Content deleted Content added
Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
||
Line 41:
Since biogenetic structural theorists have rejected conceptions of consciousness as a disembodied occurrence, they consider the brain central to any investigation of symbolic culture. Using information from developmental and evolutionary sciences, such theorists study the relations between [[information system|information processing technologies]] (e.g, computers) and cognition, especially the use of machines for the propagation of [[Brain-computer interface|direct brain-computer interfaces]]. Their considerations relate to areas of study in both [[cyborg anthropology]] and [[cyberculture]], which ultimately derive from the writings of NASA scientists Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline (1960), whose studies have suggested that advantages might be gained in [[space exploration]] if human bodies were altered using available technologies. [[Cyborg|"Cyborg"]] is a shortened version of their phrase"cybernetic organism," which refers to a being that is partly a biologically reproduced individual and partly a technological machine (see Gray 1995).
Biogenetic structuralists have grounded their cyborg research in modern neuroscience, which
This model emphasizes that cyborg evolution, conceived as a process, involves progressive penetration of mechanical inventions into the human body, which in turn is altered, since biological structures that mediate human realities are replaced in favor of mechanics and computing-based supplementations and replacements. It follows that cognitive attributes, which have heretofore relied upon non-technological properties, will evolve, along with emotion, modes of sensation, imaginative speculation, rational thought, and the organization of intentional acts, to name a few. According to thoughts of Laughlin et al, technology's progressive penetration into the cortex of the brain will inevitably result in the [[neurotechnology|technical alteration]] of human consciousness on the whole (1997), including its functional optimality and its development during childhood (Laughlin 2000).
|