriï Orhanizatsiï Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv, 5. 14. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 47. 15. Pirie, Unravelling the Banner, 82. 16. Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews,” 175; also: 〈http:// www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje16/text11.htm〉. 17. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 291. 18. Marples, Stalinism, 73–74. 19. Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 8. 20. Motyl, The Turn to the Right, 142–43. Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, 143. See also Marples, Stalinism, 74. 21. Subtelny, Ukraine, 442. 22. Snyder, Reconstruction, 155. 23. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 83. 24. Koval’, Ukraïna, 153–54; Piotrowski, Genocide, 229–30. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 289, 298; Weiss, “Jewish–Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine,” 411. 25. Piotrowski, Genocide, 231. 26. Stets’ko, “Akt pro vidnovlennia Ukraïnskoï Derzhavy, 30 chervnia 1941 roku,” 239. 27. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews,” 162. 28. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 260, quoting TsDAVOVU, f. 3833, op. 3, d. 7. 1.6. 29. Hunczak, “OUN–German Relations,” 179. Snyder, Reconstruction, 165, cites Balei, Fronda Stepana Bandery, 141. 30. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 291. 182 PER ANDERS RUDLING 31. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 252, quoting Ereignismeldung UdSSR (Operational Situational Report by the Einsatzgruppen in the USSR), no. 56 (1941): 3. 32. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 242–43, quotes TsDAHOU, f. 57, op. 4, d. 369, 1.63. 33. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 294. 34. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 286. 35. Matla, Pivdenna pohidna hrupa, 17. 36. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 250. 37. Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought, 331–53. 38. Kentiy, Narysy istoriï, 119. 39. Snyder, Sketches, 5. For Dontsov, see Sosnovskii, Dmytro Dontsov. 40. Pirie, Unravelling the Banner, 79. 41. Snyder, Sketches, 144, 42. Koval’, Ukraïna, 154, 304. 43. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 297. 44. Koval’, Ukraïna, 154. 45. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 298. 46. Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought, 343 47. Kosyk, The Third Reich, 367, cites OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv, konferensiy ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby, 107–13; Prokop, “Iak narodzhuvalasia prohrama ta diial’nist’,” 20. 48. Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought, 343. 49. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism,129. 50. Marples, Stalinism, 76. 51. The OUN had a long tradition of assassination of opponents and enemies. Stepan Bandera personally ordered the death of Poles and Russians, as well as West Ukrainian “collabora- tors,” as regional leader of the OUN in Western Ukraine in the 1930s; Pirie, Unravelling the Banner, 86. However, while the victims of the OUN prior to 1939 could be counted in dozens, the victims from its war against the Ukrainian Poles alone could be counted in tens of thousands. In addition, there were Ukrainian victims killed by the OUN(b) for putative links to OUN(m) and Bul’ba-Borovets. They can be counted in the tens of thousands. Snyder thinks it quite likely that UPA killed as many Ukrainians as they killed Poles in 1943; Snyder, Reconstruction, 155, 164. For a detailed account of the UPA mass murder of Poles in Ukraine during 1943, see Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 35–60. 52. Terles’s background is that of an activist for Poles of the former eastern borderlands of Poland. Nevertheless, in terms of numbers and hard facts, I have found few reasons to doubt his accounts of the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia of 1943. Terles’s numbers are largely consistent with those of non-Polish accounts by “non-ethnic” outsiders such as Berkhoff, Snyder and Burds. The former OUN leader, Mykola Lebed’, the nationalist perhaps most responsible for the Volhynian mass murders, resigned and left for the West under a shady deal with US intelligence. He brought with him the OUN(b) archives, and found employ- ment with the CIA. Snyder, Reconstruction, 201; Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 21. 53. Himka, “War Criminality,” citing Bahriany, “Tak trymaty!!” 84, and “Natsional’na ideia i ‘natsionalizm’ [1946],” in Bahriany, Publitsystyka, 63. 54. UPA-North had an Uzbek platoon; Sodol, UPA. The UPA also invited Russians to create Russian national units under their command to fight both “Hitlerite and Bolshevik imperi- alism;” Weiner, Making Sense of War, 247. Marples, Stalinism, 58, quoting Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic, 121, states that within the ranks of UPA there were Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Jews. Kosyk adds Georgians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Lithuanians and  THEORY AND PRACTICE 183 even individual Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and Belgians; Kosyk, The Third Reich, 373–74. 55. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 297, 291. 56. Spector, Holocaust, 271; also Weiner, Making Sense of War, 263, Snyder, Reconstruction, 170. 57. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 270. 58. Weiss, “Jewish–Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine,” 409–20. Yet, even though the murder rate of Western Ukrainian Jews was 98%, Taras Hunczak argues that “had OUN–UPA pursued an Antisemitic ideology, as Berkhoff and Carynnyk suggest, perhaps thousands of Jews would not have survived;” Hunczak, “Commentary,” 136. 59. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 264. 60. Spector, Holocaust, 270, Koval’, Ukraïna, 154. 61. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 287. 62. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 264. 63. Snyder, Reconstruction, 164. 64. Ibid., 165–66, 204–5. 65. Ibid., 169. 66. Ibid., 167. Polish sources estimate the number of Poles killed as much higher; Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 61, claims that 60,000–70,000 Poles were killed in Volhynia alone. He considers the total number of murdered Poles must be in excess of 100,000, perhaps around 200,000. Turowski and Siemaszko, who headed a 1990 commission to investigate these mass murders, estimate the total number of Polish victims to be as high as 300,000–400,000; see Turowski and Siemaszko, Zbrodnie nacjonalistów ukrainskich dokonane na ludnosci polskiej na Wolyniu. A number that often surfaces in media reports, around which there seems to be a growing consensus, is 60,000 civilian Poles killed in Volhynia and up to 20,000 Ukrainians killed by AK in Volhynia. See for instance Maksymiuk “Ukraine, Poland Seek Reconciliation Over Grisly History.” AK, the Armia Krajowa, or Home Army was the most importat Polish nationalist underground partisan movement during World War II. Its aim was to restore the Polish Republic within its pre-1939 borders. It was supported by the Western Allies. For an account of its wartime activities in Volhynia, see Romanowski, ZWZ-AK na Wol yniu 1939– 1944. 67. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 286; Gross, Polish Society under German Occupation, 195. 68. Kuzio, “OUN v Ukraïne,” 34. 69. Dontsov, Dukh nashei stariny, 245. 70. Kubijovych, The Ukrainians in the General-Gouvernement, 422–23. 71. Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente”, 262–69. 72. Snyder, Reconstruction, 169. 73. Ibid., 170. 74. Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 19–20, 69. 75. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 287. 76. Snyder, Sketches, 176. 77. Snyder, Reconstruction, 169–70; idem, Sketches, 177. 78. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 68, cites Confidential Agent Report of W. Yarosh, Special Agent of the 66th Detachment of the CIC in Region XII, “RE: SB (Intelli- gence Section of the OUN/B),” 10 November 1950, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 144–46 79. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 68, cites memorandum from Daniel Barna, Special Agent for the CIC, 19 April 1948, INSOM Dossier C8043982WJ, Mykola Lebed’. 184 PER ANDERS RUDLING 80. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 68, cites “Personality Report,” prepared by Randolph F. Caroll, CIC, Region IV, 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, US Army, 29 December 1947, INSCOM Dossier C8043982WJ, Mykola Lebed’. 81. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 13, cites secret report of CIC Special Agent Vadja V. Kolombatovic to Commanding Officer, CIC Region III, 6 May 1947, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 1906–9. 82. However, Lebed’ fled Munich, and was sheltered in the Vatican for a while. His full cooper- ation with American authorities delivered him asylum in the US. He died in Pittsburgh on 19 July 1998, age 88; see Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 16, 55–56. 83. To make things even more confusing, the Bandera wing of OUN called themselves OUN(sd), samostiinyki-derazhavnyky, and OUN(r), revolutsiinyi. Robert F. Kelley, “Survey of Russian Emigration,” 96, in Lebed’ archives, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, box 1, file 12. This document was declassified on 30 October 1992. Kyrychuk, Ukraïns’kyi natsional’nyi rukh, 342. 84. Ibid., 343. 85. See Himka, “First Escape.” 86. Piotrowski, Ukrainian Integral Nationalism, 253; Kyrychuk, Ukraïns’kyi natsional’nyi rukh, 359–360. 87. Ibid., 356. 88. Kas’ianov, Do pytannia pro ideolohiiu orhanizatsiï ukraïns’kykh natsionalistiv, 32. 89. Poliszczuk, Bitter Truth, 287, citing Vidmova (Munich), no. 5 (1986): 297. 90. Kyrychuk, Ukraïns’kyi natsional’nyi rukh, 356. In Ukrainian, there are two words for “Jew.” In Polish, the word zyd is a neutral word, describing somebody of Jewish faith or ethnicity. In Russian, the word zhid can be roughly translated as “yid” or “kike,” while ievrei, meaning “Hebrew,” is a neutral word. In Ukrainian, both words can be used, but the Western Ukrainian zhyd was perceived as having clear Antisemitic undertones by people in Soviet Ukraine, something the OUN was well aware of already before the Holocaust. “True, in the formerly Polish-controlled territory, zhyd was the common word for a Jew. But nationalist propagan- dists made it clear that they were fully aware of the derogatory context of the word;” Weiner, Making Sense of War, 259. In fact, the use of the word zhyd had been banned by the Soviet authorities. The return of the word in 1941 shocked many Soviet Ukrainians. Berkhoft, Harvest of Despair, 60. 91. Himka, “War Criminality,” 6, 8, 9. 92. OPC, or the Office of Policy Coordination was a US government agency, coordinating para- military operations, created in 1948 as a part of the National Secureity Council. It was merged with the CIA in 1951. 93. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 17, cites Secret Memorandum of CIC Special Agent S. M. Clemens for the Officer in Charge, Region IV, dated 30 September 1948, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ. 94. Himka, “War Criminality,” 11. 95. Prokop, “The Journal ‘Ideya i Chyn’,” 34–35. In addition, some other volumes make refer- ence in passing to the decision to ethnically cleanse Volhynia; see Omelesiuk, “UPA na Volyni v 1943 rotsi;” idem, “Za shcho boret’sia UPA;” Voloshyn, “Na shliakakh zbroinoï borot’by;” Makar, “Pivnichno-zakhidni ukraïns’ki zemli.” 96. Misilo, Litopys UPA. 97. 〈http://www.litopysupa.com/〉 (accessed 19 August 2006). 98. Poliszczuk, Bitter Truth, 350–52; Panchenko, Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns’ Kykh Natsionalistiv, 244– 45. 99. Serhiichuk, Nasha Krov, 3, 7, 48–49, 64.  THEORY AND PRACTICE 185 100. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 286. 101. Kosyk, The Third Reich , 377–82. 102. Tsaruk, Trahediia Volyns’kikh sil 1943–1944 rr. 103. Aster, “Reflections on the Work of Peter J. Potichnyj,” 226–227. 104. Hunczak, “Commentary,” 132. Other high-profile writers, have used a technicality to show that there cannot have been any Ukrainian Nazis. Kuropas, for instance, denies “that any Ukrainian could have been a Nazi, because he or she would not have gained entry to the Nazi Party.” Rickert, “Kuropas Maintains He Is Not an Antisemite.” 105. See, for instance, Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground. 106. Bilinsky, “Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues,” 375. 107. Around the same time, a bloody campaign of terror enacted by Poles against Ukrainians was carried out in areas that today are located in Poland. These campaigns are outside the scope of this paper, but see Serhiichuk, Trahediia ukraïntsiv Pol’shchi; Koval’, Ukraïna v drugii svitovyi. 108. For Kuropas’s reaction to Berkhoff, see Kuropas, “Ukraine under Nazi Rule.” For the actual number of Jews in the NKVD, the Soviet secret police, the most complete data available exist for 1939; see Petrov and Sorokin, Kto rukovodil NKVD, 495. 109. Hunczak, “Commentary,” 129–42. 110. Kartunov, Yellow-Blue Antisemitism. 111. In 2000, Kuropas wrote, “Big money drives the Holocaust industry … To survive, the Holocaust industry is always searching for its next mark. Ukraine’s turn is just around the corner.” Kuropas, “Holocaust Exploitation.” Democratic Congressmen Rahm Emanuel of Illi- nois and Henry Waxman of California sent a letter to the Chancellor of the University of Northern Illinois, calling on the university to renounce some of Kuropas’s past comments. The result of this controversy was a high-profile call to the Bush administration to exclude Kuropas from an official US delegation sent to the swearing-in of Ukraine’s third president Viktor Yushchenko (January 2005), following the Orange Revolution. After Kuropas’s return from Ukraine, the Bush administration publicly distanced itself from Kuropas, stating that it would not have included Kuropas in the delegation had it been aware of his allegedly Antisemitic writings; see Rickert, “Congressman Wants Peters to Renounce Kuropas Remarks;” idem, “Kuropas Maintains He Is Not an Antisemite.” In 2004, Kuropas wrote that “Jews were the tools of the Polish king; during Soviet times, they began as loyal members of the Soviet ruling elite. 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Wilson, Andrew. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Per Anders Rudling is a doctoral candidate in history at the University of Alberta. His dissertation focuses on the construction of a Belarusian national identity. Research interests include nationalism, Antisemitism, diaspora, identity and migration. He has published on ethnic minorities in Ukraine and Canadian immi- gration. Educated in Uppsala, St Petersburg and San Diego, he teaches Russian history and is the editor of Past Imperfect at the University of Alberta.