Abstract
Modern communication protocols are complex programs, and only small parts inside them are security protocols, but they are critical parts. A small error is enough to disrupt the operation of the whole. Errors can occur during the implementation of protocols, and there are also problems of a time-consuming generation of encryption keys, and difficulties in managing such a large number of security keys. A question arises - can keys be intercepted, whether protocols work correctly, and whether some security measures are sometimes unnecessary? In what situations we can detect an Intruder? How many steps do we need? After what time and finally, with what probability we will detect the danger? A detailed analysis is needed.
The article presents the methods of probabilistic analysis of security protocols with the use of probabilistic timed automata, including times of generating, decrypting and encrypting messages and delays in the network. We invented an appropriate mathematical model. We also implemented the method, which allows a detailed analysis of the protocol - its strengths and weaknesses. We show a summary of the experimental results.
The project financed under the program of the Polish Minister of Science and Higher Education under the name “Regional Initiative of Excellence” in the years 2019–2022 project number 020/RID/2018/19, the amount of financing 12,000,000.00 PLN.
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Siedlecka-Lamch, O. (2021). Probabilistic and Timed Analysis of Security Protocols. In: Herrero, Á., Cambra, C., Urda, D., Sedano, J., Quintián, H., Corchado, E. (eds) 13th International Conference on Computational Intelligence in Security for Information Systems (CISIS 2020). CISIS 2019. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1267. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57805-3_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57805-3_14
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