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Leakage Resilient Cryptography in Practice

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Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security

Part of the book series: Information Security and Cryptography ((ISC))

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Abstract

Theoretical treatments of physical attacks have recently attracted the attention of the cryptographic community, as witnessed by various publications, e.g., [1, 17, 22, 24, 29, 31, 33, 34, 42]. These works consider adversaries enhanced with abilities such as inserting faults during a computation or monitoring side-channel leakages.

Olivier Pereira is a Research Associate of the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS - F.R.S.).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In [31, 42], an implementation is defined as the combination of a target device and a measurement setup. We use the same definition in this chapter.

  2. 2.

    In fact, for the PRF construction of Fig. 10, we can prove a slightly stronger result. Namely, we only need that the leakage of the last PRF round (i.e., the last 2PRG invocation) of the last query \(x_{q+1}\) is not provided to the adversary.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Crypto Group, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    François-Xavier Standaert, Olivier Pereira, Yu Yu & Jean-Jacques Quisquater

  2. Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

  3. Google Inc, Mountain View, CA, USA

    Moti Yung

  4. Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Elisabeth Oswald

Authors
  1. François-Xavier Standaert
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Correspondence to François-Xavier Standaert .

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  1. Horst Görtz Institut für, Sicherheit in der, Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, Bochum, 44780, Germany

    Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

  2. Département d'informatique, Groupe de cryptographie, École normale supérieure, rue d'Ulm 45, Paris, 75230, France

    David Naccache

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Standaert, FX., Pereira, O., Yu, Y., Quisquater, JJ., Yung, M., Oswald, E. (2010). Leakage Resilient Cryptography in Practice. In: Sadeghi, AR., Naccache, D. (eds) Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14452-3_5

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