Verifiable Functional Encryption

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Abstract

In light of security challenges that have emerged in a world with complex networks and cloud computing, the notion of functional encryption has recently emerged. In this work, we show that in several applications of functional encryption (even those cited in the earliest works on functional encryption), the formal notion of functional encryption is actually *not* sufficient to guarantee security. This is essentially because the case of a malicious authority and/or encryptor is not considered. To address this concern, we put forth the concept of *verifiable functional encryption*, which captures the basic requirement of output correctness: even if the ciphertext is maliciously generated (and even if the setup and key generation is malicious), the decryptor is still guaranteed a meaningful notion of correctness which we show is crucial in several applications.

We formalize the notion of verifiable function encryption and, following prior work in the area, put forth a simulation-based and an indistinguishability-based notion of security. We show that simulation-based verifiable functional encryption is unconditionally impossible even in the most basic setting where there may only be a single key and a single ciphertext. We then give general positive results for the indistinguishability setting: a general compiler from any functional encryption scheme into a verifiable functional encryption scheme with the only additional assumption being the Decision Linear Assumption over Bilinear Groups (DLIN). We also give a generic compiler in the secret-key setting for functional encryption which maintains both message privacy and function privacy. Our positive results are general and also apply to other simpler settings such as Identity-Based Encryption, Attribute-Based Encryption and Predicate Encryption. We also give an application of verifiable functional encryption to the recently introduced primitive of functional commitments.

Finally, in the context of indistinguishability obfuscation, there is a fundamental question of whether the correct program was obfuscated. In particular, the recipient of the obfuscated program needs a guarantee that the program indeed does what it was intended to do. This question turns out to be closely related to verifiable functional encryption. We initiate the study of verifiable obfuscation with a formal definition and construction of verifiable indistinguishability obfuscation.

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1 Introduction

Encryption has traditionally been seen as a way to ensure confidentiality of a communication channel between a unique sender and a unique receiver. However, with the emergence of complex networks and cloud computing, recently the cryptographic community has been rethinking the notion of encryption to address security concerns that arise in these more complex environments.

In particular, the notion of functional encryption (FE) was introduced [SW05, SW08], with the first comprehensive formalizations of FE given in [BSW11, O'N10]. In FE, there is an authority that sets up public parameters and a master secret key. Encryption of a value x can be performed by any party that has the public parameters and x. Crucially, however, the master secret key can be used to generate limited "function keys." More precisely, for a given allowable function f, using the master secret key, it is possible to generate a function key SK_f. Applying this function key to an encryption of x yields only $f(x)$. In particular, an adversarial entity that holds an encryption of x and SK_f learns nothing more about x than what is learned by obtaining $f(x)$. It is not difficult to imagine how useful such a notion could be – the function f could enforce access control policies, or more generally only allow highly processed forms of data to be learned by the function key holder.

Our work: The case of dishonest authority and encryptor. However, either implicitly or explicitly, almost[1] all known prior work on FE has not considered the case where either the authority or the encryptor, or both, could be dishonest. This makes sense historically, since for traditional encryption, for example, there usually isn't a whole lot to be concerned about if the receiver that chooses the public/secret key pair is herself dishonest. However, as we now illustrate with examples, there are simple and serious concerns that arise for FE usage scenarios when the case of a dishonest authority and encryptor is considered:

- **Storing encrypted images:** Let us start with a motivating example for FE given in the paper of Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [BSW11] that initiated the systematic study of FE. Suppose that there is a cloud service on which customers store encrypted images. Law enforcement may require the cloud to search for images containing a particular face. Thus, customers would be required to provide to the cloud a restrictive decryption key which allows the cloud to decrypt images containing the target face (but nothing else). Boneh et al. argued that one could use functional encryption in such a setting to provide these restricted decryption keys.

  However, we observe that if we use functional encryption, then law enforcement inherently has to trust the customer to be honest, because the customer is acting as both the authority and the encryptor in this scenario. In particular, suppose that a malicious authority could create malformed ciphertexts and "fake" decryption keys that in fact do not provide the functionality guarantees required by law enforcement. Then, for example, law enforcement could be made to believe that there are no matching images, when in fact there might be several matching images.

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[1]One of the few counter-examples to this that we are aware of is the following works [Goy07, GLSW08, SS11] on Accountable Authority IBE that dealt with the very different problem of preventing a malicious authority that tries to sell decryption boxes.

A similar argument holds if the cloud is storing encrypted text or emails (and law enforcement would like to search for the presence of certain keywords or patterns).

- **Audits:** Next, we consider an even older example proposed in the pioneering work of Goyal, Pandey, Sahai, and Waters [GPSW06] to motivate Attribute-Based Encryption, a special case of FE. Suppose there is a bank that maintains large encrypted databases of the transactions in each of its branches. An auditor is required to perform a financial audit to certify compliance with various financial regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley. For this, the auditor would need access to certain types of data (such as logs of certain transactions) stored on the bank servers. However the bank does not wish to give the auditors access to the entire data (which would leak customer personal information, etc.). A natural solution is to have the bank use functional encryption. This would enable it to release a key to the auditor which selectively gives him access to only the required data.

  However, note that the entire purpose of an audit is to provide assurances even in the setting where the entity being audited is not trusted. What if either the system setup, or the encryption, or the decryption key generation is maliciously done? Again, with the standard notions of FE, all bets are off, since these scenarios are simply not considered.

Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, this (very basic) requirement of adversarial correctness *has not been previously captured* in the standard definitions of functional encryption. Indeed, it appears that many previous works overlooked this correctness requirement while envisioning applications of (different types of) functional encryption. The same issue also arises in the context of simpler notions of functional encryption such as identity based encryption (IBE), attribute based encryption (ABE), and predicate encryption (PE), which have been studied extensively [BF03, Wat05, SW05, GPSW06, KSW08, GVW13, GVW15].

In order to solve this problem, we define the notion of *Verifiable Functional Encryption*[2] (VFE). Informally speaking, in a VFE scheme, regardless of how the system setup is done, for each (possibly maliciously generated) ciphertext C that passes a publicly known verification procedure, there must exist a unique message m such that: for any allowed function description f and function key SK_f that pass another publicly known verification procedure, it must be that the decryption algorithm given C, SK_f, and f is guaranteed to output $f(m)$. In particular, this also implies that if two decryptions corresponding to functions f_1 and f_2 of the same ciphertext yield y_1 and y_2 respectively, then there must exist a single message m such that $y_1 = f_1(m)$ and $y_2 = f_2(m)$.

We stress that even the public parameter generation algorithm can be corrupted. As illustrated above, this is critical for security in many applications. The fact that the public parameters are corrupted means that we cannot rely on the public parameters to contain an honestly generated Common Random String or Common Reference String (CRS). This presents the main technical challenge in our work, as we describe further below.

1.1 Our Contributions for Verifiable Functional Encryption

Our work makes the following contributions with regard to VFE:

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[2]A primitive with the same name was also defined in [BF12]. However, their setting is entirely different to ours. They consider a scenario where the authority as well as the encryptor are honest. Their goal is to convince a weak client that the decryption (performed by a potentially malicious cloud service provider) was done correctly using the actual ciphertext and function secret key.

- We formally define verifiable functional encryption and study both indistinguishability and simulation-based security notions. Our definitions can adapt to all major variants and predecessors of FE, including IBE, ABE, and predicate encryption.

- We show that simulation based security is unconditionally impossible to achieve by constructing a one-message zero knowledge proof system from any simulation secure verifiable functional encryption scheme. Interestingly, we show the impossibility holds even in the most basic setting where there may only be a single key and a single ciphertext that is queried by the adversary (in contrast to ordinary functional encryption where we know of general positive results in such a setting from minimal assumptions [SS10]). Thus, in the rest of our work, we focus on the indistinguishability-based security notion.

- We give a generic compiler from any public-key functional encryption scheme to a verifiable public-key functional encryption scheme, with the only additional assumption being Decision Linear Assumption over Bilinear Groups (DLIN). Informally, we show the following theorem.

  Theorem 1. *(Informal) Assuming there exists a secure public key functional encryption scheme for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}$ and DLIN is true, there exists an explicit construction of a secure verifiable functional encryption scheme for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}$.*

  In the above, the DLIN assumption is used only to construct non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof systems. We show that NIWIs are necessary by giving an explicit construction of a NIWI from any verifiable functional encryption scheme. This compiler gives rise to various verifiable functional encryption schemes under different assumptions. Some of them have been summarized in the table below:

  Table 1: Our Results for Verifiable FE

Verifiable Functionality	Assumptions Needed
Verifiable IBE	BDH+Random Oracle[BF03]
Verifiable IBE	BDH+DLIN[Wat05]
Verifiable ABE for NC^1	DLIN[OT10, Tak14]
Verifiable ABE for all Circuits	LWE + DLIN[GVW13, BGG$^+$14]
Verifiable PE for all Circuits	LWE + DLIN[GVW15]
Verifiable FE for Inner Product Equality	DLIN[OT10, Tak14]
Verifiable FE for Inner Product	DLIN[ARW16]
Verifiable FE for Bounded Collusions	DLIN[SS10, GVW12]
Verifiable FE for Bounded Collusions	LWE + DLIN[GKP$^+$13]
Verifiable FE for all Circuits	iO + Injective OWF[GGH$^+$13]

  IBE stands for identity-based encryption, ABE for attribute-based encryption and PE for predicate encryption. The citation given in the assumption column shows a relevant paper that builds ordinary FE without verifiability for the stated function class.

- We next give a generic compiler for the *secret-key* setting. Namely, we convert from any secret-key functional encryption scheme to a verifiable secret-key functional encryption scheme with the only additional assumption being DLIN. Informally, we show the following theorem :

Theorem 2. *(Informal) Assuming there exists a message hiding and function hiding secret-key functional encryption scheme for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}$ and DLIN is true, there exists an explicit construction of a message hiding and function hiding verifiable secret-key functional encryption scheme for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}$.*

An Application: Non-Interactive Functional Commitments: In a traditional non-interactive commitment scheme, a committer commits to a message m which is revealed entirely in the decommitment phase. Analogous to the evolution of functional encryption from traditional encryption, we consider the notion of *functional commitments* which were recently studied in [LRY16] as a natural generalization of non-interactive commitments. In a functional commitment scheme, a committer commits to a message m using some randomness r. In the decommitment phase, instead of revealing the entire message m, for any function f agreed upon by both parties, the committer outputs a pair of values (a, b) such that using b and the commitment, the receiver can verify that $a = f(m)$ where m was the committed value. Similar to a traditional commitment scheme, we require the properties of hiding and binding. Roughly, hiding states that for any pair of messages (m_0, m_1), a commitment of m_0 is indistinguishable to a commitment of m_1 if $f(m_0) = f(m_1)$ where f is the agreed upon function. Informally, binding states that for every commitment c, there is a unique message m committed inside c.

We show that any verifiable functional encryption scheme directly gives rise to a non-interactive functional commitment scheme with no further assumptions.

Verifiable iO: As shown recently[AJ15, BV15, AJS15], functional encryption for general functions is closely tied to indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI+01, GGH+13]. In obfuscation, aside from the security of the obfuscated program, there is a fundamental question of whether the *correct* program was obfuscated. In particular, the recipient of the obfuscated program needs a guarantee that the program indeed does what it was intended to do.

Indeed, if someone hands you an obfuscated program, and asks you to run it, your first response might be to run away. After all, you have no idea what the obfuscated program does. Perhaps it contains backdoors or performs other problematic behavior. In general, before running an obfuscated program, it makes sense for the recipient to wait to be convinced that the program behaves in an appropriate way. More specifically, the recipient would want an assurance that only certain specific secrets are kept hidden inside it, and that it uses these secrets only in certain well-defined ways.

In traditional constructions of obfuscation, the obfuscator is assumed to be honest and no correctness guarantees are given to an honest evaluator if the obfuscator is dishonest. To solve this issue, we initiate a formal study of verifiability in the context of indistinguishability obfuscation, and show how to convert any iO scheme into a usefully verifiable iO scheme.

We note that verifiable iO presents some nontrivial modeling choices. For instance, of course, it would be meaningless if a verifiable iO scheme proves that a specific circuit C is being obfuscated – the obfuscation is supposed to hide exactly which circuit is being obfuscated. At the same time, of course every obfuscated program does correspond to some Boolean circuit, and so merely proving that there exists a circuit underlying an obfuscated program would be trivial. To resolve this modeling, we introduce a public predicate P, and our definition will require that there is a public verification procedure that takes both P and any maliciously generated obfuscated circuit $\tilde{C}$ as input. If this verification procedure is satisfied, then we know that there exists a circuit C equivalent to $\tilde{C}$ such that $P(C) = 1$. In particular, P could reveal almost everything about C,

and only leave certain specific secrets hidden. (We also note that our VFE schemes can also be modified to also allow for such public predicates to be incorporated there, as well.)

iO requires that given a pair (C_0, C_1) of equivalent circuits, the obfuscation of C_0 should be indistinguishable from the obfuscation of C_1. However, in our construction, we must restrict ourselves to pairs of circuits where this equivalence can be proven with a short witness. In other words, there should be an NP language L such that $(C_0, C_1) \in L$ implies that C_0 is equivalent to C_1. We leave removing this restriction as an important open problem. However, we note that, to the best of our knowledge, all known applications of iO in fact only consider pairs of circuits where proving equivalence is in fact easy given a short witness[3].

1.2 Technical Overview

At first glance, constructing verifiable functional encryption may seem easy. One naive approach would be to just compile any functional encryption (FE) system with NIZKs to achieve verifiability. However, note that this doesn't work, since if the system setup is maliciously generated, then the CRS for the NIZK would also be maliciously generated, and therefore soundness would not be guaranteed to hold.

Thus, the starting point of our work is to use a relaxation of NIZK proofs called non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof (NIWI) systems, that do guarantee soundness even without a CRS. However, NIWIs only guarantee witness indistinguishability, not zero-knowledge. In particular, if there is only one valid witness, then NIWIs do not promise any security at all. When using NIWIs, therefore, it is typically necessary to engineer the possibility of multiple witnesses.

A failed first attempt and the mismatch problem: Two parallel FE schemes. A natural initial idea would be to execute two FE systems in parallel and prove using a NIWI that at least one of them is fully correct: that is, its setup was generated correctly, the constituent ciphertext generated using this system was computed correctly and the constituent function secret key generated using this system was computed correctly. Note that the NIWI computed for proving correctness of the ciphertext will have to be separately generated from the NIWI computed for proving correctness of the function secret key.

This yields the *mismatch problem*: It is possible that in one of the FE systems, the ciphertext is maliciously generated, while in the other, the function secret key is! Then, during decryption, if either the function secret key or the ciphertext is malicious, all bets are off. In fact, several known FE systems [GKP+13, GGH+13] specifically provide for programming either the ciphertext or the function secret key to force a particular output during decryption.

Could we avoid the mismatch problem by relying on majority-based decoding? In particular, suppose we have three parallel FE systems instead of two. Here, we run into the following problem: If we prove that at least two of the three ciphertexts are honestly encrypting *the same* message, the NIWI may not hide this message at all: informally speaking, the witness structure has too few "moving parts", and it is not known how to leverage NIWIs to argue indistinguishability. On the other hand, if we try to relax the NIWI and prove only that at least two of the three ciphertexts are honestly encrypting *some* (possibly different) message, each ciphertext can no longer be associated with a unique message, and the mismatch problem returns, destroying verifiability.

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[3]For instance, suppose that C_0 uses an ordinary GGM PRF key, but C_1 uses a punctured GGM PRF key. It is easy to verify that these two keys are equivalent by simply verifying each node in the punctured PRF tree of keys by repeated application of the underlying PRG.

Let's take a look at this observation a bit more in detail in the context of functional commitments, which is perhaps a simpler primitive. Consider a scheme where the honest committer commits to the same message m thrice using a non-interactive commitment scheme. Let Z_1, Z_2, Z_3 be these commitments. Note that in the case of a malicious committer, the messages being committed m_0, m_1, m_2, may all be potentially different. In the decommitment phase, the committer outputs a and a NIWI proving that two out of the three committed values (say m_i and m_j) are such that $a = f(m_i) = f(m_j)$. With such a NIWI, it is possible to give a hybrid argument that proves the hiding property (which corresponds to indistinguishability in the FE setting). However, binding (which corresponds to verifiability) is lost: One can maliciously commit to m_0, m_1, m_2 such that they satisfy the following property : there exists functions f, g, h for which it holds that $f(m_0) = f(m_1) \neq f(m_2)$, $g(m_0) \neq g(m_1) = g(m_2)$ and $h(m_0) = h(m_2) \neq h(m_1)$. Now, if the malicious committer runs the decommitment phase for these functions separately, there is no fixed message bound by the commitment.

As mentioned earlier, one could also consider a scheme where in the decommitment phase, the committer outputs $f(m)$ and a NIWI proving that two out of the three commitments correspond to the same message m (i.e. there exists i, j such that $m_i = m_j$) and $f(m_i) = a$. The scheme is binding but does not satisfy hiding any more. This is because there is no way to move from a hybrid where all three commitments correspond to message m_0^* to one where all three commitments correspond to message m_1^*, since at every step of the hybrid argument, two messages out of three must be equal.

This brings out the reason why verifiability and security are two conflicting requirements. Verifiability seems to demand a majority of some particular message in the constituent ciphertexts whereas in the security proof, we have to move from a hybrid where the majority changes (from that of m_0^* to that of m_1^*). Continuing this way it is perhaps not that hard to observe that having any number of systems will not solve the problem. Hence, we have to develop some new techniques to solve the problem motivated above. This is what we describe next.

Our solution: Locked trapdoors. Let us start with a scheme with five parallel FE schemes. Our initial idea will be to *commit to the challenge constituent ciphertexts* as part of the public parameters, but we will need to introduce a twist to make this work, that we will mention shortly. Before we get to the twist, let's first see why having a commitment to the challenge ciphertext doesn't immediately solve the problem. Let's introduce a trapdoor statement for the relation used by the NIWI corresponding to the VFE ciphertexts. This trapdoor statement states that two of the constituent ciphertexts are encryptions of the same message and all the constituent ciphertexts are committed in the public parameters. Initially, the NIWI in the challenge ciphertext uses the fact that the trapdoor statement is correct with the indices 1 and 2 encrypting the same message m_0^*. The NIWIs in the function secret keys use the fact that the first four indices are secret keys for the same function. Therefore, this leaves the fifth index free (not being part of the NIWI in any function secret key or challenge ciphertext) and we can switch the fifth constituent challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of m_1^*. We can switch the indices used in the NIWI for the function secret keys (one at a time) appropriately to leave some other index free and transform the challenge ciphertext to encrypt m_0^* in the first two indices and m_1^* in the last three. We then switch the proof in the challenge ciphertext to use the fact that the last two indices encrypt the same message m_1^*. After this, in the same manner as above, we can switch the first two indices (one by one) of the challenge ciphertext to also encrypt m_1^*. This strategy will allow us to complete the proof of indistinguishability security.

Indeed, such an idea of committing to challenge ciphertexts in the public parameters has been used in the FE context before, for example in [GGH+13]. However, observe that if we do this, then verifiability is again lost, because recall that even the public parameters of the system are under the adversary's control! If a malicious authority generates a ciphertext using the correctness of the trapdoor statement, he could encrypt the tuple (m, m, m_1, m_2, m_3) as the set of messages in the constituent ciphertexts and generate a valid NIWI. Now, for some valid function secret key, decrypting this ciphertext may not give rise to a valid function output. The inherent problem here is that any ciphertext for which the NIWI is proved using the trapdoor statement and any honestly generated function secret key need not agree on a majority (three) of the underlying systems.

To overcome this issue, we introduce the idea of a *guided locking mechanism*. Intuitively, we require that the system cannot have both valid ciphertexts that use the correctness of the trapdoor statement and valid function secret keys. Therefore, we introduce a new "lock" in the public parameters. The statement being proved in the function secret key will state that this lock is a commitment of 1, while the trapdoor statement for the ciphertexts will state that the lock is a commitment of 0. Thus, we cannot simultaneously have valid ciphertexts that use the correctness of the trapdoor statement and valid function secret keys. This ensures verifiability of the system. However, while playing this cat and mouse game of ensuring security and verifiability, observe that we can no longer prove that the system is secure! In our proof strategy, we wanted to switch the challenge ciphertext to use the correctness of the trapdoor statement which would mean that no valid function secret key can exist in the system. But, the adversary can of course ask for some function secret keys and hence the security proof wouldn't go through.

We handle this scenario by introducing another trapdoor statement for the relation corresponding to the function secret keys. This trapdoor statement is similar to the honest one in the sense that it needs four of the five constituent function secret keys to be secret keys for the same function. Crucially, however, additionally, it states that if you consider the five constituent ciphertexts committed to in the public parameters, decrypting each of them with the corresponding constituent function secret key yields the same output. Notice that for any function secret key that uses the correctness of the trapdoor statement and any ciphertext generated using the correctness of its corresponding trapdoor statement, verifiability is not lost. This is because of the condition that all corresponding decryptions yield the same output. Indeed, for any function secret key that uses the correctness of the trapdoor statement and any ciphertext generated using the correctness of its non-trapdoor statement, verifiability is maintained. Thus, this addition doesn't impact the verifiability of the system.

Now, in order to prove security, we first switch every function secret key to be generated using the correctness of the trapdoor statement. This is followed by changing the lock in the public parameter to be a commitment of 1 and then switching the NIWI in the ciphertexts to use their corresponding trapdoor statement. The rest of the security proof unravels in the same way as before. After the challenge ciphertext is transformed into an encryption of message m_1^*, we reverse the whole process to switch every function secret key to use the real statement (and not the trapdoor one) and to switch the challenge ciphertext to use the corresponding real statement. Notice that the lock essentially guides the sequence of steps to be followed by the security proof as any other sequence is not possible. In this way, the locks *guide* the hybrids that can be considered in the security argument, hence the name "guided" locking mechanism for the technique. In fact, using these ideas, it turns out that just having four parallel systems suffices to construct verifiable functional encryption in the public key setting.

In the secret key setting, to achieve verifiability, we also have to commit to all the constituent master secret keys in the public parameters. However, we need an additional system (bringing the total back to five) because in order to switch a constituent challenge ciphertext from an encryption of m_0^* to that of m_1^*, we need to puncture out the corresponding master secret key committed in the public parameters. We observe that in the secret key setting, ciphertexts and function secret keys can be seen as duals of each other. Hence, to prove function hiding, we introduce indistinguishable modes and a switching mechanism. At any point in time, the system can either be in function hiding mode or in message hiding mode but not both. At all stages, verifiability is maintained using similar techniques.

Organisation: In section 2 we define the preliminaries used in the paper. In section 3, we give the definition of a verifiable functional encryption scheme. This is followed by the construction and proof of a verifiable functional encryption scheme in 4. In section 5, we give the construction of a secret key verifiable functional encryption scheme. Section 6 is devoted to the study of verifiable obfuscation. An application of verifiable functional encryption is in achieving functional commitments. This is described in Appendix H.

2 Preliminaries

Throughout the paper, let the security parameter be λ and let PPT denote a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. We defer the description of public key encryption and non-interactive commitment schemes to Appendix A.

2.1 One message WI Proofs

We will be extensively using one message witness indistinguishable proofs NIWI as provided by [GOS06].

Definition 1. *A pair of PPT algorithms $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ is a NIWI for an NP relation $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{L}$ if it satisfies:*

1. *Completeness: for every $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}_\mathcal{L}$, $Pr[\mathcal{V}(x, \pi) = 1 : \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(x, w)] = 1$.*

2. *(Perfect) Soundness: Proof system is said to be perfectly sound if there for every $x \notin L$ and $\pi \in \{0,1\}^*$*
   $Pr[\mathcal{V}(x, \pi) = 1] = 0$.

3. *Witness indistinguishability: for any sequence $\mathcal{I} = \{(x, w_1, w_2) : w_1, w_2 \in \mathcal{R}_\mathcal{L}(x)\}$*
   $\{\pi_1 : \pi_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(x, w_1)\}_{(x,w_1,w_2) \in \mathcal{I}} \approx_c \{\pi_2 : \pi_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(x, w_2)\}_{(x,w_1,w_2) \in \mathcal{I}}$

[GOS06] provides perfectly sound one message witness indistinguishable proofs based on the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption. [BOV07] also provides perfectly sound proofs (although less efficient) under a complexity theoretic assumption, namely that Hitting Set Generators against co-non deterministic circuits exist. [BP15] construct NIWI from one-way permutations and indistinguishability obfuscation.

3 Verifiable Functional Encryption

In this section we give the definition of a (public-key) verifiable functional encryption scheme. Let $\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{Y} = \{\mathcal{Y}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote ensembles where each $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and $\mathcal{Y}_\lambda$ is a finite set.

Let $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote an ensemble where each $\mathcal{F}_\lambda$ is a finite collection of functions, and each function $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ takes as input a string $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and outputs $f(x) \in \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$. A verifiable functional encryption scheme is similar to a regular functional encryption scheme with two additional algorithms (VerifyCT, VerifyK). Formally, VFE = (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec, VerifyCT, VerifyK) consists of the following polynomial time algorithms:

- Setup(1^λ). The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a master public key-secret key pair (MPK, MSK).

- Enc(MPK, x) $\rightarrow$ CT. The encryption algorithm takes as input a message $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and the master public key MPK. It outputs a ciphertext CT.

- KeyGen(MPK, MSK, f) $\rightarrow$ SK$_f$. The key generation algorithm takes as input a function $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$, the master public key MPK and the master secret key MSK. It outputs a function secret key SK$_f$.

- Dec(MPK, f, SK$_f$, CT) $\rightarrow y$ or $\perp$. The decryption algorithm takes as input the master public key MPK, a function f, the corresponding function secret key SK$_f$ and a ciphertext CT. It either outputs a string $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ or $\perp$. Informally speaking, MPK is given to the decryption algorithm for verification purpose.

- VerifyCT(MPK, CT) $\rightarrow 1/0$. Takes as input the master public key MPK and a ciphertext CT. It outputs 0 or 1. Intuitively, it outputs 1 if CT was correctly generated using the master public key MPK for some message x.

- VerifyK(MPK, f, SK) $\rightarrow 1/0$. Takes as input the master public key MPK, a function f and a function secret key SK$_f$. It outputs either 0 or 1. Intuitively, it outputs 1 if SK$_f$ was correctly generated as a function secret key for f.

The scheme has the following properties:

Definition 2. *(Correctness) A verifiable functional encryption scheme* VFE *for $\mathcal{F}$ is correct if for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and all $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{(MPK,MSK)} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{SK}_f \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{MPK}, \text{MSK}, f) \\ \text{Dec}(\text{MPK}, f, \text{SK}_f, \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x)) = f(x) \end{array} \right] = 1$$

Definition 3. *(Verifiability) A verifiable functional encryption scheme* VFE *for $\mathcal{F}$ is verifiable if, for all* MPK $\in \{0,1\}^*$, *for all* CT $\in \{0,1\}^*$, *there exists $x \in \mathcal{X}$ such that for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and* SK $\in \{0,1\}^*$, *if*

$$\text{VerifyCT}(\text{MPK}, \text{CT}) = 1 \text{ and } \text{VerifyK}(\text{MPK}, f, \text{SK}) = 1$$

then

$$\Pr \left[\text{Dec}(\text{MPK}, f, \text{SK}, \text{CT}) = f(x) \right] = 1$$

Remark. Intuitively, verifiability states that each ciphertext (possibly associated with a maliciously generated public key) should be associated with a unique message and decryption for a function f using any possibly maliciously generated key SK should result in $f(x)$ for that unique message $f(x)$ and nothing else (if the ciphertext and keys are verified by the respective algorithms).

We also note that a verifiable functional encryption scheme should satisfy perfect correctness. Otherwise, a non-uniform malicious authority can sample ciphertexts/keys from the space where it fails to be correct. Thus, the primitives that we will use in our constructions are assumed to have perfect correctness. Such primitives have been constructed before in the literature.

3.1 Indistinguishability Based Security

The indistinguishability based security for verifiable functional encryption is similar to the security notion of a functional encryption scheme. For completeness, we define it below. We also consider a {full/selective} CCA secure variant where the adversary, in addition to the security game described below, has access to a decryption oracle which takes a ciphertext and a function as input and decrypts the ciphertext with an honestly generated key for that function and returns the output. The adversary is allowed to query this decryption oracle for all ciphertexts of his choice except the challenge ciphertext itself.

We define the security notion for a verifiable functional encryption scheme using the following game $(\mathsf{Full} - \mathsf{IND})$ between a challenger and an adversary.

Setup Phase: The challenger $(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{vFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and then hands over the master public key MPK to the adversary.

Key Query Phase 1: The adversary makes function secret key queries by submitting functions $\mathsf{f} \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$. The challenger responds by giving the adversary the corresponding function secret key $\mathsf{SK_f} \leftarrow \mathsf{vFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{f})$.

Challenge Phase: The adversary chooses two messages $(\mathsf{m_0}, \mathsf{m_1})$ of the same size (each in $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$)) such that for all queried functions f in the key query phase, it holds that $\mathsf{f(m_0)} = \mathsf{f(m_1)}$. The challenger selects a random bit $\mathsf{b} \in \{0, 1\}$ and sends a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} \leftarrow \mathsf{vFE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{m_b})$ to the adversary.

Key Query Phase 2: The adversary may submit additional key queries $\mathsf{f} \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ as long as they do not violate the constraint described above. That is, for all queries f, it must hold that $\mathsf{f(m_0)} = \mathsf{f(m_1)}$.

Guess: The adversary submits a guess b' and wins if $b' = b$. The adversary's advantage in this game is defined to be $2 * |\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{b} = \mathsf{b}'] - 1/2|$.

We also define the *selective* security game, which we call $(\mathsf{sel} - \mathsf{IND})$ where the adversary outputs the challenge message pair even before seeing the master public key.

Definition 4. *A verifiable functional encryption scheme* VFE *is* { *selective, fully* } *secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the* $\{\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}, \mathsf{Full} - \mathsf{IND}\}$ *security game.*

Functional Encryption: In our construction, we will use functional encryption as an underlying primitive. Syntax of a functional encryption scheme is defined in [GGH+13]. It is similar to the syntax of a verifiable functional encryption scheme except that it doesn't have the VerifyCT and VerifyK algorithms, the KeyGen algorithm does not take as input the master public key and the decryption algorithm does not take as input the master public key and the function. Other than that, the security notions and correctness are the same. However, in general any functional encryption scheme is not required to satisfy the verifiability property.

3.2 Simulation Based Security

Many variants of simulation based security definitions have been proposed for functional encryption. In general, simulation security (where the adversary can request for keys arbitrarily) is shown to be impossible [AGVW13]. We show that even the weakest form of simulation based security is impossible to achieve for verifiable functional encryption. For completeness, simulation based security of a verifiable functional encryption scheme is defined in Appendix B.

Theorem 3. *There exists a family of functions, each of which can be represented as a polynomial sized circuit, for which there does not exist any simulation secure verifiable functional encryption scheme.*

Proof. Let L be a NP complete language. Let $\mathcal{R}$ be the relation for this language. $\mathcal{R} : \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}$, takes as input a string x and a polynomial sized (in the length of x) witness w and outputs 1 iff $x \in L$ and w is a witness to this fact. For any security parameter λ, let us define a family of functions $\mathcal{F}_\lambda$ as a family indexed by strings $y \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$. Namely, $\mathcal{F}_\lambda = \{\mathcal{R}(y, \cdot) \; \forall y \in \{0,1\}^\lambda\}$.

Informally speaking, any verifiable functional encryption scheme that is also simulation secure for this family implies the existence of one message zero knowledge proofs for L. The proof system is described as follows: the prover, who has the witness for any instance x of length λ, samples a master public key and master secret key pair for a verifiable functional encryption scheme with security parameter λ. Using the master public key, it encrypts the witness and samples a function secret key for the function $\mathcal{R}(x, \cdot)$. The verifier is given the master public key, the ciphertext and the function secret key. Informally, simulation security of the verifiable functional encryption scheme provides computational zero knowledge while perfect soundness and correctness follow from verifiability. A formal proof is shown in Appendix B. □

In a similar manner, we can rule out even weaker simulation based definitions in the literature where the simulator also gets to generate the function secret keys and the master public key. Interestingly, IND secure VFE for the circuit family described in the above proof implies one message witness indistinguishable proofs(NIWI) for NP and hence it is intuitive that we will have to make use of NIWI in our constructions.

Theorem 4. *There exists a family of functions, each of which can be represented as a polynomial sized circuit, for which (selective) IND secure verifiable functional encryption implies the existence of one message witness indistinguishable proofs for NP (NIWI).*

We prove the theorem in Appendix B.

The definition for verifiable secret key functional encryption is given in Appendix B.2 and the definition for verifiable multi-input functional encryption is given in Appendix C.1.2.

4 Construction of Verifiable Functional Encryption

In this section, we give a compiler from any $\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}$ secure public key functional encryption scheme to a $\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}$ secure verifiable public key functional encryption scheme. The techniques used in this construction have been elaborated upon in section **??**. The resulting verifiable functional encryption scheme has the same security properties as the underlying one - that is, the resulting scheme is q-query secure if the original scheme that we started out with was q-query secure and

so on, where q refers to the number of function secret key queries that the adversary is allowed to make. We prove the following theorem :

Theorem 5. *Let $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a parameterized collection of functions. Then, assuming there exists a $\mathsf{Sel - IND}$ secure public key functional encryption scheme FE for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}$, a non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof system, a non-interactive perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme, the proposed scheme VFE is a $\mathsf{Sel - IND}$ secure verifiable functional encryption scheme for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}$ according to definition 3.1.*

Notation : Without loss of generality, let's assume that every plaintext message is of length λ where λ denotes the security parameter of our scheme. Let $(\mathsf{Prove}, \mathsf{Verify})$ be a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proof system for NP, $\mathsf{FE} = (\mathsf{FE.Setup}, \mathsf{FE.Enc}, \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}, \mathsf{FE.Dec})$ be a $\mathsf{Sel - IND}$ secure public key functional encryption scheme, Com be a statistically binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme. Without loss of generality, let's say Com commits to a string bit-by-bit and uses randomness of length λ to commit to a single bit. We denote the length of ciphertexts in FE by $\mathsf{c\text{-}len} = \mathsf{c\text{-}len}(\lambda)$. Let $\mathsf{len} = 4 \cdot \mathsf{c\text{-}len}$.
Our scheme $\mathsf{VFE} = (\mathsf{VFE.Setup}, \mathsf{VFE.Enc}, \mathsf{VFE.KeyGen}, \mathsf{VFE.Dec}, \mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT},$
$\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK})$ is as follows:

- **Setup** $\mathsf{VFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ **:**
  The setup algorithm does the following:

    1. For all $i \in [4]$, compute $(\mathsf{MPK}_i, \mathsf{MSK}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; s_i)$ using randomness s_i.
    2. Set $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len}}; u)$ and $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1)$ where u, u_1 represent the randomness used in the commitment.

  The master public key is $\mathsf{MPK} = (\{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$.
  The master secret key is $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, u, u_1)$.

- **Encryption** $\mathsf{VFE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}, m)$ **:**
  To encrypt a message m, the encryption algorithm does the following:

    1. For all $i \in [4]$, compute $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m; r_i)$.
    2. Compute a proof $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y \in L$ using witness w where :
       $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$,
       $w = (m, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0, 0, 0^{|u|}, 0^{|u_1|})$.
       L is defined corresponding to the relation R defined below.

  Relation R :
  Instance : $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$
  Witness : $w = (m, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, i_1, i_2, u, u_1)$
  $R_1(y, w) = 1$ if and only if either of the following conditions hold :

    1. All 4 constituent ciphertexts encrypt the same message. That is,
       $\forall i \in [4], \mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m; r_i)$
       (OR)
    2. 2 constituent ciphertexts (corresponding to indices i_1, i_2) encrypt the same message, Z is a commitment to all the constituent ciphertexts and Z_1 is a commitment to 0. That is,

(a) $\forall i \in \{1_1, i_2\}$, $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m; r_i)$.

(b) $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$.

(c) $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$.

The output of the algorithm is the ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi)$.
π is computed for statement 1 of relation R.

- **Key Generation** $\mathsf{VFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK}, f)$:
  To generate the function secret key K^f for a function f, the key generation algorithm does the following:

  1. $\forall i \in [4]$, compute $\mathsf{K}_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i)$.

  2. Compute a proof $\gamma \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y \in L_1$ using witness w where:
     $y = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$,
     $w = (f, \{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0^3, 0^{|u|}, u_1)$.
     L_1 is defined corresponding to the relation R_1 defined below.

Relation R_1 :
Instance : $y = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$.
Witness : $w = (f, \{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, i_1, i_2, i_3, u, u_1)$
$R_1(y, w) = 1$ if and only if either of the following conditions hold :

1. Z_1 is a commitment to 1, all 4 constituent function secret keys are secret keys for the same function and are constructed using honestly generated public key-secret key pairs.

   (a) $\forall i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{K}_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i)$.

   (b) $\forall i \in [4]$, $(\mathsf{MPK}_i, \mathsf{MSK}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; s_i)$.

   (c) $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1)$.

   (OR)

2. 3 of the constituent function secret keys (corresponding to indices i_1, i_2, i_3) are keys for the same function and are constructed using honestly generated public key-secret key pairs, Z is a commitment to a set of ciphertexts CT such that each constituent ciphertext in CT when decrypted with the corresponding function secret key gives the same output. That is,

   (a) $\forall i \in \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i)$.

   (b) $\forall i \in \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$, $(\mathsf{MPK}_i, \mathsf{MSK}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; s_i)$.

   (c) $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$.

   (d) $\exists x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ such that $\forall i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i^f) = x$

The output of the algorithm is the function secret key $\mathsf{K}^f = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \gamma)$.
γ is computed for statement 1 of relation R_1.

- **Decryption** $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{K}^f, \mathsf{CT})$:
  This algorithm decrypts the ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi)$ using function secret key $\mathsf{K}^f = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \gamma)$ in the following way:

1. Let $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ be the statement corresponding to proof π. If $\mathsf{Verify}(y, \pi) = 0$, then stop and output $\bot$. Else, continue to the next step.

2. Let $y_1 = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ be the statement corresponding to proof γ. If $\mathsf{Verify}(y_1, \gamma) = 0$, then stop and output $\bot$. Else, continue to the next step.

3. For $i \in [4]$, compute $m_i = \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i^f)$. If at least 3 of the m_i's are equal (let's say that value is m), output m. Else, output $\bot$.

- **VerifyCT** $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{CT})$:
  Given a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi)$, this algorithm checks whether the ciphertext was generated correctly using master public key MPK. Let $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ be the statement corresponding to proof π. If $\mathsf{Verify}(y, \pi) = 1$, it outputs 1. Else, it outputs 0.

- **VerifyK** $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{K})$:
  Given a function f and a function secret key $\mathsf{K} = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \gamma)$, this algorithm checks whether the key was generated correctly for function f using the master secret key corresponding to master public key MPK. Let $y = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ be the statement corresponding to proof γ. If $\mathsf{Verify}(y, \gamma) = 1$, it outputs 1. Else, it outputs 0.

Correctness :
Correctness follows directly from the correctness of the underlying FE scheme, correctness of the commitment scheme and the completeness of the NIWI proof system.

4.1 Verifiability

Consider any master public key MPK and any ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi)$ such that $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{CT}) = 1$. Now, there are two cases possible for the proof π.

1. Statement 1 of relation R is correct :
   Therefore, there exists $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ such that $\forall i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m; r_i)$ where r_i is a random string. Consider any function f and function secret key $\mathsf{K} = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \gamma)$ such that $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{K}) = 1$. There are two cases possible for the proof γ.

   (a) Statement 1 of relation R_1 is correct :
       Therefore, $\forall i \in [4]$, K_i is a function secret key for the same function - f. That is, $\forall i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i')$ where r_i' is a random string. Thus, for all $i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Hence, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

   (b) Statement 2 of relation R_1 is correct :
       Therefore, there exists 3 indices i_1, i_2, i_3 such that $\mathsf{K}_{i_1}, \mathsf{K}_{i_2}, \mathsf{K}_{i_3}$ are function secret keys for the same function - f. That is, $\forall i \in \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i')$ where r_i' is a random string Thus, for all $i \in \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Hence, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

2. Statement 2 of relation R is correct:
   Therefore, $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$ and $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$ for some random strings u, u_1. Also, there exists 2 indices i_1, i_2 and a message $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ such that for $i \in \{i_1, i_2\}$, $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m; r_i)$ where r_i is a random string. Consider any function f and function secret key $\mathsf{K} = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \gamma)$ such that $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{K}) = 1$. There are two cases possible for the proof γ.

(a) Statement 1 of relation R_1 is correct :

Then, it must be the case that $Z_1 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1')$ for some random string u_1'. However, we already know that $Z_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$ and Com is a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Thus, this scenario isn't possible. That is, both $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{CT})$ and $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{K})$ can't be equal to 1.

(b) Statement 2 of relation R_1 is correct :

Therefore, there exists 3 indices i_1', i_2', i_3' such that $\mathsf{K}_{i_1'}, \mathsf{K}_{i_2'}, \mathsf{K}_{i_3'}$ are function secret keys for the same function - f. That is, $\forall i \in \{i_1', i_2', i_3'\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i')$ where r_i' is a random string. Thus, by pigeonhole principle, there exists $i^* \in \{i_1', i_2', i_3'\}$ such that $i^* \in \{i_1, i_2\}$ as well. Also, $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$ and $\forall i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i)$ is the same. Therefore, for the index i^*, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_{i^*}, \mathsf{K}_{i^*}) = f(m)$. Hence, $\forall i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Therefore, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

4.2   Security Proof

We now prove that the proposed scheme VFE is $\mathsf{Sel - IND}$ secure. We will prove this via a series of hybrid experiments $\mathsf{H}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{H}_{16}$ where H_1 corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit $b = 0$ and H_{16} corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit $b = 1$. The hybrids are summarized below in Table 4.2.

We briefly describe the hybrids below. A more detailed description can be found in Appendix E.

- **Hybrid H_1:** This is the real experiment with challenge bit $b = 0$. The master public key is $\mathsf{MPK} = (\{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ such that $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len}}; u)$ and $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1)$ for random strings u, u_1. The challenge ciphertext is $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi^*)$, where for all $i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m_0; r_i)$ for some random string r_i. π^* is computed for statement 1 of relation R.

- **Hybrid H_2:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$.

- **Hybrid H_3:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using indices $\{1, 2, 3\}$ as the set of 3 indices $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, \mathsf{MSK}_3, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_4|}, s_1, s_2, s_3,$ $0^{|s_4|}, r_1, r_2, r_3, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, 3, u, 0^{|u_1|})$.

- **Hybrid H_4:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_1 is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$.

- **Hybrid H_5:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 2 of relation R using indices $\{1, 2\}$ as the 2 indices $\{i_1, i_2\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (m, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, u, u_1)$.

- **Hybrid H_6:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the fourth component CT_4^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $\mathsf{CT}_4^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_4, m_1; r_4)$ for some random string r_4. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

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Hybrid	$(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	π^*	$\{K_i^f\}_{i\in[4]}$	γ	Z	Z_1	Security
H_1	(m_0, m_0, m_0, m_0)	1	(f, f, f, f)	1	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	$\mathsf{Com}(1)$	-
H_2	(m_0, m_0, m_0, m_0)	1	(f, f, f, f)	1	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(1)$	Com-Hiding
H_3	(m_0, m_0, m_0, m_0)	1	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(1)$	NIWI
H_4	(m_0, m_0, m_0, m_0)	1	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	Com-Hiding
H_5	(m_0, m_0, m_0, m_0)	2	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	NIWI
H_6	(m_0, m_0, m_0, m_1)	2	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	IND-secure FE
H_7	(m_0, m_0, m_0, m_1)	2	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	NIWI
H_8	(m_0, m_0, m_1, m_1)	2	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	IND-secure FE
H_9	(m_0, m_0, m_1, m_1)	2	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	NIWI
H_{10}	(m_0, m_1, m_1, m_1)	2	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	IND-secure FE
H_{11}	(m_0, m_1, m_1, m_1)	2	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	NIWI
H_{12}	(m_1, m_1, m_1, m_1)	2	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	IND-secure FE
H_{13}	(m_1, m_1, m_1, m_1)	1	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	NIWI
H_{14}	(m_1, m_1, m_1, m_1)	1	(f, f, f, f)	2	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(1)$	Com-Hiding
H_{15}	(m_1, m_1, m_1, m_1)	1	(f, f, f, f)	1	$\mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$	$\mathsf{Com}(1)$	NIWI
H_{16}	(m_1, m_1, m_1, m_1)	1	(f, f, f, f)	1	$\mathsf{Com}(0)$	$\mathsf{Com}(1)$	Com-Hiding

Table 5.2 : Here, (m_0, m_0, m_0, m_0) indicates the messages that are encrypted to form the challenge ciphertext $\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]}$. Similarly for the column $\{K_i^f\}_{i\in[4]}$. The column π^* (and γ) denote the statement proved by the proof in relation R (and R_1). The text in red indicates the difference from the previous hybrid. The text in blue denotes the indices used in the proofs π^* and γ. That is, the text in blue in the column $(\{CT_i^*\}_{i\in[4]})$ denotes the indices used in the proof π^* and the text in blue in the column $(\{K_i^f\}_{i\in[4]})$ denotes the indices used in the proof γ for every function secret key K^f corresponding to function f. In some cases, the difference is only in the indices used in the proofs π^* or γ and these are not reflected using red.

- **Hybrid H_7:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using indices $\{1, 2, 4\}$ as the set of 3 indices $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_3|}, \mathsf{MSK}_4, s_1, s_2, 0^{|s_3|},$
  $s_4, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, r_4, 1, 2, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$.

- **Hybrid H_8:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the third component CT_3^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_3^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_3, m_1; r_3)$ for some random string r_3.
  Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

- **Hybrid H_9:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 2 of relation R using message m_1 and indices $\{3, 4\}$ as the 2 indices $\{i_1, i_2\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (m_1, 0^{|r_1|}, 0^{|r_2|}, r_3, r_4, 3, 4, u, u_1)$.
  Also, for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using indices $\{1, 3, 4\}$ as the set of 3 indices $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_2|}, \mathsf{MSK}_3, \mathsf{MSK}_4, s_1,$
  $0^{|s_2|}, s_3, s_4, r_1, 0^{|r_2|}, r_3, r_4, 1, 3, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$.

- **Hybrid H_{10}**: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the second component CT_2^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_2^* = FE.Enc(MPK_2, m_1; r_2)$ for some random string r_2. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

- **Hybrid H_{11}**: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using indices $\{2, 3, 4\}$ as the set of 3 indices $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is
$w = (f, 0^{|MSK_1|}, MSK_2, MSK_3, MSK_4, 0^{|s_1|}, s_2, s_3,$
$s_4, 0^{|r_1|}, r_2, r_3, r_4, 2, 3, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$.

- **Hybrid H_{12}**: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the first component CT_1^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_1^* = FE.Enc(MPK_1, m_1; r_1)$ for some random string r_1. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

- **Hybrid H_{13}**: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 1 of relation R. The witness is
$w = (m_1, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0, 0, 0^{|u|}, 0^{|u_1|})$.

- **Hybrid H_{14}**: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_1 is computed differently. $Z_1 = Com(1; u_1)$.

- **Hybrid H_{15}**: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 1 of relation R_1. The witness is
$w = (f, \{MSK_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0^3, 0^{|u|}, u_1)$.

- **Hybrid H_{16}**: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z is computed differently. $Z = Com(0^{len}; u)$. This hybrid is identical to the real experiment with challenge bit $b = 1$.

Below we will prove that ($H_1 \approx_c H_2$) and ($H_5 \approx_c H_6$). The indistinguishability of other hybrids will follow along the same lines and is described in Appendix E.

Lemma 1. *($H_1 \approx_c H_2$). Assuming that* Com *is a (computationally) hiding commitment scheme, the outputs of experiments H_1 and H_2 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the commitment Z is computed. Let's consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ that interacts with a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ to break the hiding of the commitment scheme. Also, internally, it acts as the challenger in the security game with an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that tries to distinguish between H_1 and H_2. $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ executes the hybrid H_1 except that it does not generate the commitment Z on it's own. Instead, after receiving the challenge messages (m_0, m_1) from $\mathcal{A}$, it computes $CT^* = (\{CT_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi^*)$ as an encryption of message m_0 by following the honest encryption algorithm as in H_1 and H_2. Then, it sends two strings, namely (0^{len}) and $(\{CT_i^*\}_{i \in [4]})$ to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. In return, $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ receives a commitment Z corresponding to either the first or the second string. It then gives this to $\mathcal{A}$. Now, whatever bit b $\mathcal{A}$ guesses, $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ forwards the same guess to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ is a polynomial time algorithm and breaks the hiding property of Com unless $H_1 \approx_c H_2$. $\square$

Lemma 2. *($H_5 \approx_c H_6$). Assuming that* FE *is a* Sel $-$ IND *secure functional encryption scheme, the outputs of experiments* H_5 *and* H_6 *are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the challenge ciphertext is created. More specifically, in H_5, the fourth component of the challenge ciphertext CT_4^* is computed as an encryption of message m_0, while in H_6, CT_4^* is computed as an encryption of message m_1. Note that the proof π^* remains same in both the hybrids.

Let's consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$ that interacts with a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ to break the security of the underlying FE scheme. Also, internally, it acts as the challenger in the security game with an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that tries to distinguish between H_5 and H_6. $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$ executes the hybrid H_5 except that it does not generate the parameters (MPK_4, MSK_4) itself. It sets (MPK_4) to be the public key given by the challenger $\mathcal{C}$. After receiving the challenge messages (m_0, m_1) from $\mathcal{A}$, it forwards the pair (m_0, m_1) to the challenger $\mathcal{C}$ and receives a ciphertext CT which is either an encryption of m_0 or m_1 using public key MPK_4. $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$ sets $CT_4^* = CT$ and computes $CT^* = (\{CT_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi^*)$ as the challenge ciphertext as in H_5. Note that proof π^* is proved for statement 2 of relation R. It then sets the public parameter $Z = Com(\{CT_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$ and sends the master public key MPK and the challenge ciphertext CT^* to $\mathcal{A}$.

Now, whatever bit b $\mathcal{A}$ guesses, $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$ forwards the same guess to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$ is a polynomial time algorithm and breaks the security of the functional encryption scheme FE unless $H_5 \approx_c H_6$. □

5 Construction of Verifiable Secret Key Functional Encryption

In this section, we give a compiler from any Sel $-$ IND secure message hiding and function hiding secret key functional encryption scheme to a Sel $-$ IND secure message hiding and function hiding verifiable secret key functional encryption scheme. The resulting verifiable functional encryption scheme has the same security properties as the underlying one - that is, the resulting scheme is q-query secure if the original scheme that we started out with was q-query secure and so on, where q refers to the number of function secret key queries (or encryption queries) that the adversary is allowed to make. We prove the following theorem.

Theorem 6. *Let $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a parameterized collection of functions. Then, assuming there exists a* Sel $-$ IND *secure message hiding and function hiding secret key functional encryption scheme* FE *for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}$, a non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof system, a non-interactive perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme, the proposed scheme* VFE *is a* Sel $-$ IND *secure message hiding and function hiding verifiable secret key functional encryption scheme for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}$ according to definition C.1.*

Notation : Without loss of generality, let's assume that every plaintext message is of length λ where λ denotes the security parameter of our scheme and that the length of every function in $\mathcal{F}_\lambda$ is the same. Let (Prove, Verify) be a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proof system for NP, FE = (FE.Setup, FE.Enc, FE.KeyGen, FE.Dec) be a Sel $-$ IND secure message hiding and function hiding secret key functional encryption scheme, Com be a statistically binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme. Without loss of generality, let's say Com commits to a string bit-by-bit

and uses randomness of length λ to commit to a single bit. We denote the length of ciphertexts in FE by c-len = c-len(λ). Let the length of every function secret key in FE be k-len = k-len(λ). Let $\mathsf{len_{CT}} = 5 \cdot \mathsf{c\text{-}len}$ and $\mathsf{len_f} = 5 \cdot \mathsf{k\text{-}len}$.

Our scheme VFE = (VFE.Setup, VFE.Enc, VFE.KeyGen, VFE.Dec, VFE.VerifyCT, VFE.VerifyK) is as follows:

- **Setup** VFE.Setup(1^λ) :
  The setup algorithm does the following:

  1. For all $i \in [5]$, compute $(\mathsf{MSK}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; p_i)$ and $\mathsf{S}_i = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_i; s_i)$ using randomness s_i.

  2. Set $\mathsf{Z_{CT}} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len_{CT}}}; a)$ and $\mathsf{Z_f} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len_f}}; b)$ where a, b represents the randomness used in the commitments.

  3. For all $i \in [3]$, set $\mathsf{Z}_i = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_i)$ where u_i represents the randomness used in the commitment. Let's denote u-len = $|u_1| + |u_2| + |u_3|$.

  The public parameters are $\mathsf{PP} = (\{\mathsf{S}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{Z_{CT}}, \mathsf{Z_f}, \{\mathsf{Z}_i\}_{i \in [3]})$.
  The master secret key is $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \{p_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [5]}, a, b, \{u_i\}_{i \in [3]})$.

- **Encryption** VFE.Enc($\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, m$) :
  To encrypt a message m, the encryption algorithm does the following:

  1. For all $i \in [5]$, compute $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, m; r_i)$.

  2. Compute a proof $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y \in L$ using witness w where :
     $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{PP})$,
     $w = (m, \mathsf{MSK}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [5]}, 0^2, 5, 0)$.
     L is defined corresponding to the relation R defined below.

  Relation R :
  Instance : $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{PP})$
  Witness : $w = (m, \mathsf{MSK}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [5]}, i_1, i_2, j, k)$
  $R_1(y, w) = 1$ if and only if either of the following conditions hold :

  1. 4 out of the 5 constituent ciphertexts (except index j) encrypt the same message and are constructed using honestly generated secret keys. Also, Z_1 is a commitment to 1. That is,

     (a) $\forall i \in [5]/\{j\}$, $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, m; r_i)$.
     (b) $\forall i \in [5]/\{j\}$, $\mathsf{S}_i = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_i; s_i)$ and $\mathsf{MSK}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; p_i)$
     (c) $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1)$

     (OR)

  2. 2 constituent ciphertexts (corresponding to indices i_1, i_2) encrypt the same message and are constructed using honestly generated secret keys. $\mathsf{Z_{CT}}$ is a commitment to all the constituent ciphertexts, Z_2 is a commitment to 0 and Z_3 is a commitment to 1. That is,

     (a) $\forall i \in \{1_1, i_2\}$, $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, m; r_i)$.
     (b) $\forall i \in \{1_1, i_2\}$, $\mathsf{S}_i = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_i; s_i)$ and $\mathsf{MSK}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; p_i)$

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(c) $Z_{CT} = \mathsf{Com}(\{CT_i\}_{i\in[5]}; a)$.

(d) $Z_2 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_2)$.

(e) $Z_3 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_3)$.

(OR)

3. 4 out of 5 constituent ciphertexts (except for index k) encrypt the same message and are constructed using honestly generated secret keys. Z_f is a commitment to a set of function secret keys K such that each constituent function secret key in K when decrypted with the corresponding ciphertext gives the same output . That is,

(a) $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, $CT_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(MSK_i, m; r_i)$.

(b) $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, $S_i = \mathsf{Com}(MSK_i; s_i)$ and $MSK_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; p_i)$

(c) $Z_f = \mathsf{Com}(\{K_i\}_{i\in[5]}; b)$.

(d) $\exists x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ such that $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(CT_i, K_i) = x$

The output of the algorithm is the ciphertext $CT = (\{CT_i\}_{i\in[5]}, \pi)$.
π is computed for statement 1 of relation R.

- **Key Generation** $\mathsf{VFE.KeyGen}(PP, MSK, f)$ **:**
  To generate the function secret key K^f for a function f, the key generation algorithm does the following:

  1. $\forall i \in [5]$, compute $K_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(MSK_i, f; r_i)$.

  2. Compute a proof $\gamma \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y \in L_1$ using witness w where:
     $y = (\{K_i^f\}_{i\in[5]}, PP)$,
     $w = (f, MSK, \{r_i\}_{i\in[5]}, 0^3, 5, 0)$.
     L_1 is defined corresponding to the relation R_1 defined below.

  Relation R_1 :
  Instance : $y = (\{K_i^f\}_{i\in[5]}, PP)$.
  Witness : $w = (f, MSK, \{r_i\}_{i\in[5]}, i_1, i_2, j, k)$
  $R_1(y, w) = 1$ if and only if either of the following conditions hold :

  1. 4 out of 5 constituent function secret keys (except index j) are keys for the same function and are constructed using honestly generated secret keys. Also, Z_2 is a commitment to 1. That is,

  (a) $\forall i \in [5]/\{j\}$, $K_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(MSK_i, f; r_i)$.

  (b) $\forall i \in [5]/\{j\}$, $S_i = \mathsf{Com}(MSK_i; s_i)$ and $MSK_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; p_i)$

  (c) $Z_2 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1)$

  (OR)

  2. 4 out of 5 constituent function secret keys (except index k) are keys for the same function and are constructed using honestly generated secret keys. Z_{CT} is a commitment to a set of ciphertexts CT such that each constituent ciphertext in CT when decrypted with the corresponding function secret key gives the same output . That is,

  (a) $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, $K_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(MSK_i, f; r_i)$.

(b) $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, $\mathsf{S}_i = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_i; s_i)$ and $\mathsf{MSK}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; p_i)$

(c) $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}} = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{CT}; a)$.

(d) $\exists x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ such that $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i^f) = x$

(OR)

3. 2 constituent function secret keys (corresponding to indices i_1, i_2) are keys for the same function and are constructed using honestly generated secret keys. Z_{f} is a commitment to all the constituent function secret keys, Z_1 is a commitment to 0 and Z_3 is a commitment to 0. That is,

(a) $\forall i \in \{1_1, i_2\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i)$.

(b) $\forall i \in \{1_1, i_2\}$, $\mathsf{S}_i = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_i; s_i)$ and $\mathsf{MSK}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; p_i)$

(c) $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{f}} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [5]}; b)$.

(d) $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$.

(e) $\mathsf{Z}_3 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_3)$.

The output of the algorithm is the function secret key $\mathsf{K}^f = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [5]}, \gamma)$.
γ is computed for statement 1 of relation R_1.

- **Decryption** $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}^f, \mathsf{CT})$:
  This algorithm decrypts the ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \pi)$ using function secret key $\mathsf{K}^f = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [5]}, \gamma)$ in the following way:

  1. Let $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{PP})$ be the statement corresponding to proof π. If $\mathsf{Verify}(y, \pi) = 0$, then stop and output $\perp$. Else, continue to the next step.

  2. Let $y_1 = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{PP})$ be the statement corresponding to proof γ. If $\mathsf{Verify}(y_1, \gamma) = 0$, then stop and output $\perp$. Else, continue to the next step.

  3. For $i \in [5]$, compute $m_i = \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i^f)$. If at least 3 of the m_i's are equal (let's say that value is m), output m. Else, output $\perp$.

- **VerifyCT** $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{CT})$:
  Given a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \pi)$, this algorithm checks whether the ciphertext was generated correctly using the master secret key corresponding to the public parameters PP. Let $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{PP})$ be the statement corresponding to proof π. If $\mathsf{Verify}(y, \pi) = 1$, it outputs 1. Else, it outputs 0.

- **VerifyK** $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K})$:
  Given a function secret key $\mathsf{K} = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \gamma)$, this algorithm checks whether the key was generated correctly for some function using the master secret key corresponding to public parameters PP. Let $y = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{PP})$ be the statement corresponding to proof γ. If $\mathsf{Verify}(y, \gamma) = 1$, it outputs 1. Else, it outputs 0.

Correctness :
Correctness follows directly from the correctness of the underlying FE scheme, correctness of the commitment scheme and the completeness of the NIWI proof system.

The proofs for verifiability and security are given in Appendix F.

Verifiable Multi-Input Functional Encryption : We also study verifiability in the case of multi-input functional encryption. The construction (and proofs) of a verifiable multi-input functional encryption scheme are given in Appendix F.3.

6 Verifiable Indistinguishability Obfuscation

In this section, we first we recall the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation that was first proposed by [BGI+01] and then define the notion of verifiable indistinguishability obfuscation. For indistinguishability obfuscation, intuitively, we require that for any two circuits C_0 and C_1 that are "functionally equivalent" (i.e for all inputs x in the domain, $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$, the obfuscation of C_0 must be computationally indistinguishable from the obfuscation of C_1. Below, we present the formal definition following the syntax of [GGH+13].

Definition 5. *(Indistinguishability Obfuscation) A uniform PPT machine* iO *is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class* $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ *if the following conditions are satisfied:*

- *Functionality :*
  For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, *every* $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, *every input* x *to* C :

  $$Pr[(\mathsf{iO}(C))(x) \neq C(x)] <= negl(|C|),$$

  where the probability is over the coins of iO.

- *Polynomial Slowdown :*
  There exists a polynomial q *such that for every* $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ *and every* $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, *we have that* $|\mathsf{iO}(C)| <= q(|C|)$.

- *Indistinguishability :*
  For all PPT distinguishers D, *there exists a negligible function* α *such that for every* $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, *for all pairs of circuits* $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, *we have that if* $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$ *for all inputs* x, *then*

  $$|Pr[D(\mathsf{iO}(C_0))] - Pr[D(\mathsf{iO}(C_1))]| <= \alpha(\lambda)$$

  .

Definition 6. *($(L, \mathcal{C})-$Restricted Verifiable Indistinguishability Obfuscation) Let* $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ *denote an ensemble where each* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ *is a finite collection of circuits. Let* L *be any language in* NP *defined by a relation* R *satisfying the following two properties:*

1. *For any two circuits* $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}$, *if there exists a string* w *such that* $R(C_0, C_1, w) = 1$, *then* C_0 *is equivalent to* C_1.

2. *For any circuit* $C \in \mathcal{C}$, $R(C, C, 0) = 1$.

Let $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$ *be the ensemble of inputs to circuits in* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$. *Let* $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ *be an ensemble where each* $\mathcal{P}_\lambda$ *is a collection of predicates and each predicate* $\mathsf{P} \in \mathcal{P}_\lambda$ *takes as input a circuit* $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ *and outputs a bit. A verifiable indistinguishability obfuscation scheme consists of the following algorithms:*

- $\mathsf{vi}\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C, P \in \mathcal{P}_\lambda) \to \widehat{C}$. $\mathsf{vi}\mathcal{O}$ is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ, a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ and a predicate P in $\mathcal{P}_\lambda$. It outputs an obfuscated circuit $\widehat{C}$.

- $\mathsf{Eval}(\widehat{C}, x, P \in \mathcal{P}_\lambda) \to y$. Eval_P is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an obfuscation $\widehat{C}$, an input x and a predicate P in $\mathcal{P}_\lambda$. It outputs a string y.

The scheme must satisfy the following properties :

- *Functionality :*
  For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, every $\mathsf{P} \in \mathcal{P}_\lambda$ such that $\mathsf{P}(C) = 1$ and every input x to C :

$$Pr[\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{vi}\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C, P), x, P) \neq C(x)] = 0,$$

  where the probability is over the coins of $\mathsf{vi}\mathcal{O}$.

- *Polynomial Slowdown :*
  There exists a polynomial q such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ and every $\mathsf{P} \in \mathcal{P}_\lambda$, we have that $|\mathsf{vi}\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C, \mathsf{P})| <= q(|C| + |\mathsf{P}| + \lambda)$. We also require that the running time of $Eval$ on input $(\widehat{C}, x, \mathsf{P})$ is polynomially bounded in $|P| + \lambda + |\widehat{C}|$

- *Indistinguishability :*
  We define indistinguishability with respect to two adversaries $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$. We place no restriction on the running time of $\mathcal{A}_1$. On input 1^λ $\mathcal{A}_1$ outputs two equivalent circuits (C_0, C_1) in $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$, such that $(C_0, C_1) \in L$. For all PPT distinguishers $\mathcal{A}_2$, there exists a negligible function α such that for every $\lambda \in N$, for pairs of circuits (C_0, C_1) and for all predicates $\mathsf{P} \in \mathcal{P}_\lambda$, we have that if $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$ for all inputs x and $\mathsf{P}(C_0) = \mathsf{P}(C_1)$, then

$$|Pr[\mathcal{A}_2(\mathsf{vi}\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_0, P))] - Pr[\mathcal{A}_2(\mathsf{vi}\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_1, P))]| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

- *Verifiability :*
  In addition to the above algorithms, there exists an additional deterministic polynomial time algorithm **VerifyO** that takes as input a string in $\{0,1\}^*$ and a predicate $\mathsf{P} \in \mathcal{P}_\lambda$. It outputs 1 or 0. We say that the obfuscator $\mathsf{vi}\mathcal{O}$ is verifiable if : For any $\mathsf{P} \in \mathcal{P}_\lambda$ and $\widehat{C} \in \{0,1\}^*$, if **VerifyO**$(\widehat{C}, \mathsf{P}) = 1$, then there exists a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ such that $P(C) = 1$ and for all $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, $\mathsf{Eval}(\widehat{C}, x, \mathsf{P}) = C(x)$.

6.1 Construction

Let $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}\}_\lambda$ be the set of all polynomial sized circuits and let L_{eq} be an NP language given by some relation R_{eq}.
Relation R_{eq}:
Instance: C', D'
Witness: γ
$\mathsf{R}_{eq}(C', D', \pi) = 1$ implies that :

1. $C' = D' \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ for some $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. That is, both circuits are equal. (OR)

2. $C', D' \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, and there exists a witness γ of size $\mathsf{poly}(|C'|, |D'|)$ proving that C' is functionally equivalent to D'.

We now construct an $(L_{eq}, \mathcal{C})-$restricted verifiable indistinguishability obfuscation scheme. Let iO be a perfectly correct indistinguishability obfuscator and $(\mathsf{Prove}, \mathsf{Verify})$ be a NIWI for NP. Formally, we prove the following theorem:

Theorem 7. *Assuming NIWI is a witness indistinguishable proof system and iO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$, the proposed scheme viO is a secure $(L_{eq}, \mathcal{C})-$restricted verifiable indistinguishability obfuscator.*

$\underline{\mathsf{viO}(\mathbf{1}^\lambda, \mathbf{C}, \mathsf{P})}$: The obfuscator does the following.

- Compute $C^i = \mathsf{iO}(C; r_i) \ \forall i \in [3]$.

- Compute a NIWI proof π for the following statement $(\mathsf{P}, C^1, C^2, C^3) \in L$ using witness $(1, 2, C, C, r_1, r_2, 0)$ where L is an NP language defined by the following relation R_1 where
  Relation R_1
  Instance: $y = (\mathsf{P}, C^1, C^2, C^3)$
  Witness: $w = (i, j, C_i, C_j, r_i, r_j, \gamma)$
  $\mathsf{R}_1(y, w) = 1$ if and only if:

  1. $C^i = \mathsf{iO}(C_i; r_i)$ and $C^j = \mathsf{iO}(C_j; r_j)$ where $i \neq j$ and $i, j \in [3]$. (AND)
  2. $\mathsf{P}(C^i) = \mathsf{P}(C^j) = 1$ (AND)
  3. $R_{eq}(C_i, C_j, \gamma) = 1$.

- Output (C^1, C^2, C^3, π) as the obfuscation.

$\underline{\mathsf{Eval}(\mathcal{O} = (\mathbf{C^1}, \mathbf{C^2}, \mathbf{C^3}, \pi), \mathbf{x}, \mathsf{P})}$: To evaluate:

- Verify the proof π. Output $\perp$ if the verification fails.

- Otherwise, output the majority of $\{C^i(x)\}_{i \in [3]}$.

We now investigate the properties of this scheme.

Correctness: By completeness of NIWI and correctness of the obfuscator iO it is straightforward to see that our obfuscator is correct.

Verifiability: We now present the algorithm **VerifyO**. It takes as input an obfuscation (C^1, C^2, C^3, π) and a predicate P. It outputs 1 if π verifies and 0 otherwise. Note that if π verifies then there are two indices $i, j \in [3]$ such that C^i (C^j) is an iO obfuscation of some circuit C_i (C_j) and it holds that $\mathsf{P}(C_i) = \mathsf{P}(C_j) = 1$. Also, either $C_i = C_j$ or C_i is equivalent to C_j (due to the soundness of NIWI). Hence, the evaluate algorithm always outputs $C_i(x)$ on any input x due to perfect correctness of iO.

Security Proof :
Let P be a predicate and (C_0, C_1) be any two equivalent circuits in $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ such that $P(C_0) = P(C_1) = 1$ and there exists a string γ_1 such that $\mathsf{R}_{eq}(C_0, C_1, \gamma_1) = 1$. Let (C^1, C^2, C^3, π) be the challenge obfuscated circuit. We now define indistinguishable hybrids such that the first hybrid (Hybrid_0) corresponds to the real world security game where the challenger obfuscates C_0 and the final hybrid (Hybrid_5) corresponds to the security game where the challenger obfuscates C_1.

- **Hybrid$_0$** : In this hybrid, $C^i = i\mathcal{O}(C_0; r_i)$ $\forall i \in [3]$ and $(1, 2, C_0, C_0, r_1, r_2, 0)$ is used as a witness to compute π.

- **Hybrid$_1$** : This hybrid is same as the previous hybrid except that C^3 is computed as $C^3 = i\mathcal{O}(C_1; r_3)$.

- **Hybrid$_2$** : This hybrid is same as the previous hybrid except that the witness used to compute π is$(1, 3, C_0, C_1, r_1, r_2, \gamma_1)$ where γ_1 is the witness for the statement $(C_0, C_1) \in L_{eq}$.

- **Hybrid$_3$** : This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that C^2 is computed as $C^2 = i\mathcal{O}(C_1; r_2)$.

- **Hybrid$_4$** : This hybrid is same as the previous hybrid except that the witness used to compute π is $(2, 3, C_1, C_1, r_1, r_2, 0)$.

- **Hybrid$_5$** : This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that $C^1 = i\mathcal{O}(C_1; r_1)$. This hybrid corresponds to the real world security game where the challenger obfuscates C_1.

Now, we prove indistinguishability of the hybrids.

Lemma 3. *Assuming* $i\mathcal{O}$ *is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$, Hybrid$_0$ *is computationally indistinguishable from* Hybrid$_1$.

Proof. Note that the only difference between Hybrid$_0$ and Hybrid$_1$ is the way C^3 is generated. In Hybrid$_0$, it is generated as an obfuscation of C_0, while in Hybrid$_1$ it is generated as an obfuscation of C_1. Since C_0 and C_1 are equivalent the lemma now follows from the security of $i\mathcal{O}$. $\square$

Lemma 4. *Assuming* NIWI *is a witness indistinguishable proof system,* Hybrid$_1$ *is computationally indistinguishable from* Hybrid$_2$.

Proof. Note that the only difference between Hybrid$_1$ and Hybrid$_2$ is the way in which π is generated. In Hybrid$_1$ it uses $(1, 2, C_0, C_0, r_1, r_2, 0)$ as its witness while in Hybrid$_2$ it uses $(1, 3, C_0, C_1, r_1, r_2, \gamma_1)$ as its witness where γ_1 is the witness for the instance (C_0, C_1) satisfying the relation $\mathsf{R_{eq}}$. The lemma now follows due to the witness indistinguishability of NIWI. $\square$

Lemma 5. *Assuming* $i\mathcal{O}$ *is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$, Hybrid$_2$ *is computationally indistinguishable from* Hybrid$_3$.

Proof. Note that the only difference between Hybrid$_2$ and Hybrid$_3$ is the way C^2 is generated. In Hybrid$_2$, it is generated as an obfuscation of C_0, while in Hybrid$_3$ it is generated as an obfuscation of C_1. Since C_0 and C_1 are equivalent the lemma now follows from the security of $i\mathcal{O}$. $\square$

Lemma 6. *Assuming* NIWI *is a witness indistinguishable proof system,* Hybrid$_3$ *is computationally indistinguishable from* Hybrid$_4$.

Proof. Note that the only difference between Hybrid$_3$ and Hybrid$_4$ is the way π is generated. In Hybrid$_3$ it uses $(1, 3, C_0, C_1, r_1, r_3, \gamma_1)$ as its witness while in Hybrid$_4$ it uses $(2, 3, C_1, C_1, r_2, r_3, 0)$ as its witness where γ_1 is the witness for the instance (C_0, C_1) satisfying the relation $\mathbf{R_{eq}}$. The lemma now follows due to the witness indistinguishability of NIWI. $\square$

Lemma 7. *Assuming* iO *is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$*,* Hybrid$_4$ *is computationally indistinguishable from* Hybrid$_5$*.*

Proof. Note that the only difference between Hybrid$_4$ and Hybrid$_5$ is the way C^1 is generated. In Hybrid$_4$ it is generated as an obfuscation of C_0, while in Hybrid$_5$ it is generated as an obfuscation of C_1. Since C_0 and C_1 are equivalent the lemma now follows from the security of iO. $\square$

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A   Preliminaries

A.1   Public Key Encryption

A public key encryption scheme PKE over a message space $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ consists of three algorithms (PKE.Setup, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec). Here, $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$ denotes the set of all strings of length λ. The algorithm PKE.Setup takes the security parameter 1^λ as input and outputs the public key pk and secret key sk of the scheme. The algorithm PKE.Enc takes the public key pk and a message $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ as input and outputs a ciphertext c that is an encryption of x. The algorithm PKE.Dec takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext c as input and outputs a message x which is the decryption of c.

- **Correctness:** A public key encryption scheme PKE is said to be correct if for all messages $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$:

$$\Pr[(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{PKE.Setup}(1^\lambda); \mathsf{PKE.Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{PKE.Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, x; r)) \neq x] \leqslant \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

- **Semantic Security:** A public key encryption scheme PKE is said to be semantically secure if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds:

$$\Pr\left[b = b' \;\middle|\; \begin{array}{l} (\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{PKE.Setup}(1^\lambda); (x_0, x_1, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{pk}); \\ b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}; c = \mathsf{PKE.Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, x_b; r); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c, st) \end{array}\right] \leqslant \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

A.2 Commitment Schemes

A commitment scheme Com is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a string x and randomness r and outputs $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(x, r)$. A perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme must satisfy the following properties:

- **Perfectly Binding**: Two different strings cannot have the same commitment.
  More formally, $\forall x_1 \neq x_2, r_1, r_2, \ \mathsf{Com}(x_1; r_1) \neq \mathsf{Com}(x_2; r_2)$.

- **Computational Hiding**: For all strings x_0 and x_1 (of the same length), for all *non-uniform* PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have that:
  $|Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{Com}(x_0) = 1] - Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{Com}(x_1) = 1]| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$

In our constructions, we will use a standard non interactive perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme. Such a commitment scheme can be based on one way permutations.

B Simulation Secure Verifiable Functional Encryption

In this section, we first formally define simulation secure verifiable functional encryption.

Definition 7. *(SIM-Security) Let* VFE *denote a functional encryption scheme for a function family* $\mathcal{F}$. *For every PPT adversary* $\mathsf{B} = (\mathsf{B}_1, \mathsf{B}_2)$ *and a PPT simulator* Sim, *consider the following two experiments:*

$\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{real}}_{\mathsf{vFE},\mathsf{B}}(1^\lambda)$ $\hspace{6cm}$ $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ideal}}_{\mathsf{vFE},\mathsf{B},\mathsf{Sim}}(1^\lambda)$

$$\{\mathsf{vFE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK})\}$$

$$\mathsf{B}_1(\mathsf{MPK}) \rightarrow (\mathsf{f}, \mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{B}_1})$$

$$\{\mathsf{SK}_{\mathsf{f}} \leftarrow \mathsf{vFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{f})\}$$

$$\mathsf{B}_2(\mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{B}_1}, \mathsf{SK}_{\mathsf{f}}) \rightarrow (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{B}_2})$$

$\mathsf{vFE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{x}) \rightarrow \mathsf{CT}$ $\hspace{5cm}$ $\mathsf{Sim}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{f}, \mathsf{SK}_{\mathsf{f}}, \mathsf{f}(\mathsf{x})) \rightarrow \tilde{\mathsf{CT}}$
Output $(\mathsf{CT}, \mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{B}_2})$ $\hspace{6cm}$ *Output* $(\tilde{\mathsf{CT}}, \mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{B}_2})$

The scheme is said to be (single-key) SIM-secure if there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for all PPT adversaries $(\mathsf{B}_1, \mathsf{B}_2)$, *the outcomes of the two experiments are computationally indistinguishable:*

$$\{\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{real}}_{\mathsf{vFE},\mathsf{B}}(1^\lambda)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \approx_{\mathsf{c}} \{\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ideal}}_{\mathsf{vFE},\mathsf{B},\mathsf{Sim}}(1^\lambda)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$$

B.1 Proof of Theorem 3

Consider the following proof system $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ for an NP language L with relation $\mathcal{R}$ (modeled as a circuit).

- $\mathcal{P}(x, w)$: Run $(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{vFE.Setup}(1^{|x|})$.
  Output $\pi = (\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{VFE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}, w), \mathsf{VFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathcal{R}(x, \cdot)))$.

- $\mathcal{V}(\pi, x)$: Parse $\pi = (\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{CT}, \mathsf{SK}_{\mathcal{R}(x,\cdot)})$; if $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathcal{R}(x,\cdot), \mathsf{SK}_{\mathcal{R}(x,\cdot)}, \mathsf{CT}) = 1$, output accept. Else, output reject.

We now examine the properties of the proof system described above.

(Perfect) Completeness: This follows from the correctness of the underlying verifiable functional encryption scheme. An honest prover will run the setup of the VFE scheme honestly and will also run the encryption and key generation honestly. Such a proof will always be accepted.

(Perfect) Soundness: Suppose $x \notin L$ and there is a proof $\pi = (\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{SK}_{\mathcal{R}(x,\cdot)}, \mathsf{CT})$ that is accepted by the receiver. Therefore, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathcal{R}(x,\cdot), \mathsf{SK}_{\mathcal{R}(x,\cdot)}, \mathsf{CT}) = 1$. By the verifiability property, this implies that the underlying message in the ciphertext is a witness to $x \in L$.

(Computational) Zero Knowledge: Due to the existence of the simulator Sim, the simulated proof for any statement can be generated as follows:

1. Compute $(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.Setup}(1^{|x|})$ and $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}, \mathcal{R}(x,\cdot))$.

2. Compute $\tilde{\mathsf{CT}} \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathcal{R}(x,\cdot), \mathsf{SK}, 1)$.

3. Output $(\mathsf{MPK}, \tilde{\mathsf{CT}}, \mathsf{SK})$.

Note that by the definition of simulation based security, the simulated proof is computationally indistinguishable from a genuine proof. Thus, simulation secure verifiable functional encryption implies the existence of one message zero knowledge for NP, which is known to be impossible. Hence, proved.

B.2 Proof of Theorem 4

Let the desired family of circuits $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ and the proof system be the same as described in the previous theorem. Soundness and completeness follow directly. It only remains to prove computational witness indistinguishability of the proof system. If there is an adversary B that breaks witness indistinguishability of the proof system, we construct an adversary A that breaks the security of the verifiable functional encryption scheme. The adversary A sends (w_0, w_1) i.e. two witnesses for x to the challenger for the VFE scheme and gets MPK and CT in return (where CT is either an encryption of w_0 or an encryption of w_1). Then, A queries for the function key SK corresponding to the function $\mathcal{R}(x,\cdot)$ to the verifiable functional encryption challenger. A sends $(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT})$ to the NIWI adversary B and outputs whatever B outputs. Note that if the advantage of A in breaking the security of the functional encryption scheme is non-negligible, then so is the advantage of B in breaking the witness indistinguishability of the proof system.

C Verifiable Secret Key Functional Encryption

In this section, we define verifiable secret key functional encryption. Let $\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{Y} = \{\mathcal{Y}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote ensembles where each $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and $\mathcal{Y}_\lambda$ is a finite set. Let $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote an ensemble where each $\mathcal{F}_\lambda$ is a finite collection of functions, and each function $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ takes as input a string $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and outputs $f(x) \in \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$. Similar to a secret key functional encryption scheme, a verifiable secret key functional encryption scheme $\mathsf{VFE} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{VerifyCT}, \mathsf{VerifyK})$ consists of the following polynomial time algorithms:

- Setup(1^λ). The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs the public parameters PP and the master secret key MSK.

- Enc(PP, MSK, x) $\to$ CT. The encryption algorithm takes as input a message $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, the public parameters PP and the master secret key MSK. It outputs a ciphertext CT.

- KeyGen(PP, MSK, f) $\to$ SK$_f$. The key generation algorithm takes as input a function $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$, the public parameters PP and the master secret key MSK. It outputs a function secret key SK$_f$.

- Dec(PP, SK$_f$, CT) $\to y$ or $\perp$. The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP, a function secret key SK$_f$ and a ciphertext CT. It either outputs a string $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ or $\perp$. Informally speaking, PP is given to the decryption algorithm for verification purpose.

- VerifyCT(PP, CT) $\to 1/0$. Takes as input the public parameters PP and a ciphertext CT. It outputs 0 or 1. Intuitively, it outputs 1 if CT was correctly generated using the master secret key MSK for some message x.

- VerifyK(PP, SK) $\to 1/0$. Takes as input the public parameters PP, and a function secret key SK. It outputs either 0 or 1. Intuitively, it outputs 1 if SK was correctly generated as a function secret key for some function.

The scheme has the following properties:

Definition 8. *(Correctness) A verifiable secret key functional encryption scheme* VFE *for $\mathcal{F}$ is correct if for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and all $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{c} (\text{PP,MSK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{SK}_f \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}, f) \\ \text{Dec}(\text{PP}, \text{SK}_f, \text{Enc}(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}, x)) = f(x) \end{array} \right] = 1$$

Definition 9. *(Verifiability) A verifiable secret key functional encryption scheme* VFE *for $\mathcal{F}$ is verifiable if, for all* PP $\in \{0,1\}^*$, *for all* CT $\in \{0,1\}^*$, *there exists $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and for all* SK $\in \{0,1\}^*$, *there exists $f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that: if*

$$\text{VerifyCT}(\text{PP}, \text{CT}) = 1 \ and \ \text{VerifyK}(\text{PP}, \text{SK}) = 1$$

then

$$\Pr \left[\text{Dec}(\text{PP}, \text{SK}, \text{CT}) = f(x) \right] = 1$$

.

Remark: Note that unlike in the public key setting, the decryption algorithm doesn't take as input the function f corresponding to the secret key because we want our scheme to also satisfy function hiding along with message hiding (defined later). Function hiding is trivially broken if the decryption algorithm takes a function f as input.

C.1 Indistinguishability based Security

C.1.1 Message Hiding

The indistinguishability based security notion for message hiding in a verifiable secret key functional encryption is similar to the security notion for message hiding of a secret key functional encryption scheme. For completeness, we define it below. We also consider a {full/selective} CCA secure variant where the adversary, in addition to the security game described below, has access to a decryption oracle which takes a ciphertext and a function as input and decrypts the ciphertext with an honestly generated key for that function and returns the output. The adversary is allowed to query this decryption oracle for all ciphertexts of his choice except the challenge ciphertext itself. We define the security notion for message hiding in a verifiable secret key functional encryption scheme using the following game ($\mathsf{Full} - \mathsf{IND}$) message hiding between a challenger and an adversary.
Setup Phase: The challenger runs the setup algorithm and generates $(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. The challenger then hands over the public parameters PP to the adversary. The adversary has access to two oracles which it can query in any interleaved fashion.
Function Secret Key Oracle: The adversary makes function secret key queries by submitting functions $\mathsf{f} \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$. The challenger responds by giving the adversary the corresponding function secret key $\mathsf{SK_f} \leftarrow \mathsf{vFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{f})$.
Encryption Oracle: The adversary queries with a message $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and gets back a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} \leftarrow \mathsf{vFE.Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{m})$.
Challenge Phase: The adversary chooses two messages $(\mathsf{m_0}, \mathsf{m_1})$ of the same size (each in $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$) such that for all queried functions f to the function secret key oracle, it holds that $\mathsf{f}(\mathsf{m_0}) = \mathsf{f}(\mathsf{m_1})$. The challenger selects a random bit $\mathsf{b} \in \{0, 1\}$ and sends a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{m_b})$ to the adversary.
Function Secret Key Oracle: The adversary may submit additional function queries $\mathsf{f} \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ as long as they do not violate the constraint described above. That is, for all queries f, it must hold that $\mathsf{f}(\mathsf{m_0}) = \mathsf{f}(\mathsf{m_1})$.
Encryption Oracle: The adversary may submit additional message queries.
Guess: The adversary submits a guess b' and wins if $b' = b$. The adversary's advantage in this game is defined to be $2 * |\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{b} = \mathsf{b}'] - 1/2|$.

We also define the *selective* security game, which we call ($\mathsf{sel} - \mathsf{IND}$) where the adversary outputs the challenge message pair even before seeing the public parameters.

Definition 10. *A secret key verifiable functional encryption scheme* VFE *is* { *selective, fully* } *secure message hiding if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the* {$\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}, \mathsf{Full} - \mathsf{IND}$} *message hiding security game.*

One can also consider (q_1, q_2) secure secret-key VFE where the adversary is allowed upto q_1 and q_2 queries to the oracles respectively. Our results are general and directly extend to these restricted security models also.

C.1.2 Function Hiding

The indistinguishability based security notion for function hiding in a verifiable secret key functional encryption is similar to the security notion for function hiding of a secret key functional encryption scheme[SSW09, AAB⁺13]. For completeness, we define it below. We also consider a

{full/selective} CCA secure variant where the adversary, in addition to the security game described below, has access to a decryption oracle which takes a ciphertext and a function as input and decrypts the ciphertext with an honestly generated key for that function and returns the output. The adversary is allowed to query this decryption oracle for all function secret keys of his choice except the challenge function secret key itself.

We define the security notion for function hiding in a verifiable secret key functional encryption scheme using the following game $(\mathsf{Full} - \mathsf{IND})$ function hiding between a challenger and an adversary.

Setup Phase: The challenger runs the setup algorithm and generates $(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. The challenger then hands over the public parameters PP to the adversary. The adversary has access to two oracles which it can query in any interleaved fashion.

Function Secret Key Oracle: The adversary makes function secret key queries by submitting functions $\mathsf{f} \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$. The challenger responds by giving the adversary the corresponding function secret key $\mathsf{SK_f} \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{f})$.

Encryption Oracle: The adversary queries with a message $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and gets back a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{m})$.

Challenge Phase: The adversary chooses two functions $(\mathsf{f_0}, \mathsf{f_1})$ of the same size (each in $\mathcal{F}_\lambda$) such that for all queried messages m to the encryption oracle, it holds that $\mathsf{f_0}(\mathsf{m}) = \mathsf{f_1}(\mathsf{m})$. The challenger selects a random bit $\mathsf{b} \in \{0,1\}$ and sends a function secret key $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{f_b})$ to the adversary.

Function Secret Key Oracle: The adversary may submit additional function queries.

Encryption Oracle: The adversary may submit additional message queries $\mathsf{m} \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ as long as they do not violate the constraint described above. That is, for all queries m, it must hold that $\mathsf{f_0}(\mathsf{m}) = \mathsf{f_1}(\mathsf{m})$.

Guess: The adversary submits a guess b' and wins if $b' = b$. The adversary's advantage in this game is defined to be $2 * |\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{b} = \mathsf{b}'] - 1/2|$.

We also define the *selective* security game, which we call $(\mathsf{sel} - \mathsf{IND})$ where the adversary outputs the challenge function pair even before seeing the public parameters.

Definition 11. *A verifiable secret key functional encryption scheme* VFE *is* { *selective, fully* } *secure function hiding if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the* $\{\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}, \mathsf{Full} - \mathsf{IND}\}$ *function hiding security game.*

Again, one can also consider (q_1, q_2) secure secret-key VFE where the adversary is allowed upto q_1 and q_2 queries to the oracles respectively. Our results are general and directly extend to these restricted security models also.

D   Verifiable Multi-Input Functional Encryption

The issue of verifiability also applies to the setting of multi-input functional encryption [GGG$^+$, BGJS15, GJO15]. The syntax for verifiable multi-input functional encryption for a family of functions $\mathcal{F}$ is similar to that of multi-input functional encryption except that it also has an additional verifiability property. For completeness sake, we describe the syntax and security notions here. We borrow some notations from [GGG$^+$]. Let $\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{Y} = \{\mathcal{Y}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote ensembles where each $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and $\mathcal{Y}_\lambda$ is a finite set. Let $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote an ensemble where each $\mathcal{F}_\lambda$ is a finite

collection of n-ary functions. Each $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ takes as input n strings $(x_1, .., x_n)$ where each $x_i \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ and outputs $f(x_1, .., x_n) \in \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$. We now describe the algorithms.

- Setup$(1^\lambda, n)$: is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter λ and the function arity n. It outputs the public parameters PP, n encryption keys $(\mathsf{EK}_1, ..., \mathsf{EK}_n)$ and the master secret key MSK.

- Enc$(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{EK}_i, x)$: is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the public parameters PP, an encryption key $\mathsf{EK}_i \in (\mathsf{EK}_1, .., \mathsf{EK}_n)$ and an input message $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$. It outputs a ciphertext CT for message x corresponding to index i.

- KeyGen$(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, f)$: is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the public parameters PP, the master secret key MSK and an $n-$ary function $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$. It outputs a function secret key SK_f .

- Dec$(\mathsf{PP}, f, \mathsf{SK}_f, \mathsf{CT}_1, .., \mathsf{CT}_n)$: is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the public parameters PP, a function f, a function secret key SK_f and n ciphertexts $\mathsf{CT}_1, .., \mathsf{CT}_n$. It outputs a string $\mathsf{y} \in \mathcal{Y}_k$.

- VerifyCT$(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{i}, \mathsf{CT}) \rightarrow 1/0$; takes as input a public parameter, cipher-text and an index $\mathsf{i} \in [\mathsf{n}]$ and outputs in $\{0, 1\}$

- VerifyK$(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{f}, \mathsf{K}) \rightarrow 1/0$; takes as input a public parameter, a function and a key and outputs in $\{0, 1\}$.

The scheme has the following properties:

Correctness. A verifiable multi-input functional encryption scheme vMIFE for $\mathcal{F}$ is correct if for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and all $(x_1, ..., x_n) \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda^n$

$$Pr[(\mathsf{PP}, \vec{EK}, \mathsf{MSK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{vMIFE.Setup}(1^\lambda, n); \mathsf{sk}_f \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}, f);$$
$$\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, f, \mathsf{sk}_f, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{EK}_1, x_1) \ldots \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{EK}_n, x_n)) = f(x_1, ..., x_n)] = 1$$

Where the probability is taken over the coins of all these algorithms.

Definition 12. *(Verifiability) A verifiable multi-input functional encryption scheme* vMIFE *for* $\mathcal{F}$ *is verifiable if it holds that,*

$$\forall \mathsf{PP} \in \{0, 1\}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{CT}_{\alpha_1}, \ldots \mathsf{CT}_{\alpha_n} \in \{0, 1\}^*, \ \exists x_{\alpha_1}, \ldots x_{\alpha_n} \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda \ such \ that \ \ \forall \ n\text{-}ary \ functions \ f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$$
$$and \ \mathsf{SK} \in \{0, 1\}^*,$$

If VerifyK$(\mathsf{PP}, f, \mathsf{sk}) = 1$ *and* VerifyCT$(\mathsf{PP}, i, \mathsf{CT}_{\alpha_i}) = 1$ *for all* $i \in [n]$ *then,*

$$Pr\Big[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, f, \mathsf{SK}, \mathsf{CT}_{\alpha_1}, .., \mathsf{CT}_{\alpha_n}) = f(x_{\alpha_1}, .., x_{\alpha_n})\Big] = 1$$

In the past, both simulation based and indistinguishability based definitions have been studied for functional encryption. As with verifiable single input functional encryption, simulation security is impossible to achieve in the multi-input setting and hence we restrict ourselves only to the indistinguishability based security notion. We now describe the indistinguishability based security definition for a verifiable multi-input functional encryption scheme (which is similar to the security definition of a multi-input functional encryption [GGG+]).

Definition 13. *Let $\{f\}$ be any set of functions $f \in \mathcal{F}_\kappa$. Let $[n] = \{1, .., n\}$ and $I \subseteq [n]$. Let $\vec{X^0}$ and $\vec{X^1}$ be a pair of input vectors, where $\vec{X^b} = \{x_{1,j}^b, .., x_{n,j}^b\}_{j=1}^q$. We say that $\mathcal{F}$ and (X^0, X^1) are I-compatible if they satisfy the following property: For every $f \in \{f\}$, every $I' = \{i_1, .., i_t\} \subseteq I$, every $j_1, .., j_{n-t} \in [q]$ and every $x'_{i_1}, .., x'_{i_t} \in \mathcal{X}_\kappa$,*

$$f(< x_{i_1,j_1}^0, .., x_{i_{n-t},j_{n-t}}^0, x'_{i_1}, .., x'_{i_t} >) = f(< x_{i_1,j_1}^1, .., x_{i_{n-t},j_{n-t}}^1, x'_{i_1}, .., x'_{i_t} >)$$

where $< y_{i_1}, ..., y_{i_n} >$ denotes a permutation of the values $y_{i_1}, .., y_{i_n}$ such that the value y_{i_j} is mapped to the lth location if y_{i_j} is the lth input (out of n inputs) to f.

IND-Secure vMIFE: Our security definition is parametrized by two variables t and q, where t denotes the number of encryption keys known to the adversary, and q denotes the number of challenge messages per encryption key. We are now ready to present our formal definition for (t, q)-IND-secure verifiable multi-input functional encryption.

Definition 14. *(Indisitinguishability based security). We say that a multi-input functional encryption scheme vMIFE for for n ary functions $\mathcal{F}$ is (t, q)-IND-secure if for every PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ defined as in the figure 1.*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{vMIFE,IND}}(1^\lambda) = |Pr[\mathsf{IND}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{vMIFE}}] - 1/2|$$

is $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$, where:

$$\mathsf{IND}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{vMIFE}}(1^\kappa)$$

$(I, \mathsf{st}_0) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda)$ where $|I| = t$
$(PP, \vec{EK}, MSK) \leftarrow \mathsf{vMIFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$
$(\vec{X^0}, \vec{X^1}, st_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathsf{vMIFE.Keygen}(\mathsf{PP,MSK},\cdot)}(\mathsf{st}_0, \mathsf{PP}, \vec{\mathsf{EK}}_I)$ where $\vec{X^l} = \{x_{1,j}^l, .., x_{n,j}^l\}_{j=1}^q$
$d \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; \mathsf{CT}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathsf{vMIFE.Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{EK}_i, x_{i,j}^d) \ \forall i \in [n], j \in [q]$
$d' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathsf{vMIFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP,MSK},\cdot)}(\mathsf{st}_1, \vec{\mathsf{CT}})$
Output $(d = d')$

Figure 1: Security definition for vMIFE

In the above experiment, we require:

- *Let $\{f\}$ denote the entire set of key queries made by $\mathcal{A}_1$. Then, the challenge message vectors $\vec{X^0}$ and $\vec{X^1}$ chosen by $\mathcal{A}_1$ must be $I-$compatible with $\{f\}$.*

- *The key queries $\{g\}$ made by $\mathcal{A}_2$ must be I-compatible with $\vec{X^0}$ and $\vec{X^1}$*

We also consider selective indistinguishability-based security for verifiable multi-input functional encryption. Formally, (t, q)-sel-IND-security is defined in the same manner as above, except that the adversary $\mathcal{A}_1$ is required to choose the challenge message vectors $\vec{X^0}, \vec{X^1}$ before the setup is performed by the challenger. We omit the formal definition to avoid repetition.

E Security Proof for Public Key Verifiable Functional Encryption

We now prove that the scheme VFE proposed in section 4 is $\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}$ secure. We will prove this via a series of hybrid experiments $\mathsf{H}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{H}_{16}$ where H_1 corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit $b = 0$ and H_{16} corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit $b = 1$.

Before describing the hybrids, we first describe a set of experiments that can later be instantiated to construct the hybrids.

- **Experiment** $\mathsf{Exp}_1(\lambda, b, b_z)$:
  The experiment takes as input two variables b and b_z.

  1. Adversary sends challenge messages (m_0, m_1) to the challenger.
  2. Challenger runs $\mathsf{VFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ to produce $\mathsf{MPK} = (\{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ and $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, u, u_1)$.
  3. Challenger does the following:
     (a) For all $i \in [4]$, compute $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m_b; r_i)$.
     (b) If $b_z = 1$, reinitialize Z as $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$.
     (c) Compute a proof $\pi^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y \in L$ using witness w where :
        $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ and $w = (m, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0, 0, 0^{|u|}, 0^{|u_1|})$.
        The language L and the corresponding relation R are defined in the protocol in Section 4.
     (d) The challenge ciphertext is $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi^*)$ where the proof π^* is computed for statement 1 of relation R.
  4. Challenger sends MPK and challenge ciphertext CT^* to the adversary.
  5. For every function secret key query f made by the adversary, the challenger does the following:
     (a) $\forall i \in [4]$, compute $\mathsf{K}_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i)$.
     (b) Compute a proof $\gamma \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y \in L_1$ using witness w where:
        $y = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ and $w = (f, \{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0^3, 0^{|u|}, u_1)$.
        The language L_1 and the corresponding relation R_1 are defined in the protocol in Section 4.
     (c) The function secret key is $\mathsf{K}^f = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \gamma)$ where γ is computed for statement 1 of relation R_1. K^f is sent to the adversary.
  6. Finally, the adversary makes a guess b' and wins if $b = b'$.

- **Experiment** $\mathsf{Exp}_2(\lambda, b, b_{z_1})$:
  The experiment takes as input two variables b and b_{z_1}.

  1. Adversary sends challenge messages (m_0, m_1) to the challenger.
  2. Challenger runs $\mathsf{VFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ to produce $\mathsf{MPK} = (\{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ and $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, u, u_1)$. It reinitializes Z_1 as $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(b_{z_1}; u_1)$.

3. Challenger does the following:

   (a) For all $i \in [4]$, compute $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m_b; r_i)$.

   (b) Reinitialize Z as $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$.

   (c) Compute a proof $\pi^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y \in L$ using witness w
   where :
   $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ and $w = (m, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0, 0, 0^{|u|}, 0^{|u_1|})$.
   The language L and the corresponding relation R are defined in the protocol in
   Section 4.

   (d) The challenge ciphertext is $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi^*)$ where the proof π^* is computed
   for statement 1 of relation R.

4. Challenger sends MPK and challenge ciphertext CT^* to the adversary.

5. For every function secret key query f made by the adversary, the challenger does the
   following:

   (a) $\forall i \in [4]$, compute $\mathsf{K}_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i)$.

   (b) Compute a proof $\gamma \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1) \in$
   L_1 using witness w as :
   $(f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, \mathsf{MSK}_3, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_4|}, s_1, s_2, s_3, 0^{|s_4|}, r_1, r_2, r_3, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, 3, u, 0^{|u_1|})$ if $b = 0$
   and
   $(f, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_1|}, \mathsf{MSK}_2, \mathsf{MSK}_3, \mathsf{MSK}_4, 0^{|s_1|}, s_2, s_3, s_4, 0^{|r_1|}, r_2, r_3, r_4, 2, 3, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$ if $b = 1$.
   The language L_1 and the corresponding relation R_1 are defined in the protocol in
   Section 4.

   (c) The function secret key is $\mathsf{K}^f = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [4]}, \gamma)$ where γ is computed for statement 2
   of relation R_1. K^f is sent to the adversary.

6. Finally, the adversary makes a guess b' and wins if $b = b'$.

- **Experiment** $\mathsf{Exp}_3(\lambda, b, b_1)$:
  The experiment takes as input two variables b and b_1.

  1. Adversary sends challenge messages (m_0, m_1) to the challenger.

  2. Challenger runs $\mathsf{VFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ to produce $\mathsf{MPK} = (\{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ and $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, u, u_1)$. It reinitializes Z_1 as $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$.

  3. Challenger does the following:

     (a) If $b = 0$, for all $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, compute $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m_0; r_i)$ and $\mathsf{CT}_4^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_4, m_{b_1}; r_4)$.

     (b) If $b = 1$, for all $i \in \{2, 3, 4\}$, compute $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m_1; r_i)$ and $\mathsf{CT}_1^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_1, m_{b_1}; r_1)$.

     (c) Reinitialize Z as $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$.

     (d) Compute a proof $\pi^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1) \in$
     L using witness w as :
     $(m, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, u, u_1)$ if $b = 0$ and
     $(m, 0^{|r_1|}, 0^{|r_2|}, r_3, r_4, 3, 4, u, u_1)$ if $b = 1$.
     The language L and the corresponding relation R are defined in the protocol in
     Section 4.

(e) The challenge ciphertext is $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i\in[4]}, \pi^*)$ where the proof π^* is computed for statement 2 of relation R.

4. Challenger sends MPK and challenge ciphertext CT^* to the adversary.

5. For every function secret key query f made by the adversary, the challenger does the following:

(a) $\forall i \in [4]$, compute $\mathsf{K}_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i)$.

(b) Compute a proof $\gamma \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i\in[4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i\in[4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1) \in L_1$ using witness w as :
$(f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, \mathsf{MSK}_3, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_4|}, s_1, s_2, s_3, 0^{|s_4|}, r_1, r_2, r_3, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, 3, u, 0^{|u_1|})$ if $b = 0$ and
$(f, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_1|}, \mathsf{MSK}_2, \mathsf{MSK}_3, \mathsf{MSK}_4, 0^{|s_1|}, s_2, s_3, s_4, 0^{|r_1|}, r_2, r_3, r_4, 2, 3, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$ if $b = 1$.
The language L_1 and the corresponding relation R_1 are defined in the protocol in Section 4.

(c) The function secret key is $\mathsf{K}^f = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i\in[4]}, \gamma)$ where γ is computed for statement 2 of relation R_1. K^f is sent to the adversary.

6. Finally, the adversary makes a guess b' and wins if $b = b'$.

- **Experiment** $\mathsf{Exp}_4(\lambda, b, b_1)$:
  The experiment takes as input two variables b and b_1.

  1. Adversary sends challenge messages (m_0, m_1) to the challenger.

  2. Challenger runs $\mathsf{VFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ to produce $\mathsf{MPK} = (\{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i\in[4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ and $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i\in[4]}, \{s_i\}_{i\in[4]}, u, u_1)$. It reinitializes Z_1 as $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$.

  3. Challenger does the following:

     (a) If $b = 0$, for all $i \in \{1, 2\}$, compute $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m_0; r_i)$, $\mathsf{CT}_4^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_4, m_1; r_4)$ and $\mathsf{CT}_3^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_3, m_{b_1}; r_3)$.

     (b) If $b = 1$, for all $i \in \{3, 4\}$, compute $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m_1; r_i)$, $\mathsf{CT}_1^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_1, m_0; r_1)$ and $\mathsf{CT}_2^* = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_2, m_{b_1}; r_2)$.

     (c) Reinitialize Z as $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i\in[4]}; u)$.

     (d) Compute a proof $\pi^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i\in[4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i\in[4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1) \in L$ using witness w as :
     $(m, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, u, u_1)$ if $b = 0$ and
     $(m, 0^{|r_1|}, 0^{|r_2|}, r_3, r_4, 3, 4, u, u_1)$ if $b = 1$.
     The language L and the corresponding relation R are defined in the protocol in Section 4.

     (e) The challenge ciphertext is $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i\in[4]}, \pi^*)$ where the proof π^* is computed for statement 2 of relation R.

  4. Challenger sends MPK and challenge ciphertext CT^* to the adversary.

  5. For every function secret key query f made by the adversary, the challenger does the following:

     (a) $\forall i \in [4]$, compute $\mathsf{K}_i^f = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i)$.

(b) Compute a proof $\gamma \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}(y, w)$ for the statement that $y = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i\in[4]}, \{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i\in[4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1) \in L_1$ using witness w as :
$(f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_3|}, \mathsf{MSK}_4, s_1, s_2, 0^{|s_3|}, s_4, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, r_4, 1, 2, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$ if $b = 0$
and
$(f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_2|}, \mathsf{MSK}_3, \mathsf{MSK}_4, s_1, 0^{|s_2|}, s_3, s_4, r_1, 0^{|r_2|}, r_3, r_4, 1, 3, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$ if $b = 1$.
The language L_1 and the corresponding relation R_1 are defined in the protocol in [Section 4](#).

(c) The function secret key is $\mathsf{K}^f = (\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i\in[4]}, \gamma)$ where γ is computed for statement 2 of relation R_1. K^f is sent to the adversary.

6. Finally, the adversary makes a guess b' and wins if $b = b'$.

- **Hybrid H_1:** This hybrid is generated by running $\mathsf{Exp}_1(\lambda, 0, 0)$ which is identical to the real experiment with challenge bit $b = 0$.
  The master public key is $\mathsf{MPK} = (\{\mathsf{MPK}_i\}_{i\in[4]}, \mathsf{Z}, \mathsf{Z}_1)$ such that $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len}}; u)$ and $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1)$ for random strings u, u_1. The challenge ciphertext is $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i\in[4]}, \pi^*)$, where for all $i \in [4]$, $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m_0; r_i)$ for some random string r_i. π^* is computed for statement 1 of relation R.

- **Hybrid H_2:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i\in[4]}; u)$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $\mathsf{Exp}_1(\lambda, 0, 1)$.

- **Hybrid H_3:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using indices $\{1, 2, 3\}$ as the set of 3 indices $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, \mathsf{MSK}_3, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_4|}, s_1, s_2, s_3, 0^{|s_4|}, r_1, r_2, r_3, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, 3, u, 0^{|u_1|})$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $\mathsf{Exp}_2(\lambda, 0, 1)$.

- **Hybrid H_4:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_1 is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $\mathsf{Exp}_2(\lambda, 0, 0)$.

- **Hybrid H_5:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 2 of relation R using indices $\{1, 2\}$ as the 2 indices $\{i_1, i_2\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (m, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, u, u_1)$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $\mathsf{Exp}_3(\lambda, 0, 0)$.

- **Hybrid H_6:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the fourth component CT_4^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $\mathsf{CT}_4^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_4, m_1; r_4)$ for some random string r_4. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.
  This hybrid is generated by running $\mathsf{Exp}_3(\lambda, 0, 1)$.

- **Hybrid H_7:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using indices $\{1, 2, 4\}$ as the set of 3 indices $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_3|}, \mathsf{MSK}_4, s_1, s_2, 0^{|s_3|}, s_4, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, r_4, 1, 2, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $\mathsf{Exp}_4(\lambda, 0, 0)$.

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- **Hybrid** H_8: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the third component CT_3^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_3^* = FE.Enc(MPK_3, m_1; r_3)$ for some random string r_3.
  Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.
  This hybrid is generated by running $Exp_4(\lambda, 0, 1)$.

- **Hybrid** H_9: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 2 of relation R using message m_1 and indices $\{3, 4\}$ as the 2 indices $\{i_1, i_2\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (m_1, 0^{|r_1|}, 0^{|r_2|}, r_3, r_4, 3, 4, u, u_1)$.
  Also, for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using indices $\{1, 3, 4\}$ as the set of 3 indices $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (f, MSK_1, 0^{|MSK_2|}, MSK_3, MSK_4, s_1, 0^{|s_2|}, s_3, s_4, r_1, 0^{|r_2|}, r_3, r_4, 1, 3, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $Exp_4(\lambda, 1, 0)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{10}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the second component CT_2^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_2^* = FE.Enc(MPK_2, m_1; r_2)$ for some random string r_2.
  Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.
  This hybrid is generated by running $Exp_4(\lambda, 1, 1)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{11}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using indices $\{2, 3, 4\}$ as the set of 3 indices $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ in the witness. That is, the witness is $w = (f, 0^{|MSK_1|}, MSK_2, MSK_3, MSK_4, 0^{|s_1|}, s_2, s_3, s_4, 0^{|r_1|}, r_2, r_3, r_4, 2, 3, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $Exp_3(\lambda, 1, 0)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{12}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the first component CT_1^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_1^* = FE.Enc(MPK_1, m_1; r_1)$ for some random string r_1. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.
  This hybrid is generated by running $Exp_3(\lambda, 1, 1)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{13}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 1 of relation R. The witness is $w = (m_1, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0, 0, 0^{|u|}, 0^{|u_1|})$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $Exp_2(\lambda, 1, 0)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{14}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_1 is computed differently. $Z_1 = Com(1; u_1)$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $Exp_2(\lambda, 1, 1)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{15}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 1 of relation R_1. The witness is $w = (f, \{MSK_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0^3, 0^{|u|}, u_1)$.
  This hybrid is generated by running $Exp_1(\lambda, 1, 1)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{16}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z is computed differently. $Z = Com(0^{len}; u)$.

This hybrid is generated by running $\mathsf{Exp}_1(\lambda, 1, 0)$ which is identical to the real experiment with challenge bit $b = 1$.

We will now prove the indistinguishability of the hybrids.

Lemma 8. ($\mathsf{H}_1 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_2$). *Assuming that* Com *is a (computationally) hiding commitment scheme, the outputs of experiments* H_1 *and* H_2 *are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the commitment Z is computed. Let's consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ that interacts with a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ to break the hiding of the commitment scheme. Also, internally, it acts as the challenger in the security game with an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that tries to distinguish between H_1 and H_2. $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ executes the hybrid H_1 except that it does not generate the commitment Z on it's own. Instead, after receiving the challenge messages (m_0, m_1) from $\mathcal{A}$, it computes $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi^*)$ as an encryption of message m_0 by following the honest encryption algorithm as in H_1 and H_2. Then, it sends two strings, namely (0^{len}) and $(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]})$ to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. In return, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ receives a commitment Z corresponding to either the first or the second string. It then gives this to $\mathcal{A}$. Now, whatever bit b $\mathcal{A}$ guesses, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ forwards the same guess to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ is a polynomial time algorithm and breaks the hiding property of Com unless $\mathsf{H}_1 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_2$. $\square$

Lemma 9. ($\mathsf{H}_2 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_3$). *Assuming that* $(\mathsf{Prove}, \mathsf{Verify})$ *is a non-interactive witness indistinguishable (*NIWI*) proof system, the outputs of experiments* H_2 *and* H_3 *are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the proof γ is computed for each function secret key query f. In H_2, γ is computed for statement 1 of relation R_1 using the "real" witness $w = (f, \{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [4]}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0^3, 0^{|u|}, u_1)$. In H_3, γ is computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using the "trapdoor" witness
$w = (f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, \mathsf{MSK}_3, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_4|}, s_1, s_2, s_3, 0^{|s_4|}, r_1, r_2, r_3, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, 3, u, 0^{|u_1|})$. Thus, by a standard hybrid argument, the indistinguishability of the two hybrids follows from the witness indistinguishability property of the NIWI proof system. $\square$

Lemma 10. ($\mathsf{H}_3 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_4$). *Assuming that* Com *is a (computationally) hiding commitment scheme, the outputs of experiments* H_3 *and* H_4 *are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the commitment Z_1 is computed. Let's consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ that interacts with a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ to break the hiding of the commitment scheme. Also, internally, it acts as the challenger in the security game with an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that tries to distinguish between H_3 and H_4. $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ executes the hybrid H_1 except that it does not generate the commitment Z_1 on it's own. Instead, after receiving the challenge messages (m_0, m_1) from $\mathcal{A}$, it computes $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi^*)$ as an encryption of message m_0 by following the honest encryption algorithm as in H_1 and H_2. Then, it sends two strings, namely (0^{len}) and (1^{len}) to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. In return, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ receives a commitment Z_1 corresponding to either the first or the second string. It then gives this to $\mathcal{A}$. Now, whatever bit b $\mathcal{A}$ guesses, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ forwards the same guess to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{Com}}$ is a polynomial time algorithm and breaks the hiding property of Com unless $\mathsf{H}_3 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_4$. $\square$

Lemma 11. ($\mathsf{H}_4 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_5$). *Assuming that* $(\mathsf{Prove}, \mathsf{Verify})$ *is a non-interactive witness indistinguishable (*NIWI*) proof system, the outputs of experiments* H_4 *and* H_5 *are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is computed. In H_4, π^* is computed for statement 1 of relation R using the "real" witness $w = (m_0, \{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}, 0^2, 0^{|u|}, 0^{|u_1|})$ where $\{r_i\}_{i \in [4]}$ are the randomness used to generate $\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}$. In H_3, π^* is computed for statement 2 of relation R using the "trapdoor" witness $w = (m, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, u, u_1)$. Thus, by a standard hybrid argument, the indistinguishability of the two hybrids follows from the witness indistinguishability property of the NIWI proof system. $\square$

Lemma 12. *($\mathsf{H}_5 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_6$). Assuming that FE is a $\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}$ secure functional encryption scheme, the outputs of experiments H_5 and H_6 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the challenge ciphertext is created. More specifically, in H_5, the fourth component of the challenge ciphertext CT_4^* is computed as an encryption of message m_0, while in H_6, CT_4^* is computed as an encryption of message m_1. Note that the proof π^* remains same in both the hybrids.

Let's consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{FE}}$ that interacts with a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ to break the security of the underlying FE scheme. Also, internally, it acts as the challenger in the security game with an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that tries to distinguish between H_5 and H_6. $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{FE}}$ executes the hybrid H_5 except that it does not generate the parameters $(\mathsf{MPK}_4, \mathsf{MSK}_4)$ itself. It sets (MPK_4) to be the public key given by the challenger $\mathcal{C}$. After receiving the challenge messages (m_0, m_1) from $\mathcal{A}$, it forwards the pair (m_0, m_1) to the challenger $\mathcal{C}$ and receives a ciphertext CT which is either an encryption of m_0 or m_1 using public key MPK_4. $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{FE}}$ sets $\mathsf{CT}_4^* = \mathsf{CT}$ and computes $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}, \pi^*)$ as the challenge ciphertext as in H_5. Note that proof π^* is proved for statement 2 of relation R. It then sets the public parameter $\mathsf{Z} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [4]}; u)$ and sends the master public key MPK and the challenge ciphertext CT^* to $\mathcal{A}$.

Now, whatever bit b $\mathcal{A}$ guesses, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{FE}}$ forwards the same guess to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{FE}}$ is a polynomial time algorithm and breaks the security of the functional encryption scheme FE unless $\mathsf{H}_5 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_6$. $\square$

Lemma 13. *($\mathsf{H}_6 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_7$). Assuming that $(\mathsf{Prove}, \mathsf{Verify})$ is a non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof system, the outputs of experiments H_6 and H_7 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the proof γ is computed for each function secret key query f. In H_6, γ is computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using the witness $w = (f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, \mathsf{MSK}_3, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_4|}, s_1, s_2, s_3, 0^{|s_4|}, r_1, r_2, r_3, 0^{|r_4|}, 1, 2, 3, u, 0^{|u_1|})$. In H_7, γ is computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using the witness
$w = (f, \mathsf{MSK}_1, \mathsf{MSK}_2, 0^{|\mathsf{MSK}_3|}, \mathsf{MSK}_4, s_1, s_2, 0^{|s_3|}, s_4, r_1, r_2, 0^{|r_3|}, r_4, 1, 2, 4, u, 0^{|u_1|})$. Thus, by a standard hybrid argument, the indistinguishability of the two hybrids follows from the witness indistinguishability property of the NIWI proof system. $\square$

Lemma 14. *($\mathsf{H}_7 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_8$). Assuming that FE is a $\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}$ secure functional encryption scheme, the outputs of experiments H_5 and H_6 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the challenge ciphertext is created. More specifically, in H_7, the third component of the challenge ciphertext CT_3^* is computed as an encryption of message m_0, while in H_8, CT_3^* is computed as an encryption of message m_1.

Note that the proof π^* remains same in both the hybrids. Thus, the proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 12. □

Lemma 15. *($H_8 \approx_c H_9$). Assuming that* (Prove, Verify) *is a non-interactive witness indistinguishable (*NIWI*) proof system, the outputs of experiments H_8 and H_9 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 13. □

Lemma 16. *($H_9 \approx_c H_{10}$). Assuming that* FE *is a* Sel − IND *secure functional encryption scheme, the outputs of experiments H_9 and H_{10} are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 14. □

Lemma 17. *($H_{10} \approx_c H_{11}$). Assuming that* (Prove, Verify) *is a non-interactive witness indistinguishable (*NIWI*) proof system, the outputs of experiments H_{10} and H_{11} are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 13. □

Lemma 18. *($H_{11} \approx_c H_{12}$). Assuming that* FE *is a* Sel − IND *secure functional encryption scheme, the outputs of experiments H_{11} and H_{12} are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 14. □

Lemma 19. *($H_{12} \approx_c H_{13}$). Assuming that* (Prove, Verify) *is a non-interactive witness indistinguishable (*NIWI*) proof system, the outputs of experiments H_{12} and H_{13} are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 11. □

Lemma 20. *($H_{13} \approx_c H_{14}$). Assuming that* Com *is a (computationally) hiding commitment scheme, the outputs of experiments H_{13} and H_{14} are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 10. □

Lemma 21. *($H_{14} \approx_c H_{15}$). Assuming that* (Prove, Verify) *is a non-interactive witness indistinguishable (*NIWI*) proof system, the outputs of experiments H_{14} and H_{15} are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 9. □

Lemma 22. *($H_{15} \approx_c H_{16}$). Assuming that* Com *is a (computationally) hiding commitment scheme, the outputs of experiments H_{15} and H_{16} are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 8. □

F   Proofs for Secret Key Verifiable Functional Encryption

. In this section, we give the formal proof of verifiability and security for the secret key verifiable functional encryption scheme constructed in section 5.

F.1 Verifiability

Consider any public parameters PP and any ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i\in[5]}, \pi)$ such that $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{CT}) = 1$. Now, there are three cases possible for the proof π.

1. Statement 1 of relation R is correct :
   Therefore, there exists $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, index j such that $\forall i \in [5]/\{j\}$, $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m; r_i)$ where r_i is a random string. Also, $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1)$ where u_1 is a random string. Consider any function secret key $\mathsf{K} = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i\in[5]}, \gamma)$ such that $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}) = 1$. There are three cases possible for the proof γ.

   (a) Statement 1 of relation R_1 is correct :
       Therefore, there exists $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and index j_1 such that $\forall i \in [5]/\{j_1\}$, K_i is a function secret key for the same function - f. That is, $\forall i \in [5]/\{j_1\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r'_i)$ where r'_i is a random string.
       Thus, for all $i \in [5]/\{j, j_1\}$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Hence, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

   (b) Statement 2 of relation R_1 is correct :
       Therefore, there exists $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and index k such that $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, K_i is a function secret key for the same function - f. That is, $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r'_i)$ where r'_i is a random string.
       Thus, for all $i \in [5]/\{j, k\}$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Hence, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

   (c) Statement 3 of relation R_1 is correct :
       Then, it must be the case that $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u'_1)$ for some random string u'_1. However, we already know that $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_1)$ and Com is a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Thus, this scenario isn't possible. That is, in this case, both $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{CT})$ and $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K})$ can't be equal to 1.

2. Statement 2 of relation R is correct:
   Therefore, $\mathsf{Z}_2 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_2)$, $\mathsf{Z}_3 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_3)$ and $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i\in[5]}; a)$ for some random strings u_2, u_3, a. Also, there exists 2 indices i_1, i_2 and a message $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ such that for $i \in \{i_1, i_2\}$, $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{PP}_i, m; r_i)$ where r_i is a random string. Consider any function secret key $\mathsf{K} = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i\in[5]}, \gamma)$ such that $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}) = 1$. There are three cases possible for the proof γ.

   (a) Statement 1 of relation R_1 is correct :
       Then, it must be the case that $\mathsf{Z}_2 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u'_2)$ for some random string u'_2. However, we already know that $\mathsf{Z}_2 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_2)$ and Com is a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Thus, this scenario isn't possible. That is, in this case, both $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{CT})$ and $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K})$ can't be equal to 1.

   (b) Statement 2 of relation R_1 is correct :
       Therefore, there exists an index k such that $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, K_i are function secret keys for the same function - f. That is, $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r'_i)$ where r'_i is a random string. Thus, by pigeonhole principle, there exists $i \in [5]/\{k\}$ such that $i \in \{i_1, i_2\}$ as well.
       Also, $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i\in[5]}; a)$ and $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i)$ is the same. For the

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index i, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Hence, $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Therefore, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

    (c) Statement 3 of relation R_1 is correct :
Then, it must be the case that $\mathsf{Z}_3 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_3')$ for some random string u_3'. However, we already know that $\mathsf{Z}_3 = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_3)$ and Com is a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Thus, this scenario isn't possible. That is, in this case, both $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyCT}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{CT})$ and $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K})$ can't be equal to 1.

3. Statement 3 of relation R is correct :
Therefore, there exists $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, index k such that $\forall i \in [5]/\{k\}$, $\mathsf{CT}_i = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}_i, m; r_i)$ where r_i is a random string. Also, $\mathsf{Z}_\mathsf{f} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [5]}, b)$ for some random string b and there exists $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ such that $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i^f) = x$. Consider any function secret key $\mathsf{K} = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \gamma)$ such that $\mathsf{VFE.VerifyK}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}) = 1$. There are three cases possible for the proof γ.

    (a) Statement 1 of relation R_1 is correct :
Therefore, there exists $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and index j such that $\forall i \in [5]/\{j\}$, K_i is a function secret key for the same function - f. That is, $\forall i \in [5]/\{j\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i')$ where r_i' is a random string.
Thus, for all $i \in [5]/\{j, k\}$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Hence, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

    (b) Statement 2 of relation R_1 is correct :
Therefore, there exists $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and index k_1 such that $\forall i \in [5]/\{k_1\}$, K_i is a function secret key for the same function - f. That is, $\forall i \in [5]/\{k_1\}$,
$\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i')$ where r_i' is a random string.
Thus, for all $i \in [5]/\{k, k_1\}$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Hence, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

    (c) Statement 3 of relation R_1 is correct :
Therefore, there exists indices i_1, i_2 and a function f such that $\forall i\{i_1, i_2\}$, $\mathsf{K}_i = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}_i, f; r_i')$ where r_i' is a random string. Thus, by pigeonhole principle, there exists $i \in [5]/\{k\}$ such that $i \in \{i_1, i_2\}$ as well.
Also, $\mathsf{Z}_\mathsf{f} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [5]}; b)$ and $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i^f)$ is the same. However, we have that $\mathsf{Z}_\mathsf{f} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [5]}; b')$ for some random string b'. Since Com is a perfectly binding commitment scheme, $\{\mathsf{K}_i^f\}_{i \in [5]} = \{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [5]}$. Therefore, for the index i, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Hence, $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{CT}_i, \mathsf{K}_i) = f(m)$. Therefore, $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{K}, \mathsf{CT}) = f(m)$.

F.2 Message Hiding Security Proof

We now prove that the proposed scheme VFE is $\mathsf{Sel} - \mathsf{IND}$ secure message hiding. We will prove this via a series of hybrid experiments $\mathsf{H}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{H}_{28}$ where H_1 corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit $b = 0$ and H_{28} corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit $b = 1$.

- **Hybrid H_1:** This is the real experiment with challenge bit $b = 0$. The master secret key is $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \{p_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [5]}, a, b, \{u_i\}_{i \in [3]})$. The public parameters are $\mathsf{PP} =$

$(\{\mathsf{S}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}}, \mathsf{Z}_\mathsf{f}, \{\mathsf{Z}_i\}_{i \in [3]})$ such that $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{S}_i = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_i; s_i)$, $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len}_{\mathsf{CT}}}; a)$, $\mathsf{Z}_\mathsf{f} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len}_\mathsf{f}}; b)$ and $\forall i \in [3]$, $\mathsf{Z}_i = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_i)$ for random strings $a, b, \{u_i\}_{i \in [3]}$. The challenge ciphertext is $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [5]}, \pi^*)$, where for all $i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{CT}_i^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}_i, m_0; r_i)$ for some random string r_i. π^* is computed for statement 1 of relation R.

- **Hybrid** H_2: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_{CT} is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [5]}; a)$.

- **Hybrid** H_3: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using index 5 as the index k in the witness.

- **Hybrid** H_4: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_2 is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z}_2 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_2)$.

- **Hybrid** H_5: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 2 of relation R using indices $\{1, 2\}$ as the 2 indices $\{i_1, i_2\}$ in the witness.

- **Hybrid** H_6: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_5 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_5 = \mathsf{Com}(0; s_5)$.

- **Hybrid** H_7: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the fifth component CT_5^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $\mathsf{CT}_5^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, m_1; r_5)$ for some random string r_5. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

- **Hybrid** H_8: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_5 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_5 = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_5; s_5)$.

- **Hybrid** H_9: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using index 4 as the index k in the witness.

- **Hybrid** H_{10}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_4 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_4 = \mathsf{Com}(0; s_4)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{11}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the fourth component CT_4^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $\mathsf{CT}_4^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, m_1; r_4)$ for some random string r_4. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

- **Hybrid** H_{12}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_4 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_4 = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_5; s_4)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{13}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using index 3 as the index k in the witness.

- **Hybrid** H_{14}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_3 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_3 = \mathsf{Com}(0; s_3)$.

- **Hybrid H_{15}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the third component CT_3^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_3^* = FE.Enc(PP, m_1; r_3)$ for some random string r_3. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

- **Hybrid H_{16}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_3 is computed differently. $S_3 = Com(MSK_3; s_3)$.

- **Hybrid H_{17}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using index 2 as the index k in the witness.
  Also, the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 2 of relation R using indices $\{4, 5\}$ as the 2 indices $\{i_1, i_2\}$ in the witness.

- **Hybrid H_{18}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_2 is computed differently. $S_2 = Com(0; s_2)$.

- **Hybrid H_{19}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the second component CT_2^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_2^* = FE.Enc(PP, m_1; r_2)$ for some random string r_2. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

- **Hybrid H_{20}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_2 is computed differently. $S_2 = Com(MSK_2; s_2)$.

- **Hybrid H_{21}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using index 1 as the index k in the witness.

- **Hybrid H_{22}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_1 is computed differently. $S_1 = Com(0; s_1)$.

- **Hybrid H_{23}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the first component CT_1^* of the challenge ciphertext to be an encryption of the challenge message m_1 (as opposed to m_0). That is, $CT_1^* = FE.Enc(PP, m_1; r_1)$ for some random string r_1. Note that the proof π^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R.

- **Hybrid H_{24}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_1 is computed differently. $S_1 = Com(MSK_1; s_1)$.

- **Hybrid H_{25}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof π^* in the challenge ciphertext is now computed for statement 1 of relation R with index j as 5.

- **Hybrid H_{26}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_2 is computed differently. $Z_2 = Com(1; u_2)$.

- **Hybrid H_{27}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every function secret key K^f, the proof γ is now computed for statement 1 of relation R_1 with index j as 5.

- **Hybrid** H_{28}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_{CT} is computed differently. $Z_{CT} = \text{Com}(0^{\text{len}_{CT}}; a)$.

  This hybrid is identical to the real experiment with challenge bit $b = 1$.

Below we will prove that $(H_1 \approx_c H_2)$, $(H_2 \approx_c H_3)$ and $(H_6 \approx_c H_7)$. The indistinguishability of other hybrids will follow along the same lines. We will now prove the indistinguishability of the hybrids.

Lemma 23. $(H_1 \approx_c H_2)$. *Assuming that* Com *is a (computationally) hiding commitment scheme, the outputs of experiments* H_1 *and* H_2 *are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the commitment Z_{CT} is computed. Let's consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ that interacts with a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ to break the hiding of the commitment scheme. Also, internally, it acts as the challenger in the security game with an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that tries to distinguish between H_1 and H_2. $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ executes the hybrid H_1 except that it does not generate the commitment Z_{CT} on it's own. Instead, after receiving the challenge messages (m_0, m_1) from $\mathcal{A}$, it computes $CT^* = (\{CT_i^*\}_{i \in [5]}, \pi^*)$ as an encryption of message m_0 by following the honest encryption algorithm as in H_1 and H_2. Then, it sends two strings, namely $(0^{\text{len}_{CT}})$ and $(\{CT_i^*\}_{i \in [5]})$ to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. In return, $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ receives a commitment Z corresponding to either the first or the second string. It then gives this to $\mathcal{A}$. Now, whatever bit b $\mathcal{A}$ guesses, $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ forwards the same guess to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{A}_{Com}$ is a polynomial time algorithm and breaks the hiding property of Com unless $H_1 \approx_c H_2$. $\square$

Lemma 24. $(H_2 \approx_c H_3)$. *Assuming that* $(\text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ *is a non-interactive witness indistinguishable (*NIWI*) proof system, the outputs of experiments* H_2 *and* H_3 *are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the proof γ is computed for each function secret key query f. In H_2, γ is computed for statement 1 of relation R_1 using the "real" witness with index j as 5. That is, $w = (f, \text{MSK}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [5]}, 0^2, 5, 0)$. In H_3, γ is computed for statement 2 of relation R_1 using the "trapdoor" witness with index k as 5. That is, $w = (f, \text{MSK}, \{r_i\}_{i \in [5]}, 0^3, 5)$. Thus, by a standard hybrid argument, the indistinguishability of the two hybrids follows from the witness indistinguishability property of the NIWI proof system. $\square$

Lemma 25. $(H_6 \approx_c H_7)$. *Assuming that* FE *is a* $\text{Sel} - \text{IND}$ *secure message hiding functional encryption scheme, the outputs of experiments* H_6 *and* H_7 *are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is the manner in which the challenge ciphertext is created. More specifically, in H_6, the fifth component of the challenge ciphertext CT_5^* is computed as an encryption of message m_0, while in H_7, CT_5^* is computed as an encryption of message m_1. Note that the proof π^* remains same in both the hybrids.

Let's consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$ that interacts with a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ to break the security of the underlying FE scheme. Also, internally, it acts as the challenger in the security game with an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that tries to distinguish between H_6 and H_7. $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$ executes the hybrid H_6 except that it does not generate the parameter (MSK_5) itself. Note that it sets $S_5 = \text{Com}(0; s_5)$. After receiving the challenge messages (m_0, m_1) from $\mathcal{A}$, it forwards the pair (m_0, m_1) to the challenger $\mathcal{C}$ and receives a ciphertext CT which is either an encryption of m_0 or m_1. $\mathcal{A}_{FE}$ sets $CT_5^* = CT$

and computes $\mathsf{CT}^* = (\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [5]}, \pi^*)$ as the challenge ciphertext as in H_6. Note that proof π^* is proved for statement 2 of relation R. It then sets the public parameter $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{CT}_i^*\}_{i \in [5]}; u)$ and sends the public parameters PP and the challenge ciphertext CT^* to $\mathcal{A}$.

Now, whatever bit b $\mathcal{A}$ guesses, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{FE}}$ forwards the same guess to the outside challenger $\mathcal{C}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{FE}}$ is a polynomial time algorithm and breaks the security of the functional encryption scheme FE unless $\mathsf{H}_6 \approx_c \mathsf{H}_7$. $\qquad\square$

F.3   Function Hiding Security Proof

The security proof for the function hiding property is very similar to the one in the previous section for message hiding. Observe that the NP relations in our scheme are symmetric with respect to encryption and function secret key generation and so the same proof as above would work in this case with roles reversed. For completeness, we describe the proof below.

We prove this via a series of hybrid experiments $\mathsf{H}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{H}_{28}$ where H_1 corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit $b = 0$ and H_{28} corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit $b = 1$.

- **Hybrid H_1:** This is the real experiment with challenge bit $b = 0$. The master secret key is $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathsf{MSK}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \{p_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \{s_i\}_{i \in [5]}, a, b, \{u_i\}_{i \in [3]})$. The public parameters are $\mathsf{PP} = (\{\mathsf{S}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}}, \mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{f}}, \{\mathsf{Z}_i\}_{i \in [3]})$ such that $\forall i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{S}_i = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_i; s_i)$, $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{CT}} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len}_{\mathsf{CT}}}; a)$, $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{f}} = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len}_{\mathsf{f}}}; b)$ and $\forall i \in [3]$, $\mathsf{Z}_i = \mathsf{Com}(1; u_i)$ for random strings $a, b, \{u_i\}_{i \in [3]}$. The challenge function secret key is $\mathsf{K}^* = (\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [5]}, \gamma^*)$, where for all $i \in [5]$, $\mathsf{K}_i^* = \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}_i, f_0; r_i)$ for some random string r_i. γ^* is computed for statement 1 of relation R_1.

- **Hybrid H_2:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_3 and is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z}_3 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_3)$.

- **Hybrid H_3:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_{f} and is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z}_{\mathsf{f}} = \mathsf{Com}(\{\mathsf{K}_i\}_{i \in [5]}; b)$.

- **Hybrid H_4:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every ciphertext CT_m, the proof π is now computed for statement 3 of relation R using index 5 as the index k in the witness.

- **Hybrid H_5:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_1 is computed differently. $\mathsf{Z}_1 = \mathsf{Com}(0; u_1)$.

- **Hybrid H_6:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof γ^* in the challenge function secret key is now computed for statement 3 of relation R_1 using indices $\{1, 2\}$ as the 2 indices $\{i_1, i_2\}$ in the witness.

- **Hybrid H_7:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_5 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_5 = \mathsf{Com}(0; s_5)$.

- **Hybrid H_8:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the fifth component K_5^* of the challenge function secret key to be a secret key of the challenge function

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f_1 (as opposed to f_0). That is, $\mathsf{K}_5^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}_5, f_1; r_5)$ for some random string r_5. Note that the proof γ^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 3 of relation R_1.

- **Hybrid H_9:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_5 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_5 = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_5; s_5)$.

- **Hybrid H_{10}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every ciphertext CT_m, the proof π is now computed for statement 3 of relation R using index 4 as the index k in the witness.

- **Hybrid H_{11}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_4 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_4 = \mathsf{Com}(0; s_4)$.

- **Hybrid H_{12}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the fourth component K_4^* of the challenge function secret key to be a secret key of the challenge function f_1 (as opposed to f_0). That is, $\mathsf{K}_4^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}_4, f_1; r_4)$ for some random string r_4. Note that the proof γ^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 2 of relation R_1.

- **Hybrid H_{13}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_4 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_4 = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_5; s_4)$.

- **Hybrid H_{14}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every ciphertext CT_m, the proof π is now computed for statement 3 of relation R using index 3 as the index k in the witness.

- **Hybrid H_{15}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_3 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_3 = \mathsf{Com}(0; s_3)$.

- **Hybrid H_{16}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the third component K_3^* of the challenge function secret key to be a secret key of the challenge function f_1 (as opposed to f_0). That is, $\mathsf{K}_3^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}_3, f_1; r_3)$ for some random string r_3. Note that the proof γ^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 3 of relation R_1.

- **Hybrid H_{17}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_3 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_3 = \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{MSK}_3; s_3)$.

- **Hybrid H_{18}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every ciphertext CT_m, the proof π is now computed for statement 3 of relation R using index 2 as the index k in the witness.
  Also, the proof γ^* in the challenge function secret key is now computed for statement 3 of relation R_1 using indices $\{4, 5\}$ as the 2 indices $\{i_1, i_2\}$ in the witness.

- **Hybrid H_{19}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_2 is computed differently. $\mathsf{S}_2 = \mathsf{Com}(0; s_2)$.

- **Hybrid H_{20}:** This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the second component K_2^* of the challenge function secret key to be a secret key of the challenge function f_1 (as opposed to f_0). That is, $\mathsf{K}_2^* = \mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{MSK}_2, f_1; r_2)$ for some random string r_2. Note that the proof γ^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 3 of relation R_1.

- **Hybrid** H_{21}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_2 is computed differently. $S_2 = \text{Com}(\text{MSK}_2; s_2)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{22}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every ciphertext CT_m, the proof π is now computed for statement 3 of relation R using index 1 as the index k in the witness.

- **Hybrid** H_{23}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_1 is computed differently. $S_1 = \text{Com}(0; s_1)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{24}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that we change the first component K_1^* of the challenge function secret key to be a secret key of the challenge function f_1 (as opposed to f_0). That is, $K_1^* = \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{PP}, \text{MSK}_1, f_1; r_1)$ for some random string r_1. Note that the proof γ^* is unchanged and is still proven for statement 3 of relation R_1.

- **Hybrid** H_{25}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that S_1 is computed differently. $S_1 = \text{Com}(\text{MSK}_1; s_1)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{26}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that the proof γ^* in the challenge function secret key is now computed for statement 1 of relation R_1 with index j as 5.

- **Hybrid** H_{27}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_1 is computed differently. $Z_1 = \text{Com}(1; u_1)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{28}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that for every ciphertext CT_m, the proof π is now computed for statement 1 of relation R with index j as 5.

- **Hybrid** H_{29}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_3 and is computed differently. $Z_3 = \text{Com}(1; u_3)$.

- **Hybrid** H_{30}: This hybrid is identical to the previous hybrid except that Z_f is computed differently. $Z_f = \text{Com}(0^{\text{len}_f}; b)$.
  This hybrid is identical to the real experiment with challenge bit $b = 1$.

The proof of indistinguishability between every consecutive pair of hybrids follows very similarly to the proofs in the case of message hiding and are not elaborated here.

G Construction of Verifiable Multi-Input Functional Encryption

G.1 Equivalence of circuits

Let us define a relation $\mathcal{R}_{eq}$ with the following property: $\mathcal{R}_{eq} : \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}$, takes as input two circuits C_0 and C_1 and a poly-sized string w. It outputs 1 if C_0 and C_1 are equivalent and w is a witness of this fact. In general, two equivalent circuits might not have a witness of the fact that they are equivalent as checking equivalence is in coNP. We model this equivalence by viewing w as a *functionality preserving* transformation that takes C_0 to C_1. Therefore, this relation given two circuits outputs 1 iff there exists a polynomial sized (in the size of circuit) transformation that maps one circuit to the other while preserving the functionality. We use this, relation to define our verifiable multi-input functional encryption scheme, vMIFE.

Definition 15. *(Special family $\mathcal{F}_{eq}$) Let, $\mathcal{F}_{eq} = \{\mathcal{F}_{eq,k}\}$ be a family of circuits in n ary polynomial size circuits, which takes input from $\mathcal{X}_k^n$ and outputs in $\mathcal{Y}$. This family is special if, $\forall \mathsf{f} \in \mathcal{F}_{eq,k}$ and $\forall \mathsf{i} \in [\mathsf{n}]$ for any $\mathsf{x}_1, \mathsf{x}_2 \in \mathcal{X}_k$, it holds that $\mathsf{F}_1 = \mathsf{f}(*, ..*, \mathsf{x}_1, *, .., *)$ is functionally equivalent to $\mathsf{F}_2 = \mathsf{f}(*, ..*, \mathsf{x}_2, *, .., *)$ where x_1, x_2 are fed into f at index i, then there is some polynomial size witness w satisfying $\mathcal{R}(\mathsf{F}_1, \mathsf{F}_2, \mathsf{w}) = 1$.*

We now present our construction vMIFE with strong verifiability for this special family of circuits (with a sketch of proof).

Notation: Let Com denote a perfectly binding and non interactive commitment scheme. Let $i\mathcal{O}$ denote an indistinguishability obfuscator and NIWI denote a perfectly sound one message witness indistinguishable proof system. Finally, let $\mathsf{PKE} = (\mathsf{PKE.Setup}, \mathsf{PKE.Enc}, \mathsf{PKE.Dec})$ be a semantically secure perfectly correct public-key encryption scheme. We denote the length of cipher texts in PKE by $\mathsf{c} - \mathsf{len} = \mathsf{c} - \mathsf{len}(\mathsf{k})$. Let $\mathsf{len} = 4 * \mathsf{c} - \mathsf{len}$.

G.2 Construction

$\underline{\mathsf{vMIFE.Setup}(1^k, \mathsf{n})}$: The setup algorithm generates four PKE key pairs for each index $\mathsf{i} \in [\mathsf{n}]$. Then it computes two commitments of 0. Encryption key for index i, EK_i is set as four corresponding public keys. Master secret key is set as the collection of all PKE secret keys and random tapes used to generate keys. Formally,
Generate key pairs for public key encryption scheme, $\{(\mathsf{PK}_i[\mathsf{j}], \mathsf{SK}_i[\mathsf{j}]) \leftarrow \mathsf{PKE.Setup}(1^k; \mathsf{R}_i[\mathsf{j}])\}_{\mathsf{i} \in [\mathsf{n}], \mathsf{j} \in [4]}$.
Also form two commitments $\mathsf{Z}^1 = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\mathsf{len}})$ and $\mathsf{Z}^2 = \mathsf{Com}(0^{\log \mathsf{n}})$. Encryption key for the index i is generated as:
$\mathsf{EK}_i = \{\mathsf{PK}_i[1], .., \mathsf{PK}_i[4]\}$. The master secret key is set as: $\mathsf{MSK} = \{\mathsf{SK}_i[\mathsf{j}], \mathsf{R}_i[\mathsf{j}]\}_{\mathsf{i} \in [\mathsf{n}], \mathsf{j} \in [4]}$. Public parameter is declared as the collection of the two commitments, Z^1 and Z^2. The algorithm outputs $\{\mathsf{PP}, \{\mathsf{EK}_i\}_{\mathsf{i} \in [\mathsf{n}]}, \mathsf{MSK}\}$

$\underline{\mathsf{vMIFE.Enc}(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{EK}_i, \mathsf{m})}$: For the index $\mathsf{i} \in [\mathsf{n}]$, cipher-text is generated by encrypting the message under the four corresponding PKE public keys and proving that either all four cipher-texts encrypt the same message or under a trapdoor condition (specified later) two of the cipher-text encrypt the same message. Formally,
Compute $\{\mathsf{CT}_i[\mathsf{j}] = \mathsf{PKE.Enc}(\mathsf{PK}_i[\mathsf{j}], \mathsf{m})\}_{\mathsf{j} \in [4]}$. Next compute a NIWI proof, π for the statement $\{\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{i}, \mathsf{CT}_i[1], .., \mathsf{CT}_i[4]\}$ where:

- *Either* all $(\mathsf{CT}_i[1], \mathsf{CT}_i[2], \mathsf{CT}_i[3], \mathsf{CT}_i[4])$ encrypt the same message m under $(\mathsf{PK}_i[1], \mathsf{PK}_i[2], \mathsf{PK}_i[3], \mathsf{PK}_i[4])$ respectively. Cipher-text with such a proof is referred to as *genuine* cipher-text. Witness for proving this statement contains the message and the randomness used in creating the cipher-texts. *or*,

- $\exists(\mathsf{j}_1 \neq \mathsf{j}_2)$ such that the cipher-texts $(\mathsf{CT}_i[\mathsf{j}_1], \mathsf{CT}_i[\mathsf{j}_2])$ encrypt the same message m under the key $(\mathsf{PK}_i[\mathsf{j}_1], \mathsf{PK}_i[\mathsf{j}_2])$ respectively. Additionally, Z^2 is a commitment of $(\mathsf{CT}_i[1], \mathsf{CT}_i[2], \mathsf{CT}_i[3], \mathsf{CT}_i[4])$ and Z^1 is a commitment of i. In an honestly generated setup, this statement is always false. But, in a maliciously generated setup a cipher-text may have a *trapdoor witness* that contains the message, indices of the two cipher-texts with the randomness used in creating those two cipher-text and the commitments $(\mathsf{Z}^1, \mathsf{Z}^2)$.

Output $\mathsf{CT}_i = \{\mathsf{CT}_i[1], \mathsf{CT}_i[2], \mathsf{CT}_i[3], \mathsf{CT}_i[4], \pi\}$.

vMIFE.KeyGen(PP, MSK, f): Let G_f be the following circuit as described in figure 2

G_f

Constants: Public Keys $\{PK_i[j]\}_{i\in[n],j\in[4]}$, secret keys $\{SK_i[j]\}_{i\in[n],j\in[4]}$ and commitments Z^1, Z^2

Input: Cipher-text $CT_1, ..., CT_n$, CT_i encrypted under EK_i

1. Parse each $CT_i = (CT_i[1], .., CT_i[4], \pi_i)$ and let $y_i = (PP, i, CT_i[1], .., CT_i[4])$ be the statement corresponding to the string π_i. For all $i \in [n]$, run NIWI.Verify(y_i, π_i). If, any verification fails output $\perp$.

2. $\{a_i[j] = PKE.Dec(SK_i[j], CT_i[j])\}_{i\in[n],j\in[4]}$. By the soundness of the NIWI, for all (except possibly one) $i \in [n]$, $a_i[1] = a_i[2] = a_i[3] = a_i[4]$. For every i, compute m_i, first two occurring equal values of $(a_i[1], a_i[2], a_i[3], a_i[4])$. This existence is guaranteed by soundness of NIWI. Circuit outputs $f(m_1, .., m_n)$.


Figure 2: Functionality G_f

Compute three independent obfuscations of the circuit G_f (see figure 4). i.e. $K_f^i = i\mathcal{O}(G_f)$ $\forall i \in [3]$. Compute a NIWI proof γ for the statement $(PP, f, K_f^1, K_f^2, K_f^3)$ where:

- 2 out of 3 obfuscations (K_f^1, K_f^2, K_f^3) satisfy one of the following:

  - *Either* is an obfuscations of G_f (see figure 5) and uses all four corresponding secret keys per index. Additionally, these four key pairs per index are correctly generated. Program proving this statement is said to be *genuine or*,

  - Z^1 is a commitment of some $i \in [n]$ and Z^2 is a commitment of four PKE cipher-texts (i.e. $Z^2 = Com(C[1], C[2], C[3], C[4])$) that satisfy a special property; There exists an $s \in [4]$ and the circuits $F[j]$ (defined below) indexed by $j \in [4] \setminus s$ are functionally equivalent (using the relation of equivalence). We define, $F[j] = f(*, ..*, PKE.Dec(SK_i[j], C[j]), *, .., *)$. Here, $PKE.Dec(SK_i[j], C[j])$ is fed as i^{th} input to the circuit f; Under this condition, the program is an obfuscation of G_f^s of circuit in figure 3. Additionally, for every index $i \in [n]$, three key pairs $(PK_i[j], SK_i[j])$ for $j \in [4] \setminus s$ are correctly generated.

Witness for this statement includes two indices (two out of three in [3]) that correspond to the obfuscations of the circuit of the types described above and corresponding witnesses. Witness for these circuits may include corresponding randomization used by the obfuscator, secret keys used by the circuits, opening of the commitments Z^1, Z^2, and possibly random tapes used to create PKE key pairs.

vMIFE.Dec(PP, f, K_f, $CT_1, .., CT_n$): The algorithm first parses $K_f = (K_f^1, K_f^2, K_f^3, \gamma)$. Let $y = (PP, f, K_f^1, K_f^2, K_f^3)$ be the statement corresponding to the γ. The decryption algorithm first verifies γ and if it fails, it outputs $\perp$.

Then, it outputs majority of $(K_f^1(CT_1, .., CT_n), K_f^2(CT_1, .., CT_n), K_f^3(CT_1, .., CT_n))$. Let us now examine following properties,

Correctness: Correctness follows from correctness of PKE, correctness of $i\mathcal{O}$ and perfect completeness of NIWI.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                     G_f^s                                      │
│                                                                                │
│  Constants: Public Keys $\{\mathsf{PK}_i[j]\}_{i\in[n],j\in[4]}$, secret       │
│  keys $\{\mathsf{SK}_i[j]\}_{i\in[n],j\in[4]\setminus s}$ and commitments       │
│  $Z^1, Z^2$                                                                     │
│  Input: Cipher-text $\mathsf{CT}_1, ..., \mathsf{CT}_n$, $\mathsf{CT}_i$        │
│  encrypted under $\mathsf{EK}_i$                                                │
│                                                                                │
│    1. Parse each $\mathsf{CT}_i = (\mathsf{CT}^i[1], .., \mathsf{CT}_i[4],      │
│       \pi_i)$ and let $y_i = (\mathsf{PP}, i, \mathsf{CT}_i[1], ..,             │
│       \mathsf{CT}_i[4])$ be the state-ment corresponding to the string          │
│       $\pi_i$. For each $i \in [n]$, run $\mathsf{NIWI.Verify}(y_i, \pi_i)$.    │
│       If, any verification fails output $\perp$.                                │
│                                                                                │
│    2. $\{a_i[j] = \mathsf{PKE.Dec}(\mathsf{SK}_i[j], \mathsf{CT}_i[j])\}_{i\in  │
│       [n],j\in[4]\setminus s}$. Circuit computes $f(a_1[j], .., a_n[j])$        │
│       $\forall j \in [4] \setminus s$. If the three values are equal, it        │
│       outputs the same value otherwise it outputs $\perp$.                      │
│                                                                                │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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
Figure 3: Functionality G_f^s

Verifiability: This scheme is a verifiable multi-input functional encryption scheme where the verification algorithms verify the NIWI proofs corresponding to the cipher-texts and the keys. This is because at a time there can be only one index under which there can exist a dishonest ciphertext and that too is committed along with the index in the commitment Z^1, Z^2. In this case by the soundness of NIWI, there are two constituent PKE ciphertexts in the committed ciphertext that encrypt the same message. Hence, there exist a message which repeats first while decryption with respective PKE secret keys. Call that message m. Any genuine key for f will use this m to compute the decryption. Due to the soundness of the NIWI, any malicious key for f with a valid proof, will also use this m. This is because, for any circuit in the key that use three PKE keys (say, indexed by $[4] \setminus s$ for some s) and has a witness, the circuits $f(*, \ldots, m_j, \ldots, *)$ are equivalent for $j \in [4] \setminus s$. Here m_j is the PKE decryption of constituent ciphertext with corresponding PKE key indexed by $j \in [4] \setminus s$.

Theorem 8. *Assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation for all efficiently computable circuits, one way permutations, perfectly sound one message witness indistinguishable proofs for NP and semantically secure perfectly correct public key encryption,* vMIFE *is a selectively secure verifiable public key multi-input functional encryption scheme for the family of circuits $\mathcal{F}_{eq}$.*

Proof. (Sketch.) The proof begins with a hybrid where the message vector $\vec{M}^0$ is encrypted. Then we move to a hybrid where Z_1, Z_2 commits to the index 1 and first challenge ciphertext for index 1. Then we use switch the keys to use three secret keys instead of four (and using the trapdoor witness). This way we can switch one PKE ciphertext in the first challenge ciphertext for index 1. This way we gradually move to a hybrid where the first challenge ciphertext encrypt M_i^1 for $i \in [q]$. We now go to the honest key generation using all four secret keys. After this, we can repeat the above procedure for all indices one by one, once we get to a hybrid where the challenge ciphertext vector encrypts M^1. $\qquad\square$

H Non-Interactive Functional Commitments

Functional commitments with setup has been introduced in [LRY16]. Here, we define non-interactive functional commitments. A non-interactive functional commitment scheme for an ensemble $\mathcal{X}$ of plaintext messages and an ensemble of functions $\mathcal{F}$ consists of three p.p.t. algorithms $\mathsf{FC} = (\mathsf{FCom}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Verify})$ defined below:

- $\mathsf{FCom}(1^\lambda, x)$: The commitment algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1^λ and a plaintext $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$. It outputs a commitment C and some randomness R.

- $\mathsf{KeyGen}(R, C, f)$: The keygen algorithm takes as input a commitment C, its associated randomness R and a function f. It outputs a function key sk_f.

- $\mathsf{Verify}(f, \mathsf{sk}, C, y)$: The verification algorithm takes as input a function f, a function key sk, a commitment C and a value y. It outputs 1 or 0.

We require the following properties for a functional commitment scheme:

Correctness.   For all $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$,

$$Pr[(C, R) \leftarrow \mathsf{FCom}(1^\lambda, x); \mathsf{sk}_f \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(R, C, f); \mathsf{Verify}(f, \mathsf{sk}_f, C, f(x)) = 1] = 1$$

Perfect Binding.   It holds that for any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, and for all $C \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $\exists x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ such that for any $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$, $K \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$, if $\mathsf{Verify}(f, K, C, y) = 1$ then it must hold that $y = f(x)$.

Computational Hiding.   We describe this property with the help of a game played between a committer and a polynomial time receiver.
Commit Phase: The receiver outputs two equal length messages (m_0, m_1) in $\mathcal{X}_\lambda$. The committer picks $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and computes $(C^*, R) \leftarrow \mathsf{FCom}(1^\lambda, m_b)$. The committer then outputs C^*.
Decommitment Phase: The receiver chooses $f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ such that $f(m_0) = f(m_1)$ and sends it to the committer. The committer then computes $\mathsf{sk}_f \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(R, C, f)$ and outputs $(f(m_b), \mathsf{sk}_f)$.
Guess: The receiver submits a guess b' and wins if $b' = b$. The receiver's advantage in this game is defined to be $2 * |\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{b} = \mathsf{b}'] - 1/2|$.

We say that the scheme FC is computationally hiding if the advantage of any polynomial time receiver in winning the game described above is at most $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function negl. One can also consider a definition where the receiver is allowed to issue q KeyGen queries in the decommitment phase. We call such a scheme $q-$hiding.

Theorem 9. *If there exists a verifiable functional encryption scheme* VFE *secure against q function secret key queries for function space* $\mathcal{F}$ *and message space* $\mathcal{X}$, *then there exists a $q-$hiding non-interactive functional commitment scheme for function space* $\mathcal{F}$ *and message space* $\mathcal{X}$.

Proof. The proof of this theorem is straightforward and we directly describe our construction here. Let VFE be a functional encryption scheme satisfying the requirement described in the theorem. We describe our functional commitment scheme $\mathsf{FC} = (\mathsf{FCom}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Verify})$ as follows:

- $\mathsf{FCom}(1^\lambda, m)$: To commit m, we first run $\mathsf{VFE}.\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda) \to (\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK})$. Then, encrypt m to compute $\mathsf{CT} \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MPK}, m)$. Output $(\{\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{CT}\}, \mathsf{MSK})$.

- KeyGen(R, C, f) : On input $R = \mathsf{MSK}$ and $C = \{\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{CT}\}$, compute
  $\mathsf{sk}_f \leftarrow \mathsf{VFE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{MSK}, f)$. Output sk_f.

- Verify(f, sk_f, C, y) : Parse $C = \{\mathsf{MPK}, \mathsf{CT}\}$. Output 1 if $\mathsf{VFE.Dec}(\mathsf{MPK}, f, \mathsf{sk}_f, \mathsf{CT}) = y$. Else, output 0.

We now analyze the properties of the scheme. It is easy to see that correctness and hiding follow from the correctness and the security of the underlying VFE scheme. Binding follows from the verifiability property of the VFE scheme. □

From the above theorem and using schemes in [GOS06, GVW12], we get the following corollary:

Corollary 1. *Assuming decisional linear assumption over bilinear groups, there exists a computationally q-hiding non-interactive functional commitment scheme for all circuits for any bounded q.*

From the above theorem and using schemes in [GOS06, ARW16], we get the following corollary:

Corollary 2. *Assuming decisional linear assumption over bilinear groups, there exists a computationally q-hiding non-interactive functional commitment scheme for inner products for any unbounded q that is polynomial in the security parameter.*

Note that similar to verifiable functional encryption, a non-interactive functional commitment scheme for circuits implies the existence of a NIWI proof system. This essentially proves that our result is tight.