

**CSO NOTICE TO GUARDIANS (C-NOTE #26)**

**DATED: 19 APR 24**

**SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION**

**FROM: CSO**

**TO: ALL PERSONNEL**

**UNCLASS**

To recap a few of my previous C-notes, the Space Force presents *combat squadrons* and *combat detachments* to the Joint Force. When these units of action are placed under the operational control of a *Service component commander*, the resulting formation is a *Space Mission Task Force* that conducts military space operations under the authority of a joint force commander. It is not an exaggeration to say that the security of the Joint Force and the Nation depend on the success of these combat formations. Space Force forces must be ready, regardless of the threats they face.

The term readiness gets used a lot, often incorrectly. When I say *readiness*, I am referring to the ability of a combat squadron or detachment to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. Readiness measures combat potential by answering a simple but important question: *does a combat formation have the personnel, training, equipment, and sustainment to accomplish its mission in the anticipated threat environment?* Expecting Guardians to accomplish a combat mission they are not ready to perform betrays the trust the American people have placed in the Space Force. That's why building readiness is a central obligation of our Service.

Space Force Generation (SPAFORGEN) is the model we use to build readiness. It is based on the straightforward observation that *day-to-day space operations do not prepare Guardians for the challenges they will face in a high-intensity combat environment*. Balancing operations with readiness requires a different approach than the "all in, all the time" construct we used before. Under SPAFORGEN, the force elements that comprise combat squadrons and detachments rotate through three phases. During the *Prepare Phase*, Guardians build expertise in assigned roles. Next comes the *Ready Phase* where Guardians participate in advanced training to equip them for high-intensity conflict. Guardians then rotate into the *Commit Phase* as part of a combat squadron or combat detachment. Once complete, they rotate back into the Prepare Phase and begin the process again.

SPAFORGEN is another example where the Space Force is prioritizing *combat effectiveness* over *organizational efficiency*. It allows headquarters staffs to accurately measure and resource readiness. Doing so creates the capacity to perform today's mission while also preparing for tomorrow's fight. Under the old construct, most young officers spent the beginning of an assignment on crew before rotating into a backshop for the remainder of their tour. In contrast, most enlisted members remained on crew for multiple years, experiencing little, if any, threat-based training. Under SPAFORGEN, both officers and enlisted in mission squadrons will continue to rotate in and out of operations while assigned to the unit, creating a more experienced, capable, and *threat-focused crew force*.

In my estimation, SPAFORGEN is the most drastic change accompanying the establishment of the Space Force. It fundamentally alters how we prepare for operations. Big changes are never easy, and there is still a tremendous amount of work needed to fully implement SPAFORGEN across the Service. My hope is that, by sharing the principles here, leaders at every level can *aggressively resource and normalize* the SPAFORGEN model to maximize our combat effectiveness.

Semper Supra!