Conclusion
In this study, a novel power leakage model called correlation leakage model was presented, which utilizes the correlation coefficient between the leakages of intermediate variables to represent the power leakage. By employing mathematical reasoning, the exact formula of this model was given, in which the relationship between the correlation leakage and the sensitive intermediate variable was clearly observed. Based on this leakage model, we proposed a new type of second-order attack, CLA. This CLA can break the first-order masked implementations of cryptographic algorithms; it is applicable to all the cases that can be attacked by second-order analysis. Both the simulated and practical experiments verified the effectiveness and good performance of the CLA attacks.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61872040, U1836101), National Cryptography Development Fund (Grant No. MMJJ20170201), Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory (Grant No. KJ-17-009), and Henan Key Laboratory of Network Cryptography Technology (Grant No. LNCT2019-A02).
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Zhang, J., Niu, Y. & Wang, A. Correlation leakage analysis based on masking schemes. Sci. China Inf. Sci. 65, 129101 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-019-2719-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-019-2719-2