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Existence of nash equilibria for generalized games without upper semicontinuity

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Abstract

The present note extends Debreu's equilibrium existence theorem for a generalized game in the context of finite-dimensional strategy spaces, by weakening the upper Semicontinuity and closed-valuedness assumption on the feasible strategy multifunctions. This is made by establishing an inequality of Ky Fan's type, whose proof is based on a selection theorem by E. Michael. An extension to generalized games with unbounded strategy spaces is also presented.

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Cubiotti, P. Existence of nash equilibria for generalized games without upper semicontinuity. Int J Game Theory 26, 267–273 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01295855

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