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Piper Alpha Disaster Slides

The Piper Alpha oil platform disaster in 1988 resulted in the deaths of 167 men. An initial explosion was caused by a condensate leak during maintenance work, igniting large oil fires. The platform's fire systems failed to activate and control was lost. As fires escalated, the platform was destroyed within 20 minutes. The disaster revealed failures in management systems, operations, design, and emergency response. It led to major changes in North Sea safety procedures and management of process safety risks on offshore oil platforms.

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100% found this document useful (2 votes)
1K views20 pages

Piper Alpha Disaster Slides

The Piper Alpha oil platform disaster in 1988 resulted in the deaths of 167 men. An initial explosion was caused by a condensate leak during maintenance work, igniting large oil fires. The platform's fire systems failed to activate and control was lost. As fires escalated, the platform was destroyed within 20 minutes. The disaster revealed failures in management systems, operations, design, and emergency response. It led to major changes in North Sea safety procedures and management of process safety risks on offshore oil platforms.

Uploaded by

tokkxylah
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Piper Alpha Case Study:

June 2008
Credited to ConocoPhillips Project
Development

What was the Piper Alpha platform?


Built in 1976
A major Northern North Sea oil & gas drilling &
production platform
226 people lived and worked on the platform
Exported oil to Flotta, and gas to St. Fergus
Acted as a hub for gas import and export
Designed and built to the standards of the day
Had recently been inspected and declared
safe

Location of Piper Alpha

What happened?

At around 10pm on 6th July 1988 a series of events started which


would destroy the platform completely
165 of 226 men on board were killed plus 2 crew members from a fast
rescue craft which was trying to rescue people
Only 61 survived, all of who decided to go for it and save themselves

27 climbed down ropes to a lower deck and then to the sea


1 by a stair to a low deck and then the sea
7 by rope and then dropped into the sea
5 jumped from 65
1 jumped from the derrick level
15 jumped from the pipe deck at 133
5 jumped from the helideck at 175
none who jumped knew what they were jumping into

What happened?

109 men died of smoke and gas inhalation


80 of those were in the accommodation
unit

Events leading up to the initial


explosion
Activities in place: drilling, production,
inspection & maintenance (some by divers)
Platform had 2 condensate injection pumps,
one was out of service for work on a pressure
relief valve, the other was operational
Work was being done under the PTW system
The 2nd pump trips and the flare intensity
increases, shut down is threatened

The initial explosion

They did not want to shut down


They did not know there was a missing PSV
and a blank flange in its place
First pump was started up
the blind flange leaks, ignites and causes an
explosion in the gas compression module
this wipes out the control room (no blast walls)
initiates large oil fires from the topside
inventory causing intense smoke and fires

Escalation

The fire system does not start, it has been


put on manual because there are divers in
the water: 2 men go to try to start the
pumps and are never seen again

Escalation
The fires continue, smoke intensifies
People are gathering in the
accommodation, but there is no control
Some start to escape on their own initiative
It is only about 15 to 20 minutes from the
initial explosion

The Tartan riser ruptures

The Tartan platform has been continuing to pump gas to Piper Alpha,
the intense heat and fires melt the riser and the riser ruptures
(although the SDVs may have closed, there is a large section of the
riser on the cellar deck, completely unprotected
The bursting riser causes a huge fireball which engulfs the platform
The tartan platform continues to pump gas to Piper as the OIM has no
authority to shut it in (needs authority from shore based
Management)
The platforms fate is now sealed, destruction is inevitable
It is 20 minutes from the initial explosion
The only hope now is to escape

Evacuation and Escape?


The helideck is engulfed in smoke and
helicopters are too far away
The lifeboats are similarly inaccessible
Due to a design fault, the gangway of the
safety vessel, Tharos, is too short to reach
into the platform
All control has broken down on the platform
By this time the only option is to escape to the
sea in whatever manner possible

The failures?
Management:
Permit To Work System not used properly
Platform management did not have full authority
to act (reluctant to shut-down)
Surrounding platform OIMs did not have authority
to stop exporting
Command system failed in an emergency
Occidentals management were too easily
satisfied, since nobody was telling them there
were issues, they assumed everything was OK
Passing a prescriptive safety inspection does not
confirm a safe operation

The failures?
Operations:
No proper handover between shifts
Not aware of or understanding the risks
Fire water system on manual, no proper way of
starting it in an emergency

The failures?
Design:
No recognition of the changed risks when gas
production was started (no blast walls, for
example)
Control room was unprotected and in an exposed
location
No sensible segregation of hazardous areas from
non-hazardous
Risers not protected, inappropriately sited SDVs
Inadequate refuge area
Inadequate escape systems

Legacy of Accident
The Cullen Inquiry is set up in November 1988.
It concluded that the initial condensate leak was
the result of maintenance work being carried
out simultaneously on a pump and related
safety valve.
Occidental (Piper Alphas operator), which was
found guilty of having inadequate maintenance
and safety procedures
The enquiry made 106 recommendations for
changes to North Sea safety procedures.
The disaster led to insurance claims of around
US$ 1.4 billion.

Lessons, actions for the future?


Management:
An effective Company Management System for
the management of the operation as a whole
An effective Operational Management System
for the management of the facility on site (PTW
system is crucial)
Regular audit and review of the system to make
sure it is being used and is effective
Training in use of the SMS and training in
understanding the risks of the operation

Lessons, actions for the future?


Safety Engineering:
Use tools such as QRA and ALARP to
understand the risks and hazards
Segregation of hazardous areas from control
rooms and accommodations, use of firewalls,
blast walls, protected control rooms and muster
areas
Active and passive fire protection systems
Riser ESDVs properly positioned and protected
A variety of escape systems

Lessons, actions for the future?


Operational Management:
Understand the risks and hazards,
communicate those and look for ways to
manage and control them
PTW system is the most crucial system
Training and competence is essential
Training and practicing for emergencies is vital

and finally?
It can happen, has happened and will
happen again, without action:
Never be complacent

Do not be too easily satisfied

References
ConocoPhillips Project Development - Piper
Alpha: 20 years on Alaister McIntosh, June
2008.
Steven Duff, Remembering Piper Alpha
Disaster, BBC News, 2008.
Wikipedia: Piper Alpha, retrieved in 2012.

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