

# An Efficient Password Authentication Scheme for Smart Card

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## Abstract

Yang-Wang-Chang proposed an improved timestamp associated password authentication scheme based on Yang-Shieh, who had earlier proposed timestamp-based remote authentication scheme using smart cards. In this paper, we propose an efficient password authentication scheme with smart card applying RSA. The proposed scheme withstands most of the attacks with minimum computational cost.

*Keywords:* Authentication, password, remote system, RSA, smart card

## 1 Introduction

Remote user authentication using smart cards is a good solution for many e-based applications. Smart card implementation ensures secure communications. Several schemes using timestamp for remote authentication have already been proposed. However these are vulnerable to certain types of forgery attack. To access resources at remote system, users should have proper access rights. One of the simplest and efficient mechanisms is the use of a password authentication scheme. To access the resources, each user should have an identity (ID) and a password (PW). In the existing traditional set up the ID and PW are maintained by the remote system in a verification table. If a user wants to login to a remote server, he has to submit his ID and password PW to the server. The remote server receives the login message and checks the authenticity of the user by referencing the verification table. If the submitted ID and PW match the corresponding pair stored in the server's verification table, the user will be granted access to the server.

A remote password authentication scheme authenticates the legitimacy of the remote user over insecure channel. In such schemes, the password is often regarded as a secret shared between the authentication server (AS) and the user, and serves to authenticate the identity of the individual login. Through knowledge of the password, the remote user can use it to create a valid login message to

the authentication server. AS checks the validity of the login message and provides access right. Password authentication schemes with smart card have a long history in the remote user authentication environment.

This work proposes an efficient password authentication scheme with smart card using RSA. The proposed scheme entails reasonable computational cost. We have done the security analysis of this scheme. Section 2, provides a brief review of related password based authentication schemes. Section 3, proposes an efficient password authentication scheme with smart card. Section 4, discusses the security analysis of the proposed scheme with related schemes. Section 5, provides a computational cost comparison with other related schemes. Section 6, discusses the implementation results. Section 7, gives the concluding remarks

## 2 Related Work

In 1981, Lamport [19] proposed a remote password authentication scheme using a password table to achieve user authentication. Lamport [19] scheme is not secure, due to some vulnerability. A remote user authentication scheme using smart card was proposed by Hwang-Li [10]. Hwang-Li's scheme is based on ElGamal's [6] public key scheme. This scheme can withstand replaying attack by including time stamp in the login message. Moreover, the remote system does not need to store a password table for verifying the legitimacy of the login users. The system only needs to maintain a secret key, which is used to compute user passwords, based on user submitted parameters during the authentication phase. The strength of the scheme relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields. Therefore a user cannot compute the secret key of the system from known information. This scheme is breakable only by a legitimate user. A legitimate user can impersonate other legal users by constructing valid pairs of user identities without knowing the secure key of the system. Later, Shen [24] analyzed impersonation attack of Chan [2] on Hwang Li's [10] scheme, and suggested ways to repulse the

attack. Awasthi-Lal [1], presented a remote user authentication scheme using smart card with forward security. Forward security ensures that the previously generated passwords in the system are secure even if the system's secret key is compromised. Yoon-Ryu-Yoo [35] citing Lal [1] proposed a hash based authentication scheme based on the work of Chien et al. [5]. In the authentication phase, the system cannot validate the login request message to compute the password of the user.

Yoo [34], presents an enhancement to resolve the problems in above-mentioned scheme. This scheme enables users to change their passwords freely and securely without the help of a remote server, while also providing secure mutual authentication. But the scheme entails more computational cost.

In 2004, Kumar [16] proposed a scheme, which is secure against forgery attacks. To ensure security, this scheme suggests some modification in login and authentication phases. This scheme is the modified form of the Shen-Lin-Hwang's [24] scheme and uses one more function  $C_K$  to generate the check digit of Kumar [16] for each registered identity. In this scheme, only the AS can generate a valid identity and the corresponding check digit. Fan-Chan-Zhang [7] proposed a robust remote authentication scheme with smart card. They claimed that their scheme satisfy the following properties: 1) low computation for smart cards; 2) no password table; 3) password chosen by the users themselves; 4) no need for clock synchronization and delay-time limitation; 5) withstand the replay attack; 6) server authentication; 7) withstand the offline dictionary attack without smart card; 8) withstand the offline dictionary attack with the smart card; 9) revoking the lost cards without changing the user's identities. The major contribution of Fan Chan-Zhang [7] scheme is a method for preventing the offline dictionary attack even if the secret information stored in a smart card is compromised. The major drawbacks of their scheme are the higher computation and communication costs, because of using Rabin's public-key cryptosystem [28]. Furthermore, their scheme does not provide a function for session key agreement and cannot prevent the insider attack. Ku-Chen [15] proposed an improvement to prevent reflection attack mentioned by Mitchell [22] and an insider attack discussed by Ku-Chen-Lee [14]. In addition, they showed that Chien et al. [5] scheme is vulnerable and can be compromised. Furthermore, Ku-Chen [15] proposed an improvement to Chien et al. [5] scheme to prevent the above-mentioned weaknesses. However, the improved scheme is not only susceptible to parallel session attack proposed by Hsu [9], but also insecure for changing the user's password in password changing phase. Different types of password authentication schemes have been proposed in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 20, 26, 31, 33].

In 2004, Yoon et al. [35] proposed a user authentication scheme based on generalized ElGamal signature scheme using smart cards. Wang and Li [29], pointed that Yoon et al. [35] scheme is not forward-secure. In their scheme the previous session keys will be compromised if

the secret key of the system is leaked. Wang and Li [29] propose a new scheme which can offer forward secrecy. This scheme is also secure against forgery attack while keeping the merits of the scheme proposed by Yoon et al. [35]. Recently, a hash-based strong-password authentication scheme was described in [13], which withstands several attacks, including replay, password-file compromise, denial-of-service, and insider attacks. However, this protocol is still vulnerable to stolen-verifier, and impersonation attacks described by Kim-Koc [12].

Tsai, Lee and Hwang [28] present the survey of all currently available password-authentication-related schemes and classify them in terms of several crucial criteria. Tsai et al. [28] pointed out, most of the existing schemes are vulnerable to various attacks. They fail to achieve all the objectives that an ideal password authentication scheme should. They also define all possible attacks and goals that an ideal password authentication scheme should withstand and achieve. Tian et al. [27] show that Yoon et al. scheme [34] is subject to forgery attacks if the information stored in the smart card is stolen. This violates the "two factor security" objective of the smart card based remote user authentication schemes. Tian et al. [27] propose an amendment to this problem and propose two new schemes, which are more efficient and secure than Yoon et al.'s scheme. Liu et al. [21] proposed a novel ECC-based wire-less authentication protocol and analyze the security of their protocol.

Yang-Shieh [33] proposed a timestamp based password authentication scheme. This scheme is susceptible to well-known attacks. Fan et al. [8] proposed an enhancement in Yang-Shieh's [33] scheme. The scheme is similar to Yang-Shieh scheme, except it stipulates a strict limit on the user ID selection. Yang-Wang-Chang proposed a scheme [32], which removes the pitfalls present in the Yang-Shieh scheme [33]. Pathan-Hong [23], established that some kind of attacks are possible on Yang-Wang-Chang [32] scheme. Recently, Yang et al. [32] improved Yang and Shieh's [33] two password authentication scheme to withstand Sun and Yeh's [25] forgery attacks. However, Kim et al. [11] pointed out that Yang et al.'s [32] improvements still cannot withstand forgery attacks. At the same time, Kim et al. [11] proposed improved methods. Wang and Yang [30] pointed that Kim et al.'s [11] improvements also cannot resist the forgery attacks.

Kumar proposed a scheme [17] wherein the server and user authenticate one another, and then generate a secret session key for secure communication. In this scheme, the remote user is free to change his/her password without connecting to server. Kumar [18] proposes a secure remote user authentication scheme with smart cards. This scheme not only provides mutual authentication between the user and server, but also establishes a common session key to provide message confidentiality. In addition, this protocol provides the explicit key authentication property for established common session keys. Kumar pointed out that this protocol is provably secure to withstand the replay attack and the stolen verifier attack. In the pass-

word change phase of this protocol, each user can change his password without connecting to any server. In this paper, we propose an efficient password authentication scheme with smart card using RSA, which entails minimum computational cost. The proposed scheme removes the pitfalls in the above-mentioned schemes. We provide security analysis of the proposed scheme and implementation cost analysis.

### 3 Proposed Scheme

This paper, proposes an efficient password authentication scheme with smart card based on RSA. The proposed scheme has three phases, registration phase, login phase, and authentication phase. These phases are explained below.

#### 3.1 Registration Phase

User  $U_i$  submits his  $ID_i$  and chosen  $PW_i$  to KIC. Key Information Center (KIC) issues a smart card to user  $U_i$ . Then KIC performs the registration steps:

- 1) Generate an RSA key pair, namely a private key  $d$  and a public key  $(e, n)$ . KIC publishes  $(e, n)$  and keeps  $d$  secret.
- 2) Determine an integer  $g$ , which is a primitive in both  $GF_p$  and  $GF_q$ .
- 3) Generate the smart card identifier  $CID_i$  of  $U_i$  and calculate the user's secret information as  $W_i = ID_i^{CID_i \times d} \bmod n$ .
- 4) Compute  $V_i$  by  $V_i = g^{PW_i \times d \times T_R} \bmod n$ , here  $T_R$  is the time of registration of the user. This value is unique for every user, and maintained by the server.

#### 3.2 Login Phase

When  $U_i$  wants to login to  $S$ , he inserts his smart card into a card reader and keys  $ID_i$  and  $PW_i$ . Then smart card reader will perform the following steps:

- 1) Generates a random number  $r$  and calculate  $X_i = g^{PW_i \times r} \bmod n$  and  $Y_i = W_i \times V_i^{r \times T} \bmod n$ .
- 2) Send the login request message  $(ID_i, CID_i, X_i, Y_i, n, e, g, T)$  to  $S$

#### 3.3 Authentication Phase

Server receives the login request and performs the following steps:

- 1) Check whether  $ID_i$  is a valid user identity and  $CID_i$  is a legal smart card identity, if not, then  $AS$  rejects the login request.

- 2) Check, whether  $T_c - T \leq \Delta T$ , where  $T_c$  is the login request received time by server and  $\Delta T$  is the legal time interval due to transmission delay, if not, then  $AS$  rejects the login request.

- 3) Evaluate the equation

$$Y_i^e = ID_i^{CID_i} \times X_i^{T \times T_R} \bmod n,$$

where  $T$  is the login request time and  $T_R$  is the registration time of every user.

- 4) If any one of the above result is negative, then login request is rejected. Otherwise, the login request is accepted.
- 5) If the login request is rejected three times then automatically the user account is locked and he has to contact server to unlock the account.

### 4 Security Analysis

This section discusses the security analysis of the proposed scheme.

#### 4.1 Denial of Service Attack

The login request is generated based on password, current time and user's secret information. The login request generation is not based on any previous information; every time it a new one with current time. The attacker cannot create or update the false information for login. DOS attacks might result from the computation consumption also. The attackers might send the forged login request message to  $S$ . If  $ID_i$  is a valid user identity and  $T$  is a valid timestamp, the server  $S$  will perform the authentication. The more forged login request messages are sent, the more computation load the server performs. In the proposed scheme, if the login request is rejected three times then automatically the user account is locked and he has to contact server to unlock the account. The proposed protocol overcomes the DOS attack over the computation power of the server.

#### 4.2 Parallel Session Attack

Suppose an adversary intercepts the login request  $(ID_i, CID_i, X_i, Y_i, n, e, g, T)$ . He cannot create a valid new login request because  $X_i$  is calculated using a random number and password  $PW_i$ , and  $Y_i$  value is calculated using user secret information and current time. The adversary cannot create a valid login request without knowing,  $PW_i, T_R$  and  $d$ .

#### 4.3 Smart Card Loss Attack

Suppose user  $U_i$  loses his smart card, the adversary cannot use this card without knowing the password of the user  $U_i$ . Suppose an adversary wants to change the password, he must know the original password. Thus his attempt to impersonate user  $U_i$  fails.

#### 4.4 Password Guessing Attack

In our scheme, the password  $PW_i$  is calculated by using certain functions selected by user  $U_i$ . Suppose an adversary intercepts the login request  $(ID_i, CID_i, X_i, Y_i, n, e, g, T)$  of a user  $U_i$ . It is not possible to recover the original password from this login request message.

#### 4.5 Impersonation Attack

In this attack, we assume a case given below,

Let as assume in the authentication phase, attackers can sniff the login request messages  $(ID_i, CID_i, X_i, Y_i, n, e, g, T)$ . If  $2CID_i$  is a valid  $CID$ , attackers can send  $(ID_i, 2CID_i, X_i, Y_i^2, n, e, g, 2T)$  at  $2T$  to login as  $ID_i$ .

- 1) Card identity  $CID_i$  is unique identity for every user identity  $ID_i$ . The  $2CID_i$  is not a valid  $CID$  for user  $ID_i$ , then login request is rejected.
- 2) The login time  $2T$  will not satisfy  $T_c - T \leq \Delta T$ , then login request is rejected by server.
- 3) In the verification phase,  $Y_i^e = ID_i^{2 \times CID_i} \times X_i^{2 \times T \times T_R} \pmod n$ , the equation will not satisfy.

### 5 Cost Analysis

This section, presents the cost comparison of our scheme with other smart card based authentication schemes. Yang-Shieh [33], Fan-Li-Zhu [8], Yang-Wang-Chang [32] and our schemes are based on RSA. Table 1 illustrates the computational cost for each phase. The proposed scheme has high time complexity due to the improved security level from already existing schemes.

Kumar's scheme [17, 18] provides mutual authentication. In the cost analysis part, we omitted the computational cost needed for mutual authentication part.

- 1) E1 - Computation cost for Registration Phase;
- 2) E2 - Computation cost for Login Phase;
- 3) E3 - Computation cost for Authentication Phase;
- 4)  $T_{mexp}$  is the time taken for executing a modular exponentiation operation;
- 5)  $T_{mmul}$  is the time taken for executing a modular multiplication operation;
- 6)  $T_h$  is the time for executing a one-way hash function;
- 7)  $T_{C_K}$  is the time for executing a function to generate check digit for the registered identity.

## 6 Implementation Results and Discussions

This section, discusses the implementation result of proposed scheme and related schemes. Yang-Shieh [33] scheme needs  $2T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul}$  computational cost for registration phase,  $2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul} + 1T_h$  for login phase and  $2T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul} + 1T_h$  for authentication phase. Fan-Li-Zhu [8] scheme needs  $2T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul}$  computational cost for registration phase,  $2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul} + 1T_h$  for login phase and  $2T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul} + 1T_h$  for authentication phase. Yang-Shieh [33] and Fan-Li-Zhu [8] schemes are need same computational cost. Yang-Wang-Chang [32] scheme needs  $2T_{mexp} + 2T_{mmul}$  computational cost for registration phase,  $2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul}$  for login phase and  $3T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul}$  for authentication phase. Kumar's [17] scheme needs  $T_{mexp} + T_{C_K}$  computational cost for registration phase,  $3T_{mexp} + 2T_h$  for login phase and  $2T_{mexp} + T_h + T_{C_K}$  for authentication phase. Another of Kumar's [18] scheme needs  $T_{mexp} + T_{C_K}$  computational cost for registration phase,  $2T_{mexp} + T_h$  for login phase and  $T_{mexp} + T_h + T_{C_K}$  for authentication phase. The proposed scheme needs  $2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul}$  computational cost for registration phase,  $2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul}$  for login phase and  $3T_{mexp} + 2T_{mmul}$  for authentication phase. Table 2 illustrates the time estimate for various operations. Table 3 illustrates the computational cost for all the phases to the related schemes

### 6.1 Performance Notations

- 1)  $T_{mul}$  is the time for multiplication;
- 2)  $T_h$  is the time for executing hash function;
- 3)  $T_{exp}$  is the time for exponentiation with mod  $P$ ;
- 4)  $T_{inv}$  is the time for inversion mod  $P$ ;
- 5)  $T_{KV}$  is the time for knapsack value generation;
- 6)  $T_{inKV}$  is the time for inverse knapsack value generation.

$T_h, T_{exp}, T_{mul}, T_{inv}, T_{KV}, T_{inKV}$  entail heavy computational cost.  $T_{ECmul}$  is used to indicate the time for multiplying a number by a point on the elliptic curve.  $T_{ECadd}$  is the time for the adding one point to another on the elliptic curve. Normally, it has minimum computational cost. In this performance analysis, we consider two phases to measure the performance analysis. One could dispute the computational cost over two phases, signature generation phase, and message recovery phase. The signature generation phase of Horster et al. [31] requires  $T_{exp} + T_{inv} + 2T_{mul} + T_h$  and the message recovery phase needs  $2T_{exp} + T_h + 3T_{mul}$ . The signature generation phase of Wu [14] requires  $3T_h + T_{inv} + 2T_{mul} + 2T_{exp}$  and the message recovery phase needs  $3T_h + T_{inv} + 3T_{exp}$ . In Tzeng and Hwang AES based on ECDLP [25], the signature scheme with message recovery, the signature generation



Table 1: Computation cost comparison between proposed scheme and related schemes

Schemes	E1	E2	E3
Yang-Shieh [33]	$2T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul}$	$2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul} + 1T_h$	$2T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul} + T_h$
Fan-Li-Zhu [8]	$2T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul}$	$2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul} + 1T_h$	$2T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul} + T_h$
Yang-Wang-Chang [32]	$2T_{mexp} + 2T_{mmul}$	$2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul}$	$3T_{mexp} + 1T_{mmul}$
Kumar [17]	$T_{mexp} + T_{CK}$	$3T_{mexp} + 2T_h$	$2T_{mexp} + T_h + T_{CK}$
Kumar [18]	$T_{mexp} + T_{CK}$	$2T_{mexp} + 1T_h$	$T_{mexp} + T_h + T_{CK}$
Our Scheme	$2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul}$	$2T_{mexp} + 3T_{mmul}$	$3T_{mexp} + 2T_{mmul}$

phase needs  $T_{ECmul} + T_{mul} + T_h$ , and the message recovery phase has costs  $2T_{ECmul} + T_{ECadd} + T_h$ . In the Hsu and Wu [2] scheme, the signer generates a signature that the computational cost is  $3T_{exp} + T_{mul}$ , and the verifier recovers the message which needs  $3T_{exp} + (2t+1)T_{mul} + (t-1)T_{inv}$ . In Nyang et al. [13] scheme, signature generation phase and verification phase required computational cost  $2T_{exp} + T_{mul} + T_h$  and  $2T_{exp} + T_{mul} + T_h$  respectively. Chen et al. [15] scheme, requires the computational cost for signature generation phase of  $2T_{ECmul} + T_{ECadd} + T_{mul} + T_h$  and verification phase required  $3T_{ECmul} + 2T_{ECadd} + T_h$ . The Table 2 illustrates the estimated time for various operations, for the implementation purpose we are taking 128 bit data.

Table 3 illustrates the computational performance analysis for different authenticated encryption schemes with the proposed scheme.

The new scheme has a higher estimated time, compared to the existing schemes. This has to be tolerated due to the higher security it affords, eliminates the verification table of the server and provides mutual authentication between user and the server.

## 7 Conclusion

Yang-Wang-Chang scheme fails to prevent some tricky forgery attacks. We propose an efficient password authentication scheme using smart card. The proposed scheme restricts most of the well-known attacks with reasonable computational cost. The proposed scheme is based RSA. The server need not maintain password table, instead it maintains only registration time of every user. This will reduce the server over head of maintaining large user data for authentication.

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Table 2: Estimated time for various operations

Operations (128 bit)	Estimated Time in ms
$T_{mmul}$	$\approx 1.527932$ ms
$T_h$	$\approx 1.513726$ ms
$T_{mexp}$	$\approx 2.139810$ ms
$T_{C_K}$	$\approx 2.078715$ ms

Table 3: Computation cost comparison between proposed scheme and related schemes

Schemes	E1	E2	E3
Yang-Shieh [33]	$\approx 5.807552$ ms	$\approx 10.377142$ ms	$\approx 7.321278$ ms
Fan-Li-Zhu [8]	$\approx 5.807552$ ms	$\approx 10.377142$ ms	$\approx 7.321278$ ms
Yang-Wang-Chang [32]	$\approx 7.335484$ ms	$\approx 8.863416$ ms	$\approx 7.947362$ ms
Kumar [17]	$\approx 3.606653$ ms	$\approx 8.863416$ ms	$\approx 7.274389$ ms
Kumar [18]	$\approx 3.606653$ ms	$\approx 5.195674$ ms	$\approx 5.746457$ ms
Our Scheme	$\approx 8.863416$ ms	$\approx 8.863416$ ms	$\approx 9.475294$ ms

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