JANUARY 2003

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is

unlimited.
 FM 3-21.11

Field Manual Headquarters

No. 3-21.11 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 23 January 2003

THE SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY

CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE...........................................................................................................................x

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THE SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY

Section I. Introduction ......................................................................................... 1-1
1-1. Characteristics of the SBCT Infantry Rifle Company............. 1-1
1-2. Operational Premise ................................................................ 1-1
1-3. Capabilities and Limitations of the SBCT Force .................... 1-1
Section II. Organization ........................................................................................ 1-2
1-4. Brigade Organization .............................................................. 1-2
1-5. SBCT Infantry Battalion Organization.................................... 1-3
1-6. Company Organization............................................................ 1-4
1-7. SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon................................................... 1-6
1-8. Mobile Gun System Platoon.................................................. 1-10
1-9. Sniper Team .......................................................................... 1-11
1-10. SBCT Combat Support Assets .............................................. 1-12
1-11. SBCT Combat Service Support Assets ................................. 1-13
Section III. Duties and Responsibilities of Key Personnel .................................. 1-14
1-12. Company Commander........................................................... 1-14
1-13. Executive Officer .................................................................. 1-14
1-14. First Sergeant......................................................................... 1-15
1-15. Platoon Leader....................................................................... 1-16
1-16. Platoon Sergeant.................................................................... 1-16
1-17. Fire Support Officer .............................................................. 1-16
1-18. Communications Specialist ................................................... 1-17
1-19. Radiotelephone Operator....................................................... 1-17
1-20. Supply Sergeant..................................................................... 1-17
1-21. Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological NCO .............................. 1-18
1-22. Mortar Section Leader........................................................... 1-18
1-23. Sniper Team Leader .............................................................. 1-18
1-24. Armorer/Supply Specialist .................................................... 1-18
1-25. Company Medic .................................................................... 1-19
Section IV. Battlefield Operating Systems........................................................... 1-19
1-26. Command and Control .......................................................... 1-19
1-27. Intelligence ............................................................................ 1-20
1-28. Maneuver............................................................................... 1-20

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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1-29. Fire Support........................................................................... 1-20
1-30. Air Defense............................................................................ 1-20
1-31. Mobility and Survivability .................................................... 1-21
1-32. Combat Service Support........................................................ 1-21

CHAPTER 2. BATTLE COMMAND AND TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

Section I. Command and Control ........................................................................ 2-1
2-1. Command and Control ............................................................ 2-1
2-2. Concept of Command and Control.......................................... 2-1
2-3. Leadership ............................................................................... 2-2
2-4. Fundamentals of Command and Control................................. 2-2
2-5. Command and Control Responsibilities.................................. 2-3
2-6. Combat Orders ........................................................................ 2-4
Section II. Troop Leading Procedures .................................................................. 2-5
2-7. Application of Troop-Leading Procedures.............................. 2-5
2-8. Receive the Mission ................................................................ 2-7
2-9. Issue a Warning Order........................................................... 2-22
2-10. Make a Tentative Plan........................................................... 2-22
2-11. Initiate Movement ................................................................. 2-26
2-12. Conduct Reconnaissance....................................................... 2-27
2-13. Complete the Plan ................................................................. 2-27
2-14. Issue the OPORD .................................................................. 2-28
2-15. Supervise and or Refine ........................................................ 2-28

CHAPTER 3. MOVEMENT
3-1. Tactical Movement and Enemy Contact ................................. 3-1
3-2. Movement Techniques ............................................................ 3-2
3-3. Movement Formations ............................................................ 3-8
3-4. Use of Movement Formations ............................................... 3-19
3-5. Control Techniques ............................................................... 3-22
3-6. Security during Movement .................................................... 3-23
3-7. Movement as Part of a Battalion ........................................... 3-24

CHAPTER 4. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section I. General Planning Considerations ........................................................ 4-1
4-1. Characteristics of the Offense ................................................. 4-1
4-2. Types of Offensive Operations................................................ 4-2
4-3. Forms of Maneuver ................................................................. 4-3
Section II. Sequence of Offensive Operation........................................................ 4-7
4-4. Assembly Area ........................................................................ 4-7
4-5. Reconnaissance ....................................................................... 4-8
4-6. Movement to the Line of Departure ........................................ 4-8
4-7. Maneuver................................................................................. 4-8
4-8. Deployment ............................................................................. 4-9
4-9. Assault ..................................................................................... 4-9
4-10. Consolidation and Reorganization ........................................ 4-10

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Section III. Planning Considerations.................................................................... 4-10
4-11. Fire Support........................................................................... 4-10
4-12. Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability....................... 4-11
4-13. Air Defense............................................................................ 4-11
4-14. Combat Service Support........................................................ 4-11
4-15. Aviation ................................................................................. 4-12
4-16. Integration of Vehicles .......................................................... 4-13
Section IV. Actions on Contact ............................................................................ 4-13
4-17. Developing Actions on Contact ............................................ 4-14
4-18. Time Requirements for Actions on Contact.......................... 4-14
4-19. The Four Steps of Actions on Contact .................................. 4-14
Section V. Company Offensive Operations ........................................................ 4-17
4-20. Attack Characteristics............................................................ 4-17
4-21. Hasty and Deliberate Attacks ................................................ 4-18
4-22. Attacks during Limited Visibility.......................................... 4-21
Section VI. Other Offensive Operations............................................................... 4-21
4-23. Planning Considerations........................................................ 4-21
4-24. The Search-and-Attach Technique ........................................ 4-22
4-25. The Approach-March Technique .......................................... 4-28
4-26. Considerations ....................................................................... 4-31
4-27. Exploitation ........................................................................... 4-33
4-28. Pursuit.................................................................................... 4-33
Section VII. Special Purpose Attacks .................................................................... 4-33
4-29. Ambush ................................................................................. 4-34
4-30. Raid ....................................................................................... 4-35
4-31. Spoiling Attack...................................................................... 4-35
4-32. Counterattack......................................................................... 4-36
4-33. Feint....................................................................................... 4-36
4-34. Demonstration ....................................................................... 4-37
Section VIII. Attack Techniques............................................................................. 4-37
4-35. Assault of a Strongpoint ........................................................ 4-37
4-36. Attack during Limited Visibility ........................................... 4-45
Section IX. Common Offensive Activities........................................................... 4-54
4-37. Infiltration.............................................................................. 4-54
4-38. Overwatch ............................................................................. 4-58
4-39. Follow and Support ............................................................... 4-59
4-40. Bypass ................................................................................... 4-60
4-41. Clear an Objective ................................................................. 4-60
4-42. The Company as Reserve ...................................................... 4-62
4-43. Security Operations ............................................................... 4-63

CHAPTER 5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section I. General Planning Considerations ........................................................ 5-1
5-1. Defensive Operations .............................................................. 5-1
5-2. Purposes................................................................................... 5-2

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Section II. Characteristics of the Defense ............................................................. 5-2
5-3. Preparation............................................................................... 5-2
5-4. Security......................................................................................52
5-5. Disruption................................................................................ 5-2
5-6. Mass and Concentration .......................................................... 5-2
5-7. Flexibility ................................................................................ 5-3
Section III. Sequence of the Defense ..................................................................... 5-3
5-8. Reconnaissance and Security Operations and
Enemy Preparatory Fires ......................................................... 5-3
5-9. Occupation and Preparation .................................................... 5-4
5-10. Approach of the Enemy Main Attack...................................... 5-4
5-11. Enemy Assault......................................................................... 5-4
5-12. Counterattack........................................................................... 5-4
5-13. Consolidation and Reorganization .......................................... 5-5
Section IV. Planning Considerations...................................................................... 5-5
5-14. Maneuver................................................................................. 5-5
5-15. Fire Support............................................................................. 5-7
5-16. Air Defense.............................................................................. 5-8
5-17. Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability......................... 5-8
5-18. Combat Service Support........................................................ 5-13
Section V. Preparation and Integration ............................................................... 5-13
5-19. Defensive Techniques ........................................................... 5-13
5-20. Sector Defense....................................................................... 5-14
5-21. Battle Position Defense ......................................................... 5-16
5-22. Strongpoint Defense .............................................................. 5-19
5-23. Perimeter Defense ................................................................. 5-21
5-24. Linear Defense ...................................................................... 5-26
5-25. Nonlinear Defense................................................................. 5-27
5-26. Reverse Slope Defense.......................................................... 5-28
5-27. Engagement Area Development............................................ 5-31
5-28. Priority of Work .................................................................... 5-38
5-29. Adjacent Unit Coordination .................................................. 5-41
Section VI. Retrograde Operations....................................................................... 5-41
5-30. Delay ..................................................................................... 5-42
5-31. Planning................................................................................. 5-42
5-32. Delay Techniques .................................................................. 5-43
5-33. Withdrawal ............................................................................ 5-45
5-34. Phases .................................................................................... 5-46
5-35. Unassisted Withdrawal.......................................................... 5-46
5-36. Assisted Withdrawal.............................................................. 5-47
5-37. Retirement ............................................................................. 5-48

CHAPTER 6. URBAN OPERATIONS

Section I. General Planning Considerations ........................................................ 6-1
6-1. Employment Considerations for Company-Size
Combined-Arms Teams .......................................................... 6-1

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6-2. Employment of Infantry and MGS Vehicles........................... 6-3
Section II. Offense .............................................................................................. 6-10
6-3. General Offensive Considerations......................................... 6-10
6-4. METT-TC Factors................................................................. 6-11
6-5. Battle Command.................................................................... 6-16
6-6. Task Organization ................................................................. 6-18
6-7. Movement.............................................................................. 6-20
6-8. Deliberate Attack................................................................... 6-21
6-9. Isolate an Urban Objective .................................................... 6-23
6-10. Assault a Building ................................................................. 6-25
6-11. Attack a Block or Group of Buildings................................... 6-28
6-12. Consolidation and Reorganization ........................................ 6-29
Section III. Defense .............................................................................................. 6-30
6-13. METT-TC Factors................................................................. 6-30
6-14. Command and Control .......................................................... 6-40
6-15. Hasty Defense........................................................................ 6-42
6-16. Company Defense of a Village ............................................. 6-43
6-17. Defense of a Block or Group of Buildings............................ 6-45
6-18. Defense of Key Terrain ......................................................... 6-46
6-19. Defense of an Urban Strongpoint.......................................... 6-48
6-20. Delay ..................................................................................... 6-50

CHAPTER 7. TACTICAL ENABLING OPERATIONS

Section I. Reconnaissance ................................................................................... 7-1
7-1. Reconnaissance Planning ........................................................ 7-1
7-2. Reconnaissance Execution ...................................................... 7-1
7-3. Reconnaissance Before and After Operations......................... 7-2
7-4. Reconnaissance during Operations ......................................... 7-4
7-5. Forms of Reconnaissance........................................................ 7-4
Section II. Linkup ................................................................................................. 7-5
7-6. Linkup Situations .................................................................... 7-5
7-7. Linkup Planning ...................................................................... 7-5
7-8. Steps of the Linkup Operation................................................. 7-6
Section III. Security Operations ............................................................................. 7-8
7-9. Forms of Security Operations.................................................. 7-8
7-10. Planning Considerations.......................................................... 7-8
7-11. Screen .................................................................................... 7-11
7-12. Guard ..................................................................................... 7-13
7-13. Local Security........................................................................ 7-17
Section IV. Vehicle Laager .................................................................................. 7-18
7-14. Planning Considerations........................................................ 7-18
7-15. Occupying Vehicle Laager Sites ........................................... 7-19
Section V. Passage of Lines ................................................................................ 7-19
7-16. Planning Considerations........................................................ 7-20
7-17. Reconnaissance Coordination ............................................... 7-20
7-18. Forward Passage of Lines...................................................... 7-21

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7-19. Rearward Passage of Lines.................................................... 7-22
Section VI. Breaching........................................................................................... 7-23
7-20. Breaching Tenets................................................................... 7-23
7-21. Types of Breaches ................................................................. 7-26
Section VII. Air Assault Operations ...................................................................... 7-26
7-22. Planning Considerations........................................................ 7-26
7-23. Reverse Planning Sequence................................................... 7-27

CHAPTER 8. STABILITY OPERATIONS

Section I. Planning Considerations...................................................................... 8-1
8-1. Rules of Engagement............................................................... 8-1
8-2. Rules of Interaction ................................................................. 8-2
8-3. Force Protection ...................................................................... 8-2
8-4. Task Organization ................................................................... 8-3
8-5. CSS Considerations................................................................. 8-3
8-6. Media Considerations.............................................................. 8-4
8-7. Operations with Outside Agencies .......................................... 8-4
Section II. Types of Operations ............................................................................ 8-4
8-8. Peace Operations ..................................................................... 8-4
8-9. Foreign Internal Defense ......................................................... 8-5
8-10. Security Assistance.................................................................. 8-5
8-11. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance ........................................ 8-5
8-12. Support to Insurgency ............................................................. 8-5
8-13. Support to Counterdrug Operations ........................................ 8-5
8-14. Combating Terrorism .............................................................. 8-6
8-15. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations .................................... 8-6
8-16. Arms Control........................................................................... 8-6
8-17. Show of Force Operations....................................................... 8-6
Section III. Company Tasks ................................................................................... 8-6
8-18. Establish and Occupy a Lodgment Area ................................. 8-6
8-19. Conduct Negotiations .............................................................. 8-9
8-20. Monitor Compliance with an Agreement .............................. 8-11
8-21. Establish Observation Posts .................................................. 8-12
8-22. Establish Checkpoints ........................................................... 8-13
8-23. Conduct Patrol Operations .................................................... 8-15
8-24. Conduct Convoy Escort......................................................... 8-17
8-25. Open and Secure Routes........................................................ 8-22
8-26. Conduct Reserve Operations ................................................. 8-22

CHAPTER 9. SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Section I. Characteristics of Support Operations................................................. 9-1
9-1. Types of Support Operations................................................... 9-1
9-2. Domestic Support Operations ................................................. 9-1
9-3. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ........................................... 9-2
Section II. Forms of Support Operations .............................................................. 9-2
9-4. Relief Operations..................................................................... 9-2

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9-5. Support to Domestic CBRNE Consequence Management ..... 9-3
9-6. Support to Civil Law Enforcement ......................................... 9-3
9-7. Community Assistance............................................................ 9-3
Section III. Considerations for Support Operations ............................................... 9-5
9-8. Provide Essential Support to the Largest
Number of People.................................................................... 9-5
9-9. Coordinate Actions with Other Agencies................................ 9-5
9-10. Establish Measures of Effectiveness ....................................... 9-5
9-11. Hand Over to Civilian Agencies As Soon As Feasible ........... 9-6
Section IV. Phases of Support Operations.............................................................. 9-6
9-12. Response Phase ....................................................................... 9-6
9-13. Recovery Phase ....................................................................... 9-6
9-14. Restoration Phase .................................................................... 9-7

CHAPTER 10. COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Section I. Command and Support Relationships ............................................... 10-1
10-1. Command Relationships........................................................ 10-1
10-2. Support Relationships............................................................ 10-1
Section II. Fires and Effects................................................................................ 10-2
10-3. Indirect Fire Capabilities ....................................................... 10-2
10-4. Fire Support Planning and Coordination............................... 10-4
10-5. Maneuver Commander's Intent ........................................... 10-10
10-6. Planning Process.................................................................. 10-10
10-7. Targets ................................................................................. 10-16
10-8. Final Protective Fires........................................................... 10-17
10-9. Special Munitions................................................................ 10-17
10-10. Smoke Support .................................................................... 10-18
10-11. Observer Positions............................................................... 10-18
10-12. Rehearsals and Execution.................................................... 10-19
10-13. Communications.................................................................. 10-19
10-14. Quick Fire Channel ............................................................. 10-21
10-15. Indirect Fires in Close Support............................................ 10-21
10-16. Fire Support Team............................................................... 10-22
10-17. Mortars ................................................................................ 10-23
10-18. Mortar Positions .................................................................. 10-26
10-19. Mortar Employment ............................................................ 10-27
10-20. Mortar Displacement ........................................................... 10-27
10-21. Mortar Engagements ........................................................... 10-28
Section III. Engineers ......................................................................................... 10-30
10-22. Organization and Capabilities ............................................. 10-30
10-23. Medium Engineer Company ............................................... 10-31
10-24. Mobility ............................................................................... 10-34
10-25. Countermobility................................................................... 10-35
10-26. Survivability ........................................................................ 10-41
Section IV. Air Defense Artillery....................................................................... 10-41
10-27. Systems, Organization, and Capabilities............................. 10-41

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10-28. Employment of Air Defense Systems ................................. 10-42
10-29. Weapons Control Status ...................................................... 10-43
10-30. Early Warning Procedures................................................... 10-43
10-31. Reaction Procedures ............................................................ 10-43
Section V. NBC Support ................................................................................... 10-45
10-32. Reconnaissance Support...................................................... 10-45
10-33. Decontamination Support.................................................... 10-46

CHAPTER 11. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Section I. CSS Planning Considerations............................................................ 11-1
11-1. General Guidelines ................................................................ 11-1
11-2. Company Responsibilities..................................................... 11-2
Section II. Soldier’s Load ................................................................................... 11-4
11-3. Load Planning........................................................................ 11-5
11-4. Load Calculation ................................................................... 11-6
11-5. Load Management Techniques ............................................. 11-7
Section III. Trains ............................................................................................... 11-8
11-6. SBCT Infantry Battalion Trains ............................................ 11-8
11-7. SBCT Infantry Company Trains ........................................... 11-8
11-8. Trains Security ...................................................................... 11-9
11-9. Communications.................................................................... 11-9
Section IV. CSS in the SBCT............................................................................... 11-9
11-10. Brigade Support Battalion ................................................... 11-10
11-11. S1 Section............................................................................ 11-11
11-12. Brigade Operational Law Team .......................................... 11-11
11-13. Unit Ministry Team ............................................................. 11-11
11-14. Financial Management ........................................................ 11-11
11-15. Enemy Prisoners of War...................................................... 11-12
Section V. Supply and Transportation Operations............................................ 11-12
11-16. Classes of Supply ................................................................ 11-12
11-17. Routine Supply .................................................................... 11-14
11-18. Emergency Resupply........................................................... 11-17
11-19. Prestock Operations............................................................. 11-17
11-20. Company Resupply Requirements ...................................... 11-18
11-21. Company Resupply Techniques.......................................... 11-18
11-22. Supply Considerations......................................................... 11-19
11-23. Transportation ..................................................................... 11-21
Section VI. Maintenance Operations.................................................................. 11-21
11-24. SBCT Maintenance Concept ............................................... 11-21
11-25. Maintenance Requirements ................................................. 11-21
11-26. Company Role ..................................................................... 11-22
11-27. Destruction .......................................................................... 11-22
Section VII. Health Service Support.................................................................... 11-23
11-28. Health and Hygiene. ............................................................ 11-23
11-29. Soldiers Wounded in Action ............................................... 11-23
11-30. Casualty Evacuation ............................................................ 11-24

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11-31. Soldiers Killed in Action..................................................... 11-28
Section VIII. Reorganization and Weapons Replacement .................................... 11-28
11-32. Replacement and Cross-Leveling of Personnel................... 11-29
11-33. Personnel Replacement Procedures..................................... 11-29
11-34. Replacement and Salvaging of Equipment ......................... 11-29
11-35. Weapons System Replacement Operations ......................... 11-29

APPENDIX A. JAVELIN EMPLOYMENT............................................................... A-1

APPENDIX B. THE MGS PLATOON ........................................................................B-1
APPENDIX C. SNIPERS .............................................................................................C-1
APPENDIX D. TLP-MDMP INTEGRATION ........................................................... D-1
APPENDIX E. RISK MANAGEMENT ......................................................................E-1
APPENDIX F. FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE............................................................. F-1
APPENDIX G. ROAD MARCHES AND ASSEMBLY AREAS .............................. G-1
APPENDIX H. DIRECT FIRE PLANNING AND CONTROL ................................. H-1
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ................................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ...................................................................................................................... Index-1

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 PREFACE

This manual is based on the premise that although the unit

organization, weapons systems, and conditions have changed, platoon
maneuver, fire, and movement have not changed.

FM 3-21.11 describes the doctrinal and tactical employment principles for the Stryker
brigade combat team (SBCT) infantry rifle company, which is an element of the SBCT
battalion. This field manual responds to a need for emerging doctrine, tactics, and
techniques for the infantry companies of the SBCT. The fundamental shift and focus for
the manual is the combination of an infantry-centric organization, three full platoons, and
a mobile gun system (MGS) platoon. This is a departure from the light and mechanized
infantry concept.
This manual provides the company commander with tactics and techniques to exploit
the infantry capabilities, to reduce vulnerabilities, and to enable the unit to win on the
battlefield. This manual borrows from “nested” concepts found in FM 7-10 and FM 71-1
and reemphasizes information from other manuals that are of critical importance.
The proponent of this publication is the US Army Infantry School. Send comments
and recommendations to doctrine@benning.army.mil or on DA Form 2028 directly to
Commandant, US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, Georgia
31905-5000.
Unless this manual states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer
exclusively to men.

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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY

The five types of infantry have historically been separated into two
“schools of thought”: light vs. mechanized. Both are extremely lethal in
the terrain and missions for which they are best suited. Mechanized forces
excel in terrain that supports rapid fire and maneuver while light forces
excel in more restrictive terrain and accomplish their missions at the
small-unit level. The overarching doctrine is the same across these two
schools of thought; however, the tactics, techniques, capabilities, and
limitations between light and mechanized infantry create a divergence.
The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) infantry rifle company, as a part
of the SBCT battalion, fills this gap. The SBCT can operate independently,
or it can supplement light and mechanized forces.

Section I. INTRODUCTION
This manual addresses the doctrine of the SBCT at the company level. The SBCT
infantry rifle company capitalizes on the strengths and minimizes the limitations of
mechanized and light doctrine. The light infantry ethos is the foundation of this
organization but is combined with the speed, mobility, and precision of mounted warfare.
Success is achieved by integrating the complementary characteristics of each type of
infantry where decisive action must occur.

1-1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY

Because the fundamentals of fire and maneuver are unchanged, the majority of the
combat power of the SBCT infantry rifle company lies in its highly trained squads and
platoons. The organic vehicles in the platoons are for moving infantry to the fight swiftly
and providing tactical flexibility while tailoring the soldiers' loads through a "mobile
arms room" concept. There is also a mobile gun system (MGS) platoon that supports the
infantry fight with long-range precision fires. The MGS is a fighting vehicle but is not a
Bradley or a tank and should not be employed in the traditional sense of a fighting
vehicle. Flexibility is the key to the rifle company. Current and predicted global
situations dictate the need for a force that is rapidly deployable (within 96 hours), lethal,
and flexible enough to address the full spectrum of Army operations.

1-2. OPERATIONAL PREMISE

The SBCT was developed to address some of the changing situations the US Army
currently faces. At the brigade level, there are significant changes that affect the way this
unit fights. Although the changes at brigade level do not significantly change tactics at
company level and below, they do affect the frequency with which companies, platoons
and squads execute certain missions.

1-3. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE SBCT FORCE

The SBCT infantry rifle company commander must understand the differences in the
capabilities and limitations of this unit as compared to that of traditional infantry forces.
The SBCT combines the tactical mobility aspect of mechanized units while emphasizing

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FM3-21.11

and exploiting the infantry fight where decisive action occurs. Table 1-1 highlights the
capabilities and limitations of the SBCT infantry rifle company.

CAPABILITIES LIMITATIONS
• Conducts organic combined-arms assaults • Vulnerable to indirect fires while
in complex environments. dismounted.
• Strategic deployability. • Reduced overmatch capability.
• Smaller logistical footprint. • Increased requirement for augmentation in
• Increased combat power with 4 platoons a major theater war.
per company and 4 squads per infantry • Reduced sustainability in forward units.
platoon. • Reduced company logistical systems.
• Increased tactical mobility for infantry. • No organic maintenance sections.
• Carries and employs assortment of • Not an initial entry force.
weapons to the fight with a “mobile arms
room” concept. • Vulnerable to nuclear, biological, chemical
(NBC) attack.
• 120-mm and 60-mm mortars organic to
company.
• Information dominance.
• Can operate routinely in nonlinear and
contiguous environments.
• Organic capability to coordinate both lethal
and nonlethal effects.
• Responsible for a much larger area of
operations.
• Self-sustained operations for 72 hours.

Table 1-1. Capabilities and limitations of the SBCT infantry rifle company.

Section II. ORGANIZATION

The SBCT is capable of fighting combined-arms operations down to company level. This
creates the necessary combat power and flexibility needed in complex environments.

1-4. BRIGADE ORGANIZATION

The SBCT is an infantry-centric, full spectrum, early entry combat force pre-configured
in ready-to-fight combined-arms packages (Figure 1-1). The design includes embedded
unit-based capabilities such as military intelligence (MI), signal, engineer, antitank,
artillery, and combat service support (CSS) elements. This organization allows the SBCT
to fight using combined arms down to company level. The following are key organic
assets that allow the brigade commander to conduct shaping and decisive operations more
effectively:
• Brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC).
• Infantry battalion (x3).
• Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron.
• Antitank company.
• Artillery battalion.

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 FM 3-21.11

• Medium engineer company.

• Military intelligence company.
• Signal company.
• Brigade support battalion.

Figure 1-1. SBCT organization.

1-5. SBCT INFANTRY BATTALION ORGANIZATION

The SBCT infantry battalion (Figure 1-2, page 1-4) consists of three rifle companies and
an HHC. The HHC provides support to the battalion commander and the staff and
controls the battalion’s reconnaissance platoon, mortar platoon, medical platoon,
communication section, and sniper squad.

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FM3-21.11

Figure 1-2. SBCT infantry battalion organization.

1-6. COMPANY ORGANIZATION

Figure 1-3, page 1-6, illustrates the organization of the SBCT infantry rifle company. The
company headquarters section provides command, control, and supervision of all organic
and attached elements. The company headquarters consists of the company commander,
executive officer (XO), first sergeant (1SG), company supply and nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) personnel, infantry carrier vehicle (ICV) crews for the company
commander (CO) and XO, and the company commander’s radiotelephone operators
(RATELOs). The company headquarters includes the following personnel and
equipment:

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• Two ICVs, each with a driver and a vehicle commander (VC), commanded by
the CO and the XO.
• Two high-mobility, multiwheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) with trailers, which
are under the control of the 1SG. The NBC noncommissioned officer (NCO)
and the communications specialist operate these vehicles.
• Two trucks with trailers, which are under the control of the supply sergeant.
The supply specialists drive these vehicles.

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Figure 1-3. SBCT infantry rifle company organization.

1-7. SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON

Figure 1-4 illustrates the organization of the SBCT infantry rifle platoon. The platoon
includes the following personnel and equipment:

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• Platoon headquarters, which includes platoon leader (PL), platoon sergeant

(PSG), RATELO, forward observer (FO), and platoon medic (attached).
• Four ICVs, each with driver and vehicle commander. The PL and PSG are the
vehicle commanders of two of the ICVs while the platoon is mounted.
• Three 9-man squads of infantry with antitank assets (Javelin).
• One 7-man weapons squad.
The SBCT infantry platoon has one officer and 44 enlisted personnel in three elements:
the platoon headquarters, the mounted element, and the infantry squads.

Figure 1-4. SBCT infantry rifle platoon organization.

a. Rifle Platoon Headquarters. The platoon headquarters (Figure 1-5, page 1-8)
consists of the rifle platoon leader, platoon sergeant, FO, and RATELO. In tactical
situations, it also includes the platoon medic. The platoon leader is responsible for the
employment of the platoon and all the platoon’s systems. The platoon sergeant is the
most senior NCO in the platoon. He is second in succession of command and leads the
platoon’s mounted element when the platoon leader dismounts with the infantry squads.
He assists and advises the platoon leader, and he leads the platoon in the platoon leader’s
absence. The decision as to whether the PSG will participate as part of the dismounted
element or mounted element will always be based on the factors of mission, enemy,
terrain, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

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Figure 1-5. Rifle platoon headquarters.

b. Mounted Element. The infantry rifle platoon is equipped with four ICVs that
provide rapid, protected tactical and operational mobility of infantry squads to critical
locations on the battlefield (Figure 1-6). The ICV is a fully mobile system capable of
operating in conjunction with infantry and other elements of the combined-arms team.
Each ICV has a crew of two (VC and driver) that operates the vehicle. These mounted
crews provide critical support to the platoon by operating and maintaining the ICVs and
properly employing them on the battlefield to ensure protected delivery of the infantry
squads to their dismount point. Once the infantry squads have dismounted the ICVs, the
vehicle crew may employ local defensive armament to defeat “thin-skinned” enemy
vehicles (trucks or lightly armored vehicles) or dismounted infantry.
(1) The VC is responsible for the overall employment of the ICV and operates the
ICV’s defensive armament. The vehicle driver operates the vehicle during all conditions--
day or night. At the VC’s direction, the driver negotiates the vehicle through all terrain
and obstacles to deliver the infantry squad safely to the point of employment on the
battlefield.
(2) As previously stated, the ICV’s local defensive armament is capable of defeating
“thin-skinned” enemy vehicles (trucks or lightly armored vehicles) and dismounted
infantry. ICV crews may employ these weapons to augment the base of fire provided by
the platoon’s weapons squad. These augmenting direct fires can ensure the infantry
squad’s freedom of maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy. These fires can also
provide accurate suppressive fires on enemy personnel, bunkers, or emplacements and
destroy enemy infantry in daylight, at night, or during conditions of limited visibility
(smoke, haze, and fog).
(3) The platoon’s ICVs and infantry soldiers provide mutual protection for each other
while performing their assigned missions. Infantry soldiers provide security for the
vehicles while halted, and the ICVs provide rapid, protected battlefield mobility and an
augmenting base of fire capability for the dismounted infantry assault.

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(4) While the platoon remains mounted, the platoon leader controls the movement of
the platoon’s ICVs. When the platoon leader dismounts to conduct the assault or other
dismounted infantry operations with the infantry squads, the platoon sergeant normally
assumes control of the mounted element of the platoon. He maneuvers them in support of
the infantry squads and as directed by the platoon leader. For example, if the direct fires
of the ICVs are needed to facilitate the maneuver of the squads, the platoon leader may
decide to have the platoon sergeant direct the fires of the mounted element to facilitate
the platoon's maneuver. The platoon sergeant also can dismount with the rest of the
platoon, if required.
(5) The platoon fights as a team. It must be prepared to maneuver in restricted terrain
supported by the weapons squad and, when possible, the ICVs and MGS. When the
platoon conducts dismounted operations, it has three 9-man rifle squads and a 7-man
weapons squad. The key advantage here is that, with the added support of the weapons
squad, the infantry no longer has to stay within range of ICV direct fire support. In this
case, the ICVs could overwatch, block another avenue of approach, isolate the objective,
or conduct other missions.

Figure 1-6. Mounted element.

c. Infantry Squads. The infantry rifle platoon has three 9-man rifle squads and one
7-man weapons squad. These squads are at the center of the SBCT infantry rifle platoon
concept.
(1) Rifle Squads. Each of the three rifle squads (Figure 1-7, page 1-10) consists of a
rifle squad leader and eight soldiers. The rifle squad leader is the senior tactical leader of
the squad and controls the squad’s movement and fires. He conducts squad training and
maintains the squad’s ability to conduct tactical missions successfully. Each infantry
squad is further organized into two 4-man fire teams consisting of a team leader, a
grenadier, and an automatic rifleman. The fourth member within each fire team is either
the squad’s antiarmor specialist or the squad’s designated marksman (DM). The fire team
leader is a fighting leader who leads his team by example. He is equipped with an M4
rifle. The fire team leader controls the movement of his team and the placement of fires
against enemy soldiers. He assists the squad leader as required.

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Figure 1-7. Rifle squad.

(a) Squad Antiarmor Specialist. Although normally functioning as a rifleman within

one of the fire teams in a rifle squad, the squad antiarmor specialist is also capable of
defeating heavy armor in any tactical environment. He is equipped with the Javelin
missile system, which provides the squad, platoon, and company with an extremely
lethal, fire-and-forget, man-portable, top-attack antiarmor capability to defeat threat main
battle tanks during day, night, and adverse weather conditions at ranges up to 2,000
meters. The command launch unit (CLU) for the Javelin missile is transported in the
squad's ICV. If required, the squad antiarmor specialist destroys enemy armor threats that
may impede the squad and platoon's ability to accomplish their mission. See Appendix A
for a discussion of Javelin employment.
(b) Squad Designated Marksman. Although normally functioning as a rifleman
within one of the fire teams in a rifle squad, the squad designated marksman is also
armed with the M24 7.62-mm sniper rifle. He is employed at the direction of the squad
leader or reorganized with the other squad marksmen into a platoon sniper section. The
designated marksman can defeat high-value enemy personnel targets, such as automatic
rifle teams, antiarmor teams, and snipers, at ranges out to 800 meters.
(2) Weapons Squad. The seven-man weapons squad (Figure 1-8) consists of a squad
leader and two 3-man machine-gun teams. The weapons squad provides the primary base
of fire for the maneuver of the platoon’s rifle squads with highly accurate short- and
long-range, direct and small-arms fires against enemy personnel and equipment. Each of
the two machine-gun teams consists of the gunner, assistant gunner, and ammunition
bearer. Each team has an M240B 7.62-mm medium machine gun, which has an effective
range of over 800 meters.

Figure 1-8. Weapons squad.

1-8. MOBILE GUN SYSTEM PLATOON

Figure 1-9 illustrates the organization of the MGS platoon. The platoon includes three
MGS vehicles, each with a crew of three: VC, gunner, and driver. The platoon leader and

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platoon sergeant are the VCs for two of the MGS vehicles. (Appendix B of this manual
details the MGS platoon and its employment considerations.)

Figure 1-9. MGS platoon organization.

1-9. SNIPER TEAM

The SBCT infantry company employs snipers as a three-man team, consisting of a sniper,
an observer, and one man who secures the team (Figure 1-10, page 1-12). The senior man
in the team is the observer, the next most senior is the sniper, and the junior man secures
the sniper team. The team is capable of providing the company with a full range of sniper
support and is equipped with both the M24 7.62-mm sniper rifle (providing antipersonnel
fires out to 800 meters) and the .50-caliber XM107 sniper rifle (providing antipersonnel
and antiequipment fires beyond 800 meters). This “arms room” concept allows the sniper
team to employ the sniper system that best supports the mission parameters. Additionally,
the third member of the sniper team is equipped with an M203 rifle system to provide
protection and security for the sniper and his spotter as well as a means to break contact if
the team is compromised. The sniper team is employed to support maneuver, to kill
essential enemy leadership or command personnel, to disable lightly armored or “thin
skinned” vehicles, to enhance force protection, to provide lethal accurate fires in urban
operations, and to perform the counter-sniper role. Refer to Appendix C for a detailed
discussion of Sniper employment.

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Figure 1-10. Sniper team organization.

1-10. SBCT COMBAT SUPPORT ASSETS

The company has an organic mortar section and fire support team. The company also
may be task-organized with additional combat support (CS) elements.
a. Mortar Section. The mortar section is the rifle company’s primary indirect fire
support element. The section consists of ten soldiers organized in two mortar crews; each
crew is equipped with a 120-mm mortar mounted on a specially equipped mortar carrier
(MC) (Figure 1-11). The MC allows for rapid and flexible delivery of indirect fires and
increased responsiveness through rapid maneuver in support of company operations.
Each crew is also equipped with a 60-mm mortar, which enables the section to provide a
more lightweight dismounted mortar system to meet the requirements of a traditional
light infantry mission (such as infiltration). With the exception of having two mortar
systems rather than four, the mortar section provides the company commander with the
same indirect fire capabilities that the battalion mortar platoon provides to the battalion
commander. The man-portable nature of the mortar systems gives the company
commander a flexible and robust indirect fire capability. Due to crew limitations, only
one system (60-mm or 120-mm) can be employed at a given time.

Figure 1-11. Mortar section organization.

b. Fire Support Team. The fire support team (FIST) (Figure 1-12) consists of the
fire support officer (FSO), the fire support (FS) NCO, and one fire support specialist. It is
equipped with the fire support vehicle (FSV) and has the Striker to provide a combat
laser designation capability for delivery of precision artillery or aerial-delivered
munitions. The FIST assists the company commander in planning, integrating,
coordinating, and executing all types of available supporting fires during tactical

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operations. The FIST is the commander’s primary fire support coordinator and provides
the commander a direct link to battalion indirect fire support systems.

Figure 1-12. Fire support team.

c. Other Elements. Additional CS elements that may be task organized to the

company include--
• Engineer assets, such as an engineer squad, special equipment, or both.
• A Stinger team, which rides on a dedicated vehicle. Air defense artillery
(ADA) assets are attached from a divisional direct-support ADA battalion, if
needed.
• An SBCT battalion reconnaissance squad.
• An SBCT battalion mortar section (during some tactical operations).
• Sensor teams (during some security operations), such as those using ground
surveillance radar (GSR) or the improved remotely monitored battlefield
sensor system (IREMBASS).
• Counterintelligence, civil affairs, and linguistic support teams (during stability
operations or support operations).
• Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets may be provided from the SBCT,
based on METT-TC considerations.

1-11. SBCT COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ASSETS

SBCT combat service support assets consist of a company medical team and a medical
evacuation team attached from the SBCT battalion HHC.
a. Company Medical Team. The company medical team consists of a senior
company medic and three platoon medics attached from the battalion’s medical platoon.
They ensure that the company is physically capable of conducting tactical operations.
The company medic advises the commander on the medical readiness of his soldiers,
assists the commander with planning and executing company and platoon medical
training, supervises the three platoon medics, and supervises monitoring of the health and
hygiene of company personnel. During tactical operations, the company medic organizes
and coordinates casualty treatment and evacuation operations.
b. Medical Evacuation Team. A medical evacuation team (Figure 1-13, page 1-14)
with a medical evacuation vehicle (MEV) from the battalion medical platoon is normally

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placed in direct support (DS) of the SBCT infantry company. This team has a senior
trauma specialist (vehicle commander), a trauma specialist, and a driver. When in DS of
the SBCT infantry rifle company, the ambulance crew assists the company medical
personnel with treatment and medical evacuations of ill, injured, or wounded company
personnel. While in DS of the company, the ambulance team is directed by the company
1SG and senior company medic. If required, the ambulance team provides medical
evacuation of company personnel from platoon and company casualty collection points
(CCP) to a supporting treatment team or to the battalion aid station (BAS).

Figure 1-13. Medical evacuation team.

Section III. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY PERSONNEL

This section describes the duties and responsibilities of key personnel in the SBCT
infantry company.

1-12. COMPANY COMMANDER

The company commander is responsible for everything the company does or fails to do.
This includes the tactical employment, training, administration, personnel management,
maintenance, and sustainment of his company. He must know the capabilities of his men
and supporting weapons and how to tactically employ them. He must also know the
capabilities of the enemy.
a. The company commander exercises command through his subordinate leaders.
b. The commander employs his company to support the accomplishment of the
battalion and SBCT missions. He requests additional support from the battalion when
required.

1-13. EXECUTIVE OFFICER

The executive officer is second in command. His primary role is to oversee the
management, collation, and processing of digitized information and to assist the
commander in mission planning and accomplishment. He assumes command of the
company as required and ensures that tactical reports from the platoons are forwarded to
the battalion tactical operations center (TOC). The XO locates where he can maintain
communications with the company commander and the battalion.
a. The XO is the company's primary facilitator for the flow of digitized information.
b. Before the battle, the XO (with the first sergeant) plans and supervises the
company's CSS. They ensure precombat inspections are complete. The XO plans and

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coordinates logistical support with agencies outside the company while the first sergeant
does the same internally. He prepares or assists in the preparation of paragraph 4 of the
company operations order (OPORD). He may also assist the company commander in
planning the mission.
c. The XO coordinates with higher, adjacent, and supporting units. He may aid in
control of certain significant steps of the battle such as a passage of lines, bridging a gap,
or breaching an obstacle, or he may assume control of a platoon attached to the company
during movement.
d. The XO may be assigned tactical responsibilities such as the following:
(1) Landing or Pickup Zone Control Officer. This may include straggler control,
casualty evacuation, resupply operations, or air/ground liaison.
(2) Quartering Party or Detachment Officer in Charge. The XO may be the officer
in charge (OIC) of an element consisting of representatives of various company elements.
Their purpose is to precede the company and reconnoiter, secure, and mark an assembly
area, or they remain behind the company to move or secure excess equipment and
personnel while the company moves to a new location or conducts combat operations.
(3) Element Leader. The XO may be assigned a mission and a task-organized
element with which to accomplish it. He may, for instance, control all the company
machine guns, the mortar section, and one rifle platoon as the support force leader in a
company raid or attack. Common missions of this nature include--
• Lead the reserve.
• Lead the detachment left in contact (DLIC) during a withdrawal.
• Control attachments to the company.
• Serve as movement control officer.

1-14. FIRST SERGEANT

The first sergeant is the senior NCO and normally the most experienced soldier in the
company. He is the commander's primary tactical advisor and the expert on individual
and NCO skills. He assists the commander in planning, coordinating, and supervising all
activities that support the unit mission. He operates where the commander directs or
where his duties require him. His specific duties include the following.
a. He executes and supervises routine operations. This includes enforcing the
tactical standing operating procedure (SOP), planning and coordinating training,
coordinating and reporting personnel and administrative actions, and supervising supply,
maintenance, communications, field hygiene, and medical evacuation operations.
b. He supervises, inspects, or observes matters designated by the commander. (For
example, he observes and reports on a portion of the company's sector or zone, inspects
the mortar section, or inspects all range cards.)
c. He assists and coordinates with the XO and is prepared to assume the XO’s
duties.
d. The 1SG leads task-organized elements or subunits on designated missions, if
required.

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1-15. PLATOON LEADER

The platoon leader is responsible to the commander for leadership, discipline, training,
and sustainment activities related to the platoon and for the platoon's success in combat.
He is also responsible for maintenance and accountability of platoon equipment.
a. He must be proficient in the tactical employment of the platoon and his section
(mounted or dismounted) in concert with the rest of the company.
b. He must have a solid understanding of troop-leading procedures and develop his
ability to apply them quickly and efficiently.
c. He must know the capabilities and limitations of the platoon’s personnel and
equipment and be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and equipment.
d. He must possess the ability to make rapid decisions accurately based on the
commander’s intent and specifics of the tactical situation.

1-16. PLATOON SERGEANT

The platoon sergeant is the platoon’s second in command and is accountable to the
platoon leader for the leadership, discipline, training, and welfare of the platoon’s
soldiers.
a. He coordinates the platoon’s maintenance and logistical requirements and handles
the personal needs of individual soldiers.
b. He remains with the mounted element when the platoon dismounts, or he can
dismount with the platoon as required by METT-TC considerations.

1-17. FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

The fire support officer helps plan, coordinate, and execute the company's fire support.
During planning, he develops a fire support plan based on the company commander’s
concept and guidance. He coordinates the fire support plan with the battalion FSO.
a. During planning, the FSO's duties include--
• Advising the commander of the capabilities and current status of all available
fire support assets.
• Assisting the commander in developing the OPORD to ensure full integration
of fires into his concept.
• Designating targets and fire control measures and determining method of
engagement and responsibility for firing the targets.
• Determining the specific tasks and instructions required to conduct and
control the fire plan.
b. The FSO briefs the fire support plan as part of the company OPORD and
coordinates with PLs to ensure they understand their fire support responsibilities.
c. The FSO integrates platoon targets into the company target overlay and target
worksheet. He then sends these products to the battalion fire support element (FSE).
d. During the battle, the FSO normally locates near the commander. This allows
greater flexibility in conducting or adjusting the fire support plan. At times, the FSO may
locate away from the commander to control supporting fires more effectively. The FSO
informs the commander of key information on his radio net.
e. The FSO must understand infantry tactics. This knowledge allows the FSO to
provide better fires integration and, if the company commander becomes a casualty,

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allows him to assume temporary control of the company until the XO can assume
command.
f. The FSO may coordinate close air support (CAS), or he may employ and control
the company mortar section.
g. The FSO ensures the indirect fire plan is part of each company rehearsal.

1-18. COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALIST

The communications specialist supervises operation, maintenance, and installation of
digital communications equipment, organic wire, and FM communications. This includes
sending and receiving routine traffic and making required communication checks.
a. He supervises the company command post (CP) to include relaying information,
monitoring the tactical situation, establishing the CP security plan and radio watch
schedule, and informing the commander and subordinate units of significant events.
b. He performs limited troubleshooting of organic communications equipment and
provides the link between the company and the battalion for communications equipment
maintenance.
c. He supervises all aspects of communications security (COMSEC) equipment, to
include requesting, receipting, maintaining, securing, employing, and training for
COMSEC equipment and related materials.
d. He advises the company commander in planning and employing the
communications systems. Based on the commander’s guidance, he prepares or assists in
preparing paragraph 5 of the OPORD.
e. He is responsible for fielding new information systems digitization equipment and
the employment of the tactical internet (TI).

1-19. RADIOTELEPHONE OPERATOR

The radiotelephone operator operates and performs maintenance on his assigned radio to
include preparation for special operations (cold weather, air assault, or waterborne) and
the construction of field-expedient antennas.
a. He must understand the company mission. In the event the commander becomes a
casualty, the RATELO may be the only man on the radio for a time. If so, he must be
prepared to call for and adjust artillery or to request medical evacuation or resupply.
b. He may assist in OPORD preparation by copying overlays and building a
sand table.

1-20. SUPPLY SERGEANT

The supply sergeant requests, receives, issues, stores, maintains, and turns in supplies and
equipment for the company. He coordinates requirements with the 1SG and the battalion
S4.
a. The HHC commander supervises the supply sergeant when he is located in the
battalion field trains. He uses the battalion administrative/logistical (A/L) radio network
or their Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) net to communicate with
the company.
b. The supply sergeant controls the supply trucks that are organic to the company.
c. The supply sergeant monitors the tactical situation and anticipates logistical
requirements. (Chapter 11 has a more detailed discussion of the CSS requirements.)

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1-21. NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL NCO

The nuclear, chemical, and biological NCO assists and advises the company commander
in planning NBC operations. He conducts and supervises NBC training within the
company (decontamination, monitoring, survey, and equipment maintenance operations)
and inspects detection and protective equipment for serviceability.
a. He uses digital systems to gain situational understanding quickly.
b. He operates forward with the company CP and assists the communications
specialist with CP operations and security.
c. His specific duties include the following:
• Recommends mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) levels to the
commander (based on guidance from the battalion NBC NCO and the current
situation).
• Conducts continuous NBC vulnerability analysis.
• Ensures connectivity with the joint warning and reporting network (JWARN).
• Acts as liaison with supporting chemical units.
• Reports, analyzes, and disseminates NBC attack data manually or digitally
using the NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS), and NBC1, NBC4,
and spot reports from the FBCB2 system.
• Plans and supervises decontamination and monitoring/survey operations.
• Requisitions NBC equipment and supplies.

1-22. MORTAR SECTION LEADER

The mortar section leader is responsible for employing the mortar section and ensures
effective mortar support for the company.
a. He assists the company commander in planning the employment of the mortar
section.
b. He coordinates with the company FSO and FIST.
c. He controls the section during tactical operations.
d. He is the primary trainer for mortar systems.

1-23. SNIPER TEAM LEADER

The sniper team leader is responsible for employing the sniper team and ensures effective
sniper support for the company.
a. He assists the company commander in planning the employment of the sniper
team.
b. He coordinates with the company FSO and FIST.
c. He controls the team during tactical operations.
d. He is the primary trainer for the sniper team.
e. He is the primary observer of the sniper team.

1-24. ARMORER/SUPPLY SPECIALIST

The armorer/supply specialist performs organizational maintenance and repairs on the
company's small arms weapons. He evacuates weapons to the DS maintenance unit, if
required. Normally, he assists the supply sergeant in the brigade support area (BSA), but
he may operate forward with the company CP to support continuous CP operations.

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1-25. COMPANY MEDIC

The senior trauma specialist/ senior company medic is attached to the rifle company to
provide emergency medical treatment (EMT) for sick, injured, or wounded company
personnel. Emergency medical treatment procedures performed by the trauma specialist
may include opening an airway, starting intravenous fluids, controlling hemorrhage,
preventing or treating for shock, splinting fractures or suspected fractures, and providing
relief for pain. The EMT performed by the trauma specialist is under the supervision of
the battalion surgeon or physician's assistant (PA). The senior trauma specialist/company
medic is responsible for--
• Overseeing and providing guidance to each platoon medic as required.
• Triaging injured, wounded, or ill friendly and enemy personnel for priority of
teatment as they arrive at the company CCP.
• Overseeing sick call screening for the company.
• Requesting and coordinating the evacuation of sick, injured, or wounded
personnel under the direction of the company 1SG.
• Assisting in the training of the company personnel on first aid and combat
lifesavers in enhanced first-aid procedures.
• Requisitioning Class VIII supplies from the BAS for the company according
to the TSOP.
• Recommending locations for company CCPs.
• Providing guidance to the company's combat lifesavers as required.
• Monitoring the tactical situation and anticipating and coordinating health
service support (HSS) requirement and Class VIII resupply as necessary.
• Advising the company commander and 1SG on mass casualty operations.
• Keeping the 1SG informed on the status of casualties and coordinating with
him for additional HSS requirements.

Section IV. BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

The battlefield operating systems (BOSs) provide a means of reviewing preparations or
execution in discrete subsets. Critical to this review is the synchronization and
coordination of activities not only within a BOS but also among the various BOSs.

1-26. COMMAND AND CONTROL

The command and control process is the commander’s basic tool in the employment of
the company. It consists of the activities and procedures used by the commander to plan,
direct, coordinate, and control the functions and actions of the company; it also includes
the personnel and equipment that assist him with command and control.
a. The commander employs the company in accordance with the guidance and
orders he receives from the SBCT battalion. Perhaps his most important skills are his
ability to accurately analyze the situation and develop a plan that has the greatest chance
of accomplishing the mission with the least cost in lives and equipment. After developing
the plan, the commander delegates authority to his subordinates, clearly assigning
responsibilities, tasks, and purposes and stating his intent so that every member of the
unit can effectively use responsible initiative.
b. Critical to the commander's ability to command and control is employment of
digitized communications. The tactical internet--composed of the FBCB2 system,

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enhanced position and location reporting system (EPLRS), and single-channel ground
and airborne radio system (SINCGARS)--passes data between company elements. This
digital traffic allows dissemination of graphics, orders, and tactical enemy and friendly
information to squad level.

1-27. INTELLIGENCE
The intelligence operating system covers activities employed to see the enemy, terrain,
and other aspects of battle space that affect friendly operations. Although the company’s
primary mission is to fight, it normally conducts some type of reconnaissance or
surveillance prior to any operation, and it conducts reconnaissance during execution of all
operations. Both before and during an operation, the company receives intelligence and
combat information from its parent headquarters, from other companies, and from
elements within the company. At the same time, the company is a critical source of
combat information throughout the operation.

1-28. MANEUVER
Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battlefield. It entails using a combination of
fire (or fire potential) and movement to achieve a position of advantage with respect to
the enemy, to develop the situation as necessary, and to close with and destroy the
enemy. Based on the factors of METT-TC, the company commander may maneuver his
platoons (mounted or dismounted) and other support forces to achieve the positional
advantage. Ideally, when contact is likely, the commander moves the company using
bounding overwatch. Once contact is made, he then makes the transition to maneuver and
executes actions on contact as necessary. He uses direct and indirect fires from stationary
friendly elements to provide protection for the moving elements as they close with the
enemy. He also ensures effective flank security, an essential element of successful
maneuver.

1-29. FIRE SUPPORT

The company integrates fire support into its portion of the battalion fight. The battalion
fire support plan specifies the intended tactical purpose for each task assigned to the
company. For example, the plan may state that a target will be fired so that it diverts an
enemy force from a particular route. The company commander designates triggers for
each target as well as primary and backup observers to call for and adjust fires as
necessary. The commander then has ultimate responsibility for ensuring not only that the
team effectively executes the target but also that the intended purpose is met (in this case,
diverting the enemy from his original course).

1-30. AIR DEFENSE

The company executes passive or active air defense measures, or a combination, to evade
enemy aircraft, degrade the effects of an air attack, or destroy the attacking aircraft.
Passive air defense is aimed at avoiding detection and protecting the unit through the use
of camouflage, hide positions, route selection, or other similar measures. Active air
defense may entail execution of air defense drills by organic elements, employment of the
company’s organic firepower, employment of air defense assets, or any combination of
these.

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1-31. MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

Mobility and survivability preserve friendly force freedom of maneuver, attack that of the
enemy, and protect friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapon systems and the
environment. All units, regardless of type, perform basic mobility and survivability tasks.
a. Because of the anticipated condensed planning timeline, SBCT companies rely
heavily on the SBCT and its infantry battalions to plan and integrate mobility and
survivability into offensive operations. The organic SBCT engineer company task-
organizes its subordinate units and equipment to the infantry battalions and companies in
order to accomplish specific mobility and survivability tasks. (Refer to Chapter 10 for a
detailed discussion of the SBCT engineer company’s organization, capabilities, and
limitations.) Because overmatching mobility is critical to the success of the SBCT,
engineers normally task organize to the lowest possible level, optimizing responsive
mobility efforts during decentralized offensive operations.
b. Although mission-dependent, SBCT infantry battalions typically receive a task-
organized engineer platoon; subsequently, infantry companies receive a task-organized
engineer squad or team. Engineers perform obstacle reduction tasks for both mounted and
dismounted maneuver to counter the effects of existing and reinforcing obstacles in all
categories of terrain, including the urban environment. Engineer capabilities include
manual, explosive, and mechanical breaching methods.
c. Engineers may employ limited countermobility capability (scatterable mines and
sub-munitions) to shape enemy maneuver, to preserve and protect friendly forces, and to
gain, retain, or secure the positional advantage. Engineers may also perform limited
survivability tasks such as constructing individual and vehicle fighting positions,
preparing protective positions, and constructing fortifications to enhance force protection.
d. Engineer assets may be organized into combat mobility platoons and mobility
support sections.
(1) Combat Mobility Platoon. The combat mobility platoon normally supports an
SBCT infantry battalion. During offensive operations, an infantry company may receive a
portion, or all, of the combat mobility platoon based on the situation, mission, scheme of
maneuver, and mobility tasks identified. Engineers normally do not task organize below
squad level for mounted mobility operations. The platoon or squads may be task
organized with a mobility support section or specific mobility support equipment from
the SBCT engineer company’s mobility support platoon.
(2) Mobility Support Section. The mobility support section provides short-span
assault crossing of wet or dry gaps and moderate earthmoving and constructed obstacle
reduction capability. The section, or any of the vehicles in the section, may be task
organized to combat mobility platoons and squads.

1-32. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

There are five functional areas of CSS: supply, transportation, maintenance, field
services, and personnel services. The company has an organic supply section and
normally has an attached medical and evacuation team. The SBCT battalion provides
other CSS for the infantry company. Combat service support is discussed in detail in
Chapter 11.

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CHAPTER 2
BATTLE COMMAND AND
TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
Battle command is the exercise of command in operations against a
hostile, thinking enemy. It uses the leadership element of combat power to
assimilate thousands of bits of information to visualize the operation,
describe it in terms of intent, and direct the military actions of
subordinates to achieve victory. Thinking and acting are simultaneous
activities for infantry leaders in battle. Battle command covers the
knowledge, techniques, and procedures necessary to control operations
and to motivate soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish
assigned missions. As part of battle command, commanders visualize the
current state of the battlefield as well as future states at different points in
the operation; they then formulate concepts of operations that allow their
units to progress from one state to the other at the least cost. Other
elements of battle command include assigning missions, prioritizing and
allocating resources, selecting the critical times and places to act, and
knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight.

SECTION I. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

2-1. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control are two dependent concepts that have distinct meanings rather than
one word or system.
a. Command. Command is the art of assigning missions, prioritizing resources,
guiding and directing subordinates, and focusing the unit's energy to accomplish clear
objectives. The commander’s will to win, morale, and physical presence must be felt by
those he leads. Leading soldiers and units to successfully accomplish the mission remains
a command imperative; safeguarding soldiers is an inherent responsibility of command.
b. Control. Control is the science of defining limits, computing requirements,
allocating resources, monitoring performance, and directing subordinate actions to
accomplish the commander’s intent.
c. The Command and Control System. The command and control (C2) system
within an infantry rifle company is the arrangement of personnel, information
management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential to plan, prepare for,
execute, and assess operations. The C2 system must be reliable, responsive, and durable.
It must withstand crises, even the loss of the leader, and still continue to function.
Although it is the most complex system in the unit, C2 must result in clear, concise
instructions that focus the entire unit toward the objective.

2-2. CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

Historically, military commanders have employed variations of the two basic command
and control concepts: detailed command and mission command.

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a. Detailed Command. Detailed command centralizes information and decision-

making authority. Orders and plans are detailed and explicit and successful execution
depends on strict obedience by subordinates with minimal decision-making or initiative
on their part. Detailed command emphasizes vertical, linear information flow where
information flows up the chain of command and orders flow down.
b. Mission Command. Mission command concentrates on the objective of an
operation and not on how to achieve that objective. It is the conduct of military
operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission
accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all
echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish
missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. Today’s
operational environment emphasizes the need for rapid decision-making and execution to
include rapid response to changing situations. It stresses trust and mutual understanding
among superiors and subordinates. Mission command accepts the uncertainty of war by
reducing the need for complete certainty in order to act. Because mission command
decentralizes decision making authority and grants subordinates significant freedom of
action, it demands a leader who is thoroughly versed in Army doctrine and who is
disciplined, informed, innovative, dynamic, audacious, confident, and competent.

2-3. LEADERSHIP
Leadership is the critical element of both the C2 system (personnel) and combat power.
Through leadership, the commander inspires and directs his unit to complete demanding
tasks in difficult situations. In addition, the following factors are essential to the company
commander's ability to lead his company on the battlefield.
a. Will. Often the victor in battle is the unit that refuses to lose. Competent leaders
and tough, realistic training are the keys to developing this determination. The leader
must develop a "will to win" in his soldiers and his unit.
b. Trust. The leader must earn the trust of his soldiers. They must have confidence
in his abilities. The leader also must trust his soldiers and develop a climate that allows
subordinates to make decisions.
c. Delegation. After ensuring his subordinates are well trained, the leader must
delegate the proper authority and freedoms to his men. He focuses his time and energy on
what he determines as critical and delegates the remainder to his subordinates.
d. Discipline. The leader instills discipline in his soldiers. Discipline ensures that
proper standards are maintained in the absence of leader supervision. The decentralized
operations conducted by infantry companies require self-discipline of every soldier in the
unit.

2-4. FUNDAMENTALS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

The following fundamentals describe methods of directing military operations that
encourage and expect subordinates to take action consistent with the intent and concept
of higher headquarters.
a. Expect Uncertainty. The leader must understand the environment of combat; the
battle will be dynamic and non-linear. Communications will be degraded, and the chaos
of battle will often prevent the commander from knowing what is happening beyond his
own senses. The situation during planning will always change before execution.

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b. Reduce Leader Intervention. Plan and direct operations to require the absolute
minimum intervention during execution. When soldiers expect the leader to make the
decision or initiate the action, they are reluctant to take action. When precise control is
required for synchronization, such as an on-order task, the leader should also provide the
subordinate the criteria for making the decision. Leaders must realize that some loss of
precision is better than inactivity.
c. Increase Subordinate Planning Time. The commander ensures the effective use
of all available planning time. Although the majority of the planning takes place at the
battalion and company level, the infantry rifle platoons and squads require extra time to
conduct their rehearsals and inspections. A unit SOP is a key tool for using time well.
d. Give Subordinates Maximum Freedom of Action. Given the expected
battlefield conditions, leaders at every level avoid placing unnecessary limits on their
soldiers' freedom of action. The leader at the point of decision must have the knowledge,
the training, and the freedom to make the correct decision that supports the commander's
intent.
e. Lead Well Forward. The leader locates where he can best fight his unit, and he
considers a number of factors in determining this location. His leadership is most
effective face-to-face when he can see the situation and his soldiers can see him. Since he
cannot be everywhere, he focuses on the decisive action that will accomplish his mission.
He normally locates with his main effort (the subordinate unit assigned the decisive
action) to provide his leadership and to be in a position to shift or re-task the main effort.

2-5. COMMAND AND CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES

Infantry rifle company commanders train and maintain their units to conduct sustained
operations. All leaders must ensure that their soldiers are tactically and technically
proficient in the weapons systems found in the unit.
a. Company Commander. The commander employs command and control to
ensure the company accomplishes its missions. He is also responsible for the tactical
employment, training, administration, personnel management, and sustainment of his
company. He must know the capabilities of his men and weapons systems and how to
tactically employ them. The commander exercises command through his subordinate
leaders. In an airborne and air assault battalion or an SBCT, he serves as an advisor to the
higher commander concerning employment of all assets.
b. Company Executive Officer. The XO is the second in command of the company.
He assists the company commander control the fires and movement of the rifle platoons.
The XO frees the company commander of all distractions to allow the company
commander to control the company’s most critical actions. (For example, the XO submits
situation reports to the higher headquarters main command post, relays information to the
company commander such as enemy and friendly situational updates, and communicates
with adjacent units.) During preparation for combat operations, the XO serves as the
company’s primary CSS planner and makes the necessary coordination with the higher
headquarters, and he provides the company first sergeant with the CSS plan for
execution. During execution, the XO may be designated as an element leader. Typically,
he will control the company’s 60-mm mortar section and the antiarmor section. He may
also control a supporting element consisting of a rifle platoon and other elements (for
example, all of the company’s machine guns).

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c. Company First Sergeant. The first sergeant is the senior NCO in the company
and is normally the most experienced soldier in the company. He advises the company
commander on tactical employment, and he is the expert on individual and NCO skills.
He assists the company commander to plan, coordinate, and supervise all activities that
support the mission. During execution, the 1SG is the primary CSS executor. He may
also control elements or subordinate units during designated missions.
d. Mortar Section Leader. The mortar section leader is responsible for training and
maintaining the company’s 60-mm mortar section. He ensures that the company has
effective fire support from the mortar section. He also assists the commander in planning
the employment of the mortar section, coordinates with the company FIST, and controls
the section during tactical operations.
e. Rifle Platoon Leader. The rifle platoon leader is responsible for training,
maintaining, and tactically employing the platoon. His responsibilities include planning,
coordinating, and integrating the platoon’s fires to fit the supported unit’s tactical plan.
He knows the abilities of his weapons systems and is skilled in their use. The platoon
leader must also be proficient in calling for and adjusting indirect fires. He employs his
platoon tactically based on orders from the commander.
f. Rifle Platoon Sergeant. The platoon sergeant is normally the most experienced
soldier in the platoon. He leads the elements of the platoon as directed by the platoon
leader; he assumes responsibility of the platoon in the platoon leader’s absence. The PSG
is responsible for individual training, advising the platoon leader on tactical employment
of the platoon’s weapons systems, and helping to control the platoon during combat
operations. He supervises equipment maintenance, supply, and casualty evacuation.
g. Weapons Squad Leader. The weapons squad leader is responsible for the
discipline and training of his two machine gun teams and for the maintenance of his
squad’s equipment. During operations, he selects the location of primary, alternate, and
supplementary firing positions. He controls the squad’s fires and movement, and he
ensures mutual support is achieved with other elements of the platoon with which he is
operating. He may assume the responsibilities of the platoon sergeant in his absence.
h. Rifle Squad Leader. The squad leader is responsible for the discipline and
training of his squad and the maintenance of his equipment. He is skilled in all aspects of
his weapons systems. He employs his squad in accordance with (IAW) orders from the
platoon leader. He detects and identifies targets, issues fire commands, and controls the
fires and movement of his squad.

2-6. COMBAT ORDERS

Combat orders focus on what tasks must be accomplished without dictating in detail how
they will be done. Whenever possible, they are oral orders issued face-to-face on the
ground where the fight will take place.
a. Brevity and Clarity. Combat orders require well-trained subordinates who
understand their commanders' intent and concepts (two levels higher). Combat orders
address only the required information. They avoid unnecessary detail and redundancy and
do not restate doctrine or SOPs.
b. Tailoring. The leader determines exactly what he wants his units to accomplish
and clearly communicates these requirements to them. If one of his subordinates has not
displayed the tactical competence to operate with a combat order, then the order must be

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tailored based on the training, experience, and capability of the subordinate leader
receiving the order.
(1) This tailoring may include nothing more than providing additional instructions,
establishing more restrictive control measures, or directing a specific use for one of his
organic assets.
(2) A commander may detail exactly how a platoon leader will employ his entire
platoon, clearly state the limits for using his initiative, and collocate himself or the
company XO with this platoon. This should be only a short-term solution; leaders must
be trained to meet their responsibilities.

SECTION II. TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

Troop-leading procedures (TLP) are a sequence of actions that enable the company
commander to use available time effectively and efficiently in the planning, preparing,
executing, and assessing of combat missions. Collectively, the TLP are a tool to assist
leaders in making, issuing, and supervising operation orders. The TLP are integrally
coupled with the military decision-making process (MDMP) (see Appendix D, TLP-
MDMP Integration). Digitization has enhanced, not changed, the SBCT infantry
company commander's TLP. The tactical internet provides continually updated
information from intelligence sources both internal and external to the SBCT. It transmits
information from satellites, sensors, UAVs, and human intelligence (HUMINT) sources
to the company commander for incorporation into his plan. This cycle of collection
provides faster, more detailed information than previously available. Additionally,
combat information provided by the RSTA squadron and battalion’s reconnaissance
platoon minimizes, but does not replace, the traditional assumptions and templates. The
company commander must be knowledgeable of these resources and must plan
operations to maximize the communications that make access to this information
possible. Beyond the communications, the need to apply both known and templated
enemies in planning processes is paramount.

2-7. APPLICATION OF TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

The following discussion of troop-leading procedures (Figure 2-1) assumes that the
company commander will plan in a time-constrained environment. As such, the
suggested techniques are oriented to help him quickly develop and issue a combat order.

Figure 2-1. Troop-leading procedures.

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a. Troop-leading procedures are consistent with the MDMP described in FM 5-0

(FM 101-5). The two are not identical, however, because specific steps of the MDMP are
designed and intended to help coordinate staff and commander responsibilities of units
with staffs. While the company commander has subordinate leaders who assist him with
aspects of planning for operations, these leaders are not staff officers. This fact places the
burden of planning on the shoulders of the company commander. The TLP reflect this
reality while incorporating the spirit, language, and general process of the MDMP to
assist in the preparation of OPORDs.
b. The TLP are not a hard and fast set of rules. Rather, they provide a guide that the
company commander applies in ways that are consistent with the situation, his
experience, and the experience of his subordinate leaders. The tasks involved in some
steps (such as issue the warning order, initiate movement, and conduct reconnaissance)
may recur several times. The last step, the activities of supervising and refining the plan,
occur throughout the TLP. The following outline of the TLP assumes that the company
commander will plan in a time-constrained environment. The suggested techniques can
help him quickly develop and issue a combat order. The higher headquarters may issue
two warning orders before the company commander begins his TLP.
(1) IAW FM 5-0 (101-5), the warning order will address the following elements at a
minimum: type of operation, general location of operation, any reconnaissance to initiate,
any movement to initiate, and an initial time line. The higher headquarters may issue
additional information in the first warning order (for example, products from current staff
or commander estimates). The leader will conduct his initial planning-time analysis,
which allows him to determine the total amount of time to plan and prepare. This initial
planning-time analysis is the basis for the detailed time analysis that will be conducted as
planning continues. He analyzes the time his unit has available and prepares an initial
time line. He should plan to use no more than one-third of the available planning time,
thus leaving his subordinates with two-thirds of the available time. An effective
technique to manage the available time is for the leader to issue his operations order in
approximately one-fifth of the available planning time. This provides additional time for
rehearsals without cutting into subordinate planning time. He should take into account
ambient light effects when planning his time line.
(2) The company commander may issue a warning order immediately following the
higher headquarters’ initial warning order. He addresses the same elements of the higher
headquarters’ initial warning order in his initial warning order. The most important
element of this warning order is his initial planning time line. He also may pass on any
other instructions or information that he thinks will assist his subordinates in preparing
for the upcoming mission. The company commander may distribute this warning order
through the tactical internet, or he may brief his warning order from the actual terrain,
terrain model, sketch, or map. If practical, he assembles his subordinate leaders to receive
the warning order face-to-face from the actual terrain. If not practical, he may use a
terrain model, sketch, or map. By quickly issuing his warning order the leader enables his
subordinates to begin their own preparations while he develops the remaining warning
orders and the OPORD. Warning orders, though not as detailed as an operations order,
should follow the same five-paragraph format, providing as much information as possible
with an initial time line.

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(3) The second warning order from the higher headquarters consists of the essential
information derived from mission analysis and the higher commander’s guidance. It
includes mission analysis results:
• Analysis of terrain.
• Enemy forces (paragraph 1a of the higher headquarters’ OPORD to include
the enemy situational template [SITEMP]).
• Higher headquarters’ restated mission statement.
• Higher commander’s intent.
• Area of operations (AO), area of influence, and area of interest.
• Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).
• Risk guidance.
• Reconnaissance to initiate.
• Security measures.
• Deception guidance.
• Mobility/counter-mobility guidance.
• Specific priorities.
• Time line.
• Guidance on rehearsals.
The higher headquarters may issue additional information in the second warning order
(for example, friendly forces, paragraph 1b of the OPORD). The commander must
understand the information given in higher headquarters’ second warning order. He can
conduct an assessment but will not complete a detailed analysis until he receives the
mission. Depending on the situation, he may choose to issue an initial warning order to
his subordinates following receipt of the higher headquarters’ second warning order.
(4) The company commander may determine that he needs to issue a second warning
order after receiving the higher headquarters’ second warning order or after receiving
other pertinent information. Since he does very little analysis with information received
in the higher headquarters’ second warning order, and depending on his situation, he may
not issue the second company warning order. He may choose instead to issue this
information after receiving the higher headquarters’ third warning order.

2-8. RECEIVE THE MISSION

As the title indicates, this step addresses the actions a company commander takes as he
receives his mission. "Receiving" the mission may occur in one of several ways. It may
begin with the receipt of a warning order from the higher headquarters, or it may not
begin until he actually receives the higher headquarters’ OPORD (which would be the
case if the higher headquarters did not use warning orders prior to issuing the OPORD).
In the most challenging situation, it may come about as a result of a change in the overall
situation during execution. Besides receiving (or deducing) his mission during the first
step of the TLP, the company commander must also assess the time he has available to
prepare for and execute the mission. As a result of his time assessment, he prepares an
initial time line for planning and execution.
a. Mission Analysis. Although the focus of the first step of the TLP is on
determining the unit mission and assessing the time available to accomplish the mission,
this step also begins an activity called mission analysis. The company commander will
not receive his mission until the higher headquarters produces its third warning order or
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the OPORD. For him, mission analysis is not as detailed as it is in the higher
headquarters’ MDMP. His mission analysis is essentially an analysis of METT-TC
considerations. He does this in as much depth as time and quality of information allows.
Analyzing the factors of METT-TC is a continuous process. He constantly receives
information from the time that he begins planning through execution. During execution,
his continuous analysis enables him to issue well-developed fragmentary orders. He must
assess if the new information affects his mission and his plan. If it does, he then must
decide how to adjust his plan to meet this new situation. He does not need to analyze the
factors of METT-TC in any set order or sequence. How and when he analyzes each factor
depends on when information is made available to him and his own experience and
preference. One technique is to parallel the TLP based on the products received from the
higher headquarters’ MDMP. Using this technique, he analyzes mission first, terrain and
weather, enemy, troops and support available, time available, and finally civil
considerations. This is not a hard and fast set of rules. Different elements of information
that come into the unit must be analyzed and assessed.
(1) Mission. Leaders at every echelon must have a clear understanding of the
mission, intent, and concept of the operation of the commanders one and two levels
higher. This understanding makes it possible to exercise disciplined initiative. The
company commander captures his understanding of what his unit is to accomplish in his
restated mission statement. He takes six steps to write his restated unit mission statement.
These steps include analyzing the higher headquarters’ (two levels up) mission, intent and
concept; the immediate higher headquarters’ (one level up) mission, intent, and concept;
identifying specified, implied, and essential tasks, and any constraints.
(a) Higher Headquarters (two levels up) Mission, Intent, and Concept. The company
commander understands this higher headquarters’ concept of the operation. He identifies
this headquarters’ task and purpose and how his immediate higher headquarters is
contributing to the fight. He also must understand the commander’s intent (two levels up).
(b) Immediate Higher Headquarters (one level up) Mission, Intent, and Concept. The
company commander understands the immediate headquarters’ concept of the operation.
He identifies this headquarters’ task and purpose as well as his contribution to this fight.
The company commander must clearly understand the commander’s intent from the
OPORD (one level up). Additionally, he identifies the task, purpose, and disposition for
all adjacent maneuver elements underneath this headquarters’ control.
(c) Unit Mission. The company commander finds his unit’s mission in the concept of
the operation paragraph in the immediate higher headquarters’ OPORD. The purpose of
the main effort unit usually matches or achieves the purpose of the immediate higher
headquarters. Similarly, supporting effort units’ purposes must relate directly to the main
effort unit accomplishing its purpose. The company commander must understand how his
unit relates to the purposes of the other units. Finally, he determines his unit’s mission
essential tactical task. The unit must accomplish this task in order to accomplish the
assigned purpose. He must understand why the commander (one level up) assigned his
unit the particular tactical task and determine how it fits into the immediate higher
headquarters’ concept of the operation.
(d) Constraints. Constraints placed on the leader by a higher command to dictate an
action or inaction restricts the freedom of action the subordinate leader has for planning
by stating the things that he must or must not do. The company commander identifies all

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constraints the OPORD places on the unit’s ability to execute its mission. There are two
types of constraints: proscriptive (requirements for action) and prohibitive (requirements
for inaction).
(e) Identify Tasks. The company commander must identify and understand the tasks
required to accomplish a given mission. There are three different types of tasks:
specified, implied, and essential.
• Specified Tasks. Tasks specifically assigned to a unit by a higher
headquarters. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of a higher headquarters’ order or plan state
specified tasks. Specified tasks may also be found in annexes and digital
overlays (for example, "seize OBJ FOX," "reconnoiter route BLUE," "assist
the forward passage of B company," "send two soldiers to assist in the loading
of ammunition").
• Implied Tasks. Tasks that must be performed to accomplish a specified task
but are not stated in a higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks are derived
from a detailed analysis of the higher headquarters’ order, the enemy situation
and courses of action, and the terrain. Analysis of the unit’s current location in
relation to future areas of operation as well as the doctrinal requirements for
each specified task might provide implied tasks. Only those tasks that require
allocation of resources should be retained.
• Essential Tasks. These tasks are important for the success of the unit. They are
derived from a review of the specified and implied tasks. An essential task
that must be executed to accomplish the assigned purpose is the mission
essential task.
(f) Restated Mission Statement. The leader prepares his restated mission statement
expressed around the five W’s: who, what, when, where, and why. The “who” is the
company and or platoon; the “what” is the unit’s mission essential task. The “when” is
given in the higher headquarters’ OPORD; the “where” is the objective or location taken
from the higher headquarters’ OPORD; and the “why” is the company and or platoon
purpose taken from the higher headquarters’ concept of the operation. An example of a
company restated mission statement follows:

EXAMPLE: B Company attacks to seize OBJ FOX (NB123456) not later

than (NLT) 010200 October __ in order to prevent enemy forces from
counterattacking into the battalion’s main effort.

(2) Terrain and Weather. If the higher headquarters has developed a modified
combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and shared it via the TI, the company commander
can quickly accomplish his analysis of the terrain. From the MCOO he will already have
an appreciation for the general nature of the ground and the effects of weather. However,
he must conduct his own detailed analysis to determine how terrain and weather will
uniquely affect his unit’s mission and the enemy. He must go beyond merely passing
along the MCOO to his subordinate leaders and making a general observation of the
terrain (for example, this is high ground). He must arrive at significant conclusions about
how the terrain and weather will affect the enemy and the unit. Most importantly, the

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company commander will apply these conclusions when he develops courses of action
for both enemy forces and his unit.
(a) Classifying Terrain Mobility. Terrain mobility is classified in one of four
categories: unrestricted, restricted, severely restricted, and complex.
• Unrestricted. This terrain is free of any restrictions to movement; no actions
are required to enhance mobility. This type of terrain generally allows wide
maneuver and offers unlimited travel over well-developed road networks.
• Restricted. This terrain hinders movement to some degree. Little effort is
needed to enhance mobility, but units may need to detour frequently. They
may have difficulty maintaining optimum speed, moving in some types of
combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to another.
• Severely restricted. This terrain severely hinders or slows movement in
combat formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobility. It may
require commitment of engineer forces to improve mobility, or it may require
deviation from doctrinal formations and or deviation from doctrinal rates of
march.
• Complex. Complex terrain includes two or more of the traditional
classifications of terrain. For example, complex terrain may have an area of
forest that is restricted along with an urban area that is severely restricted and
rolling plains that are unrestricted.
(b) Prioritizing Terrain Analysis. Limited available planning time may force the
company commander to prioritize his terrain analysis. For example, in the conduct of an
attack, a company commander may prioritize the area immediately around the objective
for analysis, followed by the company’s specific axis leading to the objective. Given
more time, he may then analyze the remainder of his company’s area of operation, area of
influence, and area of interest.
(c) Using Visual Aids. The company commander prepares some sort of visual aid to
depict and explain the results of his analysis for his subordinates so they can understand
his conclusions about the effects that the terrain and weather will have on the mission.
This visual aid could be a digital overlay sent to the subordinate leaders via the tactical
internet, a hand-drawn overlay for a map sheet, or a terrain model. Whatever the chosen
method, he must include graphical depictions of terrain mobility classification, key
terrain, inter-visibility (IV) lines, known obstacles, and avenues of approach and mobility
corridors.
(d) Using OAKOC. The military aspects of terrain (OAKOC), Figure 2-2, are used to
analyze the ground. The sequence used to analyze the military aspects of terrain can vary.
The leader may prefer to determine Obstacles first, Avenues of Approach second, Key
Terrain third, Observation and Fields of Fire fourth, and Cover and Concealment last.
For each aspect of terrain, the company commander determines its effect on both friendly
and enemy forces. These effects translate directly into conclusions that can be applied to
either friendly or enemy courses of action. One technique to analyze terrain is to use a
matrix. See Figure 2-3 (Analysis of Terrain Matrix).

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Figure 2-2. Military aspects of terrain.

Effects Conclusions
Obstacles Friendly
Enemy
Avenues of Approach Friendly
Enemy
Key Terrain #1 Observation Friendly
Enemy
Fields of Fire Friendly
Enemy
Cover Friendly
Enemy
Concealment Friendly
Enemy
Figure 2-3. Analysis of terrain matrix.

(e) Obstacles. The company commander first identifies existing and reinforcing
obstacles in his area of operation that limit mobility with regards to the mission. Existing
obstacles include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Ravines.
• Gaps and ditches over 3 meters wide.
• Tree stumps and large rocks over 18 inches high.
• Forests with trees 8 inches or more in diameter with less than 4 meters
between trees.
• Man-made existing obstacles (for example, buildings or power and telephone
lines).
Reinforcing obstacles include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Minefields (conventional and situational).
• Antitank ditches.
• Wire obstacles.
Figure 2-4, page 2-12, lists several offensive and defensive considerations the infantry
rifle company commander can include in his analysis of obstacles and restricted terrain.

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Figure 2-4. Considerations in analysis of obstacles and restricted terrain.

(f) Avenues of Approach. An avenue of approach is an air or ground route of an

attacking force leading to an objective or key terrain. Avenues of approach are classified
by type (mounted, dismounted, air, or subterranean), formation, and speed of the largest
unit that can travel along it. First, the company commander must identify mobility
corridors, if not provided by the higher headquarters. Mobility corridors are areas where a
force can move in a doctrinal formation at a doctrinal rate of march. They are classified
by type and size of force and formation employed. Two examples are--
• A motorized rifle platoon (MRP) moving in column (MRP-Column).
• An enemy squad (SQD) moving in a wedge (dismounted SQD–Wedge)
The company commander groups mutually supporting mobility corridors to form an
avenue of approach. If mutually supporting mobility corridors do not exist, then a single
mobility corridor may become an avenue of approach. Avenues of approach are classified
in the same manner as a mobility corridor. After identifying these avenues of approach,
he must evaluate each one and reach a conclusion on their importance to the situation.
Figure 2-5 lists several offensive and defensive considerations that the infantry rifle
company commander can include in his evaluation of avenues of approach.

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Figure 2-5. Considerations in avenue of approach analysis.

(g) Key Terrain. The company commander must identify key terrain. Key terrain is
any location or area of which the seizure, retention, or control affords a marked
advantage to either combatant. It is a conclusion rather than an observation: a prominent
hilltop overlooking an avenue of approach, for example, may or may not be key terrain.
Even if the hill offers clear observation and fields of fire, it is of no marked advantage to
the unit that controls it if the opposition can easily bypass it on another avenue of
approach. On the other hand, if the hilltop affords cover and concealment, observation,
and good fields of fire on multiple avenues of approach, or is the only avenue of
approach in the area, the terrain offers a definite advantage to whoever controls it. The
commander must assess what terrain is essential to his mission accomplishment. An
example of key terrain for an infantry rifle company in the attack could be a tree line that
overlooks the enemy's reverse slope defense. Controlling this area may be critical in
establishing a support-by-fire position to protect a breach force. The commander also
must determine if any ground is decisive terrain. This is key terrain for which the seizure,
retention, or control is necessary for mission accomplishment. Decisive terrain is not
present in every situation. By determining that terrain is decisive, he recognizes that
seizing or retaining it is an absolute requirement for successful accomplishment of the
mission. Figure 2-6, page 2-14, lists several considerations that can be included in his
analysis of key terrain.

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Figure 2-6. Considerations in key terrain analysis.

(h) Observation and Fields of Fire. The company commander must identify locations
along each avenue of approach that provide clear observation and fields of fire for both
the attacker and the defender. He analyzes the area surrounding key terrain, objectives,
engagement areas, and obstacles. He locates IV lines (terrain that inhibits observation
from one point to another) and assesses the ability of the attacking force to overwatch or
support movement (with direct fire). In analyzing fields of fire, he focuses on both the
friendly and enemy potential to cover terrain (especially avenues of approach and key
terrain) with direct fires. Additionally, he must identify positions that enable artillery
observers to call indirect fire. Whenever possible, he conducts a reconnaissance of the
ground from both enemy and friendly perspectives. He might conduct this reconnaissance
personally, by map, or with his subordinate units, or he can use the assets and information
provided by the RSTA squadron or battalion reconnaissance platoon. This reconnaissance
helps him to see the ground in a more objective manner and to see how the ground affects
both enemy and friendly forces (Figure 2-7).

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Figure 2-7. Considerations in analysis of observation and fields of fire.

(i) Cover and Concealment. The company commander looks at the terrain, foliage,
structures, and other features along avenues of approach and on objectives or key terrain
to identify sites that offer cover (protection from the effects of direct and indirect fire)
and concealment (protection from observation). In the defense, weapon positions must be
both lethal and survivable, and effective cover and concealment is just as vital as clear
fields of fire (Figure 2-8).

Figure 2-8. Considerations in analysis of cover and concealment.

(j) Weather Analysis. There are five military aspects of weather: visibility, winds,
precipitation, cloud cover, and temperature/humidity. Consideration of the effects of

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weather is an essential part of the company commander’s mission analysis. The

commander must go beyond merely making observations; he must arrive at significant
conclusions about how the weather will affect the visibility, mobility, and survivability of
his company and the enemy. The company commander reviews the conclusions from his
higher commander and identifies his own critical conclusions about the five military
aspects of weather. He must apply the results of his analysis when he develops friendly
and enemy courses of action.
(k) Visibility. The company commander identifies critical conclusions about visibility
factors (such as light data, fog, and smog) and battlefield obscurants (such as smoke and
dust). The commander considers light data and identifies critical conclusions about
beginning morning nautical twilight (BMNT), sunrise (SR), sunset (SS), end of evening
nautical twilight (EENT), moonrise (MR), moonset (MS) and percentage of illumination.
Some additional visibility considerations include:
• Will the sun rise behind my attack? Will I attack toward the sunrise?
• How can I take advantage of the limited illumination?
• How will this affect friendly and enemy target acquisition?
• Will the current weather favor the use of smoke to obscure during breaching?
• Will fog affect friendly and enemy target acquisition?
(l) Winds. The company commander identifies critical conclusions about wind
factors (such as direction and speed) Some wind considerations are:
• Will wind speed cause smoke to dissipate quickly?
• Will wind speed and direction favor enemy use of smoke?
• Will wind speed and direction affect the employment of 60mm mortars?
(m) Precipitation. The company commander identifies critical conclusions about
precipitation factors (such as type, amount, and duration). Some precipitation
considerations are:
• How will precipitation affect the mobility of the company?
• How can precipitation add to the company achieving surprise?
(n) Cloud Cover. The company commander identifies critical conclusions about cloud
cover (such as limits on illumination and solar heating of targets).
• How will cloud cover affect company operations at night? How will it affect
the enemy?
• How will cloud cover affect the target acquisition of the CLU?
(o) Temperature and Humidity. The company commander identifies critical
conclusions about temperature factors (such as high and low temperatures and infrared
crossover times) and battlefield factors (such as use of smoke or chemicals). Some
temperature considerations are:
• How will temperature (hot or cold) and humidity affect the rate of march for
the company?
• How will temperature (hot or cold) and humidity affect the soldiers and
equipment?
• Will temperatures and humidity favor the use of nonpersistent chemicals?
(3) Enemy. Analyzing the enemy consists of seven steps: doctrinal analysis,
composition, disposition, strength, capabilities, company level enemy SITEMP, and
initial company priority intelligence requirements (PIR). The critical outcome of
analyzing the enemy is for the company commander to identify the enemy’s weaknesses
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so that he might exploit them by applying overwhelming combat power to achieve his
purpose. He must know how the enemy will fight and the ground where the fight will
occur. The company commander must understand what is actually known of the enemy
and what is merely templated. Without this appreciation, it is possible to develop an
erroneous plan that is based solely on assumptions and therefore not a reliable prediction
of what will occur. The company commander must understand the assumptions the
battalion S2 used to portray the enemy’s courses of action. Furthermore, his own
assumptions about the enemy must be consistent with those of his higher commander.

NOTE: In analyzing the enemy, the company commander must understand the
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Although he does not prepare
IPB products for his subordinates, he must be able to use the products of the
higher headquarters’ IPB effectively

(a) Doctrinal Analysis (How the Enemy Will Fight). It is not enough simply to know
the number and types of vehicles, soldiers, and weapons the enemy has. The company
commander must thoroughly understand when, where, and how the enemy prefers or
tends to use the assets he possesses. A doctrinal template is a visual illustration of how
the enemy force might look and act without the effects of weather and terrain. He looks at
specific enemy actions during a given operation (such as defense out of contact, security
zone defense, or movement to contact) and uses the appropriate doctrinal template to gain
insights into how the enemy may fight. Likewise, he must understand enemy doctrinal
objectives. In doctrinal terms, he asks: Is the enemy oriented on the terrain (for example,
a forward detachment), on his own force (such as an advance guard), or on friendly
forces (as in a security zone)? What effect will this have on the way the enemy fights? As
the global situation changes, however, the possibility increases of fighting adversaries
with no structured doctrine. Therefore, the process of templating the enemy would be
somewhat limited. In such a situation, a company commander must rely on information
provided by RSTA squadron and battalion reconnaissance platoon assets. He also may
make sound assumptions about the enemy, human nature, and local culture.
(b) Composition. His analysis must determine the types of vehicles, soldiers, and
equipment the enemy could use against his unit. From the enemy forces paragraph (1a),
the intelligence annex of the higher headquarters’ OPORD, or through information
provided via the common operational picture (COP), he identifies the task and purpose of
the enemy elements.
(c) Disposition. He determines how the enemy is (or might be) arrayed from higher
headquarters’ information. Next, he determines the enemy’s form of maneuver or
defensive technique. If available, he determines from what echelon force the enemy
comes. He determines the disposition for the next two higher enemy elements.
(d) Strength. He identifies the enemy’s strength by unit. He can obtain this
information by translating percentages given from higher headquarters to the actual
numbers in each enemy element or from information provided by the COP.
(e) Capabilities. Based on the S2’s assessment and the enemy’s doctrine and current
location, the company commander must determine the enemy's capabilities. This also
includes studying the maximum effective range for each weapon system, doctrinal rates
of march, and associated time lines to perform certain tasks. One technique is to use the

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BOS as a checklist to address every significant element the enemy brings to the fight. The
company commander also determines the capabilities of the next higher enemy element.
These capabilities should include reasonable assets the next higher element, or other
higher enemy headquarters, may provide. This should include, but is not limited to,
employment of reserves, use of chemical weapons, artillery and or mortar locations and
ranges, and employment of reconnaissance assets.
(f) Enemy SITEMP. To identify how the enemy will potentially fight, the company
commander weighs the result of his analysis of terrain and weather against the higher
headquarters’ SITEMP. The refined product is a company SITEMP, a visual/graphic
depiction of how he believes the enemy will fight under specific battlefield conditions.
This SITEMP is portrayed one echelon lower than that developed by the higher
headquarters’ S2. For example, if a battalion SITEMP identifies a motorized rifle platoon
(MRP) on the company’s objective, the company commander, using his knowledge of
both the enemy’s doctrine and the terrain, develops a SITEMP that positions individual
vehicles from the MRP and possibly individual fighting positions or trenches in the
platoon’s defense. He includes in this SITEMP the likely sectors of fire of the enemy’s
weapons and any tactical and protective obstacles, either identified or merely templated,
which support the defense. Figure 2-9 depicts recommended SITEMP items. It is
important to remember that the company commander must not develop his SITEMP
independently of the higher commander’s guidance and the S2's product. The product
must reflect the results of reconnaissance and shared information. Differences between
the SITEMPs must be resolved before the company commander may continue with his
analysis of the enemy. Finally, given the scale with which the company commander often
develops his SITEMP, a 1:50,000 map, it is advisable to transfer the SITEMP to a large-
scale sketch for briefing purposes when the situation allows. This is not for analysis, but
to enable subordinates to see the details of the anticipated enemy course of action (COA).
Once he briefs the enemy analysis to his subordinates, he must ensure they understand
what is known, what is suspected, and what is merely templated (estimated). Unless
given the benefit of reconnaissance or other intelligence, his SITEMP is only an
"estimate" of how the enemy may dispose itself. He must not take these as facts.
Reconnaissance is critical in developing the best possible enemy scenario.

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Figure 2-9. Recommended SITEMP items.

(g) Initial Priority Intelligence Requirements. The company commander will develop
his initial PIR. PIR are defined as information about the enemy that will lead to a critical
decision by a commander. Answering the PIR will allow the commander to clarify the
enemy situation. Although the company commander’s PIR will help clarify the enemy
situation for him, they usually lead to answering the battalion commander’s PIR.
(4) Troops and Support Available. Perhaps the most critical aspect of mission
analysis is determining the combat potential of one’s own force. The company
commander must realistically and unemotionally determine all available resources and
any new limitations based on level of training or recent fighting. This includes troops
who are either attached to or in direct support of his unit. He must know the status of his
soldiers’ morale, their experience and training, and the strengths and weaknesses of
subordinate leaders. The assessment includes knowing the strength and status of his
soldiers and their equipment. It also includes understanding the full array of assets that
are in support of the unit. He must know, for example, how much indirect fire, by type, is
available and when it will become available.
(5) Time Available. As addressed in the first step of the TLP, time analysis is a
critical aspect to planning, preparation, and execution. The company commander must
not only appreciate how much time is available. He must also be able to appreciate the
time-space aspects of preparing, moving, fighting, and sustaining. He must be able to see
his own tasks and enemy actions in relation to time. For example, he must be able to
assess the impact of limited visibility conditions on the troop-leading procedures. He
must know how long it takes under such conditions to prepare for certain tasks--such as
order preparation, rehearsals, and backbriefs--and to complete other time-sensitive
preparations for subordinate elements. He must understand how long it takes to deploy a
support-by-fire element and determine the amount of ammunition that is needed to
sustain the support for a specific period of time. He must know how long it takes to
assemble a bangalore torpedo and to breach a wire obstacle. Most importantly, as events
occur he must adjust his appreciation of time available to him and assess its impact on
what he wants to accomplish. Finally, he must update previous time lines for his

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subordinates, listing all events that affect the company and its subordinate elements.
Figure 2-10 provides an example of a company time line.

Figure 2-10. Example of a company time line.

(6) Civil Considerations. The higher headquarters will provide the company
commander with civil considerations that may affect the battalion’s mission. The
company commander must also identify any civil consideration that may affect only his
mission. These may include refugee movement, humanitarian assistance requirements, or
specific requirements related to the rules of engagement (ROE) or rules of interaction
(ROI).
(7) Summary of Mission Analysis. The end result of mission analysis is the
development of a number of insights and conclusions regarding how the factors of
METT-TC affect accomplishment of the unit’s mission. From these insights and
conclusions, the company commander derives a restated mission, an initial intent, an
initial risk assessment, and possibly a decisive point. He uses these to develop courses of
action, which are possible ways to accomplish his mission.
(a) Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of
what the force must do to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and desired end
state. It provides the link between the mission and the concept of operations by stating the
key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates to exercise
disciplined initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept
of operation no longer applies. Key tasks are those that must be performed by the unit or
conditions that must be met to achieve the stated purpose of the operation. Key tasks are
not tied to a specific course of action. They are not limited to "tactical tasks." The
operation’s tempo, duration and effect on the enemy, and the terrain that must be
controlled, are examples of key tasks. The commander’s intent does not include the
method by which the force will get from its current state to the end state. The method is
the concept of operations. Nor does the intent contain "acceptable risk." Risk is addressed

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in courses of action. Figure 2-11 shows an example of key tasks related to enemy, terrain,
and desired end state. An example of commander’s intent follows.

Commander’s Intent: All enemy forces on OBJ ATLANTA destroyed;

company controls west side of Bush Hill; company is in defensive posture
NLT 011400 OCT __, able to defeat enemy CATK in EA RED; TF 2-99 IN
(M) passed through CP2 without significant delay.

KEY TASKS IN RELATION TO--

Enemy: Terrain: Desired End State:
• All enemy forces on OBJ • Company controls west • Company in defensive
ATLANTA destroyed. side of Bush Hill NLT posture NLT 011400OCT__,
• Enemy forces fixed in EA 010600OCT__. able to destroy enemy
DOG. • Major chokepoints along counterattack in EA RED. TF
• Enemy reconnaissance RT BLUE cleared of obstacles 2-99 IN (M) passed through
forces destroyed prior to and enemy forces. CP2 without significant
reaching PL DOG. • Company reaches PL delay.
• Enemy unable to mass DOG NLT 010400OCT__.
greater than one MRP against
the Company ME.
Figure 2-11. Example of key tasks related to
enemy, terrain, and desired end state.

(b) Risk Assessment. Risk assessment is the identification and assessment of hazards
that allows a commander to implement measures to control hazards. (Refer to Appendix
E for a detailed discussion of risk management and Appendix F for a discussion of
fratricide avoidance.) Identification and assessment are the first two steps of the risk
management process. Risk management is conducted to protect the force and increase the
chance of mission accomplishment. The commander must consider two kinds of risk:
tactical and accident. Tactical risk is associated with hazards that exist due to the
presence of the enemy on the battlefield. The consequences of tactical risk take two
major forms:
• Enemy action in an area where the leader has accepted risk (such as an enemy
attack where the friendly commander has chosen to conduct an economy of
force).
• Lost opportunity (such as moving across severely restricted terrain and then
being unable to mass effects of combat power because of inability to traverse
the terrain rapidly).
Accident risk includes all operational risk considerations other than tactical risk and can
include activities associated with hazards concerning friendly personnel, equipment
readiness, and environmental considerations. Fratricide and the inability to complete a
planned air movement because of weather conditions are two examples of accident risk.
The leader must identify risks based on the results of his mission analysis, decide which
risks he is willing to accept, and incorporate measures that abolish or mitigate the
consequences of the identified risks into his courses of action.

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2-9. ISSUE A WARNING ORDER

After the company commander has determined his unit’s mission and assessed the time
available for planning, preparing for, and executing the mission, he should immediately
issue a warning order to his subordinates. In addition to telling his subordinates of the
company’s new mission, the warning order also gives them his planning time line. He
also may communicate any other instructions or information that he thinks will assist
them in preparing for the new mission. This includes any information on the enemy and
the nature of the higher headquarters’ overall plan and any specific instructions or
rehearsal tasks for preparing subordinate units for the mission. The most important thing
is not to waste any time in issuing the initial warning order. If and when more
information becomes available, he can--and should--issue additional warning orders. By
issuing the initial warning order as quickly as possible, he enables his subordinates to
begin their own planning and preparation (parallel planning) while he begins to develop
the OPORD.

2-10. MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN

In a time-constrained environment, a company commander typically will develop only
one course of action; however, as time permits, he may develop as many courses of
action as possible to allow comparison. He will begin this step of the TLP after he issues
his warning order and after he has received higher headquarters’ third warning order. He
does not need to wait for a complete OPORD from the higher headquarters before
beginning his own course of action development. The SBCT infantry company
commander must take advantage of the tactical internet to communicate his COA through
imagery, graphics, and relevant information.
a. Course of Action Development. The purpose of course of action development is
to determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission that are consistent with the
immediate higher commander’s intent. A COA describes how the unit might generate the
effects of overwhelming combat power against the enemy at the decisive place with the
least friendly casualties. Each COA the company commander develops must be detailed
enough to clearly describe how he envisions using all of his assets and combat multipliers
to achieve the company’s mission-essential task and purpose. To develop a COA, he
focuses on the actions the company must take at the decisive point and works backward
to his start point. He should develop several COAs if time permits. A legitimate COA
must be--
• Suitable. If successfully executed, the COA will accomplish the mission
consistent with the higher commander’s concept and intent.
• Feasible. The unit has the technical and tactical skills and resources to
successfully accomplish the COA.
• Acceptable. The COA minimizes friendly casualties.
• Distinguishable. Each COA must be sufficiently different from the others to
justify full development and consideration.
• Complete. The COA must cover the operational factors of who, what, when,
where, and how and address the mission from its start point to its conclusion.
The COA also must address the doctrinal aspects of the mission. For example, in an
attack against a defending enemy, the COA must address the movement to, deployment
against, assault of, and consolidation upon, the objective.

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(1) Analyze Relative Combat Power. The purpose of this step is to compare combat
power of friendly and enemy forces. It is not merely a calculation and comparison of
friendly and enemy weapons numbers or units with the aim of gaining a numerical
advantage. Using the results of all previous analyses done during mission analysis, the
company commander compares his unit’s combat power strengths and weaknesses with
those of the enemy. He seeks to calculate the time and manner in which his force (and the
enemy) can maximize the effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and
information in relation to the specific ground, disposition, and composition of each force.
In short, he is trying to determine where, when, and how his unit’s combat power (the
effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and information) can overwhelm
the enemy’s ability to generate combat power. Where and when this occurs is, of course,
the decisive point. Using a relative combat power analysis (RCPA) matrix is a technique
to assist in organizing his analysis (Figure 2-12). The matrix allows him to identify
conclusions that he can apply to the development of his COA. The conclusions from his
analysis of combat power are not COA specific, but rather apply to all COAs he may
develop. Once he has completed his analysis of relative combat power, he attempts to
determine a decisive point (if he has not done so already). He does this by considering the
unit’s mission, the terrain, and the enemy, seeking to find a place in time or space where
he can focus overwhelming combat power to accomplish the unit’s assigned purpose. He
must understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of his unit and the enemy. The RCPA,
as a tool, should lead him to a better understanding of when, where, and how to apply his
combat power to exploit a weakness or relative weakness of the enemy. This process
points the way to a potential decisive point, tactics, or techniques to be used when
generating options.

Combat Power
Friendly Enemy Friendly Enemy Conclusions Tactics
Strengths Weaknesses Weaknesses Strengths Techniques
Maneuver

Firepower

Protection

Leadership

Information

Figure 2-12. Relative combat power analysis (RCPA) matrix.

(2) Generate Options. The company commander first determines the doctrinal
requirements for his particular operation. These also may include the doctrinal tasks to be
assigned to subordinate units. For example, a breach requires an assault force, a support
force, a breach force, and possibly a reserve. This doctrinal requirement provides a
framework for the commander to develop a COA. Next he determines his decisive point.
If he has not done so earlier in the TLP, he must determine his decisive point during this
step in order to proceed. Once he has determined his decisive point, he identifies the main
effort’s purpose and the purposes of his supporting efforts. The main effort’s purpose is
nested to his unit’s overall purpose and is achieved at his decisive point. The supporting
efforts’ purposes are nested to the main effort’s purpose by setting the conditions for

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success of the main effort. He then determines the mission-essential tactical tasks for the
main and supporting efforts. These tasks are those that must be accomplished to achieve
the subordinate units’ given purposes.
(3) Array Initial Forces. He must then determine the specific quantity of weapons
(by type) and fire support necessary to accomplish each task against the enemy array of
forces. He must ensure that he has sufficient combat power to accomplish the assigned
task. He allocates resources required for the main effort’s success first and then
determines the resources needed for supporting efforts in descending order of importance.

EXAMPLE: The main effort in an attack of a strongpoint may require

three rifle squads and an engineer squad to seize a foothold, whereas a
support-by-fire force may require four squads and one MGS vehicle. This
array relies on an accurate assessment in the relative combat power
analysis (step 1).

(4) Develop Schemes of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuver is a description of how

the company commander envisions the COA unfolding from its start to its conclusion or
end state. He clarifies in his mind the best ways to use the available terrain and to employ
the unit’s strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. He includes the requirements of
indirect fire to support the maneuver. He then develops the maneuver control measures
necessary to convey his intent, to enhance the understanding of the schemes of maneuver,
to prevent fratricide, and to clarify the tasks and purposes of the main and supporting
efforts. He also determines the CS and CSS aspects of the COA. One technique is to
overlay his scheme of maneuver onto the SITEMP digitally. As control measures become
necessary, he places them on his maneuver overlay. This now becomes the basis for his
COA sketch that he can distribute to his subordinates.
(5) Assign Headquarters. He assigns specific subordinate elements as the main and
supporting efforts. He ensures that he has employed every unit in his command and every
asset that has been attached and that he has provided for adequate command and control
of each element. The company commander must avoid unnecessarily complicated
command and control structures.
(6) Prepare COA Statements and Sketches. He bases the COA statement on the
scheme of maneuver that he has already developed. The statement focuses on all
significant actions from the start of the COA to its finish. His ability to prepare COA
sketches and statements depends on the amount of time available as well as his skill and
experience with weapons systems within the company. He should, whenever possible,
prepare a sketch showing each COA (if more than one has been developed). Another
useful technique is to show the time it takes to achieve each movement and task in the
COA sketch to gain an appreciation for the relative accumulation of time as the course of
action is executed. The COA statement should state his decisive point and why it is
decisive, the form of maneuver or the defensive technique, the tasks and purposes of his
main and supporting efforts, the task and purpose of critical BOS elements, and an end
state.

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b. Course of Action Analysis. After developing the COA, the commander analyzes
it to determine its strengths and weaknesses; to visualize the flow of the battle; to identify
the conditions or requirements necessary to enhance synchronization; and, most
significantly, to gain insights into actions at the decisive point of the mission. If he has
developed more than one COA, he applies this same analysis to each COA developed. He
does this analysis through war-gaming or "fighting" the COA against at least one enemy
COA.
(1) War-Gaming. When time permits, he war-games each friendly COA against the
most probable enemy COA. War-gaming, depending on how much time is devoted to it,
provides the following:
• An appreciation for the time, space, and triggers needed to integrate fire
support, smoke, engineers, ADA, and NBC with maneuver platoons (infantry,
antiarmor, or tank) to support unit tasks and purposes identified in the scheme
of maneuver.
• Flexibility built into the plan by gaining insights into possible branches to the
basic plan.
• The need for control measures (such as checkpoints, contact points, and target
reference points [TRPs]) that facilitate control, flexibility, and
synchronization.
• Coordinating instructions to enhance execution and unity of effort and to
mitigate confusion between subordinate elements.
• Information needed to complete paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the OPORD.
• Assessments regarding on-order and be-prepared missions.
• Projected CSS expenditures, friendly casualties, and resulting medical
requirements.
(2) War-Gaming Techniques. Depending on the time available and his personal
preference, the company commander may use any of the following war-gaming
techniques--
(a) Box Technique. The box technique focuses the war game on a specific area of the
battlefield. This may be the objective area, the engagement area, or some other critical
location where decisive or critical actions will take place. It should include all of the
units, friendly and enemy, that will have a direct impact on those actions. This technique
is a good one to use when time is limited and the enemy situation is relatively clear.
However, a key disadvantage is that when considering only the actions at the critical or
decisive points, the company commander may overlook other actions or events that could
have a significant impact on the unit’s mission.
(b) Belt Technique. The belt technique allows him to divide the COA into events or
belts. He may do this in several ways, such as from phase line to phase line or by
significant event. Each step then is war-gamed in sequence. This approach is most
effective for offensive COAs. The company commander can modify this technique by
dividing the battlefield into belts that are not necessarily adjacent or overlapping but
focus on the critical actions throughout the area of operations.
(c) Avenue-in-Depth Technique. This method is most effective for a defensive COA,
especially when there are several avenues of approach to consider. Using the enemy's
most probable COA, he analyzes friendly and enemy actions along one avenue of
approach at a time.

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(3) War-Gaming Guidelines. To gain the benefits that result from war-gaming a
COA, the company commander must remain objective and record the results of the war
game. He must remember the assumptions he made about the enemy, his unit, and the
ground during the development of his tentative plan. He must avoid letting the enemy or
his unit “win” to justify the COA. Additionally, he must avoid drawing premature
conclusions about the war game or making changes to his COA until the war game is
complete.
c. Course of Action Comparison and Selection. If the company commander has
developed more than one COA, he must compare them by weighing the specific
advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses of each COA as noted during the
war game. These attributes may pertain to the accomplishment of the unit purpose, the
use of terrain, the destruction of the enemy, or any other aspect of the operation that he
believes is important. He uses these factors, gained from his RCPA matrix, as his frame
of reference in tentatively selecting the best COA. He makes the final selection of a COA
based on his own judgment, the start time of the operation, the area of operations, the
scheme of maneuver, and subordinate unit tasks and purposes.
d. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. The CCIR identify and
filter information needed by a commander to support his visualization and to make
critical decisions, especially to determine or validate courses of action. They help him
determine what is relevant to mission accomplishment. In one technique, he writes the
desired question, the quantified answer, and the reaction (critical decision to make).
CCIR also help focus the efforts of his subordinates and assist in the allocation of
resources. CCIR should be kept to what is absolutely essential.
(1) Priority Intelligence Requirements. PIR is information that a commander needs
to know about terrain or enemy in order to make a critical decision. PIR are best
expressed in a question that can be answered with a “Yes” or “No.”

EXAMPLE: Can enemy wheeled vehicles cross the creek at

NU12345678? If yes, the company will reinforce the obstacle and
establish an antiarmor ambush at this location. If no, the company will
emplace an OP then establish the antiarmor ambush along another route.

(2) Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR). This is information that a

commander needs to know about his unit or adjacent units to make a critical decision.

EXAMPLE: I want to know when we have lost one MGS because I will
need to supplement the remaining direct fires of the support element with
additional mortar fires.

2-11. INITIATE MOVEMENT

The company commander initiates any movement necessary to continue mission
preparation or to posture the unit for the start of the mission. This step can be executed at

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any time throughout the sequence of the TLP. This may include movement to an
assembly area, a battle position, a new area of operation, or the movement of guides or
quartering parties.

2-12. CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE

In order to exploit the principles of speed and surprise, the company commander should
weigh the advantage gained by personal reconnaissance versus the combat multiplier
received in the form of supplied information via FBCB2. The commander may have the
ability to plan his operation based upon the unprecedented amount of combat information
provided by the RSTA squadron and by the other information collection sources.
However, if time permits, he should verify higher headquarters’ intelligence with visual
reconnaissance. His reconnaissance should seek to confirm the PIR that support his
tentative plan. These PIR are usually assumptions or critical facts concerning the enemy
(his location, especially templated positions, and strength) and the terrain (verification,
for example, that a tentative support-by-fire position actually will allow for suppression
of the enemy or that an avenue of approach will be useable).
a. If possible, he should include his subordinate leaders in this reconnaissance. This
allows them to see as much of the terrain and enemy as possible. The reconnaissance also
helps subordinate leaders to gain insight into his visualization of the operation.
b. The leader’s reconnaissance may include moving to or beyond the line of
departure (LD) or walking from the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) back to and
through the company area of operation or battle position along likely enemy avenues of
approach. If possible, he should select a vantage point that provides the group with the
best possible view of the decisive point.
c. In addition to the leader’s reconnaissance, the unit may conduct additional
reconnaissance operations. Examples include surveillance of an area by subordinate
elements, patrols to determine where the enemy is (and is not) located, and establishment
of observation posts to gain additional information. The commander may also incorporate
the Javelin CLU as a surveillance tool (day or night), based on an analysis of the factors
of METT-TC.
d. The nature of the reconnaissance, including what it covers and how long it lasts,
depends on the tactical situation and the time available. The company commander should
use the results of the COA development process to identify information and security
requirements for the unit’s reconnaissance operations.

2-13. COMPLETE THE PLAN

During this step, the company commander takes his selected (or refined) COA and
expands it into a complete OPORD. He prepares overlays, refines the indirect fire list,
completes CSS and C2 requirements and, of course, updates the tentative plan based on
the latest reconnaissance or information. He prepares a briefing site and other briefing
materials he may need to present the OPORD directly to his subordinates. Finally, he
makes final coordination with other units or staff members before issuing the order to his
subordinates. The five-paragraph OPORD format helps him paint a complete picture of
all aspects of the operation: terrain, enemy, higher and adjacent friendly units, unit
mission, execution, support, and command and control. The format also assists him in

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addressing all relevant details of the operation. It provides subordinates with a smooth
flow of information from beginning to end.

2-14. ISSUE THE OPORD

The OPORD precisely and concisely explains both his intent and concept of how he
envisions the unit accomplishing the mission. The order does not contain unnecessary
information. Nice-to-know information clouds what is essential and important and often
causes confusion and uncertainty.
a. When issuing the OPORD, he must ensure his subordinates understand and share
his vision of what must be done and when and how it must be done. They must
understand how all the company’s elements work together to accomplish the mission.
They must also understand how the company’s mission supports the intentions of the
immediate higher commander. When he has finished issuing the order, subordinate
leaders should leave with a clear understanding of what the company commander expects
their elements to do.
b. Additionally, and in many respects more importantly, the company commander
must issue the order in a manner that imbues his subordinates with confidence in the plan
and a commitment to do their best to achieve the plan. Whenever possible, he must issue
the order in person, looking into the eyes of his soldiers, to ensure each subordinate
leader understands his mission and what his element must achieve.
c. Complete the order with an initial backbrief utilizing the initial warning order
issued in step 2 of the TLP. Each subordinate leader should be able to backbrief the unit
mission and intent, the immediate higher commander’s intent, his own task and purpose,
and the time he will issue his unit’s OPORD.

2-15. SUPERVISE AND OR REFINE

This final step of the TLP is crucial. After issuing the OPORD, the company commander
and his subordinate leaders must ensure that the required activities and tasks are
completed in a timely manner prior to mission execution. Supervision is the primary
responsibility of all leadership. It is imperative that both officers and NCOs check
everything that is important for successful mission accomplishment. This includes but is
not limited to--
• Listening to subordinate operation orders.
• Observing rehearsals of subordinate units.
• Checking load plans to ensure they are carrying only what is necessary for the
mission.
• Checking the status and serviceability of weapons.
• Checking on maintenance activities of subordinate units.
• Ensuring local security is maintained.

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CHAPTER 3
MOVEMENT

The purpose of tactical movement is to move SBCT units on the

battlefield and prepare them for contact. This chapter focuses on the
movement techniques, formations, and dismounted transition points that,
in combination, provide the SBCT company commander with options for
moving his unit. The various techniques and formations have unique
advantages and disadvantages. Some movement techniques are secure but
slow while others are faster but less secure. Some formations work well in
certain types of terrain or tactical situations but are less effective in
others. Because of the capabilities of the SBCT infantry company, the
commander must consider the overall mounted and dismounted movement
plan, to include where, when, and how he will transition between the two.
None of the movement techniques or formations described in this section
should be considered inflexible or immutable. The company commander
must be prepared to adapt them to the situation at hand.

3-1. TACTICAL MOVEMENT AND ENEMY CONTACT

Do not confuse movement with maneuver. Maneuver is defined as movement supported
by fire to gain a position of advantage over the enemy. At company level, there is
considerable overlap between the two. Tactical movement differs from maneuver,
however, in that maneuver is movement while in contact, but tactical movement is
movement in preparation for contact. The process by which units transition from tactical
movement to maneuver is called "actions on contact." Actions on contact are covered in
Section IV of Chapter 4. Figure 3-1, page 3-2, illustrates the relationship between
movement techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch), the
possibility of enemy contact, and transition to maneuver.

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Figure 3-1. Transition from movement techniques to maneuver.

3-2. MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES

The SBCT infantry company commander selects from the three movement techniques
based on several battlefield factors:
• The likelihood of enemy contact.
• The type of contact expected.
• The availability of an overwatch element.
• The terrain over which the moving element will pass.
• The balance of speed and security required during movement.
See Figure 3-2 for a legend of symbols for company personnel and elements.

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Figure 3-2. Legend of company symbols.

a. Traveling. Traveling is characterized by continuous movement by all company

elements. It is best suited to situations in which enemy contact is unlikely and speed is
important. Figures 3-3 and 3-4, page 3-4, illustrate the traveling technique, dismounted
and mounted.

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Figure 3-3. Traveling dismounted.

Figure 3-4. Traveling mounted.

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b. Traveling Overwatch. This is an extended form of traveling that provides

additional security when speed is desirable but contact is possible. The lead element
moves continuously. The trail element moves at various speeds and may halt periodically
to overwatch movement of the lead element. Dispersion between the two elements must
be based on the trail element’s ability to see the lead element (visually or digitally) and to
provide immediate suppressive fires in case the lead element is engaged. The intent is to
maintain depth, provide flexibility, and maintain the ability to maneuver even if contact
occurs, although a unit ideally should make contact while moving in bounding overwatch
rather than traveling overwatch. Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6, page 3-7, illustrate traveling
overwatch, dismounted and mounted.

NOTE: Organization of the company in both traveling overwatch and bounding

overwatch consists of a lead element (also called the bounding element in
bounding overwatch) and a trail (or overwatch) element. The commander
constitutes these elements using varying combinations of company elements;
his decision must be based on the results of his METT-TC analysis. For
example, the lead element might be one platoon and the XO's vehicle,
overwatched by the two remaining platoons, the commander, and the FSO.

Figure 3-5. Traveling overwatch dismounted.

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Figure 3-6. Traveling overwatch mounted.

c. Bounding Overwatch. Bounding overwatch is used when contact is expected. It

is the most secure, but slowest, movement technique. The purpose of bounding
overwatch is to deploy prior to contact, giving the unit the ability to protect a bounding
element by immediately suppressing an enemy force. In all types of bounding, the
overwatch element is assigned sectors to scan while the bounding element uses terrain to
achieve cover and concealment. The bounding element should avoid masking the fires of
the overwatch element; it must never move beyond the range at which the overwatch
element can effectively suppress likely or suspected enemy positions. The company can
employ either of two bounding methods, alternate bounds or successive bounds, which
are discussed in the following paragraphs. Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8, page 3-8, show the
technique of bounding overwatch utilizing the MGS platoon, dismounted and mounted.

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Figure 3-7. Bounding overwatch dismounted.

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Figure 3-8. Bounding overwatch mounted.

(1) Alternate Bounds. Covered by the rear element, the lead element moves forward,
halts, and assumes overwatch positions. The rear element advances past the lead element
and takes up overwatch positions. This sequence continues as necessary, with only one
element moving at a time. This method is usually more rapid than successive bounds.
(2) Successive Bounds. In the successive bounding method the lead element, covered
by the rear element, advances and takes up overwatch positions. The rear element then
advances to an overwatch position roughly abreast of the lead element and halts. The lead
element then moves to the next position, and so on. Only one element moves at a time,
and the rear element avoids advancing beyond the lead element. This method is easier to
control and more secure than the alternate bounding method, but it is slower.

3-3. MOVEMENT FORMATIONS

The SBCT infantry company uses six basic movement formations: column, line, vee,
wedge, file, and echelon right or left. These formations describe the locations of the
company's platoons and sections in relation to each other. They are guides on how to

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form the company for movement. Each formation aids control, security, and firepower to
varying degrees.
a. Considerations. These formations can be used mounted or dismounted to control
the company. Because of the limitations on the ICVs and MGS, the majority of mounted
movement takes place on roads or unrestricted terrain.
(1) Whether mounted or dismounted, the best formation to use depends on the--
• Mission.
• Enemy situation.
• Terrain.
• Weather and visibility conditions.
• Speed of movement desired.
• Degree of flexibility desired.
(2) When moving cross-country, the distance between soldiers, vehicles, and platoons
varies according to the terrain and the situation. Soldiers should constantly observe their
sectors for likely enemy positions and look for cover that can be reached quickly in case
of enemy contact.
(3) The company commander may specify the platoon formations to be used within
the company formation. If he does not, each platoon leader selects his platoon's
formation. For example, the lead platoon leader may select a formation that permits good
observation and massing of fire to the front (vee formation). The second platoon leader
may select a formation that permits fast movement to overwatch positions and good flank
security (wedge formation). (Squad and platoon movement formations and techniques are
discussed in FM 3-21.9 [FM 7-5].)
(4) When moving in a formation, the company normally guides on the base platoon to
ease control. This should be the lead platoon. In the line or the vee formation, the
company commander must specify which platoon is the base platoon. The other platoons
key their speed and direction on the base platoon. This permits quick changes and lets the
commander control the movement of the entire company by controlling only the base
platoon. Terrain features may be designated for the base platoon to guide on, using the
control techniques described in paragraph 3-5. The company commander normally
locates himself within the formation where he can best see and direct the movement of
the base platoon.
(5) One technique used to alert units for possible movement or for units to report their
readiness to move is an alert status. With this technique, use a readiness condition
(REDCON) system to reflect the amount of time a unit will have before it is required to
move:
• REDCON 1: Be prepared to move immediately.
• REDCON 2: Be prepared to move in 15 minutes.
• REDCON 3: Be prepared to move in 1 hour.
• REDCON 4: Be prepared to move in 2 hours.
b. Formations. The following is a discussion of SBCT infantry company movement
formations.
(1) Column. The column formation allows the company to make contact with one
platoon and maneuver with the three trail platoons. It is a flexible formation, allowing
easy transition to other formations. It provides good all-round security and allows fast
movement. It also provides good dispersion and aids maneuver and control, especially

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during limited visibility. The company can deliver a limited volume of fire to the front
and to the rear, but a high volume to the flanks. Figures 3-9 and 3-10 depict company
columns.

Figure 3-9. Company column dismounted.

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Figure 3-10. Company column mounted.

(2) Company Line. The company line formation puts all platoons forward along the
same direction of movement and provides for the delivery of maximum fire to the front,
but less to the flanks. It is the most difficult formation to control. The company
commander should designate a base platoon (normally the center platoon) for the other
platoons to guide on. Flank and rear security is generally poor but is improved when the
flank platoons use echelon formations. Figures 3-11 and 3-12, page 3-12, depict
examples of the company line.

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Figure 3-11. Company line dismounted.

Figure 3-12. Company line mounted.

(3) Company Wedge. The company wedge formation allows the commander to make
contact with a small element and still maneuver the remaining platoons. If the company is
hit from the flank, one platoon is free to maneuver. This formation is hard to control, but
it allows faster movement than the company vee formation. Figures 3-13 and 3-14 depict
examples of the company wedge.

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Figure 3-13. Company wedge dismounted.

Figure 3-14. Company wedge mounted.

(4) Company Vee. The company vee formation has two platoons forward to provide
immediate fire on contact or to flank the enemy. It also has one platoon in the center and
one platoon in the rear. These platoons either overwatch or trail the lead platoons. If the
company is hit from either flank, two platoons can provide fire, and at least one platoon is
free to maneuver. This formation is hard to control and slows movement. The company
commander designates one of the forward platoons as the base platoon. Figures 3-15 and
3-16, page 3-14, depict examples of the company vee with all platoons in wedge.

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Figure 3-15. Company vee dismounted.

Figure 3-16. Company vee mounted.

(5) Company File. The company file formation is the easiest formation to control. It
allows rapid movement in restricted terrain and during limited visibility, and it enhances
control and concealment. It is, however, the least secure formation and the hardest from
which to maneuver. Figure 3-17 and Figure 3-18, page 3-16, depict examples of the
company file with all units in file.

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(a) The company commander locates well forward with the lead platoon headquarters
or immediately behind the lead security element. This location increases his control by
putting him in position to make critical decisions. The company command post can locate
farther back (behind the lead platoon) to avoid interfering with the platoon's movement
and to aid communications with other elements.
(b) The 1SG (or XO) is last, or nearly last, in the company file to provide leadership
and to prevent breaks in contact within the file.
(c) The company file is vulnerable to breaks in contact and should be used only when
necessary and for short periods of time. Dismounted, a company stretches out over 600
meters in a company file, with a pass time of more than 20 minutes.

Figure 3-17. Company file dismounted.

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Figure 3-18. Company file mounted.

(6) Echelon Right or Left. The echelon right or echelon left formation is used if the
situation is vague and the company commander anticipates enemy contact to the front or
on one of the flanks. Normally, an obstacle or another friendly unit exists on the flank of
the company opposite the echeloned flank, preventing enemy contact on that side. This
formation provides a good volume of fire and protection to the echeloned flank, but less
to the opposite flank. Figure 3-19 and Figure 3-20, page 3-18, depict examples of the
echelon right formation.

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Figure 3-19. Echelon right dismounted.

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Figure 3-20. Echelon right mounted.

c. Formation Selection. The company commander selects the formation that

provides the proper control, security, and speed. Table 3-1 provides a comparison of the
six movement formations.

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FORMATION SECURITY FIRES CONTROL SPEED

• Good dispersion • Good to front and • Easy to control • Fast
rear
Column • Good 360° security • Flexible formation
• Excellent to the
flanks
• Excellent to the • Excellent to the • Difficult to control • Slow
front front
Line • Inflexible formation
• Poor to the flank • Poor to the flank
and rear and rear
• Good 360° security • Good to the front • Less difficult to • Faster
Wedge and flanks control than the line than the
line
• Flexible formation
• Better to the front • Very good to the • Very difficult to • Slow
Vee
front control
• Least secure • Poor • Easy to control • Fast
File • Effective use of
concealment
• Good to the • Good to the • Difficult to control • Slow
Echelon echeloned flank and echeloned flank and
front front

Table 3-1. Comparison of movement formations (mounted or dismounted).

3-4. USE OF MOVEMENT FORMATIONS

Movement should be as rapid as the terrain, the mobility of the force, and the enemy
situation permit. The ability to gain and maintain the initiative often depends on
undetected movement by the unit. If detected during movement, the enemy may be able
to apply substantial combat power against the company. The SBCT infantry company
depends heavily upon the terrain for protection from the enemy's fires. The company
commander also protects his company during movement by ensuring the company is
using proper movement formations and techniques.
a. Fundamentals. The SBCT infantry company commander's mission analysis and
information gained through FBCB2 assist him in deciding how to move his unit most
effectively. There is no set method for this. When planning company movements, the
commander must ensure the unit is moving in a way that supports a rapid transition to
maneuver. Once contact with the enemy is made, squads and platoons receiving effective
fire execute the appropriate battle drills, and leaders begin to maneuver their units. The
following fundamentals provide guidance for planning effective company movements.
(1) Conduct Reconnaissance. All echelons should conduct reconnaissance. The
enemy situation and the available planning time may limit the unit's reconnaissance, but
leaders at every level must aggressively seek information about the terrain and enemy.
Primarily, this information about the terrain and enemy is gained through FBCB2.
However, if sufficient information is still lacking, an effective technique is to send a
reconnaissance element forward of the lead platoon. Even if this unit is only 15 minutes
ahead of the company, it can still provide valuable information and reaction time for the
company commander.
(2) Use the Terrain and Weather Effectively. One of the strengths of the SBCT
infantry company is its ability to move across almost any terrain and in almost any

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weather conditions. The company should move on covered and concealed routes. Moving
during limited visibility may provide better concealment, and the enemy may be less alert
during these periods. Plan to avoid identified danger areas.
(3) Move as Squads and Platoon.. The advantages to moving the company by squads
and platoons include--
• Faster movement.
• Better security. A small unit is less likely to be detected because it requires
less cover and concealment.
• More dispersion. The dispersion gained by moving the company by squads
and platoons makes it much more difficult for the enemy to concentrate his
fires against the company, especially indirect fires, CAS, and chemical agents.
Subordinate units also gain room to maneuver. Information sharing through
the tactical internet makes this a plausible option.
• Better operational security (OPSEC). It is much more difficult for the enemy
to determine what the friendly force is doing if all he has are isolated squad-
size spot reports.
Although the advantages normally outweigh the disadvantages, when planning
decentralized movements the commander should also consider the following
disadvantages:
• Requires numerous linkups are required to regroup the company.
• May take longer to mass combat power to support a hasty attack or disengage
in the event of enemy contact.
(4) Maintain Security during the Movement. A primary responsibility of the
company commander is to protect his unit at all times. This is critical during movement
because the company is extremely vulnerable to enemy direct and indirect fires. In
addition to the fundamentals listed earlier, the company commander achieves security for
the company by applying the following:
• Use the appropriate movement formation and technique for the conditions.
• Move as fast as the situation allows. This may degrade the enemy's ability to
detect the unit and the effectiveness of his fires once he detects it.
• Ensure that subordinate units correctly position security elements to the
flanks, front, and rear at a distance that prevents enemy direct fire on the main
body. (Normally, the company formation and movement technique provides
greater security to the front; it is the flanks and rear that must be secured by
these security elements. The company SOP should state who is responsible for
providing these security elements.)
• Enforce noise and light discipline (especially when dismounted).
• Enforce camouflage discipline (soldiers and their equipment).
• When the situation is not clear, make contact with the smallest element
possible. By making contact with a small element, the company commander
maintains the ability to maneuver with the majority of his force. The soldiers
who first receive enemy fires are most likely to become casualties. They also
are most likely to be suppressed and fixed by the enemy.
• When the situation is clear, the company commander must quickly mass the
effects of his combat power to overwhelm the enemy.

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b. Locations of Key Leaders and Weapons. The locations of key leaders and
weapons depend on the situation, the movement formation and technique, and the
organization of the SBCT infantry company. The following paragraphs provide guidance
for the company commander in deciding where these assets should locate.
(1) Company Command Post. The company command post normally consists of the
company commander, his RATELOs, the FIST, the communications specialist, the NBC
sergeant, and possibly other personnel and attachments (XO, 1SG, or a security element).
The company CP locates where it can best support the company commander and
maintain communications with higher and subordinate units. To maintain
communications, the mounted CP may need to locate away from the commander. In this
case, the XO controls the CP (or part of it) and maintains communications with higher or
adjacent units while the commander locates where he can best control the company.
Although the CP can move independently, it normally locates where it is secured by the
other platoons and sections within the company formation.
(2) Company Commander. The company commander locates where he can see and
control the company. Normally, he positions the CP at his location, but at times he may
move separate from the CP. If dismounted, he may take only his company net RATELO
and travel with one of his platoons. This allows him to move with a platoon without
disrupting their formation. Generally, the company commander (with the CP) operates
immediately behind the lead platoon.
(3) Company Fire Support Officer. The company FSO normally moves with the
company commander. At times, he may locate elsewhere to control indirect fires or relay
calls for fire from the platoons.
(4) Company Mortars. The company mortars locate where they can provide
responsive fires in case of enemy contact. They must locate where they gain security
from the other units in the company. They normally are not last in the company formation
because they have limited capability to provide security and their soldiers' loads, if
dismounted, often make them the slowest element in the company.
(5) Other Attachments. The locations of other attachments depend on METT-TC. CS
assets, such as engineers, are positioned where they can best support the company. For
example, the engineers may follow the lead platoon where they can be more responsive.
(6) Infantry Carrier Vehicles, Mobile Gun Systems, and Other Vehicles. The SBCT
infantry company’s ICVs, MGSs and other vehicle attachments, such as ambulances or
resupply vehicles, present certain challenges to the SBCT infantry company commander.
The terrain that the infantry company normally moves along after dismounting may not
support vehicular movement. It may be possible for the company to secure the roads or
trails these vehicles will move on by moving through and securing more restrictive
terrain on the flanks. After dismounting, there are several options available to the
commander for the disposition of the vehicles. Some of these options are:
• Employ them to support the dismounted infantry.
• Leave them in a lagger site (see Chapter 7, Section IV) with their crews to be
called later for linkup.
• Displace them to another location.
• Leave them in place while their crews move dismounted.

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3-5. CONTROL TECHNIQUES

Using the proper formation and movement techniques assists the SBCT infantry company
commander's control of the company, but additional control techniques are often
required. The following techniques may help in controlling company movements.
a. Graphics. Normally, the SBCT battalion assigns graphic control measures to
integrate the SBCT infantry company's movement into the battalion's movement or
scheme of maneuver. The company commander may need to establish other control
measures to control his units. These may include boundaries, routes, checkpoints, release
points, and target reference points on known (likely) enemy positions to control direct
fires. The SBCT company commander ensures that each graphic control measure is
updated in FBCB2 and is easy to locate on the terrain.
b. Reconnaissance. Prior reconnaissance aids control during movement. It provides
the SBCT infantry company commander with a better idea of where movement is more
difficult and where graphic control measures are needed. Elements from the company
may perform this reconnaissance, but the RSTA squadron or battalion reconnaissance
platoon is more likely to conduct the reconnaissance and provide the information to other
organizations through FBCB2.
c. Guides. Guides who have already seen the terrain are the best way to provide
control. When it is not possible to have guides for the entire movement, have them
reconnoiter the difficult areas and guide the SBCT infantry company through them.
d. Navigational Aids. Even with the availability of a global positioning system
(GPS), every leader should use his compass and a pace count for all moves. If possible,
select routes that allow leaders to use prominent terrain to stay oriented.
e. Limited Visibility Dismounted Movements. The measures already listed are the
best ways to provide control for moving during limited visibility. The following measures
provide extra control when moving dismounted in limited visibility.
(1) Use Night Vision Devices. Effective limited visibility movement is possible even
if there is not a sufficient quantity of night vision devices (NVDs) for every soldier. If the
soldiers providing front, flank, and rear security use them, the entire unit can move faster.
Soldiers should rotate to maintain effectiveness. Key leaders throughout the formation
must also use NVDs.
(2) Reduce the Interval between Soldiers and Units. Closing up the formation allows
the use of arm-and-hand signals and reduces the chance of breaks in contact. However,
leaders should try to maintain the most dispersion possible at all times. Well-trained units
can operate at night as they do during the day.
(3) Use Other Measures. Other measures include using luminous tape on the back of
helmets, slowing the speed of movement, using land line to communicate or to guide
units, and moving leaders closer to the front.
f. Limited Visibility Mounted Movement. Every leader should use the information
gained through FBCB2 in addition to his map and compass to remain oriented at all
times. If possible, select routes that allow leaders to use prominent terrain to stay
oriented. In addition to the capabilities inherent with FBCB2, additional control measures
provide unit vehicle integrity during mounted limited visibility movement operations.
(1) Use Night Vision Devices. Effective mounted limited visibility movement is
possible if drivers and VCs throughout the formation use NVDs.

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(2) Reduce the Interval between Soldiers, Vehicles, and Units. Closing up the
formation allows the use of arm-and-hand signals and reduces the chance of breaks in
contact. However, leaders should rely on FBCB2 and night vision equipment to maintain
the greatest vehicle dispersion possible at all times. Well-trained units can operate at
night as they do during the day.

3-6. SECURITY DURING MOVEMENT

During company movement, each platoon is responsible for a sector, depending on its
position in the formation. When dismounted, each fire team and squad within the
platoons has a sector, so the company has all-round security during movement (Figure 3-
21).

Figure 3-21. All-round security.

a. During short halts, soldiers spread out and assume prone positions behind cover.
They watch the same sectors they did while moving. Leaders orient machine guns and
antiarmor weapons on likely enemy avenues of approach into the position. Soldiers
remain alert and keep movement to a minimum. They speak quietly and only when
necessary. Soldiers with night vision devices scan areas where the enemy may be
concealed during limited visibility.
b. During long halts, the SBCT infantry company sets up a perimeter defense (see
Chapter 5). The company commander chooses the most defensible terrain, which must
have good cover and concealment. The company SOP must address the actions required
during long halts.
c. For additional security, small ambush teams may be concealed and remain in
position after a short halt. Ideally, the center platoon provides these teams, which remain

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in position to ambush any enemy following the SBCT infantry company. The linkup of
these teams must be coordinated and understood by all.
d. Before occupying a static position (objective rally point, patrol base, or perimeter
defense), the SBCT infantry commander should ensure that the enemy is unaware of his
company's location. In addition to using the ambush teams, he may also conceal security
teams in or near the tentative static position as the company passes it. The company
continues movement, preferably until darkness, and then circles back to link up with the
security teams, who have reconnoitered the position and guide the company into it.

3-7. MOVEMENT AS PART OF A BATTALION

The SBCT infantry company often moves as part of the battalion. The battalion
commander assigns the company a position within the battalion formation, and the
company commander uses the movement technique and movement formation that best
suits the likelihood of enemy contact and his unit’s mission. Regardless of the company's
position within the battalion formation, it must be ready to make contact or to support the
other SBCT infantry companies by maneuver or by fire alone.

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CHAPTER 4
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The SBCT infantry rifle company has great flexibility due to its
organic mobility and robust infantry organization. While retaining its light
infantry ethos and warfighting capability, it can move faster and farther
and can react rapidly to changes in the tactical situation. Thus, this unit is
not constrained by the time-space problem that has historically faced the
light infantry.

Section I. GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The outcome of decisive combat derives from offensive actions. All operations are
designed to transition to and support the offense. Only through offensive actions can the
company accomplish its primary mission--to close with the enemy by means of fire and
maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and
counterattack. A sound doctrinal foundation during offensive planning assists the
commander in capitalizing on the increased tactical flexibility of the SBCT infantry rifle
company.

4-1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE

Traditionally, the characteristics of the offense include surprise, tempo, concentration,
and audacity. Due to the nature of modern offensive operations and the digital
capabilities of the SBCT company, however, flexibility has been added to the following
discussion of the offense. The SBCT infantry rifle company commander must master
both analog and digital capabilities. This dual capability provides the flexibility necessary
to glean the benefits of digital while retaining the ability to transition rapidly to analog to
continue the offense in case of a disruption in digital capability. The commander decides
how to apply the following characteristics for each mission.
a. Surprise. Units achieve surprise by striking the enemy at a time, at a place, or in
a manner for which he is unprepared. Total surprise rarely is essential; simply delaying or
disrupting the enemy's reaction usually is effective.
(1) Surprise delays the enemy's reactions, stresses his command and control, and
induces psychological shock in his soldiers and leaders. This may allow an attacker to
succeed with fewer forces than might otherwise be required.
(2) The company's abilities to attack during limited visibility, to operate in small
units, and to infiltrate are often key to achieving surprise. The company must exploit the
effect of surprise on the enemy before he can recover.
b. Tempo. Tempo is the rate of speed of military action. Controlling or altering that
rate is essential for maintaining the initiative. Speed promotes surprise, keeps the enemy
off balance, contributes to the security of the attacking force, and prevents the defender
from taking effective countermeasures.
(1) Properly exploited, speed confuses and immobilizes the defender until the attack
becomes unstoppable. Leaders build speed into operations through careful planning.
(2) The company increases its speed through its ability to transition rapidly from
moving mounted to moving as light infantry by using simple plans, decentralized control,
and mission orders. Speed of movement depends on reconnaissance, reducing the

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soldiers' loads, using proper movement formations and techniques, and selecting good
routes for both mounted and dismounted movement. In the case of dismounted
movement, ICVs allow soldiers to shed loads down to fighting loads. Companies develop
SOPs to facilitate their transition from mounted movement to dismounted movement.
c. Concentration. The attacker concentrates combat power at the decisive points
and times to achieve the unit's purpose. Leaders strive to concentrate the effects of their
combat power without concentrating forces.
(1) Because the attacker often moves across terrain the enemy has prepared, he may
expose himself to the enemy's fires. By concentrating overwhelming combat power at an
area or system that is weak, the attacker can reduce both the effectiveness of enemy fires
and the amount of time he is exposed to these fires.
(2) The challenge for the company commander is to concentrate combat power while
reducing the enemy's ability to do the same against his unit. Actions that cause the enemy
to shift combat potential away from the intended decisive point result in a greater
advantage in combat power where and when the commander needs it most. The
commander must consider employing his mounted and light infantry capabilities to
achieve overwhelming combat power at the decisive point.
d. Audacity. Audacity is the willingness to risk bold action to achieve positive
results. The audacious commander develops confidence by conducting a thorough
estimate. His actions, although quick and decisive, are based on a reasoned approach to
the tactical situation and on his knowledge of his soldiers, the enemy, and the terrain. He
is daring and original, but he is not rash.
(1) Audacious commanders throughout history have used the "indirect approach."
They maneuver to maintain a position of advantage over the enemy, seek to attack the
enemy on the flank or rear, and exploit success at once, even if this briefly exposes their
own flanks.
(2) Boldness and calculated risk have always been the keystones of successful
offensive operations. They must, however, be consistent with the higher commander's
mission and intent.
e. Flexibility. Given the increased capabilities of the SBCT infantry rifle company,
the commander has much greater flexibility with this new organization and should plan
on maximizing it in planning and execution. At some point in most attacks, the original
plan must be adjusted to meet changes in the situation. Mission orders and competent
subordinate leaders who exercise initiative ensure the proper adjustments are made.
(1) The commander must expect uncertainties and be ready to exploit opportunities.
The flexibility required often depends on the amount of reliable intelligence the
commander has on the enemy.
(2) The commander builds flexibility into his plan during the decision-making
process. By conducting a thorough wargame, he develops a full appreciation for possible
enemy actions. A reserve increases the company commander's flexibility. However,
given the SBCT infantry company's organization and increased situational understanding
through the COP, its reserve may be smaller than in strictly light and heavy units.

4-2. TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The four types of offensive operations, described in FM 3-90, are movement to contact,
attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Companies can execute movements to contact and

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attacks. Platoons generally conduct these forms of the offense as part of a company or
larger unit operation. Companies and platoons participate in a higher unit’s exploitation
or pursuit. The nature of these operations depends largely on the amount of time and
enemy information available during the planning and preparing for the operation phases.
a. Movement to Contact. The movement to contact (MTC) is a type of offensive
operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact. The company
may conduct an MTC on its own or as part of a larger unit’s operation when the enemy
situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. (For a detailed discussion
of MTC refer to Section VI.)
b. Attack. An attack is an offensive operation that destroys enemy forces or seizes
or secures terrain. Movement, supported by fires, characterizes the conduct of an attack.
The company likely will participate in a synchronized attack. However, a company may
conduct a special purpose attack as part of, or separate from, an offensive or defensive
operation. Special purpose attacks consist of ambush, spoiling attack, counterattack, raid,
feint, and demonstration. (For a detailed discussion of attack and special purpose attacks
refer to Sections V and VII.)
c. Exploitation. Exploitations are conducted at the battalion level and higher. The
objective of exploitation is to complete the destruction of the enemy following a
successful attack. Companies and platoons may conduct movements to contact or attacks
as part of a higher unit’s exploitation.
d. Pursuit. Pursuits normally are conducted at the brigade or higher level. A pursuit
typically follows a successful exploitation and is designed to prevent a fleeing enemy
from escaping and to destroy him. Companies and platoons will participate in a larger
unit’s exploitation and may conduct attacks as part of the higher unit’s operation.

4-3. FORMS OF MANUEVER

Given the typical sequence for offensive operations (refer to Section II), the company
maneuvers against the enemy in an area of operation. Maneuver places the enemy at a
disadvantage through the application of friendly fires and movement. The five forms of
maneuver are:
• Envelopment.
• Turning movement.
• Infiltration.
• Penetration.
• Frontal attack.
a. Envelopment. Envelopment (Figure 4-1, page 4-4) is a form of maneuver in
which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing
objectives to the enemy rear or flank in order to destroy him in his current positions.
“Flank attacks” are a variant of envelopment in which access to the enemy’s flank and
rear results in enemy movement. A successful envelopment requires discovery or creation
of an assailable flank. The envelopment is the preferred form of maneuver because the
attacking force tends to suffer fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to
destroy the enemy. Envelopments focus on:
• Seizing terrain.
• Destroying specific enemy forces.
• Interdicting enemy withdrawal routes.

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Figure 4-1. Envelopment.

b. Turning Movemen.. Turning movement (Figure 4-2) is a form of maneuver in

which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s principal defensive positions by
seizing objectives to the enemy’s rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current
positions or to divert major forces to meet the threat. For a turning movement to be
successful, the unit trying to turn the enemy must attack something that the enemy will
fight to save. This may be a supply route, artillery emplacement, or a headquarters. In
addition to attacking a target that the enemy will fight to save, the attacking unit should
be strong enough to pose a real threat to the enemy. The turning movement is a type of
envelopment in which the attacker attempts to avoid the defense entirely. Instead, he
seeks to secure key terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along his lines of
communication. Faced with a major threat to his rear, the enemy is thus "turned" out of
his defensive positions and forced to attack rearward. The company will likely conduct a
turning movement as part of a battalion supporting an SBCT attack.

NOTE: Turning movement differs from envelopment in that the force conducting the
turning movement seeks to make the enemy displace from his current location
whereas an enveloping force seeks to engage the enemy in his current location
from an unexpected direction.

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Figure 4-2. Turning movement.

c. Infiltration. Infiltration (Figure 4-3, page 4-6) is a form of maneuver in which an

attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by
enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only
small elements to enemy defensive fires. Moving and assembling forces covertly through
enemy positions takes a considerable amount of time. A successful infiltration reaches
the enemy’s rear without fighting through prepared positions. An infiltration is normally
used in conjunction with and in support of another form of maneuver. A company may
conduct an infiltration (dismounted or mounted) as part of a larger unit’s attack with the
battalion employing another form of maneuver. The company commander also may
employ maneuver by infiltration to move his platoons to locations to support the
battalion’s attack. SBCT infantry companies are well suited for infiltrations due to their
mobility, positional awareness, COP, and small signature when moving dismounted. A
company may conduct an infiltration in order to--
• Attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction.
• Occupy a support-by-fire position to support an attack.

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• Secure key terrain.

• Conduct ambushes and raids.
• Conduct a covert breach of an obstacle.

Figure 4-3. Infiltration.

d. Penetration. Penetration (Figure 4-4) is a form of maneuver in which an

attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to create both
assailable flanks and access to the enemy’s rear. Penetration is used when enemy flanks
are not assailable, when enemy defenses are overextended, when weak spots in the
enemy defense are identified, and when time does not permit some other form of
maneuver. A penetration normally consists of three steps:
• Breach the enemy’s main defense positions.
• Widen the gap created to secure flanks by enveloping one or both of the newly
exposed flanks.
• Seize the objective.
As part of a larger force penetration, the company will normally isolate, suppress, fix, or
destroy enemy forces, breach tactical or protective obstacles in the enemy’s main
defense, secure the shoulders of the penetration, or seize key terrain. A battalion may also
use the penetration to secure a foothold within a large built-up area.

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Figure 4-4. Penetration.

e. Frontal Attack. Frontal attack is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force

seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force along a broad front. It
is the least desirable form of maneuver because it exposes the attacker to the concentrated
fire of the defender and limits the effectiveness of the attacker’s own fires. However, the
frontal attack is often the best form of maneuver for an attack in which speed and
simplicity are key; it is useful in overwhelming weak defenses, security outposts, or
disorganized enemy forces.

Section II. SEQUENCE OF OFFENSIVE OPERATION

As the company commander plans for an offensive mission, he generally considers the
following sequence of events that apply to many, but not all, offensive operations.
• Assembly area.
• Reconnaissance.
• Movement to the line of departure.
• Maneuver.
• Deployment.
• Assault
• Consolidation and reorganization.

4-4. ASSEMBLY AREA

The commander directs and supervises mission preparations in the assembly area to
prepare the company for the upcoming battle. Preparation time also allows the company
to conduct precombat checks and inspections, rehearsals at all levels, and CSS activities.

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Given the communications capabilities of the company, the commander may conduct on-
the-move planning to hasten his attack. (See Appendix G, Road Marches and Assembly
Areas, for more information.)

4-5. RECONNAISSANCE
All echelons should conduct reconnaissance. The enemy situation and available planning
time may limit the unit’s reconnaissance, but leaders at every level must aggressively
seek information about the terrain and enemy. Leaders must remember the benefits of
having their soldiers on the ground providing real-time information, regardless of the
information available via FBCB2. The on-the-ground company reconnaissance effort
reports on enemy activity in the company’s area of interest (AOI) near the LD, attack
position (ATK PSN), assault position (ASLT PSN), or the company-assigned unit
objective (OBJ). This provides the maneuver commander with the information needed to
execute the best possible tactical plan.

4-6. MOVEMENT TO THE LINE OF DEPARTURE

When attacking from positions not in contact, rifle companies often stage in rear
assembly areas, road march to ATK PSN behind friendly units in contact with the enemy,
conduct passage of lines, begin the attack, and then move to their AOs. When necessary,
the rifle company employs indirect fires, close air support (when available), and direct
fire to facilitate its movement.

4-7. MANEUVER
Maneuver is the foundation for the employment of forces on the battlefield. It is defined
as the use of movement in combination with fire (or fire potential), employed to achieve a
position of advantage with respect to the enemy and to facilitate accomplishment of the
mission. At the company level, maneuver is the essence of every tactical operation and
task. When possible, the commander employs those techniques that avoid the enemy’s
strength and conceal the company's true intentions. He deceives the enemy as to the
location of the main effort, uses surprise to take advantage of his initiative in determining
the time and place of his attack, and uses indirect approaches, when available, to strike
the enemy from a flank or the rear. The company commander maneuvers his platoons to
close with the enemy, to gain positional advantage over him, and ultimately to destroy
him or force him to withdraw or capitulate.
a. Base of Fire Force. The combination of fire and movement first requires a base
of fire in which some elements of the company remain stationary and provide protection
for the bounding forces by preventing the enemy from reacting to the bounding force.
(1) The base of fire force occupies positions that afford effective cover and
concealment, unobstructed observation, and clear fields of fire. Once it is in position, the
base of fire is responsible both for suppressing known enemy forces and for aggressively
scanning assigned sectors of observation; it identifies previously unknown elements and
then suppresses them. The protection provided by the base of fire force allows the
bounding unit to continue its movement and to retain the initiative even when it is under
enemy observation or within range of enemy weapons.
(2) Because maneuver is decentralized in nature, decisions on where and when to
establish a base of fire must be made at the appropriate level. These decisions normally

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fall to a leader on a specific part of the battlefield who knows what enemy forces can
engage the bounding force and what friendly forces are available to serve as the base of
fire. At company level, these decisions may be made within the company (with the base
of fire provided by a platoon), within platoons (with the base of fire provided by the
weapons squad), or within squads (with a fire team as the base of fire).
b. Bounding Force. Movement in a maneuver situation is inherently dangerous. It is
complicated not only by the obvious potential for harm posed by enemy weapons but also
by the uncertainty caused by unknown terrain and other operational factors.
(1) The bounding force must take full advantage of whatever cover and concealment
the terrain provides. Leaders can enhance security by enforcing use of intervening terrain
and avoidance of skylining.
(2) All elements and or vehicle crews involved in the maneuver must maintain 360-
degree security at all times. Elements in the bounding force must scan their assigned
sectors of observation continuously.
(3) Although METT-TC factors ultimately dictate the length of the bounds, the
bounding force should never move beyond the range at which the base of fire force can
effectively suppress known, likely, or suspected enemy positions. This minimizes the
bounding force’s exposure to enemy fires.
(4) In severely restricted terrain, bounds are generally much shorter than in more
open areas.
(5) If mounted, the bounding force may need to dismount infantry squads or
individual crewmen to observe intervening gaps or dead space. Although this usually
causes the platoons to make a tactical pause, it does not slow the operation as much as
would the loss of a squad or vehicle and crew to a hidden enemy antitank system.
(6) The bounding element must remain focused on its ultimate goal of gaining a
positional advantage, which it then can use to destroy the enemy by direct and indirect
fires.

4-8. DEPLOYMENT
As a unit deploys and moves toward the assault position, the unit begins the final
positioning of its forces so the company can pass through the assault position with
minimum delay and confusion. This tactical positioning allows units the opportunity to
continue to "flow" the force in its best tactical posture through the ASLT PSN into the
attack. Movement should be as rapid as the terrain, force mobility, and enemy situation
permit. The probable line of departure is the next control measure following the attack
position and represents the point at which the force is fully committed to offensive action.

4-9. ASSAULT
During offensive operations, the unit remains enemy- and effects-oriented; however,
based on the factors of METT-TC, the company's objective may be terrain- or force-
oriented. Terrain-oriented objectives require the SBCT infantry rifle company to seize
and retain a designated area and often require fighting through enemy forces. If the
objective is force-oriented, an objective area may be assigned for orientation, but the
company’s effort is focused on the enemy’s actual location. The enemy may be a
stationary or moving force. Actions on the objective start when the company begins

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placing fires on the objective; this normally occurs when the commander initiates his
echelonment of fire onto the objective.

4-10. CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION.

The company consolidates and reorganizes as required by the situation and mission.
Consolidation is the process of organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so
that it can be defended. Reorganization is the actions taken to shift internal resources
within a degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness. The company
executes follow-on missions as directed by the SBCT battalion commander. A likely
mission is to continue the attack against targets of opportunity in the objective area.
Whether a raid, hasty attack, or deliberate attack, a company must posture itself and
prepare for continued offensive operations.

Section III. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The battlefield operating systems (BOS) are a listing of critical tactical activities that
provides a means of reviewing preparation and execution. Synchronization and
coordination among the BOS are critical for success. Selected BOS and other planning
considerations are addressed in this section. For a detailed discussion of Command and
Control and Intelligence, refer to Chapter 2.

4-11. FIRE SUPPORT

As part of the top-down fire planning system, the company commander must refine the
fire plan from higher headquarters to meet his mission requirements. He incorporates the
results of his METT-TC analysis and makes key locations and targets from the fire plan
an integral part of the company rehearsal. Additionally, he works with the FSO to
develop a corresponding observation plan and establishes triggers for initiating or shifting
fires. The company commander and the FSO must have a thorough understanding of
organic fire support elements and traditional artillery support assets. The majority of the
company's fire support is from mortar systems organic to the SBCT infantry battalion and
company. The commander employs supporting fires in the offense to achieve a variety of
tactical goals:
• To suppress enemy weapons systems that inhibit movement.
• To fix or neutralize bypassed enemy elements.
• To prepare enemy positions for an assault. Preparatory fires are normally used
during a deliberate attack, with fires placed on key targets before the assault
begins. These indirect fires are integrated and synchronized with the
company’s direct fire systems to provide constant pressure on the enemy
position and prevent him from reacting to the company’s assaulting elements.
The commander must weigh the benefits of preparatory fires against the
potential loss of surprise.
• To obscure enemy observation or screen friendly maneuver. The company can
take advantage of smoke in various maneuver situations, such as during a
bypass or in deception operations.

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• To support breaching operations. Fires can obscure or suppress enemy

elements that are overwatching reinforcing obstacles. They can also obscure
or suppress enemy forces on an objective area during the conduct of an assault
breach.
• To illuminate enemy positions. Illumination fires are always included in
contingency plans for night attacks.

4-12. MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY

The SBCT battalion may task-organize the company with engineers as part of a
breaching operation in the offense. The company commander normally receives
additional mobility assets, such as an engineer platoon. If attached to heavy forces, it can
also receive equipment suited for mounted mobility, such as mine clearing line charges
(MICLICs), or armored combat earthmovers, based on METT-TC. Refer to FM 90-13-1
and FM 90-7 for a detailed discussion of mobility and survivability operations and
support, and FM 3-34.2 for a detailed discussion of breaching operations.

4-13. AIR DEFENSE

Avengers or mounted Stinger sections may be attached, with organic vehicle support, to
travel with the company. Their security must be a consideration in planning for offensive
operations. The company commander must plan for and rehearse internal air security and
active air defense measures. SOP normally dictates ADA requirements and procedures.
The commander must anticipate possible contact with enemy air assets by templating
enemy helicopter and fixed-wing air corridors and avenues of approach. Unit SOPs
should dictate internal air security measures and active air defense measures.

4-14. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

The main purpose of combat service support in the offense is to assist maneuver elements
in maintaining the momentum of the attack. In the offense, CSS functions are performed
as far forward as the tactical situation allows. Company trains remain one terrain feature
behind the location of the company vehicles when the company has dismounted and is
moving forward on foot. The commander must consider the enemy situation and how it
relates to the security of the company trains. If the company is conducting decentralized
operations, the company trains locate where they can best support the platoons in the
accomplishment of the company's mission. The ICVs and medical evacuation team move
forward to the objective area to evacuate casualties and conduct resupply. If necessary,
the supply sergeant also can move forward to assist with sustainment operations. The
company CP reports the company's combat status to the SBCT battalion and requests
resupply as needed. Key CSS planning considerations for company offensive operations
include the following:
• Increased consumption of Class III, V and VIII supplies.
• Higher casualty rates.
• Vehicle maintenance requirements.

4-15. AVIATION
The SBCT does not have organic or assigned helicopter support, but the SBCT infantry
company commander must have a good understanding of aviation employment

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capabilities in case the company is supported by these assets. Refer to Chapter 10 for a
detailed discussion of Army aviation support.
a. Reconnaissance. Like their ground-based counterparts, air reconnaissance
operations obtain information by visual observation and other detection methods. They
must have the ability to develop the situation, process the information, and provide it to
the commander in near real time. The company commander, through the battalion, can
take advantage of the supporting aviation element’s AH-64 Apache helicopters to
dramatically improve his 24-hour reconnaissance capability. Under favorable conditions,
they can furnish early information concerning the enemy’s general disposition and
movements to considerable depth beyond the forward line of troops.
b. Security. Aviation assets can extend the company’s security area, providing the
commander with battle-tracking capability. They can expand the company's maneuver
space, provide additional reaction time, and assist in protection of the company.
c. Attack. The primary purpose of attack helicopter operations is the destruction of
enemy ground forces at decisive points in close operations. Helicopters are normally
most effective when used en masse in continuous operations on the enemy’s flanks and
rear. Night operations are preferred.
d. Support by Fire. When assigned a support-by-fire mission, attack helicopters
establish a base of fire or overwatch position. They then can engage enemy targets while
SBCT infantry elements move to or bypass the target area. The helicopters’ role may
range from suppression to complete destruction of the enemy force. Their most common
mission is to fix targets so other friendly elements can maneuver.
e. Attack by Fire. When the enemy situation is vague, as in a movement to contact,
and the attack helicopter battalion commander has been assigned his own sector, the
commander may establish attack-by-fire positions. From these positions the attack
helicopters engage their targets without maneuvering over them. The intent here is to
inflict only a specified level of damage. Attack-by-fire positions are best suited to a fluid
battlefield. The aviation commander often has the best vantage point from which to
synchronize the combat multipliers, clear fires, and prevent fratricide.
f. Air Assault. SBCT forces should always consider the use of air assault to assist
them in overcoming obstacles or restricted terrain during the seizure of critical terrain and
in executing follow and support missions to preserve the momentum of the attack. The
company can participate in an air assault to an objective, and the vehicles can be brought
forward during consolidation and reorganization to resupply and prepare for upcoming
missions. (Refer to FM 90-4 for a detailed discussion of air assault operations.)
g. Communications. All Army helicopters have SINCGARS radios and can
transmit digital information to vehicles equipped to receive such data. While the radio is
the primary means of tactical communications, face-to-face contact remains the best
method of passing information between air and ground elements. Whenever the situation
permits, aviation leaders should land their aircraft, link up with their ground counterparts
(such as the company commander), and directly communicate the battlefield situation as
gathered from the air.
h. Coordination. Aviation scout assets can easily identify enemy targets and then
coordinate with the company FIST to facilitate destruction of the targets with direct and
indirect fires. In addition, identifying friendly positions and planned movements during

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prior coordination between air and ground elements can eliminate a significant number of
factors that contribute to fratricide, a vital concern during combined-arms missions.

4-16. INTEGRATION OF VEHICLES

The ICV is primarily a troop transport vehicle that provides increased mobility and
tactical flexibility. The purpose of the vehicle is not to provide a substantial increase in
firepower for the infantry close fight. However, if the terrain supports wheeled movement
and the weapons systems can range the objective area, the commander can use the
mounted weapons systems to augment the effects of direct and indirect fires. There are
two basic concepts for augmentation fires: complementary and reinforcing.
Complementary fires are fires that are different in nature from the "base" weapon system
but increase the effects of that base system. For example, a commander may implement
complementary fires by utilizing his MGS platoon, with flechette rounds, to increase the
lethality of his dismounted suppression element in an attack. Reinforcing fires are
additional fires that are similar to the base system but that increase the volume and,
subsequently, the lethality of the base weapon system. For example, a commander may
employ his mounted weapons systems from the ICVs to reinforce the dismounted
suppression element in an attack. The following are employment options for the ICV in
the offense:
• Overwatching the movement of infantry.
• Providing long-range suppression fires that can augment a dismounted
support-by-fire position in support of an attack.
• Securing MGSs as they provide direct fire support to the dismounted attack.
• Providing internal and external isolation of an objective.
• Resupplying infantry with Class V (ammunition) and providing casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC) to the urban operations (UO) fight.
• Conducting a mounted assault onto an enemy objective and then dismounting
the infantry directly on the objective (if the antitank [AT] threat is low).

Section IV. ACTIONS ON CONTACT

In both offensive and defensive operations, contact occurs when a member of the SBCT
infantry company encounters any situation that requires an active or passive response to
the enemy. These situations may entail one or more of the following forms of contact:
• Visual contact (friendly elements may or may not be observed by the enemy).
• Physical contact (direct fire) with an enemy force.
• Indirect fire contact.
• Contact with obstacles of enemy or unknown origin.
• Contact with enemy or unknown aircraft.
• Situations involving NBC conditions.
• Situations involving electronic warfare tactics.
• Contact with nonhostile elements, such as civilians.
Leaders at echelons from platoon through battalion conduct actions on contact when they
or a subordinate element recognizes one of the forms of contact or receives a report of
enemy contact. The company may conduct actions on contact in response to a variety of
circumstances, including the following:

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• Subordinate platoon(s) conducting actions on contact.

• Reports from the SBCT battalion or another higher unit.
• Reports from or actions of an adjacent unit.

4-17. DEVELOPING ACTIONS ON CONTACT

SBCT infantry company commanders and platoon leaders analyze the enemy throughout
the troop-leading procedures to identify all likely contact situations that may occur during
an operation. Through the planning and rehearsals conducted during troop-leading
procedures, they develop, modify if necessary, and refine COAs to deal with probable
enemy actions. Planning and rehearsals will, when conducted properly, reduce the
planning to action time. The COAs eventually become the foundation for the company’s
scheme of maneuver. During the troop-leading process, the leaders must evaluate a
number of factors to determine their impact on the unit’s actions on contact. For example,
the commander needs to consider how the likelihood of contact affects his choice of
movement techniques and formations. By doing this, he can begin preparing the company
for actions on contact; for example, he may outline procedures for the transition to more
secure movement techniques before a contact situation.

4-18. TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTIONS ON CONTACT

SBCT infantry commanders must understand that properly executed actions on contact
require time at both platoon and company levels. To develop the situation fully, a platoon
may have to execute extensive lateral movement, dismount and remount infantry squads,
conduct reconnaissance by fire, and call for and adjust indirect fires. Each of these
activities requires time. The commander must balance the time required for subordinate
elements to conduct actions on contact with the need of the company or SBCT battalion
to maintain tempo and momentum. In terms of slowing the tempo of an operation,
however, the loss of a platoon is much more costly than the additional time required to
allow the subordinate element to develop the situation properly.

4-19. THE FOUR STEPS OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT

The company should execute actions on contact using a logical, well-organized process
of decision-making and action entailing these four steps:
• Deploy and report.
• Evaluate and develop the situation.
• Choose a COA.
• Execute the selected COA.
The four-step process is not intended to generate a rigid, lockstep response to the enemy.
Rather, the goal is to provide an orderly framework that enables the company and its
platoons to respond to the initial contact and then to apply sound decision-making and
timely actions to complete the operation. Ideally, the company will acquire the enemy
before being sighted by the enemy; it then can initiate physical contact on its own terms
by executing the designated COA.
a. Step 1, Deploy and Report. Events that occur during the first step of actions on
contact depend in great measure on whether the contact is expected or unexpected.
Regardless of whether contact is expected or unexpected, the first step of actions on
contact concludes with the unit deployed (into base of fire and bounding forces), the

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enemy suppressed or destroyed, and the commander sending a contact report to SBCT
battalion headquarters. The following discussion examines some of the variables the
company commander faces in expected and unexpected contact situations and discusses
the roles of platoon battle drills, SOPs, and reports.
(1) Expected Contact. If the commander expects contact, he will already have
deployed the company by transitioning to the bounding overwatch movement technique.
If the company is alert to the likely presence of the enemy, it has a better chance of
establishing visual contact, and then physical contact, on its own terms before being
detected by the enemy. An overwatching or bounding platoon usually makes visual or
physical contact which initiates the company's actions on contact. In a worst-case
scenario, the platoon may be engaged by a previously undetected (but expected) enemy
element. In this event, the platoon in contact conducts a battle drill for its own survival
and then initiates actions on contact.
(2) Unexpected Contact. In some cases, the company may make unexpected contact
with the enemy while using traveling or traveling overwatch. The element in contact or, if
necessary, the entire company may have to deploy using battle drills to survive the initial
contact.
(3) Battle Drills. Battle drills provide virtually automatic responses to contact
situations in which immediate, and in many cases violent, execution of an action is
critical both to the unit’s initial survival and to its ultimate success in combat. Drills are
not a substitute for carefully planned COAs; rather, they buy time for the unit in contact
and provide a framework for development of the situation. When contact occurs, the
company’s platoons deploy immediately, executing the appropriate battle drills under the
direction of the commander. (For additional information on dismounted platoon battle
drills, refer to FM 3-21.9 [FM7-5].)
(4) Maneuver Standing Operating Procedures. An effectively written, well-
rehearsed maneuver SOP helps to ensure quick, predictable actions by all members of the
company. The SOP, unlike platoon battle drills, allows leaders to take into account the
friendly task organization, a specific enemy, and a specific type of terrain. Therefore, the
SOP can assist the company in conducting actions on contact and maintaining the
initiative in a number of battlefield situations.
(5) Reports. Timely, accurate, and complete reports are essential throughout actions
on contact. As part of the first step of the process, the company commander must send a
contact report to the SBCT battalion as soon as possible after contact occurs. He provides
subsequent reports to update the situation as necessary.
b. Step 2, Evaluate and Develop the Situation. While the company deploys, the
commander must evaluate the situation and, as necessary, continue to maneuver to
develop it.
(1) The commander quickly gathers as much information as possible, either visually
or, more often, through FBCB2 reports from the platoon(s) in contact. He analyzes the
information to determine critical operational considerations, including these:
• Size of the enemy element.
• Location, composition, activity, orientation, and capabilities of the enemy force.
• Effects of obstacles and terrain.
• Probable enemy intentions.
• How to gain positional advantage over the enemy.

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• Friendly situation (location, strength, and capabilities).

• Possible friendly COAs to achieve the specified end state.
(2) After evaluating the situation, the commander may discover that he does not have
enough information to identify the necessary operational considerations. To make this
determination, he must further develop the situation in accordance with the SBCT
battalion commander’s intent, using a combination of these techniques:
• Dismounted squads conducting surveillance (using binoculars and other
optical aids).
• Mounted maneuver, dismounted maneuver, or both (this includes lateral
maneuver to gain additional information by viewing the enemy from another
perspective).
• Indirect fire.
• Reconnaissance by fire.
(3) Once the commander has determined the size of the enemy force the company has
encountered, he sends a report to the SBCT battalion.
c. Step 3, Choose a COA. After developing the situation and determining that he
has enough information to make a decision, the company commander selects a COA that
meets the requirements of the SBCT battalion commander’s intent and is within the
company’s capabilities.
(1) Nature of Contact. The nature of the contact (expected or unexpected) may have
a significant impact on how long it takes a commander to develop and select a COA. As
an example, in preparing to conduct an attack the company commander determines that
the company will encounter an enemy security observation post along its axis of advance.
During troop-leading procedures, he develops a scheme of maneuver to defeat the
outpost. When the company’s lead platoon makes contact with the enemy, the
commander can quickly assess that this is the anticipated contact and direct the company
to execute his plan. On the other hand, unexpected contact with a well-concealed enemy
force may require time for development of the situation at platoon level. As it "fights" for
critical information that will eventually allow the commander to make a sound decision,
the company may have to employ several of the techniques for developing the situation.
(2) COA Procedures. The company commander has several options in how he goes
about the process of selecting a COA.
(a) If his development of the situation reveals no need for change, the company
commander directs the company to execute the original plan.
(b) If his analysis shows that the original plan is still valid but that some refinement is
necessary, the company commander informs the SBCT battalion commander (prior to
execution, if possible) and issues a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to refine the plan.
(c) If his analysis shows that the original plan needs to be changed but that the
selected COA will still comply with the SBCT battalion commander’s intent, the
company commander informs the battalion commander (prior to execution, if possible)
and issues a FRAGO to re-task his subordinate elements.
(d) If his analysis shows that the original plan deviates from the SBCT battalion
commander’s intent and needs to be changed, the company commander must report the
situation and, based on known information in response to an unforeseen enemy or
battlefield situation, recommend an alternative COA to the SBCT battalion commander.

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(e) If the battlefield picture is still vague, the company commander must direct the
company or a platoon to continue to develop the situation. This will allow him to gather
the information needed to clarify a vague battlefield picture. He then uses one of the first
four options to report the situation, choose a COA, and direct further action.
d. Step 4, Execute the Selected COA. In executing a COA, the company transitions
to maneuver. It then continues to maneuver throughout execution, either as part of a
tactical task or as an advance while in contact, to reach the point on the battlefield from
which it executes its tactical task. The company can employ a number of tactical tasks as
COAs, any of which may be preceded and followed by additional maneuver. As
execution continues, more information becomes available to the company commander.
Based on the emerging details of the enemy situation, he may have to alter his COA
during execution.

EXAMPLE: As the company maneuvers to destroy what appears to be a

dismounted infantry platoon, it discovers two additional enemy platoons in
prepared positions. The commander must analyze and develop the new
situation. He then selects an alternate COA, such as establishing a support-
by-fire position to support another company’s maneuver against the newly
discovered enemy force.

Section V. COMPANY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The company normally conducts offensive operations--attack, movement to contact,
exploitation, and pursuit--as part of an SBCT battalion or larger element. (The company
also may conduct these operations independently.) Movement to contact will be
discussed in Section VI. This section examines the various roles the company may play
in these operations and the tactics for conducting--
• Force-oriented attacks against a stationary enemy force.
• Force-oriented attacks against a moving enemy force.
• Terrain-oriented attacks.

4-20. ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS

An attack is a type of offensive operation characterized by movement supported by fire.
The purpose of an attack is to defeat an enemy force or to seize terrain. The company can
attack independently or as part of an SBCT battalion or larger element. The two basic
types of attack are the hasty attack and the deliberate attack (see paragraph 4-21). Figure
4-5, page 4-18, illustrates the situations under which a company conducts an attack,
compares them to the amount of planning and preparation time required, and provides
options for the commander to accomplish his purpose and support the higher
commander's intent. All attacks, whether hasty or deliberate, depend on synchronization
for success. They require planning, coordination via digital or analog means, and time to
prepare.
a. The company commanders translate the mission assigned by the SBCT battalion,
through analyzing the task and purpose, into specific missions for subordinate platoons
and squads. To facilitate parallel planning, they immediately forward these missions
digitally, along with the appropriate portions of the battalion's plans and orders, to
subordinate platoons and squads. Commanders and platoon leaders must work together to

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develop the best plans; this requires sharing information freely between the command
posts. The goal is not simply to reduce the time required to produce and distribute the
plans, but, more importantly, to produce a better plan by including input from adjacent,
higher, and lower elements. Additionally, this collaboration promotes understanding of
the plan, thereby enhancing preparation and execution.
b. The information systems available to the SBCT infantry rifle company facilitate
detailed planning. By properly leveraging digital systems and sensors, SBCT infantry
company commanders can obtain near-real-time knowledge of enemy composition,
locations, activity, and probable intentions. Thus, modern technology improves the
company commander's ability to develop his COA and plan his actions against an enemy
force from either stationary or moving C2 platforms.
c. As the company plans, the enemy also has time to improve his defenses,
disengage, or conduct spoiling attacks of his own. Clearly, planning must be
accomplished in the shortest time possible and must accommodate the changes driven by
what the enemy does.

Attack
Situations Force-Oriented Force-Oriented Terrain-Oriented
Planning Moving Enemy Stationary Enemy
Time Attack Options
• Hasty attack to • Hasty attack to • Hasty attack to
(destroy, disrupt, (destroy, disrupt, (seize, clear, secure)
block) block) • Counterattack
Less Time • Counterattack • Counterattack
• Spoiling attack • Feint
• Ambush • Demonstration
• Deliberate • Deliberate attack • Deliberate attack to
attack to (destroy, to (destroy) (seize, clear, secure)
disrupt, block) • Raid • Counterattack
• Counterattack • Counterattack
More Time • Spoiling attack • Feint
• Ambush • Demonstration
• Feint
• Demonstration

Figure 4-5. Spectrum of attacks.

4-21. HASTY AND DELIBERATE ATTACKS

Although having different forms based on their purposes, there is no clear distinction
between deliberate and hasty attacks. The primary difference between the two is the
extent of planning and preparation conducted by the attacking force. Attacks range along
a continuum defined at one end by FRAGOs, which direct the rapid execution of battle
drills by forces immediately available. These attacks rely on an implicit understanding
and electronic communication with detailed orders and appropriate branches and sequels
that make understanding explicit. Information on the general enemy situation comes from

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a movement to contact, and the company launches a hasty attack as a continuation of the
meeting engagement. The hasty attack capitalizes on a temporary advantage in relative
combat power and may preempt enemy actions. At the other end of the continuum, the
company moves into a deliberate attack from a reserve position or assembly area with
detailed knowledge of the enemy, a task organization designed specifically for the attack,
and a fully rehearsed plan. Most attacks fall somewhere between these two ends of the
continuum.
a. Hasty Attack. The commander may conduct a hasty attack during movement to
contact, as part of a defense, or whenever he determines that the enemy is in a vulnerable
position and can be quickly defeated by immediate offensive action. A hasty attack is
used to--
• Exploit a tactical opportunity.
• Maintain the momentum.
• Regain the initiative.
• Prevent the enemy from regaining organization or balance.
• Gain a favorable position that may be lost with time.
Because its primary purpose is to maintain momentum or take advantage of the enemy
situation, the hasty attack is normally conducted with only the resources that are
immediately available. Maintaining unrelenting pressure through hasty attacks keeps the
enemy off balance and makes it difficult for him to react effectively. Rapidly attacking
before the enemy can act often results in success even when the combat power ratio is not
as favorable as desired. With its emphasis on agility and surprise, however, this type of
attack may cause the attacking force to lose a degree of synchronization. To minimize
this risk, the commander should maximize use of standard formations; well-rehearsed,
thoroughly understood battle drills and SOPs; and digital tools that facilitate rapid
planning and preparation. By assigning on-order and be-prepared missions to subordinate
companies as the situation warrants, the company is better able to transition into hasty
attacks. The hasty attack is often the preferred option during continuous operations. It
allows the commander to maintain the momentum of friendly operations while denying
the enemy the time needed to prepare his defenses and to recover from losses suffered
during previous action. Hasty attacks normally result from a movement to contact,
successful defense, or continuation of a previous attack.
(1) Task Organization. The hasty attack is conducted using the principles of fire and
movement. The controlling headquarters normally designates a base of fire force and a
maneuver force.
(2) Conduct of the Hasty Attack. The company must first conduct actions on contact,
allowing the commander to gather the information he needs to make an informed
decision. The term "hasty" refers to limits on planning and preparation time, not to any
acceleration in the conduct of actions on contact. Because the intelligence picture is
vague, the commander normally needs more time, rather than less, during this process to
gain adequate information about the enemy force.
(a) Execution begins with establishment of a base of fire, which then suppresses the
enemy force. The maneuver force uses a combination of techniques to maintain its
security as it advances in contact to a position of advantage. These techniques include,
but are not limited to, the following:

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• Use of internal base of fire and bounding elements.

• Use of covered and concealed routes.
• Use of indirect fires to suppress or obscure the enemy or to screen friendly
movement.
• Execution of bold maneuver that initially takes the maneuver force out of
enemy direct fire range.
(b) Once the maneuver force has gained the positional advantage, it can execute a
tactical task, such as assault, to destroy the remaining enemy.
b. Deliberate Attack. The SBCT infantry rifle company conducts a deliberate attack
only when the enemy’s strength prevents it from conducting a hasty attack. It normally
conducts a deliberate attack against a strong enemy defense. As the company prepares for
the attack, the enemy also continues to strengthen his position. Deliberate attacks follow
a distinct period of preparation, which is used for extensive reconnaissance and
intelligence collection, detailed planning, task organization of forces, preparation of
troops and equipment, coordination, rehearsals, and plan refinement. The deliberate
attack is a fully synchronized operation that employs every available asset against the
enemy defense. It is characterized by a high volume of planned fires, use of major
supporting attacks, forward positioning of resources needed to maintain momentum, and
operations throughout the depth of enemy positions. Thorough preparation allows the
attacking force to stage a combined arms and fully integrated attack. Likewise, however,
the enemy will have more time to prepare his defensive positions and integrate fires and
obstacles. The factors of METT-TC dictate how thoroughly these activities are
accomplished. The commander normally conducts a deliberate attack when enemy
positions are too strong to overcome by a hasty attack. In weighing his decision to take
the time required to prepare for and conduct the deliberate attack, he must consider the
advantages that may be gained by both friendly and enemy forces.
(1) Task Organization. The SBCT company commander normally task-organizes the
company into support and assault forces for conduct of a deliberate attack. He also
designates a breach force if the company must conduct a breach as part of the attack.
Specific duties of these elements are covered in the discussion of a company-level assault
of a strongpoint and tactical tasks (paragraph 4-35).
(2) Conduct of the Deliberate Attack. The SBCT infantry company's deliberate
attack normally is broken into the following steps:
(a) Attack in Zone. The attacking SBCT company advances to within assault distance
of the enemy position under supporting fires and using any combination of movement
techniques. Platoons advance to successive positions using available cover and
concealment. The company commander may designate support by fire positions to
protect friendly forces with suppressive direct fires. As the company maneuvers in zone,
it employs lethal and nonlethal fires to suppress and obscure enemy positions.
(b) Actions at the Probable Line of Deployment (PLD). The PLD is normally a phase
line or checkpoint where elements of the attacking company transition to secure
movement techniques in preparation for contact with the enemy. Platoons may maneuver
from the PLD to designated support-by-fire positions, assault positions, or breach or
bypass sites. The PLD may be collocated with the assault position.
(c) Actions on the Objective. The final assault combines the effects of overwhelming
combat power and suppressive fires with the use of maneuver to gain positional

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advantage over the defending enemy. Suppressive fires from support forces and from
supporting indirect fire assets isolate the objective area and suppress the enemy. These
fires protect the assault force as it closes with the enemy. Other measures the SBCT
infantry company may use to set the conditions for the final assault include, but are not
limited to, the following:
• MGS platoon employment.
• Employment of mortar, artillery, direct fires, or a combination of these, from
support-by-fire positions to destroy enemy forces on the objective or to isolate
enemy forces on the objective and create favorable force ratios.
• Use of obscuring smoke.
Once the conditions are set, the assault forces maneuver to close with and destroy the
enemy. Other SBCT infantry company elements continue to provide support as necessary
throughout the assault.

4-22. ATTACKS DURING LIMITED VISIBILITY

Effective use of digitized and own the night (OTN) equipment during limited visibility
attacks enhances squad and platoon ability to achieve surprise and causes panic in a
lesser-equipped enemy. OTN enhancements allow the infantry soldier to see farther and
with greater clarity. The OTN enhancements and increased friendly and enemy
information afford a marked advantage over the enemy. (Refer to paragraph 4-36 for a
detailed discussion of limited visibility attacks.)

Section VI. OTHER OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The SBCT infantry rifle company normally conducts other offensive operations--
movement to contact, exploitation, and pursuit--as part of an SBCT infantry battalion or
larger element.

4-23. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The purpose of movement to contact is to gain or regain contact with the enemy. It is
most appropriate when the enemy situation is vague and there is not time to reconnoiter
extensively to locate the enemy. Because of the increased amount of intelligence
available through the RSTA assets, US forces execute movement to contact less
frequently than in the past. Movement to contact ends when contact is made. (Contact
results in initiation of another operation such as attack against a stationary or moving
enemy force, defense, delay, or withdrawal.) The SBCT infantry rifle company normally
conducts movement to contact as part of an SBCT battalion or larger element. Based on
the factors of METT-TC, however, it can conduct the operation independently. As an
example, the company may conduct movement to contact prior to occupation of a screen
line. Because the enemy situation is not clear, the company moves in a way that provides
security and supports a rapid buildup of combat power against enemy units once they are
identified. Two techniques for conducting a movement to contact are the search-and-
attack technique and the approach-march technique. If no contact occurs, the company
may be directed to conduct consolidation on the objective. The following paragraphs
examine the role of the company in a battalion-level movement to contact.
a. Fundamentals. The SBCT infantry rifle company commander analyzes the
situation and selects the proper tactics to conduct the mission. He reports all information

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rapidly and accurately and strives to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. He
retains freedom of maneuver by moving the company in a manner that--
• Makes enemy contact with the smallest element possible (ideally, a
reconnaissance and surveillance [R&S] element).
• Rapidly develops combat power upon enemy contact.
• Provides all-round security for the unit.
• Supports the battalion concept.

4-24. THE SEARCH-AND-ATTACK TECHNIQUE

This decentralized technique uses multiple, coordinated, small-unit (team, squad, or
platoon) actions to find the enemy. If the company makes contact without being detected
by the enemy, the commander gains the initiative. He then has the option to destroy the
enemy with the immediately available combat potential, to maneuver the remainder of
the company to destroy the enemy, or to follow the enemy back to his base camp and
destroy him there. During his planning, the SBCT infantry commander decides how to
find the enemy, how to fix or follow him, and then how to finish him.
a. Concept Development. Initially, the decisive points are identified as the most
likely enemy locations. Once the enemy has been located, the specific decisive point
must be determined as in any attack, and a concept must be developed for generating
overwhelming combat power there. The initial concept must include the actions to finish
the enemy force once they are located. At times, this part of the plan may be very general
or consist only of control measures and be-prepared missions to provide flexibility and to
support the rapid issuance of FRAGOs.
(1) The commander must understand the battalion commander's concept and what
freedom of action the company has to engage the enemy. At times, the company must
engage and destroy all enemy forces within their capabilities. In other cases, the company
must locate, follow, and report small enemy units to allow the battalion to concentrate
and destroy these forces.
(2) The commander focuses the platoons and squads on the likely enemy locations.
He assigns missions IAW the battalion commander's concept. Possible operations include
a zone or area reconnaissance, an ambush, or surveillance. The small-unit leaders must
know what actions to take when they locate the enemy either with or without being
detected. The platoon most likely to make contact normally is designated the main effort.
b. Considerations. The commander determines the number and size of the units that
will conduct reconnaissance and combat actions against the enemy. The size of the area,
the duration of the mission, the soldier's load, and the probable size of the enemy force
are key to this decision.
(1) The size of the area of operations is considered in relation to how much time is
available to search the area. When allocating terrain, the commander must consider how
the platoons will conduct the reconnaissance, how to provide security, and how to
provide control.
(a) One technique is to assign small AOs that keep the platoons more concentrated
and help maintain control. The platoons move into the next AO on order.
(b) Another technique is to divide the company area into zones. The commander
concentrates most of the company in one zone and uses fire team or squad patrols to
reconnoiter the next zone or the rest of the area. Once the company (-) has completed the

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reconnaissance in the initial zone, it moves into the area the small units have
reconnoitered. This technique is effective when a detailed reconnaissance is required, but
it also supports the seizure of the initiative through speed, stealth, and surprise. The
small, dispersed units have a better chance of locating the enemy undetected. They also
provide initial reconnaissance information on which the commander focuses the
remainder of the company's reconnaissance efforts.
(2) The commander must consider how the duration of the mission affects the
company's ability to conduct contingency operations. If the mission will continue for
days or longer, the commander must develop a concept that allows his subordinates to
maintain combat effectiveness. The concept must address the use of patrol bases and
limited visibility operations. The commander must ensure that the concept provides
sufficient rest to maintain his soldiers' stealth, alertness, and security.
(3) The duration of the mission also affects the soldier's load, which has a tremendous
impact on a search-and-attack mission. The longer the mission is expected to last, the
heavier the soldiers' loads may need to be to reduce the need for resupply. The ability to
move with stealth and security while close to the enemy is hindered by heavy loads, but
resupply operations also may hinder the company's operation and allow the enemy to
locate the unit by following or observing the resupply vehicles.
(a) The company commander must determine what the essential requirements are for
the soldiers' loads. If this results in excessive loads, he plans for resupply operations that
avoid enemy detection and maintain the security of the company.
(b) The company commander may combine techniques to reduce the risk of moving
with these heavy loads. He identifies objective rally points (ORPs) or company patrol
bases throughout the AO, and the company moves between these ORPs using the
approach-march technique to provide greater control and security. After securing and
occupying the ORP, the platoons leave their rucksacks and move out to conduct
decentralized search-and-attack operations. A security force secures the ORP until the
units return to get their rucksacks and move to the next ORP. Platoons can use this same
technique when the risk is acceptable.
(4) Knowing the size of the enemy units with which the company is likely to make
contact assists the company commander in determining the risk to the company. The
company commander also must consider the enemy's capabilities, likely COAs, and
specific weapons capabilities to understand the threat and ensure the security of his
company, even when conducting decentralized operations. The company commander
may direct specific force protection restraints such as "no patrols smaller than a squad,"
"platoons must be able to consolidate within 20 minutes," or "platoons will depart their
patrol bases NLT 60 minutes prior to BMNT."
c. Find the Enemy. During this step, the focus is on reconnaissance to locate the
enemy. Generally, small units able to move quickly and with stealth are more likely to
locate the enemy without detection. The company commander's concept may restrict the
platoon's authority to destroy the enemy once located. It may be more important to locate
and follow enemy units to identify their base camps. When not restricted, however, the
unit making contact takes immediate action to destroy the enemy. If it is not within this
unit's capabilities, the platoon conducts linkups to mass sufficient combat potential and to
coordinate the attack.

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(1) Platoons normally do not receive a mission with the vague requirement to search
and attack. The company commander must be more specific in stating his concept. His
concept must also address the likely actions to destroy the enemy once they are located.
Specific taskings may include route, area, and zone reconnaissance or surveillance tasks.
Platoons also may be tasked to conduct ambushes, to be prepared to conduct an attack to
destroy enemy forces, to provide security for another force such as the CP or the mortar
section, or to act as the company reserve.
(2) During limited visibility, reconnaissance is more difficult and potentially more
dangerous. If a unit makes contact with the enemy in the dark, a hasty attack is very
risky. Reconnaissance is also less effective in the dark because the unit covers less area
and is unable to detect many signs of enemy activity. Although observation is reduced
during limited visibility, the unit may be more likely to detect the enemy by sight or
smell. Route and small-area reconnaissance tasks are more effective for limited visibility.
(3) Ambushes are effective during limited visibility. The enemy may avoid daylight
movements if aware of the company's presence in the AO. Ambushes should be set up on
the enemy's likely routes or near their water and food sources. Patrol bases should
integrate ambushes and observation posts (OPs) (with thermal sights, NVDs, and platoon
early warning systems [PEWS]) into their security plans. These tasks support the seizure
and maintenance of the initiative.
d. Fix and Finish the Enemy. These steps of a search and attack are closely related.
An initial attempt to finish the enemy by the platoon in contact may quickly become the
fixing effort for the company's attack if the enemy is too strong for the platoon or the
platoon is unable to achieve surprise. When the authority to conduct offensive actions to
destroy the enemy has been decentralized to the lowest level, the fundamentals of an
attack apply at every echelon.
(1) Achieve Surprise. Locate the enemy without being detected. This allows more
time to plan and coordinate the attack. Once detected, speed and violence in the assault
may also achieve surprise, but this is rarely true against a prepared enemy defense.
(2) Limit the Enemy's Freedom of Action. Fix the enemy in position. Block his
routes of escape with indirect fires, maneuver forces, or both. Suppress his weapons
systems, obscure his vision, and disrupt his command and control. Reconnaissance is
continuous; leaders at every echelon seek out the enemy's dispositions, strengths, and
weaknesses. Initially, these actions are directed toward supporting an attack by the lowest
echelon. At some point, the leader of this unit must determine if he is able to achieve fire
superiority and conduct the assault. If he determines he does not have sufficient combat
power to complete the destruction of the enemy, the leader focuses on fixing the enemy
and reconnoitering to support the attack by the next higher echelon.
(3) Maintain Security. While attempting to take these actions against the enemy, the
enemy is attempting to do the same. Do not assume the enemy that has been identified is
alone; there may be mutually supporting positions or units. The planned envelopment or
flank attack of one enemy position may move through the kill zone of another unit, or
this maneuver may expose the flank of the assault force to fires from undetected
positions.
(4) Concentrate Combat Power. Once contact is made, the plan must support the
rapid concentration of combat power to fix and destroy (finish) the enemy. Leaders at

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each echelon plan to destroy the enemy within their capabilities. The combat potential of
small units may be increased by ensuring each has the ability to request fire support.
(a) The company commander may retain a portion of the company in reserve to react
quickly to enemy contact by one of the small units. However, when the company is
operating in a more dispersed manner, this company reserve may not be responsive
enough. It may be more effective for each platoon to retain its own reserve.
(b) If the unit or platoon cannot finish the enemy, the company commander
determines how to fix or contain the enemy while concentrating his dispersed combat
potential. He then develops an attack plan to destroy the enemy force. He may use the
fixing force to support by fire and assault with another platoon(s), or he may use artillery
and CAS to destroy him in position.
(c) Each leader must report the results of his reconnaissance to support the company
commander's planning. Leaders recommend effective support positions, good assault
positions or directions of attack, and likely enemy weak points. The leader of the unit in
contact should also identify good linkup points in case the preplanned points are not
effective. In most cases, this leader should coordinate face to face with the company
commander or the leader of the assault element before initiating the assault.
e. Follow the Enemy. When the purpose of the operation is to locate the enemy's
base camps or other fixed sites, the company concept must avoid nondecisive fights
between small units. When friendly units locate small enemy units, they report and
attempt to follow or track these units back to their base camps. Well-trained trackers
familiar with the area may be able to identify and follow enemy tracks that are hours or
even days old (FM 7-8). The company commander must ensure that his concept does not
risk the security of his force in the attempt to make undetected contact and track enemy
units. Units tracking the enemy must be ready to react to enemy contact and avoid likely
ambush situations. It also may be possible to track the enemy's movement through the
AO by using stationary OPs as trail watchers to report enemy activity.
f. Enter the Area of Operations. The company commander decides how the
company will enter its zone or area of operations, how to move once in the area, where to
locate certain units or facilities, and what the requirements for contingency plans are.
This includes establishing the proper graphic control measures to control the movement
of the units, to provide for linkups between units, and to support the rapid concentration
of the company's combat power. It also includes synchronizing the actions of the
company and providing specific tasks or restraints to ensure subordinates understand
what actions to take once they make contact with the enemy. The company may enter the
area or zone by moving as a company and then splitting up (Figure 4-6, page 4-26), by
infiltrating squads and platoons (Figure 4-7, page 4-26), or by air assault.

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Figure 4-6. Infiltration by company.

Figure 4-7. Infiltration by squad/platoon.

(1) Movement within the area or through the zone of attack may be conducted by the
entire company or by individual platoons. Figure 4-8 shows a concept sketch for a search
and attack conducted without a company linkup.

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Figure 4-8. Company search-and-attack concept sketch.

(2) The SBCT infantry rifle company commander must decide where the company
CP will locate. He may collocate it with the main effort platoon or position it in a central
location where it can communicate with and move quickly to each platoon's location. A
technique to support contingency operations (CONOPS) is to rotate a reserve platoon
each day to provide security for the CP and the company mortars. To prevent a serious
degradation in effectiveness due to sleep loss, each platoon spends only 48 hours actively
searching for the enemy and then rotates into the reserve role.
(3) Company mortars must locate where they have security and can support the
platoons. The company commander may collocate the mortars with the company CP. To
overcome the difficulties of moving mortar ammunition, the company commander may
direct the reserve platoon to carry the ammunition to the next firing position. Another
option is to establish company ORPs or patrol bases and place the mortars at these
locations. The entire company can then carry the mortar ammunition; the soldiers drop
off the rounds before moving out to the platoon areas. However, the entire company must
return to this location before continuing the operation through the zone.
(4) The soldier's load and the threat of enemy armor are two primary considerations
for employing the antiarmor assets. If there is an armored threat, the company
commander must provide guidance to platoon leaders on where to position the antiarmor
assets. If the threat does not require antiarmor weapons, the platoons may still use some
thermal sights for observation.
(5) Contingency plans may include actions in case one platoon becomes decisively
engaged or the company receives a new mission. All units should routinely report

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possible landing zone/pick-up zone (LZ/PZ) locations, mortar firing positions, any sign
of recent enemy activity, and any sightings of civilians in the area.

4-25. THE APPROACH-MARCH TECHNIQUE

The SBCT infantry rifle company normally uses this technique when it conducts a
movement to contact as part of the battalion. The company can act as the advance guard,
move as part of the battalion main body, or provide flank or rear guards for the battalion,
depending on its location in the formation and its assigned mission.
a. Planning. When planning for an approach-march movement to contact, the
company commander needs certain information from the battalion commander. With this
information, the company commander develops his scheme of maneuver and fire support
plan. He provides this same information to the platoon leaders. As a minimum, he needs
to know--
• The company's mission.
• The friendly and enemy situations.
• The route (axis of advance) and the desired rate of movement.
• The control measures to be used.
• The company's actions on contact.
• The fire support plan.
• The company's actions upon reaching the march objective, if one is used.
b. Lead Company Responsibilities. The SBCT battalion may conduct a movement
to contact on a single axis or on multiple axes. The lead company on an axis is
responsible for--
• Protecting the battalion from a surprise attack by providing early warning of
enemy positions and obstacles.
• Assisting the forward movement of the battalion by removing obstacles or
finding routes around them.
• Destroying enemy forces (within its capability).
• Rapidly developing the situation once contact is made.
c. Lead Company Movement. The lead company or advance guard on an axis
moves using traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch, depending on the situation. It
normally is assigned an axis of advance or a zone of action and a march objective on
which to orient its movement. Phase lines and checkpoints also can help control
movement.
(1) The company commander selects the movement technique and formation based
on the likelihood of enemy contact and the speed of movement desired by the battalion
commander. Bounding overwatch provides the best security, but traveling overwatch is
faster. If the company uses traveling overwatch, the lead platoon may use bounding
overwatch for added security.
(2) The company commander must retain the freedom to maneuver his platoons and
weapons. He analyzes the terrain, anticipates where he might make contact, and plans
fires on those locations. He should avoid terrain that restricts maneuver, such as draws,
ravines, narrow trails, and steep slopes.
d. Other Companies. A company not in the lead uses traveling or traveling
overwatch. It must be ready to fire or maneuver in support of the lead company, or to
assume the lead company's mission.

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e. Contact. Once the company makes contact with the enemy, the company
commander maintains that contact until ordered to do otherwise by the battalion
commander. The following actions must take place at once:
(1) When there is an unexpected contact, the platoon in contact returns fire at once
and takes cover. If the enemy is unaware, the platoon making contact reports and deploys
to prevent detection. The maneuver to a position of advantage by this platoon (or other
units) should maintain the element of surprise until the company completes preparation
for the hasty attack. If detected, or once the company commander decides to initiate the
hasty attack, the platoon leader attempts to fight through, destroying the enemy with the
resources that are immediately available. His FIST should begin calling for fire. The
platoon leader then reports to the company commander and develops the situation. The
overwatch element immediately fires at the enemy position. Trail platoons that are not
able to fire take cover and wait for orders.
(2) The squad or platoon that initially received direct fire immediately executes the
attack drill (FM 3-21.9 [FM7-5]). The intent is to use aggressive small-unit actions to
seize the initiative rapidly and at the lowest echelon possible. The unit in contact attempts
to achieve fire superiority to fix or suppress the enemy with the resources that are
immediately available. The unit then executes a flank attack directed against an identified
enemy weakness. If this is not possible, the unit develops the situation to identify the
enemy's flanks, any covered and concealed routes around the enemy position, possible
supporting positions (both friendly and enemy), and any protective obstacles that the
enemy has constructed. It then reports this information to the company commander.
(3) Upon receipt of this information, the company commander determines the proper
action to take. The XO reports the situation to battalion. The company commander may
conduct, or direct his units to conduct, additional reconnaissance. The company FSO
requests and coordinates indirect fires to support the company's maneuver. Possible
actions include the following.
(a) Conduct a Hasty Attack. If the company commander feels he can defeat the
enemy force and an attack supports the battalion commander's concept, he conducts a
hasty attack immediately, before the enemy can react.
(b) Bypass the Enemy. The company commander, with battalion permission, may
bypass an enemy force. He may bypass the enemy with one platoon at a time or with the
entire company at once (Figure 4-9, page 4-30).

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Figure 4-9. Bypass.

(c) Fix or Suppress the Enemy. When the enemy cannot be bypassed and a hasty
attack by the company would be too costly, the battalion normally directs the company to
fix or suppress the enemy (Figure 4-10). This ensures that the enemy does not have the
freedom to fire or maneuver against the main body of the battalion while the battalion
moves to attack the enemy. The company commander supports the battalion
commander's planning by reconnoitering to identify the enemy's disposition, strengths,
and weaknesses. The company identifies covered and concealed routes, good support
positions, and enemy obstacles and reports these to battalion.

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Figure 4-10. Fix or suppress.

(d) Establish a Hasty Defense. Although this action tends to give the initiative to the
enemy force, it might provide a needed advantage. This might be required in a meeting
engagement with a superior force. The company may establish a hasty defense to protect
itself while the remainder of the battalion maneuvers against the enemy.
(e) Disengage. This action is not preferred unless disengaging is the only way to
ensure preservation of the force. Use of indirect fires and bounding and overwatch
elements is essential in disengaging from a superior force. The company may disengage
while another unit maintains contact, or the company may disengage by moving back
through the battalion to draw the enemy into an ambush.

4-26. CONSIDERATIONS
The battalion may direct the company's technique (search-and-attack or approach-march).
If not, the SBCT infantry rifle company commander considers his mission and the
battalion concept as he conducts his estimate to select the best technique. Normally, when
operating as part of a battalion movement to contact, the company employs the same
technique as the battalion. The commander must consider the mounted capabilities of his
company during both techniques. The following considerations may also assist the
commander in developing his concept.

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a. Time Available. The time available for planning, coordinating, and rehearsing
may affect the decision. The approach-march technique generally requires much less time
for preparation. The company may require only a brief FRAGO assigning the movement
formation or technique and some simple graphic control measures to begin movement.
The search-and-attack technique may require more preparation time because the platoons
and squads have more planning responsibilities (such as patrol base, linkups, and casualty
evacuations).
b. Speed of Movement. The speed the company must move is a major factor. With
either technique, the faster the company moves, the less effective its R&S efforts are.
Thus, it becomes more likely that the enemy will initiate fires at the time and place he
selects. The approach-march technique is normally more effective for quickly reacting to
enemy contacts.
c. Enemy. The company commander considers the clarity of the enemy situation. If
the enemy situation is vague then a movement to contact is required; however the SBCT
company commander should have some information via analog activities or digital
information. Knowing where the enemy will probably locate and in what strength is key
to developing a concept. The company commander considers the enemy's probable
locations and strength when planning the company's movement and security needs, and
he analyzes the risks for each technique. The company commander also considers the
expected enemy action upon contact. If he expects the enemy to fight, then the approach
march may be the more effective technique. If the enemy will attempt to avoid detection
or quickly disengage, the search-and-attack technique may be the better method.
d. Security. Preparation time, required movement speed, and the enemy situation
have a direct impact on the company's security requirements. The company commander
also considers the terrain, the adjacent units, the available combat support, and the
present status of his unit to determine how to provide security for his company.
Successful movements to contact depend on locating the enemy without being detected.
This provides the company commander the initiative to develop the situation by fully
coordinating and supporting the attack with all available resources.
e. Combined Technique. An effective option may be to combine the techniques by
having the lead platoon use the search-and-attack technique while the rest of the unit uses
the approach-march technique. The lead platoon is assigned reconnaissance missions to
find the enemy. In the example illustrated in Figure 4-11, the company commander
assigns route reconnaissance tasks to the 2d Platoon. He assigns checkpoints and named
areas of interest (NAIs) to focus the subordinate elements on specific locations. He can
also use phase lines (PLs) to control the lead platoon by directing that PLs be crossed on
order. The company main body follows the reconnaissance at a distance that allows it to
rapidly maneuver based on reports from the lead platoon. The formation and movement
techniques for the main body vary but generally apply the fundamentals for the approach-
march technique.

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Figure 4-11. Combined techniques.

4-27. EXPLOITATION
A company normally takes part in exploitations as part of a larger force; however, the
company should exploit tactical success at the local level within the higher commanders'
concept of the operation.

4-28. PURSUIT
The objective of the pursuit phase of an operation is the total destruction of the enemy
force. The SBCT infantry rifle company may take part in a pursuit as part of a larger
force or, because of its organic transportation, may act as the pursuit force that can close
with and destroy the remnants of the enemy force.

Section VII. SPECIAL PURPOSE ATTACKS

The company conducts a special purpose attack at the direction of the battalion
commander. The commander bases his decision on the factors of METT-TC. Special
purpose attacks are subordinate forms of an attack and they include--
• Ambush.
• Raid.
• Counterattack.

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• Spoiling attack.
• Feint.
• Demonstration

As forms of the attack, they share many of the same planning, preparation, and execution
considerations of the offense. Feints and demonstrations are also associated with military
deception operations.

4-29. AMBUSH
An ambush is a surprise attack, from concealed positions, on a moving or temporarily
halted enemy. It may take the form of an assault to close with and destroy the enemy, or
it may be an attack by fire only, executed from concealed positions. An ambush does not
require that ground be seized or held. Infantry forces normally conduct ambushes. (For a
more detailed discussion of ambushes, refer to FM 7-10.)
a. Purposes. Ambushes are generally executed to reduce the enemy force’s overall
combat effectiveness. Destruction is the primary reason for conducting an ambush. Other
reasons to conduct ambushes are to harass the enemy, capture the enemy, and destroy or
capture enemy equipment and supplies.
b. Operational Considerations. The execution of an ambush is offensive in nature.
The company, however, may be directed to conduct an ambush in a wide variety of
situations. For example, it may stage the ambush during offensive or defensive
operations, as part of SBCT battalion rear area operations, or during retrograde
operations. The commander must consider the capabilities of his company in the mounted
and dismounted role. Operational security is critical to the success of an ambush and is a
major reason the operation normally is conducted only by infantry forces. The company
must take all necessary precautions to ensure that it is not detected during movement to
or preparation of the ambush site. The company must also have a secure route of
withdrawal following the ambush.
c. Actions. An ambush normally consists of the following actions:
• Tactical movement to the ORP.
• Reconnaissance of the ambush site.
• Establishment of ambush site security.
• Preparation of the ambush site.
• Execution of the ambush.
• Withdrawal.
d. Task Organization. The company normally is task-organized into assault,
support, and security forces for the execution of the ambush.
(1) Support Force. The support force fixes the enemy force and prevents it from
moving out of the kill zone, allowing the assault force to conduct the ambush. The
support force generally uses direct fires in this role, but it also may be responsible for
calling for indirect fires to further fix the ambushed force.
(2) Assault Force. The assault force executes the ambush. It may employ an attack
by fire, an assault, or a combination of those techniques to destroy the ambushed force.
(3) Security Force. The security force provides protection and early warning to the
ambush patrol and secures the ORP. It isolates the ambush area both to prevent the
ambushed enemy force from moving out of the ambush site and to keep enemy rescue

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elements from reaching the site. The security force also may be responsible for securing
the company’s withdrawal route.
e. Types of Ambushes. Once the company receives an order to conduct an ambush,
the commander must determine which of the two types of ambush operations is best
suited to the situation and the capabilities of his company. In a point ambush, the patrol
deploys to attack an enemy force in a single kill zone. In an area ambush, the patrol is
deployed to conduct several related point ambushes throughout an ambush area.

4-30. RAID
A raid is a limited-objective form of attack entailing swift penetration of hostile terrain. A
raid operation always ends with a planned withdrawal to a friendly location upon the
completion of the assigned mission. It is not intended to hold territory. The company can
conduct an independent point raid or it can participate in a battalion area raid. A point
raid attacks the enemy force in a single kill zone; an area raid encompasses several
related point raids or other related operations. It is unlikely that a company would
conduct an area raid independently.
a. Company Role. The company conducts raids to accomplish a number of
missions, including the following:
• Capture prisoners.
• Capture or destroy specific command and control locations.
• Destroy logistical areas.
• Obtain information concerning enemy locations, dispositions, strength,
intentions, or methods of operation.
• Confuse the enemy or disrupt his plans.
b. Task Organization. Task organization of a raiding force is based on the purpose
of the operation. It normally consists of the following elements:
• Support force (with the task of support by fire).
• Assault force (with the task of destroy).
• Breach force (if required).
c. Conduct of the Raid. The main differences between a raid and other attack forms
are the limited objectives of the raid and the associated withdrawal following completion.
Raids may be conducted in daylight or darkness, within or beyond supporting distance of
the parent unit. When the area to be raided is beyond supporting distance of friendly
lines, the raiding party operates as a separate force. An objective, usually very specific in
nature, normally is assigned to orient the raiding unit. During the withdrawal, the
attacking force should use a route or axis different from that used to conduct the raid
itself.

4-31. SPOILING ATTACK

A spoiling attack is a limited-objective attack to delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's
capability to attack. SBCT infantry commanders mount spoiling attacks from defensive
postures to disrupt expected enemy attacks. A spoiling attack attempts to strike the enemy
while he is most vulnerable--during his preparations for attack in assembly areas and
attack positions or while he is on the move prior to crossing his line of departure. In most
respects, commanders conduct spoiling attacks like any other attack. They may be either

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hasty (when time is short) or deliberate (when the command has adequate forewarning).
When the situation permits, commanders exploit a spoiling attack like any other attack.

4-32. COUNTERATTACK
A counterattack is an attack by defensive forces to regain the initiative or to deny the
enemy success with his attack. Commanders conduct counterattacks either with a reserve
or with lightly committed forward elements. They counterattack after the enemy launches
his attack, reveals his main effort, or creates an assailable flank. SBCT infantry
commanders conduct counterattacks much like other attacks but synchronizing them
within the overall defensive effort requires careful timing.
a. Commitment of Combat Power. Counterattacks afford the defender the
opportunity to create favorable conditions for the commitment of combat power. If it can
fix the enemy, then the company can rehearse counterattacks, control their timing, and
prepare the ground to be traversed. Counterattacks are most useful when they are
anticipated, planned, and executed in coordination with other defending, delaying, or
attacking forces and in conjunction with a higher commander's plan.
b. Exploit Success. As in spoiling attacks, commanders prepare to seize the
opportunity to exploit success by the entire force. However, counterattacks may be
limited to movement to better terrain in order to bring fires on the enemy. Given the same
forces on both sides, counterattacks can achieve greater effects than other attacks because
the defender can create more favorable conditions through rehearsal and control of the
timing.

4-33. FEINT
The feint is in many ways identical to other forms of the attack. Its purpose is to cause the
enemy to react in a particular way, such as by repositioning forces, committing its
reserve, or shifting fires. The key difference between the feint and other attack forms is
that it is much more limited in scope and has an extremely specific objective. The scale
of the operation, however, usually is apparent only to the controlling headquarters. For
the element actually conducting the feint, such as an SBCT infantry company or
battalion, execution is just as rapid and violent as in a full-scale attack.
a. Company Role. The company normally participates in a feint as part of a larger
element. Among the planning considerations for the company commander are the
following:
• The higher commander’s intent regarding force preservation.
• Disengagement criteria and plans.
• Assignment of limited depth and attainable objectives.
• Clear follow-on orders that ensure the feinting force is prepared to exploit the
success of the main attack if necessary.
b. Making Feints Believable. Feints are successful only if the enemy believes that a
full-scale attack operation is underway. To be believable, they must be conducted with
the same violence and the same level of precision as any attack. The controlling
headquarters must issue a clear task and purpose to the unit conducting the feint. This
should include identification of the specific enemy action the feint is supposed to trigger
(or deny), such as forcing the commitment of an enemy reserve force or preventing an

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enemy element from repositioning against the main effort attack. Feints are most
effective under the following conditions:
• When they reinforce the enemy’s expectations.
• When the attack appears to present a definite threat to the enemy.
• When the enemy has a large reserve that he has consistently committed early
in the battle.
• When the attacker has several feasible COAs, any of which the enemy could
mistake for the main effort.

4-34. DEMONSTRATION
The demonstration is an attack whose purpose is to deceive the enemy about the location
of the main attack. This purpose is similar to that of a feint, but the friendly force does
not make contact with the enemy. For example, the SBCT infantry company’s role might
entail establishing an attack-by-fire position beyond the enemy’s direct fire engagement
range; the purpose would be to cause the enemy to commit a specific element simply by
virtue of the positioning of the demonstration force. In preparing to participate in a
demonstration as part of a larger force, the company commander should keep in mind the
following planning considerations.
a. Limit of Advance. The limit of advance must be carefully planned so the enemy
can "see" the demonstration force but cannot effectively engage it with direct fires. The
force must also take any other security measures necessary to prevent engagement by the
enemy.
b. Contingency Plans. The demonstration force must make contingency plans so it
can respond effectively to enemy direct or indirect fires while avoiding decisive
engagement.
c. Follow-on Orders. Clear, specific follow-on orders must ensure that the
demonstration force is prepared to exploit the success of the main attack, if necessary.

Section VIII. ATTACK TECHNIQUES

The assault on an enemy strongpoint and a limited visibility attack are the two most
demanding attacks an SBCT company conducts. The fundamentals and techniques
discussed in this section will assist the SBCT infantry commander in planning, preparing,
and conducting all attacks.

4-35. ASSAULT OF A STRONGPOINT

The most difficult objective for a light infantry force is to seize or clear an enemy
strongpoint complete with obstacles and fortifications. The commander employs
techniques that avoid attacking the enemy's main strength. Instead, he tries to identify and
attack a weakness in the defense. The SBCT infantry commander deceives the enemy as
to the point of the main attack; he uses surprise to take advantage of his initiative in
determining the time and place for the attack. He attempts to strike the enemy on exposed
flanks or the rear. A deliberate attack of a strongpoint is usually conducted in the
following steps:
• Reconnoiter the objective and develop the concept.
• Move to the objective.
• Isolate the objective and the selected breach site.

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• Attack to seize a foothold.

• Exploit the penetration and clear the objective.
a. Reconnoiter and Develop the Concept. The commander conducts
reconnaissance of the objective himself or has someone else do it. The reconnaissance
should identify the positions on the objective (crew-served weapons, C2 locations, and
vehicles), the level of preparation, the gaps in the defense, and other potential
weaknesses. The SBCT infantry commander may conduct reconnaissance of the
objective to determine any changes from previous information.
(1) The reconnaissance may be done many different ways. An effective technique is
to task-organize a reconnaissance patrol with leaders from the assault, support, and
breach elements. There should be sufficient personnel to establish surveillance on the
objective and to secure the ORP. The reconnaissance patrol either returns to the
company's location or meets the company at a designated linkup point and guides it into
the ORP. At times, the scout platoon or other battalion assets may be tasked to conduct
reconnaissance in support of the company's mission.
(2) After the commander develops his concept, he often task-organizes his unit into a
breach element, a support element, an assault element, and possibly a reserve. The
reserve is normally under his control and is positioned where it can best exploit the
success of the attack or increase combat power as necessary. The reserve should not be so
close that it loses flexibility during the assault. The reserve leader must know where he
will locate throughout the attack.
(a) The breach force is usually formed around an infantry unit. Engineers, if
available, are also part of the breaching element. Any mechanical or explosive breaching
assets are attached to this element. The breach force makes the initial breach and passes
the assault element through. It may have to organize its own assault element (to secure
the breach), support element (to provide close-in suppression), and breach element (to
actually breach the obstacles).
(b) The support element is organized to provide supporting (indirect or direct) fires
initially to the breach element, then to the assault element. The support element may
consist of any combination of infantry squads, the 120-mm/60-mm mortar section, the
machine-gun teams, M203 gunners, the MGS platoon, or the ICVs. Their primary
responsibilities are to suppress enemy forces that may engage the breach element and to
isolate the objective from enemy reinforcement or escape.
(3) The assault element is usually one or two infantry platoons, depending on the
enemy situation (number of personnel, level of preparation, and complexity of
fortifications) and the size and composition of the breach and support elements. Often, a
small assault element supported by a large volume of accurate suppressive fires is
effective in clearing the objective. The assault element may also need to breach enemy
protective obstacles on the objective.
(4) The commander determines the best task organization for the entire mission. It
should be simple and maintain unit integrity whenever possible. At times, the company
moves to the ORP task-organized as usual (no cross attachments), changes task
organization in the ORP for the conduct of the assault, and then modifies this task
organization to consolidate in defensive positions on the objective.
b. Move to the Objective. The company approaches the objective (Figure 4-12) in a
manner that supports its deployment prior to the assault. The SBCT infantry commander

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must determine the transition between mounted and foot movement based on the enemy
situation. This may be a movement intended to avoid detection that allows the company
to occupy the ORP and conduct the leader's reconnaissance of the objective. The
company may cross the LD (or depart the perimeter defense) supported by heavy
suppressive direct and indirect fires. These fires continue until the company reaches its
assault position or final coordination line (FCL); they then shift to allow the assault on
the objective. In either case, the following fundamentals should be part of this step of the
attack:

Figure 4-12. Movement to the objective.

(1) The movement from the assembly area to the LD is timed so that movement to
and across the LD is continuous. The lead element of the company starts crossing the LD
at the attack time specified in the battalion OPORD. Before the company's movement, a
patrol may be sent to reconnoiter and mark the route and check the time it takes to move
to the LD.
(2) The support element may precede the assault and the breach elements to the LD in
order to be in an overwatch position ready to fire when they cross the LD. Company
mortars move forward to a firing position near the LD to allow maximum coverage of the
objective area.
(3) The commander normally avoids stopping in the attack position. However, if the
company is ahead of schedule or told to hold in the attack position, it occupies the attack
position, posts security, and waits until it is time to move (or until told to move).

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(4) During movement from the LD to the assault position, the company makes the
best use of cover, concealment, smoke, and supporting fire.
(5) If the company is hit by indirect fire en route, it moves quickly out of the impact
area. If it meets enemy resistance short of the objective, it returns fire at once. The leader
of the platoon in contact calls for and adjusts indirect fire on the enemy. Depending on
the company plan and the location and type of resistance, the platoon may bypass an
enemy position that cannot affect the mission. The locations of all bypassed enemy are
reported to the company commander through FBCB2; he, in turn, forwards them to the
battalion.
(6) If the company cannot bypass an enemy position, the company commander and
the platoon leader in contact must take prompt and aggressive action. The platoon leader
attempts to conduct the platoon attack drill and destroy the enemy position. The
commander quickly conducts an estimate of the situation and issues FRAGOs as needed
to carry out his plan. He should not commit platoons piecemeal. He coordinates actions
and fires so the company can attack the enemy with its full combat power. The
commander should maneuver to assault the flank or rear of the enemy position. When it
has destroyed or suppressed the enemy, the company continues toward its objective.
(7) The company either bypasses or breaches obstacles along the route. The
commander must decide the best way to overcome the obstacle without losing
momentum. In selecting the scheme of maneuver, the commander normally tries to avoid
COAs that require breaching of enemy obstacles. Because all forces construct defensive
obstacles around their positions, however, the attacking unit must be prepared to conduct
a breach. In an SBCT battalion deliberate attack, the company may be the breach force; it
may conduct breaches with its organic countermine equipment or with attached engineer
assets. The company commander informs the battalion commander of obstacles that may
affect units following the company. The company commander positions engineers
forward to provide a rapid assessment of the obstacle.
(8) The support force (if any) should be in position before the company's assault force
reaches the assault position. The support element initiates its fire on the objective on
order or at a specified time. Supporting indirect fires are synchronized to impact at the
same time.
c. Isolate the Objective and the Selected Breach Site. Normally, the SBCT
battalion isolates the objective area to allow the company (or companies) to concentrate
its combat potential on the enemy strongpoint (Figure 4-13).

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Figure 4-13. Isolate the objective.

(1) The company may begin the isolation during the leader's reconnaissance by
positioning security elements to prevent enemy movement into or out of the objective
area. The commander must ensure that these units understand what actions to take.
Initially, they may only observe and report until the company deploys for the assault. At a
designated time or signal, they begin active measures to isolate the objective.
(2) Once the company has isolated the objective area, the commander focuses on
isolation at the breach point or point of attack. This isolation is to prevent enemy
reinforcement at the breach site and also to suppress enemy weapons and positions that
have observation of the breach site. The support force is assigned the main responsibility
for this isolation.
(3) The commander masses all available combat power at the initial penetration or
breach point. He uses indirect fires to suppress or obscure adjacent enemy positions and
isolate them from the breach site.
d. Attack to Seize a Foothold. The breach of the enemy position is normally the
SBCT infantry company's initial main effort. The breach force penetrates or bypasses the
enemy's protective obstacles, gains a foothold in the trench line, and creates a gap large
enough for the assault element to pass through (Figure 4-14, page 4-42).

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Figure 4-14. Breach and secure a foothold.

(1) Preparations. A unit conducting a breach must be prepared to execute the

following steps:
• Suppress the enemy covering the obstacle or breach site.
• Use smoke to obscure the enemy's observation of the breach element.
• Secure the far side of the breach by seizing the terrain or destroying the enemy
that can engage the breach site.
• Reduce the obstacle, widen and mark the lane, or both.
• Assist passage of the assault elements.
(2) Planning. In planning the breach operation, consider the following:
(a) The breach force moves forward by covered and concealed routes. If possible, the
breach should be covert to reduce the time the breach and assault forces are exposed to
enemy fire. If this is not possible or if the breaching attempt is compromised, the breach
force moves under the suppressive fires of the support force.
(b) The penetration of the enemy position is made on a narrow front. The concept is
to make a narrow penetration into the enemy defenses and then expand it enough to allow

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rapid passage of the assault force. Normally, the company concentrates all combat power
at one breach point. It may use two breach sites, however, if they are mutually supporting
and do not result in a lack of concentration or a piecemeal assault. When using only one
breach site, the company should plan an alternate site as a contingency in case the
primary breach is unsuccessful.
(c) The support force provides effective suppression for the breach and assault
force(s) to cross the enemy's killing ground. Each weapon in the support element should
have a specific enemy position or sector of responsibility assigned. Initially, the support
force establishes fire superiority with a maximum volume of fire; they then maintain fire
superiority throughout the attack. When indirect fires shift, the support force increases the
rate of direct fire to maintain the suppression.
(d) The support force normally occupies one position to simplify control. At times,
however, the support force must occupy several positions to provide effective
suppression of the enemy. This may be required to prevent the masking of fires by the
breach or assault force or because of the characteristics of the supporting weapons (120-
mm/60-mm mortars). Also, the support force often needs to reposition once the assault
force begins clearing the objective. They may follow the assault force through the breach
or reposition outside the enemy position.
e. Exploit the Penetration and Seize the Decisive Point. After the successful
breach, the assault force conducts the main attack (Figure 4-15, page 4-44). The assault
force passes rapidly through the breach, supported by the fires of the support force and
the breach force. In planning the assault, consider the following points:

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Figure 4-15. Exploit the penetration.

(1) The assault force must reduce the enemy position as quickly as possible. If the
assault force can capture or destroy the enemy’s command and control facilities or other
key positions and weapons, the enemy may surrender or abandon the position. If there is
key terrain, this may be the decisive point for the assault force. Normally, the assault
force moves within the enemy's trenches to avoid exposure to enemy fire.
(2) The assault force must also organize into support, assault, and breach elements.
As it encounters subsequent positions or bunkers, it may have to repeat the breaching
operations. As in the initial breach, the breach element establishes a support-by-fire
position and conducts the same sequence of breaching and assaulting to reduce the
position.
(3) The designation of a reserve allows the SBCT infantry commander to retain
flexibility during the attack. The commander should be prepared to commit his reserve to
exploit success and to continue the attack. The reserve also may repulse counterattacks
during consolidation and reorganization.

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(4) Once an assault starts, the company maneuvers aggressively to allow the enemy
less time to react. The commander monitors the situation and adjusts the plan to exploit
any weakness found during the attack. If a situation develops that is beyond the capability
of his company, he notifies the battalion commander. He may have to hold his position
until other companies can maneuver to support him.
(5) In moving from their assault positions, platoons advance in the formation most
suitable to the terrain and situation. When the assault element must move through a
narrow lane in the obstacles, it maintains dispersion and assaults through the lane by fire
commands; signals should be coordinated to support this. The commander moves where
he can best control his platoons and supporting fire. Indirect fire and the direct fires of the
support force shift when they endanger the advancing soldiers.
(6) The assaulting soldiers clear enemy positions, secure and search prisoners, and
move quickly across the objective. When they reach the far side, they take up hasty
fighting positions and continue to fire at the withdrawing enemy. When the objective is
secured and cleared (seized), the supporting elements and company trains are called
forward.
(7) Once it seizes the objective, the company consolidates. Reorganization, if
required, is normally conducted concurrently with consolidation and consists of actions
taken to prepare for follow-on operations. As with consolidation, the SBCT infantry
company commander must plan and prepare for reorganization as he conducts his troop-
leading procedures. He ensures that the company is prepared to take the following
actions:
• Provide essential medical treatment and evacuate casualties as necessary.
• Cross-level personnel and adjust task organization as required.
• Conduct resupply operations, including rearming and refueling.
• Redistribute ammunition.
• Conduct required maintenance.

4-36. ATTACK DURING LIMITED VISIBILITY

Successful attacks during limited visibility depend on leadership, reconnaissance,
training, planning, and surprise. Although these fundamentals are also key to daylight
attacks, attacks during limited visibility require certain considerations and the proper
application of the techniques discussed in this chapter to ensure control in the attack.
Darkness, fog, heavy rain, and falling snow limit visibility. Smoke and dust from high
explosive (HE) fires also limit visibility, but their effects are more temporary. SBCT
infantry companies attack during limited visibility--
• To achieve surprise.
• To avoid heavy losses.
• To cause panic in a weak or disorganized enemy.
• To exploit success and maintain momentum.
• To keep pressure on the enemy.
a. Fundamentals. The SBCT infantry company, when equipped with NVDs,
conducts limited visibility attacks very much like daylight attacks (Figure 4-16, page 4-
46). The fundamentals for a daylight attack, discussed earlier in this chapter, still apply
for night attacks. Conducting attacks in this manner requires--

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• A company that is well-trained in limited visibility attacks.

• Enough natural light to employ the unit's NVDs.
• A simple, effective concept that takes advantage of the enemy's surprise and
confusion.
• A successful reconnaissance of the objective area.
• Additional control measures and techniques, as needed.

Figure 4-16. Limited visibility attack with NVDs.

b. Challenges. When planning attacks at night, the SBCT infantry commander must
consider the increased difficulty of--
• Controlling units, soldiers, and fires.
• Identifying and engaging targets.

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• Navigating and moving.

• Distinguishing friendly and enemy soldiers.
• Locating, treating, and evacuating casualties.
• Locating and bypassing or breaching enemy obstacles.
c. Considerations. In planning limited visibility attacks, the SBCT infantry
commander also should consider the following:
(1) Feints and other deceptions may be more effective. (This is true for the enemy
also.)
(2) If a small element can infiltrate the enemy position, it can be extremely effective
in supporting the main attack. A small element can also covertly breach obstacles or
neutralize key positions and weapons to allow the main attack to seize a foothold quickly.
(3) It may be possible to infiltrate the main attack inside the enemy's positions and
then fight from the inside to the outside. In this case, the unit inside the position may be
able to occupy defensive positions and force the enemy to attack him.
d. Illumination and Indirect Fire. There are two basic decisions to be made for
conducting limited visibility attacks:
• Illumination on the objective.
• Indirect fire support for the attack.
(1) The infantry company normally conducts nonilluminated attacks to exploit its
technological and training advantage. For all night attacks, however, illumination should
be readily available in case the enemy detects the attack and uses illumination, or if he
possesses NVDs. Illumination also may be effective to support reorganization and
consolidation after the objective is secure, particularly for casualty evacuation.
(2) The infantry company conducts illuminated night attacks like daylight attacks.
Illumination is available from artillery, mortars, M203s, and hand-fired and aircraft
flares. Permission to fire illumination is often retained by battalion because the light may
affect adjacent unit operations.
(3) Nonilluminated, nonsupported attacks offer the best chance of gaining surprise.
These attacks are conducted like daylight attacks.
(4) Illuminated, supported attacks are almost identical to daylight attacks. These may
be most effective when speed is essential, when there is limited time for reconnaissance,
or when the enemy is weak or disorganized. When conducting these types of attacks, the
attacking unit still attempts to use stealth and the concealment of limited visibility to gain
surprise. They then initiate illumination and fires to support the assault.
e. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is critical in every attack, but especially for
attacks at night. It should be conducted during daylight and down to the lowest level
possible. Each SBCT unit should reconnoiter the routes on which they will move, the
positions they will occupy, and the objective they are assigned. The company must
balance the need for detailed information about the enemy against the risk of detection
and loss of surprise.
(1) The reconnaissance plan should establish surveillance on the objective in case the
enemy repositions units and weapons or prepares additional obstacles. Surveillance and
security elements should secure critical locations, such as assault and support positions,
the LD or PLD, and key routes and ORPs to protect the company from enemy ambushes
and spoiling attacks. These security forces may become part of the isolation element
during the attack.

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(2) When reconnaissance is not successful due to lack of time, failure to identify
critical aspects of the enemy's position, detection by the enemy, or any other reason, the
commander should request a delay in the attack time to allow for further reconnaissance.
If this is not possible, he should consider an illuminated or supported attack. A night
attack with marginal information on the enemy's defense is very risky and difficult to
conduct successfully.
f. Simplicity. A simple concept, particularly for the actions on the objective, also
supports control during the assault. If possible, SBCT platoon and squad objectives
should be small and easily identified.
(1) Avoid developing a concept that requires the company to fight for each enemy
fighting position. As in a daylight attack, identify a decisive point and focus combat
power at this location. Once the decisive action is accomplished, the plan must also
address any remaining enemy. If required by the higher commander's concept or for an
effective consolidation, the company may have to clear all enemy forces from the
objective area.
(2) A smaller assault force maneuvering on the objective is easier to control and less
likely to suffer casualties from enemy or friendly fires. The assault force must have clear
signals to ensure control of all supporting fires, both direct and indirect.
(3) The concept for a nonilluminated attack should be flexible to allow for adjustment
to a daylight attack if illumination becomes appropriate due to detection by the enemy or
the use of illumination by an adjacent unit. This is especially critical for a unit that plans
a modified linear assault attack but may be forced to conduct an illuminated attack. A
contingency plan that reorients for illumination should be prepared and issued, and every
soldier should know under what conditions to execute this plan. In some cases (when
already deployed through the PLD and advancing on the enemy, for example), the
company may have no choice but to continue the attack as planned or attempt to
disengage.
g. Fire Control Techniques. Fire control techniques for limited visibility include--
(1) Tracer Fire. Leaders in the assault force fire all tracers; their men fire where the
leader's tracers impact. The support force positions an automatic weapon on a tripod on
the flank nearest the assault element. This weapon fires a burst of tracers every 15
seconds to indicate the near limit of the supporting fires. All other weapons in the support
force keep their fires on the side of this tracer away from the assault force. The assault
force signals to shift fires to the next position or to a set distance. If required, these
rounds can be adjusted well over the head of the assault force to preclude casualties.
(2) Luminous Tape or Chemical Lights. Mark assault personnel to prevent fratricide.
Do this in a way that avoids enemy detection, such as luminous tape on the back of the
helmet or small infrared chemical lights (if the enemy has no NVDs). The support force
should know where the lead assault force is. If individual soldier markings do not suffice,
use large chemical lights (infrared [IR] or visible). Place these on the ground or throw
them in front of the assault force. When clearing a trench line, put the lights on a stick
and move them with the lead element.
(3) Weapons Control Restrictions. Assign weapons control restrictions to reduce the
risk to the assault force.

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(a) The platoon on the right in the assault might be given weapons free to the right
flank, because there are no friendly soldiers there, but weapons tight or hold on the left
because another friendly unit is located there.
(b) The assault force may be restricted to using only shotguns and pistols.
(c) The assault force may be restricted to no automatic weapons fire on the objective.
This ensures that all automatic weapons in use are enemy.
(4) Other Techniques. Use the following techniques to increase control during the
assault:
• Not allowing flares, grenades, or smoke on the objective.
• Allowing only certain personnel with NVDs to engage targets on the
objective.
• Using a magnetic azimuth for maintaining direction.
• Using mortar or artillery rounds to orient attacking units.
• Using guides.
• Reducing intervals between soldiers and units.
h. Supporting Fires. Mortar, artillery, and antiarmor fires are planned for a night
attack much like in a daylight attack. However, they do not fire unless the SBCT infantry
company is detected or until the company is ready to assault. Some weapons may fire
before the attack and maintain a pattern to deceive the enemy or to help cover noise made
by the company's movement. This is avoided if it will disclose the attack.
(1) Indirect fire is difficult to adjust when visibility is poor. If doubt exists as to exact
friendly locations, indirect fire is directed first at enemy positions beyond the objective
and then walked onto the objective. The illumination rounds may be fired to impact on
the ground, providing both light and markings on the objective. They may also be placed
behind the objective and in the air, causing the enemy to be silhouetted. Once
illumination is begun, it should continue until the objective is secure. Sufficient
ammunition must be available.
(2) Smoke is planned to further reduce the enemy's visibility, particularly if he has
night vision devices. The smoke is laid close to or on enemy positions to avoid restricting
friendly movement or hindering the breaching of obstacles. Employing smoke on the
objective during the assault may make it hard for assaulting soldiers to find enemy
fighting positions, but if sufficient thermal sights are available, using smoke on the
objective may provide a decisive advantage for a well-trained unit.
(3) Illumination is always planned for attacks to be conducted in limited visibility.
That gives the company commander the option of calling for it. The battalion commander
normally controls illumination but may authorize the company commander to call for it
when needed. If the company commander decides to use illumination, he should not call
for it until the assault is initiated or the attack is detected. It should be placed on several
locations over a wide area to confuse the enemy as to the exact location of the attack. It
also should be placed beyond the objective to help assaulting soldiers see and fire at
withdrawing or counterattacking enemy soldiers.
(4) Illumination also may be required if the enemy uses illumination to disrupt the
effectiveness of the company's NVDs. Once used, illumination must be continuous
because attacking soldiers will temporarily lose their normal night vision. Any break in
illumination also may reduce the effectiveness of suppressive fire when the attackers

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need it most. Care must be taken to ensure that the squad and platoon leaders do not use
hand flares before the commander has decided to illuminate the objective.
(5) The thermal sights of weapons (such as the Javelin) may be employed strictly for
observation if there are no targets for these weapons to engage. Positioned outside the
objective area, these sights can provide critical current information. They also can assist
the support force in controlling their fires or provide the assault force with reports of
enemy movements on the objective.
(6) When limited NVDs are available, they must be prioritized and employed at the
most critical locations. Priorities to consider include key soldiers in the breach force, key
leaders in the assault force, other members of the assault force, and key leaders and
weapons in the support force.
i. Consolidation and Reorganization. When it has seized the objective, the SBCT
infantry company consolidates and reorganizes. Consolidation and reorganization are the
same as for a daylight attack with the following exceptions:
(1) Guides lead trains and support elements forward to their positions.
(2) The consolidation plan should be as simple as possible. Avoid changes in task
organization.
(3) Locating and evacuating casualties and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) takes
longer. They may have to be moved to the rear of the objective and kept there until
visibility improves.
(4) Platoon positions are closer together to ease control and improve mutual support.
Position distances are adjusted as visibility improves.
j. Modified Linear Assault. The modified linear assault is a technique for
conducting a nonilluminated attack without NVDs to seize an occupied objective. This
technique is effective in controlling the fires of the assault force by maintaining a linear
formation. Each soldier assaults using individual movement techniques while remaining
generally "on line" with the soldier on his right and left. Each soldier is able to engage or
suppress targets to his front with fewer restrictions because there is less chance of
fratricide.
(1) Modifications. In the true linear assault, the company deploys through its
respective squad release points RPs), and the entire company conducts a linear assault
across the objective (Figure 4-17). To reduce the vulnerability of the assault force, this
technique is normally modified, which may be done in a number of ways depending on
the situation.

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Figure 4-17. Linear assault.

(a) The most effective modification is to establish part of the company in a support-
by-fire position. The remainder of the company deploys at the PLD and conducts the
assault (Figure 4-18, page 4-52). Machine guns, mortars, and Javelins are normally most
effective in this role. M203s also may be effective if visibility is sufficient for their
employment. It is essential that the flank of the assault force nearest the support force be
visible to the support force. The fire team on this flank may mark themselves with
chemical lights or glint tape to ensure they are visible.

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Figure 4-18. Linear assault with support element.

(b) Other variations of this technique may include attacking on a much narrower front
with a smaller assault force and having a large follow-and-support force. For example,
instead of two platoons deploying at the PLD, a platoon(-) could deploy against an
identified enemy weak point (Figure 4-19). This platoon could be tasked to bypass enemy
positions to seize or destroy a critical location or facility quickly, with the follow-and-
support force reducing bypassed positions. Another variation is to assign the assault force
a shallow objective to support the forward passage of the trailing unit, or to deploy
through the platoon release points and then to attack in squad files. The latter is most
effective when the situation supports an infiltration through the enemy defenses to seize
decisive terrain or positions to the rear.

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Figure 4-19. Linear assault with follow and support.

(2) Advantages. The modified linear assault simplifies the control of supporting fires
from outside the objective. By establishing support positions perpendicular to the
direction of assault, the supporting fires can be employed next to the assault force and
then shifted in front of them as they advance.
(3) Disadvantages. The linear formation is the biggest weakness with the modified
linear assault. If the enemy is in well-prepared defensive positions, the linear formation
ensures at least part of the assault force attacks through the enemy's kill zones. Also,
assaulting using this technique makes it very difficult for the leader to concentrate
combat power against an identified enemy weakness. Finally, if the enemy has NVDs or
the assault force runs into unidentified obstacles after deploying at the PLD, fire
superiority may not be achieved and the assault will rapidly come to a halt. This may
result in the majority of the company being decisively engaged in the enemy killing
ground.
(4) Conduct of the Assault. Although there are significant difficulties with the
modified linear attack, it remains a viable technique for attack during limited visibility by
units without NVDs. It is most effective against a weak or disorganized enemy. If the
enemy has NVDs or a well-prepared defense with protective obstacles, this technique
should not be used. An illuminated, supported attack that is conducted as a daylight
attack may be the most effective option in that situation.
(a) Before attacking in this manner, the SBCT infantry company should secure the
PLD and provide personnel to guide the company from the LD to the PLD. Each platoon

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provides personnel to secure their portion of the PLD and to guide the platoon from the
platoon release point (RP). These soldiers are briefed on the routes from the LD to the
platoon RP, actions on enemy contact, time of departure, and other information needed
by the patrol units to conduct their mission. They move forward to the platoon RP; then
they move forward to reconnoiter and mark the platoon routes, secure their respective
parts of the PLD, and observe the objective. The platoon guides go back to the platoon
RP to guide their platoons to the squad RP and to the PLD.
(b) Once the company crosses the LD, movement to the PLD is continuous. They
move slowly to maintain stealth. Platoons are released at the platoon RP so they can
deploy before reaching the PLD. Once their units are deployed, the platoon leaders and
the support element leader notify the commander. When the company is fully deployed,
the commander informs the battalion commander. On the battalion commander's order,
the company moves silently forward from the PLD. The platoons guide on the base
platoon.
(c) When the attack is discovered, or on the commander's order, the support element
opens fire and the platoons assault. Leaders must recognize that this technique for
conducting a limited visibility attack results in a linear assault. To be successful, the
assault must achieve surprise and rapidly overwhelm the defender. If the initial assault
fails, it is difficult to regain control. Scattered enemy fire must not be taken as a loss of
surprise, and it should not be cause to start the assault.
(d) Soldiers assault aggressively using individual movement techniques to maneuver.
The support force must quickly gain fire superiority with a heavy volume of fire. Tracers
are used to improve accuracy, to control fires, and to allow the assault force to see where
its supporting fires are impacting. The FIST calls for indirect fire around and beyond the
objective to disrupt enemy reinforcement. As the assault closes on the objective, fires are
shifted beyond the limit of advance or lifted entirely. Soldiers must not go beyond the
limit of advance.
(e) If the enemy discovers the attack before the company reaches the PLD, the
commander may--
• Call for planned, supporting fire to suppress the enemy.
• Call for illumination (if authorized by the battalion commander) to ease
control and movement.
• Continue as if it were a daylight attack by modifying the attack plan to a
daylight attack.

NOTE: A linear assault, even a modified variation, is very risky when conducted
under illumination.

Section IX. COMMON OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

These activities are the warfighting actions the SBCT infantry rifle company may be
called upon to perform in battle.

4-37. INFILTRATION
Infiltration is a form of maneuver used by infantry units in many situations. During an
attack, strong enemy defensive positions may be encountered. To avoid the enemy's
strength, the SBCT infantry commander may place his ICVs and other vehicles in a

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secure location and move dismounted by stealth through gaps or around enemy positions
to conduct operations in the enemy's rear area. The company may infiltrate to conduct
raids, ambushes, or other attacks. The company may also use infiltrations for many other
types of operations, such as stay-behind and reconnaissance.
a. Fundamentals. By infiltrating, the SBCT infantry company can maneuver to
critical targets undetected, can achieve surprise, and can avoid the effects of enemy fires.
Limited visibility, bad weather, and restrictive terrain reduce the chances of detection
during an infiltration.
(1) A unit may infiltrate--
• To gather information.
• To attack the enemy at a weak point.
• To seize key terrain or destroy vital installations behind enemy positions.
• To harass and disrupt the enemy with ambushes in his rear area.
• To attack enemy reserves, fire support units, and command posts.
(2) The steps of an infiltration are as follows:
(a) Patrol. Find gaps or weak areas in the enemy defense and locate enemy positions.
The SBCT company may conduct patrols, but RSTA assets are more likely to conduct
them.
(b) Prepare. Conduct troop-leading procedures.
(c) Infiltrate. Avoid enemy contact; move by smallest units possible.
(d) Consolidate. Link up and prepare for actions at the objective.
(e) Execute. Complete the mission.
(3) Infiltrations do not always require that all units move through the enemy's
positions without detection or contact. Depending on the mission, the company can still
complete the mission even though some of the squads make contact en route to the linkup
point. Although the enemy may have some idea of what is taking place, it is very difficult
for him to estimate exactly what these small contacts mean. OPSEC may require that
only key leaders have the entire plan during the infiltration step to prevent disclosure due
to casualties or friendly prisoners.
b. Considerations. The SBCT infantry company commander must prepare an
infiltration plan and give units enough time for preparation and movement. The company
may infiltrate by itself or as part of the SBCT battalion. In either case, movement
techniques and formations are based on the likelihood of enemy contact, the terrain, the
level of visibility, and the need for speed and control.
(1) Size. The size of the infiltrating unit depends on the amount of time available, the
amount of cover and concealment, and the enemy. Other considerations may include the
need to communicate, the difficulty of navigation, the number of infiltration routes, and
whether or not to take vehicles. Generally, smaller units can move more quickly and
make better use of available concealment, but they may increase the number of linkups,
requiring more time. Infiltrating by company or platoons ensures control and provides
more combat power in the event of contact.
(2) Infiltration Lane. The company may be assigned an infiltration lane or zone. The
company commander must decide whether to move the entire company together through
the company's lane or to assign each platoon a separate infiltration lane within the
company lane. He also has the option to stagger the start time for each platoon on the one
company lane. The infiltration lane should be wide enough to allow the infiltrating units

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to change their planned routes to avoid enemy contact. If the company uses a single
company lane (Figure 4-20), the company commander picks a route through it and a
company ORP. If the company commander uses multiple lanes (Figure 4-21), the
company commander assigns each platoon a lane and a start time, picks linkup points for
the platoons, and picks a company ORP. The platoon leaders pick the routes through their
lanes. In making his decision whether to use single or multiple lanes, the company
commander considers several things.
(a) Moving as a company on a single lane--
• May get the company to the ORP faster.
• Makes control easier.
• Makes navigation easier.
• Increases the chance of the entire company being detected but provides
greater combat potential if detected.
(b) Moving on multiple lanes or by platoons on one lane--
• Requires linkups.
• Makes control harder.
• May make navigation more difficult.
• Decreases the chance of the entire company being detected but provides less
combat potential if detected.

Figure 4-20. Company moving on single infiltration lane.

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Figure 4-21. Company moving on multiple infiltration lanes.

(3) Routes. The routes selected must avoid enemy positions, use the best available
cover and concealment, ease control and navigation, and avoid obstacles and danger
areas.
(a) Routes should be reconnoitered without alerting the enemy. This may be possible
by using RSTA assets within the SBCT; however, leaders should consider using a map
reconnaissance or guides, or marking the routes.
(b) Rally points may be selected based on the reconnaissance assets available to the
commander; others are selected as the company moves along the route. If the infiltrating
company is dispersed by enemy action, it rallies at the last rally point passed that is not
within enemy small-arms range. The assembled unit then waits until a set number of units
or soldiers arrive at the rally point, or until a specified time, before continuing the
mission. The senior man at the rally point should, in the absence of the commander,
assume command and decide how best to continue the mission within the commander’s
intent.
(c) Locate the ORP as close to the objective as possible without being detected or
losing security. The ORP should be large enough so that the company can deploy in it. It
should be cleared before it is occupied.
(4) Linkup Point. When using multiple lanes, the platoons meet at a linkup point and
then move as a company to the ORP. Do not plan linkups at the ORP. If a unit misses its
linkup, it moves to a contingency linkup point located away from the ORP and links up
with a small element from the ORP.
(5) Signals. Visual signals, such as arm-and-hand signals, infrared devices, and
flashlights with colored lenses, reduce the chance of detection. Avoid sound signals and
flares. Recognition signals are critical for actions at a linkup or rally point.
(a) Radio listening silence should be enforced, except when a unit must report its
progress or when a unit detected by the enemy needs supporting fire.
(b) Radio messages to report crossing of phase lines or checkpoints (if required)
should be brief--one code word. They may be transmitted without using call signs to
identify units, providing each unit has separate code words.

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(c) When required, units operating out of radio contact (because of terrain or
distances) can monitor or send codes only at a certain time. At these times, they set up
expedient antennas or move to terrain better suited for communication.
(6) Fire Support. Indirect fires are always planned but are used only when contact is
made or when needed to support the mission. If contact is made with an enemy element,
the infiltrating unit should use indirect fire to divert the enemy's attention, suppress
enemy positions, and screen friendly movement as they disengage. Indirect fires may also
be used to assist in navigation and to cause enemy soldiers on security to seek cover.
(7) Actions on Contact. When infiltrating on multiple lanes, detection of one
infiltrating unit may alert the enemy and compromise the other infiltrating units. The
company OPORD must state whether to continue the mission or return to friendly lines if
detected by the enemy. Units following on the same lane should switch to an alternate
lane. If a soldier in the unit speaks the enemy's language, he should be positioned at or
near the front of the column in case an enemy OP or patrol challenges the unit. The order
also must specify what to do in the event of casualties.
(8) Methods of Handling Casualties and Prisoners. During the infiltration, it may be
hard to evacuate casualties or move prisoners without jeopardizing security. Casualties
can be carried to the ORP or linkup point and evacuated when the operation has ended, or
they can be concealed and left for pickup later. Moving casualties or prisoners to the ORP
is dangerous when trying to avoid detection. Soldiers with medical supplies stay with any
casualties left behind. The killed in action (KIA) can be concealed and recovered later.
Leave prisoners under guard at a rally point and evacuate them when the operation is
over.
(9) Rehearsals. Every soldier must know the plan and his role in it. Units should
rehearse their formations, their movement techniques, and their actions--
• On enemy contact.
• At rally points.
• At the linkup point.
• At the ORP.
• At danger areas.
• At the objective.

4-38. OVERWATCH
Overwatch is the component of tactical movement in which an element observes and, if
necessary, provides direct fire support for a friendly moving element. Situational
understanding of the tactical environment is crucial for the overwatch unit, whose
objective is to prevent the enemy from surprising and engaging the moving unit. The
overwatch force must maintain communications with the moving element and provide
early warning of enemy elements that could affect it. The overwatch must be able to
support the moving element with immediate direct (to include dismounted antiarmor
fires) and indirect fires; it can do this in either bounding overwatch or traveling
overwatch. The key to successful overwatch is aggressive scanning of gaps and dead
space within the moving element’s formation and on surrounding terrain. If the
overwatch is unable to scan gaps and dead space and effectively engage the enemy, it
must alert the moving element of the lapse in coverage. The moving element normally
adjusts its movement speed, formation, or both, and initiates its own overwatch until the

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overwatch force completes movement to a position from which it can continue the
overwatch mission.
a. Bounding Overwatch. The overwatch element occupies firing positions that
afford effective cover and concealment, unobstructed observation, and clear fields of fire.
The leader of the overwatch element (such as the SBCT infantry commander, platoon
leader, or section leader) assigns sectors of observation and fire. The overwatch element
is responsible for its own security during both occupation of the overwatch position and
execution of the operation. A common security measure is to clear the position with the
infantry prior to occupying with the vehicles.
(1) Squads or platoons scan their assigned sectors to identify enemy elements and
positions. The leader must structure the mission so the overwatch element can effectively
scan for known or likely enemy positions, paying close attention to possible gaps and
dead space. The overwatching element must have a clear understanding of the enemy
situation so soldiers know what to look for and where to look. They use applicable search
techniques and employ all available sights and other visual devices (such as binoculars
and night vision goggles).
(2) If contact is made, the overwatch element initiates a high volume of direct fires. It
moves between primary and alternate positions as necessary to avoid being decisively
engaged by the enemy.
b. Traveling Overwatch. While maintaining its location in the overall unit
formation, the overwatch element (usually a platoon or section) continuously scans the
lead element’s battle space and closely monitors all potential gaps and dead space. The
overwatch maintains a specified interval from the lead element; this interval is dictated
by weapons capabilities and the effects of terrain and movement speed. As needed, the
overwatch can execute short halts to provide more effective observation, facilitating
acquisition of enemy forces.

4-39. FOLLOW AND SUPPORT

Follow and support forces are employed in the offense to maintain the momentum of an
operation. They do this by providing support or assistance that relieves the lead element
of hindrances that could slow its advance. Follow and support missions are usually
assigned when the enemy situation is vague and speed of the operation is important.
a. The SBCT infantry company may be task-organized to conduct follow and
support missions in one of several ways:
• It can be part of an SBCT battalion with the mission of maintaining the
momentum of a brigade attack.
• It can function as a separate maneuver element in support of the movement of
another SBCT battalion element.
• Platoons within the company may conduct follow and support missions in
support of other infantry elements.
b. Follow and support operations may require the company to conduct a variety of
tactical tasks, including the following:
• Conduct linkup operations with the lead element’s fixing or overwatch force.
• Destroy bypassed pockets of resistance.
• Secure the flanks of a penetration to prevent the enemy from closing the
penetration.

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• Secure lines of communications.

• Secure bypassed key terrain.
• Protect key installations.
• Guard EPWs.
• Evacuate casualties.
c. The follow and support force receives information on the enemy or the supporting
tasks from the lead element’s fixing or overwatch force.
d. The follow and support force conducts linkup with the fixing force on the ground,
completes the exchange of critical tactical information, and accepts responsibility for the
assigned tasks. The fixing force then rejoins the lead element, and the follow and support
force executes its tasks. If enemy contact occurs, the follow and support force conducts
actions on contact as outlined earlier in this chapter.

4-40. BYPASS
The company may bypass an enemy force or obstacle to maintain the momentum of the
attack or for another tactical purpose. The SBCT battalion commander often establishes
bypass criteria.
a. The SBCT infantry company commander designates a fixing force to maintain
contact with the enemy and assist the remainder of the company during the bypass. This
fixing force may not come into direct fire contact with the enemy force.
b. The bypassing force uses covered and concealed routes and, if possible, moves
along bypass routes that are outside the enemy’s direct fire range. If the situation dictates,
the company can also employ smoke to obscure the enemy or to screen the bypassing
force’s movement. The company must conduct adequate reconnaissance of the route to
confirm the feasibility of the bypass; the enemy may intentionally leave a bypass route
unguarded to draw attacking forces into his kill sacks.
c. Once the rest of the SBCT infantry company clears the enemy position, the fixing
platoon normally hands the enemy over to a supporting force, breaks contact, and rejoins
the company. The fixing platoon may be attached to the follow-on force, but this is
unlikely.

4-41. CLEAR AN OBJECTIVE

The company may be tasked with clearing an objective area during an attack to facilitate
the movement of the remainder of the SBCT battalion or with clearing a specific part of a
larger objective area. Situations in which the SBCT infantry company may conduct the
tactical task CLEAR include the following:
• Clear a defile, including high ground surrounding the defile and choke points
within the defile.
• Clear a heavily wooded area.
• Clear a built-up area. (For more detailed discussions of UO, refer to FM 90-10
and FM 90-10-1.)
• Clear a road, trail, or other narrow corridor. This may include obstacles or
other obstructions on the actual roadway, as well as surrounding wooded and
built-up areas.
a. Terrain Factors. The commander must take several important terrain
considerations into account in planning and executing the task CLEAR. These factors

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include obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and
cover and concealment:
(1) Obstacles. Obstacles influence the maneuver of any vehicle entering the objective
area. The narrow corridors, trails, or roads associated with restricted terrain can be
obstructed easily with wire, mines, and log cribs.
(2) Avenues of Approach. Avenues of approach are limited. Consider the impact of
canalization and estimate how much longer it will take to clear the objective area.
(3) Key Terrain. Key terrain may include areas that dominate the approaches or exits
for the objective area as well as any terrain that dominates the fight inside the defile,
wooded area, or built-up area.
(4) Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation and fields of fire favor the enemy.
The attacking force must neutralize this advantage to be successful. Identify dead space
where the enemy cannot see or engage friendly forces. In addition, identify multiple
support by fire positions; these are necessary to support a complex scheme of maneuver
that covers the company’s approach, the actual clearance task, and maneuver beyond the
restricted terrain.
(5) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment are normally abundant for
dismounted infantry elements but scarce for vehicles. Lack of cover leaves vehicles
vulnerable to enemy antitank guided missile (ATGM) fires.
b. Enemy Situation. Careful analysis of the enemy situation is necessary for
success. The enemy analysis should include the following elements:
• Determine the location of the enemy’s vehicles, key weapons, and infantry
elements in the area of operations.
• Identify the type and location of enemy reserve forces.
• Identify the type and location of enemy contact.
• Assess the impact of the enemy’s NBC and artillery capabilities.
c. Clearing in Restricted Terrain. Clearing in restricted terrain is time-consuming
and resource-intensive. During the planning process, the SBCT infantry company
commander evaluates the tactical requirements, resources, and other considerations for
each of the three steps of the operation:
• Approach the restricted terrain.
• Clear the area in and around the restricted area.
• Pass friendly forces, as required.
(1) Approach. The approach focuses on moving combat power into restricted terrain
and posturing it to begin clearing. The company commander takes the following actions:
(a) Establishes support-by-fire positions; destroys or suppresses any known enemy
positions to allow forces to approach the restricted terrain.
(b) Provides additional security by incorporating suppressive indirect fires and
obscuring or screening smoke.
(c) Provides support by fire for the dismounted infantry. Be prepared to cover
infantry elements from their dismount points to the points at which they enter the
restricted terrain such as high ground on either side of a defile, wooded areas on either
side of a trail or road, or buildings on either side of a road in a built-up area.
(d) Moves dismounted infantry elements along axes that provide the best available
cover and concealment. The approach ends when the infantry elements are prepared to
conduct an attack.

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(2) Clear. The clearing begins as the infantry squads begin their attack in and around
the restricted terrain.
(a) Locations where this maneuver may take place include the following:
• On both sides of a defile, either along the ridgelines or high along the walls of
the defile.
• Along the wood lines parallel to a road or trail.
• Around and between buildings on either side of the roadway in a built-up area.
(b) The following actions and considerations are applicable during this step:
• The infantry squads clear in concert with the MGS and or ICVs. Vehicles
provide a base of fire to protect infantry squads as they clear an area. The
infantry stops at a designated point or terrain feature where observation is
affected; it provides a base of fire to allow the MGS or ICVs to bound to a
new support-by-fire position. This cycle continues until the entire area is
cleared.
• Direct fire plans should cover responsibility for both horizontal and vertical
observation and direct fire.
• Infantry squads should clear a defile from the top down and should orient on
objectives on the far side of the defile.
• Dismounted engineers with manual breaching capability should move with the
infantry squads. Additionally, mounted engineer assets should move with the
overwatching MGS to reduce obstacles.
(3) Pass Friendly Forces. The SBCT infantry company may be directed to assist the
passage of another element forward to continue the clearing. When clearing is complete,
the company must be prepared to take any action necessary to pass friendly forces, such
as the following:
• Within the capabilities of the company, assault to destroy enemy forces and
secure the far side of the restricted terrain.
• Maneuver mounted elements to establish support-by-fire positions on the far
side of the restricted terrain.
• Conduct support by fire to protect the deployment of the follow-on force that
is assuming the fight or to destroy or suppress any enemy elements that
threaten the SBCT battalion as it exits the restricted terrain.
• Defeat any counterattacks.
• Protect the obstacle reduction effort.
• Maintain observation beyond the restricted terrain.
• Integrate indirect fires as necessary.

4-42. THE COMPANY AS A RESERVE

The company may be held as the SBCT battalion reserve during an attack. The SBCT
infantry battalion commander commits the reserve to decisively influence the action and
to maintain the momentum of the attack. To exploit the success of the other attacking
SBCT infantry companies and to achieve surprise, the reserve should attack the enemy
from a new direction. Because of the various missions that the reserve may be assigned,
the reserve commander must keep abreast of the tactical situation, know the missions and
the tactical plans of the other companies, and be familiar with the terrain and the enemy
situation in the objective area. The reserve must act quickly and effectively when

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committed. The reserve may be assigned one or more of the following tasks as part of its
be-prepared missions:
• Protect the flanks or the rear of a battalion.
• Assume the mission of another company.
• Support by fire.
• Clear a position that has been overrun or bypassed.
• Attack from a new direction.
• Assist during the consolidation on an objective.
• Guard and evacuate prisoners.

4-43. SECURITY OPERATIONS

The battalion may assign the SBCT infantry company commander a security mission,
such as to screen or guard another friendly unit or asset. This may be part of the SBCT
battalion counterreconnaissance mission (FM 3-21.21 [FM 7-22]). The company
commander may also assign one of these tasks to his platoons as part of his scheme of
maneuver. Security operations require the unit to orient on the friendly forces to prevent
enemy forces from detecting, observing, and engaging. The commander analyzes the
situation and develops his plan as in any tactical situation. Refer to Chapter 7 for detailed
discussion of security operations.

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CHAPTER 5
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The SBCT infantry rifle company has the flexibility to defend in both
restricted and unrestricted terrain through the use of its infantry forces
and the precision direct fires of its MGS platoon. When defending against
a mounted threat in open terrain, it uses its dismounted AT weapons and
MGS to destroy enemy vehicles while its infantry protects its AT assets
from a dismounted assault. However, this unit defends best in restricted
terrain using light infantry decentralized tactics. This chapter covers
specific considerations for use of vehicles (both the MGS and the ICV) in
defending restricted terrain. It also addresses the defensive employment of
MGS vehicles below the platoon level.

Section I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The immediate purpose of defensive actions is to resist, defeat, or destroy an enemy
attack and gain the initiative for the offense. Defensive operations defeat an enemy
attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive
operations. Defensive actions alone are not decisive; they must be combined with or
followed by offensive action. Though the outcome of decisive combat derives from
offensive actions, commanders often find that it is necessary, even advisable, to defend.
Once they make this choice, they must set the conditions for the defense in a way that
allows friendly forces to withstand and hold the enemy while they prepare to seize the
initiative and return to the offense. A thorough understanding of the commander’s intent
is especially critical in defensive operations, which demand precise integration of
combat, combat service, and combat service support elements.

5-1. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

As part of the SBCT defensive operations, the company may defend, delay, withdraw, or
counterattack. The company also may perform security tasks. The company normally
defends as part of the battalion’s defense in the SBCT’s main battle area (MBA). The
three types of defensive operations are--
• Area Defense. Concentrates on denying the enemy access to designated
terrain for a specified time, rather than the outright destruction of the enemy.
The SBCT infantry rifle company, with its enhanced mobility, has the
capability to perform an area defense.
• Mobile Defense. Orients on the destruction of the enemy through a decisive
attack(s) by a striking force. The SBCT infantry rifle company participates in
a mobile defense as the striking force or as part of a larger striking force.
• Retrograde Operations. Forced or voluntary movements to the rear or away
from the enemy. The SBCT infantry rifle company normally participates in
retrograde operations as part of a larger unit.

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5-2. PURPOSES
The immediate purposes of all defensive operations are to defeat an enemy attack and
gain the initiative for offensive operations. The SBCT infantry company also may
conduct the defense to achieve one or more of the following purposes:
• Gain time.
• Retain key terrain.
• Support other operations.
• Preoccupy the enemy in one area while friendly forces attack him in another.
• Erode enemy forces at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly operations.

Section II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE

The characteristics of the defense--preparation, security, disruption, mass, concentration,
and flexibility--are planning fundamentals for the SBCT infantry company. There are two
defensive patterns outlined in FM 3-90: area and mobile. (See FM 3-90 for further
discussion on mobile and area defenses and the characteristics of the defense.)

5-3. PREPARATION
The defender arrives in the battle area before the attacker. He must take advantage of this
by making the most thorough preparations for combat possible in the time he has. By
analyzing the factors of METT-TC, the SBCT infantry rifle company commander gains
an understanding of the tactical situation and identifies potential friendly and enemy
weaknesses. He then war-games friendly and enemy options and synchronizes his
concept of the operation with all available combat multipliers.

5-4. SECURITY
The goals of the company security effort normally include providing early warning,
destroying enemy reconnaissance units, and impeding and harassing enemy main body
elements. The company continues its mission until directed to displace.

5-5. DISRUPTION
Defensive plans vary with the circumstances, but all defensive concepts of operation aim
at disrupting the attacker's synchronization. Counterattacks, indirect fires, obstacles, and
retention of key or decisive terrain prevent the enemy from concentrating his strength
against portions of the defense. Destroying enemy command and control vehicles disrupts
enemy synchronization and flexibility.

5-6. MASS AND CONCENTRATION

The defender must concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place if he is to
succeed. He must obtain a local advantage at points of decision. Offensive action and the
use of surprise and deception are often the means of gaining this advantage. The defender
must remember that this concentration refers to combat power and its effects--not just
numbers of soldiers and weapons systems. To concentrate combat power, the defender
normally must economize in some areas, retain a reserve, and maneuver to gain local
superiority. Local counterattacks may be needed to maintain the integrity of the defense.
Indirect fire can shift to critical points to concentrate destructive effects rapidly.

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5-7. FLEXIBILITY
Flexibility is derived from sound preparation and effective C2. The defender must be
agile enough to counter or avoid the attacker's blow and then strike back effectively.
Flexibility results from a detailed mission analysis, an understanding of the unit's
purpose, aggressive R&S), and, when applicable, organization in depth and retention or
reconstitution of a reserve. Flexibility requires that the company commander "see the
battlefield"--physically and through the COP as well as timely and accurate analog
reports. Supplementary positions on secondary avenues of approach may provide
additional flexibility to the company commander. After a good analysis of the terrain and
enemy, reserves can be positioned to allow the company commander to react to
unanticipated events.

Section III. SEQUENCE OF THE DEFENSE

As part of a larger element, the SBCT infantry rifle company conducts defensive
operations in a sequence of integrated and overlapping steps. The following paragraphs
focus on the tactical considerations and procedures involved in each step. This discussion
illustrates an attacking enemy that uses depth in its operations, but there will be situations
where a company must defend against an enemy that does not have a doctrinal
operational foundation. Such a situation requires a more flexible plan that allows for
more centralized combat power rather than spreading it throughout the company's area of
operations.

5-8. RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS AND ENEMY

PREPARATORY FIRES
Security forces must protect friendly MBA forces and allow them to continue their
defensive preparations. When possible, these security forces work in conjunction with the
SBCT's RSTA squadron. The enemy will attempt to discover the defensive scheme of
maneuver using reconnaissance elements and attacks by forward detachments and
advance guard elements. He also will attempt to breach the SBCT battalion’s tactical
obstacles.
a. Security Force. The goals of the SBCT battalion security force normally include
providing early warning, destroying enemy reconnaissance units, and impeding and
harassing enemy main body elements. The security force continues its mission until
directed to displace. The SBCT battalion commander also may use security forces in his
deception effort to give the illusion of strength in one area while positioning his true
combat power in another. While conducting this type of security operation, the SBCT
infantry rifle company may simultaneously have to prepare battle positions (BPs),
creating a challenging time management problem for the commander and his subordinate
leaders.
b. Guides. During this step, the SBCT infantry company may need to provide guides
to pass the security force and may be tasked to close the passage lanes. The company also
may play a role in shaping the battlefield. The SBCT battalion commander may position
the company to deny likely enemy attack corridors to enhance flexibility and force enemy
elements into friendly engagement areas. When it is not conducting security or
preparation tasks, the company normally occupies hide positions to avoid possible
chemical strikes or enemy artillery preparation.

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5-9. OCCUPATION AND PREPARATION

During this step, the company reconnoiters and occupies its positions. This usually
includes movement from tactical assembly areas to the actual defensive AO, led by a
quartering party that clears the defensive positions. The brigade and battalion establish
security forces during this step, and remaining forces begin to develop engagement areas
and prepare BPs. Operational and tactical security is critical during the occupation to
ensure the company can avoid detection and maintain combat power for the actual
defense. Soldiers at all levels of the company must thoroughly understand their duties and
responsibilities related to the occupation; they must be able to execute the occupation
quickly and efficiently to maximize the time available for planning and preparation of the
defense.

5-10. APPROACH OF THE ENEMY MAIN ATTACK

As this phase begins, the SBCT engages the enemy at long ranges using indirect fires,
electronic warfare, and close air support (deep fight). The goal is to use these assets,
along with disrupting obstacles, to shape the battlefield, to slow the enemy’s advance,
and to disrupt his formations. As the enemy’s main body echelon approaches the SBCT
battalion engagement area, the battalion may initiate indirect fires and CAS to further
weaken the enemy by attrition; at the same time, the SBCT's effort normally shifts to
second-echelon forces. Friendly forces occupy their actual defensive positions before the
enemy reaches direct fire range; they may shift positions in response to enemy actions or
other tactical factors.

NOTE: Long-range fires may be withheld in accordance with a higher commander’s

intent.

5-11. ENEMY ASSAULT

During this step, the enemy deploys to achieve mass at a designated point, normally
employing both assault and support forces. This may leave him vulnerable to the
combined effects of indirect and direct fires and integrated obstacles. The enemy may
employ additional forces to fix friendly elements and prevent their repositioning. Friendly
counterattack forces may be committed against the enemy flank or rear, while other
friendly forces may displace to alternate, supplementary, or subsequent positions in
support of the commander’s scheme of maneuver. All friendly forces should be prepared
for the enemy to maximize employment of combat multipliers, such as dismounted
infantry operations, to create vulnerability. The enemy is also likely to use artillery, CAS,
and chemical weapons to set the conditions for the assault.

5-12. COUNTERATTACK
As the enemy’s momentum slows or stops, friendly forces may launch a counterattack.
The counterattack may be launched purely for offensive purposes to seize the initiative
from the enemy. In some cases, however, the purpose of the counterattack is mainly
defensive, such as reestablishing a position or restoring control of the sector. The SBCT
infantry company may participate in the counterattack as a base of fire element
(providing support by fire for the counterattack force) or as the actual counterattack force.

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5-13. CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION

The company must secure its sector by repositioning forces, destroying remaining enemy
elements, processing EPWs, and reestablishing obstacles. The company conducts all
necessary CSS functions as it prepares to continue the defense. Even when enemy forces
are not actively engaging it, the SBCT infantry company must maintain awareness of the
tactical situation and local security at all times during consolidation and reorganization.
The company then must prepare itself for possible follow-on missions.

Section IV. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The battlefield operating systems (BOS) are a listing of critical tactical activities that
provide a means of reviewing preparations or execution. The synchronization and
coordination of activities within each BOS and among the various BOSs are critical to the
success of the SBCT infantry rifle company.

5-14. MANEUVER
Maneuver is the foundation for the employment of forces on the battlefield. It is defined
as the use of movement in combination with fire (or fire potential), employed to achieve a
position of advantage with respect to the enemy and to facilitate accomplishment of the
mission. In the defense, effective weapons positioning is critical to the company’s
success. The goal of effective weapons positioning is to enable the company to mass fires
at critical points on the battlefield and to enhance its survivability. To do this, the
company commander must maximize the strengths of his weapons systems while
minimizing the company's exposure to enemy observation and fires. The following
paragraphs focus on tactical considerations for weapons positioning.
a. Depth and Dispersion. Dispersing positions laterally and in depth helps to
protect the force from enemy observation and fires. If the terrain allows for the
development of a company engagement area (EA), the positions are established in depth,
allowing sufficient maneuver space within each position to establish in-depth placement
of vehicles, weapons systems, and infantry elements. Fighting positions should be
positioned to allow the massing of fires at critical points on the battlefield.
b. Flank Positions. Flank positions enable a defending force to bring fires to bear on
an attacking force moving parallel to the defender’s forces. An effective flank position
provides the defender with a larger and more vulnerable target while leaving the attacker
unsure of the location of the defense. Major considerations for successful employment of
a flank position are the defender’s ability to secure the flank and his ability to achieve
surprise by remaining undetected. Effective fire control and fratricide avoidance
measures are critical considerations in the employment of flank positions. See Appendix
H for a more detailed discussion of direct fire planning and control.
c. Displacement Planning. Disengagement and displacement allow the company to
retain its operational flexibility and tactical agility in the defense. The ultimate goals of
disengagement and displacement are to enable the company to maintain standoff range
and to avoid being fixed or decisively engaged by the enemy. The commander must
consider several important factors in displacement planning; these include, but are not
limited to, the following:

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• The enemy situation (for example, an enemy attack with two battalion-size
enemy units may prevent the company from disengaging).
• Disengagement criteria.
• Availability of direct fire suppression that can support disengagement by
suppressing or disrupting the enemy.
• Availability of cover and concealment, indirect fires, and smoke to assist
disengagement.
• Obstacle integration, including situational obstacles.
• Positioning of forces on terrain that provides an advantage to the disengaging
elements (such as reverse slopes or natural obstacles).
• Identification of displacement routes and times when disengagement or
displacement will take place. Routes and times are rehearsed.
• The size of the friendly force that must be available to engage the enemy in
support of the displacing unit.
• Location of remount points, times allocated for remounting, and maneuver
considerations for conduct of a remount in contact.
While disengagement and displacement are valuable tactical tools, they can be extremely
difficult to execute in the face of a rapidly moving enemy force. In fact, displacement in
contact poses such great problems that the company commander must plan for it
thoroughly and rehearse displacement before the conduct of the defense. He then must
carefully evaluate the situation at the time displacement in contact becomes necessary to
ensure it is feasible and will not result in unacceptable personnel or equipment losses.
d. Disengagement Criteria. Disengagement criteria dictate to subordinate elements
the circumstances under which they will displace to an alternate, supplementary, or
subsequent BP. The criteria are tied to an enemy action (such as an enemy unit advancing
past phase line DOG) and are linked to the friendly situation (for example, they may
depend on whether artillery or an overwatch element can engage the enemy).
Disengagement criteria are developed during the planning process based on the unique
conditions of a specific situation; they should never be part of the unit’s SOP.
e. Direct Fire Suppression. The attacking enemy force must not be allowed to
bring effective direct and indirect fires to bear on a disengaging friendly force. Direct
fires from the base of fire element, employed to suppress or disrupt the enemy, are the
most effective way to facilitate disengagement. The company may receive base of fire
support from another element in the battalion. In most cases, however, the company
establishes its own base of fire element. Having an internal base of fire requires the
company commander to carefully sequence the displacement of his forces.
f. Cover and Concealment. Ideally, the company and subordinate platoons should
use covered and concealed routes when moving to alternate, supplementary, or
subsequent BPs. Regardless of the degree of protection the route itself affords, the
company and platoons should rehearse the movement. Rehearsals increase the speed at
which they can conduct the move, providing an added measure of security. The
commander must make a concerted effort to allocate available time to rehearse movement
in limited visibility and degraded conditions.
g. Indirect Fires and Smoke. Artillery or mortar fires can assist the company
during disengagement. Suppression fires, placed on an enemy force as it is closing inside
the defender’s standoff range, slow the enemy and cause him to button up. The defending

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force engages the enemy with long-range precision direct fires from the MGS platoon
and then disengages and moves to new positions. Smoke can obscure the enemy’s vision,
slow his progress, or screen the defender’s movement out of the BP or along his
displacement route.
h. Obstacle Integration. Obstacles must be integrated with direct and indirect fires.
By slowing and disrupting enemy movement, obstacles provide the defender with the
time necessary for displacement and allow friendly forces to employ direct and indirect
fires effectively against the enemy. The modular pack mine system (MOPMS) also can
be employed in support of the disengagement, either to block a key displacement route
once the displacing unit has passed through it or to close a lane through a tactical
obstacle. The location of obstacles in support of disengagement depends in large measure
on METT-TC factors. A major consideration is that an obstacle should be positioned far
enough away from the defender that he can effectively engage enemy elements on the far
side of the obstacle while remaining out of range of the enemy’s massed direct fires.
i. Vehicle Employment. Traditionally, vehicles are not employed below section
level; however, if defending in restricted terrain, the SBCT infantry rifle company
commander may consider a different task organization to accomplish his mission. For
example, the commander's concept may lead him to incorporate ICVs within the defense
concept or to task-organize a single MGS vehicle under the control of an infantry platoon
leader. The commander must consider the best employment of his company assets to
accomplish his mission. He must address the security of the vehicles in his plan if
vehicles are not incorporated into the defense.
(1) Vehicles. The SBCT infantry company commander has several options when
employing his vehicles in the defense:
• Incorporate ICVs as part of the defense.
• Dismount the weapon system from the ICVs and incorporate the weapon into
the defense. Use ICVs as CASEVAC platforms.
• Prepare a separate battle position for a platoon's ICVs.
• Prepare MGS positions within platoon battle positions.
• Use the vehicles to mount a strike force.
(2) Vehicles in Support of Infantry. There are special considerations in employing
the vehicles in support of the infantry fight:
• The commander must consider the vehicles' security if they are employed
below platoon level.
• When dismounting the weapon system, the commander must consider the
manning of the weapon system and ICV. The commander must analyze the
need for increased firepower and the consequences of decreased mobility.

5-15. FIRE SUPPORT

For the indirect fire plan to be effective in the defense, the unit must plan and execute
fires in a manner that achieves the intended task and purpose of each target. Indirect fires
serve a variety of purposes in the defense, including the following:
• Slow and disrupt enemy movement.
• Prevent the enemy from executing breaching operations at turning or blocking
obstacles.

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• Destroy or delay enemy forces at obstacles using massed fires or pinpoint

munitions.
• Disrupt enemy support-by-fire elements.
• Defeat attacks along infantry avenues of approach with the use of final
protective fire (FPF).
• Disrupt the enemy to allow friendly elements to disengage or conduct
counterattacks.
• Obscure enemy observation or screen friendly movement during
disengagement and counterattacks.
• Use smoke to separate enemy echelons, to screen friendly displacement, or to
silhouette enemy formations to facilitate direct fire engagement.
• Deliver scatterable mines to close lanes and gaps in obstacles, to disrupt or
prevent enemy breaching operations, to disrupt enemy movement at choke
points, or to separate or isolate enemy echelons.
• Provide illumination as necessary.
• Execute suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions to support CAS,
attack aviation, and high-payoff targets.
a. Fire Support Assets. In developing the fire plan, the company commander must
evaluate the indirect fire systems available to provide support. Considerations include
tactical capabilities, weapons ranges, and available munitions. These factors help the
company commander and FSO determine the best method for achieving the task and
purpose of each target in the fire plan.
b. FIST Positioning. The company’s fire support personnel contribute significantly
to the fight. Effective positioning is critical. The company commander and FSO must
select positions that provide fire support personnel with unobstructed observation of the
area of operations. In addition, the FSV should receive high priority for a position with
enhanced survivability.

5-16. AIR DEFENSE

The focus of the air defense plan is on likely air avenues of approach for enemy fixed-
wing aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs. Air avenues of approach may or may not
correspond with the enemy’s ground avenues of approach. ADA assets that are available
to the SBCT infantry rifle company are positioned based on METT-TC factors and the
SBCT infantry battalion commander’s scheme of maneuver. For example, ADA assets
are usually positioned about 2 kilometers apart to maximize the Stinger’s capabilities in
the defense. The Stinger then becomes the primary killer of rotary-wing and fixed-wing
aircraft, with combined arms air defense (small arms and vehicle-mounted weapons
systems) for close-in defense. In another situation, the SBCT battalion S2 and the
supporting air defense commander or leader may determine that the air defense systems
should be positioned independent of the friendly ground maneuver elements. These
systems also are frequently used to protect friendly counterattack forces against aerial
observation or attack. Another factor in air defense planning is resupply of Stinger
missiles, which places unique demands on the company and requires detailed planning
and consideration. It may be necessary to pre-position Stingers in the company area to
facilitate timely resupply.

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5-17. MOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY, AND COUNTERMOBILITY

Mobility focuses on preserving the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces. Survivability
focuses on protecting friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapon systems.
Countermobility limits the maneuver of enemy forces and enhances the effectiveness of
fires.
a. Mobility. Initially during defensive preparations, mobility operations focus on the
ability to resupply, reposition, and conduct rearward and forward passage of forces,
material, and equipment. Once defensive preparations are complete, the focus normally
shifts to supporting the company reserve, local counterattacks, and the higher HQ
counterattack or reserve. Priorities set by the SBCT battalion may specify routes for
improvement in support of such operations. Normally, all or most of the available
engineer assets are allocated to the survivability/countermobility effort until defensive
preparations are complete. At a designated time or trigger, engineers disengage from
obstacle and survivability position construction and begin preparing for focused mobility
operations.
b. Survivability. The SBCT engineer company is extremely limited in organic
earthmoving equipment. It is capable of preparing hasty fighting positions and improving
reverse-slope positions during the transition to a hasty defense, but to construct
survivability positions for a deliberate defense, the SBCT requires equipment
augmentation from a divisional engineer battalion. Thus, it is critical that SBCT infantry
battalions and companies maximize the effects of terrain when selecting positions for key
weapons and vehicles.
(1) Survivability positions are prepared in BPs or strongpoints to protect infantry
elements, weapons systems, and vehicles. Positions can be constructed and reinforced
with overhead cover to provide infantry and crew-served weapons with protection against
shrapnel from air bursts.
(2) The commander prepares the company area for the arrival of the high mobility
engineer excavators (HMEE) by marking positions and designating guides for the
engineer vehicles. If time is available, vehicle positions are constructed with both hull-
defilade firing positions and turret-defilade observation positions. In addition, the
company may use digging assets for ammunition caches at alternate, supplementary, or
subsequent BPs or in individual vehicle positions. In the event that the company is
defending as part of a battalion defense, the process of digging all the SBCT infantry
battalion assets will require many "blade hours."
(3) With limited organic engineer assets, the SBCT allocates specific equipment, by
type and time, to battalions and companies. The SBCT infantry rifle company
commander must know the number of blade hours and positions (vehicle and individual)
he requires, understand the number of blade hours and positions allocated to him, and
prepare a prioritized plan based on his analysis of "required" versus "available." For
example, the company commander may have time to dig in only the positions that have
the least amount of natural cover and concealment. Soil composition also should be a
consideration in BP selection; sites to be avoided include those where the soil is overly
soft, hard, wet, or rocky. However, placement to support the direct fire plan must be the
main consideration.

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(4) It is critical that all leaders understand the survivability plan and priorities, that
one leader within the company is specifically designated to enforce the plan and
priorities, and that completion status is accurately reported and tracked.
c. Countermobility. To be successful in the defense, the company commander must
integrate individual obstacles into both direct and indirect fire plans, taking into account
the intent of each obstacle group. At the SBCT level, obstacle intent consists of the target
of the obstacle group, the desired effect on the target, and the relative location of the
group. In addition, like artillery and mortar employment, obstacle emplacement must
have a clear task and purpose. The purpose influences many aspects of the operation,
from selection and design of obstacle sites to actual conduct of the defense. Normally, the
battalion or SBCT designates the purpose of an obstacle group. (Refer to FM 90-7 for
additional information on obstacle planning, siting, and turnover.)
(1) Tactical Obstacles. The SBCT battalion designs and resources tactical obstacle
groups and assigns them to companies. The battalion commander provides obstacle
planning guidance, in terms of obstacle intent, to company commanders and the engineer.
Obstacle intent includes the target (enemy force), the desired effect (on the target), and
the relative location (relative to terrain, enemy, and friendly) of the company’s assigned
obstacle group. For example, the battalion commander might specify this purpose: "We
must deny the enemy access to our flank by turning the northern, first-echelon motorized
rifle battalion (MRB) into our engagement area, allowing Companies B and C to mass
their fires to destroy it." Due to the nonlinear, highly mobile nature of SBCT operations,
the force relies heavily on scatterable minefield systems and sub-munitions as primary
tactical obstacle construction means. These systems, with their self- and command-
destruct capability, optimize flexibility and better support rapid transitions between
offensive and defensive operations than do conventional mines and other constructed
obstacles. The force constructs conventional minefields and obstacles only when
preparing a deliberate, long-term defense. In this situation, the SBCT battalion and
companies are usually augmented with assets from a divisional engineer battalion. Table
5-1 shows the symbology for each obstacle effect and describes the purpose and
characteristics inherent in each.

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 FM 3-21.11

OBSTACLE FIRES AND OBSTACLE

EFFECT PURPOSE OBSTACLES MUST: CHARACTERISTICS

• Breakup enemy formations. • Cause the enemy to deploy • Do not require extensive
early. resources.
• Interrupt the enemy's
timetable and C2. • Slow part of his formation while • Difficult to detect at long
allowing part to advance range.
DISRUPT • Cause premature commitment
unimpeded.
➊ of breach assets.
• Cause the enemy to
piecemeal his attack.
• Slow an attacker within an • Cause the enemy to deploy • Arrayed in depth.
area so he can be destroyed. into attack formation before
• Span the entire width of the
encountering the obstacles.
FIX • Generate the time necessary avenue of approach.
for the friendly force to • Allow the enemy to advance
➋ disengage. slowly in an EA or AO.
• Must not make the terrain
appear impenetrable.
• Make the enemy fight in
multiple directions once he is in
the EA or AO.
• Force the enemy to move in • Prevent the enemy from • Tie into impassable terrain at
the direction desired by the bypassing or breaching the the anchor point.
friendly commander. obstacle belt.
• Consist of obstacles in depth.
TURN • Maintain pressure on the
• Provide a subtle orientation
enemy force throughout the turn.
➌ relative to the enemy's
• Mass direct and indirect fires at approach.
the anchor point of the turn.
• Stop an attacker along a • Prevent the enemy from • Must tie into impassable
specific avenue of approach. bypassing or penetrating through terrain.
the belt.
BLOCK • Prevent an attacker from • Consist of complex obstacles.
passing through an AO or EA. • Stop the enemy's advance.
➍ • Defeat the enemy's mounted
• Stop the enemy from using an • Destroy all enemy breach and dismounted breaching
avenue of approach and force efforts. effort.
him to use another avenue of
approach.

Table 5-1. Obstacle effects.

(2) Protective Obstacles. SBCT infantry rifle companies are responsible for planning
and constructing their own protective obstacles. To be most effective, these should be
tied into existing or tactical reinforcing obstacles. The company may use mines and wire
from its basic load or receive additional materiel (including MOPMS, if available) from
the battalion Class IV or V supply point. The company also may be responsible for any
other required coordination (such as that needed in a relief in place), for recovery of the
obstacle or for its destruction (as in the case of MOPMS).
(a) In planning for protective obstacles, the commander must evaluate the potential
threat to the company's position and then employ the appropriate system to counter that
threat. For example, MOPMS is predominantly an antitank system best used on mounted
avenues of approach, but it does have some antipersonnel applications. Wire obstacles,
on the other hand, may be most effective when employed on dismounted avenues. FM
90-7 provides detailed planning guidance for protective obstacle emplacement.
(b) Protective obstacles are usually located beyond hand grenade distance (40 to 100
meters) from the soldier's fighting position, and may extend out 300 to 500 meters to tie
into tactical obstacles and existing restricted terrain. As with tactical obstacles, the

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commander should plan protective obstacles in depth and attempt to maximize the
effective range of his weapons.
(c) When planning protective obstacles, the company commander should consider the
amount of time required to prepare them, the burden on the logistical system, the soldiers'
loads, and the risk of the enemy detecting the obstacles and the resulting loss of surprise.
(3) Wire Obstacles. There are three types of wire obstacles (Figure 5-1): protective
wire, tactical wire, and supplementary wire.
(a) Protective wire may be a complex obstacle providing all-round protection of a
platoon perimeter, or it may be a simple wire obstacle on the likely dismounted avenue of
approach (AA) into a squad ambush position. Command-detonated M18 Claymore mines
may be integrated into the protective wire or used separately.
(b) Tactical wire is positioned to increase the effectiveness of the company's fires. It
usually is positioned along the friendly side of the machine gun final protective lines
(FPLs). Tactical minefields also may be integrated into these wire obstacles or may be
used separately.
(c) Supplementary wire obstacles are used to break up the line of tactical wire to
prevent the enemy from locating friendly weapons (particularly the machine guns) by
following the tactical wire.

Figure 5-1. Protective wire obstacles.

(4) Obstacle Lanes. The company may be responsible for actions related to lanes
through obstacles. These duties may include marking lanes in an obstacle, reporting
locations of the start and end points of each lane, manning contact points, providing
guides for elements passing through the obstacle, and closing the lane.

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5-18. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

In addition to the CSS functions required for all operations (Chapter 11), the SBCT
infantry rifle company commander’s planning process should include the considerations
highlighted in the following paragraphs.
a. Pre-Positioning and Caches. The commander’s mission analysis may reveal that
the company’s ammunition needs during an upcoming operation exceed its basic load.
This requires the company to pre-position ammunition caches. The caches, which may be
positioned either at an alternate or subsequent BP or with the ICVs and MGSs, should be
both dug in and guarded.
b. Position of Train.. The company trains normally operate one terrain feature to
the rear of the company to provide immediate recovery and medical support. The
commander also must ensure that all elements know the locations of the SBCT battalion's
combat trains and main aid stations and that they plan and rehearse casualty evacuation
procedures.

Section V. PREPARATION AND INTEGRATION

The company commander's analysis determines the most effective measures for every
mission. This section describes the techniques and planning considerations available to
the company commander as he prepares his defense.

5-19. DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES

The company normally defends using one of these basic defensive techniques:
• Defend in sector.
• Defend a BP.
• Defend a strongpoint.
• Defend a perimeter.
• Defend in a linear defense.
• Defend in a nonlinear defense.
• Defend on a reverse slope.
The control measures for the defense are sectors, battle positions, or a combination of
these measures. There are no set criteria for selecting the control measures, but Table 5-2,
page 5-14, provides some basic considerations.

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BATTLE POSITION SECTOR

WELL-DEFENDED;
ENEMY CAN BE AVENUES OF APPROACH NOT EASILY DEFINED
CANALIZED
DOMINATES
DOMINATING TERRAIN
AVENUES OF TERRAIN
NOT AVAILABLE
APPROACH
UNIT AREA OF
NARROW/SMALL WIDE/LARGE
OPERATIONS
CANNOT EASILY BE
ACHIEVABLE MUTUAL SUPPORT
ACHIEVED
COMMANDERS' ABILITY
GOOD DEGRADED
TO SEE/CONTROL

RETAIN, BLOCK ASSIGNED TASK DISRUPT, CONTAIN

Table 5-2. Selecting control measures.

5-20. SECTOR DEFENSE

A sector is the company control measure that provides the most freedom of action to a
platoon. It provides the platoon with the flexibility to operate in a decentralized manner
while still ensuring sufficient control exists to prevent confusion and to synchronize the
company's operation. In restricted terrain, where dismounted infantry forces prefer to
work, it is difficult to achieve mutual support between the company's platoon battle
positions. It is also very difficult for the commander to see and control the fight
throughout the company sector.
a. Company Disposition. The company disposition may consist of platoon sectors,
a series of mutually supporting BPs on restricted terrain, or a combination of the two
(Figure 5-2). Positions are arrayed in depth. The strength of the sector comes from its
flexibility. This defense normally orients on the enemy force and not on retaining terrain.
It is effective because it allows the enemy to expose his flanks and critical C2 and CS
assets through his own maneuver into the depth of the defense.

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Figure 5-2. Company defense in sector, with a platoon in a BP.

b. Decentralization. By assigning platoon sectors, the company may fight a defense

in sector very similar to a nonlinear defense. This decentralized technique for conducting
a defense in sector requires greater initiative and delegates more of the control to
subordinate leaders. The small-unit actions are very similar to the nonlinear defense.
When required, squads or platoons may disengage independently and move to another
location within the sector to continue the fight. Considerations for the company R&S plan
and employment of a reserve also are very similar to the nonlinear defense.
c. Platoon Battle Positions. When fighting a company defense in sector from
platoon battle positions, the concept is to defeat the attacker through the depth of his
formation by confronting him with effective fires from mutually supporting BPs as he
attempts to maneuver around them. Infantry positions, patrols, mines, and other obstacles
cover gaps that, due to terrain masking or heavy woods, cannot be covered effectively by
direct fire. Units remain in place except for local or internal movement to alternate or
supplementary positions. If certain platoon positions become untenable during the battle,
the company commander may withdraw the platoons according to prepared plans.
(1) One technique is to allow the enemy to move into the EA and destroy him with
massed fires. Another technique is to engage the attacker at maximum range with fires
from tactical aircraft, attack helicopters, field artillery, and mortars, then to engage with
organic antiarmor weapons positioned to deliver fires at maximum effective ranges from
the flanks and rear. As the enemy closes, antiarmor weapons may move to alternate or
supplementary firing positions within the BP to continue firing and avoid being bypassed.
(2) The company defense in sector from platoon battle positions generally requires
the company commander to be able to see and control the battle. It also requires good

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fields of fire to allow mutual support. If the terrain or the expected enemy course of
action prevents this, the defense may be more effective if control is more decentralized
and the platoons fight in sector.
(3) A significant concern, particularly when fighting from BPs, is the enemy's ability
to isolate a part of the company and then fix and destroy or bypass them. Without
effective mutual support between the BPs, this is likely to occur. Even with mutual
support, responsive and effective indirect fire support may be critical to defending the
BPs. Without immediately available fire support, a capable enemy will quickly
concentrate combat power against any BP that is identified.

5-21. BATTLE POSITION DEFENSE

A battle position is a general location and orientation of forces on the ground from which
units defend. The platoon is located within the general area of the BP. Security elements
may be located forward and to the flanks of the BP. Platoons defending a BP may not be
tied in with adjacent units; thus, the requirement for all-round security is increased. When
assigning BPs, the commander assigns his platoons sectors of fire and primary positions
to defend. Each position must contribute to the company's accomplishment of its assigned
task and purpose within the battalion commander's concept of the operation. A
commander also may assign alternate and supplementary positions to platoons,
depending on the situation.
a. Alternate Position. An alternate position is a position to the front, flank, or
slightly to the rear of the primary position (Figure 5-3). It must allow the platoon to cover
the same sector of fire as the primary position. If it is to be occupied during limited
visibility, it may be forward of the primary position. The alternate position may be
occupied if the platoon is driven out of the primary position by enemy fire or by assault,
or it may be occupied to begin the fight to deceive the enemy of the platoon's primary
position.

Figure 5-3. Alternate position.

b. Supplementary Position. A supplementary position is to the flank or the rear of

the primary position. It allows the platoon to defend against an attack on an avenue of
approach not covered by the primary position (Figure 5-4). It can be assigned when the
platoon must cover more than one avenue of approach. A platoon moves from its

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primary, alternate, or supplementary position only with the commander's approval or

when a condition exists that the commander has prescribed as a reason to move.

Figure 5-4. Supplementary position.

c. Centralized Technique. Fighting from battle positions is a more centralized

technique and also may be more linear at the company level (Figure 5-5, page 5-18).
Even so, it should not be a static defense. Battle positions should be positioned to achieve
surprise and to allow maneuver within and between BPs. Defense from BPs is effective
in concentrating combat power into an engagement area. It prevents the enemy from
isolating one part of the company and concentrating his combat power in this area.
Normally, platoons are assigned mutual supporting battle positions that cover the enemy's
likely avenue of approach. These BPs are located on terrain that provides cover and
concealment and restricts vehicular movement.
d. Achieving Surprise. The commander's concept for fighting this defensive
technique should concentrate on achieving surprise for each of the BPs. This is
accomplished by conducting an effective counterreconnaissance effort to prevent the
enemy from locating the BPs and by initiating fires from one BP and waiting for the
enemy to react to this engagement prior to engaging from the other BPs (Figure 5-5, page
5-18). Fighting in this manner confuses the enemy and disrupts his C2 process.

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Figure 5-5. Defense from mutually supporting platoon battle positions.

(5) When the terrain provides a large EA and the commander's concept allows most
of the enemy into the EA, the company may engage with massed fires from all platoon
BPs. A disadvantage to this technique is that if there are still uncommitted enemy forces
outside the EA, they will know the locations of the BPs and will attempt to isolate and
concentrate against them. Contingency plans to disengage from these BPs and reorganize
to continue the fight must be developed. This may involve displacing to alternate BPs or
disengaging to conduct counterattacks or spoiling attacks against identified enemy C2,
CS, or CSS assets.
(6) Instead of one company EA, multiple EAs may be identified to provide flexibility
to the plan (Figure 5-6). The plan must clearly state which platoons must reorient fires
into the alternate engagement area and when they must do so.

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Figure 5-6. Multiple engagement areas.

5-22. STRONGPOINT DEFENSE.

A company may be directed to construct a strongpoint as part of a larger SBCT infantry
battalion defense (Figure 5-7, page 5-20). In order to do so, it must be augmented with
engineer support, more weapons, and CSS resources. A strongpoint is defended until the
commander directing the defense formally orders the unit out of it.
a. The specific positioning of units in the strongpoint depends on the company
commander’s mission analysis. The same considerations for a perimeter defense apply, in
addition to the following:
(1) Reinforce each individual fighting position (to include alternate and
supplementary positions) to withstand small-arms fire, mortar fire, and artillery
fragmentation. Stockpile food, water, ammunition, pioneer tools, and medical supplies in
each fighting position.
(2) Support each individual fighting position with several others. Plan or construct
covered and concealed routes between positions and along routes of supply and
communication. Use these to support counterattack and maneuver within the strongpoint.

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Figure 5-7. Company strongpoint.

(3) Divide the strongpoint into several independent, but mutually supporting,
positions or sectors. If one of the positions or sectors must be evacuated or is overrun,
limit the enemy penetration with obstacles and fires and support a counterattack.
(4) Construct obstacles and minefields to disrupt and canalize enemy formations, to
reinforce fires, and to protect the strongpoint from the assault. Place the obstacles and
mines out as far as friendly units can observe them, within the strongpoint, and at points
in between where they will be useful.
(5) Prepare range cards for each position and confirm them by fires. Plan indirect
fires in detail and register them. Also plan indirect fires for firing directly on the
strongpoint using proximity fuses.
(6) Plan and test several means of communication within the strongpoint and to
higher headquarters. Possibilities include radio, wire, messenger, pyrotechnics, and other
signals.
(7) Improve or repair the strongpoint until the unit is relieved or withdrawn. More
positions can be built, tunnels and trenches dug, existing positions improved or repaired,
and barriers built or fixed.
b. A strongpoint may be part of any defensive plan. It may be built to protect vital
units or installations, as an anchor around which more mobile units maneuver, or as part
of a trap designed to destroy enemy forces that attack it.
c. Mold the strongpoint to the terrain and use natural camouflage and obstacles.
Existing obstacles can support formidable strongpoints, providing cover, concealment,
and obstacles. Complex and urban areas are also easily converted to strongpoints. Stone,
brick, or steel buildings provide cover and concealment. Buildings, sewers, and some
streets provide covered and concealed routes and can be rubbled to provide obstacles.
Telephone systems can provide communications.

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5-23. PERIMETER DEFENSE

A perimeter defense allows the defending force to orient in all directions (Figure 5-8). In
terms of weapons emplacement, direct and indirect fire integration, and reserve
employment, a commander conducting a perimeter defense must consider the same
factors as for a strongpoint operation. The SBCT infantry rifle company may be called
upon to execute this type of defense under a variety of conditions, including the
following:
• When it must hold critical terrain in areas where the defense is not tied in with
adjacent units.
• When it has been bypassed and isolated by the enemy and must defend in
place.
• When it conducts occupation of an independent assembly area or reserve
position.
• When it begins preparation of a strongpoint.
• When it is directed to concentrate fires into two or more adjacent avenues of
approach.
a. Preparations. The SBCT infantry company prepares a perimeter defense when
there are no friendly units adjacent to it (Figure 5-8, page 5-22). A perimeter defense may
be used in a reserve position, in an assembly area or patrol base, on a follow-on
decentralized company operation, during resupply, or when the company is isolated. The
following actions constitute setting up a perimeter defense:

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Figure 5-8. Company perimeter defense.

(1) Preparing a perimeter defense is like preparing any other position defense, but the
company must disperse in a circular configuration for all-round security (the actual shape
depends on the terrain). The company must be prepared to defend in all directions.
(2) The commander assigns the infantry platoon covering the most likely approach a
smaller sector than the other platoons. He prepares alternate and supplementary positions
within the perimeter.
(3) If available, Javelins and MGS vehicles cover likely armor approaches. They may
use hide positions and move forward to fire as the enemy appears. The commander
should assign several firing positions to Javelins and MGS vehicles. If there are few
positions for them, they are assigned a primary position and are dug in.
(4) Keep the mortars near the center of the perimeter so their minimum range (70
meters) does not restrict their ability to fire in any direction. They should be dug in and
have covered ammunition storage bunkers. They communicate by phone (the wire is
buried). The fire direction center (FDC) is dug in with overhead cover.
(5) If possible, hold at least one mounted rifle squad in reserve. The company
commander assigns a primary position to the rear of the platoon, covering the most

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dangerous avenue of approach. He also may assign the rifle squad supplementary
positions since it must be prepared to fight in all directions.
(6) Prepare obstacles in depth around the perimeter.
(7) Plan direct and indirect fire as for any type of defense. Plan and use fire support
from outside the perimeter when available.
(8) Counter enemy probing attacks by area fire weapons (artillery, mortars,
Claymores, and grenade launchers) to avoid revealing the locations of fighting positions.
(9) If the enemy penetrates the perimeter, the reserve blocks the penetration and
covers friendly soldiers while they move to their alternate or supplementary positions.
Even though the company's counterattack ability is limited, it must strive to restore its
perimeter.
(10) CSS elements may support from within the perimeter or from another position.
Supply and evacuation may be by air. Consider the availability of landing zones and drop
zones (protected from enemy observation and fire) when selecting and preparing the
position.
b. Y Variation. The Y-shaped perimeter defense is a variation of the perimeter
defense that uses the terrain effectively. This defense is used when the terrain, cover and
concealment, or the fields of fire do not support the physical positioning of the platoons
in a circular manner. The Y-shaped perimeter defense (Figure 5-9, page 5-24) is so
named because the platoon battle positions are positioned on three different axes
radiating from one central point. It is still a perimeter defense because it is effective
against an attack from any direction. The Y-shaped defense provides all-round perimeter
fires without having to position soldiers on the perimeter. It is most likely to be effective
in mountainous terrain, but it also may be effective in a dense jungle environment due to
limited fields of fire. All of the fundamentals of a perimeter defense previously discussed
apply, with the following adjustments and special considerations:
(1) Although each platoon battle position has a primary orientation for its fires, each
platoon must be prepared to reorient to mass fires into the EAs to its rear.
(2) When no most likely enemy approach is identified, or during limited visibility,
each platoon may have half its soldiers oriented into the EAs to the front and half into the
EAs to the rear. Ideally, supplementary individual fighting positions are prepared to allow
the soldiers to reposition when required to mass fires into one EA.

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Figure 5-9. Y-shaped perimeter defense.

(3) When a most likely enemy avenue of approach is identified, the company
commander may adjust the normal platoon orientations to concentrate fires (Figure 5-10).
This entails accepting risk in another area of the perimeter. The company security plan
should compensate for this with additional OPs, patrols, or other measures.
(4) The positioning of the company CP, mortars, a reserve, or any CSS assets is much
more difficult due to a lack of depth within the perimeter.

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Figure 5-10. Modified Y-shaped perimeter defense.

(5) The most difficult aspect of the Y-shaped perimeter defense is the fire control
measures required. To safely fight this defense without casualties from friendly fire, the
leaders must ensure the limits of fire for each weapon do not allow fires into the adjacent
platoon position. In a mountainous environment, firing downward into the EAs may
make this more simple. Some measures to consider include:
• Position machine guns near the apex of the Y to allow an FPL that covers the
platoon front while firing away from the adjacent platoon.
• Cover the areas of the EAs closest to the apex with Claymores, other mines, or
obstacles to reduce the need for direct fires in these areas.
• Identify those positions at most risk to friendly fires and prepare the fighting
position to protect the soldier from fires in this direction.
• The loss of one platoon position may threaten the loss of the entire company.
To prevent this, plan and rehearse immediate counterattacks with a reserve or
the least committed platoon.
• Consider allowing the enemy to penetrate well into the EAs and destroy him
as in an ambush.
• Be aware that if a Y-shaped defense is established on the prominent terrain
feature and the enemy has the ability to mass fires, he may fix the company
with direct fires and destroy it with massed indirect fires.

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5-24. LINEAR DEFENSE

This technique allows interlocking and overlapping observation and fields of fire across
the company's front (Figure 5-11). The bulk of the company's combat power is well
forward. Sufficient resources must be available to provide adequate combat power across
the sector to detect and stop an attack. The company relies on fighting from well-
prepared mutually supporting positions. It uses a high volume of direct and indirect fires
to stop the attacker. The main concern when fighting a linear defense is the lack of
flexibility and the difficulty of both seizing the initiative and seeking out enemy
weaknesses. When the enemy has a mobility advantage, a linear defense may be
extremely risky. Obstacles, indirect fires, and contingency planning are key to this
maneuver. The company depends upon surprise, well-prepared positions, and deadly
accurate fires to defeat the enemy. The reserve is usually small, perhaps a squad.
a. Terrain Considerations. A linear defense may be used when defensible terrain is
available in the forward portion of the company's sector or to take advantage of a major
linear natural obstacle. It is also used when the enemy is mainly infantry, when the
company conducts a security mission such as counter-infiltration, or when directed by
battalion.

Figure 5-11. Linear defense.

b. Obstacles. Minefields and other obstacles are positioned and covered by fire to
slow the attacker and to inflict casualties on him. Initially, engage him at long range by

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supporting fires (tactical air, attack helicopters, and field artillery) to disrupt the
momentum of his attack. Use fires from mortars, machine guns, and small arms as he
comes into range. If he penetrates the defense, block his advance with the reserve and
shift fire from the forward platoons onto the enemy flanks. Then counterattack (either by
the company reserve or the least committed platoon) with intense fires to destroy isolated
or weakened enemy forces and regain key terrain.
c. Counterreconnaissance. The counterreconnaissance effort is critical when
fighting a linear defense to deny the enemy the locations of the company's forward
positions. If the enemy locates the forward positions, he will concentrate combat power
where he desires while fixing the rest of the company to prevent their maneuver to
disrupt his attack. This effort may be enhanced by initially occupying and fighting from
alternate positions forward of the primary positions. This enhances the security mission
and deceives the enemy reconnaissance that may get through the security force.

5-25. NONLINEAR DEFENSE

The nonlinear defense is the most decentralized and dynamic defense conducted by an
SBCT infantry company. It is frequently used when operating against an enemy force that
has equal or greater firepower and mobility capabilities. This type of defense is almost
exclusively enemy-oriented and is not well suited for retaining terrain. It depends on
surprise, offensive action, and the initiative of small-unit leaders to be successful (Figure
5-12). It is a very fluid defense with little static positioning involved.

Figure 5-12. Nonlinear defense.

a. Company Focus. Normally, SBCT battalion directs this defensive technique

when the battalion concept does not focus the company. An example is when the
battalion assigns the company a sector and a mission that focuses the company on the

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enemy force. Mutual support is achieved solely through the linkage of purposes in the
mission statements. The company commander may decide to conduct a nonlinear defense
when he finds it difficult to identify a single decisive point that allows the company to
concentrate combat power and achieve its purpose. Nonlinear defense may also be
appropriate in terrain that prevents mutual support between platoons or against an enemy
force capable of directing overwhelming firepower against identified friendly positions.
b. Reconnaissance and Security. The reconnaissance and security plan for this
defensive technique focuses on avoiding detection by the enemy's reconnaissance assets.
Operating in smaller units supports this requirement. Preparation and activity along likely
reconnaissance routes must be closely controlled. Ideally, the company allows the enemy
reconnaissance to move through the area before destroying him.
c. Platoon Sectors. The company commander assigns platoon sectors and may also
identify likely ambush positions and rally points for each platoon. He identifies a main
effort and assigns the supporting efforts missions that provide mutual support and
degrade the enemy's ability to generate combat power against the main effort. The main
effort may be weighted by assigning priority of fires; by the allocation of mines, barrier
materials, and other supplies; and by locating the company CP, casualty collection point
(CCP), and most of the caches in their vicinity.
d. Event-oriented Synchronization. The platoons conduct numerous squad and
platoon ambushes, raids, and counterattacks, but they avoid decisive engagement. Before
the enemy is able to react and concentrate against these small units, they disengage and
seek out another enemy weak point. The synchronization for this defense may be event-
oriented or accomplished by assigning ambush locations and initiating times or signals.
The event-oriented synchronization involves identifying key enemy assets or vehicles
that, if destroyed or disrupted, will have the greatest detrimental effect on the enemy.
e. Company Reserve. A company reserve is normally quite small. Due to the
extended distances over which the company and platoons operate, the timely employment
of the company reserve in a decisive action is not likely. Generally, the platoons are able
to employ resources more effectively. A squad-sized company reserve with ICV support
could be employed under the control of the 1SG as a logistics squad, for CASEVAC, or
as a reaction force to support the main effort.
f. Other Considerations. Other concerns include the difficulty of conducting
resupply operations and casualty evacuation when defending in this manner. Resupply
can be accomplished through pre-positioning of the critical supplies. CASEVAC requires
detailed planning and battalion support. Platoon CCPs must be identified well forward to
support each platoon. Litter teams moving on routes that avoid the enemy normally
conduct the evacuation from these points to the company CCP. If possible, vehicular
evacuation begins at the company collection point or as far forward as possible.
Treatment teams from the BAS should be positioned at the company collection point,
particularly if casualties may need to be held until darkness for evacuation.

5-26. REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE

An alternative to defending on the forward slope of a hill or a ridge is to defend on a
reverse slope (Figure 5-13). In such a defense, the company is deployed on terrain that is
masked from enemy direct fire and ground observation by the crest of a hill. Although
some units and weapons may be positioned on the forward slope, the crest, or the

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counterslope (a forward slope of a hill to the rear of a reverse slope), most forces are on
the reverse slope. The key to this defense is control of the crest by direct fire. The MGS
platoon is located on the counterslope to maximize its standoff.
a. General Considerations. These considerations generally apply when defending
on a reverse slope.
(1) The crest protects the company from direct fire. This is a distinct advantage if the
attacker has greater weapons range than the defender. The reverse slope defense can
eliminate or reduce the standoff advantage of the attacker. It also makes enemy
adjustment of his indirect fire more difficult since he cannot see his rounds impact. It
keeps the enemy's second echelon from supporting his first echelon's assault.

Figure 5-13. Company defense on a reverse slope.

(2) The enemy may be deceived and may advance to close contact before he
discovers the defensive position. Therefore, the defender may gain the advantage of
surprise.
(3) The defender can improve positions, build obstacles, and clear fields of fire
without disclosing his positions.
(4) The defender may use dummy positions on the forward slope to deceive the
enemy.
(5) Resupply and evacuation (when under attack) may be easier when defending on a
reverse slope.

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FM 3-21.11

(6) Enemy target acquisition and jamming efforts are degraded. Enemy radar,
infrared sights, and thermal viewers cannot detect soldiers masked by a hill. Radios with
a hill between them and the enemy are less vulnerable to jamming and direction finders.
(7) Enemy use of CAS and attack helicopters is restricted. Enemy aircraft must attack
defensive positions from the flank or from the rear, which makes it easier for friendly air
defense weapons to hit them.
(8) A counterattacking unit has more freedom of maneuver since it is masked from
the enemy's direct fire.
(9) The thinner armor on top of armored vehicles may be left open to antiarmor shots.
(10) The crest can provide protection from the blast effect of a nuclear explosion.
b. Special Considerations. These considerations may apply when defending on a
reverse slope.
(1) Observation of the enemy is more difficult. Soldiers in this position see forward
no farther than the crest. This makes it hard to determine exactly where the enemy is as
he advances, especially when visibility is poor. OPs must be placed forward of the
topographic crest for early warning and long-range observation.
(2) Egress from the position may be more difficult.
(3) Fields of fire are normally short.
(4) Obstacles on the forward slope can be covered only with indirect fire or by units
on the flanks of the company unless some weapons systems are initially placed forward.
(5) If the enemy gains the crest, he can assault downhill. This may give him a
psychological advantage.
(6) If OPs are insufficient or improperly placed, the defenders may have to fight an
enemy who suddenly appears in strength at close range.
c. Feasibility. A defense on a reverse slope may be effective when--
(1) The enemy has more long-range weapons than the defender.
(2) The forward slope has little cover and concealment.
(3) The forward slope is untenable because of enemy fire.
(4) The forward slope has been lost or not yet gained.
(5) There are better fields of fire on the reverse slope.
(6) It adds to the surprise and deception.
d. Plans. The fundamentals of the defense apply to a defense on a reverse slope.
(1) Position forward platoons within 200 to 500 meters of the crest of the defended
hill or ridge and site them so they block enemy approaches and exploit existing obstacles.
They should permit surprise fire on the crest and on the approaches around the crest.
Forward fighting positions should have rear and overhead cover to protect friendly
soldiers from fratricide.
(2) Position OPs, including FIST personnel, on the crest or the forward slope of the
defended hill. At night, increase OPs and patrol units to prevent infiltration. Machine
guns may be attached to OPs.
(3) Position the platoon in depth or reserve where it can provide the most flexibility,
support the forward platoons by fire, protect the flanks and the rear of the company, and,
if necessary, counterattack. It may be positioned on the counterslope to the rear of the
forward platoons if that position allows it to fire and hit the enemy when he reaches the
crest of the defended hill.

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 FM 3-21.11

(4) Position the company CP to the rear where it will not interfere with the reserve or
supporting units. The company commander may have an OP on the forward slope or crest
and another on the reverse slope or counterslope. He uses the OP on the forward slope or
crest before the battle starts when he is trying to determine the enemy's intentions. During
the fight, he moves to the OP on the reverse slope or counterslope.
(5) Plan indirect fire well forward of, on, and to the flanks of the forward slope, crest,
reverse slope, and counterslope. Plan indirect FPF on the crest of the hill to control the
crest and stop assaults. Put the company commander's mortar section in defilade to the
rear of the counterslope.
(6) Reinforce existing obstacles. Protective obstacles on the reverse slope--just down
from the crest where it can be covered by fire--can slow the enemy's advance and hold
him under friendly fire.
(7) The commander normally plans counterattacks. He plans to drive the enemy off
the crest by fire, if possible. He must also be prepared to drive the enemy off by fire and
movement.

5-27. ENGAGEMENT AREA DEVELOPMENT

The engagement area is where the company commander intends to destroy an enemy
force using the massed fires of all available weapons. The success of any engagement
depends on how effectively the commander can integrate the obstacle plan, the indirect
fire plan, the direct fire plan, and the terrain within the engagement area to achieve the
company’s tactical purpose. Beginning with evaluation of METT-TC factors, the
development process covers these steps:
• Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.
• Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver.
• Determine where to kill the enemy.
• Emplace weapons systems.
• Plan and integrate obstacles.
• Plan and integrate indirect fires.
• Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.
The following paragraphs outline planning and preparation procedures the company
commander may use for each of these steps.
a. Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach. The following procedures and
considerations, as illustrated in Figure 5-14, page 5-32, apply in identifying the enemy’s
likely avenues of approach:
(1) Conduct initial reconnaissance. If possible, do this from the enemy’s perspective
along each avenue of approach into the sector or engagement area.
(2) Identify key and decisive terrain. This includes locations that afford positions of
advantage over the enemy as well as natural obstacles and choke points that restrict
forward movement.
(3) Determine which avenues will provide cover and concealment for the enemy
while allowing him to maintain his tempo.
(4) Evaluate lateral routes adjoining each avenue of approach.

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Figure 5-14. Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.

b. Determine the Enemy Scheme of Maneuver. The company commander can use
the following procedures and considerations, which are illustrated in Figure 5-15, in
determining the enemy’s scheme of maneuver:
(1) Determine how the enemy will structure the attack. In what formation will he
attack? How will he sequence his forces?
(2) Determine how the enemy will use his reconnaissance assets. Will he attempt to
infiltrate friendly positions?
(3) Determine where and when the enemy will change formations and establish
support-by-fire positions.
(4) Determine where, when, and how the enemy will conduct his assault and
breaching operations.
(5) Determine where and when he will commit follow-on forces.
(6) Determine the enemy’s expected rates of movement.
(7) Assess the effects of his combat multipliers.
(8) Determine what reactions the enemy is likely to have in response to projected
friendly actions.

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Figure 5-15. Determine the enemy's scheme of maneuver.

c. Determine Where to Kill the Enemy. The following steps (Figure 5-16, page 5-
34) apply in identifying and marking where the SBCT battalion and company will engage
the enemy:
(1) Identify TRPs that match the enemy’s scheme of maneuver, allowing the
company to identify where it will engage enemy forces through the depth of the sector.
(2) Identify and record the exact location of each TRP.
(3) Determine how many weapons systems must focus fires on each TRP to achieve
the desired effects.
(4) Determine which platoons will mass fires on each TRP.
(5) Establish engagement areas around TRPs.
(6) Develop the direct fire planning measures necessary to focus fires at each TRP.

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Figure 5-16. Determine where to kill the enemy.

NOTE: In marking TRPs, use thermal sights to ensure visibility at the appropriate
range under varying conditions, including daylight and limited visibility
(darkness, smoke, dust, or other obscurants).

d. Emplace Weapons System.. The following steps apply in selecting and

improving BPs and emplacing the company’s vehicles (ICVs and MGSs), crew-served
weapons systems, and dismounted infantry positions (Figure 5-17):
(1) Select tentative platoon BPs. (When possible, select these while moving in the
engagement area. Using the enemy’s perspective enables the commander to assess the
survivability of the positions.)
(2) Conduct a leader’s reconnaissance of the tentative BPs.
(3) Drive the engagement area to confirm that selected positions are tactically
advantageous.
(4) Confirm and mark the selected BPs.
(5) Ensure that BPs do not conflict with those of adjacent units and that they are
effectively tied in with adjacent positions.
(6) Select primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions to achieve the
desired effect for each TRP.
(7) Ensure that platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, vehicle commanders, and
dismounted infantry squad leaders position weapons systems so that the required number
of weapons, vehicles, and platoons effectively covers each TRP.
(8) Ensure that positions allow MGS vehicle commanders, gunners, and assistant
gunners (as applicable for each vehicle) to observe the engagement area from the turret-
down position and engage enemy forces from the hull-down position.
(9) Site and mark vehicle positions in accordance with unit SOP so engineers can dig
in the positions while vehicle commanders supervise.
(10) Proof all vehicle positions before engineer assets depart.

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 FM 3-21.11

Figure 5-17. Emplace weapons systems.

e. Plan and Integrate Obstacles. The following steps apply in planning and
integrating obstacles in the company defense (Figure 5-18, page 5-36):
(1) Understand obstacle group intent.
(2) Coordinate with the engineers.
(3) Site and mark individual obstacle locations.
(4) Refine direct and indirect fire control measures.
(5) Identify lanes and gaps.
(6) Report obstacle locations and gaps to higher headquarters.

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Figure 5-18. Plan and integrate obstacles.

f. Plan and Integrate Indirect Fires. The following steps apply in planning and
integrating indirect fires (Figure 5-19):
(1) Determine the purpose of fires and the essential fire support task (EFST) that
supports it.
(2) Determine where the purpose can best be achieved.
(3) Establish the observation plan, with redundancy for each target. Observers include
the FIST, as well as members of maneuver elements with fire support responsibilities
(such as platoon sergeants).
(4) Establish triggers.
(5) Obtain accurate target locations using lasing devices.
(6) Refine target locations to ensure coverage of obstacles.
(7) Adjust artillery and mortar targets.
(8) Plan FPFs.
(9) Request critical friendly zones (CFZs) for protection of maneuver elements and
no-fire areas (NFAs) for protection of OPs and forward positions.

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Figure 5-19. Integrate direct and indirect fires.

g. Conduct an Engagement Area Rehearsal. The purpose of this rehearsal is to

ensure every leader and soldier understands the plan and all elements are prepared to
cover their assigned areas with direct and indirect fires. Although the company
commander has several options, the most common and most effective type of rehearsal is
to replicate the threat. One technique for the rehearsal in the defense is to have the
company trains, under the control of the company XO, move through the EA to depict the
enemy force while the commander and subordinate platoons rehearse the battle from the
company BP. The rehearsal should cover these actions:
• Rearward passage of security forces (as required).
• Closure of lanes (as required).
• Movement from the hide position to the BP.
• Use of fire commands, triggers, and maximum engagement lines (MELs) to
initiate direct and indirect fires.
• Shifting of fires to refocus and redistribute fire effects.
• Emplacement of scatterable mine systems.
• Preparation and transmission of critical reports using frequency modulated
(FM) and digital systems (as applicable).
• Assessment of the effects of enemy weapons systems.
• Displacement to alternate, supplementary, or subsequent BPs.
• Cross-leveling or resupply of Class V.
• Evacuation of casualties.

NOTE: The company commander should coordinate the rehearsal with the battalion to
ensure other units’ rehearsals are not planned for the same time or location.
Coordination leads to more efficient use of planning and preparation time for
all battalion units. It also eliminates the danger of misidentification of friendly
forces in the rehearsal area, which could result in fratricide.

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5-28. PRIORITY OF WORK

Priority of work is a set method of controlling the preparation and conduct of a defense.
SOP should describe priority of work to include individual duties. The commander
changes priorities based on the situation. All leaders in the company should have a
specific priority of work for their duty position.
a. Although listed in sequence, several tasks may be performed at the same time. An
example priority of work sequence is as follows:
• Establish the company R&S operation.
• Post local security.
• Position Javelins, MGS vehicles, machine guns, and soldiers; assign sectors of
fire.
• Position other assets (company CP, mortars, and vehicles).
• Designate FPLs and FPFs.
• Clear fields of fire and prepare range cards and sector sketches.
• Adjust indirect fire FPFs. The firing unit FDC should provide a safety box that
is clear of all friendly units before firing any adjusting rounds.
• Prepare fighting positions.
• Install wire communications, if applicable.
• Emplace obstacles and mines.
• Mark (or improve marking) for TRPs and direct fire control measures.
• Improve primary fighting positions such as overhead cover.
• Prepare alternate and supplementary positions.
• Establish sleep/rest plan.
• Reconnoiter movements.
• Rehearse engagements and disengagements or displacements.
• Adjust positions and control measures as required.
• Stockpile ammunition, food, and water.
• Dig trenches between positions.
• Reconnoiter routes.
• Continue to improve positions.
b. Routine priorities for various duty positions are listed below.
(1) Company Commander. Many of these duties can be delegated to subordinates,
but the commander must ensure they are done. The commander must--
• Establish local security. Set up OPs if not already done and establish an SBCT
infantry company perimeter.
• Conduct a leader's reconnaissance with the platoon leaders and selected
personnel. Confirm or deny significant deductions or assumptions from the
mission analysis. Designate primary, alternate, and supplementary positions
for platoons, sections, and supporting elements. Require platoons to conduct
coordination. Designate EAs, designate and integrate obstacles, designate the
general company CP location, and position key weapons.
• Check the company CP and brief the 1SG and XO on the situation and
logistics requirements.

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 FM 3-21.11

• Upon receipt of the platoon sector sketches, make two copies of a defensive
sector sketch and a fire plan. Retain one copy and forward the other to the
battalion (Figure 5-20). Ideally, this is accomplished through FBCB2.
• Confirm the platoon positions before digging starts. Coordinate with the left
and right units.
• Check with the battalion commander for any changes or updates in the orders.
• Finish the security, deception, counterattack, and obstacle plans.
• Walk the company positions after they are dug. Confirm clear fields of fire
and complete coverage of the sector of fire of all key weapons. Look at the
defensive plan from an enemy point of view, both conceptually and
physically.
• Check dissemination of information, interlocking fires, dead space, and
security.
• Correct deficiencies immediately.
• Report obstacle locations.

Figure 5-20. Company defensive sector sketch.

(2) First Sergeant and Executive Officer. One of them must--

• Establish the company CP and ensure that wire communications link the
platoons, sections, and attached elements if applicable.
• Establish casualty collection points, company logistics release points, and
EPW collection points.
• Brief platoon sergeants on the company CP location, logistics plan, and routes
between positions.
• Assist the company commander with the sector sketch.
• Request and allocate pioneer tools, barrier material, rations, water, and
ammunition.

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• Walk the positions with the company commander. Start supervising

emplacement of the platoons and sections, and check range cards and sector
sketches.
• Establish routine security or alert plan, radio watch, and rest plan. Brief the
company commander.
• Supervise continuously and assist the commander with other duties as
assigned.
(3) Fire Support Officer. The FSO must--
• Assist the commander in planning the indirect fires to support the defense.
• Advise the commander on the current status of all firing units and on the use
of smoke or illumination.
• Coordinate with the SBCT infantry battalion FSO, firing units, and platoon
leaders to ensure the fire plan is synchronized and fully understood.
• Ensure the indirect fire plan is rehearsed and understood by all.
• Ensure all FPFs are adjusted in as soon as possible.
• Develop observation plan.
• Coordinate and rehearse any repositioning of observers within the company
sector to ensure they can observe targets or areas of responsibility.
• Develop triggers.
• Report battlefield intelligence.
• Ensure redundancy in communications.
(4) Mortar Section Leader. He must--
• Choose tentative firing position(s) and OP(s) and complete his portion of the
fire plan based on the company OPORD, coordinated with the FSO and his
own analysis.
• Take part in the company leader's reconnaissance. Confirm or adjust the firing
position, select OPs, and coordinate the indirect fire plan with the company
FSO.
• Issue FRAGOs to the mortar squads. Conduct a section leader's
reconnaissance with squad leaders. Require squad leaders to coordinate with
platoons and squads for security and logistics support.
• Direct the mortar section to begin digging.
• Establish internal and external wire communications, if applicable.
• Assist the FSO in completing the fire plan and overlays.
• Register and adjust the FPF.
• Inspect the mortar position.
• Reconnoiter routes to alternate firing positions.
(5) Communications Specialist. He must--
• Supervise setting up wire, radio, voice, and digital communications with the
battalion, platoons, and sections.
• Organize a radio watch.
• Supervise the performance of preventive maintenance checks and services
(PMCS) on the radios.
• Assist the 1SG and XO, as required. Help organize local security for the
company CP, dig fighting positions, and assist in OPORD production.

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(6) NBC NCO. He must--

• Assist the commander with an updated MOPP analysis.
• Ensure that chemical detection and monitoring procedures are established and
maintained.
• Coordinate for decontamination support.
• Coordinate smoke support.
• Supervise decontamination operations.
• Provide guidance on operations in NBC conditions.

5-29. ADJACENT UNIT COORDINATION

The ultimate goal of adjacent unit coordination is to ensure unity of effort in the
accomplishment of the SBCT's and SBCT infantry battalion's missions. Items that
adjacent units must coordinate include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Unit positions, including locations of command and control nodes.
• Locations of OPs and patrols.
• Overlapping fires (to ensure that direct fire responsibility is clearly defined).
• TRPs.
• Alternate, supplementary, and subsequent BPs.
• Indirect fire and encryption information.
• Obstacles (location and type).
• Air defense considerations, if applicable.
• Routes to be used during occupation and repositioning.
• CSS considerations.

Section VI. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

The retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away
from the enemy (FM 3-0). The enemy may force these operations or a commander may
execute them voluntarily. In either case, the higher commander of the force executing the
operation must approve the retrograde (FM 3-90). Retrograde operations are conducted to
improve a tactical situation or to prevent a worse situation from developing. Companies
normally conduct retrogrades as part of a larger force but may conduct independent
retrogrades (withdrawal) as required, such as when conducting a raid. Retrograde
operations accomplish the following:
• Resist, exhaust, and defeat enemy forces.
• Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
• Avoid contact in undesirable conditions.
• Gain time.
• Disengage a force from battle for use elsewhere in other missions.
• Reposition forces, shorten lines of communication, or conform to movements
of other friendly units.
• Secure more favorable terrain.
There are three types of retrograde operations:
• Delay. This operation allows the unit to trade space for time, avoiding
decisive engagement and safeguarding its elements.

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• Withdrawal. The commander uses this operation to break enemy contact,

especially when he needs to free the unit for a new mission.
• Retirement. This operation is employed to move a force that is not in contact
to the rear.

5-30. DELAY
A delay is a series of defensive and offensive actions over subsequent positions in depth.
It is an economy of force operation that trades space for time. While the enemy gains
access to the area (space) that is vacated, friendly elements gain time to conduct
necessary operations and retain freedom of action and maneuver. This allows friendly
forces to influence the action; they can prevent decisive engagement or postpone action to
occur at a more critical time or place on the battlefield.
a. Types of Delays. There are two types of delay missions:
• Delay in sector.
• Delay forward of a specified line or position for a specified time.
b. Components of Successful Delay. For either type of delay mission, the flow of
the operation can be summarized as “hit hard, then move.” A successful delay has three
key components:
• The ability to stop or slow the enemy’s momentum while avoiding decisive
engagement.
• The ability to degrade the enemy’s combat power.
• The ability to maintain a mobility advantage.
c. Delay within a Sector. The company may be assigned a mission to delay within a
sector (area of operations). The higher commander normally provides guidance regarding
intent and desired effect on the enemy, but he minimizes restrictions regarding terrain,
time, and coordination with adjacent forces. This form of a delay is normally assigned
when force preservation is the highest priority and there is considerable depth to the
battalion or SBCT’s area of operations.
d. Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time. The company may be
assigned a mission to delay forward of a specific control measure for a specific period of
time. This mission is assigned when the SBCT or battalion must control the enemy’s
attack and retain specified terrain to achieve some purpose relative to another element,
such as setting the conditions for a counterattack, for completion of defensive
preparations, or for the movement of other forces or civilians. The focus of this delay
mission is clearly on time, terrain, and enemy destruction. It carries a much higher risk
for the battalion, with the likelihood of all or part of the unit becoming decisively
engaged. The timing of the operation is controlled graphically by a series of phase lines
with associated dates and times to define the desired delay-until period.
e. Culmination of the Delay. Delay missions usually conclude in one of three
ways--a defense, a withdrawal, or a counterattack. Planning options should address all
three possibilities.

5-31. PLANNING
In preparing for the delay operation, the commander uses planning considerations that are
identical to those for a defense in sector, varying only in their purpose. Planning for the

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delay must cover several areas related to hindering enemy movement and maintaining
mobility. These considerations include the following:
• Use of existing terrain and obstacles, enhanced as necessary by employment
of reinforcing obstacles.
• Designation of positions from which the friendly force can harass or impede
the enemy without risking decisive engagement itself; this is especially
applicable for a delay in sector. When a battalion is delaying in sector,
companies are normally assigned a series of specific BPs to enhance
command and control across the sector. Likewise, in a company delay in
sector, the commander will assign a series of specific BPs for each platoon.
• Assessment of opportunities to conduct limited counterattacks to disrupt
enemy actions.
• Designation of high-speed avenues of withdrawal.
• Rehearsal of operations anticipated for the delay; these may include
engagement of the enemy and maneuver through the delay area.

5-32. DELAY TECHNIQUES

In executing either a delay in sector or a time-related delay, the commander can choose
from the following techniques:
• Delay from subsequent positions or phase lines.
• Delay from alternating positions.
a. Delay from Subsequent Positions or Phase Lines. This delay technique
normally is used when the sector is so wide that available forces cannot occupy more
than a single line of positions.
(1) The commander must be aware of several factors that may put his unit at a
disadvantage during the delay:
• Lack of depth at any particular time.
• The possibility of inadequate time to prepare subsequent positions.
• Decreased security during disengagement.
• The possibility of gaps between units.
(2) When the unit receives the order to conduct the delay from its initial positions,
one element (such as a company in a battalion delay or a platoon in a company delay)
displaces and occupies its subsequent BP. The remainder of the unit maintains contact
with the enemy until the first displacing element is in position to engage the enemy from
the subsequent position. The first element then provides overwatch or base of fire as
other elements displace to their subsequent positions. Figure 5-21, page 5-44, illustrates a
company conducting a dismounted delay from subsequent positions.

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Figure 5-21. Example company dismounted delay from subsequent

positions.

b. Delay from Alternating Positions. This method of delay may be used when the
delaying element has sufficient forces to occupy more than a single line of positions
(normally in a narrow sector). The delaying battalion or company arrays one or more of
its subordinate elements in the initial delay positions. This first echelon then engages the
enemy while the rest of the unit occupies and prepares second-echelon delay positions.
(1) The unit then alternates fighting the enemy with movement to new positions. The
elements in the initial delay positions engage the enemy until ordered to displace or until
their displacement criteria have been met. They then displace, moving through the
second-echelon delay positions to their own subsequent positions (which become the
third echelon of the delay).
(2) Elements in the second echelon overwatch the displacing units’ movement and
assume responsibility for engaging the enemy. This sequence continues until the delay
operation is completed. Figure 5-22 illustrates a company delay from alternating
positions.

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Figure 5-22. Example company delay from alternating positions.

5-33. WITHDRAWAL
Withdrawal is a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy
force. Withdrawals may or may not be conducted under enemy pressure. The two types
of withdrawals are assisted and unassisted.
a. Assisted. The assisting force occupies positions to the rear of the withdrawing
unit and prepares to accept control of the situation. It can also assist the withdrawing unit
with route reconnaissance, route maintenance, fire support, and CSS. Both forces closely

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coordinate the withdrawal. After coordination, the withdrawing unit delays to a battle
handover line, conducts a passage of lines, and moves to its final destination.
b. Unassisted. The withdrawing unit establishes routes and develops plans for the
withdrawal and then establishes a security force as the rear guard while the main body
withdraws. CSS and CS elements normally withdraw first followed by combat forces. To
deceive the enemy as to the friendly movement, the SBCT or battalion may establish a
detachment left in contact (DLIC) if withdrawing under enemy pressure. As the unit
withdraws, the DLIC disengages from the enemy and follows the main body to its final
destination.

5-34. PHASES
Withdrawals are accomplished in three overlapping phases, which are outlined in the
following paragraphs.
a. Preparation. The commander dispatches quartering parties, issues warning
orders (WARNOs), and initiates planning. Nonessential vehicles are moved to the rear.
b. Disengagement. Designated elements begin movement to the rear. They break
contact and conduct tactical movement to a designated assembly area or position.
c. Security. In this phase, a security force protects and assists the other elements as
they disengage and or move to their new positions. This is done either by a DLIC, which
the unit itself designates in an unassisted withdrawal, or by a security force provided by
the higher headquarters in an assisted withdrawal. As necessary, the security force
assumes responsibility for the sector, deceives the enemy, and protects the movement of
disengaged elements by providing overwatch and suppressive fires. In an assisted
withdrawal, the security phase ends when the security force has assumed responsibility
for the fight and the withdrawing element has completed its movement. In an unassisted
withdrawal, this phase ends when the DLIC completes its disengagement and movement
to the rear.

5-35. UNASSISTED WITHDRAWAL

In an unassisted withdrawal, the unit conducting the withdrawal establishes the DLIC to
maintain contact with the enemy and or to deceive him.
a. Battalion Withdrawal. In a battalion withdrawal, the DLIC may consist of an
element from each company (under leadership of the company XO or a platoon leader),
with the battalion S3 as the overall DLIC commander. As an alternative, a company may
serve as the DLIC for the rest of the battalion. The company commander has several
deployment options. He can reposition elements across the entire battalion frontage.
Another option is to position the company to cover only the most dangerous enemy
avenue of approach; other avenues into the sector are covered with observation from
additional security elements provided by the battalion, such as the reconnaissance
platoon.
b. Company Unassisted Withdrawal. The commander has similar options in an
unassisted company withdrawal. He may designate one platoon to execute the DLIC
mission for the company, or he can constitute the DLIC using elements from the three
rifle platoons and the MGS platoon, with the XO as the DLIC commander. Figure 5-23
illustrates an example of an unassisted withdrawal.

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Figure 5-23. Example of an unassisted withdrawal.

5-36. ASSISTED WTHDRAWAL

In an assisted battalion withdrawal, the SBCT normally will provide a security element to
maintain contact with and deceive the enemy while the battalion conducts its withdrawal.
Likewise, in a company withdrawal, the battalion provides the security force. The
security force establishes defensive positions behind the withdrawing unit and conducts
preparations for a rearward passage of lines. The withdrawing force disengages from the
enemy and conducts the rearward passage through the security force to assembly areas in
the rear.

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5-37. RETIREMENT
Retirement is a retrograde operation in which a force not in contact with the enemy
conducts organized movement to the rear. It is normally done during periods of limited
visibility. The company conducts a retirement as part of a larger force.

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CHAPTER 6
URBAN OPERATIONS

The first and most fundamental lesson learned from recent operations
in built-up areas is the value of the fully integrated combined-arms team.
The value of infantry forces during urban combat is undeniable, but urban
combat by units composed entirely of infantrymen is an historical
anomaly. Across the spectrum of combat action in urban areas, powerful
combined-arms teams produce the best results. Commanders at all levels
must determine the actual composition of these teams based on a careful
analysis. Infantry units operating alone suffer from critical shortcomings
that they can overcome only by appropriate task organization with other
branches to achieve a combined-arms effect. These forces must be
supported by closely integrated armor, aviation, direct and indirect fire
support, communications, and logistical elements.

Section I. GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

This section highlights the basic urban operation planning considerations for SBCT
infantry company commanders.

6-1. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMPANY-SIZE

COMBINED-ARMS TEAMS
Because of the decentralized nature of urban combat and the need for a high number of
troops to conduct operations in dense, complex terrain, infantrymen will always represent
the bulk of forces. At the small-unit tactical level, however, infantry forces have
disadvantages that can be overcome by mechanized infantry or armor units. Conversely,
vehicles face problems in the confines of urban areas which place them at a severe
disadvantage when operating alone, unsupported by infantry. Only by working together
can these forces accomplish their missions with minimal casualties while avoiding
unnecessary collateral damage.
a. Infantry Strengths. The infantry has the following strengths in an urban
environment:
(1) Infantry small-arms fire within a building can eliminate resistance without
seriously damaging the structure.
(2) Infantrymen can move stealthily into position without alerting the enemy.
Infantrymen can move over or around most urban terrain, regardless of the amount of
damage to buildings.
(3) Infantrymen have excellent all-round vision and can engage targets with small-
arms fire under almost all conditions.
(4) Infantrymen can clear severely restricted terrain that is not readily accessible to
other forces.
b. Mobile Gun System Strengths. The MGS has the following strengths in an
urban environment:
(1) The thermal sights on the MGS vehicle can detect enemy activity through
darkness and smoke, conditions that may limit even the best-equipped infantry.

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(2) The MGS vehicle can deliver devastating fires; is fully protected against
antipersonnel mines, fragments, and small arms; and has excellent mobility along
unblocked routes.
(3) The MGS vehicle projects a psychological presence, an aura of invulnerability
that aids the friendly forces in deterring violence. Mounted patrols by MGS vehicles can
monitor large areas of a city while making their presence known to the entire populace,
both friendly and unfriendly.
(4) The mobile, protected firepower of MGS vehicles can add security to resupply
convoys. The MGS vehicle’s smoke-generation capability can aid in extracting wounded
personnel and other small-unit actions.
c. Infantry Carrier Vehicle Strengths. The ICV has the following strengths in an
urban environment:
(1) The ICV can provide protection to the infantry by negating the effects of enemy
small-arms weapons, either by driving soldiers up to a building or by acting as a shield
while the infantry moves behind it along a street.
(2) ICVs can resupply units quickly and with more ammunition than resupply by
foot.
(3) Because of their armor protection, ICVs can be used to conduct CASEVAC under
fire.
d. Infantry Limitations. Infantry forces have the following limitations in an urban
environment:
(1) They lack heavy supporting firepower.
(2) Exposed infantry forces are subject to taking a high number of casualties.
(3) Infantry forces are more subject to fratricide-related casualties from friendly
direct and indirect fire.
e. Mobile Gun System Limitations. The MGS has the following limitations in an
urban environment:
(1) Crewmen in MGS vehicles have poor all-round vision through their vision blocks,
which are easily degraded by smoke or dust.
(2) If isolated or unsupported by infantry, MGS vehicles are vulnerable to enemy
teams firing light and medium antiarmor weapons.
(3) Elevation and depression limitations of the main gun limit the gunner’s target
acquisition capabilities in urban terrain. When operating in narrow streets or confined
areas, the vehicle commander or dismounted infantry must assist the MGS gunner in
acquiring targets.
(4) Improvised barricades, narrow streets and alleyways, or large amounts of rubble
can block armored vehicles.
(5) Due to the length of the main gun, the turret will not rotate if a solid object such
as a wall or post is in its path.
(6) Heavy fires from MGS vehicles cause unwanted collateral damage and can
destabilize basic structures.
f. Infantry Carrier Vehicle Limitations. The ICV has the following limitations in
an urban environment:
(1) If buttoned up, crewmen in ICVs have poor all-round vision through their vision
blocks; they are easily blinded by smoke or dust.

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(2) The ICV has only a local defense weapon system mounted. Once the infantry has
dismounted and is not supporting the vehicle, its firepower is diminished.
(3) The ICV is vulnerable to anything other than small arms and particularly to AT
weapons.

6-2. EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY AND MGS VEHICLES

An effective use of armored combat vehicles in most tactical situations is en masse.
Armored units operating in platoon, company, and battalion strength combine mobility,
protection, and firepower to seize the initiative from the enemy and greatly aid friendly
success. However, urban combat is often so decentralized, and avenues of approach for
vehicles so canalized, that massed armored combat vehicles cannot be effectively
employed. Thus, the urban situation may call for fewer armored combat vehicles
employed over broader areas. The decision to disperse rather than mass armored combat
vehicles should be made only after a careful consideration of the factors of METT-TC,
the situation, and the anticipated operations in the near future. Decentralized armored
combat vehicle support greatly increases a dismounted infantry unit’s combat power, but
dispersed vehicles cannot be easily and quickly concentrated. If not well planned, the
sudden removal of armored combat vehicles from throughout the area will necessitate a
tactical pause for reorganization and a change of tactical tempo, which could disrupt the
ongoing combat operation at a critical time.
a. Mobile Gun System Employment. The MGS can support infantry during urban
combat operations (Figure 6-1, page 6-4) by--
• Providing shock action and firepower.
• Isolating objectives with direct fire to prevent enemy withdrawal,
reinforcement, or counterattack.
• Neutralizing or suppressing enemy positions with smoke, HE, and automatic
weapons fire as infantry closes with and destroys the enemy.
• Assisting opposed entry of infantry into buildings when enemy fire, debris, or
obstacles block doorways.
• Smashing through street barricades or reducing barricades by fire.
• Obscuring enemy observation using on-board smoke generators.
• Holding cleared portions of the objective by covering avenues of approach.
• Attacking by fire any targets designated by the infantry.
• Establishing roadblocks or checkpoints.
• Suppressing identified sniper positions.

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Figure 6-1. MGS in direct fire, supported by infantry.

b. Task Organization at Company Level. The SBCT infantry company has an

organic MGS platoon. There are three basic techniques of task-organizing the MGS
platoon for urban combat. Based on the factors of METT-TC, the commander may attach
engineers, a sniper or sniper team, an ICV and rifle squad, or a rifle squad or fire team to
the MGS platoon for a specific mission.
(1) MGS Platoon Retained under Company Control. In this technique (Figure 6-2),
the MGS platoon leader is responsible for maneuvering the MGS vehicles IAW the
company commander’s intent. With this task organization, likely missions for MGS
vehicles are to support by fire or to overwatch movement of the infantry. This task
organization poses the most difficulty in maneuvering the MGS with the dismounted
infantry. However, it provides greater flexibility in supporting the infantry during the
close fight.

Figure 6-2. MGS platoon under company control.

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(2) MGS Platoon(-) under Company Control and an MGS Vehicle under Infantry
Platoon Control. The MGS platoon detaches one vehicle to infantry platoon control.
With this technique (Figure 6-3), the selected maneuver infantry platoon has an MGS
vehicle available to support the close fight, and the company commander has an MGS
platoon (-) to deploy at the critical place and time of his choosing. This task organization
still allows support to the infantry close fight while keeping additional support options for
the company commander to employ. The disadvantages to this technique are that an
infantry platoon leader, rather than the MGS platoon leader, maneuvers MGS vehicles,
and the number of MGS vehicles directly available to the company commander is
reduced.

Figure 6-3. MGS platoon(-) under company and an MGS vehicle under
infantry platoon control.

(3) Individual MGS Vehicles under Infantry Platoon Control. In this technique
(Figure 6-4, page 6-6), each one of the MGS vehicles is task-organized to an infantry
platoon. The purpose of this type of task organization is to provide all the infantry
platoons with increased direct fire for suppression and breaching, specifically in an urban
area. Leaders must ensure that the infantry platoon secures the MGS vehicle at all times.

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Figure 6-4. Individual MGS vehicles under infantry platoon control.

(4) Selection of a Technique. None of the techniques described above is inherently

better than the others. The task organization has to be tailored to accomplish the mission.
Regardless of the technique selected, the following guidelines apply:
• Single MGSs may operate in support of infantry; however, it is preferable for
MGSs to support each other.
• If using MGS vehicles or ICVs to shield squads and teams moving from
building to building as part of the maneuver plan, the leader of the forward
element needs to control the MGS vehicles.
• If the SBCT infantry company commander controls the MGS, he needs to
move forward to a position where he can effectively maneuver the MGS in
support of the infantry.
• The task organization should support the span of control. If the company
commander controls the MGS platoon, then he does not task-organize them to
the infantry platoons.
• MGSs need infantry support when the two elements are working together. Do
not leave vehicles (ICVs or MGSs) alone; they are not prepared to provide
local security during the operation. MGS vehicles are extremely vulnerable to
dismounted attack when operating in an urban environment.
c. Mutual Support. Infantry ICV and MGS teams work together to bring the
maximum combat power to bear on the enemy. The infantry provides the eyes and ears of
the team, locating and identifying targets for the MGSs or ICVs to engage. Infantry and
ICVs move along covered and concealed routes to assault enemy elements fixed or
suppressed by MGS fire. Squads provide protection for the MGS against attack by enemy
infantry. Meanwhile, an MGS provides heavy, continuous supporting fires against enemy
strongpoints.

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d. Movement. The dismounted infantry normally leads SBCT infantry company

movement through built-up areas. The MGS vehicles and ICVs follow and provide close
overwatch. If the infantry discovers an enemy position or encounters resistance, the MGS
responds immediately with supporting fire to fix the enemy in place or suppress him and
allow the infantry to develop the situation. After sufficient time to develop the situation
or conduct short-range reconnaissance, the infantry squad leader directs the MGS to
move, if necessary, and identifies specific targets for the MGS to engage.
e. Coordination. Coordination between MGSs and infantry leaders must be close
and continuous. The MGS vehicle commander may need to dismount and move,
accompanied by the infantry squad leader, to a position where he can see the route or
target better. Everyone must understand the signals for initiating, shifting, or lifting fires.
One of the greatest barriers to coordination and command and control in urban combat is
the intense noise. Simple, nonverbal signals should back up verbal commands.
f. Communications. The MGS platoon leader and platoon sergeant must maintain
communications with the SBCT infantry company commander. Individual MGS vehicles
and infantrymen communicate with one another using one or more of the following
techniques:
(1) Visual Signals. Visual signals, either prescribed by SOP or coordinated during
linkup, can facilitate some simple communications.
(2) External Phone. All MGS vehicles have external phones that aid in the
communication between the MGS crew and the infantry.
(3) FM Radios. FM radios provide a reliable means of communications between
infantry and supporting vehicle commanders. These radios allow the infantry to use
terrain more effectively in providing close-in protection for the MGS; infantrymen can
watch for enemy elements while limiting exposure to enemy fires directed against the
MGS. Signal operating instruction (SOI) information can be used between the MGS
platoons and the company headquarters or infantry platoons. This is a fast and reliable
method of communications that does not require additional assets.

NOTE: The SBCT infantry company commander relies on the radio to help control
the battle. It is essential for platoon leaders and RATELOs to be well trained
in sending reports. Constant reporting from the subordinate elements to the
commander is critical for mission success.

g. Smoke. The MGS vehicle's on-board smoke generation system and its smoke
grenade projectors may be used both to protect the MGS from enemy observation and to
provide concealment for the infantry forces as they either move across open areas or
recover wounded personnel. The use of smoke must be carefully coordinated. Although
the MGS vehicles’ sights can see through most smoke, infantrymen are at a significant
disadvantage when enveloped in dense smoke clouds. The smoke grenade launchers on
the MGS provide excellent, rapidly developed local smoke clouds, but the grenades
produce burning fragments that are hazardous to infantrymen near the MGS and can
ignite dangerous fires in urban areas.
h. Heavy Direct Fire Support. MGS vehicles and ICVs are valuable tools for
helping assaulting forces isolate the objective area and seize a foothold. As the infantry
then moves to clear the position and expand the foothold, the MGSs remain in their initial

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support-by-fire positions. When possible, MGSs should move to subsequent positions

where their fires can prevent enemy reinforcement and engage enemy forces withdrawing
from the objective. At this time, the MGS crew must be very alert. Because of the
nonlinear nature of urban battles, enemy forces may move to the rear or flanks of the
now-isolated MGS vehicles and destroy them. If a small element of infantry cannot be
spared to support the MGS, then vehicles (MGS or ICV) should move to positions of
cover and mutual support. Crews should be alert, especially for enemy infantry
approaching from above, from the rear, or from the flanks.
i. Other Considerations. The following considerations also apply when operating
in an urban environment:
(1) In planning, pay close attention to available terrain that will support MGS and
ICV cross-country movement. While the pace may be slower, cross-country movement
may significantly enhance security.
(2) Involve the MGS platoon leader and PSG in the mission analysis. Their expertise
hastens the understanding of what MGS vehicles can and cannot do and aids the SBCT
infantry company commander in making the best MGS employment decision.
(3) MGSs and ICVs can carry ammunition, water, and other supplies to support the
urban fight.
(4) SBCT infantry company commanders must specifically allocate time in the
planning process for precombat inspections (PCIs) for the vehicles.
(5) Conduct a combined-arms rehearsal at the level where the vehicles are task-
organized. Try to replicate conditions for mission execution during rehearsals, such as
day, limited visibility, civilians on the battlefield, host nation support, and ROE. Include
the following:
• Graphic and fire control measures.
• Direct fire plans.
• Communications.
• Breach drills.
• Techniques for using vehicles as infantry shields.
(6) The following measures minimize casualties when moving outside or between
buildings:
(a) Cover all possible threat locations with either observation or fire.
(b) For those areas not possible to cover with observation or fire, use smoke to set a
screen to block enemy observation of friendly movement.
(c) Move MGS vehicles forward to support infantry movement. Position the MGS
before the infantry begins moving, whether the MGSs are supporting by fire, being used
as shields, or both.
(d) Preplan positions if possible, but devise a marking system and communication
signals to designate situation-dependent positions to help maintain momentum. (For
example, “The VS-17 panel from Building 2 means move to support by fire 3.”)
(e) When using vehicles as a shield for infantry, move the vehicles as close to the
start point as possible to allow the infantry freedom of movement when exiting the
building.
(f) Vehicles need to move at the infantry’s rate of movement.
(g) When the distance between buildings is short, position vehicles to protect the
infantry from enemy small-arms fire.

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(7) Use simple, clearly understood graphic control measures. The following are
particularly useful for operations in urban combat (Figure 6-5):
• Phase lines.
• Number and lettering systems for buildings.
• Tentative support-by-fire positions.
• No-fire areas.

Figure 6-5. Graphic control measures.

Section II. OFFENSE

Offensive operations in urban areas are based on offensive doctrine modified to conform
to the urban terrain. Urban combat imposes a number of demands that are different from
ordinary field conditions, such as problems with troop requirements, maneuver, and use
of equipment. As with all offensive operations, the company commander must retain his
ability to fix and maneuver against enemy positions.

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6-3. GENERAL OFFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Combat operations in a built-up area have a slower pace and tempo than operations in
open terrain. Unlike in open terrain, SBCT infantry companies cannot maneuver platoons
quickly. Due to the close environment and the restricted ability to use all available
weapons systems, synchronization of maneuver and combat support assets is one of the
SBCT infantry company commander’s main challenges. Missions in UO are more
methodical. Normally, the infantry company conducts missions as part of a battalion
operation, but the SBCT infantry company must be prepared to operate independently.
The company must also be prepared to conduct different but mutually supporting
missions simultaneously, such as establish a checkpoint and clear a block at the same
time.
a. Troop Requirements. Due to the nature of combat in built-up areas, more troops
are normally needed than in other combat situations. This is due to the number of tasks
required: clear buildings, provide security, control civilians, and evacuate casualties (the
probability of casualties is greater in UO).
(1) Because of the need to clear buildings and provide security, the number of troops
required to accomplish an offensive mission is much greater. To prevent enemy forces
from repositioning or counterattacking friendly forces, some forces must remain in a
building once it is cleared.
(2) Commanders must also consider soldier fatigue. Room clearing techniques are
physically demanding and quickly tire a force. Commanders must plan for the relief or
rotation of their forces before they reach the point of exhaustion.
(3) Additional forces may be needed to control civilians in the built-up area. These
forces must protect civilians, provide first aid, and prevent them from interfering with the
tactical plan.
(4) Fighting in a built-up area normally results in a greater number of friendly
casualties. The ability to see the enemy is fleeting and confined to very short ranges
compared to combat in open terrain. Fratricide can become a serious problem and must
be addressed in detail by the commander. Plan for CASEVAC and instruct subordinate
units to conduct this task.
b. Maneuver. Unlike in open terrain, the complex nature of the urban environment
makes it difficult for commanders to maneuver their SBCT infantry company and its
attachments quickly. Clearing buildings and looking for antiarmor ambushes, snipers, and
booby traps degrade the ability of the company to maneuver platoons and squads. Due to
the dense environment and its effects on weapons systems, the synchronization of combat
power is one of the commander's main challenges. Offensive operations must be planned
in detail, with subordinate elements given specific instructions and on-order missions.
c. Limitations. SBCT infantry company commanders attacking a built-up area must
recognize some important limitations in the use of available assets:
(1) Normally, the use of indirect fires, especially field artillery, is much more
restricted in built-up areas than in open terrain. Leaders must consider the effects of
indirect fire on the urban area and civilians, especially when extremely restrictive ROE
are in effect. When indirect fires are authorized, they must be fired in greater mass to
achieve the desired effect.
(2) The rubbling caused by massive indirect fires adversely affects a unit's ability to
maneuver during the attack.

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(3) The commander and leaders must consider the effect that city lights, fires, and
background illumination have on night vision devices. These elements may limit the
effectiveness of NVDs and make thermal imagery identification difficult.
(4) Communications equipment may not function to its maximum effectiveness
because of the density in building construction. Therefore, intelligent use of graphic
control measures and an understanding of the SBCT commander's intent (two levels up)
become more important to mission accomplishment.

6-4. METT-TC FACTORS

The SBCT infantry company commander's analysis of the factors of METT-TC is critical
for successful planning and execution during UO.
a. Mission. The SBCT infantry company commander must receive, analyze, and
understand the mission before he begins planning. He and his troops must clearly
understand the conditions of the operation--either precision or high intensity--and the
ROE. The company commander may be required to conduct different missions
simultaneously.
(1) Common Missions. SBCT infantry companies should expect to receive similar
types of offensive missions in urban terrain that they receive in other terrain. The
following are common company missions in urban combat:
(a) Isolation of an Urban Objective. The SBCT infantry company normally conducts
this mission as part of an SBCT battalion. The SBCT infantry company deploys its
platoons to secure the area around or near a building, block, or village in order to kill or
capture any withdrawing enemy forces and prevent reinforcement of or a counterattack
against the objective. Engineers or other CS and CSS assets may reinforce the company
based on the ROE and factors of METT-TC. In view of the fact that many casualties may
be inflicted on friendly units moving between buildings or down streets, this mission
takes on significant importance.
(b) Assault of a Building. SBCT infantry companies normally conduct this mission as
part of an SBCT battalion operation when the building is too large for a platoon to assault
and clear and the enemy defending the building requires a force larger than a platoon.
The company must enter the building, gain a foothold, and clear the building. The SBCT
battalion commander normally directs another SBCT infantry company (or other
companies) to isolate the building. Engineers or other CS and CSS assets usually
reinforce the SBCT infantry company consistent with the ROE and the factors of METT-
TC.
(c) Attack of a Block or Group of Buildings. SBCT infantry companies may attack a
block or group of buildings. Again, the company normally conducts this mission as part
of a battalion operation. If the company attacks a block as part of a battalion operation, it
may be the battalion's main or supporting effort. Another friendly unit may isolate the
objective, or the company may find that it must isolate the objective area in whole or in
part. If an infantry company receives the mission to assault a block independently, then
the company must isolate the objective area by itself.
(d) Movement to Contact. SBCT infantry companies in UO may move through urban
terrain in order to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Because the urban
environment makes movement very challenging and the buildings reduce the capabilities
of FBCB2, the company must make extra efforts to gain situational understanding (SU).

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This mission typically includes movement (often rapid) through an urban area to develop
the situation by seizing or clearing blocks and buildings.
(e) Hasty Attack of a Village. SBCT infantry companies may conduct a hasty attack
of a village either independently or as part of an SBCT infantry battalion operation. The
purpose of this mission is normally to reduce enemy control of a position and facilitate
movement for other operations.
(f) Seizure of Key Urban Terrain. SBCT infantry companies may seize key terrain in
order to provide an advantage to friendly forces. Key terrain may be overpasses, building
complexes, traffic circles, surrounding natural terrain or bridges, and so forth. The SBCT
infantry company usually conducts this mission independently to facilitate movement or
other operations.
(g) Raids. SBCT infantry companies may perform raids on urban terrain, which they
plan similar to raids on other terrain. Objectives may be located in built-up areas, and the
company may have to move through urban and other terrain in order to arrive at the
objective. The company normally conducts this mission independently, but it may also
conduct a raid in support of a battalion area raid (see Chapter 4).
(2) Analysis of Mission. When conducting his analysis, the SBCT infantry company
commander must consider his battalion commander’s intent and the end state of the
operation. For example, the company commander must determine if clearance means
every building, block by block (systematic clearance), or if the seizure of key terrain
requires clearing only along the axis of advance (selective clearance). The company
commander must also consider how and where the company must be postured in order to
conduct follow-on missions and to facilitate the battalion and brigade missions. This
influences the missions he gives to his platoon and attached element leaders.
(a) When the company is involved in clearing operations, bypassing buildings
increases the risk of attack from the rear or flank unless planned support isolates and
suppresses those buildings. Normally, the clearing platoons must not only enter, search,
and clear each building in the company’s zone of action but also leave security behind to
prevent reoccupation of buildings. This may not be feasible due to the nature of the
mission, but if it is part of the plan, it should be made clear to the platoon leaders when
orders are issued.
(b) The battle can transition quickly from precision to high intensity conditions, a
transition that may be caused by enemy actions. An assault against a deliberate, prepared
defense with obstacles becomes high intensity. Indications of an enemy-forced change of
ROE (and a change from precision conditions to high intensity) include--
• The requirement to breach multiple obstacles.
• The use of booby traps by the enemy.
• The requirement to use repetitive explosive breaching to enter a building.
• Rooms that are so well prepared or barricaded that normal movement and
clearing techniques cannot be employed.
(3) Movement. Moving from building to building or between buildings presents a
problem to platoons. Historical examples, recent operations in Somalia, and the Russian
experience in Grozny have shown that many casualties occur during movement from
building to building and down streets. Therefore, SBCT infantry company commanders
should plan operations in a manner that allows subordinate elements to take maximum
advantage of covered and concealed routes within the urban area. Additionally, company

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commanders must carefully analyze which buildings must be isolated, suppressed, and
obscured, consistent with the ROE. They may use the MGS platoon and, if attached to
mechanized units, any available tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) as shields for
maneuvering platoons.
(4) Coordination of Fire Support. Most fire support coordination occurs at battalion
level to take into account the ROE. Prior coordination determines the techniques and
procedures to use for communicating, identifying targets, and shifting fires. The FIST
chief should be extensively involved in this portion of the planning process. The
company must plan fires consistent with the ROE, giving extra consideration to civilians,
houses of worship, medical centers, schools, public services, and historical monuments.
(See Chapter 10 for further details about combat support assets.)
b. Enemy. Key factors that affect the SBCT infantry company commander’s
analysis are the type of enemy force that is expected in the urban area, the enemy’s
probable courses of action, and the ROE. More restrictive ROE work to a defender’s
advantage; conversely, less restrictive ROE work to an attacker’s advantage. The type of
threat is one factor used to determine how the company should be task organized and
how combat power should be synchronized to accomplish the mission. Additionally, the
company commander must determine if there are any asymmetrical threats that may
affect the company’s mission. For example, if the company has the mission to safeguard
(seize) a water treatment facility that is determined to be key terrain, the commander
needs to consider possible threats to the facility that may not be direct force-on-force
actions.
(1) Conventional Forces. Many third world countries have adopted techniques of
urban combat from either the United States or the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Therefore, a future threat may consider the motorized or mechanized rifle battalion the
most effective unit for urban combat because of its inherent mobility, armor protection,
and ability to adapt buildings and other structures for defense quickly.
(a) In countries that have forces equipped and trained as in the former Warsaw Pact,
there are standard urban defenses:
• Threat defenses are organized into two echelons to provide greater depth and
reserves.
• Company strongpoints are prepared and form the basis for the battalion
defensive position.
• The reserve is located in a separate strongpoint.
• Ambush locations are established in the gaps of the strongpoints, and dummy
strongpoints are constructed to deceive the attacker.
• Positions for securing and defending the entrances to and exits from
underground structures and routes are established.
• Security positions are prepared forward of first echelon defensive positions.
• A motorized or mechanized rifle company may defend several buildings or a
single large building with mutually supporting fires.
• Each platoon defends one or two buildings, or one or two floors of a single
building.
(b) In many third world countries, the forces are predominantly light with some
outdated armored vehicles. Some countries may not have actual armed forces but have
some form of armed militia(s). These forces normally do not fight a defense in the former

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Warsaw Pact style, but rather offer uncoordinated resistance, often extremely intense, as
experienced in Somalia.
(2) Unconventional (Asymmetric) Forces. Enemy analysis is similar to that for low
intensity conflict during urban counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, and counterterrorist
operations.
c. Terrain. Offensive operations must be tailored to the urban environment based on
a detailed analysis of each urban terrain setting, its types of built-up areas, and existing
structural forms. Commanders and subordinate leaders must incorporate the following
special planning considerations for an urban environment when conducting an offensive
operation:
• Military maps that may not provide enough detail for urban terrain analysis
nor reflect the underground sewer system, subways, underground water
system, mass transit routes, and utility facilities. (When available, the
commander should utilize building or city plans, engineering prints, aerial
photographs, tourist maps, or other aids that may assist him in his analysis of
the terrain.)
• Natural terrain surrounding the built-up area.
• Key and decisive terrain (stadiums, parks, sports fields, school playgrounds,
public buildings, media facilities, and industrial facilities).
• Construction and structural composition of buildings.
• Confined spaces that limit observation, fields of fire, and maneuver and
prevent the concentration of fires at critical points.
• Covered and concealed routes to and within the built-up area.
• Limited ability to employ maximum combat power due to the need to
minimize damage and rubbling effects (based on ROE).
• Problems with conducting effective reconnaissance during conventional
operations. Reconnaissance by force is the most effective reconnaissance
means, ROE permitting. This method involves probing a defense with
successively larger units until enemy positions are disclosed and can be
successfully attacked. During unconventional (asymmetric) operations or
operations under restrictive ROE, the opposite is true. Reconnaissance and
security are more easily accomplished by both sides and are more difficult to
prevent.
• ROE that limit the use of firepower.
• Significant numbers of civilians who may have to be evacuated, some
forcibly. Civilians may hinder operations on purpose or merely by their
presence.
d. Troops Available. An SBCT infantry company normally participates in an attack
as part of an attacking SBCT battalion. In this case, the company may have to isolate the
objective or seize a foothold. If the objective is a smaller built-up area, a company may
be required to accomplish the entire mission independently, assigning required tasks to its
platoons or squads. In either case, the maneuver platoons accomplish these tasks. The
company mortar section normally supports the assault by providing indirect fire support.
(See Chapter 10 for detailed discussion of assets the company commander may have
available.)

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(1) MGS Vehicles. MGS vehicles may support by fire when lead units are seizing a
foothold. During the attack of a built-up area, MGS vehicles overwatch the infantry's
initial assault until an entry into the area has been secured. ICVs or MGS vehicles need
the support of infantry in order to suppress enemy strongpoints and ATGMs while they
move into overwatch positions. The commander must employ MGS vehicles to take
advantage of the range of their main armament and their armored protection. He should
also consider bringing the vehicles forward to secure a foothold or breach exterior walls
for the infantry. He bases this decision on the ROE and the effectiveness of enemy
antiarmor fires.
(2) Direct Fire Artillery. If available, towed 155-mm howitzers can use direct fire to
destroy bunkers, heavy fortifications, or enemy positions in reinforced concrete buildings
(Figure 6-6). The towed 155-mm howitzer may also clear or create avenues of approach.
Whenever artillery is used in the direct fire role, it must be close to the infantry providing
security against enemy ground attack. Prior coordination is necessary so the bulk of the
field artillery unit's shells are HE.

Figure 6-6. Artillery in direct fire role.

e. Time. Offensive operations in built-up areas have a slower pace and operational
tempo. Consider the following issues when analyzing time available for an attack in
urban terrain:
(1) Clearing buildings, blocks, or axes of advance in the dense environment of urban
terrain requires more time than for operations in more open terrain.
(2) Troops tire more quickly because of stress and the additional physical exertion
related to clearing urban terrain. Plan additional time to recover from fatigue.

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(3) Allow additional time for thorough reconnaissance and rehearsals in order to
prevent excessive casualties and fratricide.

6-5. BATTLE COMMAND

Units in built-up areas frequently fight separated and isolated from one another. Planning
is centralized, but execution is decentralized. Therefore, it is critical that the commander
clearly describe his visualization of the terrain and the enemy to his platoon and squad
leaders. In all situations, leaders should position themselves well forward so that they can
control the action and provide assistance to subordinate leaders. In urban terrain, this is
even more critical due to obstacles, poor visibility, difficulty in communications, and the
intensity of urban combat. SBCT infantry commanders must demand timely, accurate,
and complete reporting and must plan for effective command and control to lessen the
effects of the urban battlefield. The FBCB2 capability is not 100 percent; the leader on
the ground reporting the situation as he sees it produces SU.
a. Command. Subordinate units require mission-type orders that are restrictive in
nature. SBCT infantry commanders should use detailed control measures to facilitate
decentralized execution. Increased difficulties in command, control, and communications
from higher headquarters demand increased responsibility and initiative from subordinate
leaders. Graphic control measures common to other tactical environments are also used in
combat in built-up areas. These and other control measures ensure coordination
throughout the chain of command.
b. Control. Thorough rehearsals and detailed briefbacks also enhance control. It is
important that subordinate leaders clearly understand the commander’s intent (two levels
up) and desired mission end state in order to facilitate control. SBCT infantry company
commanders should consider using subordinate leaders to control certain portions of the
fight when the commander’s attention needs to be focused elsewhere (for example, using
the XO to control the support element while the commander controls the assault
elements).
(1) Establish Communications. In built-up areas, radio communications are often
less effective than field telephones and messengers. Communications equipment may not
function properly because of the materials used in the construction of buildings and the
environment. Wire laid at street level is easily damaged by rubble and vehicle traffic.
Pyrotechnic signals are hard to see because of buildings and smoke. The high noise level
of battles within and around buildings makes sound signals and voice alerts difficult to
hear, and voice communication can also signal the unit’s intention and location to the
enemy. Line-of-sight (LOS) limitations affect both visual and radio communications.
Therefore, the time needed to establish an effective communications system might be
greater in an urban environment. Leaders should consider these effects when they
allocate time to establish communications. Since the effectiveness of normally
dependable communications may be uncertain in UO, units may fight without continuous
communications or the use of the tactical internet. Unit SOPs become significantly more
important in urban terrain.
(2) Graphic Control Measures. The use of graphic control measures to augment
FBCB2 and understanding of the SBCT commander’s intent two levels up by all leaders
becomes even more important to successful mission accomplishment in an urban

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environment. Leaders can use phase lines to report progress or to control the advance of
attacking units and limits of advance (LOAs) to prevent fratricide.
(a) When attacking to seize a foothold, the SBCT infantry company normally assigns
a building or a few small buildings as a platoon's first objective. When an objective
extends to a street, only the near side of the street is included in the objective area. The
company's final objective may be buildings at the far edge of the built-up area or key
terrain on the far side. Key buildings or groups of buildings may also be assigned as
intermediate objectives. To simplify assigning objectives and reporting, buildings along
the route of attack should be identified by SOP. An example using numbers is shown in
Figure 6-7.

Figure 6-7. Example of a numbering system.

(b) When the company is involved in clearing a zone, bypassing buildings increases
the risk of attack from the rear or flank. Thus, the clearing unit must enter, search, and
clear each building in its zone of action or isolate it by fire or other means. A single
building may be an objective for a rifle squad or, if the building is large, for a rifle
platoon or even a company. When the SBCT infantry commander's concept is based on
speed or when conducting a hasty attack, a company may be directed not to clear
throughout its entire zone.
(c) Phase lines can be used to report progress or to control the advance of attacking
units (Figure 6-8, page 6-18). Principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines are suitable
phase lines, which should be on the near side of the street or open area. In systematic
clearing, a company may have the mission to clear its zone of action up to a phase line. In
that case, the company commander chooses his own objectives when assigning missions
to his subordinate units.

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Figure 6-8. Zones, boundaries, and phase lines.

(d) Set company boundaries within blocks so that a street is included in a company
zone. Place boundaries to ensure both sides of a street are in the zone of one unit.
(e) Plan checkpoints and contact points at street corners, buildings, railway crossings,
bridges, or any other easily identifiable urban feature.
(f) Forward units may occupy an attack position for last-minute preparation and
coordination. The attack position is often behind or inside the last covered and concealed
position, such as a large building, before crossing the LD. The LD should be the near side
of a street or rail line.
(g) A unit's assigned frontage for the attack of a built-up area depends on the size of
buildings and the resistance anticipated. Based on city blocks averaging 175 meters in
width, a company normally attacks on a one- to two-block front; a battalion attacks on a
two- to four-block front.
(h) Conduct the attack when visibility is poor. Troops should exploit poor visibility to
cross open areas, to gain access to rooftops, to infiltrate enemy areas, and to seize a
foothold. If the attack must be made when visibility is good, units should use hydrogen
chloride (HC) smoke or other obscurants to conceal movement.

6-6. TASK ORGANIZATION

The SBCT infantry company commander normally task-organizes his company into three
elements: an assault force, a support force, and a reserve. The support force may be given
a number of tasks to conduct on order or simultaneously. Specifically, the support force
may support by fire, isolate the objective, or breach. The tactical situation dictates
whether or not separate elements need to be task-organized in order to conduct these
support missions. If available, engineers are usually task organized into the force
performing a breach. The size and composition of the force are determined by METT-
TC. If the company is part of an SBCT battalion operation, the company may have the
mission to conduct one or more of the tasks mentioned above. If conducting an urban
attack independently, the SBCT infantry company must perform both assault and support
tasks.

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a. Assault Force. The purpose of the assault force is to destroy the enemy, capture
the enemy, or force the withdrawal of the enemy from any urban objective. The assault
force of an SBCT infantry company may consist of two or more infantry platoons usually
reinforced with engineers and MGS vehicles. Building and room clearing are normally
conducted at platoon and squad levels. The assault force may also conduct a breach.
b. Support Force. The purpose of the support force is to provide any support that
may be required by the assault force. The support force at the SBCT infantry company
level normally consists of the company’s organic assets (infantry platoons, MGS platoon,
mortars, and antitank weapons), its attachments, and units that are under the operational
control (OPCON) of the company commander. This assistance includes, but is not limited
to--
• Suppressing or obscuring the enemy within the objective building(s) and
adjacent structures.
• Isolating the objective building(s) to prevent enemy withdrawal,
reinforcement, or counterattack.
• Breaching walls en route to and in the objective structure.
• Destroying or suppressing enemy positions with direct fire weapons.
• Securing cleared portions of the objective.
• Providing resupply of ammunition, explosives, and personnel.
• Evacuating casualties, EPWs, and civilians.
c. Reserves. SBCT infantry companies fighting in urban terrain should designate a
reserve. The reserve should be the same size and composition as the assault force. (As a
minimum, the reserve should have the same capabilities as the assault force to achieve
the desired action at the desired point.) The company reserve should be mobile and
prepared for commitment. Because of the available cover in built-up areas, the reserve
can stay close to forward units. The reserve follows within the same block so that it can
immediately influence the attack. Platoon(s) may be detached from the company to form
a battalion reserve. A unit with a reserve mission may be called upon to perform one or
more of the following tasks:
• Assume the mission of the assault force.
• Move behind the assault force to provide security in cleared buildings to allow
the assault force to continue to move.
• Attack from another direction.
• Exploit an enemy weakness or friendly success.
• Clear bypassed enemy positions.
• Secure the rear or a flank.
• Maintain contact with adjacent units.
• Support or counterattack by fire.
d. Breaching Element. At the SBCT infantry company level, the assault or support
force may conduct breaching. However, a separate breaching force may be created, or
platoons may be given this mission and task-organized accordingly. The purpose of
breaching is to provide the assault force with access to an urban objective, using
explosive, ballistic, or mechanical methods. Explosive breaching includes using
nonelectrical demolition systems; ballistic breaching includes using direct fire weapons;
and mechanical breaching includes the use of crowbars, axes, saws, hooligan’s tools, and
sledgehammers. Attached engineers or members of the company who have had additional

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training in explosive, ballistic, and mechanical breaching techniques may conduct the
breach.

6-7. MOVEMENT
When moving in built-up areas (BUAs), an SBCT infantry company follows the same
fundamentals and principles and uses the same movement techniques as in other areas.
Enemy actions against the company might consist of ambushes on the street, enfilade fire
down the streets, sniper fire, fire from rooftops and from within buildings, or artillery or
mortar fire. The company can minimize the effects of enemy defensive fires during
movement by--
• Using covered routes (moving through buildings).
• Moving only after defensive fires have been suppressed or obscured.
• Moving at night or during other periods of limited visibility.
• Selecting routes that will not mask friendly suppressive fires.
• Crossing open areas (streets and spaces between buildings) quickly under the
concealment of smoke with suppression provided by support forces.
• Moving on rooftops that are not covered by enemy direct fires.
• Using the concealment provided by shaded areas.
• Using cover provided by attached armored vehicles.
• Creating deceptions.
• Laying suppressive fires on known or suspected enemy positions, as allowed
by ROE.
a. Movement Down Streets. Should the situation allow or require movement down
a street, platoons move in file along one or both sides of the street with overwatching
fires from supporting weapons. Individual soldiers are dispersed, move quickly, and are
detailed to observe and cover a certain area such as second-floor windows on the opposite
side of the street. As in all urban situations, platoons must search for defenders in 360
degrees and in all three dimensions (front, flanks, rear, upper stories, basements, and
rooftops).
b. Speed of Movement. The speed of movement depends on the type of operation,
terrain, and degree of enemy resistance. As in any other terrain, the faster the speed of
movement, the lesser the degree of security; the slower the speed, the more secure the
movement. In lightly defended areas, the mission or the requirement for speed may
dictate moving through the streets and alleys without clearing all buildings in order to
reach and secure key terrain. More importantly, the company commander must establish
and enforce the tempo of the operation.
c. Danger Areas. As in any other type of terrain, the company should avoid danger
areas if possible. Unlike in other terrain, almost everything is a danger area in urban
terrain. Types of urban danger areas include, but are not limited to--
• Open areas.
• Parking lots and garages.
• Intersections.
• Streets, alleys, and roadways.
• Traffic circles and cul-de-sacs.
• Bridges, overpasses, and underpasses.

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• Subterranean areas.
• Rooftops.

6-8. DELIBERATE ATTACK

At the company level, a deliberate attack of an urban area usually involves the sequential
execution of the tactical tasks below.
a. Reconnoiter the Objective. This method involves making a physical
reconnaissance of the objective with company assets and those of higher headquarters, as
the tactical situation permits. It also involves a map reconnaissance of the objective and
all the terrain that affects the mission, to include the analysis of aerial imagery,
photographs, or any other detailed information about the building or other urban terrain,
for which the company is responsible. Additionally, any HUMINT collected by
reconnaissance and surveillance units, such as the battalion reconnaissance platoon,
snipers, and so forth, should be considered during the planning process.
b. Move to the Objective. This method may involve moving the company tactically
through open and or urban terrain. Movement should be made as rapidly as possible
without sacrificing security. Movement should be made along covered and concealed
routes and can involve moving through buildings, down streets, subsurface areas, or a
combination of all three. Urban movement must take into account the three-dimensional
aspect of the urban area.
c. Isolate the Objective. Isolating the objective involves seizing terrain that
dominates the area so that the enemy cannot supply, reinforce, or withdraw its defenders.
It also includes selecting terrain that provides the ability to place suppressive fire on the
objective. (This step may be taken at the same time as securing a foothold.) If isolating
the objective is the first step, speed is necessary so that the defender has no time to react.
Companies may be required to isolate an objective as part of a battalion operation or may
be required to do so independently. Depending on the tactical situation, an infantry
company may isolate an objective by infiltration and stealth.
d. Secure a Foothold. Securing a foothold involves seizing an intermediate
objective that provides cover from enemy fire and a location for attacking troops to enter
the urban area. The size of the foothold is METT-TC dependent and is usually a company
intermediate objective. In some cases a large building may be assigned as a company
intermediate objective (foothold). As the company attacks to gain a foothold, it should be
supported by suppressive fire and smoke.
e. Clear an Urban Area. Before determining to what extent the urban area must be
cleared, the factors of METT-TC must be considered. The ROE influence the tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) platoons and squads select as they move through the
urban area and clear individual buildings and rooms.
(1) The commander may decide to clear only those parts necessary for the success of
his mission if--
• An objective must be seized quickly.
• Enemy resistance is light or fragmented.
• The buildings in the area have large open areas between them. In this case, the
commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his
objective or only those buildings necessary for security. (See Figure 6-9, page
6-22.)

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(2) An infantry company may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all
enemy. Through detailed analysis, the commander may anticipate that he will be opposed
by a strong, organized resistance or will be in areas having strongly constructed buildings
that are close together. Therefore, one or two platoons may attack on a narrow front
against the enemy’s weakest sector. They move slowly through the area, clearing
systematically from room to room and building to building. The other platoon supports
the clearing units and is prepared to assume their mission.

Figure 6-9. Clearing selected buildings within sector.

f. Consolidate, Reorganize, and Prepare for Future Missions. Consolidation

occurs immediately after each action. Consolidation is security and allows the company
to prepare for counterattack and to facilitate reorganization. It is extremely important in
an urban environment that units consolidate and reorganize rapidly after each
engagement. The assault force in a cleared building must be quick to consolidate in order
to repel enemy counterattacks and to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back into the
cleared building. After securing a floor, selected members of the assault force are
assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes to the building. Priority must be
given to securing the direction of attack first. Those soldiers alert the assault force and
place a heavy volume of fire on enemy forces approaching the building. Reorganization
occurs after consolidation. Reorganization actions prepare the unit to continue the
mission; many actions occur at the same time.
(1) Consolidation Actions. Platoons assume hasty defensive positions after the
objective has been seized or cleared. Based upon their specified and implied tasks,
assaulting platoons should be prepared to assume an overwatch mission and support an
assault on another building or another assault within the building. Commanders must

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ensure that platoons guard enemy mouseholes between adjacent buildings, covered routes
to the building, underground routes into the basement, and approaches over adjoining
roofs.
(2) Reorganization Actions. After consolidation, the following actions are taken:
• Resupply and redistribute ammunition, equipment, and other necessary items.
• Mark the building to indicate to friendly forces that the building has been
cleared.
• Move support or reserve elements into the objective, if tactically sound.
• Redistribute personnel and equipment on adjacent structures.
• Treat and evacuate wounded personnel.
• Treat and evacuate wounded EPW and process remainder of EPWs.
• Segregate and safeguard civilians.
• Re-establish the chain of command.
• Redistribute personnel on the objective to support the next phase or mission.
(3) Prepare for Future Missions. The company commander anticipates and prepares
for future missions and prepares the company chain of command for transition to
defensive and or stability and support missions.

6-9. ISOLATE AN URBAN OBJECTIVE

SBCT infantry companies must isolate urban objectives in order to prevent reinforcement
of or counterattack against the objective and to kill or capture any withdrawing enemy
forces. When planning the isolation, commanders must consider three-dimensional and
in-depth isolation of the objective (front, flanks, rear, upper stories, basements, and
rooftops). They should employ all available direct and indirect fire weapons, to include
attack helicopters and CAS, consistent with the ROE. Isolating the objective is a key
factor in facilitating the assault and preventing casualties. The company may perform this
mission as the support element for a battalion operation, or it may assign the task to its
own internal support element for a company attack. In certain situations, SBCT infantry
companies may isolate an objective or an area for special operations forces. When
possible, the company should isolate the objective using stealth and rapid movement in
order to surprise the enemy. Depending on the tactical situation, infantry companies may
use infiltration in order to isolate the objective. Likely tasks include, but are not limited to
the following.
a. Isolating the Objective (Battalion Attack). An SBCT infantry company may
isolate the objective as the support element for a battalion operation. When an infantry
company has this mission, the objective is normally a larger structure, block, or group of
buildings. The company commander task-organizes his platoons and assigns them
support-by-fire positions based on the factors of METT-TC. In addition to isolating the
objective, the company (support element) may have additional tasks to conduct on order
or simultaneously. Examples of these additional tasks include providing the battalion
reserve, assuming assault element missions, handling civilians and EPWs, and
performing CASEVAC.
b. Isolating the Objective (Company Attack). When an SBCT infantry company
conducts an attack, the task organization and tasks given to the company support element
are determined by the factors of METT-TC. If the company conducts a company attack,
the objective can be a building, block, a grouping of buildings, traffic circle, or village

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(Figure 6-10). See Figure 6-11 for a technique of controlling direct fires during the
assault.

Figure 6-10. Isolating an urban objective.

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Figure 6-11. Direction of assault technique for direct fire planning and
control.

6-10. ASSAULT A BUILDING

The SBCT infantry company conducts this mission independently or as part of the assault
element of an SBCT battalion. (Independently is defined here as an SBCT infantry
company having to provide its own support element, as opposed to conducting an
operation without flank and rear support, such as a raid or ambush.) If the company is the
assault force of a battalion, it most frequently conducts the assault against a large
building defended by a strong enemy force (for example, a reinforced platoon). The
SBCT company commander must clearly understand the specified and implied tasks
required to accomplish the mission, as well as the SBCT and battalion commander's
intent and the desired mission end state. This allows the company commander to task-
organize and issue specific missions to his subordinate elements concerning which floors
and rooms to clear, seize, or bypass. As an example, Figure 6-12, page 6-26, depicts an
infantry battalion assigned the task of clearing the objectives in its sector (DOG and
TAIL). Company B has the task of seizing OBJ TAIL. The company commander has
decided to assign an intermediate objective (WING) to 1st Platoon. 3d Platoon is a
supporting element with the task of isolating WING (1st and 2d squads to occupy the
positions indicated) and providing one squad to act as the company reserve (3d squad).
2d Platoon (+) will pass through 1st Platoon, which will mark a passage lane and seize
TAIL. The MGS platoon (-) will be integrated into the supporting element for the assault
of OBJ WING and OBJ TAIL.

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Figure 6-12. Assault of a building.

a. Execution. Platoons move floor-to-floor by bounds when clearing a multistory

building. This permits troops to rest after a floor has been cleared. It is likely that
platoons will need to leave security on cleared floors and in cleared rooms and to
facilitate the passage of another platoon in order to continue the assault. The assault
element must quickly and violently execute its assault and subsequent clearing
operations. Once it gains the momentum, the assault force must maintain this momentum
to prevent the enemy from organizing a more determined resistance on other floors or in
other rooms. If platoons find rooms, hallways, or stairwells that are barricaded with
furniture or where obstacles have been placed, they should first attempt to bypass the
barricade or obstacle and maintain the momentum of the attack. If they cannot bypass the
barricade or obstacle, they should place security on it, check it for booby traps, and then
reduce it. Subordinate leaders should continue the momentum of the assault but not allow
the operation to become disorganized.
b. Ammunition and Equipment. METT-TC factors and the ROE determine how
the assault element is equipped and armed. Commanders must carefully manage the
soldier’s load during the assault. Ammunition, water, special assault weapons and
equipment, and medical supplies are normally the only items carried in the assault. The
assault force carries only a fighting load of equipment and as much ammunition as
possible, especially grenades. (See Section II, Chapter 11, for a discussion of load
management.) The SBCT battalion and SBCT infantry company trains maintain control
of additional ammunition and equipment not immediately needed by the assault force. An
often-overlooked munition in an urban battle is the light antitank weapon. Soldiers can
use these for a variety of purposes such as suppressing a manned position or supporting a

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breach into a structure. Resupply should be pushed to the assault element by the support
element.
c. Assault Locations. The assault may begin from the top or bottom of the building.
(1) Top Entry. Entering at the top and fighting downward is the preferred method of
clearing a building. This method is only feasible, however, when the company can gain
access to an upper floor or rooftop by ladder or from the windows or roofs of adjoining,
secured buildings, or by helicopter if enemy air defense weapons can be suppressed. The
company can also gain access to the roof by entering at ground level and fighting up a
stairwell or elevator shaft. They then clear the remainder of the building from the top to
bottom. This will afford the soldiers a covered and concealed route to the upper floors of
the building. Rooftops are danger areas when surrounding buildings are higher and forces
can be exposed to fire from those buildings. Helicopters should land only on those
buildings that have special heliports on the roofs or on parking garages, but soldiers can
rappel or fast rope onto the roof or dismount as the helicopter hovers a few feet above the
roof. Troops can then breach the roof or common walls. They may use ropes or other
means to enter the lower floors through the holes created. The use of ladders to assault an
upper level should be a last resort.
(2) Bottom Entry. Entry at the bottom is common and may be the only option
available. When entering from the bottom, breaching a wall is the preferred method
because doors and windows may be booby-trapped and covered by fire from inside the
structure. If the assault element must enter through a door or window, it should enter
from a rear or flank position. Prior to entering the building the commander must ensure
the platoons have the capability to create entry points from covered and concealed
positions. MGS or other breaching assets should be allocated to the platoons. These
assets conduct the breaches and allow the platoons to enter the building to be seized
directly from covered and concealed positions.
d. Suppressive Fires During the Assault. The support force provides suppressive
fire while the assault force systematically clears the building. It also provides suppressive
fire on adjacent buildings to prevent enemy reinforcements or withdrawal. Suppressive
fire may consist of firing at known and suspected enemy locations or, depending on the
ROE, may include only firing at identified targets or returning fire when fired upon. The
support force destroys or captures any enemy personnel trying to exit the building. The
support force must also deal with civilians displaced by the assault.
e. Clearing Rooms. SBCT infantry company commanders must ensure that clearing
platoons carry enough room marking equipment and plainly mark cleared rooms from the
friendly side IAW unit SOP (Figure 6-13, page 6-28). Markings must be visible to
friendly units even if the operation occurs during limited visibility. The support force
must understand which markings will be used and ensure that suppressive fires do not
engage cleared rooms and floors. Maintaining an awareness as to where the assault
teams are and which rooms and floors have been cleared is imperative and a key
command and control function for the company commander.

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Figure 6-13. Sample marking SOP.

6-11. ATTACK A BLOCK OR GROUP OF BUILDINGS

An SBCT infantry company normally attacks a block or group of buildings as part of an
SBCT battalion attack. To attack a block or group of buildings, an infantry company
reinforces with MGS vehicles and possibly engineers, BFVs, or tanks, consistent with the
ROE and the enemy situation.
a. Execution. Platoon attacks supported by both direct and indirect fires characterize
the execution of this mission. Success depends on isolating enemy positions (which often
become platoon objectives), suppressing enemy weapons, seizing a foothold in the block,
and clearing the block's buildings room by room.
b. Direct Fire Weapons. ICVs, MGS vehicles, machine guns, and other direct fire
support weapons fire on the objective from covered positions, consistent with the ROE.
These weapons should not be fired for prolonged periods from one position. The gunners
should use a series of positions and displace from one to another to gain better fields of
fire and to avoid being targeted by the enemy. Direct fire support tasks can be assigned as
follows:
• Machine guns fire along streets and into windows, doors, mouseholes, and
other probable enemy positions. ROE may restrict firing only to known enemy
locations.
• MGS vehicles fire at targets protected by walls and provide protection against
enemy vehicles, as required.
• ICVs may use mounted weapons systems to suppress enemy positions.
• Riflemen engage targets of opportunity.
c. Obscuration and Assault. Before an assault, the SBCT infantry company
commander should employ smoke to conceal the assaulting platoons. He secures their
flanks with direct fire weapons and employment of the reserve, if necessary. Concealed
by smoke and supported by direct fire weapons, an assaulting platoon attacks the first
isolated building. The assault force utilizes the cover of suppressive fires to gain a

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foothold. The company commander must closely coordinate the assault with its
supporting fire so that the fire is shifted at the last possible moment. After seizing the
block, the SBCT infantry company consolidates and reorganizes to repel a counterattack
or to continue the attack.

6-12. CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION

Consolidation occurs immediately after each action. Consolidation provides security and
allows a unit to reorganize and prepare for counterattack. In an urban environment, it is
extremely important that units consolidate rapidly after each engagement. The assault
force in a cleared building must be quick to consolidate in order to repel enemy
counterattacks and to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back into the cleared building.
Many actions occur simultaneously. After securing a floor, selected members of the
assault force cover potential enemy counterattack routes to the building. Priority must be
given to securing the direction of attack first. Those soldiers alert the assault force and
place a heavy volume of fire on enemy forces approaching the building. Reorganization
occurs after consolidation. Reorganization actions prepare the unit to continue the
mission.
a. Consolidation Actions. Platoons assume hasty defensive positions after the
objective has been seized or cleared. Based upon their specified and implied tasks,
assaulting platoons should be prepared to assume an overwatch mission and support an
assault on another building or another assault within the building. Commanders must
ensure that platoons guard--
• Enemy mouseholes between adjacent buildings.
• Covered routes to the building.
• Underground routes into the basement.
• Approaches over adjoining roofs.
b. Reorganization Actions. After consolidation, reorganization actions include the
following:
• Resupply and redistribute ammunition.
• Mark the building to indicate to friendly forces that it has been cleared.
• Move support or reserve elements into the objective (if tactically sound).
• Redistribute personnel and equipment on adjacent structures.
• Treat and evacuate wounded personnel.
• Treat and process EPWs.
• Segregate and safeguard civilians.
• Reestablish the chain of command.
• Redistribute personnel on the objective to support the next phase or mission.

NOTE: During evacuation of casualties, the commander must ensure that he does not
allow the evacuation to interfere with his on-going operation. He must ensure
adequate forces are maintained to prevent the enemy from successfully
counterattacking and reoccupying the building or buildings the company
seized and cleared.

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Section III. DEFENSE

The two defense patterns (area and mobile) apply in UO. Of these two patterns, the
mobile defense pattern is more focused on the enemy. The commander may decide to use
it based on his estimate of the situation. The area defense pattern is more appropriate
when most of the reasons for defending a built-up area are focused on retaining terrain. In
a built-up area, the defender must take advantage of inherent cover and concealment
afforded by urban terrain. He must also consider restrictions to the attacker's ability to
maneuver and observe. By using the terrain and fighting from well-prepared and
mutually supporting positions, a defending force can delay, block, fix, or inflict heavy
losses on a much larger attacking force. The defense of a built-up area should be
organized around key terrain features, buildings, and areas that preserve the integrity of
the defense and provide the defender ease of movement. The defender must organize and
plan his defense by considering obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation
and fields of fire, cover and concealment, fire hazards, and communications restrictions.

6-13. METT-TC FACTORS

Procedures and principles for planning and organizing the defense of a built-up area are
the same as for other defensive operations. In developing a defensive plan, the defender
considers the factors of METT-TC, emphasizing their impact on fire support, preparation
time, work priorities, and control measures. Planning for the defense of a built-up area
must be detailed and centralized. As in the offense, execution is decentralized as the
battle develops and enemy forces assault buildings and rooms. Therefore, it is imperative
that the company commander and his subordinate leaders understand the mission end
state and the commanders’ intent two levels up.
a. Mission. The SBCT infantry commander must receive, analyze, and understand
the mission before he begins planning. He may receive the mission as a FRAGO or
formal OPORD, and he must analyze all specified and implied tasks. Depending on
mission requirements, an infantry company must be prepared to defend independently or
as part of a larger force (SBCT battalion). Mission planning is essentially the same for all
defensive operations. A hasty defense may be conducted in any of the situations
described below, immediately after offensive operations, or when a higher state of
security is warranted during stability operations or support operations. The major
difference lies in the amount of time for preparation and the ROE.
b. Enemy. The commander must also analyze the type of enemy force he may
encounter. If the attacker is mostly dismounted infantry, the greatest danger is allowing
him to gain a foothold. If the attacker is mostly armored or mounted motorized infantry,
the greatest danger is that he will mass direct fire and destroy the defender's positions.
Intelligence gathering for defensive operations is not limited to only studying the enemy.
Commanders must emphasize obtaining and using all intelligence. The items of
intelligence peculiar to combat in built-up areas include--
• Street, water, and sewer plans.
• Key installations and facilities.
• Key civilians.
• Civilian police and paramilitary forces.
• Sources of food.

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• Communications facilities and plans.

• Power stations.
c. Terrain. Terrain in built-up areas is three-dimensional: ground level (streets and
parks), above ground (buildings), and below ground (subways and sewers). Analysis of
all manmade and natural terrain features is critical when planning to defend on built-up
terrain. The type of built-up area in which he will operate affects the commander's
defensive plan.
(1) Villages. Villages are often on choke points in valleys, dominating the only high-
speed avenue of approach through the terrain. If the buildings in such a village are well
constructed and provide good protection against both direct and indirect fires, a
formidable defense can be mounted by placing a company in the town while controlling
close and dominating terrain with other SBCT battalion elements.
(a) If the terrain allows easy bypass and there are no other villages on defendable
terrain within a mutually supporting distance, it is unwise to defend the village. Doing so
would allow friendly forces to be easily bypassed and isolated.
(b) Commanders may use villages on approaches to large towns or cities to add depth
to the defense or to secure the flanks. These villages are often characterized by clusters of
houses and buildings (stone, brick, or concrete). Company-size battle positions in these
small villages can block approaches into the main defensive positions.
(2) Strip Areas. Strip areas consist of houses, stores, and factories and are built along
roads or down valleys between towns and villages. They afford the defender the same
advantages as villages. If visibility is good and enough effective fields of fire are
available, a unit acting as a security force need occupy only a few strong positions spread
out within the strip. This will deceive the enemy, when engaged at long ranges, into
thinking the strip is an extensive defensive line. Strip areas often afford covered avenues
of withdrawal to the flanks once the attacking force is deployed and before the security
force becomes decisively engaged.
(3) Towns and Cities. When facing a predominantly armored enemy, a small force
can gain an advantage in combat power when defending a small city or town that is a
choke point by placing MGSs, ICVs, and Javelins on positions dominating critical
approaches. To deny the enemy the ability to bypass the town or city, the defending force
must control key terrain and coordinate with adjacent forces. Reserve forces should be
placed where they can quickly reinforce critical areas. Obstacles and minefields assist in
slowing and canalizing the attacker.
(a) Finding positions in towns and cities that provide both good fields of fire and
cover is often difficult. The forward edges of a town usually offer the best fields of fire
but can be easily targeted by enemy overwatch and supporting fire. These areas often
contain residential buildings constructed of light material. Factories, civic buildings, and
other heavy structures, which provide adequate cover and are more suitable for a defense,
are more likely to be found deeper in the town and have limited fields of fire on likely
avenues of approach.
(b) Since the forward edge of a town is the obvious position for the defender, it
usually should be avoided. However, the defender can set up his position there if the
terrain limits the enemy's ability for engagement or contains strongly constructed
buildings that give defending units adequate protection.

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(c) A force may initially be assigned battle positions on the forward edge of the town
to provide early warning of the enemy's advance. The force engages the enemy at long
range and deceives the enemy as to the true location of the defense. This force should
withdraw in time to avoid decisive engagement. If there is limited observation from the
forward edge, a force should be positioned on more favorable terrain forward or to the
flanks of the town to gain better observation and to engage the enemy at long range.
(d) To prevent airmobile or airborne landings within the city or town, the commander
must emplace obstacles on probable LZs and DZs, to include parks, stadiums, and large
rooftops and heliports. Direct and indirect fires should also cover these.
(4) Large Built-Up Areas. In large built-up areas, tall buildings are normally close
together. This may require a higher density of troops and smaller defensive sectors than
in other urban terrain. The density of buildings, rubble, and street patterns may dictate the
depth and frontage of the unit (Table 6-1).

UNIT FRONTAGES DEPTHS

SBCT infantry battalion 4 to 8 blocks 3 to 6 blocks
SBCT infantry company 2 to 4 blocks 2 to 3 blocks
SBCT infantry platoon 1 to 2 blocks 1 block
NOTE: An average city block has a frontage of about 175 meters. These
minimum figures apply in areas of dense block-type construction,
multistory buildings, and underground passages.
Table 6-1. Approximate frontages and depths in large built-up areas.

(a) In a large built-up area, an SBCT infantry company has a sector, battle
position(s), or a strongpoint to defend. Although mutual support between positions
should be maintained, built-up terrain often allows for infiltration routes that the enemy
may use to pass between positions. Therefore, the defender must identify the following:
• Positions that enable him to place effective direct fires on the infiltrating
enemy.
• Covered and concealed routes for friendly elements to move between
positions (subways and sewers).
• Structures that dominate large areas.
• Areas where antiarmor weapons have effective fields of fire, such as parks,
boulevards, rivers, highways, and railroads.
• Firing positions for mortars.
• Command and control locations that offer cover, concealment, and ease of
communications.
• Protected storage areas for supplies.
(b) Leaders choose buildings that add most to the general plan of defense for
occupation. Mutual support between these positions is vital to prevent the attacker from
maneuvering and outflanking the defensive position, making it untenable. Buildings
chosen for occupation as defensive positions should have the following characteristics:
• Good protection.
• Strong floors to keep the structure from collapsing under the weight of debris.
• Thick walls.

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• Constructed of nonflammable materials (avoid wood).

• Strategically located (corner buildings or prominent structures).
• Adjacent to streets, alleys, vacant lots, and park sites. (These buildings usually
provide better fields of fire and are more easily tied in with other buildings.)
• Covered by friendly fire and offering good escape routes.
(5) Obstacles. A built-up area is itself an obstacle since it canalizes and impedes an
attack. Likely avenues of approach should be blocked by obstacles and covered by fire
(Figure 6-14). Barriers and obstacles should be emplaced in three belts, consistent with
the ROE.

Figure 6-14. Example of urban obstacles.

(6) Avenues of Approach. The defender must consider not only the conventional
avenues of approach into and out of the city, but also the avenues above and below
ground level within built-up areas. The defender normally has the advantage. He knows
the built-up area and can move rapidly from position to position through buildings and
underground passages. Control of these above- and below-ground avenues of approach
becomes more critical when the defense of key terrain must be oriented against terrorism
and sabotage. All avenues of approach (three-dimensionally) must be denied. SBCT
infantry company commanders must not overlook the use of field-expedient obstacles,
such as cars and light poles, or the emplacement of command detonated antipersonnel
mines and antitank mines. Commanders must clearly understand the ROE and what they
are permitted to emplace. When necessary, obstacles can be emplaced without mines and
covered by fire within the parameters of the ROE.

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(7) Key Terrain. Key terrain is any place where seizure, retention, or control affords a
marked advantage to either combatant. Examples of key terrain during UO are bridges
over canals or rivers, building complexes, public utilities or services, and parks. The
population of a built-up area may also be considered key terrain. The identification of key
terrain allows the defender to select his defensive positions and assists in determining the
enemy's objectives.
(8) Observation and Fields of Fire. The defender must position weapons to obtain
maximum effect and mutual supporting fire. This allows for long-range engagements out
to the maximum effective ranges. Observers should be well above street level to adjust
fires on the enemy at maximum range. Fires and FPFs should be preplanned and, if
possible and ROE permitting, preregistered on the most likely approaches to allow for
their rapid shifting to threatened areas.
(9) Cover and Concealment. The defender should prepare positions using the
protective cover of walls, floors, and ceilings. Soldiers should always improve positions
using materials on hand. When the defender must move, he can reduce his exposure by--
• Using prepared breaches through buildings.
• Moving through reconnoitered and marked subterranean systems.
• Using trenches.
• Using the concealment offered by smoke and darkness to cross open areas.
d. Troops Available. Urban operations are manpower intensive.
(1) Employment of Platoons and Organic Assets. Once the SBCT infantry
commander has decided where to defend, he should select platoon battle positions or
sectors that block or restrict the enemy's ability to maneuver and control key areas. The
frontage for a platoon is about one to two city blocks long. Platoons can occupy about
three small structures or a larger two- to three-story building (Figure 6-15). Along with
his primary and alternate positions, the platoon leader normally selects one
supplementary position to reorient his defense to meet enemy threats from another
direction. Companies may be tasked to detach a platoon to act as the SBCT infantry
battalion reserve.

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Figure 6-15. Platoon battle positions in a company sector.

(a) Mortar Section. Mortars at the SBCT infantry company level are employed to
maximize the effect of their high-angle fires. They should be used to engage--
• Enemy overwatch positions.
• Enemy infantry before they seize a foothold.
• Targets on rooftops.
• Enemy reinforcements within range.
(b) Javelins. Based on the Javelin's capabilities and limitations, commanders give the
platoons missions that can use antiarmor systems to support the defensive scheme of
maneuver.
(2) Employment of MGS Vehicles and ICVs. The SBCT infantry commander should
employ MGS vehicles and ICVs to take advantage of their long-range fires, armored
protection, and mobility. Some built-up areas may restrict the mobility of MGS vehicles
and ICVs and make them vulnerable to enemy infantry antiarmor weapons.
(a) When MGSs and ICVs are employed in the defense of a built-up area, infantry
should be positioned to provide security against close antiarmor fires and to detect targets
for the armored vehicles. MGSs and ICVs should be assigned engagement areas in
support of the defensive scheme of maneuver. ICVs and Javelins should supplement
MGS fires. MGSs and ICVs may be--
• Positioned on the edge of the city in mutually supporting positions.
• Positioned on key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages.
• Used to cover barricades and obstacles by fire.
• Positioned as part of the reserve.

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(b) MGSs and ICVs are normally employed as a platoon. However, sections and
individual vehicles may be employed with infantry platoons or squads. This provides
MGSs and ICVs with the close security of the infantry. MGSs and ICVs provide the
SBCT infantry company commander with a mobile force to respond quickly to enemy
threats on different avenues of approach. They can also be effectively employed in
counterattacks.
(3) Employment of Fire Support. Fire planning must be comprehensive due to the
proximity of buildings to targets, minimum range restrictions, repositioning requirements,
and ROE. Mortar and artillery fires are planned on top of and immediately around
defensive positions for close support.
(a) Artillery. Artillery may be used as direct or indirect support. Artillery fire should
be used--
• To suppress or obscure enemy overwatch elements.
• To disrupt or destroy an assault.
• To provide counterbattery fire.
• To support counterattacks.
• To provide direct fire when necessary.
(b) Final Protective Fires. FPFs are planned to stop dismounted assaults in front of
the defensive positions. Fires within the city are planned along likely routes of advance to
destroy the enemy as he attempts to deepen a penetration.
(c) Priorities of Fire. The SBCT infantry company commander should establish
priorities of fire based on enemy avenues of approach and enemy systems that present the
greatest danger to the defense. For example, during the attacker's initial advance, tanks,
BMPs, and overwatching elements are the greatest threat to the defense. Javelins should
concentrate on destroying armored vehicles. In certain situations, enemy armored
personnel carriers (APCs) may present a larger threat than enemy tanks in a built-up area;
the APCs carry infantry, which can gain footholds in buildings. Mortar and artillery fires
should suppress enemy ATGMs and overwatch positions or elements. If enemy
formations secure a foothold, priority shifts to the destruction of enemy forces within the
penetration.
(d) Control of Supporting Fires. As the attack progresses in the city, enemy indirect
fires increase to separate infantry from supporting MGSs and ICVs. During this phase,
friendly artillery concentrates on counterfire missions and the destruction of
reinforcements that are approaching the city. Mortars concentrate on infantry attacks.
(e) Support of Counterattacks. When initiated, counterattacks are given priority of
supporting fires. When artillery fires the missions mentioned above, it must remain
mobile and be prepared to displace to preplanned positions to avoid enemy counterbattery
fire.
(f) Indirect Fire Planning. At company and platoon level, indirect fire plans include
fires of organic, attached, and supporting weapons. The SBCT infantry company
commander also plans his own mortar and artillery fires on and immediately around his
battle positions for close support.
(g) Air Defense Assets. Air defense assets available to the commander, such as
Stinger and Avenger, are normally employed to ensure all-round air defense. These assets
are normally controlled at SBCT battalion level, but they may be placed under the SBCT
infantry company commander’s control when METT-TC factors warrant that type of use.

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The lack of good firing positions for long-range air defense missile systems in the built-
up area may limit the number of deployed weapons. In the defense, weapons systems
may have to be winched or airlifted into positions. Rooftops and parking garages are
good firing positions because they normally offer a better line of sight. Stingers and
Avengers may be assigned to protect specific positions or function in general support of
the battalion.
(4) Employment of Engineers. Engineers are employed under SBCT battalion
control or attached to SBCT infantry companies. SBCT infantry company commanders
may receive an engineer squad to assist them in preparing the defense. Commanders must
consider engineer tasks that enhance survivability, mobility, and countermobility. Tasks
that engineers can accomplish in the defense of a built-up area include--
• Constructing obstacles and rubbling.
• Clearing fields of fire.
• Laying mines.
• Preparing mobility routes between positions.
• Preparing fighting positions.
(5) Employment of the Reserve. The commander's defensive plan must always
consider the employment of a reserve. The reserve force should be prepared to
counterattack to regain key positions, to block enemy penetrations, to protect the flanks,
or to assist by fire in the disengagement and withdrawal of positions. For combat in a
built-up area, a reserve force--
• Normally consists of infantry.
• Must be as mobile as possible.
• May be supported by an MGS.
e. Time Available. The commander must organize and establish priorities of work,
depending upon the time available. Many tasks can be accomplished simultaneously, but
priorities for preparation should be in accordance with the commander's order. A sample
priority of work sequence follows:
(1) Establish Security. The unit should quickly establish all-round security by
placing forces on likely avenues of approaches. METT-TC factors determine the level of
security (for example, 50 percent or 30 percent). The reconnaissance and
counterreconnaissance plan should be emphasized.
(2) Assign Areas of Responsibility. Boundaries define sectors of responsibility. They
include areas where units may fire and maneuver without interference or coordination
with other units. Responsibility for primary avenues of approach should never be split. In
areas of semidetached construction, where observation and movement are less restricted,
boundaries should be established along alleys or streets to include both sides of a street in
a single sector. Where buildings present a solid front along streets, boundaries may have
to extend to one side of the street. Battle positions should also be specifically assigned to
platoons, as required by METT-TC. The SBCT infantry company commander should
specify which building(s) comprise the platoon battle position or strongpoint. Positions
should be clearly designated so that no doubt remains as to which platoon has
responsibility for occupation or control.
(3) Clear Fields of Fire. In built-up areas, commanders may need to rubble certain
buildings and structures to provide greater protection and fields of fire to the defender. If
the ceiling of a lower-story room can support the weight of the rubble, collapsing the top

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floor of a building before the battle starts may afford better protection against indirect
fires. Rubbling an entire building can increase the fields of fire and create an obstacle to
enemy movement. Defenders must be careful, however. Rubbling buildings too soon or
rubbling too many may give away exact locations and destroy cover from direct fire.
Planning must be extensive so that rubbled buildings will not interfere with planned
routes of withdrawal or counterattack. Vehicles may also have to be moved to clear fields
of fire.
(4) Select and Prepare Initial Fighting Positions. The SBCT infantry company
commander should select positions in depth. The unit should prepare positions as soon as
troops arrive and continue preparing as long as positions are occupied. Enemy infiltration
or movement sometimes occurs between and behind friendly positions. Therefore, each
position must be organized for all-round defense. The defender should also--
(a) Make minimum changes to the outside appearance of buildings where positions
are located.
(b) Screen or block windows and other openings to keep the enemy from seeing in or
tossing in hand grenades. Include all windows so that the enemy cannot tell which
openings the defenders are behind.
(c) Remove combustible material to limit the danger of fire. Fires are dangerous to
defenders and create smoke that could conceal attacking troops. For these reasons,
defenders should remove all flammable materials and stockpile firefighting equipment
(such as water and sand). The danger of fire also influences the type of ammunition used
in the defense. Do not use tracers or incendiary rounds extensively if threat of fire exists.
(d) Turn off electricity and gas at the facility that serves the urban area. Both propane
and natural gas are explosive. Natural gas is also poisonous, displaces oxygen, and is not
filtered by a protective mask. Propane gas, although not poisonous, is heavier than air. If
it leaks into an enclosed area, it displaces the oxygen and causes suffocation.
(e) Locate positions so as not to establish a pattern. The unit should avoid obvious
firing locations like church steeples.
(f) Camouflage positions.
(g) Reinforce positions with all materials available, such as mattresses, furniture, and
so forth. Use caution because mattresses and fabric furniture are flammable. Fill drawers
and cabinets with earth or sand to provide cover. Consider placing vehicles, such as
trucks or buses, over positions outside buildings. Drain flammable fluids from vehicles
and remove other flammables such as seats. Fill gas tanks with water.
(h) Block stairwells and doorways with wire or other material to prevent enemy
movement. Create holes between floors and rooms to allow covered and concealed
movement within a building.
(i) Prepare range cards, fire plans, and sector sketches.
(j) Consider how to use basements. If grazing fire can be achieved from basement
windows, emplace machine guns in basements. When not using basements, seal them to
prevent enemy entry.
(k) Cache resupply of ammunition, water, and medical supplies.
(5) Establish Communications. When allocating time to establish communications,
commanders should consider the effects of built-up areas. Line-of-sight limitations affect
both visual and radio/digital communications. Wire laid at street level is easily damaged
by rubble and vehicle traffic. The noise of built-up area combat is much louder than in

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other areas, making sound signals difficult to hear. Therefore, the time needed to
establish an effective communications system in urban terrain may be greater than in
other terrain. SBCT infantry company commanders should consider the following
techniques when planning for communications:
(a) Emplace line of sight radios and retransmission sites on the upper floors of
buildings.
(b) Use existing telephone systems. However, telephones are not secure even though
many telephone cables are underground.
(c) Use messengers at all levels since they are the most secure means of
communications.
(d) If assets are available, lay wire through buildings for maximum protection.
(6) Emplace Obstacles and Mines. To save time and resources in preparing the
defense, commanders must emphasize using all available materials (to include
automobiles, railcars, and rubble) to create obstacles. Civilian construction equipment
and materials must be located and inventoried. This equipment can be used with engineer
assets or in place of damaged equipment. Coordination must be made with proper civilian
officials before use, which is normally a brigade or battalion staff responsibility.
Engineers can provide advice and resources as to the employment of obstacles and mines.
(a) The principles for employing mines and obstacles do not change in the defense of
a built-up area, but techniques do change. For example, concrete and asphalt make
burying and concealing mines in streets difficult. Consider placing mines in sandbags so
they are not visible and using fake mines placed in sandbags in order to deceive the
enemy. Mines and obstacles must be emplaced consistent with the ROE. Any
antipersonnel mines must be command detonated.
(b) Obstacles must be tied to buildings and rubbled areas to increase effectiveness
and to canalize the enemy. Family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) may be effective on
the outskirts of an urban area or in parks, but in a city core, areas may be too restrictive.
(c) Riot control agents may be employed to control noncombatant access into
defensive areas.
(7) Improve Fighting Positions. When time permits, all positions, to include
supplementary and alternate positions, should be reinforced with sandbags and provided
overhead cover. Attached engineers can help in this effort by providing advice and
assisting with construction.
(8) Establish and Mark Routes between Positions. Reconnaissance by all defending
elements assists in route selection for use by defenders moving between positions.
Movement is crucial in fighting in built-up areas. Early selection and marking of routes
adds to the defender's advantages.
f. Civilian Considerations. International law and moral imperatives require the
SBCT infantry company commander to consider the effects of operations on the civilian
population. The company commander must also consider cultural, economical, and
political boundaries as they may have a direct impact on the range of tactical options
available to him.
(1) Commanders may be precluded from countermobility operations directed at
economically important roads, railways, and bridges. They must consider civilian
movement when emplacing minefields. Commanders implement restrictive fire control
measures consistent with ROE.

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(2) Units with large civilian populations in their AO often must conduct support
operations while preparing a defense. When Army forces must damage areas that are
important to civilians, they ensure that civilian leaders and populations understand why
these actions are necessary.
g. Fire Hazards. The defender's detailed knowledge of the terrain permits him to
avoid areas that are likely to be fire hazards. All urban areas are vulnerable to fire,
especially those with many wooden buildings. The defender can deliberately set fires--
• To disrupt and disorganize the attackers.
• To canalize the attackers into more favorable engagement areas.
• To obscure the attacker's observation.
Likewise, the enemy may cause fires to confuse, disrupt, or constrain friendly forces and
efforts. Company commanders should anticipate this possibility and ensure that fire-
fighting equipment is on hand when conducting this type of operations.

6-14. COMMAND AND CONTROL

In all defensive situations, the SBCT infantry company commander should position
himself well forward so that he can control the action. Regardless of the utility of
FBCB2, the leader must see and feel the battlefield. In urban terrain, this is even more
critical due to obstacles, poor visibility, difficulty in communication, and intense fighting.
a. Graphic Control Measures. The use of graphic control measures and
understanding of the commander’s intent two levels up by all leaders become even more
important to mission accomplishment in an urban environment. Phase lines can be used
to report the enemy’s location or to control the advance of counterattacking units.
Principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines are suitable phase lines. They should be clearly
and uniformly marked on the near or far side of the street or open area. Checkpoints aid
units in reporting locations and controlling movement. Contact points designate specific
points where units make physical contact. Target reference points can facilitate fire
control. These and other control measures ensure coordination throughout the chain of
command.
b. Command Posts. Command posts should be located underground, if possible.
Their vulnerability requires all-round security. Since each CP may have to secure itself, it
should be near the reserve unit for added security. When collocated with another unit,
however, CPs may not need to provide their own security. A simplified organization for
command posts is required for ease of movement. Since rubble often hinders movement
of tracked and wheeled vehicles, the company CP must be prepared to backpack
communications and other needed equipment for operations. Alternate CP locations and
routes to them must also be identified.
c. Actions on Contact. When enemy forces enter and maneuver to seize initial
objectives, the defender should employ all available fires to destroy and suppress the
direct fire weapons that support the ground attack. Tanks and enemy APCs should be
engaged as soon as they come within the effective range of antiarmor weapons. As the
enemy attack develops, the actions of small-unit leaders assume increased importance.
Squad and platoon leaders are often responsible for fighting independent battles. Thus, it
is important that all leaders understand their commander's concept of the defense (two
levels up). Where the enemy’s efforts are likely to result in his gaining a foothold, violent
counterattacks must deny him access into the main battle area.

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d. Rear Area. SBCT infantry companies do not normally deploy maneuver

elements in the rear area; however, squads and platoons may be detached in order to
protect CSS elements. In certain cases, the company trains may collocate with the
battalion combat trains.
e. Counterattacks. Small infantry-heavy reserves supported by ICVs and MGSs, if
available, should be prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to block enemy
penetrations, to provide flank protection, and to assist by fire the disengagement and
withdrawal of endangered positions. It is especially important for enemy footholds to be
repelled violently. When the reserves are committed to counterattack to reinforce a unit,
they may be attached to the unit in whose sector the counterattack is taking place.
Otherwise, the counterattack becomes the main effort. This makes coordination easier,
especially if the counterattack goes through the unit's positions.
f. Defense During Limited Visibility. SBCT infantry company commanders can
expect the attacker to use limited visibility conditions to conduct necessary operations to
sustain or gain daylight momentum.
(1) Commanders should employ the following measures to defend against attacks
during limited visibility:
(a) Shift defensive positions and crew-served weapons from an alternate position or a
hasty security position just before dark to deceive the enemy as to the exact location of
the primary position.
(b) During limited visibility, consider the need to occupy, block, or patrol unoccupied
areas between units, which can be covered by observed fire during daylight. Install early
warning devices.
(c) Emplace radar, remote sensors, and night observation devices to cover streets and
open areas.
(d) Position nuisance mines, noise-making devices, tanglefoot tactical wire, and OPs
on all avenues of approach for early warning and to detect infiltration.
(e) Plan for artificial illumination, to include the use of street lamps, stadium lights,
pyrotechnics, and so forth.
(f) Use indirect fire weapons, grenade launchers, and hand grenades when defenses
are probed to avoid disclosure of defensive positions.
(2) Plan a signal to initiate FPFs when the enemy begins his assault. Crew-served
weapons, armored vehicle mounted weapons (if available), and individual riflemen fire
within their assigned sectors. Grenades and command-detonated mines should
supplement other fires as the enemy approaches the positions.
(3) Move to daylight positions before BMNT. To facilitate movement, buildings
should be marked from the friendly side IAW unit SOP.
g. Communications Restrictions. Radio/digital communications are initially the
primary means of communication for controlling the defense of a built-up area and for
enforcing security. Structures and a high concentration of electrical power lines may
degrade radio/digital communication in built-up areas. Wire should be emplaced and used
for communications as time permits. However, wire can be compromised if interdicted by
the enemy. Messengers can be used as another means of communication. Visual signals
may also be used but are less effective because of the screening effects of buildings and
walls. Signals must be planned, widely disseminated, and understood by all assigned and
attached units. Increased battle noise makes the effective use of sound signals difficult.

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6-15. HASTY DEFENSE

A very likely defensive mission for the SBCT infantry company in urban terrain is to
conduct a hasty defense, which is characterized by reduced preparation time. All the
troop-leading procedures are the same. The priorities of work are basically the same, but
many take place concurrently. Units are deployed, weapons emplaced, and positions
prepared in accordance with the amount of time the company commander has available.
a. Occupation and Preparation of Positions. Preparations for the hasty defense
vary with the time available. The preparations described below generally take two to four
hours. In a hasty defense, the primary effort is to camouflage and conceal the presence of
the hasty fighting positions and provide as much protection as possible for the soldiers
manning them. The company constructs positions using appliances, furniture, and other
convenient items and materials. It locates them back from the windows in the shadows of
the room. The company places less emphasis on fortifying positions and making major
alterations to the environment, delaying such activities until after it has established
security.
(1) Position Crew-Served and Special Weapons. Generally, the company positions
crew-served and special weapons inside buildings unless an outside position is preferable
and can be protected and camouflaged.
(2) Emplace Barriers and Obstacles. The company establishes two belts of barriers
and obstacles that are not as extensive as in a defense that permits more time. The
company covers all obstacles with observation and fires.
(3) Prepare Positions. Consider the following work sequence:
(a) Gather available materials, such as tables, dressers, and appliances, to construct
positions.
(b) Construct stable firing platforms for the weapons.
(c) Use the material gathered to build frontal and side protection. Fill cabinets,
dressers, end tables, and other furnishings with materials to stop small arms fire.
(d) Do not disturb firing windows. Curtains and other aspects of the original setting
are components of camouflage.
(e) Construct alternate firing positions similar to the primary positions.
(f) Emplace rear and overhead cover on the primary positions (after constructing
alternate positions).
(g) Remove fire hazards. Pre-position firefighting equipment.
(h) Construct dummy positions in rooms above, below, and next to primary and
alternate positions in order to draw enemy suppressive fire away from primary positions.
(i) Walk the positions from the enemy side.
(4) Rehearsals. Conduct rehearsals with leaders and soldiers concerning the
orientation of the defense, unit positions, location of crew-served weapons, counterattack
plans, withdrawal plan, and so forth.
(5) Movement Enhancement. There is little time to improve movement within the
defense. Units should plan to use tunnels, underground routes, and routes through
buildings. The movement enhancement priority is to remove obstructions to alternate
positions and the counterattack route.
(6) Communications. Check communications. Communications are primarily radio
and digital. Plan and improve routes for messengers. If time is available, emplace wire as
an improvement to the defense.

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b. Improving the Defense. As time permits, consider the following areas and
prioritize them in accordance with the factors of METT-TC:
• Rest plan.
• Barrier and obstacle improvement.
• Improvement of primary and alternate positions.
• Preparation of supplementary positions.
• Additional movement enhancement efforts.
• Initiation of patrols.
• Improvement of camouflage.
• Continued rehearsals for counterattack and withdrawal.
• ICV and MGS integration.

6-16. COMPANY DEFENSE OF A VILLAGE

A village is characterized by a built-up area surrounded by other types of terrain.
Normally, an SBCT infantry company defends a village as part of an SBCT battalion
defense, establishing battle positions and strongpoints with other SBCT infantry
companies defending from key or decisive terrain. Once the SBCT infantry company
commander has completed his reconnaissance of the village, he reconnoiters the
surrounding terrain and, with the information assembled, he develops his plan for the
defense. One of his first decisions is whether to defend with his infantry on the leading
edge of the village or farther back within the confines of the village. Normally, defending
on the leading edge, where the defending company can take advantage of longer-range
observation and fields of fire, is more effective against an armor-heavy force. Defending
in depth within the village to deny the enemy a foothold is more effective against a heavy
force that is primarily infantry. This decision is based on the factors of METT-TC. The
company may need to coordinate with adjacent units to plan for the defense or control of
the open terrain that typically surrounds a village.
a. Influencing Factors. Several factors influence the commander's decision. First,
he must know the type of enemy against which his company will defend. If the threat is
mainly infantry, the greatest danger is allowing them to gain a foothold in the town. If the
threat is armored or motorized infantry, the greatest danger is that massive direct fire will
destroy the SBCT infantry company's defensive positions. The SBCT infantry company
commander must also consider the terrain forward and to the flanks of the village from
which the enemy can direct fires against his positions.
b. Platoon Battle Positions. Platoons are given a small group of buildings in which
to prepare their defense, permitting the platoon leader to establish mutually supporting
squad-size positions with ICVs. This increases the area that the platoon can control and
hampers the enemy's ability to isolate or bypass a platoon. A platoon may be responsible
for the road through the village. The rest of the SBCT infantry company is then
positioned to provide all-round security and defense in depth.
c. Company Mortars and Javelins. The position of the SBCT infantry company
mortars must protect the mortars from direct fire and allow for overhead clearance.
Javelin positions must allow them to engage targets at maximum ranges with alternate
firing points.
d. ICVs. Position ICVs in defilade positions behind rubble and walls or inside
buildings for movement into and out of the area. ICVs can also conduct resupply,

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CASEVAC, and rapid repositioning during the battle, or they can provide a mobile
reserve for the company.
e. MGS. The SBCT infantry company commander can place the MGS platoon along
the leading edge of the defensive position where rapid fire will complement the Javelins.
The MGS platoon leader should select exact firing positions and recommend engagement
areas. If faced by enemy infantry, the MGS platoon moves to alternate positions with the
protection of the infantry. These alternate positions allow the MGS platoon to engage to
the front as well as the flanks with as little movement as possible. Positions can be
selected within buildings, and mouseholes can be constructed. After they are withdrawn
from the leading edge of the town, the MGS platoon can also provide a mobile reserve
for the company.
f. Company Trains. The SBCT infantry company commander locates a forward
area where he can position his company trains. He chooses a location near the main
avenue of approach to ease resupply, recovery, and maintenance operations.
g. Rubbling. If he has the authority and the ROE permit, the company commander
also decides which buildings to rubble. To defeat the enemy, he must have good fields of
fire, but rubbling the buildings too soon or rubbling too many may disclose his exact
locations and destroy cover from direct fire.
h. BFVs. Based on METT-TC considerations and when available, BFVs may be
placed along the forward edge of the urban area to engage enemy armored vehicles.
Friendly armored vehicles also can be placed in positions to the rear of the buildings and
interior courtyards where their weapon systems can provide added rear and flank
security. Combat vehicles are assigned primary, alternate, and supplementary positions as
well as primary and secondary sectors of fire. They should be positioned in defilade
behind rubble and walls or inside buildings for movement into and out of the area.
Armored vehicles also can be used for resupply, CASEVAC, and rapid repositioning
during the battle. BFVs also can provide a mobile reserve for the company. If a
mechanized infantry platoon is attached, it is controlled through its chain of command. If
a mechanized infantry section is attached, it can be controlled through the senior squad
leader.
i. Tanks. If a tank platoon is available, the company commander could place the
tanks along the leading edge of the urban area where rapid fire would complement the
antitank weapons. The tank platoon leader should select exact firing positions and
recommend engagement areas. If faced by enemy infantry, the tanks move to alternate
positions with the protection of friendly infantry. These alternate positions allow the
tanks to engage to the front as well as the flanks with as little movement as possible.
Positions can be selected within buildings and mouseholes can be constructed. After they
are withdrawn from the leading edge of the village, the tanks could provide a mobile
reserve for the company.
j. FPFs. The company plans FPFs to address the biggest threat to his company--the
enemy's infantry. When firing an FPF inside a built-up area is necessary, mortars are
more effective than artillery. Mortars have a higher angle of fall, which gives them a
greater chance of impacting on the street.
k. Barriers and Obstacles. The company can easily construct obstacles in a built-up
area, but the obstacles must stop enemy vehicles without interfering with the company's
own movement in the village. Therefore, the company detonates cratering charges at key

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street locations on order and lays mines on the outskirts of the town and along routes the
company will not use. It normally emplaces barriers and obstacles in three belts.
l. Engineers. The supporting engineers use C4 and other explosives to make firing
ports, mouseholes, and demolition obstacles. Based upon his priority of work, the SBCT
infantry company commander tells the engineer squad leader to assist each of the infantry
platoons preparing the village for defense and to execute the company obstacle plan. The
engineer squad leader's mission is to tell the infantrymen exactly where to place the
demolitions and how much is needed for the desired effect. He assists in preparation of
charges. He also assists in the emplacement and recording of the minefields and the
preparation of fighting positions.
m. Service Support. Ammunition expenditure is usually high when fighting in a
built-up area. To avoid moving around the village with ammunition resupply during the
battle, the SBCT infantry company commander directs that ammunition be stockpiled in
each occupied platoon and squad position. He also orders the platoons to stockpile
firefighting equipment, drinking water, food, and first-aid supplies at each squad position.
Other factors the company commander must consider are--
• Resupply.
• Medical evacuation.
• Firefighting.
• Security.
n. Communications. To ensure adequate and continuous communications, the
company plans and checks redundant verbal and nonverbal communications. It installs a
wire net and develops a plan for pyrotechnic signals. It lays backup wire in case vehicles,
fires, or the enemy cuts primary lines. The commander also plans for the use of
messengers throughout the village.

6-17. DEFENSE OF A BLOCK OR GROUP OF BUILDINGS

An SBCT infantry company normally conducts a defense of a city block or group of
buildings as part of an SBCT battalion conducting a sector defense in a built-up area.
Company commanders may assign their platoons strongpoints, battle positions, sectors,
or any combination of these. An infantry company operating in urban terrain may have to
defend a city block or group of buildings in a core periphery or residential area. The
company conducts this operation in accordance with the SBCT battalion’s defensive
scheme of maneuver. The operation should be coordinated with the action of security
forces that are charged with delaying to the front of the company's position. The defense
should take advantage of the protection of buildings that dominate the avenues of
approach into the MBA. This mission differs from defense of a village in that it is more
likely to be conducted completely on urban terrain, without the surrounding open terrain
that characterizes the defense of a village. An SBCT infantry company is particularly
well suited for this type of mission since the fighting requires the enemy to move infantry
into the built-up area to seize and control key terrain. In addition, an SBCT infantry
company normally conducts a delay in a built-up area as part of an SBCT battalion
conducting a delay in sector. Companies delay conducting ambushes and occupying
battle positions in sector, taking maximum advantage of the inherent cover and
concealment of the urban terrain and routes within the built-up area.

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a. Task and Purpose. A well-organized company defense in a built-up area--

• Stops the attack of the enemy on streets and city blocks by using obstacles and
fire.
• Destroys the enemy by ambush and direct fire from prepared positions within
defensible buildings.
• Ejects the enemy from footholds or remains in place for a counterattack.
b. Reconnaissance and Security. The execution of the mission will be more
effective if the SBCT infantry company reconnoiters the terrain and prepares obstacles
and fire lanes. Patrols should supplement the OPs, mainly during periods of limited
visibility. The company should use wire communications. Platoons should have the
mission to provide one OP in order to provide spot reports concerning the size, location,
direction and rate of movement, and type of enemy assaulting the company sector or
battle position.
c. Task Organization. METT-TC factors determine how the company commander
task-organizes the company to accomplish the mission.
d. Execution. The defensive forces should ambush on the avenues of approach,
cover the obstacles by fire, and prepare a strong defense inside the buildings.
Counterattack forces should be near the front of the company sector in covered and
concealed positions with an on-order mission to counterattack. Counterattack forces
should have specific instructions as to what their actions will be after the enemy assault
has been repelled, for example, to stay in sector or to revert back to reserve status. The
company should conduct rehearsals both day and night.

6-18. DEFENSE OF KEY TERRAIN

An SBCT infantry company defends key terrain independently or as part of an SBCT
battalion. It may form a perimeter defense around key terrain, such as a public utility
(gas, electric, and water plants), communications center (radio and television),
government center, command and control facility, and so forth. The infantry company
may occupy and defend buildings and other dominant terrain or may establish and
operate checkpoints and roadblocks in conjunction with this defense. An SBCT infantry
company may defend a traffic circle or similar terrain to prevent the enemy from seizing
it. This is characterized by the occupation and defense of the buildings around the traffic
circle that control the avenues of approach into and out of the objective area. This defense
may be part of conventional operations or may be an adjunct to a mission of stability
operations or support operations. In many cases, an unclear enemy situation and
extremely restrictive ROE characterize this mission. The facilities previously described
are usually sited for their centrality of location and convenience, not for the defensibility
of the terrain. Thus, the SBCT infantry company commander often finds his company
must defend a piece of terrain that he would rather not have to occupy. The factors of
METT-TC determine how to defend the objective.
a. Task Organization. The factors of METT-TC determine the task organization of
the SBCT infantry company. Figure 6-16 depicts an SBCT infantry company with three
rifle platoons and an organic MGS platoon defending an objective (a water purification
plant). Upon request, the company commander will receive additional assets based on
mission requirements and availability. In the situation depicted in Figure 6-16, the
organic weapons of the infantry company are sufficient to accomplish the mission.

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b. Tasks. The company commander must make a careful mission analysis in order
to determine the specified and implied tasks associated with a mission of this type. In the
situation shown in Figure 6-16, the SBCT infantry company commander may have
determined that in order to defend the objective properly, he needs to deploy platoons on
the defensible terrain available. Therefore, he defends urban terrain (left), high ground
(top), and low vegetated terrain (right, bottom) all at once. Additionally, some of the
tasks listed below may be necessary:
• Provide inner and outer security patrols.
• Establish OPs.
• Establish checkpoints and roadblocks.
• Conduct civilian control and evacuation.
• Conduct coordination with local authorities.
• Prevent collateral damage.
• Supervise specific functions associated with operation of the facility, such as
water purification tests, site inspections, and so forth.

Figure 6-16. Perimeter defense of key terrain.

c. Execution. The SBCT infantry company commander normally deploys platoons

in a perimeter around the objective in order to dominate key terrain and cover the
mounted and dismounted avenues of approach into the objective. (See FM 7-10 for
further information on perimeter defense.) The company emplaces machine guns and
antitank weapons to cover the dismounted and mounted avenues of approach into the
objective, respectively. It normally uses wire obstacles to restrict and deny entry into the
objective area and uses antitank and command-detonated mines consistent with the ROE.

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Obstacles should be covered by fire and rigged with detection devices and trip flares. The
company must be prepared to defend against a direct attack, such as a raid or sabotage
against key facilities within the objective (water filtration system, pump station, and so
forth). The commander must make an assessment as to the overall importance of the key
facilities within the objective and prioritize security requirements. The company
commander positions the 60-mm mortar section to provide 360-degree fire support and
positions the AT section to engage vehicular targets. If the threat does not require the
employment of mortars or AT weapons, the commander can give these sections other
tasks.
d. Other Considerations. Depending on the mission requirements and threat, the
SBCT infantry company commander may have to consider the need for the following:
• Artillery and attack helicopter support.
• ADA assets to defend against air attack.
• Engineer assets to construct obstacles.
• Interpreters to assist in the functioning of the facility and operation of the
equipment.
• Military police (MP), civil affairs, and psychological operations (PSYOP)
assets for civilian control and liaison.
• Coordination with local police and authorities.
• ICVs or MGSs to act as a mobile reserve or reaction force.
e. Force Protection. The SBCT infantry company may be required to conduct a
perimeter defense as part of a force protection mission, such as defending a friendly base
camp on urban terrain. The same techniques of establishing a perimeter defense described
above are used. The company maintains the appropriate level of security (for example,
100 percent, 50 percent, or 30 percent), consistent with the commander’s plan and the
enemy situation. Additional tasks may include--
• Set up roadblocks and checkpoints.
• Search individuals and vehicles before they enter the camp.
• Maintain a presence as a show of force to the population outside the base
camp.
• Conduct inner and outer security patrols.
• Clear urban terrain of any enemy that overwatches the base camp.
• Conduct ambushes to interdict any enemy forces moving toward the base
camp.
• Restrict access to locations within the base camp and conduct surveillance of
these locations from (or from within) adjacent structures or positions.
• Conduct reaction force duties inside and outside the perimeter of the camp.

6-19. DEFENSE OF AN URBAN STRONGPOINT

A company may be directed to construct a strongpoint as part of a battalion defense
(Figure 6-17). In order to do so, it must be augmented with engineer support, more
weapons, and CSS resources. A strong point is defended until the unit is formally ordered
out of it by the commander directing the defense. Urban areas are easily converted to
strongpoints. Stone, brick, or steel buildings provide cover and concealment. Buildings,
sewers, and some streets provide covered and concealed routes and can be rubbled to
provide obstacles, and telephone systems can provide communications.

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a. The specific positioning of units in the strongpoint depends on the commander’s

mission analysis and estimate of the situation. The same considerations for a perimeter
defense apply in addition to the following:
(1) Reinforce each individual fighting position (to include alternate and
supplementary positions) to withstand small-arms fire, mortar fire, and artillery
fragmentation. Stockpile food, water, ammunition, pioneer tools, and medical supplies in
each fighting position.
(2) Support each individual fighting position with several others. Plan or construct
covered and concealed routes between positions and along routes of supply and
communication. Use these to support counterattack and maneuver within the strongpoint.
(3) Divide the strongpoint into several independent, but mutually supporting,
positions or sectors. If one of the positions or sectors must be evacuated or is overrun,
limit the enemy penetration with obstacles and fires and support a counterattack.

Figure 6-17. Urban strongpoint.

(4) Construct obstacles and minefields to disrupt and canalize enemy formations, to
reinforce fires, and to protect the strongpoint from the assault. Place the obstacles and
mines out as far as friendly units can observe them, within the strongpoint, and at points
in between where they will be useful.

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(5) Prepare range cards for each position and confirm them by fires. Plan indirect
fires in detail and register them. Indirect fires should also be planned for firing directly on
the strongpoint using proximity fuses.
(6) Plan and test several means of communication within the strongpoint and to
higher headquarters to include radio, wire, messenger, pyrotechnics, and other signals.
(7) Improve or repair the strongpoint until the unit is relieved or withdrawn. More
positions can be built, routes to other positions marked, existing positions improved or
repaired, and barriers built or fixed.
b. A strong point may be part of any defensive plan. It may be built to protect vital
units or installations, as an anchor around which more mobile units maneuver, or as part
of a trap designed to destroy enemy forces that attack it.

6-20. DELAY
The intent of a delay is to slow the enemy, cause casualties, and stop him, where possible,
without becoming decisively engaged. This procedure is done by defending, disengaging,
moving, and defending again. A company delay is normally conducted as part of the
battalion task force’s plan. The delay destroys enemy reconnaissance elements forward of
the outskirts of the urban area, prevents the penetration of the urban area, and gains and
maintains contact with the enemy to determine the strength and location of the main
attack by trading space for time. Infantry companies are well suited for this operation,
because they can take advantage of the cover and concealment provided by urban terrain
and inflict casualties on the enemy at close range. Delays are planned by assigning
platoon battle positions, platoon sectors, or both. Figure 6-18 depicts a company delay in
urban terrain with the company commander assigning platoon battle positions. Routes are
planned to each subsequent battle position or within the sector. Routes also are planned to
take advantage of the inherent cover and concealment afforded by urban terrain, such as
going through and hugging buildings, using shadows, subsurface areas, and so forth.

Figure 6-18. Company delay in an urban area.

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a. The company’s sector should be prepared with obstacles to increase the effect of
the delay. Engineers prepare obstacles on main routes but avoid some covered and
concealed routes that are known by the friendly troops for reinforcement, displacement,
and resupply. These routes are destroyed and obstacles are executed when no longer
needed.
b. Antiarmor weapon systems, MGS, ICVs, and other combat vehicles (tanks,
BFVs) should be positioned on the outskirts of the urban area to destroy the enemy at
maximum range. They should be located in defilade positions or in prepared shelters.
They fire at visible targets and then fall back or proceed to alternate positions. Platoons
should be assigned sectors from 100 to 300 meters (one to two blocks) wide. If available,
they should be reinforced with sensors or GSRs, which can be emplaced on the outskirts
or on higher ground to attain the maximum range in the assigned sector. Platoons delay
by detecting the enemy early and inflicting casualties on him using patrols, OPs, and
ambushes and by taking advantage of all obstacles. Each action is followed by a
disengagement and withdrawal. Withdrawals occur on covered and concealed routes
through buildings or underground. By day, the defense is dispersed; at night, it is more
concentrated. Close coordination and maintaining awareness of the current friendly and
enemy situation are critical aspects of this operation.

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CHAPTER 7
TACTICAL ENABLING OPERATIONS

This chapter covers tasks the SBCT infantry rifle company may
conduct, either on its own or as part of a larger force, to complement or
support its primary missions. Enabling operations include
reconnaissance, special purpose operations (linkup, stay-behind, relief in
place, and passage of lines), and security. The company conducts these
operations to set conditions for future operations or to support the current
operations of its higher headquarters. The planning, preparation, and
execution for these operations are just as important and require the same
level of detail as conducting defensive or offensive operations. Enabling
operations are conducted mounted, dismounted, or a combination of both.

Section I. RECONNAISSANCE
Reconnaissance is any mission undertaken to obtain information regarding the activities
and resources of enemy forces or the physical characteristics of a particular area, using
visual observation or other methods. Successful reconnaissance is a focused collection
effort, aimed at gathering timely, accurate information about the enemy and the terrain in
the area of operations. It is the responsibility of every infantry company commander to
conduct reconnaissance, with the goal of gaining the information he needs to ensure the
success of his mission. This effort, combined with the COP, will yield a greater
situational understanding of the operation or area. In addition, the company may conduct
other reconnaissance operations to gather information for higher headquarters. (For a
more detailed discussion of reconnaissance operations, refer to FM 17-95.)

7-1. RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING

Reconnaissance planning starts with the company commander’s identification of critical
information requirements. This process begins while the unit is planning or preparing for
an operation and, in many cases, continues during the conduct of the operation. Once the
operation is under way, the commander continues to identify information requirements.
An example is the need to find an assailable flank or another position of advantage over
an identified enemy force while the company develops the situation. In such a situation,
the commander may dispatch a platoon or section to find a flank or position from which
the company can effectively engage the enemy.

7-2. RECONNAISSANCE EXECUTION

In addition to using the digital information available via the FBCB2 system, the company
commander develops the enemy situation through active and passive reconnaissance.
Passive reconnaissance includes techniques such as map and photographic
reconnaissance and surveillance. Active methods available to the company include
mounted and dismounted ground reconnaissance and reconnaissance by fire. Active
reconnaissance operations are also classified as stealthy or aggressive, as discussed in the
following paragraphs.

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a. Stealthy Reconnaissance. Stealthy reconnaissance emphasizes procedures and

techniques that allow the unit to avoid detection and engagement by the enemy. It is more
time-consuming than aggressive reconnaissance. To be effective, stealthy reconnaissance
must rely primarily on dismounted elements that make maximum use of covered and
concealed terrain. The company’s primary assets for stealthy reconnaissance are its
infantry squads. (For a more detailed discussion of dismounted patrolling, refer to FM
7-10.)
b. Aggressive Reconnaissance. Aggressive reconnaissance is characterized by the
speed and manner in which the reconnaissance element develops the situation once
contact is made with an enemy force. A unit conducting aggressive reconnaissance uses
both direct and indirect fires and movement to develop the situation rapidly. Therefore,
the company typically uses mounted reconnaissance. In conducting a mounted patrol, the
unit employs the principles of tactical movement to maintain security. The patrolling
element maximizes the use of cover and concealment and conducts bounding overwatch
as necessary to avoid detection. (For a more detailed discussion of tactical movement,
refer to Chapter 3 of this manual.)

7-3. RECONNAISSANCE BEFORE AND AFTER OPERATIONS

To be most effective, reconnaissance must be continuous--conducted before, during, and
after operations. Before an operation, the company focuses its reconnaissance effort on
filling gaps in its information about the enemy and terrain. (Figure 7-1 shows an example
of company reconnaissance prior to an operation.) After an operation, the company
normally conducts reconnaissance to enhance SU so it can maintain contact with the
enemy and collect information for upcoming operations. Situations in which the company
may conduct reconnaissance before or after an operation include the following:
• Reconnaissance by a quartering party of an assembly area and the associated
route to it.
• Reconnaissance from the assembly area to the LD and in the vicinity of the
LD before an offensive operation.
• Reconnaissance by infantry patrols to probe enemy positions for gaps prior to
an attack or infiltration.
• Reconnaissance by infantry patrols to observe forward positions and guide
mounted elements to key positions on the battlefield.
• Reconnaissance by dismounted patrols (normally infantry and engineers) to
locate bypasses around obstacle belts or to determine the best locations and
methods for breaching operations.
• Reconnaissance by infantry patrols of choke points or other danger areas in
advance of the remainder of the company.
• Reconnaissance by mounted patrols to observe forward positions or to clear a
route to a forward position.
• Reconnaissance of defensive positions or engagement areas prior to the
conduct of the defense.
• Reconnaissance by mounted or dismounted patrols as part of security
operations to secure friendly obstacles, clear possible enemy OPs, or cover
areas not observable by stationary OPs.

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• Reconnaissance by mounted or dismounted patrols to maintain contact with

adjacent units.
• Reconnaissance by mounted or dismounted patrols to maintain contact with
enemy elements.

Figure 7-1. SBCT infantry company commander identifying intelligence

requirements and using patrols to conduct reconnaissance.

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7-4. RECONNAISSANCE DURING OPERATIONS

During offensive operations, company reconnaissance normally focuses on fighting for
information about the enemy and the terrain, with the primary goal of gaining an
advantage over the enemy. The company conducts this type of reconnaissance during
actions on contact. As the company develops the situation, the commander may dispatch
mounted or dismounted patrols to identify positions of advantage or to acquire an enemy
force. The information gained by the company while in contact is critical not only to the
success of its own mission but also to the success of its higher headquarters. (Refer to
Chapter 4 for discussion of actions on contact.)

7-5. FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE

In addition to reconnaissance performed as part of another type of operation, there are
three forms of reconnaissance that are conducted as distinct operations: route
reconnaissance, zone reconnaissance, and area reconnaissance.
a. Positioning of Subordinate Elements. In conducting a route, zone, or area
reconnaissance, the company employs a combination of mounted and dismounted
elements as well as reconnaissance by direct and indirect fires. Based on his evaluation of
METT-TC factors, the company commander establishes the role of organic elements and
support assets within his scheme of maneuver.
b. Focus of the Reconnaissance. In planning for route, zone, or area
reconnaissance, the company commander must determine the focus of the mission,
identifying whether the reconnaissance will orient on the terrain or on the enemy force. It
is then essential that he provide the company with clear guidance on the focus of the
reconnaissance. In a force-oriented reconnaissance operation, the critical task is simply to
find the enemy and gather information on him; terrain considerations of the route, zone,
or area are only a secondary concern. The company is generally able to move more
quickly in force-oriented reconnaissance than in terrain-oriented reconnaissance.
c. Conduct of the Reconnaissance. The following paragraphs examine the specifics
of route, zone, and area reconnaissance:
(1) Route Reconnaissance. A route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain
detailed information on a specific route as well as on all terrain from which the enemy
could influence movement along that route. Route reconnaissance may be oriented on a
specific area of movement, such as a road or trail, or on a more general area, like an axis
of advance.
(2) Zone Reconnaissance. A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain
detailed information concerning all routes, terrain, enemy forces, and obstacles (including
areas of chemical and radiological contamination) within a zone that is defined by
specific boundaries. The company normally conducts zone reconnaissance when the
enemy situation is vague or when the company requires information concerning cross-
country trafficability. As in route reconnaissance, the SBCT and SBCT infantry battalion
commanders' intents as well as METT-TC dictate the company’s actions during a zone
reconnaissance.
(a) The following tasks are normally critical components of the operation:
• Find and report all enemy forces within the zone.
• Reconnoiter specific terrain within the zone.
• Report all reconnaissance information.

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(b) Time permitting, the commander may also direct the company to accomplish the
following tasks as part of a zone reconnaissance:
• Reconnoiter all terrain within the zone.
• Inspect and classify all bridges.
• Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges.
• Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
• Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers (within capability).
• Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas.
(3) Area Reconnaissance. Area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed
information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. The area
can be any location that is critical to the unit’s operations. Examples include easily
identifiable areas covering a fairly large space (such as towns or military installations),
terrain features (such as ridge lines, wood lines, or choke points), or a single point (such
as a bridge or a building). The critical tasks of the area reconnaissance are the same as
those associated with zone reconnaissance.

Section II. LINKUP

Linkup is an operation that entails the meeting of friendly ground forces (or their leaders
or designated representatives). The company conducts linkup activities independently or
as part of a larger force. Within a larger unit, the company may lead the linkup force.

7-6. LINKUP SITUATIONS

Linkup may occur in, but is not limited to, the following situations:
• Advancing forces reaching an objective area previously secured by air assault,
airborne, or infiltrating forces.
• Units conducting coordination for a relief in place.
• Cross-attached units moving to join their new organization.
• A unit moving forward during a follow and support mission with a fixing force.
• A unit moving to assist an encircled force.
• Units converging on the same objective during the attack.
• Units conducting a passage of lines.

7-7. LINKUP PLANNING

The plans for a linkup must be detailed and must cover the following items:
a. Site Selection. Identify both a primary and an alternate site. These sites should be
easy to find at night, have cover and concealment, and be off the natural lines of drift.
They must also be easy to defend for a short time and offer access and escape routes.
b. Recognition Signals. Far and near recognition signals are needed to keep friendly
units from firing on each other. Although the units conducting the linkup exchange radio
frequencies and call signs, they should avoid radio communications as a means of
recognition due to the threat of compromise. Instead, visual and voice recognition signals
should be planned:
(1) One technique is a sign and countersign exchanged between units. This can be a
challenge and password or a number combination for a near signal. It can also be an
exchange of signals using flashlights, chemical lights, infrared lights, or VS-17 panels for
far recognition signals per tactical SOPs.

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(2) Another technique is to place other signals on the linkup site. Examples are stones
placed in a prearranged pattern, markings on trees, and arrangements of wood or tree
limbs. These mark the exact location of the linkup. The first unit to the linkup site places
the sign and positions the contact company to watch it. The next unit to the site then stops
at the signal and initiates the far recognition signal.
c. Indirect Fires. Indirect fires are always planned. They support the movement by
masking noise, deceiving the enemy of friendly intent, and distracting the enemy. Plan
indirect fires along the infiltration lanes and at the linkup sites to support in case of
enemy contact.
d. Direct Fires. Direct fire planning must prevent fratricide. Restrictive fire lines
(RFLs) control fires around the linkup site. Phase lines may serve as RFLs, which are
adjusted as two forces approach each other.
e. Contingency Plans. The unit tactical SOP or the linkup annex to the OPORD
must cover the following contingencies:
• Enemy contact before linkup.
• Enemy contact during linkup.
• Enemy contact after linkup.
• How long to wait at the linkup site.
• What to do if some elements do not make it to the linkup.
• Alternate linkup points and rally points.

7-8. STEPS OF THE LINKUP OPERATION

The linkup procedure begins as the unit moves to the linkup point. If using the radio, the
unit reports its location using phase lines, checkpoints, or other control measures. Each
unit sends a small contact team or element to the linkup point; the remainder of the unit
stays in the linkup rally point. The leader fixes individual duties of the contact elements
and coordinates procedures for integrating the linkup units into a single linkup rally point.
Full rehearsals are conducted if time permits. Figure 7-2 depicts a company linkup
between the 3d Platoon--which infiltrated early, conducted the reconnaissance of the
objective, and established the ORP--and the rest of the company, which infiltrated later.

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Figure 7-2. SBCT infantry company linkup.

a. The unit stops and sets up a linkup rally point about 300 meters from the linkup
point. A contact team is sent to the linkup point; it locates the point and observes the area.
If the unit is the first at the site, it clears the immediate area and marks the linkup point,
using the agreed-upon recognition signal. It then takes up a covered and concealed
position to watch the linkup point.
b. The next unit approaching the site repeats the actions above. When its contact
team arrives at the site and spots the recognition signal, they then initiate the far
recognition signal, which is answered by the first company, and they exchange near
recognition signals.
c. The contact teams coordinate the actions required to link up the units, such as to
move one unit to the other unit's rally point, or to continue the mission.
d. The linkup consists of three steps:
(1) Far Recognition Signal. During this step, the units or elements involved in the
linkup should establish communications before they reach direct fire range, if possible.
The lead element of each linkup force should operate on the same frequency as the other
friendly force.
(2) Coordination. Before initiating movement to the linkup point, the forces must
coordinate necessary tactical information, including the following:
• The known enemy situation.
• Number and types of friendly vehicles.
• Disposition of stationary forces (if either unit is stationary).
• Routes to the linkup point and rally point (if used).
• Fire control measures.

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• Near recognition signal(s).

• Communications information.
• CS coverage.
• CSS responsibilities and procedures.
• Finalized location of the linkup point and rally point (if used).
• Any special coordination, such as that covering maneuver instructions or
requests for medical support.
(3) Movement to the Linkup Point and Linkup. All units or elements involved in the
linkup must enforce strict fire control measures to help prevent fratricide; linkup points
and RFLs must be easily recognizable by moving and converging forces. Linkup
elements take these actions:
• Conduct far recognition using FM radio.
• Conduct short-range (near) recognition using the designated signal.
• Complete movement to the linkup point.
• Establish local security at the linkup point.
• Conduct additional coordination and linkup activities as necessary.

Section III. SECURITY OPERATIONS

The company may conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of the SBCT
force. Security operations provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations and
provide the protected force with time and maneuver space to react to the enemy and
develop the situation so that the commander can employ the protected force effectively.
(For additional information on security operations, refer to FM 17-95.)

7-9. FORMS OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

The four forms of security operations are screen, guard, covering force, and area security.
Screen, guard, and cover entail deployment of progressively higher levels of combat
power and provide increasing levels of security for the main body. Area security
preserves a higher commander’s freedom to move his reserves, position fire support
assets, conduct command and control operations, and provide for sustainment operations.
The company can conduct screen or guard operations on its own. It participates in area
security missions and covering force operations only as part of a larger element. The
company always provides its own local security.

NOTE: All forces have an inherent responsibility to provide for their own local
security. Local security includes OPs, local security patrols, perimeter
security, and other measures taken to provide close-in security for the force.

7-10. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Security operations require the commander assigning the security mission and the
security force commander to address a variety of special operational factors. These
planning considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs:
a. Augmentation of Security Forces. When it is assigned to conduct a screen or
guard mission, the company may receive additional combat, CS, and CSS elements.
Attachments may include, but are not limited to, the following:

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• A reconnaissance platoon.
• A mortar section or platoon.
• RSTA assets.
b. Enemy-Related Considerations. Security operations require the company to deal
with a unique set of enemy considerations. For example, the array of enemy forces (and
the tactics that enemy commanders use to employ them) may be different from those for
any other tactical operation the company conducts. Additional enemy considerations that
may influence company security operations include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) The presence or absence of specific types of forces on the battlefield including--
• Insurgent elements (not necessarily part of the enemy force).
• Enemy reconnaissance elements of varying strength and capabilities (at
divisional, brigade, or other levels).
• Enemy security elements (such as forward patrols).
• Enemy stay-behind elements or enemy elements that have been bypassed.
(2) Possible locations that the enemy will use to employ his tactical assets including--
• Reconnaissance and infiltration routes.
• OP sites for surveillance or indirect fire observers.
(3) Availability and anticipated employment of other enemy assets including--
• Surveillance devices, such as radar devices or UAVs.
• Long-range rocket and artillery assets.
• Helicopter and fixed-wing air strikes.
• Elements capable of dismounted insertion or infiltration.
• Mechanized forward detachments.
c. Time the Security Operation is Initiated. The time by which the screen or guard
must be set and active influences the company’s method of deploying to the security area
as well as the time it begins the deployment.
d. Reconnaissance of the Security Area. The company commander uses a
thorough analysis of METT-TC factors to determine the appropriate methods and
techniques for the company to use in accomplishing this critical action.

NOTE: The company commander must make every effort to conduct his own
reconnaissance of the security area he expects the company to occupy, even
when the operation is preceded by a zone reconnaissance by other SBCT
battalion elements.

e. Movement to the Security Area. In deploying elements to an area for a

stationary security mission, the company commander must deal with the competing
requirements of establishing the security operation quickly to meet mission requirements
and of providing the necessary level of local security in doing so. The company can
move to the security area using one of two basic methods: a tactical road march or a
movement to contact. Either method should be preceded by a zone reconnaissance by the
SBCT infantry battalion reconnaissance platoon. The following paragraphs examine
considerations and procedures for the two methods of movement.
(1) Tactical Road March. The company conducts a tactical road march to an RP
behind the security area to occupy their initial positions. This method of deployment is

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faster than a movement to contact, but less secure. It is appropriate when enemy contact
is not expected or when time is critical.
(2) Movement to Contact. The company conducts a movement to contact from the
LD to the security area. This method is slower than a tactical road march, but it is more
secure. It is appropriate when time is not critical and either enemy contact is likely or the
situation is unclear due to the company commander's lack of RSTA assets.
f. Location and Orientation of the Security Area. The main body commander
determines the location, orientation, and depth of the security area in which he wants the
security force to operate. The security force commander conducts a detailed analysis of
the terrain in the security area. He then establishes his initial dispositions (usually a
screen line, even for a guard mission) as far forward as possible, on terrain that allows
clear observation of avenues of approach into a sector. The initial screen line is depicted
as a phase line and sometimes represents the forward line of troops (FLOT). As such, the
screen line may be a restrictive control measure for movement. This requires the
company commander to conduct all necessary coordination if he decides to establish OPs
or to perform reconnaissance forward of the line.
g. Initial OP Locations. The company commander may deploy OPs to ensure
effective surveillance of the sector and designated NAIs. He designates initial OP
locations on or behind the screen line. He should provide OP personnel with specific
orientation and observation guidance, including, at a minimum, the primary orientation
for the surveillance effort during the conduct of the screen. Once set on the screen line,
the surveillance elements report their locations. The element that occupies each OP
always retains the responsibility for changing the location in accordance with tactical
requirements and the commander’s intent and guidance for orientation. Dismounted OPs
maximize stealth.
h. Width and Depth of the Security Area. The company sector is defined by
lateral boundaries extending out to an LOA (the initial screen line) forward of a rear
boundary. The company’s ability to maintain depth through the sector decreases as the
screened or guarded frontage increases.
i. Special Requirements and Constraints. The company commander must specify
any additional considerations for the security operation, including, but not limited to, the
following:
• All requirements for observing NAIs, as identified by the SBCT battalion.
• Any additional tactical tasks or missions that the company and subordinate
elements must perform.
• Engagement and disengagement criteria for all company elements.
j. Indirect Fire Planning. The company commander conducts indirect fire planning
to integrate artillery and mortar assets into the security mission. A wide sector may
require him to position mortar assets where they can provide effective coverage of the
enemy’s most likely axis of attack or infiltration route, as determined in his analysis of
the enemy. The commander can position the mortars so that up to two thirds of their
maximum range lies forward of the initial screen line. The company FSO assists the
commander in planning artillery fires to adequately cover any gaps in mortar coverage.
k. Positioning of Command and Control and CSS Assets. The company
commander normally positions himself where he can observe the most dangerous enemy
axis of attack or infiltration route, with the XO positioned on the second most critical axis

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or route. The XO positions the company CP (if used) in depth and, normally, centered in
sector. This allows the CP to provide control of initial movement, to receive reports from
the screen or guard elements, and to assist the commander in more effectively facilitating
command and control. Company trains are positioned behind masking terrain, but they
remain close enough for rapid response. The trains are best sited along routes that afford
good mobility laterally and in depth. Patrols may be required to cover gaps between the
OPs. The company commander tasks elements to conduct either mounted or dismounted
patrols, as required.
l. Coordination. The company commander must conduct adjacent unit coordination
to ensure there are no gaps in the screen or guard and to ensure smooth execution of the
company’s rearward passages of lines, if required. Additionally, he must coordinate the
company’s follow-on mission.
m. CSS Considerations. The company commander’s primary consideration for CSS
during security operations is coordinating and conducting resupply of the company,
especially for Class III and V supplies. (One technique is for the commander to pre-
position Class III and Class V vehicles at the company’s successive positions.) In
addition to normal considerations, however, the commander may acquire other
responsibilities in this area, such as arranging CSS for a large number of attached
elements or coordinating resupply for a subsequent mission. The company’s support
planning can be further complicated by a variety of factors. To prevent these factors from
creating outright tactical problems, the company must receive requested logistical
support, such as additional medical evacuation vehicles, from the controlling SBCT
battalion.
n. Follow-On Missions. The complexities of security missions, combined with
normal operational requirements (such as troop-leading procedures or on-the-move
[OTM] planning, engagement area development, rest plans, and CSS activities), can
easily rob the company commander of the time he needs for planning and preparation of
follow-on missions. He must address these competing demands in his initial mission
analysis to ensure that the company and its leaders can adequately meet all requirements
for current and future operations. If METT-TC factors permit, for example, the company
commander can shift his focus to preparing for follow-on missions once preparations for
the security mission are complete (or satisfactorily under way). Another technique is to
detach the XO, with support personnel and vehicles, to prepare for follow-on missions.
The XO’s party can handle such operational requirements as reconnaissance,
coordination, and development of follow-on engagement areas and BPs.

7-11. SCREEN
A screen primarily provides early warning. The screening force observes, identifies, and
reports enemy actions to the main defense. A screen provides the least amount of
protection of any security mission. Generally, a screening force engages and destroys
enemy reconnaissance elements within its capabilities but otherwise fights only in self-
defense. It normally does not have the combat power to develop the situation if FBCB2
has not provided sufficient input.
a. Purposes. A screen is appropriate to cover gaps between forces, the exposed
flanks or rear of stationary and moving forces, or the front of a stationary formation. It is
used when the likelihood of enemy contact is remote, the expected enemy force is small,

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or the friendly main body needs only a minimum amount of time, once it is warned, to
react effectively. Screening is largely accomplished by establishing a series of OPs and
conducting patrols to ensure adequate surveillance of the assigned sector. Purposes of the
screen include the following:
• To prevent enemy ground elements from passing through the screen
undetected or unreported.
• To maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach into the sector
under all visibility conditions.
• To destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance elements within capability.
• To locate the lead elements of each enemy advance guard force and determine
their direction of movement.
• To maintain contact with enemy forces and report any activity in sector.
• To impede and harass the enemy within capability while displacing.
• To maintain contact with the enemy main body and any enemy security forces
operating on the flanks of friendly forces.
b. Stationary Screen. When conducting a stationary screening mission, the
company commander first analyzes infiltration routes into the screen sector, then assigns
surveillance responsibility to the company’s subordinate elements. He designates
locations of OPs, which should be in depth through the sector. Sections within the
company normally man the OPs. The commander identifies the enemy’s likely axes of
attack or infiltration routes; if necessary, he identifies additional control measures (such
as NAIs, phase lines, TRPs, or checkpoints) to assist in movement control and in tracking
of enemy elements. The company conducts mounted and dismounted patrols to
reconnoiter areas it cannot observe from OPs. Once an OP detects the enemy, the
screening force normally engages him with indirect fires. This prevents the enemy from
penetrating the screen line and does not compromise the location of the OP. Within its
capability, the screening force may destroy enemy reconnaissance assets with direct fires
if indirect fires cannot accomplish the task. (For additional details, refer to the discussion
of actions against enemy reconnaissance elements in paragraph 7-12c(2).) The screening
force also impedes and harasses other enemy elements, primarily through the use of
indirect fires. If enemy pressure threatens the security of the screening force, the unit
normally reports the situation and requests permission to displace to a subsequent screen
line.
c. Moving Screen. The company can conduct a moving screen to the flanks or rear
of the screened force. The movement of the screen is keyed to time and distance factors
associated with the movement of the friendly main body.
(1) Moving Flank Screen. Responsibilities for a moving flank screen begin at the
front of the main body’s lead combat element and end at the rear of the protected force.
In conducting a moving flank screen, the company either occupies a series of temporary
OPs along a designated screen line or, if the protected force is moving too fast, continues
to move while maintaining surveillance and preparing to occupy a designated screen line.
There are four basic methods of controlling movement along the screened flank. The
screening force may use one or more of these methods as the speed of movement of the
protected force changes or contact is made.
(a) Alternate Bounds by Individual OP. The screening element uses this method when
the protected force is advancing slowly and enemy contact is likely along the screen line.

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Designated elements of the screening force move to and occupy new OPs as dictated by
the enemy situation and the movement of the main body. Other elements remain
stationary, providing overwatch and surveillance, until the moving elements establish
their new positions; these elements then move to new positions while the now-stationary
elements provide overwatch and surveillance. This sequence continues as needed. The
method of alternate bounding by individual OP is secure but slow.
(b) Alternate Bounds by Unit. The screening element uses this method when the
protected force is advancing slowly and enemy contact is likely along the screen line.
Designated elements of the screening force move and occupy new positions as dictated
by the enemy situation and the movement of the main body. Other elements remain
stationary, providing overwatch and surveillance, until the moving elements establish
their new positions; these elements then move to new positions while the now-stationary
elements provide overwatch and surveillance. This sequence continues as needed. The
method of alternate bounding by unit is secure but slow.
(c) Successive Bounds. The screening element uses this method when FBCB2 is not
detecting the total tactical environment and enemy contact is possible. During this time,
the main body makes frequent short halts during movement. Each platoon of the
screening force occupies a designated portion of the screen line each time the main body
stops. When main body movement resumes, the platoons move simultaneously, retaining
their relative position as they move forward.
(d) Continuous Marching. The screening element uses this method when the main
body is advancing rapidly at a constant rate and enemy contact is not likely. The
screening force maintains the same rate of movement as the main body while at the same
time conducting surveillance as necessary. The screening force plans stationary screen
lines along the movement route but occupies them only as necessary to respond to enemy
action.
(2) Moving Rear Screen. The screening force may establish a moving rear screen to
the rear of a main body force conducting an offensive operation or between the enemy
and the rear of a force conducting a retrograde operation. In either case, movement of the
screen is keyed to the movement of the main body or to the requirements of the enemy
situation. The operation is normally controlled by movements to a series of phase lines.

7-12. GUARD
A guard force protects the friendly main body either by fighting to gain time (while
simultaneously observing the enemy and reporting pertinent information) or by attacking,
defending, or delaying the enemy to prevent him from observing the main body and
engaging it with direct fires. There are three types of guard operations (advance guard,
flank guard, and rear guard). They can be conducted in support of either a stationary or a
moving friendly force. The guard force differs from a screening force in that it contains
sufficient combat power to defeat, repel, or fix the lead elements of an enemy ground
force before the enemy can engage the main body with direct fires. In addition, the guard
force normally deploys over a narrower front than does a comparably sized screening
force, allowing greater concentration of combat power. The guard force routinely
engages enemy forces with both direct and indirect fires and normally operates within
range of the main body’s indirect fire weapons.

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a. Purposes. The purposes of the guard, in addition to those listed in the earlier
discussion of the screen, include the following:
• Destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance elements.
• Fix and defeat enemy security elements.
• Cause the enemy main body to deploy and then report its direction of travel to
the friendly main body commander.
b. Types. The following discussion covers operational considerations for advance
guards, flank guards, and rear guards.
(1) Advance Guard. An advance guard for a stationary force is defensive in nature.
The company defends or delays in accordance with the intent of the main body
commander. An advance guard for a moving force is offensive in nature. The company
normally conducts an offensive advance guard mission during a movement to contact as
part of an SBCT battalion. The role of the advance guard is to maintain the freedom of
maneuver of the supported SBCT battalion by providing early warning of enemy activity
and by finding, fixing, and destroying enemy reconnaissance and security elements. (For
more details on advance guard operations, refer to the discussion of movement to contact
in Chapter 4, Section VI, of this manual.)
(2) Flank Guard. A flank guard protects an exposed flank of the main body. A flank
guard is similar to a flank screen except that both OPs and defensive positions are
planned. The company may conduct a moving flank guard during an attack or a
movement to contact. In conducting a moving flank guard, the company normally
occupies a series of BPs along the protected flank. It must maintain orientation both to
the front (to perform its overwatch role and to maintain its own security) and to the
protected flank. It must also maintain a sufficient distance from the main body to prevent
the enemy from engaging the main body with long-range direct fires before early warning
can be sent. (Paragraph 7-12d focuses on execution of a moving flank guard.)
(3) Rear Guard. The rear guard protects the rear of the main body as well as all CS
and CSS elements within the main body. This may occur during offensive operations
when the main body breaks contact with the FLOT or during retrograde operations. Rear
guards may be deployed behind either moving or stationary main bodies. (The rear guard
for a moving force displaces to successive BPs along phase lines or delay lines in depth
as the main body moves.) During retrograde operations, the rear guard normally deploys
its elements across the entire sector behind the main body’s forward maneuver units.
c. Stationary Guard. As noted, a stationary guard mission is, at least initially,
defensive in nature. The guard force normally employs OPs to accomplish all
surveillance requirements of the guard mission. The company must be prepared to
conduct actions against the enemy’s main body and security elements as well as his
reconnaissance forces. The following paragraphs discuss considerations for operations
involving these enemy elements.
(1) Actions against Main Body and Security Element.. Once contact is made with an
enemy main body or security force, the guard force attacks, defends, or delays in
accordance with the enemy situation and the intent of the commander of the protected
force. (Chapter 5 of this manual discusses considerations for the defense.)
(2) Actions against Reconnaissance Elements. When it must execute
counterreconnaissance tasks, the company normally task-organizes into a surveillance
element (normally occupying a screen line) and an attack element. Each element has

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specific responsibilities but must be prepared to work effectively with the other to ensure
success of the operation:
(a) Surveillance Element and Surveillance Sectors. The commander must assign clear
responsibilities for surveillance of identified avenues of approach and designated NAIs.
The surveillance element is tasked with detecting, reporting, and maintaining contact
with the enemy in the assigned surveillance sector. In addition, the surveillance element
is responsible for passing the enemy force off to the attack element for destruction.
(b) Attack Element. In this role, the company’s MGS platoon can serve as the primary
direct fire killing asset and remain responsive to the commander. The attack element
occupies hide positions, BPs, or attack-by-fire positions along enemy avenues of
approach. Once alerted by the surveillance force, it moves into position (if necessary) and
destroys the approaching enemy element. The attack element is responsible for direct fire
planning and engagement area development in support of the commander’s plan. It must
rehearse all necessary movement to the planned fighting positions and report the required
movement times to the commander.
(c) Relationship of Surveillance and Attack Elements. The company's surveillance
element must track locations of any enemy vehicles moving through the sector while the
attack element moves into position. Once the attack element is set and can observe the
enemy, the surveillance element completes target handover. This operation requires
continuous communication between the two subordinate elements conducting the
handover as well as close control by the company commander or XO. In close terrain, the
surveillance and attack elements must be positioned much closer together than in open
terrain. This helps the elements to maintain visual contact and achieve target handover at
the appropriate time. Figure 7-3, page 7-16, illustrates a company stationary guard
operation.

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FM 3-21.11

Figure 7-3. Stationary guard with OPs forward.

d. Moving Flank Guard. Many of the considerations for a moving flank screen
apply to the execution of a moving flank guard. However, unlike a moving flank screen
that occupies a series of OPs, the flank guard force plans to occupy a series of defensive
positions. In conducting a moving flank guard, the company either occupies a series of
temporary BPs along the protected flank or, if the protected force is moving too quickly,
continues to move along the protected flank. During movement, the company maintains
surveillance to the protected flank of the SBCT while preparing to occupy designated
BPs based on enemy activity or on the movement of the protected force. There are three
basic methods of controlling movement along the guarded flank:
• Alternate bounds by unit.
• Successive bounds by unit.
• Continuous marching.

NOTE: These are identical to the methods for controlling movement along a screened
flank except that the company and its platoons occupy designated defensive
positions instead of OPs.

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The lead element of a moving flank guard must accomplish three tasks. It must maintain
contact with the protected force, reconnoiter the flank guard’s route of advance, and
reconnoiter the zone between the protected force and the flank guard’s advance. The rest
of the flank guard marches along the route of advance and occupies BPs to the protected
flank as necessary. Figure 7-4 illustrates a company flank guard operation during a
movement to contact. One platoon is employed to provide security to the front and
maintain contact with the SBCT main body; the other two platoons are oriented to the
protected flank. The illustration shows BPs the platoons may occupy to respond to the
approaching enemy force.

Figure 7-4. SBCT infantry company guarding the SBCT flank during
movement to contact.

7-13. LOCAL SECURITY

The company is responsible for maintaining its own security at all times. It does this by
deploying mounted and dismounted OPs and patrols to maintain surveillance and by
employing appropriate OPSEC measures. In addition to maintaining security for its own
elements, the company may implement local security for other units as directed by the
SBCT battalion infantry commander. Examples of such situations include, but are not
limited to, the following:

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• Provide security for engineers as they emplace obstacles or construct

survivability positions in the company BP.
• Secure LZs.
• Establish mounted or dismounted OPs to maintain surveillance of enemy
infiltration and reconnaissance routes.
• Conduct patrols to cover gaps in observation and to clear possible enemy OPs
from surrounding areas.

Section IV. VEHICLE LAAGER

On the battlefield of the future there will be situations based on METT-TC that require
the SBCT leadership and its soldiers to be separated from their vehicles. The organic
ICVs of the SBCT infantry rifle company are for transporting the infantry squads to the
fight and providing tactical flexibility while tailoring the soldiers' loads through a
"mobile arms room" concept. There is also an MGS platoon that supports the infantry
fight with long-range precision fires. The MGS is a fighting vehicle but is not a Bradley
or a tank and should not be employed in the traditional sense of a fighting vehicle.
Flexibility is the key to this force. SBCT leadership should consider the following when
the operational situation dictates that their vehicles be placed in a vehicle laager site.

7-14. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

To avoid the enemy's detection or strength, as well as to conduct reconnaissance, the
commander may place his ICVs and other vehicles in a secure location and move
dismounted by stealth through gaps or around enemy positions to conduct operations
such as raids, ambushes, or other attacks. The company also may separate its personnel
from their vehicles for other types of operations, such as stay-behind and reconnaissance.
a. Fundamentals. The company has the capability to move to critical targets
undetected, achieve surprise, and avoid the effects of enemy fires. Limited visibility, bad
weather, and restrictive terrain also reduce the chances of detection when soldiers are
separated from their vehicles. A unit may opt to separate from its vehicles--
• To gather information.
• To attack the enemy at a weak point.
• To seize key terrain or destroy vital installations behind enemy positions.
• To harass and disrupt the enemy with ambushes in his rear area.
• To attack enemy reserves, fire support units, and command posts.
• To participate in air assault operations.
b. Considerations. The company commander must prepare and give his units
enough time for planning and preparation for movement without their vehicles. In either
case, movement techniques and formations are based on the likelihood of enemy contact,
the terrain, the level of visibility, and the need for speed and control.
(1) The routes selected must use the best available cover and concealment, ease
control and navigation, and avoid obstacles and danger areas. Routes should be
reconnoitered without alerting the enemy. This may be possible by using RSTA assets
within the SBCT; however, leaders should consider using map reconnaissance, guides, or
marking the routes.

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(2) Visual signals, such as arm-and-hand signals, infrared devices, and flashlights
with colored lenses, reduce the chance of detection. Avoid sound signals and flares.
Recognition signals are critical for actions at a linkup or rally point.
(3) Radio listening silence should be enforced, except when a unit must report its
progress or when a unit detected by the enemy needs supporting fire.
(4) Indirect fires are always planned not only for the dismounted element but the
vehicle laager area as well
(5) A vehicle laager site out of which maneuver units are executing dismounted
operations has the following characteristics:
• Concealment from enemy ground and, if possible, air observation.
• Good drainage and a surface that can support both tracked and wheeled
vehicles.
• Suitable entrances, exits, and internal roads or trails.
• Sufficient space for dispersion of vehicles and equipment.

7-15. OCCUPYING VEHICLE LAAGER SITES

The company may initially occupy the vehicle laager site as an independent element or as
part of a battalion. In either situation, upon arrival the company occupies its vehicle
laager site using the procedures for hasty occupation of a BP.
a. The company commander establishes local security and coordinates with any
adjacent units that may also be in the general area. He assigns weapons orientation and a
sector of responsibility for each platoon and subordinate elements. If the company
occupies the vehicle laager site alone, it establishes a perimeter defense. Upon departure
of the dismounted portion of the company conducting operations, the senior individual
remaining in the laager site assumes responsibility normally associated with occupation
of a BP.
b. Following occupation of the vehicle laager site, the elements remaining can
prepare for future operations by conducting troop-leading procedures and priorities of
work in accordance with SBCT battalion and company OPORDs per tactical SOPs.
These preparations include the following:
• Establish and maintain security.
• Employ security measures as necessary, including protection against enemy
infiltration.
• Conduct troop-leading procedures.
• If the tactical situation permits, perform maintenance on their vehicles and
communications equipment.
• If practical, conduct resupply operations, including refueling and rearming.
• Reestablish vehicle load plans.

Section V. PASSAGE OF LINES

A passage of lines entails movement of one or more units through another unit. This
operation becomes necessary when the moving unit(s) cannot bypass the stationary unit
and must pass through it. The primary purpose of the passage is to maintain the
momentum of the moving elements. A passage of lines may be designated as either
forward or rearward (refer to the discussion and illustrations later in this section). The
controlling SBCT battalion is responsible for planning and coordinating a passage of

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lines involving the company. In some situations, as when the company is using multiple
passage routes (such as a separate route for each platoon), the company commander must
take responsibility for planning and coordinating each phase of the operation.

7-16. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

In planning the passage of lines, the commander must consider the tactical factors and
procedures covered in the following paragraphs.
a. Passage Lanes. The passage should facilitate transition to follow-on missions
through the use of multiple lanes or lanes wide enough to support doctrinal formations for
the passing units.
b. Use of Deception. The company can use deception techniques, such as smoke, to
enhance security during the passage.
c. Battle Handover. The controlling commander must clearly define the battle
handover criteria and procedures to be used during the passage. His order should cover
the roles of both the passing unit and the stationary unit and the use of direct and indirect
fires. If necessary, he also specifies the location of the battle handover line (BHL) as part
of the unit’s graphic control measures. For a forward passage, the BHL is normally the
LD for the passing force; in a rearward passage, it is normally a location within the direct
fire range of the stationary force. In general, a defensive handover is complete when the
passing unit is clear and the stationary unit is ready to engage the enemy. Offensive
handover is complete when the passing unit has deployed and crossed the BHL.
d. Obstacles. The passing and stationary units must coordinate obstacle information,
to include the locations of enemy and friendly obstacles, existing lanes and bypasses, and
guides for the passage.
e. Air Defense. Air defense coverage is imperative during the high-risk passage
operation. Normally, the stationary SBCT unit is responsible for providing air defense,
allowing the passing unit’s air defense assets to move with it.
f. CSS Responsibilities. Responsibility for CSS actions, such as vehicle recovery or
casualty evacuation in the passage lane, must be clearly defined for both passing and
stationary units.
g. Command and Control. To enhance command and control during the passage,
the company collocates a command and control element, normally the company
commander or XO, with a similar element from the stationary or moving unit (as
applicable).

7-17. RECONNAISSANCE COORDINATION

Detailed reconnaissance and coordination are critical in a passage of lines, both in dealing
with the often complex planning factors outlined previously and in ensuring that the
passage is conducted quickly and smoothly. The company commander normally conducts
all necessary reconnaissance and coordination for the passage. At times, he may
designate the XO, 1SG, or a platoon leader to conduct liaison duties for reconnaissance
and coordination. The following items of information are coordinated:
• Unit designation and composition; type and number of passing vehicles.
• Passing unit arrival time(s).
• Location of attack positions or assembly areas.
• Current enemy situation.

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• Stationary unit’s mission and plan (to include OP, patrol, and obstacle
locations).
• Location of movement routes, contact points, passage points, and passage
lanes.

NOTE: In units with digital capability, the use of GPS and or position navigation
(POSNAV) waypoints simplifies this process and, as a result, speeds the
passage.

• Guide requirements.
• Order of march.
• Anticipated actions on enemy contact.
• Requirements for supporting direct and indirect fires, including the location of
the RFL.
• NBC conditions.
• Available CS and CSS assets and their locations.
• Communications information (to include frequencies, digital data, and near
and far recognition signals).
• Criteria for battle handover and location of the BHL.
• Additional procedures for the passage.

7-18. FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

In a forward passage, the passing unit first moves to an assembly area or an attack
position behind the stationary unit. Designated liaison personnel move forward to link up
with guides and confirm coordination information with the stationary unit. Guides then
lead the passing elements through the passage lane. The company conducts a forward
passage by employing tactical movement. It moves quickly, using appropriate dispersal
and formations whenever possible and keeping radio traffic to a minimum. It bypasses
disabled vehicles as necessary. The company holds its fire until it passes the BHL or
designated fire control measure unless the company commander has coordinated fire
control with the stationary unit. Once clear of passage lane restrictions, the unit
consolidates at a rally point or attack position and then conducts tactical movement in
accordance with its orders. Figure 7-5, page 7-22, illustrates a forward passage of lines.

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Figure 7-5. SBCT infantry company forward passage of lines.

7-19. REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

Because of the increased chance of fratricide during a rearward passage, coordination of
recognition signals and direct fire restrictions is critical. The passing unit contacts the
stationary unit while it is still beyond direct fire range and conducts coordination as
discussed previously. Coordination emphasizes near recognition signals and location of
the BHL. Additional fire control measures, such as RFLs, may be employed to further
minimize the risk of fratricide. Following coordination, the passing unit continues tactical
movement toward the passage lane. Gun tubes are oriented on the enemy, and the passing
unit is responsible for its own security until it passes the BHL. If the stationary unit
provides guides, the passing unit may conduct a short halt to link up and coordinate with
them. The passing unit moves quickly through the passage lane to a designated location
behind the stationary unit (Figure 7-6).

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Figure 7-6. SBCT infantry company rearward passage of lines.

Section VI. BREACHING

Obstacle breaching is a high-frequency task during offensive operations. Breaching
entails the employment of a combination of techniques, procedures, and equipment to
project combat power to the far side of an obstacle. The company commander must
understand the challenges presented by various types of obstacles and the capabilities and
limitations of the mobility assets the company can employ to defeat them. He must
further understand the basic tenets of breaching and the types of breaches the company
may be tasked to conduct. ( FM 3-34.2 contains a more detailed discussion of breaching
operations and threat obstacle employment.)

7-20. BREACHING TENETS

In the planning and execution of a successful combined-arms breaching operation, the
company commander must apply the five tenets of breaching. These basic principles,
described in this discussion, are the following:
• Intelligence.
• Breaching fundamentals.
• Breaching organization.
• Mass.
• Synchronization.
a. Intelligence. Well-rehearsed drills and tactical SOPs and redundancy in breaching
assets can offset a lack of obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) in breaching operations
involving simple obstacles or lightly defended obstacles. Detailed OBSTINTEL,
however, is imperative for a successful breach of a complex obstacle. Without thorough

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information on the obstacle itself and the defense it supports, the breach force is at risk.
As a minimum, OBSTINTEL requirements for breach and maneuver planning should
cover the following:
(1) Bypasses and Gaps. The existence of adequate bypasses affects the decision of
whether a breaching operation is required. Gaps may influence what type of breach is
used.
(2) Obstacle Location and Orientation. These are factors in which the breach is
conducted.
(3) Obstacle Composition and Depth. These factors, which are critical to how the
breach is conducted, include the following:
• Types of mines employed, by target type (antipersonnel or antitank),
positioning (buried or surface-laid), and method of activation (pressure,
mechanical, or magnetic).
• Presence of antihandling devices.
• Size of the obstacle and whether it is tied into existing or reinforcing
obstacles.
(4) Location of the Enemy’s Direct Fire Weapons (Mounted and Dismounted). This
influences actions on the objective during the breach, including how to suppress and
obscure the enemy.
(5) Topography. Topography affects the use of various types of breaching assets.
Some equipment, for example, may not work efficiently in rocky soil.
b. Breaching Fundamentals. There are five basic steps that are part of every
breaching operation. The simplified steps, known by the acronym SOSRA, are suppress,
obscure, secure, reduce, and assault.
(1) Suppres.. Focus all available fires on the enemy to prevent him from placing
effective fires on the breach and assault forces.
(2) Obscure. Employ screening or obscuring smoke to prevent enemy acquisition of
friendly elements.
(3) Secure. Secure the breach site to prevent the enemy from interfering with obstacle
reduction or passage of friendly forces through the cleared lanes. Security must be
effective against all types of enemy elements that can influence these actions, including
outposts and fighting positions near the obstacle, overwatching units, and counterattack
forces.
(4) Reduce. Create lanes through or over the obstacle to allow the assault force to
pass through and to enable follow-on forces to accomplish their missions.
(5) Assault. Assault through the breach to destroy enemy forces on the far side of the
obstacle that are capable of placing or observing direct and indirect fires on the reduction
area and to seize key terrain that will facilitate further combat operations.
c. Breaching Organization. The breach commander designates support, breach,
and assault forces. The following paragraphs summarize the responsibilities and actions
of these three elements during the breaching operation.
(1) Support Force. The support element takes these actions:

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• Establishes support by fire positions and suppresses the enemy with direct and
indirect fires to prevent him from placing effective fires against friendly
forces.
• Employs or calls for smoke to obscure the enemy or screen friendly
movement.
(2) Breach Force. The breach element takes these actions:
• Searches for bypasses.
• Establishes breach site security on the near side of the obstacle against
mounted and dismounted enemy elements.
• Reduces the obstacle.
• Proofs and marks lanes or bypasses.
• Establishes breach site security on the far side against mounted and
dismounted enemy elements to facilitate passage of the assault force.
(3) Assault Force. The assault element takes these actions:
• As necessary, assists the support force with suppression during the initial
reduction of the obstacle.
• As necessary, conducts an assault breach of protective obstacles.
• Secures the far side of the obstacle (this is defined as the area that can
influence the breach site).
• As directed, conducts additional actions on the objective to destroy enemy
elements on the far side of the obstacle.
d. Mass. A critical factor in the success of any breaching operation, mass is
achieved when the friendly force is able to fix a majority of the enemy or to isolate or
obscure the objective using smoke. The breach commander must plan for a 50-percent
redundancy in reduction assets. He can generate favorable force ratios through the
employment of additional combat multipliers.
e. Synchronization. Synchronization can best be achieved in a breaching operation
through the use of detailed reverse planning, clear instructions to subordinate elements,
effective command and control, and extensive rehearsals. The emphasis is on the steps of
SOSRA. Planning considerations for synchronization during the breach, listed in a
possible reverse sequence, include the following:
• Reverse planning starts with actions on the objective.
• The planned actions on the objective influence the size and composition of the
assault force and the number and location of lanes to be created.
• Lane requirements, topography, and the types of obstacles determine the type
and number of reduction assets task-organized to the breach force.
• The ability of the enemy’s infantry to interfere with the breach determines
whether the breach site is secured by fires or by force.
• The enemy’s ability to mass fires at the breach site dictates the nature of the
required suppression fires (including the composition of the support force and
the type and amount of supporting fires).
• The location of the enemy and the availability of clear fields of fire determine
the location of the support force and its support-by-fire position.

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7-21. TYPES OF BREACHES

This paragraph discusses the combined-arms deliberate breach and combined-arms hasty
breach. (Refer to FM 3-34.2 for a detailed discussion of combined-arms breaching
operations.) A discussion of the bypass operation, which the commander must first
consider as an alternative to conducting an actual breach, is also included.
a. Bypass. When a unit bypasses an obstacle, it physically changes direction,
moving along a route that avoids the obstacle. Obstacles should be bypassed whenever
possible to maintain the momentum of the operation. SBCT infantry commanders,
however, must ensure that conducting the bypass will provide a tactical advantage
without exposing the unit to unnecessary danger. If possible, they should conduct a
reconnaissance to evaluate tactical considerations to include--
• The limits of the obstacle.
• Physical aspects of the bypass route, including location, availability of cover
and concealment, and key terrain influencing the route.
• Confirmation that the bypass route will take the unit where it needs to go
while avoiding possible enemy ambush sites and kill sacks.
(For additional considerations related to bypass operations, refer to the discussion of the
bypass as a tactical task in Chapter 4 of this manual.)
b. Combined-Arms Hasty Breach. SBCTs and battalions employ the combined-
arms hasty breaching technique to overcome unexpected or lightly defended obstacles
quickly; they may also use the technique when the obstacle or enemy situation is unclear.
SBCT and SBCT infantry battalion commanders may prepare their units for a combined-
arms hasty breach by task-organizing subordinate SBCT battalions or companies (as
applicable) with the additional forces necessary to conduct the operation. As with the
combined-arms deliberate breach, the SBCT battalion commander may direct the
company, probably task-organized with one or more engineer platoons, to conduct the
combined-arms hasty breach on its own. The company commander assumes
responsibility for designating support, breach, and assault forces and for synchronizing
SOSRA actions.
c. Combined-Arms Deliberate Breach. The combined-arms deliberate breach is a
scheme of maneuver specifically designed to reduce an obstacle, allowing the unit to
continue the mission. Thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning, and extensive
preparation and rehearsal characterize the deliberate breach. Subordinate elements are
tasked to perform the roles of support, breach, and assault forces. The SBCT battalion
commander is responsible for synchronizing the steps of SOSRA.

Section VII. AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

Situations favoring an air assault operation for the SBCT include those in which the
enemy has a vulnerable area suitable for air assault, surprise can be achieved, and enemy
air defenses are weak and vulnerable or can be effectively suppressed.

7-22. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The SBCT infantry rifle company may be required to participate in air assault operations
as part of the tactical plan. The company has the ability to be air lifted as part of a larger
operation. The battalion is the lowest level with sufficient personnel to plan, coordinate,
and control an air assault operation. When company-size or lower operations are

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conducted, the planning takes place at battalion or higher headquarters. Successful air
assault execution is based on a careful analysis of METT-TC factors and detailed, precise
reverse planning. Refer to FM 90-4 for a detailed discussion of air assault operation.

NOTE: Separating the infantry from the ICV and MGS vehicles during air assault
operations will eliminate the supporting fires from the MGS platoon and may
limit the inter-networked communications and the commanders and leaders
knowledge of the changing situation.

7-23. REVERSE PLANNING SEQUENCE

The basic plans that comprise the reverse planning sequence are developed for each air
assault operation and include ground tactical plan, landing plan, air movement plan,
loading plan, and staging plan. These plans normally are coordinated and developed by
the battalion staff to make the best use of available time. If time is limited, planning steps
may be compressed or conducted concurrently.
a. Ground Tactical Plan. The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the
commander’s ground tactical plan, around which subsequent planning is based. The
ground tactical plan specifies actions in the objective area to accomplish the mission and
addresses subsequent operations. The ground tactical plan contains essentially the same
elements as any other infantry attack plan but capitalizes on speed and mobility to
achieve surprise. The vehicle link up plan should be addressed if the intent is to move the
vehicles to link up with the company in the area of operation.
b. Landing Plan. The landing plan must support the ground tactical plan. This plan
sequences elements into the area of operations to ensure that platoons arrive at designated
locations and times, prepared to execute the ground tactical plan.
c. Air Movement Plan. The air movement plan is based on the ground tactical and
landing plans. It specifies the schedule and provides the instructions for air movement of
soldiers, equipment, and supplies from pickup zones and landing zones.
d. Loading Plan. The loading plan is based on the movement plan. It ensures
soldiers, equipment, and supplies are loaded on the correct aircraft. Platoon integrity is
maintained when aircraft loads are planned. Cross loading of essential personnel and
equipment is imperative to ensure survivability of command and control assets and to
ensure that the mix of personnel and weapons arriving at the LZ is ready to fight. The
company commander or platoon leader should always ensure the aircraft is loaded so that
dismounting soldiers react promptly and contribute to mission accomplishment. The
company must have a bump plan. A bump plan ensures essential soldiers and equipment
are loaded ahead of less critical loads in case of aircraft breakdown or other problems.
e. Staging Plan. The staging plan is based on the loading plan and prescribes the
arrival time of ground units (soldiers, equipment, and supplies) at the PZ in the order of
movement. The staging plan includes the disposition of the vehicles left in the staging
area and the company’s linkup plan if the link up is to occur on return from the air assault
mission.
(1) Disposition of Vehicles. The company commander must develop a security plan
for the vehicles that remain in the staging area until the company returns to the LZ after
the air assault mission is completed. Instructions for link up of the platoons with their
vehicles will also be included.

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(2) Linkup of Vehicles. The linkup plan must be just as detailed as the staging and
loading plans. To simplify the linkup, the company commander must ensure that platoon
integrity is maintained. The company commander should designate a linkup point for
each element to link up with its vehicles. As the aircrafts land, the elements immediately
move to their linkup point to continue the mission.

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CHAPTER 8
STABILITY OPERATIONS

Stability operations encompass a range of actions that shape the

political environment and respond to developing crises. These operations
are diverse, continuous, and often long-term. Stability operations may
include both developmental and coercive actions. Developmental actions
are aimed at enhancing a government’s willingness and ability to care for
its people. Coercive military actions involve the application of limited,
carefully prescribed force, or the threat of force, to achieve specific
objectives. Stability operations are usually nonlinear and noncontiguous
and are often time and manpower intensive. Army elements may be tasked
to conduct stability operations in a complex, dynamic, and often
asymmetric environment, to accomplish one or more of the following
purposes:
• Deter or thwart aggression.
• Reassure allies or friendly governments, agencies, or groups.
• Provide encouragement and support for a weak or faltering
government.
• Stabilize an area with a restless or openly hostile population.
• Maintain or restore order.
• Satisfy treaty obligations or enforce national or international
agreements and policies.

NOTE: For more detailed information on stability operations, refer to the following
publications:
• Joint Publications 3-07.2 and 3-07.3.
• FM 3.0
• FM 7-98.
• FM 100-19.
• FM 100-20.
• FM 100-23.

Section I. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Although stability operations normally are centrally planned, execution often takes the
form of small-scale, noncontiguous actions conducted over extended distances.
Responsibility for making decisions on the ground falls to junior leaders. The following
paragraphs examine several important considerations that influence planning and
preparation for stability operations. (For a more detailed discussion of these subjects,
refer to FM 100-23.)

8-1. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

In decentralized operations, effective command guidance and a detailed understanding of
rules of engagement are critical at each operational level.

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a. ROE are directives that explain the circumstances and limitations under which US
forces initiate and continue combat engagement with forces encountered. These rules
reflect the requirements of the laws of war, operational concerns, and political
considerations when the operational environment shifts from peace to conflict and back
to peace.
b. ROE must be briefed and trained to the lowest operational level. They should be
established for, disseminated to, and thoroughly understood by every soldier in the unit.
Another important consideration in development and employment of ROE is that
commanders must assume that the belligerents they encounter will also understand the
ROE. These unfriendly elements will attempt to use their understanding of the ROE to
their own advantage and to the disadvantage of the friendly force. (Refer to FM 100-23
for a more detailed discussion of ROE.)

8-2. RULES OF INTERACTION

Rules of interaction embody the human dimension of stability operations. They lay the
foundation for successful relationships with the myriad of factions and individuals that
play critical roles in these operations. ROI encompass an array of interpersonal
communication skills, such as persuasion and negotiation.
a. ROI are tools the individual soldier needs to deal with the nontraditional
asymmetric threats that are prevalent in stability operations, including political friction,
unfamiliar cultures, and conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI enhance the soldier’s
survivability in such situations.
b. ROI are based on the applicable ROE for a particular operation; they must be
tailored to the specific regions, cultures, and populations affected by the operation.
c. Reinforcement of ROI is critical. ROI can be effective only if they are thoroughly
rehearsed and understood by every soldier in the unit.

8-3. FORCE PROTECTION

SBCT infantry commanders must implement appropriate security measures to protect the
force. Establishment of checkpoints, effective base camp security procedures, and
aggressive patrolling are examples of force protection measures. The SBCT infantry
company may receive taskings as part of the SBCT battalion security plan. Additional
security taskings result from the company commander's concept for the company
defense. These taskings may be oriented on friendly units, on the enemy and terrain
(reconnaissance), or on the enemy’s reconnaissance assets (counterreconnaissance). The
commander establishes a security plan to keep the enemy from observing or surprising
the company. He establishes this plan before moving the company into the area and
maintains it continuously. The SBCT infantry company commander bases this plan on
orders received from the SBCT battalion and on the enemy situation, terrain, and
visibility conditions. The plan provides active and passive measures and
counterreconnaissance.
a. Active Measures. These include OPs, stand-tos, and patrols.
(1) The commander can require each platoon to have a set number of OPs; if not, the
platoon leaders decide what they need. There should be at least one OP for each platoon.
In close terrain or limited visibility, there may be one for each squad.

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(2) The commander can also require a set number of men to be on security at all
times. The number varies with the enemy situation, terrain, visibility, and the unit's need
for rest. As a guide, at least one third of the soldiers should be on security at all times.
(3) When an attack is expected, the entire SBCT infantry company should be on alert;
however, this should not be maintained for long periods. The commander must keep in
mind that his soldiers need rest to function in future operations. Leaders must establish
and enforce a sleep plan without sacrificing security for rest.
(4) A stand-to is held both morning and evening to ensure that each man adjusts to
the changing light and noise conditions and is dressed, equipped, and ready for action.
The stand-to should start before first light in the morning and continue until after light. It
should start before dark in the evening and last until after dark. The starting and ending
times should vary to prevent establishing a pattern, but the stand-to must last long enough
to accomplish its purpose.
(5) The SBCT battalion can have its companies dispatch patrols whose missions
contribute to battalion security. The SBCT infantry company commander can dispatch
patrols in addition to those required by the battalion to satisfy the security needs. He may
have the patrols reconnoiter dead space in the sector, gaps between platoons, gaps
between the company and adjacent units, or open flanks. The company reserve may
provide these patrols. Platoons may dispatch similar security patrols. All patrols sent out
by the company or its platoons must be coordinated with battalion. (For more information
on patrolling, see FM 7-8.)
b. Passive Measures. These measures include camouflage, movement control, light
and noise discipline, and proper radiotelephone procedures. MGS and Javelin gunners,
with their daysights and nightsights, can add to the security effort both day and night. The
company should also use its NVDs for surveillance.
(1) To ensure effective coverage, the company commander may direct platoons to
cover specific areas with specific devices (such as NVDs and thermal sights). He may
also specify how many NVDs will be in use (for example, "one half of the soldiers on
security will use NVDs").
(2) Sector sketches should include the locations of key devices to include NVDs,
thermal sights, and MGS and Javelin nightsights.

8-4. TASK ORGANIZATION

Because of the unique requirements of stability operations, more often than not the SBCT
infantry company is task-organized to operate with a variety of units. This includes some
elements with which the company does not normally work, such as linguists,
counterintelligence teams, and civil affairs teams.

8-5. CSS CONSIDERATIONS

The operational environment the company faces during stability operations may be very
austere, creating special CSS considerations. These factors include, but are not limited to,
the following:
a. Reliance on local procurement of certain items.
b. Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supply
materials, and Class III lubricants.
c. Special Class V supply requirements, such as pepper spray.

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d. Difficulty in finding or obtaining potable water, resulting in reliance on bottled

water.

8-6. MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS

The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every soldier involved in stability
operations. All leaders and soldiers must know how to deal effectively with broadcast and
print reporters and photographers. This should include an understanding of which
subjects they are authorized to discuss and which subjects they must refer to the public
affairs officer (PAO).

8-7. OPERATIONS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

US Army units may conduct certain stability operations in coordination with a variety of
outside organizations. These include other US armed services or government agencies as
well as international organizations such as private volunteer organizations (PVOs),
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and United Nations (UN) military forces or
agencies.

Section II. TYPES OF OPERATIONS

Stability operations typically fall into ten broad types that are neither discrete nor
mutually exclusive. For example, a force engaged in a peace operation may also find
itself conducting arms control or a show of force to set the conditions for achieving an
end state. This section provides an introductory discussion of stability operations; for
more detailed information, refer to FM 3-0 and FM 3-07. Types of support operations are
as follows:
• Peace operations.
 Peacekeeping.
 Peace enforcement.
 Operation in support of diplomatic efforts.
• Foreign internal defense.
• Security assistance.
• Humanitarian and civic assistance.
• Support to insurgencies.
• Support to counterdrug operations.
• Combating terrorism.
• Noncombatant evacuation operations.
• Arms control.
• Show of force.

8-8. PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations encompass three general areas: operations in support of diplomatic
efforts, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The SBCT infantry company may
participate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations; it may support diplomatic
efforts as part of the battalion or larger force.
a. Peacekeeping Operations. A peacekeeping force monitors and facilitates the
implementation of cease-fires, truce negotiations, and other such agreements. In doing so,
it must assure all sides in the dispute that the other involved parties are not taking

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advantage of settlement terms to their own benefit. The SBCT infantry company most
often observes, monitors, or supervises and assists the parties involved in the dispute. The
peacekeeping force must remain entirely neutral. If it loses a reputation for impartiality,
its usefulness within the peacekeeping mission is compromised.
b. Peace Enforcement Operations. Several unique characteristics distinguish peace
enforcement activities from wartime operations and from other stability operations. The
purpose of peace enforcement is to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions
assigned and to maintain or restore peace and order. It may entail combat, armed
intervention, or physical threat of armed intervention. Under the provisions of an
international agreement, the SBCT battalion and its subordinate companies may be called
upon to use coercive military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or
resolutions.

8-9. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a
government in any action programs taken by another government to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JP 1-02). The main objective is to
promote stability by helping a host nation establish and maintain institutions and facilities
responsive to its people’s needs. Army forces in foreign internal defense normally advise
and assist host-nation forces conducting operations to increase their capabilities. This
type of stability operation is normally conducted by special operating forces.

8-10. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Army forces support security assistance efforts by training, advising, and assisting allied
and friendly armed forces. Security assistance includes the participation of Army forces
in any of a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military
training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or
cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives (JP 3-07).

8-11. HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs provide assistance to the host-nation
populace in conjunction with military operations and exercises. In contrast to
humanitarian and disaster relief operations, HCA actions are planned activities; they are
limited to the following categories:
• Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
• Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
• Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
• Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

8-12. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

This type of support includes assistance provided by US forces to help a friendly nation
or group that is attempting to combat insurgent elements or to stage an insurgency itself.
This type of stability activity normally is conducted by special operating forces.

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8-13. SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

US military forces may be tasked for a variety of counterdrug activities, which are always
conducted in conjunction with another government agency. These activities include
destroying illicit drugs and disrupting or interdicting drug manufacturing, growing,
processing, and smuggling operations. Counterdrug support may take the form of
advisory personnel, mobile training teams, offshore training activities, and assistance in
logistics, communications, and intelligence.

8-14. COMBATING TERRORISM

In all types of stability operations, antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities are a
continuous requirement in protecting installations, units, and individuals from the threat
of terrorism. Antiterrorism focuses on defensive measures used to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks. Counterterrorism
encompasses a full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism. (For more information on these activities, refer to Joint Publication 3-07.2.)

8-15. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

A noncombant evacuation operation (NEO) is conducted primarily to evacuate US
citizens whose lives are in danger, although it may also include natives of the host nation
and third-country nationals. These operations involve swift insertion and temporary
occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Leaders use only the
amount of force required for protection of evacuees and self-defense.

8-16. ARMS CONTROL

An SBCT infantry company may conduct arms control inspections during stability
operations to prevent escalation to conflict. This could include the mandated disarming of
belligerents. The collection, storing, and destruction of conventional munitions and
weapons systems can deter belligerents from resuming hostilities.

8-17. SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS

Forces deployed abroad lend credibility to a nation’s promises and commitments. In
support of this principle, show-of-force operations are meant to bolster and reassure allies
through a display of credible military force. SBCT infantry companies participating in a
show of force mission should assume that combat is not only possible but also probable.
All preparatory actions associated with the conduct of combat operations pertain to a
show of force. Although actual combat is not desired, a show of force can escalate
rapidly and unexpectedly.

Section III. COMPANY TASKS

Stability operations are complex and very demanding. The SBCT infantry company
participating in stability operations is required to master skills ranging from conducting
negotiations to establishing observation posts and checkpoints or conducting a convoy
escort. The tasks discussed in this section include lessons learned that will assist the
company commander in implementing these and other tasks.

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8-18. ESTABLISH AND OCCUPY A LODGMENT AREA

A lodgment area is a highly prepared position used as a base of operations in stability
operations (Figure 8-1, page 8-8). Like an assembly area or defensive strongpoint, the
lodgment provides a staging area for the occupying SBCT unit, affords a degree of force
protection, and requires 360-degree security. However, several important characteristics
distinguish the lodgment area from less permanent positions.
a. Due to the probability of long-term occupation, the lodgment requires a level of
preparation and logistical support. It must have shelters and facilities that can support the
occupying force and its attachments for an extended period. The area must be positioned
and developed so the unit can effectively conduct its primary missions (such as peace
enforcement or counterterrorism) throughout its area of responsibility.
b. In establishing the lodgment, the SBCT infantry company may use existing
facilities or request construction of new facilities. A key advantage in using existing
structures is immediate availability, and this also reduces or eliminates the need for
construction support from engineers and members of the company. There are
disadvantages as well. Existing facilities may be inadequate to meet the company's
operational needs, and they may pose security problems because of their proximity to
other structures.
c. The company may establish and occupy a lodgment area as part of an SBCT
battalion or, with significant support from the controlling SBCT battalion, as a separate
element.
d. Before he begins preparation, construction, and occupation of the lodgment area,
the company commander must plan its general layout. He should evaluate these factors:
(1) Location of the lodgment area.
(2) Effects of weather.
(3) Local traffic patterns.
(4) OP sites and patrol routes.
(5) Entry and exit procedures.
(6) Vehicle emplacement and orientation.
(7) Bunkers and fighting positions.
(8) Direct and indirect fire planning.
(9) Size and composition of the reserve.
(10) Location of possible LZs and PZs.

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Figure 8-1. Example SBCT infantry company lodgment area using existing
facilities.

(11) CSS considerations, including locations of the following:

• Mess areas, showers, and latrines (including drainage).
• Storage bunkers for Class III, IV, and V supplies.
• Maintenance and refueling areas.
• Aid station.
• CP site security.

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(12) Size, composition, and function of advance and reconnaissance parties.

(13) Nature and condition of existing facilities (quarters; water, sewer, and power
utilities; reinforced "hard-stand" areas for maintenance).
(14) Proximity to structures and roadways (including security factors).
(15) Priorities of work. The commander must designate priorities of work as the
company establishes the lodgment area. He should consider the following tasks:
• Establishment of security of the immediate area and the perimeter.
• Establishment of initial roadblocks to limit access to the area.
• Mine clearance.
• Construction of revetments to protect vehicles, generators, communications
equipment, and other facilities.
• Construction of barriers or berms around the lodgment area to limit
observation of the compound and provide protection for occupants.
• Construction of shelters for lodgment personnel.
• Construction of defensive positions.
• Construction of sanitation and personal hygiene facilities.
• Construction of hardened CP facilities.
• Continuing activities to improve the site (such as adding hard-wire electrical
power or perimeter illumination).

8-19. CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS

The SBCT infantry company may face a number of situations in which leaders need to
conduct negotiations. There are two general types of negotiations: situational and
preplanned.
a. Situational Negotiations. Situational negotiations are conducted in response to a
requirement for on-the-spot discussion and resolution of a specific issue or problem. An
example would be members of an advance guard negotiating the passage of a convoy
through a checkpoint.
(1) At the company level, situational negotiations are far more common than the
preplanned type. In fact, employment in stability operations requires the commander, his
subordinate leaders, and other soldiers to conduct some form of negotiations almost daily.
This, in turn, requires them to have a thorough understanding of the ROE and ROI.
(2) Members of the company apply this working knowledge to the process of
discussing and, whenever possible, resolving issues and problems that arise between
opposing parties, which may include the company itself. A critical aspect of this
knowledge is the negotiator’s ability to recognize that he has exhausted his options under
the ROE and ROI and must turn the discussion over to a higher authority. Negotiations
continue at progressive levels of authority until the issue is resolved.
(3) In preparing themselves and their soldiers for the negotiation process, the
commander and subordinate leaders must conduct rehearsals covering the ROE and ROI.
One effective technique is to rehearse application of ROE and ROI in a given stability
situation, such as manning a checkpoint. This forces both leaders and subordinates to
analyze the ROE and ROI while applying them in an operational environment.
b. Preplanned Negotiations. Preplanned negotiations are conducted in response to a
requirement for discussion and resolution of an upcoming specific issue or problem.
Preplanned negotiations are conducted in situations such as an SBCT infantry company

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commander conducting a work coordination meeting between leaders of the belligerents

to determine mine clearance responsibilities. Preplanned negotiations require negotiators
to thoroughly understand both the dispute or issue at hand and the factors influencing it,
such as the ROE and ROI, before talks begin. The negotiator’s ultimate goal is to reach
an agreement that is acceptable to both sides and that reduces antagonism and the chance
of renewed hostilities between the parties involved. The following paragraphs list
guidelines and procedures for each phase of the negotiation process.
(1) Identify the purpose of negotiations. Before contacting leaders of the belligerent
parties to initiate the negotiation process, the commander must familiarize himself with
both the situation and the area in which his unit will operate. This includes identifying
and evaluating avenues of approach that connect the opposing forces. Results of the
negotiation process, which may be lengthy and complicated, must be based on national or
international agreements or accords. Negotiation topics include the following:
• When the sides will withdraw.
• Positions to which they will withdraw (these should preclude observation and
direct fire by the opposing parties).
• What forces or elements will move during each phase of the operation.
• Pre-positioning of peace forces that can intervene in case of renewed
hostilities.
• Control of heavy weapons.
• Mine clearance.
• Formal protest procedures for the belligerent parties.
(2) Establish the proper context. The commander must earn the trust and confidence
of each opposing party. This includes establishing an atmosphere (and a physical setting)
that participants will judge to be both fair and safe. These considerations apply:
• Always conduct joint negotiations on matters that affect both parties.
• When serving as a mediator, remain neutral at all times.
• Learn as much as possible about the belligerents, the details of the dispute or
issue being negotiated, and other factors such as the geography of the area and
specific limitations or restrictions (for example, the ROE and ROI).
• Gain and keep the trust of the opposing parties by being firm, fair, and polite.
• Use tact, remain patient, and be objective.
• Never deviate from applicable local and national laws and international
agreements.
(3) Prepare for the negotiations. Thorough, exacting preparation is another important
factor in ensuring the success of the negotiation process. Company personnel should use
the following guidelines:
• Negotiate sequentially, from subordinate level to senior level.
• Select and prepare a meeting place that is acceptable to all parties.
• Arrange for interpreters and adequate communications facilities, as necessary.
• Ensure that all opposing parties, as well as the negotiating company, use a
common map (edition and scale).
• Coordinate all necessary movement.
• Establish local security.

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• Keep higher headquarters informed throughout preparation and during the

negotiations.
• Make arrangements to record the negotiations (use audio or video recording
equipment, if available).
(4) Conduct the negotiations. Negotiators must always strive to maintain control of
the session. They must be firm, yet evenhanded, in leading the discussion. At the same
time, they must be flexible, with a willingness to accept recommendations from the
opposing parties and from their own assistants and advisors. The following procedures
and guidelines apply:
• Exchange greetings.
• Introduce all participants by name, including negotiators and any advisors.
• Consider the use of small talk at the beginning of the session to put the
participants at ease.
• Allow each side to state its case without interruption and without making
premature judgments.
• Make a record of issues presented by both sides.
• If one side makes a statement that is incorrect, be prepared to produce
evidence or proof to establish the facts.
• If the negotiating team or peacekeeping force has a preferred solution, present
it and encourage both sides to accept it.
• Close the meeting by explaining to both sides what has been agreed upon and
what actions they are expected to take. If necessary, be prepared to present
this information in writing for their signatures.
• Do not negotiate or make deals in the presence of the media.
• Maintain the highest standards of conduct at all times.

8-20. MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT

Compliance monitoring involves observing belligerents and working with them to ensure
they meet the conditions of one or more applicable agreements. Examples of the process
include overseeing the separation of opposing combat elements, the withdrawal of heavy
weapons from a sector, or the clearance of a minefield. Planning for compliance
monitoring should cover, but is not limited to, the following considerations:
a. Liaison teams, with suitable communications and transportation assets, are
assigned to the headquarters of the opposing sides. Liaison personnel maintain
communications with the leaders of their assigned element and talk directly to each other
and to their mutual commander (the SBCT infantry company or SBCT battalion
commander).
b. The commander positions himself at the point where violations are most likely
to occur.
c. He positions platoons and squads where they can observe the opposing parties,
instructing them to assess compliance and report any violations.
d. As directed, the commander keeps higher headquarters informed of all
developments, including his assessment of compliance and noncompliance.

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8-21. ESTABLISH OBSERVATION POSTS

Construction and manning of OPs is a high-frequency task for SBCT infantry companies
and subordinate elements when they must establish area security during stability
operations. Each OP is established for a specified time and purpose. During most stability
operations, OPs are overt (conspicuously visible, unlike their tactical counterparts) and
deliberately constructed. Each OP must be integrated into supporting direct and indirect
fire plans and into the overall observation plan. Based on METT-TC factors, deliberate
OPs may include specialized facilities such as the following:
• Observation towers.
• Ammunition and fuel storage areas.
• Power sources.
• Supporting helipads.
• Kitchens, sleep areas, showers, and toilets.
They are similar in construction to bunkers (see FM 5-103) and are supported by fighting
positions, barriers, and patrols (Figure 8-2).

NOTE: If necessary, the company can also employ hasty OPs, which are similar to
individual fighting positions.

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Figure 8-2. Example deliberate observation post.

8-22. ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS

Establishment of checkpoints is a high-frequency task for SBCT infantry company and
subordinate elements involved in stability operations. Checkpoints can be either
deliberate or hasty.
a. Purposes. The SBCT infantry company or a subordinate element may be directed
to establish a checkpoint to achieve one or more of the following purposes:

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• Deter illegal movement.

• Create an instant roadblock.
• Control movement into the area of operations or onto a specific route.
• Demonstrate the presence of peace forces.
• Prevent smuggling of contraband.
• Enforce the terms of peace agreements.
• Serve as an OP, patrol base, or both.
b. Checkpoint Procedures. Checkpoint layout, construction, and manning should
reflect METT-TC factors, including the amount of time available for emplacing it (Figure
8-3). The following procedures and considerations may apply:
(1) Position the checkpoint where it is visible and where traffic cannot turn back, get
off the road, or bypass the checkpoint without being observed.
(2) Position a combat vehicle, selected based upon METT-TC, off the road, but
within sight, to deter resistance to soldiers manning the checkpoint. The vehicle should
be in a hull-down position and protected by local security. It must be able to engage
vehicles attempting to break through or bypass the checkpoint.
(3) Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the search area.
(4) Establish a reserve if applicable.
(5) Establish a bypass lane for approved convoy traffic.
(6) Establish wire communications within the checkpoint area to connect the
checkpoint bunker, combat vehicle, search area, security forces, rest area, and any other
elements involved in the operation.
(7) Designate the search area. If possible, it should be belowground to provide
protection against such incidents as the explosion of a booby-trapped vehicle. Establish a
parking area adjacent to the search area. Women normally are only checked with a metal
detector or searched by female personnel.
(8) If applicable, checkpoint personnel should include linguists.
(9) Properly construct and equip the checkpoint. Consider inclusion of the following
items:
• Barrels filled with sand, concrete, or water (emplaced to slow and canalize
vehicles).
• Concertina wire (emplaced to control movement around the checkpoint).
• Secure facilities for radio and wire communications with the controlling
headquarters.
• First-aid kit.
• Sandbags for defensive positions.
• Wood or other materials for the checkpoint bunker.
• Binoculars, night vision devices, and flashlights.
• Long-handled mirrors (for use in inspections of vehicle undercarriages).
(10) Elements manning a deliberate CP may require access to specialized equipment
such as--
• Floodlights.
• Duty logs.
• Flags and unit signs.

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• Barrier poles that can be raised and lowered.

• Generators with electric wire.

Figure 8-3. Checkpoint layout.

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8-23. CONDUCT PATROL OPERATIONS

Patrolling is also a high-frequency task during stability operations. Planning and
execution of an area security patrol are similar to procedures for other tactical patrols
except that patrol leaders must consider political implications and ROE. Figure 8-4
illustrates the use of patrols, in conjunction with checkpoints and OPs, in enforcing a
zone of separation between belligerent forces.

Figure 8-4. Employment of checkpoints, OPs, and

patrols to enforce a zone of separation.

8-24. CONDUCT CONVOY ESCORT

This mission requires the SBCT infantry company to provide a convoy with security and
close-in protection from direct fire while on the move (Figure 8-5). The SBCT battalion
may choose this course of action if enemy contact is imminent or when it anticipates a

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serious threat to the security of the convoy. Depending on METT-TC factors, the
company is capable of providing effective protection for a large convoy.

NOTE: Lighter security forces such as military police units may conduct smaller-scale
convoy escort operations.

Figure 8-5. Company convoy escort mission.

a. Command and Control. The task organization inherent in convoy escort

missions makes battle command especially critical. The SBCT infantry company

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commander may serve either as the convoy security commander or as overall convoy
commander. In the latter role, he is responsible for the employment not only of his own
organic combat elements but also of CS and CSS attachments and drivers of the escorted
vehicles. He must incorporate all these elements into the various contingency plans
developed for the operation. He must also maintain his link with the controlling TOC.
(1) Effective SOPs and drills must supplement OPORD information for the convoy,
and the company should conduct rehearsals if time permits. Additionally, the company
should conduct extensive precombat checks (PCCs) and PCIs, to include inspection of
the escorted vehicles. The commander must also ensure that the company conducts all
required coordination with units and elements in areas through which the convoy will
pass.
(2) Before the mission begins, the convoy commander should issue a complete
OPORD to all vehicle commanders in the convoy. This is vital because the convoy may
itself be task-organized from a variety of units and because some vehicles may not have
tactical radios. The order should follow the standard five-paragraph OPORD format; it
may place special emphasis on these subjects:
• Inspection of convoy vehicles.
• Route of march (including a strip map for each vehicle commander).
• Order of march.
• Actions at halts (scheduled and unscheduled).
• Actions in case of vehicle breakdown.
• Actions for a break in column.
• Actions in built-up areas.
• Actions on contact, covering such situations as snipers, enemy contact
(including near or far ambush), indirect fire, mine strike, and minefields.
• Riot drill.
• Refugee control drill.
• Evacuation drill.
• Actions at the delivery site.
• Chain of command.
• Guidelines and procedures for negotiating with local authorities.
• Communications and signal information.
• Tactical disposition.
• Fire support plan.
(3) In any escort operation, the basic mission of the convoy commander (and, as
applicable, the convoy security commander) is to establish and maintain security in all
directions and throughout the length of the convoy. He must be prepared to adjust the
disposition of the security force to fit the security requirements of each particular
situation. Several factors affect this disposition, including METT-TC, convoy size,
organization of the convoy, and types of vehicles involved. In some instances, the
commander may position security elements, such as platoons, to the front, rear, and or
flanks of the convoy. As an alternative, he may disperse the combat vehicles throughout
the convoy body.
b. Task Organization. When sufficient escort assets are available, the convoy
commander usually organizes convoy security into three distinct elements: advance

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guard, close-in protective group, and rear guard. He may also designate an additional
reserve in the rear guard to handle contingency situations. The following paragraphs
examine the role of the advance guard, of security assets accompanying the convoy main
body, and of the reserve in the rear guard.

NOTE: The convoy escort is provided with linguists as required.

(1) Advance Guard. The advance guard reconnoiters and proofs the convoy route. It
searches for signs of enemy activity, such as ambushes and obstacles. Within its
capabilities, it attempts to clear the route. The distance and time separation between the
advance guard and the main body should be sufficient to provide the convoy commander
with adequate early warning before the arrival of the vehicle column. However, the
separation should be short enough that the route cannot be interdicted between the
passage of the advance guard and the arrival of the main body. The advance guard should
be task-organized with reconnaissance and mobility assets. As necessary, it should also
include linguists.
(2) Main Body. The commander may choose to intersperse security elements with the
vehicles of the convoy main body. These may include combat elements (including the
rear guard), the convoy commander, additional linguists, mobility assets, and medical and
maintenance support assets. Depending on METT-TC, the convoy commander may also
consider the employment of flank security.
(3) Rear Guard. The rear guard serves as a reserve and either moves with the convoy
or locates at a staging area close enough to provide immediate interdiction against enemy
forces. The supporting headquarters normally designates an additional reserve, consisting
of an additional company or combat aviation assets, to support the convoy operation.
c. Actions on Contact. As the convoy moves to its new location, the enemy may
attempt to harass or destroy it. This contact usually occurs in the form of an ambush,
often executed in coordination with the use of a hasty obstacle. In such a situation, the
safety of the convoy rests on the speed and effectiveness with which escort elements can
execute appropriate actions on contact. Based on the factors of METT-TC, portions of the
convoy security force, such as a MGS platoon or section, may be designated as a reaction
force. This element performs its normal escort duties, such as conducting tactical
movement or occupying an assembly area, as required until enemy contact occurs; it then
performs a reaction mission given by the convoy commander.
(1) Actions at an Ambush. An ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a
convoy. Reaction to an ambush must be immediate, overwhelming, and decisive. Actions
on contact in response to an ambush must be planned for and rehearsed so they can be
executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with particular attention given to
fratricide prevention. In almost all situations, the security force takes several specific,
instantaneous actions in reacting to an ambush. These steps include the following:
(a) As soon as they acquire an enemy force, the escort vehicles immediately lay down
suppressive fires in the direction of the attack and attempt to clear the kill zone quickly.
They seek covered positions between the convoy and the enemy and suppress the enemy
with the highest possible volume of fire. They send contact reports to higher headquarters
as quickly as possible.

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(b) Convoy vehicles, if they are armed, may return fire only if the security force has
not positioned itself between the convoy and the enemy force.
(c) The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles and continues to
move them along the route at the highest possible speed.
(d) Subordinate leaders or the convoy commander may request that any damaged or
disabled vehicles be abandoned and pushed off the route.
(e) The convoy escort leader uses situational reports to keep the convoy security
commander informed. If necessary, the convoy escort leader can then direct a reserve
force from the rear guard or the staging area to take action; he can also call for and adjust
indirect fires.
(f) Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the convoy escort element executes one
of the following COAs based on the composition of the escort and reaction forces, the
commander’s intent, and the strength of the enemy force:
• Continue to suppress the enemy as the reserve moves to provide support.
• Break contact and move out of the kill zone.
• Assault the enemy.
(2) Actions at an Obstacle. Obstacles are obstructions that prevent advancing
movement. They include, but are not limited to, deliberate roadblocks, disabled vehicles,
and large groups of demonstrators. Obstacles pose a major threat to convoy security and
can canalize or stop the convoy to set up an enemy ambush. The purpose of route
reconnaissance ahead of a convoy is to identify obstacles and either breach them or find
bypasses. In some cases, however, the enemy or its obstacles may avoid detection by the
reconnaissance element. If this happens, the convoy must take actions to reduce or bypass
the obstacle.
(a) When an obstacle is identified, the convoy escort faces two problems: reducing or
bypassing the obstacle and maintaining protection for the convoy. Security becomes
critical, and actions at the obstacle must be accomplished very quickly. The convoy
commander must assume that the obstacle is overwatched and covered by enemy fires.
(b) To reduce the time the convoy is halted, thus reducing its vulnerability, these
actions should occur when the convoy escort encounters point-type obstacles:
• The advance guard element identifies the obstacle, and the convoy
commander directs the convoy to make a short halt and establish security.
• The convoy escort element overwatches the obstacle and requests to the
convoy commander that the breach force move forward.
• The escort maintains 360-degree security and provides overwatch as the
breach force reconnoiters the obstacle in search of a bypass.
• Once all reconnaissance is complete, the convoy commander determines
which of the following COAs he will take:
- Bypass the obstacle.
- Breach the obstacle with the assets on hand.
- Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets.

NOTE: The convoy may encounter obstacles such as an impromptu checkpoint

established by civilians or noncombat elements. If the checkpoint cannot be
bypassed or breached, the commander must be prepared to negotiate passage
for the convoy.

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• The commander relays situational reports higher and, if necessary, requests

support from combat reaction forces, engineer assets (if they are not part of
the convoy), and aerial reconnaissance elements.
• Artillery units or the supporting mortar sections are alerted to provide fire
support.
(3) Actions during a Halt. During a short halt, the convoy escort remains at
REDCON-1 status regardless of what actions other convoy vehicles are taking. If the halt
is for any reason other than an obstacle, the convoy escort takes the following actions:
(a) The convoy commander signals the short halt and transmits the order via tactical
radio. Based on METT-TC factors, he directs all vehicles in the convoy to execute the
designated formation or drill for the halt.
(b) Ideally, the convoy assumes a herringbone or coil formation. If the sides of the
road are untrafficable or are mined, however, noncombat vehicles may simply pull over
and establish 360-degree security as best they can. This allows movement of the escort
vehicles through the convoy main body as necessary.
(c) If possible, escort vehicles are positioned up to 100 meters beyond other convoy
vehicles, which are just clear of the route. Escort vehicles remain at REDCON-1 but
establish local security based on the factors of METT-TC.
(d) When given the order to continue, convoy vehicles reestablish the movement
formation, leaving space for escort vehicles. Once the convoy is in column, local security
elements (if used) return to their vehicles, and the escort vehicles rejoin the column.
(e) When all elements are in column, the convoy resumes movement.

8-25. OPEN AND SECURE ROUTES

This task is a mobility operation normally conducted by the engineers. The SBCT
infantry company may be tasked to assist in route clearance and to provide overwatch
support. Route clearance may achieve one of several tactical purposes:
• To clear a route for the initial entry of the SBCT battalion into an area of
operations.
• To clear a route ahead of a planned convoy to ensure that belligerent elements
have not emplaced new obstacles since the last time the route was cleared.
• To secure the route to make it safe for use as a main supply route (MSR).
The planning considerations associated with opening and securing a route are similar to
those for a convoy escort operation. The company commander must analyze the route and
develop contingency plans covering such possibilities as likely ambush locations and
sites that are likely to be mined. The size and composition of a team charged with
opening and securing a route is based on METT-TC. (For information on combined-arms
route clearance operations, refer to FM 20-32.)

8-26. CONDUCT RESERVE OPERATIONS

Reserve operations in the stability environment are similar to those in other tactical
operations in that they allow the SBCT infantry company commander to plan for a
variety of contingencies based on the higher unit’s mission. As noted throughout this
section, the reserve may play a critical role in almost any stability activity or mission,
including lodgment area establishment, convoy escort, and area security.

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a. The reserve force must be prepared at all times to execute its operations within the
time limits specified by the controlling headquarters.
b. The controlling headquarters may also tailor the size and composition of the
reserve according to the mission it is assigned. If the reserve is supporting a convoy
mission, it may consist of a company. In a mission to support established checkpoints, the
reserve force may be the dismounted infantry elements from a platoon or company,
supported by aviation assets.

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CHAPTER 9
SUPPORT OPERATIONS

US military forces conduct support operations to assist foreign and

domestic civil authorities or designated groups by providing essential
supplies and services in the face of adverse conditions, usually disease,
hunger, or the consequences of disasters. Mission success in support
operations, which are normally characterized by the lack of an active
opponent, is measured in terms of the ability to relieve suffering and to
help civil authorities respond to crises. The ultimate goals of these
operations are to meet the immediate needs of the supported groups and to
transfer responsibility quickly and efficiently to appropriate civilian
authorities. Support operations are usually nonlinear and noncontiguous.
Support operations may complement offensive, defensive, or stability
operations (before, during, and after execution). (Refer to the discussions
of SBCT infantry company operations in Chapter 4 [offense] and Chapter
5 [defense] and for a more detailed examination of support operations,
refer to FM 3-0.)

Section I. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Support operations involve Army forces providing essential supplies, capabilities, and
services to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their control. In most cases,
Army forces focus on overcoming conditions created by natural or manmade disasters.
Army forces may provide relief or assistance directly, but Army activities in support
operations most often involve setting the conditions that facilitate the provision of
required direct support to the affected population by civil authorities or NGOs.

9-1. TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The types of support operations are domestic support operations (DSOs) and foreign
humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations. They share four forms of operations, which
occur to varying degrees in both DSO and FHA operations: relief operations, support to
incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
consequence management (CBRNE-CM); support to civil law enforcement; and
community assistance. The US Army conducts DSOs in the US and its territories, using
active and reserve components. It conducts FHA operations abroad and under the
direction of a combatant commander. Domestic emergencies can require Army forces to
respond with multiple capabilities and services. For this reason, they may conduct the
four forms of support operations simultaneously during a given operation.

9-2. DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

DSOs supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments and NGOs
within the United States. During DSOs, the US military always responds in support of
another civilian agency. DSOs also include those activities and measures taken by the
Department of Defense (DOD) to foster mutual assistance and support between the DOD
and any civil government agency. These include planning or preparedness for, or in the
application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks,

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including national security emergencies or major disasters. A presidential declaration of

an emergency or disaster area usually precedes a DSO.
a. The US military provides domestic support primarily in accordance with a DOD
directive for military assistance to civil authorities. The military assistance to civil
authorities directive addresses responses to both natural and manmade disasters and
includes military assistance with civil disturbances, counterdrug activities,
counterterrorism activities, and law enforcement.
b. In accordance with the Constitution, civilian government is responsible for
preserving public order. However, the Constitution does allow the use of military forces
to protect federal and civilian property and functions. The Posse Comitatus Act restricts
the use of the military in federal status and prevents it from executing laws and
performing civilian law enforcement functions within the US.
c. DSOs focus on the condition of all types of natural and manmade properties with
the goal of helping to protect and restore these properties, as requested. Typically,
environmental operations are conducted in response to such events as forest and
grassland fires, hazardous material releases, floods, and earthquakes.

9-3. FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

US forces conduct FHA operations outside the borders of the US or its territories to
relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions,
such as human suffering, disease, or deprivation, that might present a serious threat to life
or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.
a. The US military typically supplements the host nation authorities in concert with
other governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary
organizations, and unaffiliated individuals. The majority of foreign humanitarian
assistance operations closely resemble domestic support operations. The distinction
between the two is the legal restrictions applied to US forces inside the US and its
territories. Posse Comitatus does not apply to US forces overseas.
b. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are limited in scope and duration.
They focus exclusively on prompt aid to resolve an immediate crisis. Crises or disasters
caused by hostile individuals or factions attacking their government are normally
classified as stability rather than support operations. In environments where the situation
is vague or hostile, support activities are considered a subset of a larger stability or
offensive or defensive operation.

Section II. FORMS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

During DSOs, Army forces perform relief operations and provide support to incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), support to civil law enforcement, and
community assistance. In FHA operations, Army forces most often conduct relief
operations; however, FHA may also involve support to incidents involving CBRNE-CM,
and community assistance. Army forces involved in support operations execute
overlapping activities.

9-4. RELIEF OPERATIONS

State, local, and host nation authorities are responsible for restoring essential services in
the case of a disaster. To support their efforts or those of the lead agency, the National

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Command Authority (NCA) can deploy Army forces. Army forces execute similar
actions during relief operations in DSO and FHA. Humanitarian relief focuses on the well
being of supported populations. Disaster relief focuses on recovery of critical
infrastructure after a natural or manmade disaster. Both normally occur simultaneously.

9-5. SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CBRNE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT.

Military operations assist civil authorities in protecting US territory, population, and
infrastructure prior to an attack by supporting domestic preparedness and critical asset
protection programs. If an attack occurs, military support responds to the consequences of
the attack.
a. Domestic Preparedness. The Army’s role in facilitating domestic preparedness is
to strengthen the existing expertise of civil authorities. This is done in two primary areas:
response and training. Response is the immediate reaction to an attack; training includes
what happens after the attack.
b. Protection of Critical Assets. The purpose of this program is to identify critical
assets and to assure their integrity, availability, survivability, and capability to support
vital DOD missions across the full spectrum of military operations. Critical assets include
telecommunications, electric power, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation,
water, and emergency services. An attack on any of these assets may disrupt civilian
commerce, government operations, and the military.
c. Response to CBRNE Incidents. The initial response to the use of WMD is
primarily from local assets, but sustained Army participation may be required soon
afterward. The Army’s capabilities in this environment are--
• Detection.
• Decontamination and medical care, including assessment.
• Triage treatment.
• Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).
• Hospitalization.
• Follow-up on victims of chemical and biological agents.

9-6. SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT

Support to domestic civil law enforcement involves activities related to counterterrorism,
counterdrug operations, military assistance during civil disturbances, and general support
with providing resources, training, or augmentation. Federal military forces remain under
the military chain of command while supporting civil law enforcement. The supported
law enforcement agency coordinates Army force activities in accordance with appropriate
civil laws and interagency agreements. Army national guard (ARNG) units in "state"
status can be a particularly useful military resource. They may be able to provide
assistance to civil authorities when federal units cannot meet the provisions of the Posse
Comitatus Act.

9-7. COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE

Community assistance is a broad range of activities that provide support and maintain a
strong connection between the military and civilian communities. Community assistance
activities provide effective means of projecting a positive military image, providing
training opportunities, and enhancing the relationship between the Army and the

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American public. These activities should fulfill community needs that would not
otherwise be met. Community activities can enhance individual and unit combat
readiness. Projects should exercise individual soldier skills, encourage teamwork, and
challenge leaders' planning and coordination skills. They should result in measurable
accomplishments and increase soldier proficiency. Commanders of forward-deployed
Army units may also apply those concepts when fostering or establishing relationships
with host nation communities.
a. Community assistance at the national level enhances a cooperative relationship
between the military and American people. National efforts take advantage of the
technical, vocational, and group skills of military professionals. They supplement
programs available from the civil sector and other government agencies. The Army’s
involvement in a variety of assistance programs focuses on economic and social issues
that have long-term national security implications. They provide opportunities for the
Army to contribute to the growth and welfare of the nation, thus improving the nation's
perception of the military. Army and DOD regulations provide guidance on national-level
programs.
b. The Army has extensive national-level responsibilities related to public works
maintenance and management. The Department of Army exercises its federal engineering
executive responsibilities through the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The
USACE manages much of the nation’s public works infrastructure. Executed principally,
but not solely, through the civil works directorate, this military organization integrates
complex federal, state, and local regulations and policies governing the national
infrastructure. These include the national waterways, environmental remediation and
recovery operations, real estate, disaster recovery operations, and general project
management functions.
c. State and local efforts also improve the community's perception of the Army.
Community assistance varies widely ranging from individual soldier involvement to full
installation participation. An installation or organization can enter into an agreement with
the local community to provide critical services not available in the community, to
augment community services unable to meet demand, or to ensure that emergency
services are available in the shortest possible time.
d. Army participation in public events, memorials, and exhibits facilitates interaction
between soldiers and the local community. This contact communicates the
professionalism, readiness, and standards of the Army. Individual soldiers serve as
representatives and role models to the civilian community, promote and inspire
patriotism, and generate interest in the Army. This increased public awareness enhances
the Army’s reputation and secures the confidence of the American people.
e. Laws, regulations, and policies limit Army participation in community assistance
activities. Commanders consider the objective and purpose of community assistance and
the limitations under which Army participation in community assistance activities is
authorized. Commanders ensure that their initiatives do not compete with local resources
or services and do not result in remuneration in any form. Commanders also avoid
providing assistance and support to one segment of a community when they cannot also
provide the same assistance to others. Actions that appear to benefit a particular group
can foster perceptions of bias or partisanship. Ideally, support should be provided only to
events and activities of common interest and benefit across the community.

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Section III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Although each support operation is different, troop-leading procedures used in offensive,
defensive, and stability operations still apply. The following considerations supplement
those processes and can help commanders develop tailored concepts and schemes for
support operations.

9-8. PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO THE LARGEST NUMBER OF

PEOPLE
The principle of essential support to the largest number guides prioritization and
allocation. Commanders allocate finite resources to achieve the greatest good.
a. Initial efforts usually focus on restoring vital services, which include food and
water distribution, medical aid, power generation, search and rescue, firefighting, and
community relations. It may be necessary to complete a lower-priority task before
accomplishing a higher one. For example, Army forces may have to restore limited
electrical services before restoring hospital emergency rooms and shelter operations.
b. Commanders assess requirements to employ Army forces effectively. They
determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit the most people. In some
cases, warfighting reconnaissance capabilities and techniques are adaptable to support
operation requirements. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles can survey relief routes
and locate civilian refugee groups. Standard information collection methods are
reinforced and supplemented by civil affairs or dedicated disaster assessment teams as
well as interagency, host nation, and NGO sources. The combination of traditional and
nontraditional information support allows commanders to obtain a clear understanding of
the situation and adjust plans accordingly.

9-9. COORDINATE ACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

DSOs and FHA operations are typically joint and interagency; FHA operations are also
multinational. The potential for duplication of effort and working at cross-purposes is
high. Unity of effort requires, as a minimum, common understanding of purposes and
direction among all agencies. Ensuring unity of effort and efficient use of resources
requires constant coordination. Army forces enhance unity of effort by establishing a
civil military operations center (CMOC) in FHA operations and by providing liaison
elements, planning support, advisors, and technical experts to lead civil authority in
DSOs. Commanders determine where their objectives and plans complement or conflict
with those of other key agencies through these contacts

9-10. ESTABLISH MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

In conjunction with supported agencies and governments, commanders establish relevant
measures of effectiveness (MOEs), similar to the tactical METT-TC factors considered
during mission analysis, to gauge mission accomplishment. MOEs focus on the condition
and activity of those being supported. Because they are discrete and measurable and they
link cause and effect, they are helpful in measuring the progress and success of the
operation. In famine relief, for example, it may be tempting to measure effectiveness only
by the gross amount of food delivered. This may be an acceptable MOE, but a better
MOE may be the total nourishment delivered, as measured by the total number of
calories delivered per person per day or the rate of decline of deaths directly attributable

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to starvation. MOEs are situation-dependent and require readjustment as situations and

guidance change.

9-11. HAND OVER TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES AS SOON AS FEASIBLE

The timing and feasibility of the handover from military to civilian authorities depends
on mission-specific considerations. The two most important considerations are the ability
of civil authorities to resume operations without Army assistance and the necessity of
committing Army forces to competing operations. Commanders identify and include civil
considerations as early as possible in the planning process. Commanders must continually
consider the long-term goals of the civil leadership and the communities they assist.
While the immediate goal of support operations is to relieve hardship and suffering, the
ultimate goal is to create those conditions necessary for civil follow-on operations. The
successful handover of all activities to civil authorities and withdrawal of Army forces is
a positive signal to the supported population and the Army. It indicates that the
community has recovered enough for civil agencies to resume control, that life is
beginning to return to normal, and that the Army has successfully completed its support
mission.

Section IV. PHASES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Although each operation is unique, support operations are generally conducted in three
broad phases: response, recovery, and restoration. Army elements can expect to be most
heavily committed during the response phase. They are progressively less involved
during the recovery phase, with only very limited activity, if any, during the restoration
phase.

9-12. RESPONSE PHASE

In the response phase, commanders focus on the life-sustaining functions that are
required by those in the disaster area. The following functions dominate these response
operations:
• Search and rescue.
• Emergency flood control.
• Hazard identification.
• Food distribution.
• Water production, purification, and distribution.
• Temporary shelter construction and administration.
• Transportation support.
• Fire fighting.
• Medical support.
• Power generation.
• Communications support.

9-13. RECOVERY PHASE

Recovery phase operations begin the process of returning the community infrastructure
and related services to a status that meets the immediate needs of the population. Typical
recovery operations include the following:

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 FM 3-21.11

• Continuation of response operations as needed.

• Damage assessment.
• Power distribution.
• Water and sanitation services.
• Debris removal.

9-14. RESTORATION PHASE

Restoration is a long-term process that returns the community to pre-disaster normality.
Restoration activities do not generally involve large numbers of military forces. When
they are involved, Army elements generally work with affected communities in the
transfer of responsibility to other agencies as military support forces redeploy.

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 FM 3-21.11

CHAPTER 10
COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS
For a unit to achieve its full combat potential, the commander must
effectively integrate all available combat support assets. This chapter
focuses on the CS elements with which the SBCT infantry company is most
likely to work: fire support, engineers, air defense, NBC, intelligence, and
Army aviation in its CS role. Other CS elements include signal and
military police, but the SBCT infantry company is very rarely task
organized with those types of units.

Section I. COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

The SBCT infantry company commander must understand the command or support
relationships established between his company and supporting units.

10-1. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Command responsibility and authority are established routinely through the following
standard relationships:
a. Organic. This is a unit that forms an essential part of an Army organization and is
listed in its table of organization and equipment (TO&E) or table of distribution and
allowances (TDA).
b. Assigned. This is a unit that is placed in an organization on a permanent basis and
is controlled and administered by the organization to which it is assigned.
c. Attached. In this relationship, a unit is assigned temporarily to a command other
than its parent unit. The attached unit is under the command of the commander of the unit
to which it is attached.
(1) The commanding officer exercises the same degree of C2 as with his organic
units.
(2) C2 is subject to limitations specified by the commander directing the attachment.
This relationship includes the responsibility for logistics, training, operations, and
uniform code of military justice; however, the parent unit retains responsibility for
transfer and promotion.
(3) Having a unit attached imposes an administrative and logistical burden on the unit
to which the attachment is made.
d. Operational Control. This relationship places a unit under the control of a
commander for specific operations. The relationship is limited by function, time, or
location. OPCON does not imply responsibility for administration, logistics, discipline,
internal organization, or training. The commander's relationship with OPCON units is
otherwise the same as with organic or attached subordinate units.

10-2. SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

Support is the action of an element or unit that aids, protects, complements, or sustains
another unit IAW an order requiring such support. A supporting unit assists another unit
but is not under the command of that unit. The commander's relationship with supporting
units is as follows:

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FM 3-21.11

• He ensures that the supporting unit establishes liaison and communications

with his unit.
• He keeps the supporting unit informed of the situation and the support needed.
• The leader of the supporting unit advises him on its employment
considerations.
• A supporting unit honors his request for support as an order. In case of a
conflict, the supporting unit leader refers the matter to his parent unit
commander. The request or order in question is honored, however, until the
conflict is resolved.
a. Direct Support. A unit in DS supports another specific unit but remains under the
command of its parent unit commander. The supporting unit answers directly to the
supported unit's requests. The company commander may not reallocate, reassign, or task-
organize the DS force supporting him.
b. General Suppor.. Units in general support (GS) to the battalion are under control
of their parent unit commander. They support the battalion as a whole, not any specific
company. Company commanders may request support from the GS unit through the
battalion.
c. Reinforcing. Reinforcing is a tactical artillery mission in which an artillery unit
augments the fire of another artillery unit. Coordination for support is normally provided
through the DS artillery unit.
d. General Support Reinforcing. General support-reinforcing (GS-R) artillery is a
tactical artillery mission where an artillery unit has the mission of supporting the force as
a whole and of providing reinforcing fires for another artillery unit. Coordination for
support is the responsibility of the DS artillery unit.

Section II. FIRES SUPPORT

Fires and effects are the collective and coordinated use of indirect fire weapons and
armed aircraft in support of the battle plan. Fires and effects assets include mortars, field
artillery cannons and rockets, and CAS. Fires and effects can be lethal or nonlethal. The
integration of fire support assets is critical to the success of the company. The SBCT
infantry battalion FSO plans fire (in coordination with the plans developed by the SBCT
infantry battalion S3) to support the SBCT infantry battalion commander's concept of the
operation. The SBCT infantry company FSO plans company fire support, and the SBCT
infantry company commander approves his plan. Fires support planning is the process of
analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fires and effects assets.

10-3. INDIRECT FIRE CAPABILITIES

The effects of indirect fires on an enemy force are much greater than the effects of the
SBCT infantry company's organic weapons. Artillery provides the most destructive,
accurate, and flexible combat multiplier the SBCT infantry company commander has.
Table 10-1 lists the capabilities of the indirect fire systems that may support an SBCT
infantry company.

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 FM 3-21.11

81-mm
(im-
CALIBER: 60-mm 81-mm proved) 120-mm 105-mm 155 -mm 155-mm
MODEL: M224 M29A1 M252 M285 M119 M198 M109A6
MAX RANGE 3,490 4,595 5,608 7,200 14,000 18,100 18,100
(HE)(m):
PLANNING 11,500 14,600 14,600
RANGE (m):
PROJECTILE: HE, HE, HE, HE, HE M760 HE, WP, HE, WP,
WP, WP, WP, SMK, ILLUM, ILLUM, ILLUM,
ILLUM, ILLUM, ILLUM, ILLUM, HEP-T, SMK, SMK,
RP APICM, CHEM, CHEM,
CHEM, NUC, NUC,
RAP RAP, RAP,
FASCAM, FASCAM,
CPHD, CPHD,
AP/ AP/
DPICM DPICM
MAX RATE 30 RPM 30 30 RPM 15 RPM 6 RPM 4 RPM 4 RPM
OF FIRE: FOR RPM FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR
1 MIN FOR 2 MIN 3 MIN 1 MIN 1 MIN 1 MIN
1 MIN
SUSTAINED 20 8 15 5 3 2 2
RATE OF
FIRE (rd/min):
MINIMUM 70 70 83 180 DIRECT DIRECT DIRECT
RANGE (m): FIRE FIRE FIRE
FUZES: MO PD, PD, VT, MO PD, VT, PD, VT, PD, VT,
VT, TIME, MTSQ, CP, MT, CP, MT,
TIME, DLY CP, MT, MTSQ, MTSQ,
DLY DLY DLY DLY
LEGEND:
AP - Armor Piercing MO - Multioption - VT, PD, DLY
APICM - Antipersonnel Improved MT - Mechanical Time
Conventional Munitions MTSQ - Mechanical Time Super Quick
CHEM - Chemical NUC - Nuclear
CP - Concrete Piercing PD - Point Detonating
CPHD - Copperhead RAP - Rocket Assisted Projectile
DLY - Delay RD - Round
DPICM - Dual Purpose Improved RP - Red Phosphorus
Conventional Munitions RPM - Rounds per Minute
FASCAM - Family of Scatterable Mines SMK - Smoke
HE - High Explosive TIME - Adjustable Time Delay
HEP-T - High Explosive Plastic Tracer VT - Variable Time
ILLUM - Illumination WP - White Phosphorus
MIN - Minute

Table 10-1. Indirect fire capabilities.

a. Field artillery (FA) can fire a variety of ammunition, including high explosive,
illumination, and white phosphorous ammunitions. The 155-mm units also can fire dual-

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purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs) and scatterable mines (FASCAM).

The DPICM is a lethal antipersonnel and antiarmor munition containing bomblets that are
dispersed over a wide area because they are ejected high above the target during the flight
of the projectile. The bomblets can penetrate up to 4.5 inches of armor. FASCAM rounds
contain a number of mines with self-destruct features, which are set to detonate at
specific times (Table 10-2). The rounds may contain either antipersonnel or antiarmor
mines that arm shortly after impact. Companies do not normally plan or employ
FASCAM, but the company commander should be familiar with these weapons. (For
more information, see FM 3-21.21 [7-22].)

TYPE OF MINE ARMING TIME SELF-DESTRUCT TIMES

Adam (AP) 2 minutes 4 hours or 48 hours
RAAM (AT) 45 seconds 4 hours or 48 hours
GEMSS 45 minutes 5 days or 15 days
MOPMS 2 minutes 4 hours
Gator/Volcano 2 minutes 48 hours or 15 days
Table 10-2. FASCAM arming and self-destruct times.

b. Mortars and artillery fire can be combined to cover targets. For example, mortars
can fire illumination while artillery fires high explosives or DPICMs. The SBCT infantry
company commander must ensure his company employs each system (mortars, artillery,
and direct fire) when and where it has the greatest effect on the enemy.

10-4. FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION

SBCT elements conduct fires and effects planning concurrently with maneuver planning
at all levels. SBCT infantry battalions typically use top-down fire support planning, with
bottom-up refinement of the plans. The commander develops guidance for fires and
effects in terms of tasks, purposes, and effects. In turn, the fire support planner
determines the method to be used in accomplishing each task. Individual units then
incorporate assigned tasks into their fire support plans. In addition, units tasked to initiate
fires must refine and rehearse their assigned tasks. The company commander refines his
unit's assigned portion of the battalion fire support plan, ensuring that the designated
targets will achieve the intended purpose. He also conducts rehearsals to prepare for the
mission and, as specified in the plan, directs the company to execute its assigned targets.
a. Terms and Definitions.
(1) Fire Support Planning. Fire support planning is the continual process of
analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fire support. The goal of fire support planning is to
effectively integrate fire support into battle plans to optimize combat power. It is
performed as part of the MDMP.
(2) Fire Support Coordination. Fire support coordination is the continual process of
implementing fire support planning and managing the fire support assets that are
available to a maneuver force.
(3) Fire Planning. Fire planning is the continual process of selecting targets on
which fires are prearranged to support a phase of the commander's plan.

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(4) Essential Fire Support Task. An EFST is a task that a fire support element must
accomplish in order to support a combined-arms operation. Failure to achieve an EFST
may require the commander to alter his tactical or operational plan. A fully developed
EFST has a task, purpose, method, and effects (TPME). The task describes what targeting
objective (for example, delay, disrupt, limit, or destroy) fires must achieve on an enemy
formation's function or capability. The purpose describes why the task contributes to
maneuver. The method describes how the task will be accomplished by assigning
responsibility to observers or units and delivery assets and providing amplifying
information or restrictions. Typically, the method is described by covering three
categories: priority, allocation, and restrictions. Effects quantify successful
accomplishment of the task.
(5) Concept of Fires. The concept of fires is the logical sequence of EFSTs,
integrated with the scheme of maneuver, that will accomplish the mission and achieve the
commander's intent. It allocates in broad terms the fire support assets needed to achieve
the EFSTs. The concept of fires is the basis of the fires paragraph in the OPORD.
(6) Scheme of Fires. The scheme of fires is the detailed, logical sequence of targets
and fire support events the fire support element uses to find and attack high-payoff targets
(HPTs). It details how to execute the fire support plan in accordance with the time and
space of the battlefield to accomplish the commander's EFSTs. The products of the fire
support annex--fire support execution matrix (FSEM), target list/overlay, and or a target
synchronization matrix (TSM)--articulate the scheme of fires.
b. Linking Tasks and Maneuver Purpose. A clearly defined maneuver purpose
enables the maneuver commander to articulate precisely how he wants fires and effects to
affect the enemy during different phases of the battle. This, in turn, allows fires and
effects planners to develop a fires and effects plan that effectively supports the intended
purpose. The planners can determine each required task (in terms of effects on target), the
best method for accomplishing each task (in terms of a fires and effects asset and its fire
capabilities), and a means of quantifying accomplishment. A carefully developed method
of fire is equally valuable during execution of the fires and effects mission; it assists not
only the firing elements but also the observers who are responsible for monitoring the
effects of the indirect fires. With a clear understanding of the intended target effects, fires
and effects assets and observers can work together effectively, planning and adjusting the
fires as necessary to achieve the desired effects on the enemy. The following paragraphs
describe several types of targeting objectives associated with fires and effects tasks and
provide examples of how the SBCT infantry company commander might link a target
task to a specific maneuver purpose in his order.
(1) Delay. The friendly force uses indirect fires to cause a particular function or
action to occur later than the enemy desires. For example, the commander might direct
delaying fires this way: "Delay the repositioning of the enemy’s reserve, allowing B
Company to consolidate on OBJECTIVE BOB."
(2) Disrupt. Disrupting fires are employed to break apart the enemy’s formation; to
interrupt or delay his tempo and operational timetable; to cause premature commitment of
his forces; or to otherwise force him to stage his attack piecemeal. An example of the
commander’s direction might be: "Disrupt the easternmost lead motorized battalion to
prevent the enemy from massing two battalions against Alpha and Charlie."

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FM 3-21.11

(3) Limit. Indirect fires are used to prevent an action or function from being executed
where the enemy wants it to occur. An example of the commander’s direction might be:
"Limit the ability of the enemy’s advance guard to establish a firing line on the ridge line
to the flank of the battalion axis of advance to prevent the enemy from fixing the
battalion main body."
(4) Destroy. The friendly force uses indirect fires to render an enemy formation
ineffective. For example, the commander might direct destroying fires this way: “Destroy
enemy platoon on OBJ HARRY in order to allow the main effort to assault OBJ TOM.”
(5) Divert. Diverting fires are employed to cause the enemy to modify his course or
route of attack. An example of the commander’s direction might be: "Divert the enemy’s
combined arms reserve counterattack to EA DOG to facilitate its destruction by Delta."
(6) Screen. Screening fires entail the use of smoke to mask friendly installations,
positions, or maneuver. They normally are conducted for a specified event or a specified
period of time. An example of the commander’s direction might be: "Screen the
movement of the counterattack force (B Company) along ROUTE RED to attack by fire
(ABF) position 21 to prevent the remnants of the enemy battalion from engaging the
company."
(7) Obscure. Smoke is placed between enemy forces and friendly forces or directly
on enemy positions to confuse and disorient the enemy’s direct fire gunners and artillery
FOs. Obscuration fires are normally conducted for a specified event or a specified period
of time. An example of the commander’s direction might be: "Obscure the northernmost
company to protect our breach force until the breach site is secured."

NOTE: The supported commander also may designate purposes for special munitions
such as area denial artillery munition (ADAM)/remote antiarmor munition
(RAAM), Copperhead, or illumination rounds.

c. Final Protective Fire Planning. FPF planning is designed to create a final

barrier, or "steel curtain”, to prevent a dismounted enemy from moving across defensive
lines. These are fires of last resort and as such they take priority over all other fires, to
include priority targets. The employment of FPFs presents several potential problems.
They are linear fires, with coverage dependent on the firing sheaf of the fires and effects
asset(s). In addition, while an FPF may create a barrier against penetration by enemy
infantry, armored vehicles may simply button up and move through the fires into the
friendly defensive position. FPFs are planned targets and thus must have a clearly defined
purpose. FPF planning normally is delegated to the SBCT infantry company that is
allocated the support.
d. Target Refinement. The SBCT infantry company commander is responsible for
the employment of indirect fires in his zone or sector. The most critical aspect of this
responsibility is target refinement, in which he makes necessary changes to the fires and
effects plan to ensure that targets accomplish the SBCT infantry battalion or SBCT
commander’s intended battlefield purpose. Rather than merely executing targets without
regard to the actual enemy situation, the company commander and FSO must be ready to
adjust existing targets or to nominate new targets that allow engagement of specific
enemy forces.

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 FM 3-21.11

(1) Necessary refinements usually emerge when the SBCT infantry company
commander conducts war gaming as part of step 6 (complete the plan) of troop-leading
procedures. The war gaming process allows him to identify required additions, deletions,
and adjustments to the SBCT infantry battalion fires support plan. The company FSO
then submits the refinements to the battalion FSE for inclusion in the scheme of fires for
the operation. (This normally is only the first step of target refinement, with the
commander and FSO making further adjustments as the enemy situation becomes
clearer.)
(2) As a specific requirement in defensive planning, the company commander must
focus on target refinement for the ground he will "own" during the operation. This
usually takes place as part of engagement area development. The commander makes
appropriate adjustments to the targets based on refinements to the SITEMP, such as the
actual positions of obstacles and enemy direct fire systems.
(3) Because fires and effects are planned from the top down, cutoff times for target
nomination and target refinement normally are specified in the battalion OPORD.
Commanders must ensure that nominations and refinements meet these deadlines to
provide fire support planners with sufficient time to develop execution plans.
e. Fires Support Preparation. As noted, although the SBCT infantry battalion and
SBCT commanders establish target tasks and purposes and allocate appropriate fires and
effects assets, the SBCT infantry company commander is the one who must ensure
execution of assigned targets. In turn, successful execution demands thorough
preparation, focusing on areas covered in the following paragraphs.
(1) Observation Plan. In developing the observation plan, the commander must
ensure that both primary and alternate observers cover all targets. The plan must provide
clear, precise guidance for the observers. Perhaps the most important aspect of the plan is
positioning: observers’ positions must allow them to see the trigger for initiating fires as
well as the target area and the enemy force on which the target is oriented. The
commander must also consider other aspects of observer capabilities, including available
equipment. For example, the ground/vehicle laser locator designator (G/VLLD) provides
first round fire-for-effect capability; without it, observers may have to use adjust-fire
techniques that take longer and are more difficult to implement. The observation plan
also must include contingency plans that cover limited visibility conditions and backup
communications.

NOTE: In addition to providing the specific guidance outlined in the observation plan,
the commander must ensure that each observer understands the target task and
purpose for which he is responsible. For example, observers must understand
that once the first round impacts, the original target location is of no
consequence; rather, they must orient on the targeted enemy force to ensure
that fires achieve the intended battlefield purpose.

(2) Rehearsals. The SBCT infantry company commander is responsible for involving
his FSO in company- and battalion-level rehearsals, for making the company available
for any separate fires and effects rehearsals, and for rehearsing the company’s FOs in the
execution of targets. He also should use rehearsals to ensure that the company’s primary
and backup communications systems will adequately support the plan.

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FM 3-21.11

(3) Target Adjustment. In the defense, the commander should confirm target location
by adjusting fires as part of engagement area development.
(4) Trigger Planning. The company commander develops a trigger for each target.
The trigger can be a point on the ground (such as an easily recognizable terrain feature),
an emplaced marker, or a designated linear control measure. In the defense, triggers
should be marked physically on the ground or their location specifically selected and
identified during the development of the engagement area.

NOTE: Triggers can be marked using techniques similar to those for marking TRPs.

(a) The trigger line or point must be tied to clearly understood engagement criteria
associated with the targeted enemy force. As an example, the company commander might
use the following order to begin indirect fires: "Initiate target AE0001 when
approximately 30 APCs and 10 tanks cross TRIGGER LINE ORANGE."
(b) Several factors govern the positioning of the trigger. Especially critical factors are
the enemy’s rate of travel and the resulting time required for the enemy force to move
from the trigger to the target area. Using this information, the commander can then select
the trigger location based on the following considerations:
• The amount of time required to initiate the call for fire.
• The time needed by the fires and effects element to prepare for and fire the
mission.
• The time required to clear the fires.
• Any built-in or planned delays in the firing sequence.
• The time of flight of the indirect fire rounds.
• Possible adjustment times.
The SBCT infantry company commander can use the information in Tables 10-3 and 10-
4 as he completes the process of determining the location of the trigger in relation to the
target area. Table 10-3 lists the time required for the enemy force to move a specified
distance at a specified rate of march. Table 10-4 lists the response time required by field
artillery assets to prepare for and fire various types of support missions.

DISTANCE TRAVELED
RATE OF
1 km 2 km 3 km 4 km 5 km 6 km 7 km 8 km 9 km 10 km
MARCH
60 km/hr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
50 km/hr 1.2 2.4 3.6 4.8 6 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12
40 km/hr 1.5 3 4.5 6 7.5 9 10.5 12 13.5 15
30 km/hr 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
25 km/hr 2.4 4.8 7.2 9.6 12 14.4 16.8 19.2 21.6 24
20 km/hr 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
15 km/hr 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
10 km/hr 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
5 km/hr 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120
Table 10-3. Time (in minutes) required to travel a specified distance.

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 FM 3-21.11

GRID OR POLAR MISSION (UNPLANNED) 5-7 minutes

PREPLANNED MISSION 3 minutes
PREPLANNED PRIORITY MISSION 1-2 minutes
NOTE: These are approximate times (based on ARTEP
standards) needed to process and execute calls for fire on
normal artillery targets. Special missions may take longer.
Table 10-4. Artillery response times.

(5) Lifting and Shifting Fires. As in trigger planning for the initiation of fires, the
commander must establish triggers for lifting and shifting fires based on battlefield events
such as the movement of enemy or friendly forces. One technique is the use of a
minimum safe line (MSL) when a friendly element, such as a breach force, is moving
toward an area of indirect fires. As the element approaches the MSL, observers call for
fires to be lifted or shifted, allowing the friendly force to move safely in the danger area.
(6) Clearance of Fire. The maneuver commander has the final authority to approve
(clear) fires and their effects within his zone or sector. Although he may delegate
authority to coordinate and clear fires to his FSO, the ultimate responsibility belongs to
the SBCT infantry company commander. Normally, the FSO assists the commander by
making recommendations on the clearance of fires.
(7) Fires Support Execution Matrix. As a tool in fires support planning and
execution, the company commander may develop a graphic summary outlining the
critical elements of the fires and effects plan and the company’s role in it. The
commander can incorporate this information into his own execution matrix or into a
separate fires and effects execution matrix, similar to the battalion’s fire support
execution matrix as illustrated in Table 10-5, page 10-10. The company fire support
execution matrix is similar and should include, as a minimum, the following information
for each target:
• Target number and type, to include FPF designation.
• Allocated fires and effects asset and munition type.
• Observer and backup observer.
• Trigger.
• Target purpose.
• Target grid.
• Priority of fire.
• Priority targets.
• Fire support coordination measures (FSCMs).

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EVENT EVENT I EVENT II EVENT III EVENT IV

SUPPORT (Set conditions for (B Company (C Company
DATA (LD to SBF 01) breach from SBF 01) breach) assault)
TARGET/ AE0001 (PK AE0002 (PK O/O shift O/O lift AE0003.
GRID 10184938). 09005031). AE0001 to
AE0003 (PK
10204810) and
lift AE0002.
ASSET 155-mm HE. Mortar smoke. 155-mm. 155-mm.
OBSERVER/ Recon platoon FSO (primary)/ 1st AE0003: FSO FSO (primary)/ 3d
BACKUP will initially call platoon leader (primary)/ 2d platoon leader
for and adjust (backup). platoon leader (backup).
fires; FSO (backup).
adjusts upon
arrival at SBF;
1st platoon
leader is backup.
TRIGGER C Company On-call at SBF. B Company C Company
crosses PL crosses PL completes
LYNX. LION. consolidation on
OBJ BOB.
PURPOSE Disrupt enemy on Obscure enemy to Disrupt MRB Protect the assault
OBJ BOB to prevent interference reserve to force (C
facilitate with B Company’s protect the Company).
maneuver of A breach. assault force (C
Company to SBF Company).
position.
Table 10-5. Example battalion fire support execution matrix.

10-5. MANEUVER COMMANDER'S INTENT

The SBCT infantry company commander ensures the FSO clearly understands the intent
for maneuver and fires and effects. He identifies the role of fires and effects in the
scheme of maneuver (when, where, what, and why) by explaining in detail the concept of
the operation, scheme of maneuver, and tasks for fires and effects to the FSO.
a. Providing this level of guidance is not easy. Artillery fires are not instantaneous,
and planning must allow for this lag time. It takes several minutes to process targets of
opportunity and deliver fires in the target area. While war-gaming the maneuver, the
company commander refines the critical targets or EAs, priority of targets, priority of
engagement, sequence of fires, and results desired. He then can see when and how to
synchronize direct and indirect fires to destroy the enemy and protect the force.
b. The company commander normally designates the company's main effort to have
priority of fires. This prioritizes requests when two or more units want fires at the same
time. It should be noted that an element can still request fires even if it has not been
allocated priority of fires. He also designates where to place obscuration or illumination,
suppressive fires, and preparation fires.

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 FM 3-21.11

10-6. PLANNING PROCESS

While the SBCT infantry company commander develops and refines the tactical plan, the
FSO concurrently develops and refines the fire support portion of that plan. The FSO
does not wait for the commander to complete the scheme of maneuver; he builds the fire
plan using deliberate or quick fires and effects planning, depending on the time available.
In either case, targets must be placed in the fire support planning channels as soon as
possible so they can be processed at the battalion FSE or battery FDC (Figure 10-1).
Regardless of which planning method is used, the company fire support plan must
include:
• Target number and location.
• A description of the expected target.
• Primary and alternate persons responsible for shooting each target.
• The effect required (destroy, suppress, neutralize) and purpose.
• Radio frequency and call sign to use in requesting fires.
• When to engage the target.
• Priority of fires and shifting of priority.
• Size, location, code word, and emergency signal to begin FPF.
Other information may be included as necessary or appropriate.

Figure 10-1. The fire planning process

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FM 3-21.11

a. The company FSO does most of the company fire support planning; however, he
may receive targets and target information from platoon leaders and the battalion FSO.
The company commander and FSO should not plan too many targets.
(1) The number of targets planned by the company and included in the formal fires
and effects plan depends upon the company's priority for fire support and the number of
targets allocated to them. The total number of targets in the fire support plan or the
battalion mortar plan may be constrained. An excessive number of targets tends to dilute
the focus of fire planning and can lead to increases in response time.
(2) Informal planning continues with target locations being recorded on terrain
sketches or the FSO's map or being stored in the buffer group of the advanced field
artillery tactical data system (AFATDS) for quick reference and transmission. Fire
planning for the company mortars should complement these plans; the primary constraint
normally is ammunition availability and the rapid resupply ability. Care must be taken to
ensure that planning focuses on the critical fires and effects requirements identified by
the company commander.
b. The company FSO completes the indirect fire plan and briefs the company
commander. The company commander may alter the plan or approve it as is, but he
makes the final decision. After the company commander approves the plan, the FSO
makes sure the targets are passed to the battalion FSE where the fire plans are integrated
into the battalion scheme of maneuver.
c. The FSO ensures platoon leaders are thoroughly familiar with the indirect fire
plan. He also provides target overlays to the platoon leaders, forward observers, and the
commander. He also may disseminate the company fire support plan as a target list and a
fires and effects execution matrix. The FSO does this in sufficient time to allow
subordinates to brief their platoons and sections. (A good plan given with the company
order is better than a perfect plan handed out at the line of departure.)
(1) The Fires Paragraph. As a subparagraph to the concept of operations, the fires
paragraph describes the concept of fires that, along with the scheme of maneuver,
communicates how the force as a whole will achieve the commander’s intent. It must
clearly describe the logical sequence of EFSTs and how they contribute to the concept of
operations. The overall paragraph organization should mirror that of the scheme of
maneuver paragraph. If the maneuver paragraph is phased or otherwise organized, the
fires paragraph will take on the same organization.
(2) Task, Purpose, Method, and Effects. The internal format for the fires paragraph
uses the four subcategories of TPME. Within each phase of an operation, each EFST will
be described in the sequence of planned execution using TPME. The fires paragraph must
be concise but specific enough to clearly state what fires are to accomplish in the
operation. The information required in each subcategory is outlined below.
(a) Task. Task describes the targeting objective fires must achieve against a specific
enemy formation's function or capability. These formations are HPTs or contain one or
more HPT. Task is normally expressed in terms of objective, formation, and function.

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• Objective. Clearly describes the targeting objectives that must be achieved.

Use terms such as destroy, disrupt, delay, limit or any other terms that
describe the effects required.
• Formation. A specific element or subelement of the enemy. This can specify a
specific vehicle type or target category as long as the element or subelement is
clear.
• Function. A capability of the formation that is needed for it (the enemy
formation) to achieve its primary task and purpose.
(b) Purpose. Purpose describes the maneuver or operational reason for the task. This
should identify as specifically as possible the friendly maneuver formation that will
benefit from the targeting objective and describe in space and time what the objective
will accomplish.

EXAMPLE

TASK AND PURPOSE

Objective Formation Function

Disrupt the ability of the motorized infantry to place effective direct fire
platoon at point of against the breach force...
penetration
…to allow an SBCT infantry rifle company to breach the obstacle without
becoming decisively engaged by the motorized infantry platoon at the point of
penetration

(c) Method. Method describes how the task and purpose will be achieved. It ties the
“detect” function to the “deliver” function in time and space and describes how to
accomplish the task. Method normally is described in terms of priority, allocation, and
restriction.
• Priority. For detection assets, it assigns priorities for finding NAIs, targeted
areas of interest (TAIs), EAs, and or HPTs. For deliver assets, it assigns the
priority of the HPT that system primarily will be used against.
• Allocation. For both detection and deliver assets, it describes the allocation of
assets to accomplish the EFST.
• Restriction. Describes constraints--either requirements to do something or
prohibition on action. Considerations include ammunition restrictions and
FSCMs.
The method subparagraph includes the following information:
• Priority of fires (POFs).
• Observers (primary/alternate).
• Triggers.
• Target allocation.
• Priority targets.

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• CAS allocations.
• FPFs.
• Restrictions.
• Special munitions.
• Intelligence and electronic warfare assets.
• Any other instructions.

EXAMPLE
METHOD
FA POF to 1st platoon, mortar POF to 2d platoon. Primary observer for
AB1000 (motorized infantry platoon at point of penetration) is 1st platoon
from OP 1, NFA 1. Alternate observer is company FIST, NFA 3…no
DPICM within 300 meters NP177368….airspace coordination area
(ACA) Lion in effect when CAS at initial point….

(d) Effects. Effects attempt to quantify the successful accomplishment of the task.
They provide a guide to determine when the task is completed. One measure is to
determine if the purpose has been met. If multiple delivery assets are involved, it helps
clarify what each must accomplish. Effects determination also provides the basis for the
assess function of targeting and contributes to the decision of whether to re-attack the
target.

EXAMPLE

EFFECTS
No hostile fire on the breach force from enemy motorized infantry
platoon until at least the assault force has passed through.
25 percent of vehicles and 50 percent of enemy motorized infantry
platoon destroyed.

NOTE: At battalion and below, a formal written OPORD may not be produced. A fire
support plan at this level may be an operations overlay with written
instructions, an FSEM, and a target list/overlay.

d. Battalion fire support plans may be distributed in matrix format. The fire support
execution matrix is a concise, effective tool showing the many factors of a detailed plan.
It may aid the company FSO and the commander in understanding how the indirect fire
plan supports the scheme of maneuver. It explains what aspects of the fires and effects
plan each element is responsible for, and at what time during the battle these aspects
apply. (For more information on the battalion fire support matrix, see FM 3-21.21 [7-
22].)
(1) The advantage of the matrix is that it reduces the plan to one page and simplifies
it. The company fire support execution matrix (Figure 10-2) also directs execution

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responsibilities and reduces the possibility that planned fires will not be executed.
Dissemination of the fire plan is the responsibility of the company commander. The
commander and his key subordinate leaders must understand the categories of targets and
how to engage those targets to create the desired result.
(2) Figure 10-2, page 10-16, is an example of a completed fire support execution
matrix for a company deliberate attack. In the AA, a field artillery FPF is allocated for 1st
and 2d platoons; 3d platoon has been allocated a mortar FPF; 2d platoon has priority of
mortar fires from the LD to Checkpoint 7. From Checkpoint 7 to Objective Green, 3d
platoon has been allocated a mortar priority target and has designated it as CA3017; 2d
platoon is backup for execution. 1st platoon has been allocated a mortar FPF; 2d and 3d
platoons have been allocated field artillery FPFs. At company level, information in each
box of the matrix includes the following:
(a) Priorities of indirect fire support to a platoon appear in the upper left corner of the
appropriate box (FA).
(b) If a unit is allocated an FPF, the type of indirect fire means responsible for firing
appears next to the indicator (FA FPF or MTR FPF).
(c) The target number of priority targets allocated to a platoon appear in the box
preceded by the target, followed by the target number (MORT PRI TGT CA3014).
(d) If the company FSO is responsible for initiating specific fires, the target number,
group, or series designation is listed in the box for the FSO (CA3012). Specific
guidelines concerning fires not included on the target list are included in that box.
(e) Alternate element responsible for the execution of specific fires is listed in the
lower right hand corner of the box (2d platoon). If fires have not been initiated when they
were supposed to have been, that unit initiates them (unless ordered not to).
(f) Each fire support measure to be placed in effect, followed by a word designated
for the measure, is shown in the box (CFL CHUCK). For airspace coordination areas, the
time for the arrival of the planned CAS or attack helicopters is listed (ACA 1400Z).
(g) Other factors that apply to a certain platoon during a specific time may be
included in the appropriate box. General guidance is issued in the written portion of the
operation order.

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FM 3-21.11

Figure 10-2. Example SBCT infantry company fire support execution matrix.

10-7. TARGETS
A target can be personnel, vehicles, materiel, or terrain that is designated and numbered
for reference or firing. Every target can be classified as either a target of opportunity
(appears during combat, no attack has been planned) or a planned target (fire is
prearranged). Individually planned targets may be further subdivided into either
scheduled or on-call targets. A scheduled target is a planned target to be attacked at a
specified time. An on-call target is a planned target on which fire is delivered when
requested.
a. A priority target is one that could decisively affect the unit mission. The SBCT
commander may allocate artillery priority targets to battalions. The battalion commander
may in turn allocate priority targets to his subordinate infantry companies. Normally, the
company commander designates company priority targets (with recommendations
provided by the FSO).
b. When the battalion commander designates priority targets, he provides specific
guidance to the FSO and his subordinate companies as to when certain targets become
priority targets, when they cease to be priority targets, the desired effects on the targets,
and any special type of ammunition to be used. Firing units lay the guns on priority
targets when they are not engaged in a fire mission, which reduces reaction time. FPF is
an example of a priority target in a defensive situation.
c. The company FSO assigns a target number to each planned target. Blocks of
alphanumeric target numbers (two letters and four numbers) are provided for all fire-
planning agencies. These serve as an index to all other information regarding a particular
target, such as location, description, and size. The company FSO assigns target numbers
to any TRPs the company designates. Mortar sections have blocks of target numbers so
they can assign a target number when an observer directs "record as target" upon
completion of a registration.

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 FM 3-21.11

d. A standard target is an area about 200 meters in width. The symbol for a standard
target is a cross. It may be canted if several targets are close to each other or if the symbol
might be mistaken as a grid intersection. The intersection of the lines marks the center of
the target. The target list describes the nature of the target and other pertinent
information. (This applies to targets planned for conventional and improved conventional
ammunition.)
(1) Offensive Application. Use offensive application targets to attack known,
suspected, or likely enemy positions such as OPs, antitank sites, road intersections, or
terrain that dominates attack axes.
(2) Defensive Applicatio. Use defensive application targets to destroy the enemy as
he attacks. Plan targets at fording sites, bridges, narrow defiles restricting movement,
road intersections, obstacles, and possible overmatch positions.
e. When the expected target will be moving, extra planning is required. Determine a
trigger point that allows a designated observer sufficient time to initiate the call for fire,
the firing unit time to prepare and fire, and the projectiles time to reach the target. The
observer calls for fire as the unit or vehicles reach the trigger point and the enemy
continues moving to the target. If timed properly, enemy and projectiles arrive at the
target at the same time.

10-8. FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES

FPFs are immediately available planned fires that block enemy movement, especially
dismounted infantry approaching defensive lines or areas. These areas are integrated with
defensive plans. The pattern of FPF plans may be varied to suit the tactical situation; they
are drawn to scale on the target overlay. The size of the FPF is determined by the number
and type of weapon used to fire on it (Figure 10-3, page 10-18). The company
commander is responsible for the precise location of FPFs. The company FSO--
• Reports the desired location of the FPF to the supporting FDC.
• Adjusts indirect fire on the desired location, by weapon.
• Transmits the call to fire FPF to the supporting FDC.
The leader (normally the company commander or a platoon leader) in whose area the FPF
is located has the authority to call for the FPF. The FPF has the highest priority of any
target assigned to a fires and effects means. The FPF is only fired when required to repel
the enemy's assault. Premature firing wastes ammunition and allows the enemy to avoid
the impact area.

Figure 10-3. FPF dimensions

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FM 3-21.11

10-9. SPECIAL MUNITIONS

Obscuration fires use smoke and white phosphorus ammunition to degrade the enemy by
obscuring his view of the battlefield. (High explosive ammunition may also obscure his
view with dust and fires, but the unit should not rely on it as the primary means.) Because
smoke is subject to changes in wind direction and terrain contours, its use must be
coordinated with other friendly units affected by the operation. Used properly,
obscuration fires can--
• Slow enemy vehicles to blackout speeds.
• Obscure the vision of enemy direct fire weapon crews.
• Reduce accuracy of enemy-observed fires by obscuring OPs and CPs.
• Cause confusion and apprehension among enemy soldiers.
• Limit the effectiveness of the enemy's visual command and control signals.
a. Screening fires are closely related to obscuration fires; they also involve the use
of smoke and WP. However, screening fires mask friendly maneuver elements to disguise
the nature of their operations. For example, they are used to screen river crossings for an
enveloping force. Screening fires may assist in consolidating on an objective by placing
smoke in areas beyond the objective. They also may be used to deceive the enemy into
believing that a unit is maneuvering when it is not. Screening fires require the same
precautions as obscuration fires.
b. Special munitions may be used for illumination, which may be scheduled or on-
call. Use friendly direct fire weapons and adjustment of indirect fires to illuminate areas
of suspected enemy movement or to orient moving units.

10-10. SMOKE SUPPORT

Internal smoke capabilities consist of company mortars and smoke pots. Smoke pots are
the commander’s primary means of producing small-area screening smoke. An external
smoke platoon is required for long-term, large-area obscuration. If attached, the smoke
platoon has the capability of providing both hasty smoke and large-area smoke support
for tactical operations in the main battle area.

10-11. OBSERVER POSITIONS

To ensure that indirect fire can be called on a specific target, observers must be
designated and in the proper position. As the company plans indirect fire targets to
support the operation and passes these down to the platoon, specific observers are
positioned to observe the target and the associated trigger line or TRP. Any soldier can
perform this function as long as he understands the mission and has the communications
capability and training.
a. Once the target has been passed to the platoon or included by the platoon in the
fire support plan, the platoon leader must position the observer and make sure he
understands the following in precise terms:
(1) The nature and description of the target he is expected to engage.
(2) The terminal effects required (destroy, delay, disrupt, limit, and so on) and
purpose.
(3) The communications means, radio net, call signs, and FDC to be called.
(4) When or under what circumstances targets are to be engaged.
(5) The relative priority of targets.

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 FM 3-21.11

(6) The method of engagement and method of control to be used in the call for fire.
(a) Method of Engagement (Adjust Fire or Fire for Effect). Anticipate the need to
adjust fires when deriving target location strictly through map-spot procedures. Using this
technique, expect target location errors of up to 500 meters. Employ fire for effect when
the target can be precisely located through previous adjustment, target area survey, or the
use of laser range finders from known locations. When fires must be adjusted, consider
the additional time required to complete the fire mission (two to four minutes for each
adjustment) in the planning process.
(b) Method of Control (Time on Target, At My Command, or When Ready). The
method of control should reflect the degree of synchronization required. While time-on-
target controls the precise timing of fires, it reduces flexibility in the firing units and can
result in fewer missions being fired over a given period of time.
b. If the observer cannot be positioned to see the target and trigger line or TRP under
the visibility conditions expected at the time the target is to be fired, the headquarters that
planned the target must be notified and a new target must be planned at a location that
will meet the commander's purpose for fire support.
c. There are three observer communications options available to the company. After
considering the tactical situation, the degree of training, and the availability of fire
support assets, the commander determines which option is best suited to the mission.
Under all options, the company FSO monitors all calls for fire.
(1) Option 1 (Decentralized). The observer sends his call for fire directly to the fire
support assets available to support his operation. This option gives him the most
responsive fires; however, it allows the FIST HQ the least amount of control. Since the
observer is allowed to determine which asset should engage each target, this option
generally requires a highly trained observer and company FSO.
(2) Option 2 (Predesignated). The observer is assigned a particular fire support asset
from which he may request fire support, and he operates on that unit's net. If the observer
thinks his target should be engaged with a different fire support asset, he must request
permission from the FIST HQ to change assets. Permission is granted on a mission-by-
mission basis. Under this option, fire support is highly responsive if the asset is suitable
to the type of target.
(3) Option 3 (Centralized). The observer must contact the FIST HQ for each call for
fire. The FIST HQ refers the observer or relays his request to an appropriate fire support
asset. This option is least responsive for the observer, but it offers the highest degree of
control to the FIST HQ. This option generally is used when maneuver personnel are
observers for their platoon.
(4) Tailoring. Since the level of training and the tactical situation vary for each
observer, the company FSO may assign each observer under his control an appropriate
option. For example, the 1st Platoon FO may be decentralized, the 2nd Platoon FO may
be predesignated, and the 3rd Platoon FO may be centralized.

10-12. REHEARSALS AND EXECUTION

Once the company has developed and coordinated the fire support plan, it should rehearse
the plan. As the company rehearses the maneuver, it rehearses the fire plan. The target list
is executed as the maneuver is conducted; fires are requested (though not actually
executed by the firing units) just as they would be during the operations. Under ideal

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circumstances, an FPF can be adjusted during the rehearsal. Rehearsals on the terrain
reveal any problems in visibility, communications, and coordination of the fires and
effects plan. Conduct rehearsals under degraded conditions (at night and in MOPP4) to
make sure the company can execute the plan in all circumstances.
a. If time or conditions do not permit full-scale rehearsals, key leaders can meet,
preferably at a good vantage point, and brief back the plan. They can use a sand table
depiction of the terrain. Each player explains what he does, where he does it, and how he
plans to overcome key-leader casualties. The fires and effects plan execution is integral to
this process and is rehearsed in exactly the same way.
b. The company executes the fire plan as it conducts the operation. It fires targets as
required and makes adjustments based on enemy reactions. Priority targets are cancelled
as friendly units pass them or they are no longer relevant to the maneuver.

10-13. COMMUNICATIONS
The FSO can monitor three of four possible radio voice nets and three digital nets (Figure
10-4). The company's mission and priority determine the specific nets.
a. Company Command Net FM (Voice) and FBCB2 (Digital). Platoon leaders,
the XO, and attachments use this net to send reports, receive instructions, and request
fires. Any Strikers attached to the company monitor this net. This net also allows the
FIST to monitor company operations and links it to the company commander, platoon
leaders, and observers for planning and coordination. The company headquarters is the
net control station (NCS).
b. Battalion Mortar Fire Direction Net FM (Voice). Observers may use this net to
request fires of the battalion mortar platoon. Other stations on the net include the FIST
headquarters and the battalion FSE. The battalion mortar platoon is the NCS.
c. Battalion Mortar Fire Direction Net (Digital). As necessary, the FIST sends
fire missions to the supporting mortar platoon or section using this net.
d. Company Mortar Net (Voice). Observers or the company FSO use this net to
request fire from the company mortars.
e. Direct Support Battalion Fire Direction Net FM (Voice) and Digital. This net
is used for FA fire direction. The FIST uses this net to relay calls for fire through the
battalion FSE to supporting artillery assets. The direct support battalion FDC is the NCS.
When a Striker is present, it uses this net to request FA fires. The battery FDC and
battalion FSE also are on this net.

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 FM 3-21.11

Figure 10-4. Company FIST communications.

10-14. QUICK FIRE CHANNEL

A quick fire channel is established to link an observer (or other target executor) directly
with a weapon system (Figure 10-5, page 10-22). Quick fire channels may be either voice
or digital nets. Quick fire channels within a maneuver brigade normally are established
on FA or mortar nets. These channels are designed to expedite calls for fire against HPTs
or to trigger preplanned fires. Quick fire channels also may be used to execute fires for
critical operations or phases of the battle and to link an observer with a battery or platoon
FDC for counter reconnaissance fires. Copperhead missions can best be executed by
using quick fire channels. The fire support coordinator and or FSOs establish quick fire
channels and procedures based on the commander's intent and the concept of operations.

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FM 3-21.11

Figure 10-5. Quick fire channel illustrating sensor-to-shooter link.

10-15. INDIRECT FIRES IN CLOSE SUPPORT

Effective indirect fires and effects often require artillery and mortar fires near friendly
infantry soldiers. A safe integration of fires and maneuver this close demands careful
planning, coordination, and knowledge of the supporting weapons. These close
supporting fires are most commonly FPFs in a defensive operation or are suppression or
obscuration fires to support an assault on an enemy position. When planning these fires,
the company commander considers--
a. The Effect Required. In the defense, this may be to destroy enemy soldiers and
to degrade the effectiveness of enemy vehicles by causing them to fight buttoned-up. In
the attack, the suppression/obscuration of enemy positions to allow the breach and
seizure of a foothold on the objective is probably the desired effect.
b. The Accuracy of the Delivery System. There are many variables that impact on
the accuracy of the weapon. The FSO has the technical knowledge to assist the company
commander. Artillery and mortars are area weapons systems, which means that every
round fired from the same tube impacts in an area around the target or aiming point. This
dispersion is greater in length than in width. The weather conditions (wind, temperature,
and humidity), the condition of the weapon, and the proficiency of the crew also affect
the accuracy.
c. The Protection of His Unit as the Rounds are Impacting. If the unit is in well-
prepared defensive positions with overhead cover, an FPF can be adjusted very close, just
beyond bursting range. If required, the company commander can even call for artillery
fires right on his company position using proximity or time fuzes for airbursts. It is much
more dangerous to call for close indirect fires during an attack. The commander considers
the terrain, the breach site, and the enemy positions to determine how close to adjust his
supporting indirect fires.
d. The Integration of Indirect Suppressive Fires. When integrating indirect
suppressive fires to support the breach and assault, the following points are key:
(1) The danger increases with the size of the weapons. Use artillery to isolate the
objective; use mortars on enemy positions away from the breach site; and use the 60-mm
mortars, M203s, and direct fire weapons for close suppression.
(2) Assaulting perpendicular to the gun target (GT) line increases the probability of
safety. If the rounds are coming over the head of the assault element, the margin of safety
is reduced.

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(3) Company mortars firing direct lay or direct alignment are the most responsive
system. They are able to observe the rounds' impact and adjust accordingly. The safest
method is to fire the 60-mm mortar with a bipod.
(4) Ideally, the firing units register prior to firing close-support missions. If not, the
first rounds fired may be off target by a considerable distance. Once the firing units are
adjusted on a target, then any shifts from that target are much more reliable.
e. Timings and Control. The final requirement for integrating these fires is to
establish timings and control to ensure these targets are initiated, adjusted, and shifted
properly. If possible, the company FSO should locate where he can observe these targets
(possibly with the support element). A detailed execution matrix that assigns
responsibility for each target to the leader or observer who is in the best position to
control them should be developed. These soldiers must know when each target, series, or
group is fired, what effect is desired on which enemy positions, and when to lift or shift
the fires. Consider the use of pyrotechnic or other signals to ensure communication.

10-16. FIRE SUPPORT TEAM

The following paragraphs examine capabilities, procedures, and other considerations that
affect the company FIST and its employment in the fires and effects mission.
a. Personnel. FIST personnel at the company level include the company FSO, the
fire support sergeant, a fire support specialist, and a radiotelephone operator.
b. Equipment. The FIST operates out of the FIST FSV. This FSV is equipped with
digital and voice communications links to all available indirect fires and effects assets.
The large targeting head atop the FSV houses the G/VLLD, which can accurately
determine the range, azimuth, and vertical angle to targets and can designate targets for
laser-guided munitions.
c. FIST Employment. The company commander has two options for employment
of his FIST.
(1) Option 1. The FSV is used as a combat observation lasing team (similar to a
Striker team) somewhere within the battalion or SBCT sector or zone and is controlled by
another headquarters. The company FSO, accompanied by the fire support specialist,
rides with the company commander or in another company maneuver vehicle. He brings
two radios and the handheld terminal unit (HTU). This option severely degrades the
ability of the FIST to support the company.
(2) Option 2. The company FSO works out of the FSV, which he positions where he
can most effectively observe and control execution of the fire support plan. The FSO
establishes OPs that take maximum advantage of the capability of the Striker to create
lethal, accurate fires. He communicates with the commander on the company command
net. This option allows the FSO to maintain effective control of any designated observers
and to conduct required fires and effects coordination. He must keep the company
informed at all times of his location and the routes he will take when moving from OP to
OP.

10-17. MORTARS
The mortar section is made up of two squads, each consisting of two 60-mm mortars or
two 120-mm mortars and crew (Figures 10-6 and 10-7). The mortar section leader must
work closely with the company commander and his FSO to maximize the section's fires.

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The platoon has two vehicles to move its equipment, ammunition, and personnel; it also
has an organic FDC. Table 10-6, page 10-26, shows the different ranges and types of
ammunition for the company mortar systems. Teamwork is the key to an efficient mortar
section. Duties must be constantly drilled and personnel cross-trained.

Figure 10-6. 60-mm mortar dismounted.

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Figure 10-7. 120-mm mortar (dismounted).

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FM 3-21.11

SIZE/ MIN MAX DIAMETER

NOMEN MODEL TYPE RANGE RANGE OF ILLUM ROF
(1)
60-mm M720/M998 HE 70 3500 30 RDS PER
M224 M722 WP 70 3500 MINUTE FOR 4
MINUTES(2) THEN
M721 ILLUM 200 3500 500 20 RDS PER
M302A1 WP 35 1830 MINUTE
M83A3 ILLUM 725 950 300 SUSTAINED

M494A HE 45 1830
120-mm M57 HE 200 7200 15 RDS PER
M121 M68 WP 200 7200 MINUTE FOR 1
MINUTE, THEN 4
M91 ILLUM 200 7100 1500 RDS PER MINUTE
M933 HE (PD) 200 7200 SUSTAINED
M934 HE (MOF) 200 7200
M929 WP 200 7200
M930 ILLUM 200 7200 1500
(1) BIPOD MOUNTED, CHARGE 4 (MAXIMUM RANGE HANDHELD IS 1300 METERS).
(2) CHARGE 2 AND OVER. 30 RDS PER MINUTE CAN BE SUSTAINED WITH CHARGE 0 OR 1.

Table 10-6. Mortar ammunition characteristics.

a. Mortar Section Leader. The mortar section leader is responsible (overall) to the
company commander for the mortar section. His duties include--
• Advising the commander on employing and positioning the mortar section.
• Assisting the FIST chief in planning fire support for the company.
• Keeping the commander informed of the location of the mortar section and the
status of the mortars and ammunition.
• Maintaining a situation map showing all supported units' locations, mortar
positions, maximum range lines, and targets.
• Planning, initiating, and supervising the timely displacement of the section.
• Supervising security, resupply, and communications for the section.
• Seeing that preparations are made for special firing techniques, such as direct
lay and direct alignment.
• Performing the duties of chief computer.
• Cross-checking target plots.
• Maintaining ammunition records and submitting resupply requests.
• Recommending to the commander when the mortars should displace and
controlling their displacement.
• Relaying enemy information from designated observers to the company and
others, as directed.
b. Mortar Squad Leader. The mortar squad leader and gunners' responsibilities
include--
• Moving and positioning the mortar as directed.
• Ensuring that the mortar is properly laid.
• Checking camouflage and overhead and mask clearance.

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• Maintaining a map showing positions, sectors, and targets (needed for

independent operations or when displacing by squads).
• Computing firing data for independent operations.
• Ensuring that ammunition is properly stored.
• Checking rounds for indexing and charges.
• Maintaining communications with the FDC, when applicable.

10-18. MORTAR POSITIONS

Based on the mission, terrain, and SBCT infantry rifle company commander’s guidance,
the mortar section leader reconnoiters and selects mortar firing positions. In the battalion
mortar platoon, a representative from the base gun and one man from the FDC may help
reconnoiter and prepare the new position.
a. A mortar section position should--
• Allow firing on targets throughout the company’s sector or zone, or the
supported platoon’s sector or zone. In the offense, one half to two thirds of the
range of the mortars should be forward of the lead platoon. This reduces the
number of moves needed.
• Be in defilade to protect the mortars from enemy observation and direct fire.
Places such as the reverse slope of a hill, a deep ditch, the rear of a building,
and the rear of a stonewall are well suited for mortar positions. The reverse
slope of a hill may protect mortars from some indirect fire.
• Have concealment from air and ground observation. Vegetation is best for
breaking up silhouettes. Vehicles should be positioned in defilade where
natural camouflage conceals them. When the location of the firing position
provides little concealment, consider the use of a hide position, which
provides good cover and concealment and allows the mortar crews to quickly
occupy their firing positions when required.
• Have overhead and mask clearance. Overhead clearance is checked by setting
the sight at maximum elevation and looking along the mortar tube. Mask
clearance is checked the same way, but at minimum elevation.
• Have solid ground that supports vehicle movement and precludes excessive
settling of base plates. On soft ground, put sandbags under base plates to
reduce settling.
• Have 25 to 30 meters between 60-mm mortars and 35 to 40 meters between
120-mm mortars. This reduces the chances of having more than one mortar hit
by one enemy round. It also provides proper sheaf dispersion without plotting
for each gun.
• Have routes in and out. These routes should ease resupply and displacement.
• Be secure. The section may have to provide its own local security. Being near
other friendly units improves security.
• Avoid overhead fire of friendly soldiers when possible.
b. The FDC may be in voice-distance of the squads; however, telephone wire should
be laid from the FDC to each squad for security purposes and because battle noise may be
so intense that the squads cannot hear the commands.
c. The mortar section has a very limited capability to secure itself. Normally, it
collocates with other elements or has a security element attached.

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d. Mortar crews prepare mortar positions to protect themselves and to serve as firing
positions for the mortars. The crews construct the positions with sandbags, ammunition
boxes, earth, or any other available materials. (FM 7-90 describes these dug-in positions.)

10-19. MORTAR EMPLOYMENT

In a movement to contact, the mortar section usually supports the SBCT infantry
company with priority of fire to the lead platoon. The section normally displaces one
squad at a time so that at least one squad is always in position and ready to fire. The
section's displacement is based on the company’s movement. The leader keeps the
company commander informed of the location and status of his weapons and
ammunition. The observers report their locations to the FDC.
a. In an attack, sections prepare initial firing positions and may stockpile
ammunition. They occupy positions at the last moment before the attack. The section
must remain ready throughout the attack to respond to calls for fire and to displace, if
necessary.
b. In the defense, mortars are farther to the rear than in the offense. The company
commander plans his mortar section's final protective fire on a dangerous, dismounted
enemy avenue of approach. Extra ammunition is stockpiled (if feasible). The mortars
have some security when behind forward troops, but they still prepare to defend their
positions.
c. To avoid being suppressed, a number of mortar positions are designated, prepared
(if feasible), and occupied as required during the battle.
d. In a withdrawal not under enemy pressure, one or more mortars may be left in
position to support the DLIC.
e. No matter where the platoon or section is located, it does everything it can for its
own security. It may be able to post one or two security elements (equipped with
Claymore mines and AT4s) on the most dangerous approaches. It also uses early warning
devices. If attacked, the security elements give warning, kill as many of the enemy as
they can, and then rejoin their squads. The rest of the unit defends them from the dug-in
mortar positions. The company reserve may be employed for a counterattack or to
improve the security and defense of the mortar section.
f. The mortar section leader coordinates the section defense plan with the company
reserve. Targets are planned around the section's position so other mortars or artillery can
provide support.

10-20. MORTAR DISPLACEMENT

Mortars displace to provide continuous support and to evade suppression, whether the
company is attacking or defending. This paragraph applies to both 60-mm and 120-mm
mortars when man-packed by the platoon or section. (When displacing the 120-mm
platoon with vehicles, refer to Chapter 3 of this manual and FM 7-90.)
a. The displacement plan and the position of the mortar section in the company
formation should not disrupt the maneuver elements, should be responsive to the
commander, and should provide the mortar section with local security. It should also
allow the mortars to go into action quickly using the desired method of engagement and
should provide ammunition resupply for the mortars. The displacement plan flows

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logically from other decisions made by the company commander, the company FSO, and
the mortar section leader.
b. If the company commander determines that operations (offensive or defensive)
will move slowly enough to stay within mortar range and that continuous indirect fires
must be available, he may order the mortars to displace to a suitable support position
before the company moves out. In this event, he may not move them again until the
company reaches its next position. The choices available for displacement are
displacement by section and displacement by squad:
(1) Displacement by Section. The whole section displaces at the same time. This
allows the section to mass fires and the section sergeant to keep good control of his
section. Moving as a platoon or section maximizes the limited FDC capability. It also is
the fastest method of displacement. While the section is moving, its fire support is not
immediately available unless it is positioned to fire using the direct lay or direct
alignment methods or by conducting a hip shoot. Using any of these methods, the mortar
section can be available with only minimum delay.
(2) Displacement by Squad. This method allows continuous coverage of at least part
of the company's sector. Because there is only one radio in the mortar section and six
men for the 60-mm, it is difficult to provide continuous indirect fire coverage even when
displacing by squad. It is possible, however, for the company to attach one squad to each
of two bounding platoons so that while using the direct lay or direct alignment methods,
one squad is always in overwatch of the company's movement. This may allow increased
mortar coverage of the company sector during decentralized operations. It reduces the
difficulty of transporting the mortar ammunition and also may be the most effective
means of infiltrating the mortars. Each section carries the ammunition for the attached
gun squad.
c. The company commander also decides whether to move the mortars as a separate
element in the company formation or to attach each gun squad to a subordinate element.
(1) Attached. The mortars are attached to a subordinate element when the situation
requires that task organization (on a patrol or with the company support element, for
example) or when the mortars need additional control, security, and load-carrying
capacity (during an infiltration, for example).
(2) Separate. The mortars move as a separate element in the company formation
when the commander wishes to control them directly and keep them together for massed
use. When the mortars move as an element, they can displace by section or by squad.

10-21. MORTAR ENGAGEMENTS

There are various engagement methods: direct lay and direct alignment (which do not
require a fire direction center), the conventional indirect fire, and the hip shoot. The
primary methods of engagement for the 60-mm mortar are direct lay and direct
alignment.
a. Direct Lay. This method is used when the gunner can see the target. The mortar
may be handheld or bipod-mounted. An initial fire command is required to designate the
target and (if desired) specify the shell-fuze combination and number of rounds. The
gunner then adjusts fire and fires for effect without additional instructions (Table 10-7,
page 10-30).

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FM 3-21.11

ADVANTAGES OF DIRECT LAY DISADVANTAGES OF DIRECT LAY

• Can engage target immediately in • Requires the mortar crew to be relatively
handheld mode (the mortar weighs only 18 close to the enemy and therefore
pounds and is therefore highly portable). susceptible to direct and indirect fires.
• Can be used by relatively untrained • Is less effective at night (the gunner cannot
gunners, such as cross-trained engage when he cannot see).
infantrymen.
• Does not require an FDC.
Table 10-7. Advantages and disadvantages of direct lay.

b. Direct Alignment. This method allows the mortar crew to fire from full defilade
positions without an FDC. It requires that an observer be within 100 meters of the gun-
target line and, if possible, within 100 meters of the guns. Direct alignment can be used
only when handheld or bipod-mounted, although bipod-mounted is much more accurate
(Table 10-8).

ADVANTAGES OF DIRECT ALIGNMENT DISADVANTAGES OF DIRECT ALIGNMENT

• Can engage target more quickly than the • Is slightly slower than direct lay.
methods requiring an FDC. • Requires the mortar crew to be relatively
• Allows crew more protection than direct close to the enemy and therefore
lay. vulnerable to indirect fires or assault.
• Does not require an FDC. • Requires a well-trained observer to be
within 100 meters of the gun-target line
(preferably within 100 meters of the guns).
• Requires observers to be in direct
communication with the gun crew by voice,
arm-and-hand signal, landline, or radio.
• Requires gun to be re-laid to engage each
different target.
Table 10-8. Advantages and disadvantages of direct alignment.

c. Conventional Indirect Fire. This method is used when the mortars have been
laid for direction and an FDC established with positions plotted on the M16 plotting
board or the mortar ballistic computer (MBC). In this situation (for the 60-mm mortar),
the section leader operates the MBC or the M16 plotting board and the radio as the FDC
(Table 10-9).

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ADVANTAGES OF DISADVANTAGES OF
CONVENTIONAL INDIRECT FIRE CONVENTIONAL INDIRECT FIRE
• Can fire accurately at any target within • Requires an FDC (there is no designated
range as long as an observer who can FDC in the light infantry mortar section).
communicate with the FDC observes the • Is not as responsive as direct lay.
target.
• Can accurately engage plotted targets
during limited visibility.
• Can locate well away from enemy direct
fires.
Table 10-9. Advantages and disadvantages of conventional indirect fire.

d. Hip Shoot. When a call for fire is received during movement and the target
cannot be engaged by either the direct lay or direct alignment method, a hip shoot is
initiated. A hip shoot is a hasty occupation of a firing position; it requires both an FDC
and an observer. The section leader normally acts as the FDC (60-mm only). The
observer’s corrections may be sent over the radio or by a wire net. The platoon or section
leader must quickly determine an azimuth of fire by map inspection. He then gives this
direction to the mortar squads. The second squad leader uses the M2 compass (for the 60-
mm section) to lay the base mortar. The section leader uses the MBC, the graphical firing
scale, or the firing tables to determine the appropriate elevation and charge. He uses
either the MBC or the M19 plotting board to refine the firing data based on the observer's
corrections. The section leader may use the aiming-point deflection method, depending
upon the terrain. The second mortar is laid either by sight-to-sight or M2 compass (Table
10-10).
ADVANTAGES OF HIP SHOOT DISADVANTAGES OF HIP SHOOT
• Allows fire support when other methods of • Requires an FDC (there is no designated
engagement are not usable. FDC in the light infantry mortar section).
• Is able to move at the same time as the • Is the slowest method of fire and the least
unit and still provide adequate fires. accurate.
Table 10-10. Advantages and disadvantages of hip shoot.

Section III. ENGINEERS

The two core qualities of the SBCT infantry company are high mobility and the ability to
achieve decisive action through dismounted infantry assault. At the tactical level,
overmatching mobility is critical to the success of the force. Given the significance of
tactical mobility to the SBCT's successful operations, the SBCT engineers are essential.

10-22. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

SBCT engineer structure provides the SBCT commander with the embedded engineer
integration required to train, rehearse, plan, and execute synchronized mobility
operations. This structure includes--

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FM 3-21.11

• A four-man staff engineer planning section within the maneuver support cell.
• An organic medium engineer company outfitted with a full complement of
engineer equipment adapted to or mounted on the SBCT’s common vehicular
platform.

10-23. ENGINEER COMPANY, BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

The SBCT’s organic engineer company provides embedded, responsive mounted and
dismounted maneuver support. The engineer company supports the maneuver force--the
SBCT infantry battalions and companies. It readily integrates into maneuver operations
and organizations at all levels based on the analysis of tasks required. It is an agile
organization that assures freedom to maneuver on the battlefield within the combined-
arms-team framework. The engineer company has three combat mobility platoons, one
mobility support platoon, and a company headquarters section (Figure 10-8). The
engineer company is the lowest engineer echelon organic to the SBCT that can plan and
execute continuous 24-hour operations in support of SBCT operations. The engineer
company normally task-organizes its platoons to infantry battalions and companies in a
specific command-support relationship to provide a mission-specific, tailored package. It
performs mounted and dismounted engineer tasks equally well.

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 FM 3-21.11

Figure 10-8. SBCT engineer company organization and equipment.

a. Combat Mobility Platoon. The combat mobility platoon is normally the lowest-
level engineer unit that can effectively accomplish independent mounted engineer
missions and tasks. It is the basic building block of engineer force allocation and task
organization. A combat mobility platoon normally is task-organized to support an
infantry battalion, but it may support an infantry company based on METT-TC analysis.
The combat mobility platoon may receive augmentation in the form of special equipment
from the mobility support platoon. Engineer platoon-specific common-platform
equipment includes engineer support vehicles (ESVs) with mountable rollers or blades,
light assault bridges, light earthmovers (deployable universal combat earthmovers
[DEUCEs]), excavators (HMEEs), MICLICs, and multiple-delivery mine systems
(Volcanoes) (Figure 10-9, page 10-34). The combat mobility platoon’s eight-man
engineer squads carry a variety of explosives and demolitions. The squad is normally the
minimum force required to provide effective dismounted support to infantry companies.
The squad is the engineer organization most likely to support an infantry company,
particularly during offensive operations.

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FM 3-21.11

Figure 10-9. Combat mobility platoon.

b. Mobility Support Platoon. The mobility support platoon consists of a platoon

headquarters section and three equipment-based mobility sections (Figure 10-10). Unlike
the combat mobility platoon, it is not organized to operate independently during offensive
operations. The mobility support platoon provides the commander with specialized
equipment capabilities to weight the main effort and to perform specialized mobility
tasks. Each section is structured to provide equipment augmentation, focused on reducing
enemy obstacles and fortifications, to each of the three combat mobility platoons. Each
section has gap-crossing, obstacle-reduction, special-tool, and heavy-blade capabilities.
The mobility support platoon provides a limited capability for countermobility,
survivability, and sustainment operations.

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 FM 3-21.11

Figure 10-10. Mobility Support Platoon.

10-24. MOBILITY
At the tactical level, overmatching mobility is critical to the success of the force. Within
this context, the emphasis of engineer integration across the force is on mobility
operations. Due to the full-spectrum capability of the infantry company and the
increasingly nonlinear, asymmetric nature of the threat, the potential exists for the
company to encounter a wide variety of existing and reinforcing obstacles. To counter
this potential threat, the company commander plans, organizes, and prepares to perform
mounted and dismounted mobility tasks using the full range of organic and augmentation
mobility assets.
a. Breaching Operations. Engineers reduce obstacles as part of company breaching
operations (FM 3-34.2) and must be prepared to perform mounted and dismounted
reduction tasks using manual, mechanical, and explosive reduction means (Table 10-11,
page 10-36). Through reverse breach planning, the supporting engineer identifies critical
mobility tasks, allocates reduction assets, and recommends a breaching task organization
to the company commander. Keys to allocating reduction assets include identifying all
reduction tasks within the zone or axis, matching specific reduction assets to each task,
and planning redundancy in reduction assets for each task. The breach force must have
the capability to secure the breach site locally; therefore, an engineer-based breach force
must be task-organized with adequate maneuver combat power to suppress enemy forces
in the vicinity of the breach site. The assault force must have the capability to exploit the
breach and continue the attack. Keys to synchronizing a breach through reverse planning
include:
• Actions on the objective drive the size of the assault force.
• The size of the assault force determines the number and types of breach lanes
required.

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• The number and types of breach lanes determine composition of the breach
force.
• Suppression and obscuration required drives the size and composition of the
support force.

TYPES OF
BREACHING BREACHING BREACHING BREACHING
TENETS FUNDAMENTALS ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS
Intelligence Suppress Assault Force Assault
Breaching Obscure Breach Force Covert
Fundamentals Secure Support Force In-Stride
Breaching Reduce Deliberate
Organization
Assault
Mass
Synchronization
Table 10-11. Key breaching doctrine.

During the breach planning process, it is imperative that the SBCT infantry company
commander establishes clear commitment criteria for the breach force. The commitment
criteria should be as specific and measurable as possible so that they are clear,
executable, and reportable. Sub-unit instructions or SOPs should likewise be clear and
concise and should cover all potential actions and reactions. Leaders must position to
quickly assess the success of the force in setting the prescribed conditions. To ensure
success, all units must perform detailed combined-arms breach rehearsals, whether
mounted or dismounted.
b. Route Clearance Operations. The nature of SBCT operations makes route
clearance a likely task at all levels. Route clearance is a combined-arms operation
normally assigned to an infantry battalion or company that is task-organized with
engineers and other CS and CSS assets as required. As such, it requires the detailed
integration and synchronization found in typical breaching operations. (For a detailed
discussion of route clearance operations, refer to FM 5-7-30, FM 20-32, and FM 5-71-2.)
c. Mobility Planning in the Defense. Mobility operations in the defense ensure the
ability to reposition forces, delay, and counterattack. Because of the mobile, offensive
nature of the force, mobility planning is a key component of any defensive scheme of
maneuver. The commander analyzes the scheme of maneuver, obstacle plan, and terrain
to determine mobility requirements. Critical considerations may include--
• Lanes and gaps in the obstacle plan.
• Lane closure plan and sub-unit responsibility.
• Route reconnaissance, improvement, and maintenance.

10-25. COUNTERMOBILITY
Due to the austere engineer force structure, the SBCT infantry battalion engineer
performs the majority of obstacle planning and provides detailed integration and
resourcing information to the infantry companies in the battalion OPORD. He plans
obstacles for both offensive and defensive operations. In either situation, the engineer
uses obstacles to develop engagement areas, protect friendly vulnerabilities, and

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counteract enemy reactions to friendly maneuver. Because of the mobile nature of the
force and the inherently asymmetric, nonlinear environment in which it operates, the
engineer relies primarily on scatterable, remotely delivered minefield systems to shape
the battlefield. To the infantry company, this normally means integrating ground Volcano
and MOPMS into the obstacle plan. The SBCT or battalion engineer designs and
resources tactical obstacle groups which companies integrate with direct and indirect fires
and construct with engineer support. Obstacle groups consist of one or more individual
obstacles that, when integrated with direct and indirect fires, achieve a specific effect
(disrupt, fix, block, or turn). The obstacle plan must support the scheme of maneuver,
maximize subordinate flexibility, and facilitate future operations.
a. Obstacle Planning Process. The obstacle planning process is an integral part of
developing both offensive and defensive COAs. It correlates directly with sub-unit
maneuver and positioning, engagement area development, and enemy actions. It includes
these key components:
• Direct and indirect fires analysis.
• Obstacle intent integration (target, effect, relative location).
• Method of emplacement (conventional or scatterable).
• Obstacle effect priority.
• Mobility requirements.
• Obstacle design and resourcing.
• Marking and reporting obstacle locations.
b. Barrier Material Resupply. The S4 normally determines the method (tailgate,
service station, or supply point) and location for performing Class IV and V material
resupply during the MDMP. He provides resource quantities and tentative resupply node
(Class IV and V point and mine dump) locations to companies in the OPORD. SBCT
infantry company commanders then analyze resources and mine dump locations based on
physical reconnaissance of their AO. Afterwards, the commander submits the results of
this refinement to the S4 for adjustment as early as possible.
c. Mine Dump Operations. Mine dumps normally contain resources for a single
obstacle group but may contain resources for individual obstacles if the distances
between obstacles in a group are excessive and would potentially waste an inordinate
amount of transportation time. The company commander, in coordination with the
supporting engineer, locates the mine dump(s) where they best support obstacle
construction within the AO. If a company is assigned more than one obstacle group, it
may have more than one mine dump. In light of the austere engineer organization within
the force, it is imperative that SBCT infantry companies provide leadership and
manpower to operate the mine dump, allowing engineers to construct tactical obstacles
more efficiently. This requires close coordination with the supporting engineer.
d. Obstacle Intent. Obstacle intent provides a simple framework for the commander
to issue guidance and facilitates common understanding and coordination between
maneuver and engineer forces. It is at the foundation of the obstacle integration process
and includes three components: target, obstacle effect, and relative location.
(1) The target is the enemy force that the commander wants to affect with fires and
tactical obstacles. The commander identifies the target in terms of size, type, echelon,
avenue of approach, or any combination of these.

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FM 3-21.11

(2) The obstacle effect (see Table 5-1, page 5-11) describes how the commander
wants to attack enemy maneuver with obstacles and fires. Tactical obstacles block, turn,
fix, or disrupt the enemy. The obstacle effect drives integration by focusing the
relationship between obstacles and direct and indirect fires.
(3) The relative location is where the commander wants the obstacle effect to occur
against the targeted enemy force. Whenever possible, the commander identifies the
location relative to the terrain and maneuver or fire control measures to initiate the
obstacle integration process.
e. Scatterable Mines. Scatterable mines (SCATMINEs) are remotely delivered or
dispensed by aircraft, artillery, missile, or ground dispenser and laid without pattern. All
US SCATMINEs have a limited active life and self-destruct after that life has expired.
The duration of the active life varies with the type of delivery system and mine.
SCATMINEs provide the commander with a means to respond to a changing enemy
situation with remotely delivered minefields. They enable the commander to emplace
minefields rapidly in enemy-held territories, to close lanes in obstacles, and to emplace in
other areas where it is difficult for engineers to emplace conventional minefields quickly.
(1) Scatterable Mine Emplacement Authority. The corps commander has
emplacement authority for all SCATMINEs within the corps AO. He may delegate this
authority to lower echelons according to the guidelines contained in Table 10-12.

SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS EMPLACEMENT AUTHORITY

Ground- or artillery-delivered, with SD time The corps commander may delegate emplacement
greater than 48 hours (long duration). authority to division level, which may further
delegate to brigade level.
Ground- or artillery-delivered, with SD time of The corps commander may delegate emplacement
48 hours or less (short duration) authority to division level, which may further
delegate to brigade level (which may further
delegate to battalion level).
Aircraft-delivered (Gator), regardless of SD Emplacement authority is normally at corps,
time. theater, or army command level, depending on
who has air-tasking authority.
Helicopter-delivered (Volcano), regardless of Emplacement authority is normally delegated no
SD time. lower than the commander who has command
authority over the emplacing aircraft.
MOPMS when used strictly for a protective Emplacement authority is usually granted to the
minefield. company or base commander. Commanders at
higher levels restrict MOPMS use only as
necessary to support their operations.
Table 10-12. Emplacement authority.

(2) Scatterable Mine Minefield Warning. The executing unit sends a SCATMINE
warning (SCATMINWARN) to all affected units before, or immediately after, the
emplacement of the minefield (Table 10-13). The SCATMINWARN should be
disseminated over command nets at all levels to all units operating in the area of the
minefield during current and future operations. Absolutely critical components of the
SCATMINWARN include the cornerpoint locations, size of safety zone, and self-destruct
time.

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 FM 3-21.11

Table 10-13. SCATMINEWARN.

(3) Scatterable Mine Delivery Systems.

(a) Area-Denial Artillery Munitions (Field Artillery Delivered). The wedge-shaped
ADAM is a bounding-fragmentation mine that deploys up to seven tension-activated trip
wires 6 meters away from the mine. After ground impact, trip wires are released and the
mine is fully armed. The lethal casualty radius is between 6 and 10 meters.
(b) Remote Antiarmor Mines (Field Artillery Delivered). The RAAM mine has a
cylindrical shape and provides a full-width or catastrophic kill (K-kill). Using a
magnetically influenced fuze, the mine projects a bi-directional, shaped-charge warhead
through the crew compartment of a vehicle.
(c) Multiple Delivery Mine System, or Volcano (Ground or Air Delivered). The
Volcano is mounted on an ICV, cargo truck, or UH-60A Blackhawk helicopter. The
Volcano dispenses mines with 4-hour, 48-hour, and 15-day self-destruct (SD) times. The
SD times are field-selectable before dispensing and do not require a change or
modification to the mine canister. Reload time (not including movement time to the
reload site) for an experienced four-man crew is approximately 20 minutes. The average
time to emplace one ground Volcano load (160 canisters) is 10 minutes.
(d) Modular Pack Mine System (Man-Portable). The MOPMS is a man-portable,
162-pound, suitcase-shaped mine dispenser. The dispenser contains 21 mines (17 AT and
4 AP). When dispensed, an explosive propelling charge at the bottom of each tube expels
mines through the container roof. Mines are propelled 35 meters from the container in a
180-degree semicircle. The safety zone around one container is 55 meters to the front and
sides and 20 meters to the rear. Mines are dispensed on command using an M71 remote-
control unit (RCU) or an electronic initiating device with firing wire. Once mines are
dispensed, they cannot be recovered or reused. If mines are not dispensed, the container
may be disarmed and recovered for later use. The RCU can recycle the 4-hour SD time of
the mines three times, for a total duration of approximately 13 hours. The RCU can also
self-destruct mines on command, allowing a unit to counterattack or withdraw through
the minefield. The RCU can control up to 15 MOPMS containers or groups of MOPMS
containers from a distance of 300 to 1,000 meters.
(e) Raptor/Hornet (Man-Portable). The Raptor/Hornet wide area mine introduces an
entirely new obstacle concept to the combined-arms company. The Raptor/Hornet is an
integrated C2/top-attack special munition that type-categorizes, reports, and engages
individual vehicles (Figure 10-11, page 10-40). The Raptor is a “smart” remote combat
outpost that can provide the force with near-real-time situational understanding and can
command and control multiple Hornet mines in a fully integrated obstacle network. It can
be programmed to command and control coordinated attacks with other Raptor-controlled

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minefields or with direct and indirect fire weapons systems. The Raptor/Hornet can be
deactivated, allowing freedom of maneuver through the minefield while still providing
near-real-time intelligence and situational understanding. The Raptor/Hornet has standoff
detection and engagement capabilities. It attacks from the side or top at ranges up to 100
meters. The Raptor/Hornet--
• Can be a stand-alone tactical obstacle or can reinforce other conventional
obstacles.
• Disrupts and delays the enemy, allowing long-range, precision weapons to
engage more effectively. (This feature is particularly effective in non-LOS
engagements.)
• Can communicate with its employing unit for remote on/off/on or program
and battlespace intelligence reporting. The battlespace intelligence data may
include target descriptions, numbers, and the direction and rate of movement.
It also can provide an early warning of the enemy's activity.
• Can communicate with other munitions for conducting coordinated attacks.

Figure 10-11. Raptor/Hornet concept.

(4) Scatterable Mine Marking. The emplacing unit is responsible for marking a
SCATMINE (Figure 10-12). This requires direct coordination between the owning
maneuver unit and the delivering or emplacing unit. This requirement specifically applies
to MOPMS, Volcano (ground-delivered), and Raptor/Hornet minefields. Minefields
should be marked on four sides if emplaced to the rear of any friendly unit, including
scouts and other units that may require a rearward passage of lines (RPOL).

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 FM 3-21.11

Figure 10-12. SCATMINE marking.

(a) Safety Zones. A safety zone is the area where mines may land and activate outside
of the planned dimensions of a SCATMINE. The commander must prevent friendly
forces from maneuvering into the safety zone during the minefield's life cycle. Depending
on its specific location on the battlefield, the safety zone may be marked with a fence.
(b) Fragment Hazard Zones. If a SCATMINE antiarmor mine lands and activates on
its side and self-destructs, the resulting detonation may cause the shaped-charge to travel
along a horizontal trajectory. The maximum fragment hazard zone for all US
SCATMINE systems is approximately 640 meters. However, the acceptable risk distance
is 235 meters from the outer edges of the minefield's safety zone for troops in the open
(Table 10-14, page 10-42).

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System Safety Zone Fragment Hazard Zone

ADAM/RAAM 500 to 1,500 meters from aim 235 meters from the outside
point(s) (depends on delivery dimensions of the safety zone
method)
Gator 925 x 475 meters from aim point(s) 1,395 x 945 meters from aim point(s)
Ground Volcano 1,150 x 160 meters 235 meters from start and stop
points and the center line
Air Volcano 1,915 x 200 meters 235 meters from start and stop
points and the center line
MOPMS See FM 20-32, Figures 3-15 through 235 meters from the outside
3-17, for specific placement. dimensions of the safety zone
Table 10-14. Safety and fragment hazard zones.

10-26. SURVIVABILITY
Survivability operations protect the force. The SBCT infantry company commander
plans, prioritizes, and enforces the survivability effort. The plan should specify the
following:
• Level of survivability for each sub-unit position.
• Priority of survivability support by specific unit, type of weapon system, or
combination.
• Type of position to be dug for a unit or type of system.
• Sequence and time allocated for platoons to receive blade support.
Additional considerations for survivability planning include command and control of
digging assets, site security, CSS (fuel, maintenance, and Class I), and movement times
between BPs. The commander should start the survivability effort as soon as practical.
He may employ blade assets to support systems such as mortars, C2, and key weapons
before the bulk of his combat systems are ready for survivability support. The
commander should establish a NLT time or a directed time to be ready for survivability.
This helps prevent waste of blade time. Companies prepare their area for the arrival of the
blades by marking vehicle positions, identifying leaders to supervise position
construction, and designating guides for the blade movement between positions.

Section IV. AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

The air defense and aviation coordination cell's (ADACC's) air and missile defense
(AMD) analysis determines if the SBCT will be task-organized with air defense assets
from a divisional short-range air defense (SHORAD) battalion. Even if the SBCT, and,
subsequently the SBCT infantry battalion, receives air defense assets, it is unlikely that
the SBCT infantry company will be task-organized with any of the air defense assets.
However, Avengers and Linebackers may operate in and around the company AO in
support of battalion and brigade assets. Therefore, the company must conduct its own air
defense operations, relying on disciplined passive air defense measures and the ability to
actively engage aerial platforms with organic weapons systems.

10-27. SYSTEMS, ORGANIZATION, AND CAPABILITIES

The systems that may operate in and adjacent to the company AO are the Avenger and
Linebacker (Table 10-15). All systems can operate as man-portable air defense system

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(MANPADS) or Stinger teams. A maneuver battalion normally is task organized with an

air defense platoon equipped with four Avengers or Bradley Linebacker firing units. The
company may have an air defense section moving with it; however, this section normally
remains part of the air defense platoon, responsible for providing DS, GS, or general
support-reinforcing (GS-R) coverage to the battalion.

Man-Portable System

Personnel: 2-man crew

Basic load: 6 missiles basic load
w/ M998 HMMWV
Acquisition/range: Visual
Engagement range: 5 km
Engagement altitude: 3 km +
Mutual support: 2 km +

Bradley Linebacker Personnel: 4-man crew

Basic load: 10 missiles (4 ready to fire,
6 stowed)
Acquisition/range: Visual/thermal
Engagement range: 5 km (Stinger),
2500 m 25-mm, 900 m coax
Engagement altitude: 3 km +
Mutual support: 3 km
Emplacement time: Fire on the move
Reload time: 4 minutes
Avenger Personnel: 2 man crew
Basic load: 8 ready-to-fire missiles,
250 rds .50 cal
Acquisition/range: Visual/FLIR 9-10 km,
laser range finder
Engagement range: 5 km +, .50 cal
range: 6,470 m
Rate of fire: 1025 rpmEngagement altitude: 3 km
+
Mutual support: 3 km
Emplacement time: 6 minutes,
can remote operations out to 50 meters
Table 10-15. Air defense systems.

10-28. EMPLOYMENT OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

In offensive situations, Avenger and Bradley Linebacker units accompany the main
attack. They may maneuver with the battalion’s lead companies, orienting on low-altitude
air avenues of approach. When the unit is moving or in a situation that entails short halts,
the Bradley’s primary weapon is the 25-mm chain gun, which has an effective range of
2,000 meters. Consequently, to assure mutual support, Linebackers maneuver no farther
than 1,000 meters away from other company elements. The Stinger gunners can dismount
to provide air defense when the unit reaches the objective or pauses during the attack. In

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the defense, Avenger Bradley Linebacker units establish BPs based on available IPB
information and the company commander’s scheme of maneuver. Squads are positioned
approximately 2 kilometers apart to maximize the air defense vehicles’ defensive
capabilities. Avengers and Linebackers are often used to protect counterattacking
maneuver units that are vulnerable to detection and attack by enemy air forces.

10-29. WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS

The weapons control status (WCS) describes the relative degree of control in effect for
air defense fires. It applies to all weapons systems. The weapons control status is dictated
in the battalion OPORD and may be updated based on the situation. The three levels of
control are--
a. Weapons Free. Crews can fire at any air target not positively identified as
friendly. This is the least restrictive weapons control status level.
b. Weapons Tight. Crews can fire only at air targets positively identified as hostile
according to the prevailing hostile criteria.
c. Weapons Hold. Crews are prohibited from firing except in self-defense or in
response to a formal order. This is the most restrictive control status level.

10-30. EARLY WARNING PROCEDURES

Air defense warnings (ADWs) include--
• RED - Air or missile attack imminent or in progress.
• YELLOW - Air or missile attack probable.
• WHITE - Air or missile attack not likely.
While air defense warnings cover the probability of hostile air action over the entire
theater of war or operations, local air defense warnings describe with certainty the air
threat for a specific part of the battlefield. Air defense units use these local warnings to
alert Army units to the state of the air threat in terms of "right here, right now." There are
three local air defense warning levels:
• DYNAMITE - Air platforms are inbound or are attacking locally now.
• LOOKOUT - Air platforms are in the area of interest but are not threatening.
They may be inbound, but there is time to react.
• SNOWMAN - No air platforms pose a threat at this time.

NOTE: The area air defense commander routinely issues air defense warnings for
dissemination throughout the theater of war or operations. These warnings
describe the general state of the probable air threat and apply to the entire
area.

10-31. REACTION PROCEDURES

Reaction procedures include both passive and active air defense measures.
a. Passive Air Defense. Passive air defense consists of all measures taken to prevent
the enemy from detecting or locating the unit, to minimize the target acquisition
capability of enemy aircraft, and to limit damage to the unit if it comes under air attack.
One advantage the company can exploit is that target detection and acquisition are
difficult for crews of high-performance aircraft. In most cases, enemy pilots must be able
to see and identify a target before they can launch an attack.

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(1) Guidelines. The SBCT infantry company should follow these guidelines to avoid
detection or limit damage:
• When stopped, occupy positions that offer cover and concealment; dig in and
camouflage vehicles that are exposed. When moving, use covered and
concealed routes.
• Disperse vehicles as much as possible to make detection and attack more
difficult.
• Wipe out track marks leading to vehicle positions and eliminate or cover the
spoil from dug-in positions.
• If moving when an enemy aircraft attacks, disperse and seek covered and
concealed positions.
• Do not fire on a hostile fixed-wing aircraft unless it is clear that the aircraft
has identified friendly elements. Premature engagement compromises friendly
positions.
• Designate air guards for every vehicle and position; establish and maintain
360-degree security.
• Establish an air warning system in the unit SOP, including both visual and
audible signals.
(2) Procedures. When the company observes fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, or
UAVs that could influence its mission, it initially takes passive air defense measures
unless the situation requires immediate active measures. This reaction normally takes the
form of each platoon’s React to Air Attack battle drill; however, the commander can
initiate specific passive measures if necessary. Refer to the passive air defense guidelines
for the company discussed earlier in this section.

NOTE: Passive air defense also includes the company’s preparations for conducting
active air defense measures.

Passive air defense involves these three steps:

(a) Step 1 - Alert the company with a contact report.
(b) Step 2 - Deploy or take the appropriate actions. If the company is not in the direct
path of an attacking aircraft, the commander or platoon leaders order vehicles to
seek cover and concealment and halt with at least a 100-meter interval between
vehicles. They also may be ordered to continue moving as part of the battalion.
(c) Step 3 - Prepare to engage. Fighting vehicle crews prepare to engage the aircraft
with machine gun or main gun fire on order of the commander or their platoon leader.
b. Active Air Defense. If the commander determines that the SBCT infantry
company is in the direct path of attacking aircraft, he initiates active air defense
procedures, including React to Air Attack drills by the company’s platoons. Active air
defense entails the following steps:
(1) Step 1 - Initiate fires. The primary intent is to force aircraft to take self-defense
measures that alter their attack profile and reduce their effectiveness. Leaders may use a
tracer burst to designate an aim point for machine gun antiaircraft fires (see Figure 10-13,
page 10-46). Volume is the key to effectiveness; ICVs and MGSs throw up a "wall of
steel" through which aircraft must fly. The MGS main gun and Javelin missiles are
effective in company air defense employment against hovering attack helicopters; the

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MGS main gun and ICV M2s are effective against moving helicopters, and the tank main
gun multipurpose antitank (MPAT) round is effective against high-performance aircraft.
(2) Step 2 - Create a nonlinear target. Vehicles move as fast as possible at a 45-degree
angle away from the path of flight and toward attacking aircraft. Each platoon maintains
an interval of at least 100 meters between vehicles, forcing aircraft to make several
passes to engage the entire platoon.
(3) Step 3 - Move quickly to covered and concealed positions and stop. Vehicles
freeze their movement for at least 60 seconds after the last flight of aircraft has passed.
(4) Step 4 - Send a spot report (SPOTREP). The company commander or XO updates
the battalion commander on the situation as soon as possible.

Figure 10-13. Machine-gun aim points against helicopters and high-

performance aircraft.

Section V. NBC SUPPORT

NBC assets within the SBCT are limited; therefore, it is imperative that the companies
practice the fundamentals of NBC defense, avoidance, protection, and decontamination in
order to survive on a contaminated battlefield.

10-32. RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT

The NBC reconnaissance platoon organic to the RSTA squadron is the only internal NBC
reconnaissance available to the SBCT. The NBC reconnaissance platoon can locate,
identify, and mark areas of contamination. Since NBC reconnaissance assets are limited,
the SBCT infantry company commander must plan for alternate means of conducting
NBC reconnaissance (such as scouts and MPs).

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10-33. DECONTAMINATION SUPPORT

External decontamination support is not available at the company level. For operational
decontamination, the SBCT infantry company must request support from the SBCT
infantry battalion decontamination team, which is equipped with the modular
decontamination system (MDS). Thorough decontamination operations require the
support of an external decontamination platoon. The company must request this support
through the SBCT infantry battalion and SBCT S3 sections. The contaminated company
will be tasked to augment the decontamination platoon during the conduct of thorough
decontamination operations. (For a more detailed discussion of decontamination
requirements, refer to FM 3-5).

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CHAPTER 11
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Simply stated, the role of combat service support in any military unit is
to sustain the force for continuous combat operations. Within the SBCT, a
brigade support battalion (BSB) will provide the distribution of supplies
and services to company, troop, and battery level. Depending on METT-
TC, volume of supplies, expected future operations, and current situation,
that level of distribution may be to battalion, company/team, or platoon
level. Generally, distribution to SBCT infantry battalions is provided to
the company/team. Distribution to other SBCT units will be executed on
an “area support” basis and normally will occur at the same time as the
parent battalion under the current task organization of units. At the SBCT
infantry company level, the SBCT infantry company commander has
ultimate responsibility for CSS. The executive officer and the first sergeant
are the SBCT infantry company's primary CSS operators; they work
closely with the SBCT battalion staff to ensure they receive the required
support for the company's assigned operations.

Section I. CSS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

SBCT battalion and SBCT infantry company commanders, as well as the SBCT battalion
S4, make plans and key decisions concerning CSS. The battalion S4, company executive
officer, company first sergeant, company supply sergeant, platoon sergeants, and squad
leaders implement these plans. Platoon leaders plan and make CSS decisions to
accomplish their assigned missions according to guidance from higher headquarters and
SOPs. Unit SOPs should address planning, implementation, and responsibilities in detail
and should standardize as many routine CSS operations as possible.

11-1. GENERAL GUIDELINES

In SBCT infantry battalions, the health service support assets are assigned to the battalion
headquarters company. The battalion medical platoon provides HSS to the companies. The
brigade support battalion provides each SBCT infantry company with key logistics support,
such as equipment, supplies, and other support functions including petroleum, oils, and
lubricants (POL) and transportation requirements. The respective battalion staff supports
other CSS functions, such as personnel, legal, and religious (for example, the S1 and unit
ministry team [UMT])).
a. Within this support structure, the SBCT infantry company must plan, prepare, and
execute its portion of the SBCT battalion CSS plan. Concurrent with other operational
planning, the company develops its CSS plan during mission analysis and refines it in the
war gaming portion of the troop-leading process. CSS rehearsals are normally conducted at
both SBCT battalion and company levels to ensure a smooth, continuous flow of materiel
and services.
b. The company’s basic CSS responsibilities are to report and request support
requirements through the correct SBCT battalion channels and to ensure that CSS operations
are properly executed when support elements arrive in the company area. The XO and 1SG
are normally in charge of these functions, with guidance and oversight provided by the

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company commander. They must submit accurate personnel and logistical reports, along
with other necessary information and requests.

11-2. COMPANY RESPONSIBILITIES

The SBCT infantry company headquarters is responsible for the coordination and execution
of CSS functions within the company. This includes reporting current status, requesting
supplies or support, and conducting effective CSS operations within the unit. The primary
CSS functions required by the SBCT infantry company include casualty evacuation,
resupply operations, maintenance activities, and personnel service support. The following
SBCT infantry company personnel have the primary responsibility for company CSS.
a. Commander. The commander ensures that CSS operations sustain his company's
fighting potential. He integrates CSS activities into the tactical plan and provides guidance
to the CSS operators. He tailors his CSS operations to meet the tactical plan.
b. Executive Officer. The XO coordinates and supervises the company's logistical
effort. During the planning, he receives status reports from the platoon leaders, platoon
sergeants, and 1SG; reviews the tactical plan with the company commander to determine
company CSS requirements; and coordinates these needs with the battalion S4. During
execution, the XO locates at the second most important place on the battlefield, as
determined by the company commander. At times, this is the place from which he can best
supervise sustainment operations. The XO also performs the following CSS functions:
• Determines the location of the company's resupply point based on data
developed during operational planning and the war gaming process.
• Compiles periodic status reports from the platoon leaders, the PSGs, and the
1SG; provides updates to the commander as required.
• Along with the 1SG, ensures that the company executes CSS operations in
accordance with the SBCT battalion plan and SOP.
• Ensures the CSS needs of supporting units are met.
c. First Sergeant. The company 1SG is a fighter first and logistician second. In
addition to his tactical responsibilities listed in Chapter 1, the 1SG will be a key player in
CSS operations for the company. He also is a key player in the execution of the company’s
CSS plan and may supervise the company trains based upon commander intent and the
factors of METT-TC. He ensures that the XO receives current status reports from all
subordinate units, assists the XO in preparing reports and requests to battalion, and helps the
XO or commander prepare paragraph 4 of the OPORD.
(1) The 1SG ensures receipt, consolidation, and forwarding of all logistics, personnel,
and casualty reports to the battalion combat trains CP. He normally supervises the
evacuation of casualties, EPWs, and damaged equipment. He normally supervises company
resupply activities and monitors company maintenance activities.
(2) The 1SG orients new replacements and assigns them to squads and platoons IAW
the company commander's guidance.
(3) The 1SG ensures the required information is received from the platoon and section
sergeants and the senior trauma specialist. These NCOs are responsible for providing all
CSS reports IAW the SBCT infantry company SOP.
(4) The 1SG may also perform the following CSS functions:

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• Conduct CSS rehearsals at the company level and integrate CSS into the
company's maneuver rehearsals.
• Normally direct and supervise the medical team and move it forward when the
situation requires.
• Maintain the battle roster for the company.
d. Supply Sergeant. The supply sergeant is the company representative in the BSA.
(1) He verifies the logistics package (LOGPAC) and moves with the LOGPAC forward
to the company. He assists with resupply and coordinates the company's CSS requirements
with the BSB’s supply support platoon leader and the SBCT infantry battalion S4. The
supply sergeant may control the medical evacuation vehicle when it is unable to remain
forward with the company. He monitors the tactical situation and adjusts the CSS plan as
appropriate to meet the tactical plan and the company commander's guidance. He may assist
the commander by establishing caches. He forecasts the company's consumption of food,
water, ammunition, POL, and batteries, based on the operation.
(2) The supply sergeant also performs the following CSS functions:
• Coordinates with the battalion S4 for resupply of Classes I, III, and V.
• Maintains individual supply and clothing records; requisitions Class II resupply
as needed.
• Requests Class IV and Class VII equipment and supplies.
• Coordinates with the SBCT infantry battalion’s combat repair team (CRT) to
turn in and pick up maintenance documents, routine Class IX supplies, and
recoverable materials.
• Picks up replacement personnel and, as necessary, delivers them to the 1SG.
• Receives and evacuates human remains and personal effects to the mortuary
affairs point in the BSA.
• Transports, guards, and transfers EPWs as required.
• Accompanies the LOGPAC to the logistics release point (LRP) and guides the
LOGPAC to the company resupply point.
• Accompanies the LOGPAC along with EPWs and damaged vehicles (if
applicable) back to the BSA.
• Coordinates with the SBCT battalion S1 section to turn in and pick up mail and
personnel action documents.
• Collects hazardous material (HAZMAT) and transports it to collection points as
part of LOGPAC procedures.
• Maintains and provides supplies for company field sanitation activities.
e. Platoon Sergeant. Each PSG in the company performs the following CSS
functions:
• Ensures crews perform proper maintenance on all assigned equipment.
• Compiles and submits all personnel and logistics status reports for the platoon as
directed or in accordance with SOP.
• Collects each equipment inspection and maintenance form (DA Form 2404 or
5988) within the platoon.
• Obtains supplies and equipment (all classes except Class VIII) and mail from the
supply sergeant and ensures proper distribution within the platoon.
f. Senior Trauma Specialist/Senior Company Medic. The senior trauma

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specialist/senior company medic is attached to the rifle company to provide emergency

medical treatment for sick, injured, or wounded company personnel. Emergency medical
treatment procedures performed by the trauma specialist may include opening an airway,
starting intravenous fluids, controlling hemorrhage, preventing or treating for shock,
splinting fractures or suspected fractures, and providing relief for pain. The EMT
performed by the trauma specialist is under the supervision of the battalion surgeon or
physician's assistant (PA). The senior trauma specialist/company medic is responsible
for--
• Overseeing and providing guidance to each platoon medic as required.
• Triaging injured, wounded, or ill friendly and enemy personnel for priority of
treatment as they arrive at the company CCP.
• Overseeing sick call screening for the company.
• Requesting and coordinating the evacuation of sick, injured, or wounded
personnel under the direction of the company 1SG.
• Assisting in the training of the company personnel on first aid and combat
lifesavers in enhanced first-aid procedures.
• Requisitioning Class VIII supplies from the BAS for the company according
to the TSOP.
• Recommending locations for company CCPs.
• Providing guidance to the company's combat lifesavers as required.
• Monitoring the tactical situation and anticipating and coordinating health
service support (HSS) requirement and Class VIII resupply as necessary.
• Advising the company commander and 1SG on mass casualty operations.
• Keeping the 1SG informed on the status of casualties and coordinating with
him for additional HSS requirements.

Section II. SOLDIER'S LOAD

The soldier's load is of crucial concern of the leader. How much is carried, how far, and in
what configuration are important mission considerations requiring command emphasis.
Army research indicates that a soldier can carry an amount equal to 30 percent of his body
weight and still retain a high percentage of his agility, stamina, alertness, and mobility. For
the average soldier (weighing 160 pounds), this would be a 48-pound load. Success and
survival in SBCT infantry company operations demand that soldiers retain these
capabilities. When unable to move with stealth, agility, and alertness, the unit is at risk. For
each pound over 30 percent, the soldier loses a proportional amount of his functional ability.
When his load exceeds 45 percent of his body weight, or an average of 72 pounds, his
functional ability drops rapidly, and his chances of becoming a casualty increase. Research
also indicates that training can improve load-carrying capability by 10 to 20 percent at best.
Commanders must ensure soldiers carry no more than 48 pounds when in contact with the
enemy or when enemy contact is expected. At other times, the soldier's load should not
exceed 72 pounds. Sometimes soldiers may have to carry more than the recommended
combat weight, but leaders must realize how that excess weight impacts the unit's
effectiveness. (FM 3-25.18 [FM 21-18]) provides additional information on the soldier's
load.)

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11-3. LOAD PLANNING

The purpose of load planning is two fold. First, it allows the SBCT infantry company
commander to use the estimate of the situation to determine what ammunition, supplies, and
equipment are essential. Second, it recognizes the potential impact of the soldier-load
problem and emphasizes the need to carry only what is necessary. The commander then
arranges for the remainder of the load to be secured or transported. The company
commander must consider METT-TC to determine the transition from vehicle load to
dismounted movement load, thus determining the soldier's load to be carried by the
company. The company commander breaks down the company's equipment and supplies
into one of the three echelons: combat load (approach march or fighting load), sustainment
load, and contingency load (Figure 11-1). The flexibility of the SBCT company allows the
company commander to plan and conduct load planning for mounted and dismounted
movement. The company commander must tailor his load plan to meet his mission
requirements and the unique flexibility of the company to move mounted and
dismounted.

Figure 11-1. Load echelon diagram.

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FM 3-21.11

a. Combat Load. A combat load consists of the minimum mission-essential

equipment, as determined by the mission commander. This includes only what is needed to
fight and survive immediate combat operations. There are two levels of combat load:
fighting loads, which are carried on dynamic operations where contact with the enemy is
expected, and approach march loads, which are carried when transportation cannot be
provided for equipment over and above fighting loads.
(1) Fighting Load. A fighting load is what the soldier carries once contact has been
made with the enemy. It consists only of essential items the soldier needs to accomplish his
task during the engagement. For close combat and operations requiring stealth, any load at
all is a disadvantage. Cross loading of machine-gun ammunition, mortar rounds, antitank
weapons, and radio equipment causes most combat loads to exceed 48 pounds. This is
where risk analysis is critical. Excessive combat loads of assaulting troops must be
configured so that the excess can be redistributed or shed (leaving only the fighting load)
before or upon contact with the enemy.
(2) Approach March Load. This is the load that the soldier carries in addition to his
fighting load. These items, if not kept on the ICVs, are dropped in an assault position, ORP,
or other rally point before or upon contact with the enemy. On long dynamic operations,
soldiers must carry enough equipment and munitions to fight and exist until a planned
resupply can take place. These loads vary and may exceed the goal of 72 pounds.
b. Sustainment Load. A sustainment load consists of the equipment required by the
company commander for sustained operations. Ideally, this equipment is carried on the
ICVs. However, under some circumstances this equipment may be stored by the company
supply section in the BSA and brought forward when needed. A sustaining load can include
rucksacks, squad duffel bags, and sleeping bags. In combat, protective items for specific
threats, such as armored vests and chemical protective overgarments (CPOGs), if not carried
on the ICVs, may be stored in preconfigured unit loads. Commanders must coordinate with
the battalion S4 to ensure that all sustainment load items are available.
c. Contingency Load. The contingency load includes all other items that are not
necessary for ongoing operations, such as extra clothing, personal items, or even Javelins in
a nonarmored threat environment. The austere structure of the SBCT has constrained its
ability to store and maintain contingency stocks. The critical element for company
commanders to determine is what goes in these loads and who is responsible for the storage
and delivery of them.

11-4. LOAD CALCULATION

The combat load for each soldier consists of three components: common essential items
carried (worn) by all soldiers regardless of threat, environment, or mission; duty position
load, consisting of the soldier's assigned weapon (or components of the weapon system) plus
ammunition; and variables, consisting of all other items carried, based on the commander's
estimate of the situation. The latter are items that constitute the environmental, threat
protection, and mission loads. When calculating load requirements, leaders should--
• Adjust combat loads so soldiers carry less than 72 pounds.
• Divide combat loads into fighting loads and approach march loads.
• Have soldiers pack rucksacks and assault packs accordingly.
• Place all other company equipment into the sustainment load.

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Once he decides what items soldiers will carry on the mission, the leader decides how they
will carry them. Soldiers need some items to be immediately available; other items can be
carried in rucksacks.

11-5. LOAD MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

The key to load management is to carry only what is necessary to accomplish the mission.
The following techniques assist the commander in load management. The commander must
also consider his mounted capabilities when determining the company's load management
techniques and dismounted transition.
a. Make sure soldiers distribute their loads evenly over the body and load-carrying
equipment (LCE).
b. Carry critical items within easy reach: carry water, ammunition, and a first aid pouch
on the LCE, with other items in battle dress uniform (BDU) pockets. Ensure that placement
of all items is standardized within the unit, and nothing that could prevent the soldier from
taking a well-aimed shot is allowed on the firing side of the LCE.
c. Distribute loads throughout the unit. If it is necessary to manpack bulk ammunition,
rations, water, or demolitions, divide them into small loads consistent with METT-TC to
ensure they can be distributed on the battlefield where needed.
d. Rotate heavy loads among several soldiers. The unit can rotate radios, M240s,
mortars, and Javelins if enemy contact is not imminent. Ensure that the assigned gunner
stays near the weapons system components if they are rotated.
e. Upon contact with the enemy, drop rucksacks or leave them in an ORP, an assault
position, or the assembly area. The leader can later request battalion or SBCT transportation
assets to bring them to his unit when possible. Soldiers mark their rucksacks by unit to
facilitate quick recovery.
f. Share or consolidate items; if the weather requires soldiers to carry sleeping bags,
carry only enough for those who will sleep at the same time. Soldiers can share the bags as
they take turns rotating security duty. In the same manner, two or three soldiers can share a
rucksack and take turns carrying it.
g. Consider cutting rations to two or even one meal, ready to eat (MRE) per man per
day for short periods.
h. While carrying the rucksack, use water and rations carried in or on it first. If soldiers
must drop their rucksacks, what they carry in their BDUs and on the LCE remains available.
Replace ammunition, water, and rations carried on LCE or in BDU pockets as soon as
possible.
i. When carrying radios in rucksacks, keep them attached to the backpack for access
and use when rucksacks are dropped.
j. Consider caches, supply linkups, captured stocks, and foraging to provide food,
water, shelter, weapons, and equipment to reduce the need to manpack supplies.
k. Avoid unnecessary movement and displacements. To conserve the soldier's stamina,
plan the mission as efficiently as possible. Do not move a platoon when moving a squad can
do the job. If the leader becomes lost, he stops and determines his unit's location before
moving and, if necessary, sends out someone to confirm the unit's location.
l. Supervise the soldier's load closely. Soldiers may carry unnecessary items when they
start on a mission and throw essential items away when they are tired. Packing lists for
rucksack management and leader inspections before and during the mission ensure that only

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necessary items are carried. Rucksack management results in efficient use of a soldier's
energy and ensures that essential items are available when needed in combat.
m. The company net does not always need the COMSEC equipment to function
effectively. Ensure the threat warrants the extra weight on the RATELOs.
n. Consider distributing the approach march or sustainment loads to only two platoons.
This allows the lead platoon to move with more stealth and alertness and to remain
unburdened in case of contact. Platoons can then quickly swap rucksacks as they rotate the
lead.

Section III. TRAINS

In order to maintain the intent of the SBCT and SBCT infantry battalion commander, each
organization at the company level and higher must have a logistical focal point. This focal
point is generally described as the "trains." CSS personnel and equipment organic or
attached to a force that provides support such as supply, evacuation, and maintenance
services comprise the unit trains. The types of trains are described in this section.

11-6. SBCT INFANTRY BATTALION TRAINS

SBCT infantry battalion trains normally consist of two types: combat trains and field
trains.
a. Combat Trains. The SBCT battalion combat trains normally are positioned close
enough to combat elements to be responsive to forward units but beyond the range of enemy
direct fires. The SBCT battalion combat trains usually consist of the HHC’s medical platoon
and the supporting CRT. They are supervised by the combat trains command post (CTCP).
The trains are positioned based upon the factors of METT-TC.
b. Field Trains. The SBCT battalion field trains normally are positioned in the BSA.
The battalion field trains is the primary direct coordination element between the battalion
and the BSB. The HHC HQ section provides direct interface with the administrative and
logistics support elements of the SBCT battalion and BSB in the BSA. The company
normally locates its supply section and corresponding vehicles in the SBCT battalion field
trains.

11-7. SBCT INFANTRY COMPANY TRAINS

The company trains are the focal point for company sustainment operations. It is the most
forward CSS element, and provides essential medical treatment and maintenance support.
The size and composition of the company trains vary depending upon the tactical situation.
The trains may consist of nothing more than preplanned locations on the ground (a control
measure such as a checkpoint) during fast-paced offensive operations, or the trains may
contain two to five tactical vehicles during resupply operations. The company trains are
established to conduct evacuation (of wounded in action, weapons, and equipment) and
resupply as required. When the company has been allocated an ambulance, it usually locates
in the company trains as well. The company trains are located in a covered and concealed
position, close enough to the company to provide responsive support, but out of enemy
direct fire. The 1SG or XO will position the trains and supervise CSS operations.

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11-8. TRAINS SECURITY

Security of CSS elements is critical to the success of the SBCT infantry company and SBCT
battalion missions. For this reason, the company and battalion combat trains must develop
plans for continuous security operations. Company trains normally operate one terrain
feature to the rear of the company. (METT-TC factors dictate the actual distance.) This
location gives the company virtually immediate access to essential CSS functions while
allowing the trains to remain in a covered and concealed position behind the company
combat elements. Where feasible, they may plan and execute a perimeter defense. The
trains, however, may lack the personnel and combat power to conduct a major security
effort. In such situations, they must plan and implement passive security measures to
provide protection from enemy forces.

11-9. COMMUNICATIONS
Fast, reliable communications are critical to the CSS effort. Whether as directed by higher
headquarters or as needed to support the SBCT infantry company mission, the XO or 1SG
must be able to report instantly the company's status, including combat losses, and to send
resupply and support requests.
a. Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below. FBCB2 is a network of
computers, global positioning equipment, and communication systems that provide on-
the-move, real-time command and control information to tactical combat arms, CS, and
CSS soldiers and leaders. The system provides preformatted, standardized reports
allowing the leaders to rapidly disseminate required reports and FRAGOs. The company
may use the FBCB2 to transmit its logistical and personnel status reports to the battalion S4
and the company supply sergeant. FBCB2 is the fastest method of disseminating this
information. Leaders should verify receipt of all reports sent via FBCB2 either by follow-up
message or via FM voice.
b. FM Voice. FM communication is still a critical mode of passing required reports.
However, it may not be the fastest means and may be the least secure means of
communications and poses other problems for the company's CSS operators. The SBCT
battalion administrative and logistics net is used for most CSS traffic, but the company may
not have enough authorized radio systems to monitor it. When this is the case, a higher net
control station must enter the company net to contact the company. Another type of problem
can arise when a company enters the A/L net. The transmission of one company may "walk
over" another company's report or request. Unit SOPs must specify procedures to be
followed in this type of situation to ensure that the battalion trains receive all transmissions
on a timely basis.
c. Messenger. As an alternative, the company can send CSS reports and requests by
messenger or wire. Messengers are slower than radio transmission but more secure. Wire
communications are also very secure but are strictly limited in range and coverage and may
not be a feasible option in a fast paced operation or non-contiguous environment. For
sending lengthy or complex reports and requests, messenger or wire is better than radio
transmission.

Section IV. CSS IN THE SBCT

To meet the challenge of supporting the operations of high-speed war fighters and meet
time-to-deploy objectives, the SBCT employs an austere CSS package with the minimum

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capabilities. The SBCT tailors its combat service support by optimizing the use of CSS
resources (through CSS situational understanding) and minimizing the operational and
CSS footprint in the area of operations. The result is a CSS force package that is
streamlined, strategically mobile, and focused on the sustainment necessities. Split-basing
(the concept of locating assets in the rear and forward with all but the immediate
essentials held in the rear) and modularity (the concept of creating standardized units
which may be located rear or forward) provide just-in-time, tailored support to the SBCT.
Supplies are pushed forward from the rear as needed whenever and wherever feasible.
Also, highly deployable CSS assets are positioned to enter and depart the area of
operations rapidly, as needed, to sustain the force. These concepts are part of CSS reach
as discussed below and in FM 4-0 (100-10). The key logistics and CHS provider within
the SBCT is the BSB. However, there are other elements in the SBCT that plan and
execute CSS operations. This section covers the CSS functions performed by the BSB
and those SBCT elements other than the BSB.

11-10. BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

The SBCT brigade support battalion is organized to perform distribution-based, centralized
CSS functions in accordance with Army XXI CSS concepts. Logistics functions have been
removed from combat and combat support units and consolidated in the BSB. The brigade
support battalion (Figure 11-2) consists of the headquarters and three companies: the
headquarters and distribution company (HDC), the forward maintenance company
(FMC), and the brigade support medical company (BSMC). The austere design of the
CSS structure is insufficient to sustain the SBCT in garrison and during extended
operations. The combat service support company (CSSC) is the minimum solution to
overcome the shortfalls of the BSB during sustained operations. The BSB has no
explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) capability.

Figure 11- 2. Brigade support battalion.

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 FM 3-21.11

11-11. S1 SECTION
Battalion personnel sections perform their traditional roles of personnel management,
personnel services, and personnel support.
a. Personnel Management. S1 sections manage and provide the sustainment tasks
of personnel readiness, personnel accounting, strength reporting, and replacement
management.
b. Personnel Services. When deployed, the S1 performs limited personnel services
(awards, promotions, evaluations, and reassignments). S1s will handle pay-input
transactions for military pay. The brigade S1 is responsible for verifying unit submissions
of Witness Statement/Casualty Feeder Reports against the personnel database and
emergency data in the soldier’s deployment packet. After verifying information with the
appropriate medical treatment facility, the S1 forwards the casualty information through
the Army Casualty Information Processing System. Home station assets primarily
perform other personnel services via reach-back operations.
c. Personnel Support. Postal operations within the SBCT is limited to mail and
distribution activities. The brigade S1 section will receive pre-sorted letter mail and small
packages. Battalion mail clerks within the S1 sections will pick up incoming mail from,
and drop off outgoing to, the brigade mail clerk. Battalions will coordinate with the
brigade S1 for provision of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities and services
as the mission permits. The MWR system is a necessary outlet for soldiers to relieve
combat stress, which is critical to sustaining the readiness of the force.

11-12. BRIGADE OPERATIONAL LAW TEAM

The brigade operational law team (BOLT) provides legal support in operational law
(OPLAW) and either provides or coordinates legal support for the six legal disciplines:
military justice, international law, administrative law, civil law (contract law, fiscal law,
and environmental law), claims, and legal assistance.

11-13. UNIT MINISTRY TEAM

Unit ministry teams facilitate and coordinate religious support across the battlespace.
a. The UMT works directly for the commander. The UMT, at a minimum, is
composed of a chaplain (56A) and an enlisted chaplain assistant (56M). The UMT locates
where it can best coordinate, communicate and facilitate religious support throughout the
AO.
b. The brigade UMT coordinates religious support throughout the brigade AO. It
ensures all units and individuals operating within the AO are provided religious support
to include contractors, refugees, displaced persons, detained civilians in the area of
operation, and enemy prisoners of war.
c. Chaplains often serve as the "conscience of the command." Chaplains advise the
commander on the moral and ethical nature of command policies, programs, and actions,
and their impact on soldiers. The UMT is responsible for and supports the free exercise of
religion. Chaplains provide support for death notifications, Red Cross notifications by
command, and liaison with continental United States (CONUS) and host-nation clergy.

11-14. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Financial management support includes the following:

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FM 3-21.11

• Banking and currency and support.

• Procurement support.
• Disbursing support.
• Cost-capturing and accounting.
• Non-US pay, including EPW/counterintelligence (CI), and US pay and travel.
The SBCT has no organic financial management support assets. Finance units must
deploy to provide financial management for SBCTs in the same manner they support the
rest of the Army.

11-15. ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR

The SBCT has no organic military police support assets to take control and evacuate
EPWs. SBCT OPORDs and SOPs will assign responsibility for EPWs.

Section V. SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS

Each SBCT infantry company deploys with 72 hours of supplies. The SBCT infantry
company commander considers his situation to decide on the best means of resupplying his
company. Resupply operations are generally classified as routine, emergency, or prestock.
Cues and procedures for each method are specified in the company SOP and are rehearsed
during company training exercises. The actual method selected for resupply in the field
depends on METT-TC factors.

11-16. CLASSES OF SUPPLY

Supplies are divided into 10 major categories, which are referred to as classes (Figure 11-
3, page 11-14). There are also a few miscellaneous items that do not fit into any of the
other 10 supply classes.
a. Class I. Class I supplies (MREs) will be configured into unit-configured loads based
on personnel strength reports. These loads will be delivered with the LOGPACs by the
BSB’s transportation platoon. No unit in the SBCT has organic food service capabilities.
Operational rations (MREs) will be used until military augmentation (BSB combat service
support company) or contractor support is identified in theater.
b. Water. The BSB’s fuel and water support platoon is capable of limited purification,
storage, and distribution of water. The SBCT is expected to obtain water in the theater of
operations. Each day the SBCT infantry company should refill one of its two 400-gallon
water trailers.
c. Class II. Limited stocks of Class II items (preventive medicine, field hygiene,
weapons cleaning, and special tools) will be available at the BSB. Class II (NBC) will be
configured at intermediate staging bases (ISBs) and called forward as needed. Class II
administrative supplies will not be stocked at the BSB but may be requested as the theater
matures.
d. Class III. The BSB’s fuel and water support platoon has the only bulk fuel storage
and distribution capability within the SBCT. The SBCT is expected to obtain fuel in the
theater of operations. The battalion S4 will arrange for LOGPACs to deliver fuel based on
logistics status reports.
e. Class IV. Company SOP specifies the combat load of Class IV items for each
vehicle. The BSB’s supply support platoon stocks a limited amount of barrier material such

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 FM 3-21.11

as concertina wire, sandbags, and pickets. Other Class IV must be configured at ISBs and
called forward as needed.
f. Class V. The SBCT infantry company deploys with a combat load of personal
munitions and a turret load of vehicle munitions. The BSB’s ammunition transfer point
(ATP) section does not deploy with sustainment stocks. Munitions will be delivered to the
ATP on HEMMT-load handling system (LHS) flatracks and delivered to battalion release
points. The SBCT infantry company will use its personnel and equipment to rearm.
g. Class VI. The BSB does not stock Class VI supplies. After 30 days in theater, the
supplement health and comfort pack (HCP) ration is usually issued with Class I rations.
h. Class VII. Class VII status is reported through command channels; it is intensively
managed and command controlled. The BSB will receive replacement items as ready-to-
fight systems. Ready-to-fight systems are sent forward with the LOGPAC.
i. Class VIII. Medical supplies, such as first aid dressings, refills for first aid kits,
water purification tablets, and foot powder, are supplied by the BSB’s BSMC to the
battalion medical platoon via LOGPAC, ambulance backhaul, or emergency delivery.
j. Class IX. The SBCT infantry company stocks limited Class IX to perform
organizational maintenance on small arms and communications equipment. The battalion’s
supporting CRT will either request the appropriate repair parts in response to a specific
request or repair the piece of equipment by controlled exchange of serviceable parts.
Rechargeable batteries for night vision devices and man-portable radios may require one-
for-one exchange. In combat situations, exchange and controlled substitution are the normal
means of obtaining Class IX items.

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Figure 11-3. Classes of supply.

11-17. ROUTINE RESUPPLY

Routine resupply operations cover items in Classes I, III, V, and IX, as well as mail and any
other items requested by the company. Whenever possible, routine resupply should be
conducted daily, ideally during periods of limited visibility.

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 FM 3-21.11

a. Logistics Package Operations. The LOGPAC technique is a simple, efficient way

to accomplish routine resupply operations. SBCT infantry company, SBCT infantry
battalion, and BSB SOPs specify the exact composition and execution order of the
LOGPAC.
(1) Preparation. The company supply sergeant first compiles and coordinates all the
company's supply requests. Based on the requests, he then verifies the LOGPAC with the
assistance of the BSB supply support platoon leader. The BSB focuses on the resupply side
of the LOGPAC. The company supply sergeant focuses on the other needs of the company
to include--
• Replacement personnel and soldiers returning from medical treatment.
• Vehicles returning to the company area from maintenance.
• Mail and personnel action documents (including awards and finance and legal
documents) from the SBCT battalion S1 section.
When LOGPAC preparations are complete, the supply sergeant receives an update of the
company’s location and LRP via FBCB2 or FM voice. He will accompany the LOGPAC to
the LRP where he will assume control of the company LOGPAC. The supply sergeant and
LOGPAC move through the LRP to the company resupply point and link up with the XO or
1SG.
(2) Actions at the LRP. When the LOGPAC arrives at the LRP, the company supply
sergeant quickly assumes control of the company LOGPAC and continues tactical
movement to the company resupply point. The LOGPAC will stop at the LRP only when
the tactical situation dictates or when ordered by the commander. Security will be
maintained at all times.
(3) Resupply Procedures. The company can use the service station or tailgate resupply
method, both of which are discussed later in this section. The time required for resupply is
an important planning factor. Resupply must be conducted as quickly and efficiently as
possible, both to ensure operational effectiveness and to allow the company LOGPAC to
return to the LRP on time. Service station resupply of the company normally takes 60 to 90
minutes but may take longer. Tailgate resupply usually requires significantly more time than
service station resupply.
(4) Return to the LRP. Once resupply operations are complete, the LOGPAC vehicles
are prepared for the return trip. Company vehicles requiring evacuation for maintenance are
lined up and prepared for towing. Human remains and their personal effects are carried on
cargo trucks, fuel trucks, or disabled vehicles. EPWs ride in the cargo trucks and are
guarded by walking wounded or other company personnel. All supply requests and
personnel action documents are consolidated for forwarding to the field trains, where the
appropriate staff section processes them for the next LOGPAC. The supply sergeant leads
the LOGPAC back to the LRP where he links up with the BSB transportation platoon leader
or moves through the LRP to the BSA. It is critical that the LOGPAC continue to move
through the LRP to avoid interdiction by enemy forces or artillery. Whenever possible, the
reunited LOGPAC convoy returns to the BSA together. When METT-TC dictates or when
the LOGPAC arrives too late to rejoin the larger convoy, the company vehicles must return
to the BSA on their own.
b. Resupply Methods (Mounted). As directed by the commander or XO, the 1SG
establishes the company resupply point using either the service station or tailgate method.
He briefs each LOGPAC driver on which method to use. When the resupply point is ready,

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the 1SG informs the commander, who in turn directs each platoon or element to conduct
resupply based on the tactical situation.
(1) Service Station Resupply. With the service station method, vehicles move
individually or in small groups to a centrally located resupply point. Depending on the
tactical situation, one vehicle or section, or even an entire platoon, moves out of its position,
conducts resupply operations, and then moves back into position. This process continues
until the entire company has been resupplied (Figure 11-4). In using this method, platoons,
sections, or individual vehicles enter the resupply point following a one-way traffic flow.
Only vehicles requiring immediate maintenance stop at the maintenance holding area.
Vehicles move through each supply location, with squads and crews rotating individually to
eat, pick up mail and sundries, and refill or exchange water cans. When all platoon vehicles,
squads, and crews have completed resupply, they move to a holding area where, time
permitting, the platoon leader and PSG conduct a pre-combat inspection.

Figure 11-4. Service station resupply method.

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 FM 3-21.11

(2) Tailgate Resupply. The tailgate method of resupply is normally used only in
assembly areas. Vehicles remain in their vehicle positions or back out a short distance to
allow trucks carrying supplies to reach them. Squads, fire teams, machine gun teams, or
individual vehicle crews rotate through the feeding area, pick up mail and sundries, and fill
or exchange water cans. Any EPWs are centralized and guarded by company security teams.
Human remains and their personal effects, are brought to the holding area where they are
secured by the company supply sergeant (Figure 11-5).

Figure 11-5. Tailgate resupply method.

11-18. EMERGENCY RESUPPLY

Occasionally (normally during combat operations), the company may have such an urgent
need for resupply that it cannot wait for a routine LOGPAC. Emergency resupply may
involve Classes III, V, and VIII, as well as NBC equipment and, on rare occasions, Class I.
The SBCT battalion usually uses BSB supply support platoon and HHC medical assets to
conduct emergency resupply of the company. Emergency resupply can be conducted using
either the service station or tailgate method, although procedures may have to be adjusted
when the company is in contact with the enemy. In the service station method, individual
vehicles pull back during a lull in combat on order of the company commander or platoon
leader; they conduct resupply and then return to the fight. With tailgate resupply, the
company brings limited supplies forward to the closest concealed position behind each
vehicle or element.

11-19. PRESTOCK OPERATIONS

Prestock resupply, also known as pre-positioning or cache, is most often required in
defensive operations. Normally only Class V items are pre-positioned. Class III supplies can
be pre-positioned, but this requires that company vehicles refuel before moving into fighting

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positions during initial occupation of the BP or to move out of their fighting positions to
conduct refueling operations at the rear of the BP. Prestock operations must be carefully
planned and executed at every level. All leaders, down to vehicle commanders and squad
leaders, must know the exact locations of prestock sites, which they verify during
reconnaissance or rehearsals. The SBCT infantry company must take steps to ensure
survivability of the prestock supplies. These measures include digging in prestock positions
and selecting covered and concealed positions. The company commander must also have a
plan to remove or destroy pre-positioned supplies to prevent the enemy from capturing
them.

11-20. COMPANY RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS

Company resupply is mainly a "push" system. This means the company receives a standard
package of supplies from battalion based on past usage factors and planning estimates.
a. The SBCT battalion S4 plans the contents of a LOGPAC. The supplies are normally
organized and assembled in the BSA by the BSB supply support platoon leader in
coordination with the company supply sergeant. The LOGPAC should, if possible, provide
all supplies, equipment, and personnel needed to sustain the company for the next 24 hours
or until the next scheduled LOGPAC delivery.
b. Adjustments to the LOGPAC are sent to the battalion S4, who is located in the
combat trains CP. These adjustments may be sent over the battalion A/L net, through the
company supply sergeant, or by a company messenger. When using a battalion A/L net that
is not secure, encode reports using SOI.
c. Company status reports often translate into supply requests or they provide
information to allow the battalion S4 to anticipate company needs. An example is the
personnel daily summary, which is sent to the battalion S1. It provides the number of
personnel in the field, which the battalion S4 can use to plan Class I resupply.
d. The supply sergeant is responsible for non-BSB actions (for example, personnel and
administrative actions) and for delivering them to the company.

11-21. COMPANY RESUPPLY TECHNIQUES

Company resupply techniques are those methods of employing company assets (personnel
and equipment) to effect resupply or redistribution of supplies with subordinate elements.
These techniques are independent from the methods in which the company receives supplies
from higher headquarters; they are solely concerned with distribution of supplies to the
platoons and sections. There are three company resupply techniques: in position, out of
position, and pre-position.
a. In Position. The company executes in-position resupply by moving the required
supplies or equipment forward while the platoons remain in their fighting positions. This
technique is used when it is essential to maintain combat power forward (during contact or
when contact is imminent) or when the company is dispersed over a wide area. If vehicles
are not able to move near the platoons because of enemy fire, some platoon members may
have to assist resupply personnel in moving supplies and equipment forward.
b. Out of Position. The company executes out-of-position resupply by establishing a
resupply point in a covered and concealed position to the rear of a platoon position and
directing platoons to move from their fighting positions to the resupply point, pick up
supplies, and move back to their fighting positions. This technique is used when the

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situation does not necessitate all combat power being forward (contact is not likely).
Company SOPs establish whether all or part of the platoon moves to resupply at one time. A
variation of this technique would be to establish a resupply point for each platoon and pre-
position the LOGPAC.
c. Pre-Position. The company pre-positions supplies and equipment along the route to
or at the location to which the platoons are moving and directs the platoons to these
locations. The supplies or equipment may be uploaded on a vehicle or on the ground,
secured or unsecured, concealed or in the open. The factors of METT-TC determine exactly
what measures are required. This technique is most often used during defensive operations
when supplies are positioned in subsequent defensive positions.
d. Caches. A cache is a pre-positioned and concealed supply point. It can be used in
any operation. Caches are an excellent tool for reducing the soldier's load and can be set up
for a specific mission or as a contingency measure. Cache sites have the same characteristics
as an ORP or patrol base, with the supplies concealed above or below ground. An
aboveground cache is easier to get to but is more likely to be discovered by the enemy,
civilians, or animals. There is always a security risk when returning to a cache. A cache site
should be observed for signs of enemy presence and secured before being used; it may have
been booby-trapped and may be under enemy observation.
(1) In the offense, advance elements may set up a cache along the intended route of
advance to the objective. Caches may also be set up in-zone to support continuous
operations without allowing the enemy to locate the company through air or ground
resupply. Soldier's load considerations may limit the size of caches. Do not let the cache
activities jeopardize the offensive mission. In some cases, special forces, allied forces, or
partisans may set up caches.
(2) In the defense, a defending unit may set up caches throughout the area of operations
during the preparation phase. A cache should also be in each alternate or subsequent
position throughout the depth of the defense sector. During stay-behind operations, or in an
area defense on a fluid battlefield where the enemy is all around, caches may be the only
source of supply for extended periods.
e. Security. While these techniques are used in both offensive and defensive
operations, the transfer of supplies to the company is usually conducted from a defensive
posture. As such, the security considerations for a resupply operation are like those for a
perimeter defense.

11-22. SUPPLY CONSIDERATIONS

The techniques described in the preceding paragraphs are the normal methods for resupply
within the company. However, a basic understanding of nonstandard techniques, different
modes of delivery, and specific supply issues is also required for the successful execution of
the sustainment function.
a. Foraging and Scavenging. Foraging and scavenging are used infrequently and only
under extreme conditions. Foraging is the gathering of supplies and equipment necessary to
sustain basic needs (food, water, shelter, and so forth) from within the area of operations.
Scavenging is the gathering of supplies or equipment (friendly or enemy) from within the
area of operations to help the user accomplish his military mission. Leaders must protect
their soldiers by determining whether the food or water is safe or whether the equipment is
booby-trapped (FM 1-04.10 [FM 27-10]).

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b. Aerial Resupply. In using aerial resupply, the SBCT infantry company commander
must consider the threat's ability to locate his unit by observing the aircraft. Unless
conducting the resupply in an area under friendly control and away from direct enemy
observation (reverse slope of a defensive position with recon well forward), locate the drop
zone/landing zone (DZ/LZ) away from the main unit in an area that can be defended for a
short time. The delivered supplies are immediately transported away from the DZ/LZ. The
SBCT has no capability to configure loads for packaging airloads.
c. Cross-Leveling. Cross-leveling is simply a redistribution of supplies throughout the
unit. Usually done automatically between platoons and squads after every engagement, the
company may cross-level supplies between platoons when resupply cannot be effected. In
some instances, supplies may not be evenly redistributed. For example, during preparation
for an assault of an enemy trench system, the platoon with the task of support by fire may be
required to give its hand grenades to the platoon with the task of clearing the trench.
d. Backhauling. Backhauling is a method used to make the most use of vehicular or
manpack capabilities moving rearward. Backhauling returns supplies, equipment, or
HAZMAT to the rear for disposition. Backhauling is also a means for nonstandard
evacuation.
e. Water. Ensuring that soldiers receive and drink enough water is one of the prime
CSS and leadership functions at all levels in the company chain of command. Even in cold
areas, everyone needs to drink at least two quarts of water a day to maintain efficiency.
Soldiers must drink water at an increased rate in a combat environment.
(1) Water is delivered to the unit under company or battalion control in 5-gallon cans,
bottled water, water trailers, or collapsible containers. When a centralized feeding area is
established, a water point is set up in the mess area and each soldier fills his canteen as he
goes through. When the company distributes rations, it can resupply water either by
collecting and filling empty canteens or by distributing water cans to the platoons.
(2) Water is habitually included in LOGPACs. The ability of the command to supply
water is limited by the ability of the BSB’s water section to purify, store, and distribute it.
The logistics system may not always be able to meet unit needs, particularly during
decentralized operations. In most environments, water is available from natural sources.
Soldiers should be trained to find, treat (chemically or using field expedients), and use
natural water sources. See FM 3-05.70 (21-76) for ways the unit can supply its own water if
necessary.
(3) When water is not scarce, leaders must urge soldiers to drink water even when they
are not thirsty. The body's thirst mechanism does not keep pace with the loss of water
through normal daily activity. The rate at which dehydration occurs depends on the weather
conditions and the level of physical exertion.
(4) If water is in short supply, be sparing in its use for hygiene purposes. Water used for
coffee or tea may be counterproductive since both increase the flow of urine. Soups,
however, are an efficient means of getting both water and nutrition when water is scarce.
This is especially true in cold weather when heated food is desirable. When in short supply,
water should not be used to heat MREs. A centralized heating point can be used to conserve
water yet provide warmed MREs.

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11-23. TRANSPORTATION
Although an SBCT infantry company has organic transportation, movement of supplies,
equipment, and personnel with the limited vehicle assets available requires careful planning
and execution. Leaders must ensure that drivers know where they are going and how to get
there. Land navigation training, marked routes, and strip maps referenced to landmarks are
all ways to keep drivers from getting lost. SBCT infantry company personnel must know
how to select PZs and LZs and receive aerial resupply (see FM 3-97.4[FM 90-4]).

Section VI. MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

The maintenance of weapons and equipment is continuous. Every soldier must know how to
maintain his weapon and equipment in accordance with the related technical manual. The
commander, XO, and 1SG must understand maintenance for every piece of equipment in the
company.

11-24. SBCT MAINTENANCE CONCEPT

The SBCT maintenance concept is based upon the two-level maintenance system and
centralized management. The two levels of maintenance are field and sustainment. Field
maintenance is the combined organizational and direct support tasks performed by the
BSB’s CRT to return a piece of equipment to an operational status. Sustainment
maintenance occurs at echelons above the SBCT. The BSB’s forward maintenance company
provides all maintenance support for the SBCT, less medical and the limited automation
capability, which is integrated into the SBCT’s S6 sections and the signal company. The
BSB may augment its capability with contractor maintenance support. Centralized
management of all field maintenance by the BSB allows the infantry company commander
to focus on PMCS to keep his company’s weapons systems operational.

11-25. MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

Proper maintenance is the key to keeping vehicles, equipment, and other materials in
serviceable condition. It is a continuous process that starts with preventive measures taken
by each vehicle crew and continues through repair and recovery efforts by maintenance
personnel. It includes the functions of inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning,
recovering, and evacuating equipment.
a. The unit SOP should detail when maintenance is performed (at least once a day in
the field), to what standards, and who inspects it. The squad leader is most often the one
who inspects maintenance work, with the platoon sergeant, platoon leader, 1SG, XO, and
commander conducting spot-checks. One technique is for each to spot-check a different
platoon; another is for each to check a single type of weapon or piece of equipment in all
platoons daily. These instructions must be integrated into the SOP for patrol bases, assembly
areas, defenses, and reorganization to ensure that maintenance is done without jeopardizing
unit security and to make it a habit for the soldiers.
b. In addition to operator maintenance, selected soldiers are trained to perform limited
maintenance on damaged weapons and battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR).
c. Inoperative equipment is fixed as far forward as possible. When a piece of
equipment is damaged, it should be inspected to see if it can be repaired on the spot. The
company armorer keeps a small-arms repair kit in the company trains or on the dedicated
company vehicle. If equipment cannot be repaired forward, it is evacuated immediately or

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returned with a LOGPAC. Even if the item cannot be evacuated at once, the CSS system is
alerted to prepare for repair or replacement. If a replacement is available (from an evacuated
soldier or inoperative equipment), it is sent forward. If not, the leader must work around it
by prioritizing the use of remaining equipment (for example, using a squad radio for the
company FM command net if the platoon radio is broken).
d. Maintenance applies to all equipment. Items such as magazines, ammunition, and
batteries are also maintained and inspected. While test firing in an assembly area, mark the
magazines of weapons that have stoppages. If a magazine is marked more than twice, the
magazine may be causing the stoppages. Inspect the ammunition belts for crew-served
weapons along with the weapons. Dirty or corroded ammunition may also cause weapon
malfunctions.

11-26. COMPANY ROLE

Company maintenance functions begin with PMCS, a daily crew responsibility, and crew-
level preparation of the appropriate equipment inspection and maintenance forms (DA Form
2404 or 5988). These forms are the primary means through which the company obtains
maintenance support or repair parts. The forms follow a pathway, described in the following
paragraphs, from crew level to the BSA and back. Per unit SOP, the company XO or 1SG
supervises the "flow" of these critical maintenance documents and parts.
a. Squad leaders or vehicle commanders collect the maintenance forms each day and
send them via FBCB2 or give them to the PSG, who consolidates the forms for the platoon.
The PSG forwards an electronic version or gives a hard copy of the forms to the XO or 1SG,
who reviews and verifies problems and deficiencies and requests parts needed for
maintenance and repairs. The electronic versions of the forms are consolidated at company
level and then transmitted to the battalion and its supporting CRT. During the next
LOGPAC operation, the completed hard copy forms are returned to the CRT to document
completion of the repair.
b. In the BSA, the required repair parts are packaged for delivery during the next
scheduled resupply or through emergency resupply means.
c. The individual soldier or vehicle crew conducts initial maintenance, repair, and
recovery actions on site. Once it is determined that the crew cannot repair or recover the
vehicle or equipment, the platoon contacts the XO or 1SG. If additional assistance is needed,
the 1SG requests it from the SBCT battalion S4. The battalion S4 will notify the CRT
supporting the battalion to repair, classify, and coordinate evacuation, if required. The CRT
will assess the damaged or broken equipment and make necessary repairs to return the piece
of equipment to fully mission-capable or mission-capable status, if appropriate.

11-27. DESTRUCTION
When a vehicle or piece of equipment cannot be recovered or is damaged beyond repair, the
platoon reports the situation to the SBCT infantry company commander. The commander
gives permission for destruction of the materiel if that is the only way to prevent enemy
capture. Crewmen remove all digital equipment, radios, crew-served weapons, ammunition,
personal items, and other serviceable items and parts; they also take all classified materials
or paperwork that could be of intelligence value to the enemy. The platoon then destroys the
vehicle or equipment using procedures specified in the company SOP.

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Section VII. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

Effective, timely medical care is an essential factor in sustaining the company's combat
power during continuous operations. The company commander must ensure that the
company's leaders and its medical personnel know how to keep soldiers healthy, how to
save their lives if they are wounded or injured, and how to make them well once injury or
illness occurs.

11-28. HEALTH AND HYGIENE

The company commander and all leaders, in conjunction with the company senior trauma
specialist and field sanitation team, must emphasize and enforce high standards of health
and hygiene at all times. This "preventive medicine" approach should cover all aspects of
the soldier's health and well being, including the following:
• Daily shaving to ensure proper fit of the protective mask.
• Regular bathing and changing of clothes.
• Prevention of weather-related problems. These include cold injuries such as
frostbite, trench foot, and immersion foot, and heat injuries like heat exhaustion
and heat stroke. Soldiers must understand the effects of conditions such as
sunburn and wind-chill.
• Prevention of diseases. Insect-borne diseases such as malaria and Lyme disease,
and diarrheal diseases can be prevented with effective field sanitation measures,
including unit waste control, water purification, rodent control, and use of insect
repellents.
• Combat operational stress control, battle fatigue prevention, and strict
implementation of the unit sleep plan.

11-29. SOLDIERS WOUNDED IN ACTION

Care of wounded or injured soldiers during combat operations is a continuous, progressive
operation that occurs in a series of separate but interlocking stages. It involves personnel,
equipment, and facilities at virtually every level of the organization. The normal flow of
medical treatment for combat casualties is from the combat lifesaver to the company senior
trauma specialist at the CCP to medics at the BAS. In addition, company leaders play an
important role in obtaining and providing medical services for their wounded in action
(WIA). The following paragraphs discuss the individual responsibilities of company
personnel in this process.
a. Combat Lifesaver. The combat lifesaver (CLS) is almost always the first person on
the scene to begin the process of providing enhanced first aid to the wounded and injured
personnel. The CLS is a non-medical soldier trained to provide advanced first
aid/lifesaving procedures beyond the level of self-aid or buddy aid. The CLS is not
intended to take the place of medical personnel but to slow deterioration of a wounded
soldier’s condition until medical personnel arrive. Each certified CLS will be issued a
CLS aid bag. Whenever possible, the company commander should ensure that there is at
least one combat lifesaver in each fire team or at least one on each vehicle at all times.
b. Vehicle Commander. The vehicle commander is responsible for ensuring that
wounded or injured crewmen receive immediate first aid and that the commander is
informed of casualties. He coordinates with the 1SG and company senior trauma specialist
for ground evacuation. The vehicle commander ensures that casualty feeder (DA Form

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1156) and witness statement (DA Form 1155) forms are completed and routed to the proper
channels. (The casualty feeder card stays with the wounded soldier; witness statements are
given to the 1SG.)
c. Senior Trauma Specialist. The senior trauma specialist is both the company's
primary medical treatment practitioner and the supervisor of all battlefield medical
operations. The latter role encompasses numerous responsibilities. The senior trauma
specialist works closely with the company commander to ensure all members of the
company understand what to do to provide and obtain medical treatment in combat
situations. He oversees the training of combat lifesavers. Once combat begins, he will
manage the company CCP, provide medical treatment, and prepare patients for
MEDEVAC. He assists the vehicle commanders and the 1SG in arranging casualty
evacuation. The senior trauma specialist is also responsible for monitoring the vital
paperwork that is part of the medical treatment and evacuation process:
(1) He ensures that the casualty feeder report remains with each casualty until the
soldier reaches the SBCT infantry battalion main aid station or field aid station.
(2) If a soldier's remains cannot be recovered, the senior trauma specialist ensures
that the crew completes DA Form 1155 (witness statement) as quickly as possible and
ensures that the form is given to the 1SG for processing.

NOTE: DA Form 1156 is collected at the aid station by designated medical personnel; it
is forwarded to the S1 section for further processing through administrative
channels in the SBCT battalion field trains.

d. First Sergeant. The 1SG supervises and coordinates casualty operations, collects
witness statements and submits them to the battalion S1, and submits the battle loss report to
the SBCT battalion TOC. Perhaps his most important duty is managing the company's
personnel status during combat operations. As necessary, he directs cross leveling among
platoons and vehicle crews to alleviate personnel shortages.
e. Commander. The company commander has overall responsibility for medical
services. His primary task is to position medical personnel at the proper point on the
battlefield to treat casualties or to evacuate those casualties properly. The company
commander designates the location for the company's CCP and ensures that all vehicle
commanders record the location on appropriate overlays. He also develops and implements
appropriate SOPs for casualty evacuation. An example is standardized vehicle markings
based on the severity of casualties carried on particular vehicles.

11-30. CASUALTY EVACUATION

Effective casualty evacuation provides a major increase in the morale of a unit. Casualties
are cared for at the point of injury (or under nearby cover and concealment) and receive
self-aid/buddy-aid, advanced first aid from the combat lifesaver, or emergency medical
treatment from the trauma specialist (company or platoon medic).
a. During the fight, casualties should remain under cover where they received initial
treatment (self-aid or buddy-aid). As soon as the situation allows, casualties are moved to
the platoon CCP. From the platoon area, casualties are normally evacuated to the
company CCP and then back to the BAS, which is designated by the company commander
in the OPORD. The unit SOP should address this activity, to include the marking of

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casualties during limited visibility operations. Small, standard, or IR chemical lights work
well for this purpose. Once the casualties are collected, evaluated, and treated, they are
prioritized IAW FM 8-10-6 for evacuation back to the company CCP. Once they arrive at
the company CCP, the above process is repeated while awaiting their evacuation back to
the BAS.
b. An effective technique, particularly during an attack, is to task-organize a logistics
team under the 1SG. These soldiers carry additional ammunition forward to the platoons and
evacuate casualties to either the company or the battalion CCP. The leader determines the
size of the team during his estimate.
c. When the company is widely dispersed, the casualties may be evacuated directly
from the platoon CCP by vehicle or helicopter. Often, helicopter evacuation is restricted due
to the enemy ADA threat. In some cases, the casualties must be moved to the company CCP
before evacuation. When the battalion's organic ambulances are not enough to move the
wounded, unit leaders may direct supply vehicles to "backhaul" non-urgent casualties to the
battalion aid station after supplies are delivered. In other cases, the platoon sergeant may
direct platoon litter teams to carry the casualties to the rear.
d. Leaders must minimize the number of soldiers required to evacuate casualties.
Casualties with minor wounds can walk or even assist with carrying the more seriously
wounded. Soldiers can make field-expedient litters by cutting small trees and putting the
poles through the sleeves of buttoned BDU blouses. A travois, or skid, may be used for
casualty evacuation. This is a type of litter on which wounded can be strapped; it can be
pulled by one person. It can be locally fabricated from durable, rollable plastic on which tie-
down straps are fastened. In rough terrain (or on patrols), casualties may be evacuated to the
battalion aid station by litter teams, carried with the unit until transportation can reach them,
or left at a position and picked up later.
e. Unit SOPs and OPORDs must address casualty treatment and evacuation in detail.
They should cover the duties and responsibilities of key personnel, the evacuation of
chemically contaminated casualties (on separate routes from noncontaminated casualties),
and the priority for manning key weapons and positions. They should specify preferred and
alternate methods of evacuation and make provisions for retrieving and safeguarding the
weapons, ammunition, and equipment of casualties. Slightly wounded personnel are treated
and returned to duty by the lowest echelon possible. Platoon aidmen evaluate sick soldiers
and either treat or evacuate them as necessary. Casualty evacuation should be rehearsed like
any other critical part of an operation.
f. A casualty report, DA Form 1156 (Figure 11-6, page 11-27), is filled out when a
casualty occurs or as soon as the tactical situation permits. This is usually done by the
soldier's squad leader and turned in to the platoon sergeant, who forwards it to the 1SG. A
brief description of how the casualty occurred (to include the place, time, and activity being
performed) and who or what inflicted the wound is included. If the squad leader does not
have personal knowledge of how the casualty occurred, he gets this information from any
soldier who does have the knowledge. Pocketsize witness statements, DA Form 1155
(Figure 11-7, page 11-28), are used to report missing or captured soldiers or when remains
are not recovered. The soldier with the most knowledge of the incident should complete the
witness statement. This information is used to inform the soldier's next of kin and to provide
a statistical base for analysis of friendly or enemy tactics. Once the casualty’s medical

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FM 3-21.11

condition has stabilized, the company commander may write a letter to the soldier's next of
kin.

NOTE: Before casualties are evacuated to the CCP or beyond, leaders should remove all
key operational items and equipment, including SOIs, maps, position location
devices, and laser pointers. Every unit should establish an SOP for handling the
weapons and ammunition of its WIAs. Protective masks must stay with the
individual.

g. At the CCP, the senior trauma specialist conducts triage of all casualties, takes the
necessary steps to stabilize their condition, and initiates the process of evacuating them to
the rear for further treatment. He assists the PSG and vehicle commanders in arranging
evacuation via ground or air ambulance, or by non-standard means.
h. When possible, the HHC medical platoon ambulances provide evacuation and en
route care from the soldier’s point of injury or the company’s CCP to the BAS. The
ambulance team supporting the company works in coordination with the senior trauma
specialist supporting the platoons. When a casualty occurs in a fighting vehicle, the
evacuation team will move as close to the vehicle as possible, making full use of cover,
concealment, and defilade. Assisted, if possible by the vehicle’s crew, they will extract
the casualty from the vehicle and administer emergency medical treatment. In mass
casualty situations, non-medical vehicles may be used to assist in casualty evacuation as
directed by the infantry company commander. Plans for the use of non-medical vehicles
to perform casualty evacuation should be included in the unit SOP. Ground ambulances
from the BSMC or supporting corps air ambulances evacuate patients from the BAS back
to the BSMC medical treatment facility (MTF) located in the BSA.

NOTE: During entry operations, air ambulances may not be available for the first 96
hours.

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Figure 11-6. Casualty report.

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FM 3-21.11

Figure 11-7. Witness statement.

11-31. SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

The company commander designates a location for the collection of those killed in action.
Temporary remains holding areas should be established behind a natural barrier, such as a
stand of trees, or shielded from the view of others by using either tents or tarpaulins. All
personal effects remain with the body, but equipment and issue items become the
responsibility of the vehicle commander or squad leader until they can be turned over to the
1SG or supply sergeant. As a rule, human remains should not be transported on the same
vehicle as wounded soldiers. The commander sends a letter of condolence to the soldier's
next of kin, normally within 48 hours of the death.

Section VIII. REORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS REPLACEMENT

To maintain effective, consistent combat power, the company must have specific plans and
procedures that allow each element to quickly integrate replacement personnel and
equipment. Unit SOP should define how soldiers and equipment are prepared for combat,
including areas such as uploading, load plans, PCIs, and in-briefings.

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11-32. REPLACEMENT AND CROSS-LEVELING OF PERSONNEL

Replacements for wounded, killed, or missing personnel are requested through the battalion
S1. Returning or replacement personnel arriving with the LOGPAC should have already
been issued all TA-50 equipment, MOPP gear, and other items, including their personal
weapons. Within the company, each platoon leader cross-levels personnel among his crews,
with the 1SG controlling cross leveling from platoon to platoon. Soldiers from disabled or
destroyed vehicles are used to fill out squads and crews until replacement personnel and
vehicles arrive at the company CP.

11-33. PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES

Integrating replacements into a company is important. A new arrival on the battlefield may
be scared and disoriented as well as unfamiliar with local SOPs and the theater of
operations. The following procedures help integrate new arrivals into a company.
a. The company commander meets them and welcomes them to the unit. This is
normally a brief interview. The company commander must have an SOP for reception and
integration of newly assigned soldiers.
b. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant welcome them to the unit, inform them of
unit standards, and introduce them to their squad leaders.
c. The squad leader introduces them to the squad and briefs them on duty positions. He
also ensures that each replacement has a serviceable, zeroed weapon, as well as ammunition,
MOPP gear, and other essential equipment. The in-briefing should cover the squad and
platoon's recent and planned activities.
d. The new arrival is told about important SOPs and special information concerning the
area of operations. He may be given a form letter to send to his next of kin. The letter should
tell them where to mail letters and packages, tell them how to use the Red Cross in
emergencies, and introduce them to the chain of command.

11-34. REPLACEMENT AND SALVAGING OF EQUIPMENT

Lost, damaged, or destroyed equipment is replaced through normal supply channels and
brought forward with the LOGPAC. When vehicles are evacuated to the rear for extended
periods, the company commander coordinates with the battalion S4 to have crews remove
any serviceable equipment or parts for use on other company vehicles.

11-35. WEAPONS SYSTEM REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS

Weapons system replacement operations (WSRO) are conducted to provide units with fully
operational, ready-to-fight replacement weapons systems; they cover both vehicle and crew-
served systems. Echelons above the SBCT will provide replacement weapons systems to
battalions based on SBCT priorities. Before these weapons systems are brought forward for
delivery to the company, the higher headquarters supervises the completion of all necessary
pre-combat checks.

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APPENDIX A
JAVELIN EMPLOYMENT
The Javelin provides accurate, medium-range antiarmor fire for the
SBCT infantry company. The Javelin is used in offensive operations to
provide precision, direct fires that suppress or destroy enemy armored
vehicles and destroy fortifications. In defensive operations, the Javelin
may be used to overwatch obstacles, destroy armored vehicles, and force
the enemy commander to dismount prematurely, exposing his Infantry to
small arms and indirect fires. The Javelin can destroy targets from
medium ranges (65 to 2,000 meters), including helicopters and fortified
positions. The SBCT infantry leader also can use the Javelin’s imaging
infrared (I2R) sight capability to conduct surveillance of critical avenues
of approach in all types of weather. The Javelin may also be used to
engage bunkers, buildings, and other fortified targets commonly found
during combat in built-up areas.

A-1. THE JAVELIN WEAPON SYSTEM

The Javelin is a dual-mode (top attack or direct attack), man-portable antitank missile
with an increased capability to engage and defeat tanks and other armored vehicles
(Table A-1). The Javelin has a missile contained in a disposable launch tube/container
and a reusable tracker; it is a fire-and-forget weapon system. Additionally, the Javelin has
a soft launch that significantly reduces the visual and acoustical signature of the missile.

Type System: Fire and Forget

Carry Weight (Total): 49.2 lb (day & night)
Command Launch Unit: 14.1 lb (day & night)
Missile (w/launch tube): 35.2 lb
Crew: Man portable
Ready to Fire: Less than 30 sec.
Reload Time: Less than 20 sec.
Method of Attack: Top attack or direct attack (top attack is normal)
Range: Top-attack mode: 150m-2000m
Direct-attack mode: 65m-2000m

Fighting Position Restrictions: 1m x 2m, ventilation is recommended

Guidance System: Imaging Infrared or I²R
Sights: Integrated Day/Night sight unit
Time of Flight: 1,000m = approx. 4.6 sec
2,000m = approx. 14.5 sec
Sight Magnification: 4X day, 4X wide field of view and 9X narrow field
of view
Table A-1. Javelin technical characteristics.

a. Command Launch Unit. The nondisposable section of the Javelin is the CLU
(Figure A-1, page A-2). The night sight and day sight of the Javelin are integrated into
one unit. The imaging infrared or I²R sight has a 2,000-meter range, under most
conditions, which greatly increases target acquisition by the infantryman. The sight can

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operate for over four hours on a single battery and requires no coolant bottles. It has a
built-in test capability, which alerts the gunner if the system is not functioning properly
during operation.

Figure A-1. Command launch unit.

b. Missile. The missile is contained in a disposable launch tube. It has a passive

imaging infrared system, which locks on to the target before launch and is self-guiding. It
uses a tandem shaped charge warhead and a two-stage solid propellant with a low
signature, soft-launch motor, and a minimum-smoke flight motor. The launch tube
assembly and missile is shown in Figure A-2.

Figure A-2. Launch tube assembly and missile.

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 FM 3-21.11

A-2. CAPABILITIES
The Javelin antitank missile has improved capabilities over the Dragon.
a. Lethality. The Javelin is more lethal than the Dragon. The Javelin’s 2,000-meter
range and its tandem warhead, which defeats all known armor, enhance the Javelin’s
lethality.
(1) In the top-attack mode, the missile strikes the thinner armor on the top of an
armored vehicle rather than the thicker frontal and side armor plates. Top attack also
prevents an enemy target from protecting itself by moving behind frontal cover. When
used in urban areas or where obstacles might interfere with the top-attack flight path of
the missile, the Javelin can also be fired in the direct attack mode.
(2) The fire-and-forget capability of the Javelin increases the probability of a hit.
Because the gunner is no longer exposed to enemy suppressive fires while tracking the
target until impact, he can use the missile’s flight time to reload, in a covered and
concealed position, and begin engaging another target.
b. Survivability. The Javelin’s low launch signature decreases the enemy’s ability
to acquire gunners when they fire the missile. All gunner engagement tasks are
accomplished before launching the missile, making time of flight irrelevant. The 2,000-
meter range also places the Javelin gunner outside the armored vehicle’s effective coaxial
machine gun range. However, he is still within the range of the main gun.
(1) The Javelin uses a passive infrared system for target acquisition and lock-on. This
means that it emits no infrared or radar beam which enemy vehicles or smart munitions
can detect, further increasing the survivability of the Javelin gunner.
(2) The Javelin sight offers the SBCT infantry leader a superior observation
capability as compared to the Dragon. The Javelin sight can detect targets in excess of
2,000 meters.
(3) Because of the Javelin’s low backblast, it can be fired from smaller, harder to
locate, better protected positions that give the gunner a greater chance of remaining
undetected or, if detected, surviving any suppressive fires.
c. Agility. The Javelin is man-portable and relatively lightweight for an antitank
missile system, which allows the system to be moved about the battlefield with relative
ease. The Javelin’s soft launch capability allows it to be fired from inside buildings,
bunkers, and other restricted spaces with less disruption to the gunner and less signature
to be observed by the enemy. Although flank shots are still the preferred method of
engagement, the Javelin’s low signature launch and top-attack mode make frontal and
oblique engagements more effective than in the past, giving the SBCT infantry leader
additional options in his antiarmor fires planning and positioning.
d. Flexibility. The capabilities of the Javelin give the leader more flexibility in the
use and emplacement of his antiarmor systems. This new degree of flexibility challenges
the leader to make a careful METT-TC analysis to ensure that he is taking full advantage
of the Javelin’s capabilities. The Javelin gives the leader a system that complements other
antiarmor fires available, allowing him to achieve mutual support and greater overlapping
fires between the systems.

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A-3. LIMITATIONS
There are certain times when the Javelin system is not able to engage targets. These occur
either when a target is not exposed long enough for the missile seeker to achieve proper
lock on or when atmospheric conditions interfere with the seeker.
a. Limited Visibility. Heavy rain, smoke, fog, snow, sleet, haze, and dust are
referred to as limited visibility conditions. The presence of these conditions can affect the
gunner’s ability to acquire and engage targets with the Javelin, especially when using the
day sight of the CLU. The gunner should use the I2R sight of the CLU to acquire targets
because it provides the best target image during limited visibility conditions.
b. Infrared Crossover. Infrared crossover occurs at least twice in each 24-hour
period when the temperatures of soil, water, concrete, and vegetation are approximately
the same and the objects all emit the same amount of infrared energy. If there is little
difference in the amount of infrared energy between a target and its background, then
neither the Javelin CLU nor the missile seeker can see the target well, thus greatly
degrading the performance of the Javelin. This situation may last as long as an hour, until
either the background or the target changes temperature enough to become detectable.
c. Time Space Factor. Just because a target appears in the open and within range
does not always mean a Javelin gunner can acquire, lock-on, fire, and hit the target. A
vehicle must be exposed long enough for the gunner to identify it as a target and then to
achieve target lock-on with the Javelin missile seeker. This process is not instantaneous
and varies with the skill of the gunner.

A -4. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

The Javelin’s primary role is to destroy enemy armored vehicles. When there is not an
armored threat, the Javelin can be employed in a secondary role of providing fire support
against point targets such as bunkers and crew-served weapons positions. In addition, the
Javelin’s CLU can be used alone as an aided vision device for reconnaissance, security
operations, and surveillance.
a. Mutual Support. Javelins should be positioned so they can support other Javelins
as firing pairs (Figure A-3). In terrain that has multiple narrow avenues of approach, the
Javelin may be employed as a single weapon system. In open terrain, Javelins should be
positioned to achieve overlapping sectors (Figure A-4). Mutual support prevents the
enemy from isolating a portion of the friendly unit and then concentrating on one sector
without being subjected to fire from another. If mutual support is achieved, when one
Javelin is destroyed or forced to displace, the others can continue covering the assigned
sector. As a rule of thumb, gunners should normally be positioned far enough apart so
enemy fires directed at one cannot suppress others.

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Figure A-3. Employment by firing pair.

Figure A-4. Overlapping sectors of fire.

b. Flank Shot Engagements. Leaders should position Javelins to engage from the
flank whenever possible because:
• Armored vehicles are most vulnerable from the flank.
• The focus of the crew will normally be to the front and not to the flank.
• Armored vehicles present the largest visual and infrared target from the flank.

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• The vehicle’s various sighting systems, laser range finder, and firepower are
normally oriented to the front, not the flank.
• Armored vehicles have less armor on the sides than on the front. This is
important when engaging in the direct-fire mode.
c. Javelin Standoff Advantage. The difference between the Javelin’s maximum
range and the maximum effective range of the enemy tank’s coaxial machine gun (Figure
A-5) creates an advantage in a standoff. The Javelin’s maximum range is 2,000 meters.
The maximum effective range of a T-72 coaxial machine gun is 1,000 meters. The
Javelin gunner should strive to engage enemy tanks in the 1,000- to 2,000-meter range.

NOTE: Most modern tanks, as well as infantry fighting vehicles, can fire high-
explosive ammunition to suppress gunners out to 4,000 meters.

Figure A-5. Standoff range.

d. Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment are critical to the survival of
an antiarmor weapon system and its crew. The SBCT leader responsible for Javelin
employment must analyze cover and concealment along with fields of fire and
observation.
(1) Cover. Cover is protection from enemy weapons fire and may be natural or
man-made. Natural cover includes reverse slopes, ravines, and hollows. Man-made cover
includes fighting positions, walls, rubble, and craters.
(2) Concealment. Concealment is the ability to hide from enemy observation.
Soldiers should avoid unnecessary movement, stay low and observe, and present
themselves and their equipment using the lowest silhouette possible. They should alter
familiar shapes by breaking up the common outlines of the position and equipment using
vegetation and camouflage netting. They must pay attention to the varied colors and
textures of the area to ensure the position blends in with its background. Additionally,
noises, such as engines running, talking, and moving equipment, can be heard by enemy
patrols and observation posts. Shiny surfaces can reflect light for great distances;
therefore they must not expose anything that shines.

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e. Soldier’s Load. When employing the Javelin in the dismounted role, the soldier’s
load becomes important. With a total system weight of just under 50 pounds, the Javelin
is heavy. Although a man-portable weapon, one soldier cannot easily carry the Javelin
cross-country for extended periods. Leaders should be aware of this problem and address
it as they would any other soldier’s load difficulty. FM 21-18 discusses soldier’s load and
cross-leveling equipment during movement to reduce the burden on soldiers. Leaders
should develop unit SOPs that identify and describe the details of unit equipment cross
leveling.
f. Massed Fires. Massed fires are achieved by coordinating the total effects of the
unit’s combat power at the decisive place and time to gain favorable results against the
enemy. The unit achieves mass through mutual fire support, detailed fire control, and fire
distribution measures that synchronize all of the fires of the SBCT company’s weapons
systems and elements. The Javelin should always be positioned so that its fires are part of
a cohesive combination including small arms, MGS, mortar and artillery, as well as the
close-in fires of the SBCT platoons using their AT-4 light antiarmor weapons.

A-5. JAVELIN EMPLOYMENT DURING URBAN COMBAT

Javelins provide overwatching antitank fires during the attack of a built-up area and an
extended range capability for the engagement of armor during the defense. Within built-
up areas, they are best employed along major thoroughfares and from the upper stories of
buildings to attain long-range fields of fire. The missile’s minimum arming range and
flight profile could limit firing opportunities in the confines of densely built-up areas.
a. Restrictions. Ground obstacles and water do not restrict the Javelin with its fire-
and-forget capability. However, with its unique flight characteristics, overhead obstacles
can limit its use in urban terrain. In the top-attack mode, the Javelin missile requires up to
160-plus meters of overhead clearance (Figure A-6). In the direct-attack mode, the
Javelin requires up to 60-plus meters of overhead clearance (Figure A-7, page A-8).
Gunners must ensure that sufficient overhead clearance is available along the missile
flight path before engaging targets in an urban environment.

Figure A-6. Javelin flight profile in top-attack mode.

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FM 3-21.11

Figure A-7. Javelin flight profile in direct-attack mode.

b. Dead Space. The aspects of dead space that affect Javelin fires the most are
arming distance and target and background temperature differences.
(1) The Javelin missile has a minimum arming window of 65 to 75 meters. Few areas
in the inner city permit fires much beyond the minimum arming distance. Ground-level
long-range fires down streets or rail lines and across parks or plazas are possible. The
Javelin may be used effectively from the upper stories or roofs of buildings to fire into
other buildings.
(2) The Javelin gunner must take into consideration the targeting dead space that is
sometimes caused by the background of the target and its heat signature. When firing
from the upper stories of a building towards the ground, the missile seeker sometimes
cannot discriminate between the target and surrounding rubble, buildings, or paving if
that background material has the same temperature as the target.
c. Backblast. The Javelin’s soft launch capability enables the gunner to fire from
within an enclosed area (Figure A-8) with a reduced danger from backblast overpressure
or flying debris. Personnel within the enclosure should still wear a helmet, protective
vest, ballistic eye protection, and hearing protection. To fire a Javelin from inside a room,
the following safety precautions must be taken:
• Ceiling height must be at least 7 feet.
• The floor size of the room should be at least 15 feet by 12 feet.
• Window opening must be at least 5 square feet
• Door opening must be at least 20 square feet
• When launching a missile from an enclosure, allow sufficient room for the
missile container to extend beyond the outermost edge of the enclosure.
• All personnel in the room must be forward of the rear of the weapon.

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Figure A-8. Minimum room enclosure for Javelin firing.

d. Weapon Penetration. The warhead of the Javelin can achieve significant

penetration against typical urban targets. Penetration, however, does not mean a
concurrent destruction of the structural integrity of a position. When engaging a position
in a building, use the direct-attack mode to hit the target. When engaging a position or
bunker in the open, use either the top-attack or direct-attack mode.

A-6. JAVELIN FIRING POSITIONS

Each Javelin should have a primary firing position and at least one alternate position.
Depending on the factors of METT-TC, a supplementary position may also be assigned.
A Javelin firing position must allow for target engagement and provide protection for the
soldiers and the weapon system. When selecting firing positions, leaders should consider
the following:
• Cover to the front, flank, and overhead.
• Concealment from ground and aerial observation.
• Good observation and fields of fire.
• Covered and concealed routes to and between positions.
• Mutual support between squad positions and with other elements.
• Position below ridgelines and crests, preferably on the sides of hills.
• Avoid positions in swampy areas and very steep hillsides, as well as positions
on or near prominent terrain features.

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A-7. DETECT, CLASSIFY AND RECOGNIZE

US forces must engage targets quickly and efficiently to win in combat. Speed of target
engagement depends on each Javelin gunner’s proficiency in acquiring targets,
identifying targets, and determining whether targets can be engaged. Dust and smoke
make locating and identifying the enemy difficult. As the battle progresses and friendly
and enemy units merge into the same maneuver area, acquiring and identifying targets
become crucial tasks. Gunners in the company should be trained to acquire enemy targets
that are camouflaged or partially concealed by terrain, vegetation, or smoke. They should
also be trained to identify targets as friend or foe. Once soldiers know where to look, they
must know how to detect enemy targets rapidly.
a. Primary Analysis. Because the Javelin’s primary targets are armored vehicles,
specifically tanks, gunners should look for terrain where these targets are most likely to
appear. Understanding armor tactics and the characteristics of armor vehicles can help
Javelin gunners recognize the terrain where these vehicles are most likely to be
employed.
(1) Enemy Analysis. The tactics of many potential adversaries stress using speed and
massive firepower to overwhelm and destroy an opposing force. This dictates a very high
average daily rate of advance. To move consistently at a high rate, armored forces require
firm ground to move rapidly and enough space to deploy, maneuver, and fire. High-speed
avenues of approach, such as road networks, broad ridges, and flat or rolling terrain,
should be observed constantly.
(2) Terrain and Weather Analysis. A detailed analysis of the terrain and weather is
useful in pinpointing armored or mechanized avenues of approach and to evaluate them
from the enemy’s viewpoint. Some questions that the leader should ask are “How can the
enemy use this terrain?” and “Where is he most likely to appear first?” Because weather
significantly affects the trafficability of terrain, a ground reconnaissance is needed to
obtain current, detailed information about roads, trails, manmade objects, density of trees
and brush, and the seasonal conditions of streams and rivers. If a ground reconnaissance
is not possible, an aerial reconnaissance should be conducted or recent aerial photographs
should be used.
(3) Armored and Mechanized Vehicles’ Mobility Characteristics. Javelin gunners
can more easily determine where to look for enemy armored vehicles if they know the
vehicles’ mobility characteristics. If possible, tank and motorized rifle units will avoid
terrain or obstacles that can stop or impede their movement. Terrain factors that restrict
armored or mechanized vehicle mobility include:
• Slopes steeper than 30 degrees.
• Sturdy walls or embankments 3 or more feet high.
• Ditches or gullies 9 or more feet wide and 3 or more feet deep.
• Hardwood trees 10 inches or larger in diameter and 10 feet or less apart.
• Water obstacles at least 5 feet deep.
• Very swampy or very rough, rocky terrain.
• Built-up areas where vehicles are restricted to moving on confined roads,
through park areas, or across sports fields.
b. Range Estimation. Javelin gunners do not need to know the exact range to a
enemy target before engaging; they only need to know when it is in range. To speed this
determination, gunners use a maximum engagement line. A Javelin maximum

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engagement line is an imaginary line drawn across a sector’s maximum allowable range
from a Javelin firing position. To determine the location of this line on the ground, the
SBCT company leadership identifies terrain features at or near maximum range.
Therefore, any target that crosses or appears short of this line should be within range.
Establishing a maximum engagement line greatly reduces target engagement times,
especially for targets that seem to be near maximum range. Several range-determination
techniques can be used to find the maximum range line or the range to specific targets.
(1) Laser Range-Finding Method. Most units and all FIST teams should have laser
range-finders. The range from the Javelin position to an easily identifiable terrain feature
can be easily determined with the laser range-finder. Once the maximum engagement line
is determined, the gunner makes a note of a terrain feature at that location on his range
card. Any vehicle nearing that feature will be in range.
(2) Object Recognition Method. Range determination by object recognition is simple
and can be accurate with training. The soldier looks at the target with his naked eye,
sights through 7X binoculars, or uses a Javelin optical sight. Targets listed in Table A-2
are recognizable out to the ranges indicated--for example, if a target can be recognized
with the naked eye as an armored or wheeled vehicle, it is probably within 2,000 meters.
When using this method, the gunner must consider terrain, visibility conditions, and
target size.

RANGE
(meters)
TARGETS
7X
NAKED EYE
SCOPE
Tank crew members 500 2,000
Soldiers, machine gun, mortar 500 2,000
Antitank gun, antitank missile 500 2,000
launchers
Tank, APC, truck (by model) 1,000 4,000
Tank, Howitzer, APC, truck 1,500 5,000
Armored vehicle, wheeled vehicle 2,000 6,000
Table A-2. Range determination recognition method.

(3) Map and Terrain Association Method. The maximum engagement line can be
determined from a map. Do this for each firing position as follows:
• Draw an arc on the map across the assigned sector of fire at 2,000 meters.
• Examine the map to identify the distinctive natural or man-made terrain
features that the line touches.
• Study the terrain in the sector of fire using binoculars or the Javelin CLU until
all the selected terrain features are located and positively identified.
• Connect these features by an imaginary line from the maximum engagement
line.

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A-8. PRINCIPLES OF FIRE CONTROL

Effective fire control requires the SBCT company to rapidly acquire the enemy and mass
the effects of fire in order to achieve decisive results. The following principles are
fundamental to achieving effective fires. When planning and executing direct fires, the
SBCT leadership should apply the following principles of fire control:
• Mass the effects of fire.
• Destroy the greatest threat first.
• Avoid target overkill.
• Employ the best weapon for the target.
• Minimize friendly exposure.
• Minimize the chances for fratricide.

A-9. FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

Fire control measures must enable Javelin gunners to distribute or mass fires effectively
into a given area and over time. Fire control measures are the means by which the SBCT
company commander and his subordinate leaders control fires. Application of these
concepts, procedures, and techniques assists the unit in acquiring the enemy, focusing
fires on him, distributing the effects of the fires, effectively shifting fires, and preventing
fratricide. At the same time, no single measure is sufficient to effectively control fires. At
the SBCT company level, fire control measures will be effective only if the entire
company has a common understanding of what the fire control measures mean and how
to employ them. When executing direct fires, the SBCT company commander and his
subordinate leaders should apply these methods of fire control:
• Distribution of fires over a given area.
• Massing of fires into a given area.
• Distribution of fires over time.
• Massing of fires in time and space.
• Target reference points.
• Trigger lines and phase lines.
• Engagement priorities.

A-10. SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST HELICOPTERS

Because Javelin positions are selected to cover enemy armor avenues of approach, the
medium-range fields of fire afforded by these positions also enable Javelin gunners to
engage aircraft.
a. Weapons Control Status. The weapons control status established for air defense
weapons applies to Javelin gunners too. Unless ordered otherwise, gunners should only
fire in unit self-defense (for example, only engage aircraft that are attacking friendly
positions).
b. Self Defense Engagements. A Javelin gunner can automatically engage an
enemy helicopter that is attacking its position. The gunner’s target engagement sequence
is the same as against ground targets. The Javelin should be in the direct-fire mode when
engaging helicopters. The rotors of the helicopter may interfere with the sensors of the
missile in the top-attack mode and result in erratic flight of the missile and a target miss.

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APPENDIX B
THE MGS PLATOON
The fundamental mission of the mobile gun system platoon is to provide
mounted, precision direct fire support to the SBCT infantry company. Its
ability to move, shoot, and communicate, and to do so with limited armored
protection, is an important factor on the modern battlefield. The MGS
platoon moves, attacks, defends, and performs other essential tasks to
support the company's mission. In accomplishing its assigned missions, it
employs firepower, maneuver, and shock effect, synchronizing its
capabilities with those of other maneuver elements and with CS and CSS
assets. When properly supported, the platoon is capable of conducting
sustained operations against any sophisticated threat.

Section I. ORGANIZATION
The MGS platoon is organized to provide mounted, precision direct fire support to the
dismounted infantry rifle platoons of the SBCT infantry rifle company. The platoon
organization and the responsibilities of the platoon personnel will be discussed in this
section.

B-1. PLATOON ORGANIZATION

Figure B-1 illustrates the organization of the MGS platoon. The platoon includes three
MGS vehicles, each with a three-man crew (vehicle commander, gunner, and driver). The
platoon leader and platoon sergeant are the VCs for two of the MGS vehicles.

Figure B-1. MGS platoon organization.

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B-2. RESPONSIBILITIES
The following paragraphs describe the responsibilities of personnel in the MGS platoon.
a. Platoon Leader. The MGS platoon leader is responsible to the SBCT infantry
company commander for the discipline and training of his platoon, the maintenance of its
equipment, and its success in combat. He must be proficient in the tactical employment of
his vehicle and of the platoon. He must have a solid understanding of troop-leading
procedures and develop his ability to apply them quickly and efficiently on the battlefield.
(1) The platoon leader must know the capabilities and limitations of the MGS platoon's
personnel and equipment and must be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and
equipment. He must serve as an effective vehicle commander. Most importantly, the platoon
leader must be flexible and capable of using sound judgment to make decisions based on his
company commander's intent and the tactical situation.
(2) The platoon leader must know and understand both the SBCT infantry battalion's
mission and the battalion commander's intent. He must be prepared to assume the duties of
the SBCT infantry company commander in accordance with the succession of command.
b. Platoon Sergeant. The platoon sergeant is second in command and is accountable
to the platoon leader for the training, discipline, and welfare of the soldiers in the platoon.
He coordinates the platoon's maintenance and logistics requirements and resolves the
personal needs of individual soldiers. The platoon sergeant is the most experienced VC in
the platoon. His tactical and technical knowledge allows him to serve as mentor to the
crewmen, other NCOs, and the platoon leader. His actions on the battlefield must
complement those of the platoon leader. He must be able to fight his vehicle effectively,
either in concert with the platoon or by itself.
c. Vehicle Commander. The vehicle commander is responsible to the platoon leader
and platoon sergeant for the discipline and training of his crew, maintenance of assigned
equipment, reporting of logistical needs, and tactical employment of his MGS. He briefs his
crew, directs the movement of the MGS, submits all reports, and supervises initial first aid
treatment and evacuation of wounded crewmen. He is an expert in using MGS weapons
systems, requesting and adjusting indirect fires, and executing land navigation. He is
personally responsible for aiming and firing the vehicle’s local defense weapon. The VC
must know and understand the company mission and the company commander's intent. He
must be prepared to assume the duties and responsibilities of the platoon leader or platoon
sergeant in accordance with the succession of command. These requirements demand that
the VC maintain constant awareness of the enemy and friendly situation by using all
available optics for observation, by monitoring radio transmissions, and by using the
FBCB2 system.
d. Gunner. The gunner searches for targets and aims and fires the main gun. He is
responsible to the VC for the maintenance of his MGS armament and fire control
equipment. The gunner serves as the assistant VC and assumes the responsibilities of the VC
as required. He also assists other crewmembers as needed. The gunner's other duties include
maintaining MGS communications and internal control systems, monitoring
communications nets, and monitoring and maintaining the vehicle's fire control system.
e. Driver. The driver moves, positions, and stops the MGS. While driving, he
constantly searches for covered and concealed routes and for covered positions to which he
can move if the MGS is engaged. He maintains his vehicle's position in tactical formation
and watches for visual signals. During engagements, he assists the gunner and VC by

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 FM 3-21.11

scanning for targets and sensing fired rounds. The driver is responsible to the VC for the
automotive maintenance and refueling of the MGS. He assists other crewmen as needed.

Section II. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

To win in battle, leaders must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations
of their equipment. This knowledge assists the MGS platoon leader in evaluating
transportability, sustainment, and mobility considerations for his vehicles and for those with
which the platoon may operate as part of the SBCT infantry company.

B-3. CAPABILITIES
The MGS offers an impressive array of capabilities on the modern battlefield: cross-country
mobility, sophisticated communications, enhanced target acquisition, lethal firepower, and
limited armored protection. In combination, these factors produce the additional combat
power that allows the MGS platoon to support the SBCT infantry company effectively in
most weather and light conditions.
a. The MGS can move rapidly under a variety of terrain conditions, negotiating soft
ground, shallow trenches, small trees, and limited obstacles. In addition, the GPS allows the
MGS to move to designated locations quickly and accurately. Use of visual signals and the
FM radio system facilitates rapid and secure voice and digital communication of orders and
instructions. This capability links to FBCB2 to allow MGS crews to mass the effects of their
weapons systems quickly while remaining dispersed to limit the effects of the enemy's
antiarmor weapons.
b. On-board optics and sighting systems enable MGS crews to destroy fortifications or
breach building walls using the main gun and to use the self-defense weapon to suppress
enemy positions, personnel, and lightly armored targets. The MGS also has a limited
capability to acquire and destroy enemy armored vehicles. The MGS's armor protects
crewmembers from small-arms fire, light antiarmor systems, and most artillery.

B-4. LIMITATIONS
The MGS requires proficient operators and mechanics to maintain the appropriate level of
maintenance and supply of POL products. The vehicle is vulnerable to the weapons effects
of tanks and other medium to heavy assault vehicles, attack helicopters, mines, ATGMs,
antitank guns, and close attack aircraft. When the MGS operates in built-up areas, dense
woods, or other restricted terrain, reduced visibility leaves it vulnerable to dismounted
infantrymen using shoulder-fired antiarmor systems. In these situations, the MGS is usually
restricted to trails, roads, or streets, which severely limits maneuverability and observation.
Existing or reinforcing obstacles can also impede MGS movement.
a. Although the MGS has a limited armor killing capability, it should never be
considered a tank. The intended purpose of the MGS is primarily to close with and destroy
enemy infantry.
b. Mobility restrictions in an urban environment may prohibit the platoon from fighting
effectively as a platoon. The platoon may be required to fight as individual vehicles
(detached to infantry platoons), unable to rely on one another for mutual support.

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Section III. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The MGS platoon is an integral part of the SBCT infantry company. The platoon conducts
tactical movement, actions on contact, consolidation, and reorganization in support of the
company. The MGS platoon can perform many tasks required by the company commander's
intent, the tactical situation, and the ROE. Specifically, the MGS platoon can perform the
following as part of an SBCT infantry company offense:
• Attack by fire.
• Overwatch/support by fire.
• Bypass.

B-5. ATTACK BY FIRE

The company commander may order the MGS platoon to execute an attack by fire to
destroy the enemy using long-range, precision direct fires from dominant terrain or using
standoff of the main gun. The MGS platoon can use an independent attack by fire to destroy
inferior forces. In addition, the platoon may conduct an attack by fire as part of a company
assault with the goal of destroying a superior force.
a. In executing an attack by fire, the MGS platoon conducts tactical movement to a
position that allows it to employ weapons standoff or that offers cover for hull-down firing
positions. It also must be ready to move to alternate firing positions for protection from the
effects of enemy direct and indirect fires.
b. As time permits, the MGS platoon leader develops a hasty direct fire plan by
designating TRPs and assigning sectors of fire and tentative firing positions for each MGS.
He issues a platoon fire command specifying the method of fire, firing pattern, and rate of
fire the platoon must sustain to support the company.

B-6. OVERWATCH/SUPPORT BY FIRE

The SBCT infantry company commander orders the MGS platoon to provide overwatch or
support by fire during the movement of a friendly force. The MGS platoon must suppress
the enemy using long-range, precision direct fires from a dominant piece of terrain or using
the standoff of the main gun. This support sets the conditions that allow moving (mounted
or dismounted) friendly elements to engage and destroy the enemy. The techniques involved
in occupying an overwatch or support-by-fire position and in focusing and controlling fires
are similar to those for an attack by fire. However, some specific considerations exist:
a. As noted, the overwatch or support-by-fire task is always tied directly to the
movement or tactical execution of other friendly forces.
b. In executing overwatch or support by fire, the platoon must maintain a high level of
awareness relative to the supported force so it can cease or shift direct fires and adjust
indirect fires as required to prevent fratricide.
c. Throughout an overwatch or support by fire, the MGS platoon maintains cross talk
with the moving force on the company net. In addition to reducing fratricide risk, cross talk
allows the platoon to provide early warning of enemy positions it has identified. It can then
report battle damage inflicted on the enemy force.
d. The MGS platoon can conduct combat operations in a built-up area. The MGS
platoon may be tasked, as a unit or by individual vehicles, to conduct support-by-fire
missions during urban operations to assist the SBCT infantry company in seizing a foothold
or an objective in the built-up area.

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e. A successful overwatch or support by fire operation suppresses the enemy,

permitting the moving (mounted or dismounted) force to conduct tactical movement,
breaching operations, or an assault. Figure B-2 illustrates a support-by-fire situation in
support of an assault.

Figure B-2. MGS platoon supporting by fire to suppress an enemy

element during a company assault.

B-7. BYPASS
As part of his original plan or based on a change in the situation, the company commander
may order the company to bypass the enemy to maintain the tempo of the attack. This action
can be taken against either an inferior or superior enemy force. The SBCT infantry
company commander may designate the MGS platoon to suppress the enemy, allowing the
other platoons to use covered and concealed routes, weapons standoff, and obscuration to
bypass known enemy locations. (Units may have to execute contact drills while conducting
the bypass.) Once clear of the enemy, the MGS platoon hands the enemy over to another
friendly force (if applicable), breaks contact, and rejoins the company. If necessary, the
MGS platoon leader can employ tactical movement to break contact with the enemy and
continue the mission; he can also request supporting direct and indirect fires and smoke to
suppress and obscure the enemy as the MGS platoon safely breaks contact (Figure B-3, page
B-6, and Figure B-4, page B-7).

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Figure B-3. Bypass (MGS suppressing the enemy).

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Figure B-4. Bypass (MGS platoon rejoining the company).

Section IV. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

In the defense, the MGS platoon provides the SBCT infantry company with precision direct
fires from a mobile, medium-armored platform. (Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual for an
explanation of defensive operations.) The MGS platoon can perform the following as part of
an SBCT infantry company defense:
• Defend from a battle position.
• Participate in a counterattack.
• Perform as a reserve to conduct a spoiling attack, to block enemy penetration, to
reinforce a defending platoon, or to assume the mission of another platoon.

B-8. DEFENDING FROM A BATTLE POSITION

When, based on the SBCT company commander's intent, the MGS platoon must defend a
battle position, it may be tasked to destroy, block, or canalize enemy forces, or to displace to
occupy successive battle positions. The MGS platoon leader must develop his portion of the
company engagement area. An MGS platoon may be assigned a battle position as part of an
SBCT infantry company battle position, perimeter defense, strongpoint defense, or sector
defense. As a minimum, the MGS platoon leader must--
• Coordinate with adjacent infantry platoons and other organizations, both
digitally and by analog communications.
• Assign sectors of fire and identify TRPs. As time permits, he continues to
develop his EA using various direct fire control measures for his platoon

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(maximum engagement line, engagement techniques, engagement criteria and

priorities, and so on).
• Inspect each MGS vehicle position.
• Conduct rehearsals.
• Report to the SBCT infantry company commander when the MGS platoon has
established its position.
• Control direct fires with platoon fire commands.
• Monitor ammunition expenditures.

B-9. PARTICIPATE IN A COUNTERATTACK

The purposes of a counterattack are to destroy the enemy, regain key terrain, relieve enemy
pressure on an engaged unit and continue the offensive initiative of the company. The MGS
platoon conducts counterattacks as part of a larger force but has a limited capability to
conduct a counterattack by itself.
a. If the MGS platoon is designated as the counterattack force, the platoon leader
coordinates with the affected units for covered and concealed locations and routes. Prior to
execution of the defense, the platoon should rehearse these routes, time permitting. The
platoon leader incorporates weapons standoff ranges into his planning. He controls direct
and indirect fires during the counterattack. The platoon leader must disseminate all the
information to the members of his platoon. If adjustments to any position or route become
necessary, the counterattacking force must take immediate action to ensure that other forces
shift or cease direct and indirect fires as appropriate. Otherwise, fratricide risk increases.
b. When the SBCT infantry company executes a counterattack with an MGS platoon,
the platoon conducts tactical movement on a concealed route to a predetermined battle
position or attack-by-fire position from which it can engage the enemy's flank or rear. The
infantry platoons hold their positions and continue to engage the enemy (Figure B-5). The
intent is to use the advantages of weapons standoff and cover to destroy the enemy by direct
fires.

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Figure B-5. MGS platoon as the company counterattack force.

B-10. PERFORM AS A RESERVE

The SBCT infantry company commander must weigh the mobility, lethality, and
survivability of the MGS with the requirements of the reserve. This may lead the MGS
platoon to be the company reserve or to form a portion of that reserve. The factors of
METT-TC dictate the requirements. In the reserve role, the MGS platoon may execute
either offensive or defensive missions.
a. In the role of the reserve, the MGS platoon may be tasked to conduct a spoiling
attack, block enemy penetrations, or reinforce a defending platoon or company. The
MGS platoon leader must understand both the SBCT infantry company and SBCT
infantry battalion commanders' intents. This becomes critical with the multiple potential
missions the MGS platoon can perform in its role as the SBCT infantry company reserve.
b. The MGS platoon may simply be assigned the mission of another SBCT infantry
platoon while in the reserve.

Section V. URBAN OPERATIONS

Urban areas consist mainly of manmade features such as buildings, streets, and
subterranean systems. These features of urban terrain create a variety of tactical problems
and possibilities for MGS employment. To ensure that the MGS platoon can operate
effectively in the urban environment, the MGS platoon's observation and direct fire plans
must address the ground-level fight (in streets and on the ground floor of buildings), the
aboveground fight (in multistoried buildings), and the subterranean fight.

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B-11. CONSIDERATIONS
The following considerations apply to the MGS platoon in an urban environment.
a. An important aspect of the urban environment is that built-up areas degrade
command and control. The MGS platoon may need to fight as individual vehicles
attached to infantry platoons.
b. Streets are usually avenues of approach. Forces moving along a street, however,
are often canalized by buildings and have little space for off-road maneuver. Obstacles on
urban streets are therefore usually more effective than those on roads in open terrain since
they are more difficult to bypass.
c. Buildings offer cover and concealment to and severely restrict the movement of
armored vehicles. Buildings also severely restrict direct fire distribution, control, and
fields of fire. Every street corner and successive block will have characteristics similar to
an "intervisibility line," requiring careful overwatch. Thick-walled buildings provide
ready-made fortified positions.
d. Subterranean systems found in some built-up areas can be easily overlooked, but
they may prove critical to the outcome of urban operations.
e. The aboveground fight (in an area with multistoried buildings) requires an
analysis by the MGS platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and VC. This analysis is necessary
in order to determine whether, based on height and distance to the target, effective fire
can be brought to bear on target areas above the second floor.
f. If the MGS platoon enters the built-up area, they typically must move and fight
with an infantry force to provide an appropriate level of security for the MGS platoon.

B-12. ROLE OF THE MGS PLATOON

During the attack of a built-up area, the commander must employ his MGS platoon to take
advantage of the MGS vehicle’s long-range, precision lethality and medium-armored
protection. The MGS platoon may provide support by fire while lead SBCT infantry
elements seize a foothold in an urban area. The MGS platoon can then provide overwatch or
serve as a base of fire for the infantry until the area has been secured. The SBCT infantry
company commander usually positions the MGS platoon outside the built-up area. It may
remain there for the duration of the attack to cover high-speed avenues of approach. This is
especially true if the intent is to isolate a specific area as the SBCT infantry company
secures the objective area. However, the company commander may opt to attach one MGS
vehicle to an infantry platoon within the built-up area while the remainder of the MGS
platoon continues to isolate the objective area.

NOTE: Before providing support for the attack, an MGS vehicle must be able to
maneuver into a support-by-fire position. This normally requires support from
organic infantry weapons to suppress enemy strongpoints and ATGM assets.

a. Command and Contro.. The following command and control considerations affect
the MGS platoon's planning and execution in the urban environment:
(1) Communications. The task organization that may take place during urban
operations requires small tactical organizations such as squad or section elements, to
establish additional communications links to replace those that may be disrupted by
buildings and other urban terrain features.

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(2) Fire Control. Extensive direct fire planning and restrictive fire control measures are
essential during urban operations. Extensive use of RFLs and other graphic control measures
is also essential.
(3) Proximity and Visibilit.. Friendly elements must often operate in confined and
restrictive areas during urban operations, and they may not be able to see other friendly
forces nearby. These factors significantly increase the risk of fratricide; therefore, increased
communications, graphic control measures, and rehearsals are essential.
(4) Personnel Factors. Urban operations impose significant and often extreme physical
and psychological demands on soldiers and leaders. The MGS platoon's increased use of
supplies (such as fuel and ammunition) and the increased chance of destruction from ATGM
fires in the urban environment add to these demands.
(5) Rules of Engagement, Rules of Interaction, and Civilians. The rules of
engagement and rules of interaction may restrict the use of certain weapons systems or
techniques and procedures. As an integral part of the urban environment, noncombatants
create special operational problems. To deal with these concerns, units operating in urban
terrain must know how to employ the MGS effectively within the parameters of the ROE
and ROI.
(6) Tempo of Urban Operations. Because of the slow and deliberate nature of urban
operations, the MGS platoon may not be able to take full advantage of its lethality and
the speed and mobility of its vehicles.
b. Maneuver. The following factors related to maneuver affect the MGS platoon's
planning and execution in the urban environment:
(1) Need for Detailed Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution. UO usually
include a deliberate attack, demanding extensive intelligence activities and rehearsals.
(2) Requirements for Coordination. UO are successful when close coordination is
established at the lowest level between SBCT infantry squads and MGS vehicles.
(3) Formation of Combined-Arms Teams at the Lowest Levels. Whereas task
organization is normally done no lower than platoon level, UO may require task
organization of squads and vehicles. The MGS platoon may face a number of organizational
options, such as a single MGS vehicle working with an infantry platoon.
(4) Vulnerability of Friendly Forces. An MGS can provide precise direct fires to
support accompanying infantry squads, but it is, in turn, vulnerable to attack from enemy
infantry and ATGMs. The attacking force in UO must also guard against local
counterattacks.
c. Task Organization. The task organization of an MGS platoon taking part in an
attack during urban operations varies according to the specific nature of the built-up area
and the objective. In general, the SBCT battalion or SBCT infantry company employs an
assault force, a support force, a reserve, and, in some cases, a security force. Normally, there
is no separate breach force, but breaching elements may be part of the assault or support
force, depending on the type and location of anticipated obstacles.
(1) Assault Force. The assault force is the element that gains a foothold in the urban
area and conducts the clearance of actual objectives in the area. This force is normally a
dismounted element task-organized with engineers with specific augmentation by ICVs or
MGSs, either as a platoon or as a single vehicle.
(2) Support Force. Normally, most mounted elements taking part in UO, such as the
MGS platoon, are task-organized in the support force. This allows the SBCT infantry

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company commander to employ the firepower of the MGS platoon without compromising
its survivability. The support force isolates the AO and the actual entry point into the urban
area, or it provides precision direct fire to suppress enemy positions allowing assault forces
to seize a foothold.
(3) Reserve Force. The reserve force normally includes both mounted and dismounted
forces. It should be prepared to conduct any of the following tasks:
• Engage enemy from an unexpected direction.
• Exploit friendly success or enemy weakness.
• Secure the rear or flank of friendly forces.
• Clear bypassed enemy positions.
• Maintain contact with adjacent units.
• Conduct support by fire or attack by fire, as necessary.

B-13. MGS CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS IN UO

Numerous factors related to vehicles and equipment affect planning and employment of
the MGS platoon in an urban environment. These include the following:
a. Ammunition. The preferred main gun rounds in the UO environment are high
explosive, antitank, tracer (HEAT-T), high explosive, plastic, tracer (HEP-T), and white
phosphorus, tracer (WP-T). These perform much better than sabot rounds against bunkers
and buildings.
(1) HEAT-T ammunition arms approximately 60 feet from the gun muzzle. It loses
most of its effectiveness against urban targets at ranges less than 60 feet.
(2) HEP-T is used primarily against field fortifications, bunkers, buildings, crew-
served weapon emplacements, and troops (where blast concussion and fragmentation are
desired).
(3) The primary purpose of WP-T is to mark and screen targets, but the round can
also be used to ignite combustible material.
(4) Sabot petals endanger accompanying infantry elements. They create a hazard area
extending 70 meters on either side of the gun-target line, out to a range of 1 kilometer.
(5) Beehive ammunition is used primarily against troops in the open. Beehive use
may be restricted in an urban environment due to the confined area.
b. Machine Guns. The local defense weapon can effectively deliver suppressive
fires against enemy personnel and against enemy positions that are behind lightly clad
buildings. This weapon may be dismounted and used in a ground role, if necessary.
c. Visibility and Security. When buttoned up, the MGS crew has limited visibility
to the sides and rear and no visibility to the top. Figures B-6 and B-7 illustrate the dead
space associated with MGS operations in an urban environment. When an MGS is
buttoned up, dismounted infantry must provide local security to cover the dead space of
the MGS (side, top, and rear).
d. Main Gun Elevation and Depression. Elevation of the main gun to +20 degrees
is required to support dismounted infantry assaults in urban terrain. Elevation of +20
degrees is also required to provide effective direct fires to support infantry assaults on
high ground at ranges up to 1,000 meters for local defense weapons and 2,000 meters for
the main gun. This capability is crucial when MGS platforms are unable to maneuver on
designated infantry axes of attack and must support the infantry forces from a distance.

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Depression to -10 degrees is required when the MGS is used to mass fires on enemy in
low ground engagement areas during defensive operations.

Figure B-6. MGS weapon dead space at street level.

Figure B-7. MGS weapon dead space above street level.

B-14. DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES IN UO

In defensive UO, the MGS platoon provides the SBCT infantry company commander with a
mobile force that can respond quickly to enemy threats. The platoon's vehicles should be
located on likely enemy avenues of approach in positions that allow them to take advantage
of their precision long-range direct fires.
a. Employment of the MGS Platoon. Effective positioning allows the SBCT infantry
company commander to employ the MGS platoon in a number of ways, such as the
following:

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FM 3-21.11

• On the edge of the city in mutually supporting positions.

• On key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages.
• In positions from which they can cover barricades and obstacles by fire.
• As part of the company reserve.
The MGS platoon is normally employed as a platoon. However, the commander also has the
alternative of employing individual MGS vehicles with infantry platoons and squads. This
alternative allows the MGS vehicles to take advantage of the close security provided by
dismounted infantry and increases the lethality of those infantry forces.
b. Fighting Positions. Fighting positions for MGS vehicles are an essential component
of a complete and effective defensive plan in built-up areas. Vehicle positions must be
selected and developed to afford the best possible cover, concealment, observation, and
fields of fire. At the same time, they must not restrict the vehicle's ability to move when
necessary. These considerations apply:
(1) If fields of fire are restricted to the street area, hull-down positions should be used to
provide cover and to enable MGS vehicles to fire directly down the streets. From these
positions, the vehicles are protected while retaining their ability to move rapidly to alternate
positions. Buildings collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazard to MGS vehicles and
their crews.
(2) Before moving into position to engage the enemy, an MGS vehicle can occupy a
hide position for cover and concealment. Hide positions may be located inside buildings or
underground garages, adjacent to buildings (using the buildings to mask enemy
observation), or in culverts (Figure B-8).
(3) Since the crew cannot see the advancing enemy from the hide position, an observer
from the MGS vehicle or nearby dismounted infantry must be concealed but still able to
alert the crew. When the observer acquires a target, he signals the MGS to move to the firing
position and, at the proper time, to fire.
(4) After firing, the MGS moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising its
location.

WARNING
When pulling into a building to use it as a vehicle hide
position, ensure the floor will support the vehicle's
weight. Otherwise, the vehicle could fall through the
floor.

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 FM 3-21.11

Figure B-8. Example vehicle hide position in an urban environment.

B-15. EMPLOYMENT OF THE RESERVE FORCE

The company commander must always consider the employment of a reserve force in his
UO defensive scheme of maneuver. This force should be prepared to counterattack to
regain key positions, to block enemy penetrations, to protect the flanks of the friendly
force, or to provide a base of fire for disengaging elements. For combat in built-up areas,
the reserve force must be as mobile as possible. The MGS platoon (or a portion) is likely
to be the centerpiece of the company reserve force.

Section VI. STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

As noted, the MGS platoon has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to US and
combined forces executing missions in both stability operations and support operations. The
platoon may be called upon to support a wide range of operations in various political and
geographical environments. Examples of these operations are included in Chapters 8 and 9
of this manual.

B-16. MGS CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
The MGS platoon is usually used for stability and support activities that need to take
maximum advantage of its inherent capabilities of firepower, maneuver, shock effect, and
survivability for a specific operation. The platoon moves, attacks, and defends using
procedures similar to those described throughout this field manual.
a. On the other hand, the factors of METT-TC and the operational considerations
prevalent in both stability operations and support operations may modify the conditions for
successful mission accomplishment. This means the MGS platoon occasionally may be
assigned missions that are normally handled by specially trained and equipped elements. For
example, the platoon could be tasked for crowd and riot control if a shortage of military

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police exists. (Coordination must be conducted early on to determine whether the military
police organizations are digital- or analog-capable.)
b. Several problems arise when medium armored forces are used in this type of role.
To perform with complete effectiveness and efficiency, crewmen must receive special
equipment and training before executing such a mission. Certain situations during stability
or support operations may effectively negate the MGS platoon's inherent advantages
(lethality, mobility, and survivability). Therefore, the company commander must determine
where and when to use the MGS platoon to maximize its advantages.

B-17. EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLES

The following situations examine several MGS platoon employment considerations
during stability or support operations. These examples are not all-inclusive; assessment of
the factors of METT-TC and the operational considerations applicable in the area of
operations may identify additional mission requirements. The relatively simple situations
illustrated here do not adequately portray the ever-changing, often confusing conditions of
stability or support operations in which versatility is key to success (and survival). To the
extent possible, the company commander should attempt to shape the role or mission of the
MGS platoon to match the platoon's unique characteristics and capabilities. Figure B-9
illustrates a MGS platoon as part of a battle position and reserve/reaction missions.

NOTE: Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for an explanation of UO. As noted, these
operations often provide the operational framework for both stability operations
and support operations.

a. Establish a Battle Position. The platoon establishes a battle position or conducts a

relief in place at a platoon battle position as part of an SBCT infantry company perimeter or
strongpoint defense (A, Figure B-9). The SBCT infantry company MGS platoon and
dismounted infantry should be integrated. Coordination with dismounted patrols and OPs
outside the perimeter is critical. Signs, in the local language, should be posted as necessary
within the engagement area to identify movement restrictions on the local populace. (See
Chapter 5 for detailed information on defensive operations.)
b. Conduct Reserve Operations. As part of the SBCT battalion or SBCT infantry
company reserve, the MGS platoon occupies an assembly area or establishes a perimeter
defense (B, Figure B-9). Potential missions include linkup with and relief of encircled
friendly forces (B1, Figure B-9); linkup and movement to secure an objective in an
operation to rescue a downed helicopter or stranded vehicle (B2, Figure B-9); and tactical
movement to destroy enemy forces attacking a convoy (B3, Figure B-9). In all three
scenarios, the MGS platoon conducts tactical movement and actions on contact. Items such
as linkup, support by fire, attack by fire, assault, hasty attack, and consolidation and
reorganization are also critical to the reserve mission. (For more information on these
operations, refer to Chapters 4, 5, and 8.)

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 FM 3-21.11

Figure B-9. Battle position and reserve/reaction force missions.

c. Overwatch a Traffic Control Point. The MGS platoon (or vehicle) overwatches an
infantry or MP traffic control point (C, Figure B-10, page B-19). The overwatch element
must ensure its own local security, usually by coordinating with dismounted infantry for
OPs and dismounted patrols from the company.
d. Defend a Choke Poin.. The MGS platoon with an infantry squad (or an infantry
platoon with an MGS vehicle) occupies a perimeter defense to protect traffic and facilitate
movement through a choke point along the main supply route (D, Figure B-10, page B-19).
The integration of MGS and infantry in the perimeter defense is critical to mass the effects
of firepower and to provide early warning and OPSEC for the defense by means of
dismounted patrols and OPs. For detailed information on defensive operations, see Chapter
5.
e. Overwatch a Blockade or Roadblock. The MGS platoon (or vehicle) overwatches
a blockade or roadblock, either a manned position or a reinforcing obstacle covered by fires
only (E, Figure B-10, page B-19). The company commander must coordinate dismounted
infantry OPs and patrols when employing an MGS to overwatch a blockade or roadblock.

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MGS positions are improved using procedures for deliberate occupation of a BP (see
Chapter 5).
f. Conduct Convoy Escort. The MGS platoon conducts convoy escort duties (F,
Figure B-10) using procedures covered in Chapter 8.
g. Conduct Proofing/Breaching Operations. The MGS platoon (or vehicle)
overwatches breaching operations along the MSR or provides overwatch to engineer
elements as they clear the route (G, Figure B-10). Based on the factors of METT-TC, the
MGS platoon may use tactical movement techniques to provide overwatch for the proofing
element, which can be dismounted soldiers, an engineer vehicle, or a tank (equipped with a
mine roller, if available). If mines are detected, the MGS platoon continues to overwatch the
breaching force until all mines have been detected and neutralized. If the obstacle is not
within the breaching unit's capability, engineers are called forward. At all times, overwatch
vehicles should take notice of anything that is out of the ordinary, such as new construction,
repairs to damaged buildings, plants or trees that seem new or out of place, and freshly dug
earth. These conditions may indicate the presence of newly emplaced or command-
detonated mines. At no time will an MGS conduct breaching or proofing operations.

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 FM 3-21.11

Figure B-10. Traffic control point, choke point, blockade,

convoy escort, and route proofing missions.

h. Conduct Cordon and Search Operations. During cordon and search operations,
the MGS platoon occupies overwatch or hasty defensive positions (or both) to isolate a
search area (Figure B-11, page B-20). Close coordination and communication with the
search team are critical, as is employment of OPs and patrols to maintain surveillance of
dead space and gaps in the cordoned area. The MGS platoon (or vehicle) must be prepared
to take immediate action if the search team or OPs identify enemy forces. Enemy contact
may require the MGS platoon to execute tactical movement and linkup.

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Figure B-11. Cordon and search operations.

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APPENDIX C
SNIPERS

SBCT infantry companies and battalions use snipers extensively in all

operations. Snipers can significantly increase the company’s combat
power if utilized correctly.

C-1. SNIPER CHARACTERISTICS AND PLANNING

The SBCT infantry company employs snipers in three-man teams, each consisting of a
sniper, an observer, and one man who secures the team. The senior man in the team is the
observer, the next most senior is the sniper, and the junior man secures the sniper team.
Normally, the observer and the security man carry an M4 or M203, and the sniper carries
the chosen sniper weapon. Sniper teams should avoid sustained battles. During long
periods of observation, team members help each other with range estimation, round
adjustment, and security.
a. Sniper teams should be centrally controlled by the commander but may be task-
organized to platoons. Once deployed, sniper teams must be able to operate
independently, as required. Therefore, they must understand the commander's intent, his
concept of the operation, and the purpose for their assigned mission. This understanding
allows the sniper teams to exercise responsible initiative within the framework of the
commander's intent and to support the commander's concept and achievement of the
unit's mission. To ensure clear fields of fire and observation, the teams must be able to
choose their own positions once they are on the ground. Sniper teams are effective only
in areas that offer good fields of fire and observation.
b. Sniper teams should move to a release point with a security element (squad or
platoon) when possible. The sniper team moves on its own after reaching the release
point, which allows the team to reach its area of operations faster and more safely than if
it went alone from the start point. A security element can also protect the sniper section
during operations. When moving with a security element, snipers follow these guidelines:
(1) The leader of the security element leads the sniper team.
(2) Snipers must appear to be an integral part of the security element. Thus, the sniper
team should carry the sniper weapon system in line with and close to the body to hide its
outline and barrel length and should conceal from view all sniper-unique equipment such
as optics and ghillie suits. The team also should maintain proper intervals and positions in
the element formation and wear the same uniform as that of element members.
c. History has proven that a commander who employs snipers intelligently,
skillfully, and with originality gains a payoff far greater than expected. Therefore, it is
essential that a company commander understand the proper employment of sniper teams.
If a company commander knows the abilities and limitations of a sniper team, then the
team can contribute significantly to the fight. A company commander should consider
carefully all the factors of METT-TC to determine proper employment of sniper teams.
(1) Mission Analysis. The sniper team’s primary concern is to support combat
operations by delivering precise rifle fire from concealed positions. The mission assigned
to a sniper team for a particular operation consists of the task(s) that the company
commander wants the sniper team to accomplish and the purpose for each task. The
commander must decide how he wants his sniper team to affect the battlefield; then he

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must assign missions to achieve this effect. The company commander must prioritize
targets so the sniper team can avoid involvement in sustained engagements. Regardless of
the method used, the sniper team must be free to exercise responsible initiative by
changing targets to continue to support the commander's intent.
(a) The company commander may describe the effect or result he expects and allow
the sniper team to select key targets. Whether he does this depends on the sniper team’s
skills and on how well he trusts them.
(b) He may assign specific types of targets. For example, if he wants to disrupt the
defensive preparations of the enemy, he may want the sniper team to kill bulldozer and
other engineer equipment operators. He may want them to disable vehicles carrying
supplies, or he may want them to engage soldiers digging enemy defensive positions.
(c) He also may assign specific targets. These can include leaders, command and
control operators, ATGM gunners, armored-vehicle commanders, or crew-served
weapons crews.
(2) Enemy Analysis. The commander must consider the composition, disposition,
strengths, capabilities, weaknesses, and characteristics of the enemy. Is the enemy force
heavy or light, rested or tired, disciplined or not? Is it motorized infantry or towed
artillery? Is it well-supplied or severely short of supplies? Is the enemy patrolling
aggressively or does he have minimal security? Is he positioned in assembly areas or dug
in? The answers to such questions help the company commander determine the enemy's
susceptibility and reaction to effective sniper team employment. Naturally, a well-rested,
well-led, well-supplied, and aggressive enemy with armored protection poses a greater
threat to a sniper team than an enemy who is tired, poorly led, poorly supplied, lazy, and
unprotected. The company commander Also needs to know if enemy snipers are present
and if they are effective. Enemy snipers can pose a significant danger to the company
sniper team. The sniper team can assist the commander in determining or countering the
enemy sniper threat. A sniper has expert knowledge of sniping and likely enemy hiding
places; he can normally engage enemy marksmen and irregulars at a greater range than
the enemy sniper can engage the company.
(3) Terrain Analysis. The commander must evaluate the terrain in the sniper's area of
operations, the terrain he must travel to reach it, and the time and effort snipers will
expend getting into position. He must also consider the effect of weather on the sniper
and on his visibility. The snipers will need good firing positions. They prefer positions at
least 300 meters from their target area. Operating at this distance allows them to avoid
effective fire from enemy rifles, yet they retain much of the 800- to 1,000-meter effective
range of the sniper rifle. To be most effective, snipers need areas of operations with
adequate observation and fields of fire.
(4) Troop Analysis. The company commander must decide how to employ all
available assets. (Along with the company sniper section, each squad has a designated
marksman). Much depends on soldier availability, the duration of the operation, the
expected opposition, and the number and difficulty of tasks and targets assigned to the
sniper team and the designated marksmen. Commanders also must consider the level of
training and physical conditioning of the sniper team and the designated marksmen.
(5) Time Analysis. The company commander must consider how much time the
sniper team will have to achieve the expected result. The sniper team needs time to plan,
coordinate, prepare, rehearse, move, and establish positions. A company commander

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must know and accept the increased risk of sniper team employment when the team lacks
adequate time for planning or for other preparations such as moving to the area of
operations.
(a) The amount of time a sniper team can remain in a position without losing
effectiveness due to eye fatigue, muscle strain, or cramps depends mostly on the type of
position. A sniper team usually can remain in an expedient position for 6 hours before it
must be relieved. It can remain in the belly position or the semi-permanent hide for up to
48 hours before the team must be relieved. Mission duration times average 24 hours. (FM
23-10 provides guidance on sniper position considerations, construction, preparation, and
occupation.)
(b) Movement factors for a sniper team moving with a security element are the same
as for any infantry force. When a sniper team moves alone in the area of operations, it
moves slowly, with its movement measured in feet and inches. The sniper team is the
best source for determining an accurate time estimate for a particular movement.
(6) Civilian Considerations. In cases where large crowds pose a threat to US forces,
a sniper team can single out selected individuals. In populated areas where casualties
should be kept to a minimum, the sniper team can be assigned to destroy enemy snipers.

C-2. EMPLOYMENT DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Offensive operations carry the fight to the enemy to destroy his capability and will to
fight. By destroying enemy targets that threaten the success of the attack, the sniper team
can play a major role in offensive operations.
a. Offensive Operations. During offensive operations, a sniper team may perform
the following:
• Destroy enemy snipers.
• Overwatch movement of friendly forces and suppress enemy targets that
threaten the moving forces.
• Place precision rifle fire on enemy crew-served weapons teams and into
exposed bunker apertures.
• Place precision rifle fire on enemy leaders, armored-vehicle drivers or
commanders, forward observers, and other designated personnel.
• Place precision rifle fire on small, isolated, or bypassed enemy forces.
• Place precision rifle fire on enemy forces fleeing or threatening a
counterattack.
• Screen a flank.
• Secure key terrain by controlling access to it with precision rifle fires.
b. Movement to Contact. During a movement to contact, a company commander
has two sniper team employment options: the sniper team can move with the lead
element, or the commander can employ the sniper team 24 to 48 hours prior to the
company’s movement to--
• Select positions.
• Gather information about the enemy.
• Secure key terrain, preventing enemy surprise attacks.
c. Mounted Attack. During a mounted attack, the company’s rapid movement
limits the sniper team’s role. However, when the company dismounts the infantry squads,
the sniper team can be employed to support the dismounted assault.

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d. Raid. During a raid, the sniper team can be employed with either the security
element or the support element--
• To cover avenues of approach and any escape routes that lead in to and out of
the objective.
• To cover friendly routes of withdrawal to the rally point.
• To provide long-range rifle fires on the objective.
e. Consolidation. After consolidation, the sniper team may displace forward to new
positions. These positions need not be on the objective. However, the sniper team must
be able to place precision rifle fire on bypassed enemy positions, enemy counterattack
forces, or other enemy positions that could degrade the company’s ability to exploit the
success of the attack.

C-3. EMPLOYMENT DURING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

A sniper team may effectively enhance or augment any company’s defensive fire plan.
After analyzing the terrain, the sniper team should recommend options to the company
commander.
a. Defensive Operations. During defensive operations, a sniper team may perform
the following:
• Overwatch obstacles and demolitions.
• Perform counterreconnaissance (destroy enemy reconnaissance elements).
• Engage enemy observation posts, armored-vehicle commanders exposed in
turrets, and ATGM teams.
• Damage enemy vehicle optics to degrade movement.
• Suppress enemy crew-served weapons.
• Disrupt enemy follow-on units with long-range rifle fire.
b. Primary Positions. Sniper teams are generally positioned to observe or control
one or more avenues of approach into the defensive position. The types of weapons
systems available to the sniper team may lead the company commander to use his sniper
team against secondary avenues of approach to increase all-round security and to allow
him to concentrate his combat power against the most likely enemy avenue of approach.
Sniper teams may support the company by providing precise extra optics for target
acquisition and long-range rifle fires to complement those of the M249 machine gun.
This arrangement best utilizes the company’s weapons systems. Sniper teams may also
be used in an economy-of-force role to cover dismounted enemy avenues of approach
that the company cannot cover with other available assets.
c. Alternate and Supplementary Positions. A sniper team establishes alternate and
supplementary positions for all-round security. Positions near the FEBA are vulnerable to
concentrated enemy attacks, enemy artillery, and obscurants. The sniper team and
designated marksmen can be positioned for surveillance and mutual fire support. If
possible, they should establish positions in depth for continuous support during the fight.
The sniper's rate of fire neither increases nor decreases as the enemy approaches. Specific
targets are systematically and deliberately shot; accuracy is far more important than
speed.
d. Overwatch. The sniper team can be placed to overwatch key obstacles or terrain
such as river-crossing sites, bridges, and minefields that canalize the enemy directly into
engagement areas. Sniper weapons are mainly used where other weapons systems are less

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effective due to security requirements or terrain. Even though the company commander
has access to weapons systems with greater ranges and optical capabilities than those of
the sniper weapons, he may be unable to use these for any of several reasons. Unlike
sniper weapons, the other weapons systems may present too large a firing signature, be
difficult to conceal, create too much noise, or be needed more in other areas. The sniper
team can provide the company commander with greater observation capability and killing
range than other subordinate units.
e. Counterreconnaissance. The sniper team can be used as an integral part of the
counterreconnaissance effort. The team can help acquire and destroy targets. It can
augment the counterreconnaissance element by occupying concealed positions for long
periods. It also can observe direct and indirect fires (to maintain their security) and
engage targets. Selective long-range rifle fires are difficult for the enemy to detect. A few
well-placed shots can disrupt enemy reconnaissance efforts, force him to deploy into
combat formations, and deceive him as to the location of the main battle area. The sniper
team’s stealth skills counter the skills of enemy reconnaissance elements. The sniper
team can be used where infantry platoon mobility is unnecessary, freeing squad
designated marksmen to cover other sectors. The sniper team also can be used to direct
ground maneuver elements toward detected targets. This helps to maintain their security
so they can be used against successive echelons of attacking enemy.
f. Strongpoint. The commander employs the sniper team to support any unit
defending a strongpoint. The sniper team's characteristics enable it to independently
harass and observe the enemy in support of the force in the strongpoint, either from inside
or outside the strongpoint.
g. Reverse-Slope Defense. The sniper team can provide effective long-range rifle
fires from positions forward of the topographical crest or on the counterslope if the
company is occupying a reverse-slope defense.

C-4. EMPLOYMENT DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS

During stability operations, US troops are usually required to use a minimal amount of
force to respond to threats. Even with well-understood ROE, it may be difficult for an
SBCT infantry company to respond with minimum force rather than maximum force
when confronted with certain situations. The sniper team is an important tool for the
company commander during stability operations.
a. During stability operations, a sniper team may perform the following:
• Conduct active or passive countersniper missions.
• Overwatch a checkpoint.
• Monitor a public gathering.
• Identify critical people in a crowd.
• Reinforce a base camp's security.
• Conduct any offensive or defensive sniper mission.
b. The sniper team provides the company commander the required minimum force
(or an equal or reasonable response to force used against the company) through its
precision long-range rifle fires.
c. Sniper teams also provide the company commander with a ready source of
information to counter a perceived sniper threat. Through the team’s understanding of
sniping and sniper hiding places, it can provide the commander with invaluable

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information. The company commander incorporates this information into his METT-TC
analysis to develop a countersniper plan.

C-5. ACTIONS IN A BUILT-UP AREA

The unlimited use of firepower during urban operations may undermine the commander’s
intent. The sniper team is an incredible asset to the SBCT infantry company commander
while operating in a built-up area.
a. Offensive Operations. Assaulting forces usually encounter fortified positions
prepared by the defending force. These can range from field-expedient, hasty positions
produced with locally available materials to elaborate steel and concrete emplacements
complete with turrets, underground tunnels, and crew quarters. Field-expedient positions
are those most often encountered. However, the company commander should expect
elaborate positions when the enemy has significant time to prepare his defense. The
enemy may have fortified weapons emplacements or bunkers, protected shelters,
reinforced natural or constructed caves, entrenchments, and other obstacles.
(1) The enemy will try to locate these positions so they are mutually supporting and
arrayed in depth across the width of his sector. The enemy also will try to increase his
advantages by covering and concealing positions and by preparing direct fire plans and
counterattack contingencies. Because of this, fortified areas should be bypassed and
contained by a smaller force.
(2) Sniper precision fire and observation capabilities are invaluable in the assault of a
built-up area. Precision rifle fire can readily detect and destroy pinpoint targets invisible
to the naked eye. The sniper team’s role during the assault of a fortified position is to
deliver precision long-range rifle fire against the embrasures, air vents, and doorways of
key enemy positions; against observation posts; and against exposed personnel. The
company commander must plan the sequence in which the sniper team will destroy
targets. This should systematically reduce the enemy's defenses by denying the ability of
enemy positions to support each other. Once these positions are isolated, they can be
more easily reduced. Therefore, the company commander must decide where he will try
to penetrate the enemy's fortified positions and then employ his sniper team against those
locations. The sniper team can provide continuous fire support for both assaulting and
other nearby units when operating from positions near the breach point on the flanks. Its
precision rifle fires add to the effectiveness of the entire company. Frequently, when
various factors prevent the use of other precision weapons, such as Javelins, snipers are
still useful.
(3) The sniper team plans based on information available. The enemy information
needed by a sniper team includes the following:
• Extent of and exact locations of individual and underground fortifications.
• Fields of fire, directions of fire, number and locations of embrasures, and
types of weapons systems in the fortifications.
• Locations of entrances, exits, and air vents in each emplacement and building.
• Locations and types of existing and reinforcing obstacles.
• Locations of weak spots in the enemy's defense.
b. Defensive Operations. The sniper precision-fire and observation capabilities are
equally invaluable in the defense of a built-up area. As in the offense, the sniper team
detects and destroys targets that are invisible to the naked eye. The company commander

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generally positions the sniper team to observe or control one or more avenues of
approach into the built-up area. This focus generally is on secondary avenues of
approach. This employment option allows the commander to concentrate the majority of
his combat power against the enemy’s most likely avenue of approach while still having a
formidable force on the secondary avenue of approach. The company commander can
also position the sniper team and the squad designated marksmen to support or
complement each other. Finally, the company commander can employ the sniper team to
independently harass and observe the enemy in support of the company’s mission.

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APPENDIX D
TLP-MDMP INTEGRATION

The troop-leading procedures are integrally coupled and consistent

with the military decision-making process described in FM 101-5. The two
processes are not identical, however, because the specific steps of the
MDMP are designed to help commanders and their staffs develop a plan.
While company commanders have subordinate leaders who assist with
aspects of planning operations, these leaders are not company staff
officers. The TLP reflect this reality while incorporating the general
process of the MDMP.

D-1. LINKING THE TLP AND MDMP.

The troop-leading procedures are a sequence of actions that enable the company
commander to use available time effectively in the preparation and execution of company
missions. They are tools to assist the company commander in making decisions, issuing
combat orders, and supervising operations. The MDMP and TLP are linked by
information sharing and flow. The type, amount, and timeliness of the information from
battalion to company directly impact the company commander’s TLP. FM 101-5
describes a process in which the company commander receives three battalion warning
orders prior to the battalion OPORD being issued. This is situationally dependent. All
staffs in all situations may not follow the MDMP steps as listed in FM 101-5 for a variety
of reasons (such as time, experience level, tactical situation, and so on). However, as a
guide, the company TLP must be inextricably linked to the information flow from the
next higher headquarters.

D-2. PARALLEL AND COLLABORATIVE PLANNING

Parallelism and collaboration are inherent planning concepts in both the MDMP and TLP.
They ultimately provide the important linkage between the planning processes. Concurrent
effort and sharing of information are critical to the company commander’s efficient,
effective planning and the company’s successful mission accomplishment. Figure D-1, page
D-2, depicts the importance of parallelism and collaboration between the MDMP (battalion)
and the TLP (company), with references to specific paragraphs in the OPORD.

DRAFT D-1
FM 3-21.11

Figure D-1. TLP inputs.

D-2 DRAFT
 FM 3-21.11

APPENDIX E
RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk is the chance of injury or death for individuals and damage to or

loss of vehicles and equipment. Risk, or the potential for risk, is always
present in every combat and training situation the SBCT company
commander faces. Risk management must take place at all levels of the
chain of command during each phase of every operation; it is an integral
part of all tactical planning. The company commander, platoon leaders,
NCOs, and all other soldiers must know how to use risk management,
coupled with fratricide avoidance measures, to ensure that the mission is
executed in the safest possible environment within mission constraints.
The primary objective of risk management is to help units protect their
combat power through accident prevention, enabling them to win the
battle quickly and decisively with minimal losses. This appendix outlines
the process leaders use to identify hazards and implement a plan to
address each identified hazard. It also discusses the responsibilities of the
company’s leaders and individual soldiers in implementing a sound risk
management program. For additional information on risk management,
refer to FM 100-14.

Section I. RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

This section outlines the five steps of risk management. A company commander should
never approach risk management with “one size fits all” solutions to the hazards the
company will face. Rather, in performing the steps, he must keep in mind the essential
tactical and operational factors that make each situation unique.

E-1. STEP 1, IDENTIFY HAZARDS

A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential condition that could entail
injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and property; or
some other sort of mission degradation. Tactical and training operations pose many types
of hazards. The company leadership must identify the hazards associated with all aspects
and phases of the company mission, paying particular attention to the factors of METT-
TC. Risk management must never be an afterthought; leaders must begin the process
during their troop-leading procedures and continue it throughout the operation. Table E-
1, page E-2, lists possible sources of battlefield hazards that the unit might face during a
typical tactical operation. The list is organized according to the factors of METT-TC.

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MISSION
• Duration of the operation.
• Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well-developed and
easily understood?)
• Proximity and number of maneuvering units.
ENEMY
• Knowledge of the enemy situation.
• Enemy capabilities.
• Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
• Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, and smoke.
• Precipitation and its effect on mobility.
• Extreme heat or cold.
• Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, water
obstacles).
TROOPS
• Equipment status.
• Experience the units conducting the operation have working
together.
• Danger areas associated with the unit’s weapon systems.
• Soldier/leader proficiency.
• Soldier/leader rest situation.
• Degree of acclimatization to environment.
• Impact of new leaders or crewmembers.
• Friendly unit situation.
• NATO or multinational military actions combined with U.S. forces.
TIME AVAILABLE
• Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by
subordinates.
• Time available for PCCs/PCIs.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
• Applicable ROE or ROI.
• Potential stability and support operations involving contact with
civilians (such as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or
counterterrorism).
• Potential for media contact and inquiries.
• Interaction with host nation or other participating nation support.
Table E-1. Examples of potential hazards.

E-2. STEP 2, ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS

Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct impact of each hazard on an
operation (in the form of hazardous incidents). Use the following steps.
a. Determine hazards that can be eliminated or avoided.
b. Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated or avoided to determine the
probability that the hazard can occur.
c. Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated or avoided. Severity,
defined as the result or outcome of a hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree of
injury or illness (including death), loss of or damage to equipment or property,
environmental damage, or other mission-impairing factors (such as unfavorable publicity or
loss of combat power).

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 FM 3-21.71

d. Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, determine the
associated risk level (extremely high, high, moderate, and low). Table E-2 summarizes
the four risk levels.
e. Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, and risk level, as
well as the operational factors unique to the situation), complete the risk management
worksheet. Figure E-1 shows a completed risk management worksheet.

RISK LEVEL MISSION EFFECTS

Extremely High (E) Mission failure if hazardous incidents occur in
execution.
High (H) Significantly degraded mission capabilities in
terms of required mission standards. Not
accomplishing all parts of the mission or not
completing the mission to standard (if hazards
occur during mission).
Moderate (M) Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms
of required mission standards. Reduced mission
capability (if hazards occur during the mission).
Low (L) Expected losses have little or no impact on
mission success.
Table E-2. Risk levels and impact on mission execution.

Figure E-1. Completed risk management worksheet.

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E-3. STEP 3, DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

This step is accomplished in two substeps: develop controls and make risk decisions.
These substeps are accomplished during the “make a tentative plan” step of the troop-
leading procedures.
a. Developing Controls. After assessing each hazard, develop one or more controls
that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability, severity, or both) of
potential hazardous incidents. When developing controls, consider the reason for the
hazard, not just the hazard by itself.
b. Making Risk Decisions. A key element in the process of making a risk decision
is determining whether accepting the risk is justified or, conversely, is unnecessary. The
decision-maker must compare and balance the risk against mission expectations. He
alone decides if the controls are sufficient and acceptable and whether to accept the
resulting residual risk. If he determines the risk is unnecessary, he directs the
development of additional controls or alternative controls; as another option, he can
modify, change, or reject the selected COA for the operation.

E-4. STEP 4, IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to eliminate hazards or
reduce their risk. Implementing controls is the most important part of the risk
management process; this is the chain of command’s contribution to the safety of the
unit. Implementing controls includes coordination and communication with appropriate
superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and with individuals executing the mission. The
company commander must ensure that specific controls are integrated into operations
plans (OPLANs), OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to
ensure that controls are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood by all
levels. If the leaders have conducted a thoughtful risk assessment, the controls will be
easy to implement, enforce, and follow. Examples of risk management controls include
the following:
• Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including related hazards and
controls.
• Conduct thorough PCCs and PCIs.
• Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels.
• Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as possible (at least 4
hours in any 24-hour period).
• Use buddy teams.
• Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety.
• Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to distinguish maneuvering
units.
• Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on dangerous terrain.
• Establish marked and protected sleeping areas in assembly areas.
• Limit single-vehicle movement.
• Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel.

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E-5. STEP 5, SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

During mission execution, leaders must ensure that risk management controls are
properly understood and executed. Leaders must continuously evaluate the unit’s
effectiveness in managing risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement.
a. Supervision. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that effective
risk management controls are implemented.
(1) All leaders are responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to
ensure standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce established
safety policies as well as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques
include spot checks, inspections, situation reports (SITREPs), confirmation briefs, buddy
checks, and close supervision.
(2) During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk management
controls, both to determine whether they are effective and to modify them as necessary.
Leaders must also anticipate, identify, and assess new hazards. They ensure that
imminent danger issues are addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning and
execution reflect changes in hazard conditions.
b. Evaluation. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also include
an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit performance in identifying risks and
preventing hazardous situations. During an AAR, leaders should assess whether the
implemented controls were effective. Following the AAR, leaders should incorporate
lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions.

Section II. IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES

Leaders and individuals at all levels are responsible and accountable for managing risk.
They must ensure that hazards and associated risks are identified and controlled during
planning, preparation, and execution of operations. The company leadership and their
senior NCOs must look at both tactical risks and accident risks. The same risk
management process is used to manage both types of risk. The commander alone
determines how and where he is willing to take tactical risks. The commander manages
accident risks with the assistance of his officers, NCOs, and individual soldiers.

E-6. BREAKDOWN OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a risk taken or about to be assumed, the
risk management process may break down. Such a failure can be the result of several
factors; most often, it can be attributed to one or more of the following:
• The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to know about the risk.
• A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job and does not
want to bother his unit leadership.
• Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk involved.
• Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in being able to avoid
or recover from a hazardous incident.
• Subordinates who do not fully understand the higher commander’s guidance
regarding risk decisions.

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E-7. RISK MANAGEMENT COMMAND CLIMATE

The company commander gives the company direction, sets priorities, and establishes the
command climate (values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat
power requires him to embed risk management into individual behavior. To fulfill this
commitment, the company commander must exercise creative leadership, innovative
planning, and careful management. Most importantly, he must demonstrate support for
the risk management process.
a. The chain of command can establish a command climate favorable to risk
management integration by taking the following actions:
• Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management behavior through
leadership by example and emphasis on active participation throughout the
risk management process.
• Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is responsible
for obtaining the assets necessary to mitigate risk and for providing them to
subordinate leaders.
• Understand your own and your soldiers’ limitations, as well as your unit’s
capabilities.
• Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.
• Prevent a “zero defects” mindset from creeping into the unit’s culture.
• Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their trade and their
ability to execute a chosen COA.
• Keep subordinates informed.
• Listen to subordinates.
b. For the company leadership, its subordinate leaders, and individual soldiers,
responsibilities in managing risk include the following:
• Make informed risk decisions. Establish and then clearly communicate risk
decision criteria and guidance.
• Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.
• Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates understand the
who, what, when, where, and why of managing risk and how these factors
apply to their situation and assigned responsibilities.
• Accurately evaluate the company’s effectiveness, as well as subordinates’
execution of risk controls during the mission.
• Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed established limits.

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APPENDIX F
FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

Fratricide is defined as the employment of friendly weapons that

results in the unforeseen and unintentional death or injury of friendly
personnel or damage to friendly equipment. Fratricide prevention is the
SBCT company commander’s responsibility. All leaders across all
operating systems assist the company commander in accomplishing this
mission. This appendix focuses on actions the unit leadership can take
with current resources to reduce the risk of fratricide.
In any tactical situation, it is critical that every company member
know where he is and where other friendly elements are operating. With
this knowledge, he must anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps
either to avoid them or to mitigate them. The company leadership must
always be vigilant of changes and developments in the situation that may
place his sections and teams in danger. He must also ensure that all squad
and team positions are constantly reported to higher headquarters so that
all other friendly elements are aware of where they are and what they are
doing. When the company leader perceives a potential fratricide situation,
he personally must use the higher net to coordinate directly with the
friendly element involved.

F-1. EFFECTS
Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it
almost always affects the unit’s ability to survive and function. Units experiencing
fratricide suffer these consequences:
• Loss of confidence in the unit’s leadership.
• Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
• Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
• Over-supervision of units.
• Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
• Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver.
• Loss of initiative.
• Disrupted operations.
• General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.

F-2. CAUSES
The following paragraphs discuss the primary causes of fratricide. Leaders must identify
any of the factors that may affect their units and then strive to eliminate or correct them.
a. Failures in the Direct Fire Control Plan. These occur when units do not
develop effective fire control plans, particularly in the offense. Units may fail to
designate engagement areas or to adhere to the direct fire plan, or they may position their
weapons incorrectly. Under such conditions, fire discipline often breaks down upon
contact. An area of particular concern is the additional planning that must go into

F-1
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operations requiring close coordination between mounted elements and dismounted

teams.
b. Land Navigation Failures. Units often stray out of assigned sectors, report
wrong locations, and become disoriented. Much less frequently, they employ fire support
weapons in the wrong location. In either type of situation, units that unexpectedly
encounter another unit may fire their weapons at a friendly force.
c. Failures in Combat Identification. Vehicle commanders and machine gun crews
cannot accurately identify the enemy near the maximum range of their systems. In limited
visibility, friendly units within that range may mistake one another as the enemy.
d. Inadequate Control Measures. Units may fail to disseminate the minimum
necessary maneuver control measures and direct fire control measures. They may also
fail to tie control measures to recognizable terrain or events. As the battle develops, the
plan cannot address branches and sequels as they occur. When this happens,
synchronization fails.
e. Failures in Reporting and Communications. Units at all levels may fail to
generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical situations
change. This distorts the common operating picture at battalion and brigade level
(available on FBCB2) and can lead to erroneous clearance of fires.
f. Weapons Errors. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These
incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand
grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.
g. Battlefield Hazards. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create
danger on the battlefield: unexploded ordnance, booby traps, and unmarked or
unrecorded minefields, including scatterable mines. Failure to mark, record, remove, or
otherwise anticipate these threats leads to casualties.
h. Reliance on Instruments. A unit that relies too heavily on systems such as GPS
devices or FBCB2 will find its capabilities severely degraded if these systems fail. The
unit may be unable to maintain situational understanding due to the loss of the computer
generated COP and positional awareness. To prevent potential dangers when system
failure occurs, the company commander must ensure that he and his subordinate leaders
use a balance of technology with traditional basic soldier skills in observation,
navigation, and other critical activities.

F-3. PREVENTION
The measures outlined in this paragraph provide the company with a guide to actions it
can take to reduce or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not intended to restrict
initiative. Leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate, based on the specific situation
and the factors of METT-TC.
a. Principles. At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are five key
principles:
(1) Identify and Assess Potential Fratricide Risks during the Troop-Leading
Procedures. Incorporate risk reduction control measures in WARNOs, the OPORD, and
applicable FRAGOs.
(2) Maintain Situational Understanding. Focus on areas such as current intelligence,
unit locations and dispositions, obstacles, NBC contamination, SITREPs, and the factors

F-2
 FM 3-21.11

of METT-TC. An SBCT company gains an advantage in situational understanding with

FBCB2, which automatically updates the COP.
(3) Ensure Positive Target Identification. Review vehicle and weapons
identification cards. Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and
enemy vehicles, including their silhouettes and thermal signatures. This knowledge
should include the conditions, including distance (range) and weather, under which
positive identification of various vehicles and weapons is possible. Enforce the use of
challenge and password, especially during dismounted operations.
(4) Maintain Effective Fire Control. Ensure fire commands are accurate, concise,
and clearly stated. Make it mandatory for soldiers to ask for clarification of any portion of
the fire command that they do not completely understand. Stress the importance of the
chain of command in the fire control process and ensure soldiers get in the habit of
obtaining target confirmation and permission to fire from their leaders before engaging
targets they assume are enemy elements. Know who will be in and around the area of
operations.
(5) Establish a Command Climate that Emphasizes Fratricide Prevention. Enforce
fratricide prevention measures, placing special emphasis on the use of doctrinally sound
techniques and procedures. Ensure constant supervision in the execution of orders and in
the performance of all tasks and missions to standard.
b. Guidelines and Considerations. Additional guidelines and considerations for
fratricide reduction and prevention include the following.
(1) Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit cohesion by taking quick,
effective action to alleviate stress.
(2) Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training covering fratricide
awareness, target identification and recognition, and fire discipline.
(3) Develop a simple, executable plan.
(4) Give complete and concise operation orders. Include all appropriate recognition
signals in paragraph 5 of the OPORD.
(5) To simplify operation orders, use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine.
Periodically review and update SOPs as needed.
(6) Strive to provide maximum planning time for leaders and subordinates.
(7) Use common language (vocabulary) and doctrinally correct standard terminology
and control measures.
(8) Ensure thorough coordination is conducted at all levels.
(9) Plan for and establish effective communications.
(10) Plan for collocation of CPs whenever it is appropriate to the mission, such as
during a passage of lines.
(11) Make sure ROE are clear.
(12) Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows adequate time to do so.
(13) Be in the right place at the right time. Use position location and navigation
devices (GPS or POSNAV), know your location and the locations of adjacent units (left,
right, leading, and follow-on), and synchronize tactical movement. If the company or any
element becomes lost, its leader must know how to contact higher headquarters
immediately for instructions and assistance.
(14) Establish, execute, and enforce strict sleep and rest plans.

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 FM 3-21.11

APPENDIX G
ROAD MARCHES AND ASSEMBLY AREAS
When not in contact with the enemy, the SBCT infantry company may
have to move long distances to position itself for future operations. This
type of movement, called a road march, is planned at company and
battalion levels. An assembly area, either the initial assembly area before
movement begins or the forward assembly area following the move, is a
site at which the unit gathers to prepare for future operations. Preparation
activities include receiving and issuing orders, servicing and repairing
vehicles, receiving and issuing supplies, and taking care of the personal
needs of members of the SBCT infantry company.

Section I. TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

The main purpose of the road march is to relocate rapidly, not to gain contact. It is
conducted using fixed speeds and timed intervals. This section examines tactical
procedures and considerations for the road march.

G-1. MARCH COLUMNS

The following paragraphs outline the three primary road march techniques. The SBCT
infantry company usually executes a road march in column formation.
a. Open Column. The open column technique is normally used for daylight
marches, though it can be used at night with blackout lights or thermal vision equipment.
The distance between vehicles varies, normally from 50 meters to 200 meters, depending
on light and weather conditions.
b. Closed Column. The closed column technique is normally used for marches
conducted during periods of limited visibility. The distance between vehicles is based on
the ability to see the vehicle ahead; it is normally less than 50 meters.
c. Infiltration. The infiltration technique involves the movement of small groups of
personnel or vehicles at irregular intervals. It is used when sufficient time and suitable
routes are available and when maximum security, deception, and dispersion are desired.
Of the three road march techniques, infiltration provides the best possible passive defense
against enemy observation and detection.

G-2. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Standard tasks the SBCT infantry company commander (and subordinate leaders, as
necessary) may perform prior to a tactical road march include the following:
• Designate a marshaling area to organize the march column and conduct final
inspections and briefings.
• Conduct a METT-TC analysis to determine the enemy situation, including the
probability of air or ground attack.
• Establish detailed security measures.
• Designate the movement route, including the start point (SP), required
checkpoints, and the RP. Additional control measures the company may need
to identify include critical areas, defiles, choke points, rest and maintenance
stops, and danger areas.

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FM 3-21.11

• Organize, brief, and dispatch the quartering party.

• Specify march speed, movement formations, vehicle and serial intervals,
catch-up speed, lighting, and times of critical events.
• Plan for indirect fire support and contingency actions, and rehearse actions on
contact. Contingency plans should cover vehicle breakdowns, lost vehicles,
and accidents.
• Coordinate for CSS, including refueling, mess operations, vehicle recovery,
local police assistance, and medical evacuation.

G-3. QUARTERING PARTY

Whether the SBCT infantry company conducts the road march independently or as part
of a battalion or task force, it normally sends out a quartering party to assist it in moving
to and occupying a new assembly area. Dispatched prior to the departure of the main
body, the SBCT infantry company quartering party assists the battalion quartering party
in reconnoitering the route of march. It then conducts its own reconnaissance of the
feeder route from the RP to the proposed assembly area and of the assembly area itself. If
either the route or the assembly area proves unsatisfactory, the quartering party
recommends changes to the SBCT infantry company commander.

NOTE: If the SBCT battalion does not send a quartering party, the SBCT company
party assumes sole responsibility for reconnoitering the route of march from
SP to RP.

Once the road march begins, members of the quartering party serve as guides along the
feeder route and in the assembly area. The size and composition of the party usually is
dictated by unit SOP, although it can be adjusted based on specific tactical requirements.
Refer to Section II of this appendix for a more detailed discussion of quartering party
duties and procedures.

G-4. CONTROL MEASURES

The SBCT infantry company commander uses the control measures discussed in the
following paragraphs to assist in controlling the company during the road march.
a. Graphics. Road march graphics should include, at a minimum, the SP, the RP,
and the route.
(1) Start Point. The SP location represents the beginning of the road march route. It
should be located on easily recognizable terrain. It is far enough away from the
company's initial position to allow individual elements to organize into the march
formation at the appropriate speed and interval. The SBCT infantry company commander
should determine the time required to move to the SP. This will help the company arrive
at the SP at the time designated in the SBCT infantry battalion OPORD and to continue
movement onto the route of march without stopping.
(2) Release Point. The RP marks the end of the route of march. It is also located on
easily recognizable terrain. Elements do not halt at the RP. They continue to their
respective positions with assistance from guides, waypoints, and other graphic control
measures.
(3) Route. The route is the path of travel connecting the SP and RP.

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b. Digital Overlays. Digital overlays, which serve as a backup to maps with

overlays, can provide valuable assistance for digitally equipped units. They display
waypoints and other information concerning unit locations along the route of march that
can assist the units in navigating accurately. When employing analog units with SBCT
units, leaders must coordinate arrangements to prevent loss of combat efficiency.
c. Critical Points. Critical points are locations along the route of march where
terrain or other factors may interfere with movement or where timing is critical. They are
represented using checkpoints. The SP, RP, and all checkpoints are considered critical
points.
d. Strip Maps. A strip map can assist in navigation. It should include the SP, RP,
checkpoints, marshaling areas, and refuel on the move (ROM) sites; it also lists the
distances between these points. Detailed "blowup" sketches should be used for
marshaling areas, locations of scheduled halts, ROM sites, and other places where
confusion is likely to occur. Strip maps are included as an annex to the movement order;
if possible, all vehicle drivers should receive a copy.
e. Visual Signals. Regardless of whether it is analog or digital, when observing
radio silence during a road march, the unit may use hand-and-arm signals, flags, and
lights as the primary means of passing information between vehicles and moving units.
f. Traffic Control. The headquarters controlling the march may post road guides
and traffic signs at designated traffic control points (TCPs). At critical points, guides
assist in creating a smooth flow of traffic along the march route. Military police,
members of the SBCT battalion reconnaissance platoon, or designated elements from the
quartering party may serve as guides. They should have equipment or markers that allow
march elements to identify them in darkness or other limited visibility conditions. There
is normally an RP for every echelon of command conducting the road march (that is,
there is an SBCT battalion RP followed by an SBCT infantry company RP). Traffic
problems may arise if actions at each of these points are not well-rehearsed.

G-5. ACTIONS DURING THE MARCH

The following considerations apply during the conduct of the march.
a. Movement to the SP. The SBCT infantry company must arrive at the SP at the
time designated in the SBCT battalion OPORD. The company commander may need to
designate a marshaling area in which the quartering party and the main body can organize
their march columns and conduct final inspections and briefings before movement. If the
situation dictates, units may move directly to the column from their current positions. To
avoid confusion during the initial movement, leaders of all company elements should
conduct a reconnaissance of the route to the SP, issue clear movement instructions, and
conduct thorough rehearsals, paying particular attention to signals and timing.
b. Orientation. Every vehicle in the formation has an assigned sector of orientation.
Each vehicle commander should assign sectors of observation to crewmen to achieve
360-degree observation.
c. Halts. While taking part in a road march, the SBCT infantry company must be
prepared to conduct both scheduled and unscheduled halts. Security during halts normally
involves a combination of dispersion, weapons orientation, clearance of terrain that
dominates the route of march, and employment of infantry squads to secure danger areas.

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(1) Scheduled Halts. Scheduled halts are conducted to permit maintenance, refueling,
and personal relief activities and to allow other traffic to pass.
(a) The movement order establishes the time and duration of scheduled halts. Unit
SOP specifies actions to be taken during halts, but the first priority must always be to
establish and maintain local security. A maintenance halt of 15 minutes is usually
scheduled after the first hour of the march, with a 10-minute halt every two hours
thereafter.
(b) During long marches, the unit may conduct a ROM operation. The composition of
the ROM site depends both on OPSEC considerations and on the refueling capability of
assets at the ROM site. The OPORD specifies the amount of fuel or the amount of time at
the pump for each vehicle. It also gives instructions for OPSEC at the ROM site and at
the staging area to which vehicles move after refueling.
(2) Unscheduled. The SBCT infantry company conducts unscheduled halts when the
unit encounters unexpected obstacles or contaminated areas or when a disabled vehicle
temporarily blocks the route.
(a) When an unscheduled halt occurs, each vehicle commander sends a messenger to
the vehicle to his front. The messenger obtains (or, if applicable, provides) information
on the reason for the halt and on required follow-on actions. The movement commander
then takes any further actions required to determine and or eliminate the cause of the halt.
(b) A disabled vehicle must not obstruct traffic for lengthy periods. The crew should
move the vehicle off the road immediately, report its status, establish security, and post
guides to direct traffic. If possible, the crew repairs the vehicle and rejoins the rear of the
column. Vehicles that drop out of the column should return to their original positions
only when the column has halted. Until then, they move at the rear just ahead of the trail
element, which usually is made up of the security element and assets designated to
recover company vehicles. Assistance for recovery and repair of broken or damaged
equipment is received from the CRT attached to the battalion. (The XO normally handles
security if he is not part of the quartering party). If the crew cannot repair the vehicle, the
trail element or CRT recovers it.

G-6. ACTIONS ON CONTACT

If enemy contact occurs during the road march, the SBCT infantry company executes
actions on contact as described in Chapter 4 of this manual.

G-7. ACTIONS AT THE RP

The SBCT infantry company moves through the battalion RP without stopping. The
company's guide picks up the unit there and guides it to the company RP. Each SBCT
platoon then picks up its assigned guide and follows his signals to its position in the
assembly area. Depending on terrain and the equipment available (GPS or POSNAV),
guides and marking materials may be posted at or near exact vehicle locations.
(Assembly areas procedures are covered in the following section.)

Section II. ASSEMBLY AREAS

An assembly area is a site at which maneuver units prepare for future operations. A well-
planned assembly area has the following characteristics:

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• Concealment from enemy ground and air observation.

• A location on defensible terrain.
• Good drainage and a surface that can support tracked and wheeled vehicles.
• Suitable entrances, exits, and internal roads or trails.
• Sufficient space for dispersion of vehicles and equipment.

G-8. QUARTERING PARTY OPERATIONS

Normally, the SBCT infantry company employs a quartering party (also known as an
advance party) to assist in the occupation of an assembly area. The quartering party is
established in accordance with battalion or company SOP; for example, it may consist of
one vehicle per platoon along with a vehicle from the headquarters section. The company
XO, 1SG, or a senior NCO normally leads the quartering party. The quartering party's
actions in preparing the assembly area include the following:
• Reconnoiter for enemy forces and NBC contamination.
• Evaluate the condition of the route to the assembly area and the suitability of
the area itself (drainage, space, and internal routes). If the area is
unsatisfactory, the quartering party requests permission from the SBCT
infantry company commander to find a new location.
• Organize the area based on the SBCT battalion commander's guidance;
designate and mark tentative locations for platoons, CP vehicles, and trains.
• Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes.
• Mark bypasses or remove obstacles (within the party's capabilities).
• Mark tentative vehicle locations.

G-9. OCCUPATION OF THE ASSEMBLY AREA

Once the AA is prepared, the quartering party awaits the arrival of the SBCT infantry
company, maintaining surveillance and providing security of the area within its
capabilities.
a. Quartering party members guide the company as a whole from the battalion RP to
the company RP. They then guide individual elements from the company RP to their
individual locations in the AA. SOPs and prearranged signals and markers (for day or
night occupation) should be used to assist vehicle commanders in finding their positions.
The key consideration is to move quickly, both to clear the route for other units and to
assume designated positions in the AA.
b. The SBCT infantry company may occupy the AA as an independent element or as
part of a battalion (Figure G-1, page G-6). In either situation, the SBCT infantry company
occupies its positions upon arrival using the procedures for hasty occupation of a BP. The
company commander establishes local security and coordinates with adjacent units. He
assigns weapons orientation and a sector of responsibility for each platoon and
subordinate element. If the company occupies the AA alone, it establishes a perimeter
defense.

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Figure G-1. SBCT infantry company assembly area example.

G-10. ACTIONS IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA

Following occupation, the SBCT infantry company and its individual elements can
prepare for future operations by conducting troop-leading procedures and priorities of
work in accordance with battalion and company OPORDs. These preparations include the
following:
• Establish and maintain security (at the appropriate REDCON level).
• Employ infantry squads to implement security measures as necessary,
including protection against enemy infiltration.
• Conduct TLP.
• Perform maintenance on vehicles and communications equipment.
• Verify weapons system status and conduct test firing and other necessary
preparations. (The SBCT infantry company normally must coordinate test-
firing activities with its higher headquarters.)
• Conduct resupply operations, including refueling and rearming.
• Conduct rehearsals and other training for upcoming operations.
• Conduct PCCs and PCIs based on time available.
• Adjust SBCT infantry company task organization as necessary.

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• Account for company personnel and assigned sensitive items.

• Reestablish vehicle load plans.

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APPENDIX H
DIRECT FIRE PLANNING AND CONTROL

Suppressing or destroying the enemy with direct fires is fundamental

to success in close combat. Effective direct fires are the unique
contribution of maneuver forces to the combined arms team, and fire and
movement are complementary components of maneuver. The SBCT
infantry company commander must effectively plan to focus, distribute,
and shift the overwhelming mass of his direct fire capability at critical
locations and times to be successful on the battlefield. These resources
include dismounted infantry, ICVs, and MGS vehicles. Effective and
efficient fire control means that the company acquires the enemy rapidly
and masses the effects of direct fires to achieve decisive results in the
close fight.

Section I. PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT FIRE CONTROL

When planning and executing direct fires, the SBCT infantry company commander and
subordinate leaders must know how to apply several fundamental principles. The purpose
of these direct fire control principles is not to restrict the actions of subordinates, but to
help the company accomplish the primary goal of any direct fire engagement: to
eliminate the enemy by acquiring first and shooting first. Applied correctly, these
principles give subordinates the freedom to respond rapidly upon acquisition of the
enemy. This discussion focuses on the following principles:
• Mass the effects of fire.
• Destroy the greatest threat first.
• Avoid target overkill.
• Employ the best weapon for the target.
• Minimize friendly exposure.
• Prevent fratricide.
• Plan for extreme limited visibility conditions.
• Develop contingencies for diminished capabilities.

H-1. MASS THE EFFECTS OF FIRE

The SBCT infantry company must mass its direct fires to achieve decisive results.
Massing entails focusing direct fires at critical points and distributing the effects.
Random application of fires is unlikely to have a decisive effect. For example,
concentrating the company’s fires at a single target may ensure its destruction or
suppression; however, that fire control option will fail to achieve the decisive effect on
the enemy formation or position.

H-2. DESTROY THE GREATEST THREAT FIRST

The order in which the SBCT infantry company engages enemy forces is in direct
relation to the danger these forces present. The threat posed by the enemy depends on his
weapons, range, and positioning. Presented with multiple targets, a unit must initially

H-1
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concentrate direct fires to destroy the greatest threat, then distribute fires over the
remainder of the enemy force.

H-3. AVOID TARGET OVERKILL

Use only the amount of fire required to achieve necessary effects. Target overkill wastes
ammunition and is not tactically sound. To the other extreme, the company cannot have
every weapon engage a different target because the requirement to destroy the greatest
threats first remains paramount.

H-4. EMPLOY THE BEST WEAPON FOR THE TARGET

Using the appropriate weapon for the target increases the probability of rapid enemy
destruction or suppression; at the same time, it conserves ammunition. The SBCT
infantry company has many weapons with which to engage the enemy. Target type,
range, and exposure are key factors in determining the weapon and ammunition that
should be employed, as are weapons and ammunition availability and desired target
effects. Additionally, a leader must consider more than only the capabilities of
dismounted infantry squads and ICVs. He also must determine how to best employ his
MGS platoon. The company commander arrays his forces based on the terrain, enemy,
and desired effects of all of his available direct fires. As an example, when he expects an
enemy dismounted assault in restricted terrain, the company commander employs his
dismounted infantry squads, taking advantage of their ability to engage numerous, fast-
moving dismounted targets.

H-5. MINIMIZE FRIENDLY EXPOSURE

Units increase their survivability by exposing themselves to the enemy only to the extent
necessary to engage him effectively. Natural or manmade defilade provides the best
cover from ATGMs and other large caliber direct fire munitions. Dismounted infantry
and vehicles minimize their exposure by constantly seeking effective available cover,
attempting to engage the enemy from the flank, remaining dispersed, firing from multiple
positions, and limiting engagement times.

H-6. PREVENT FRATRICIDE

The company commander must be proactive in reducing the risk of fratricide and
noncombatant casualties. He has numerous tools to assist him in this effort: FBCB2,
identification training for combat vehicles and aircraft, the unit’s weapons safety posture,
the weapons control status, and recognition markings. Knowledge and employment of
applicable ROE are the primary means of preventing noncombatant casualties.

H-7. PLAN FOR EXTREME LIMITED VISIBILITY CONDITIONS

At night, limited visibility fire control equipment enables the SBCT infantry company to
engage enemy forces at nearly the same ranges that are applicable during the day.
Obscurants such as dense fog, heavy rain, heavy smoke, and blowing sand, however, may
reduce the capabilities of thermal and IR equipment. It also may add confusion to
information provided by FBCB2. Therefore, the company commander should develop
contingencies for such extreme limited visibility conditions. Although decreased
acquisition capabilities have minimal effect on area fire, point target engagements are

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likely to occur at decreased ranges. Firing positions, whether offensive or defensive,

typically must be adjusted closer to the area or point where the commander intends to
focus fires. Another alternative is the use of visual or IR illumination when there is
insufficient ambient light for passive light intensification devices.

H-8. DEVELOP CONTINGENCIES FOR DIMINISHED CAPABILITIES

Leaders initially develop plans based on their units’ maximum capabilities; they make
backup plans for implementation in the event of casualties, weapon damage or failure, or
loss of the COP. While leaders cannot anticipate or plan for every situation, they should
develop plans for what they view as the most probable occurrences. Building redundancy
into these plans, such as having two systems observe the same sector, is an invaluable
asset when the situation (and the number of available systems) permits. Designating
alternate sectors of fire provides a means of shifting fires if adjacent elements become
unable to fire.

Section II. FIRE CONTROL PROCESS

To bring direct fires against an enemy force successfully, commanders and leaders must
continuously apply the four steps of the fire control process. At the heart of this process
are two critical actions: rapid, accurate target acquisition and the massing of fires to
achieve decisive effects on the target. Target acquisition is the detection, identification,
and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of
weapons. Massing entails focusing fires at critical points and then distributing the fires
for optimum effect. The four steps are--
• Identify probable enemy locations and determine the enemy scheme of
maneuver.
• Determine where and how to mass (focus and distribute) fire effects.
• Orient forces to speed target acquisition.
• Shift fires to refocus or redistribute their effects.

H-9. IDENTIFY PROBABLE ENEMY LOCATIONS AND DETERMINE THE

ENEMY SCHEME OF MANEUVER
The SBCT infantry company commander plans and executes direct fires based on his
analysis of the factors of METT-TC. In particular, his analyses of the terrain and the
enemy force are essential and aid him in visualizing how the enemy will attack or defend
a particular piece of terrain. A defending enemy’s defensive position or an attacking
enemy’s support position is normally driven by terrain. Typically, there are limited points
on a piece of terrain that provide both good fields of fire and adequate cover for a
defender. Similarly, an attacking enemy will have only a limited selection of avenues of
approach that provide adequate cover and concealment. Coupled with awareness gained
through FBCB2, the company commander’s understanding of the effects of a specific
piece of terrain on maneuver assist him in identifying probable enemy locations and
likely avenues of approach both before and during the fight. Figure H-1, page H-4,
illustrates the commander’s analysis of enemy locations and scheme of maneuver. He
may use any or all of the following products or techniques in developing and updating the
analysis:

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• A SITEMP provided by the battalion.

• A SPOTREP or contact report on enemy locations and activities.
• Reconnaissance of the area of operations.

Figure H-1. Identifying probable enemy locations and determining enemy

scheme of maneuver.

H-10. DETERMINE WHERE AND HOW TO MASS FIRES

To achieve decisive effects, the SBCT infantry company must mass direct fires. Effective
massing requires the company commander both to focus the fires of subordinate elements
and to distribute the effects of those fires. Based on his analysis and his concept of the
operation, the company commander identifies points where he wants to--or must--focus
the company's direct fires. Most often, he has identified these locations as probable
enemy positions or points along likely enemy avenues of approach where the company
can mass direct fires. Because the platoons may not initially be oriented on the point
where the commander wants to mass direct fires, he may issue a fire command to focus

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the fires. At the same time, the company commander must use direct fire control
measures to effectively distribute the direct fires of his subordinate elements, which are
now focused on the same point. Figure H-2 illustrates how the commander masses fires
against the enemy.

Figure H-2. Determining where and how to mass (focus and distribute) fire
effects to kill the enemy.

H-11. ORIENT FORCES TO SPEED TARGET ACQUISITION

To engage the enemy with direct fires effectively, the SBCT infantry company must
rapidly and accurately acquire enemy elements. Orienting the company on probable
enemy locations and on likely enemy avenues of approach speeds target acquisition.
Conversely, failure to orient the company results in slower acquisition, which greatly
increases the likelihood that enemy forces will be able to engage first. The SBCT infantry
company commander receives information that enhances his awareness primarily by
FBCB2, but he has other methods to reinforce FBCB2 information. The clock direction
orientation method, which is prescribed in most unit SOPs, is good for achieving all-
round security, but it does not ensure that friendly forces are most effectively oriented to
detect the enemy. To achieve this critical orientation, the commander typically designates

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TRPs on or near a probable enemy location or avenues of approach and orients his
platoons using directions of fire or sectors of fire. Normally, some ICVs and MGS
vehicles scan the designated direction, sector, or area while others observe alternate
sectors or areas to provide all-round security. Figure H-3 illustrates how the company
commander orients the company for quick, effective acquisition of the enemy force.

Figure H-3. Orienting forces to speed target acquisition.

H-12. SHIFT FIRES TO REFOCUS AND REDISTRIBUTE

As the engagement proceeds, leaders must shift direct fires to refocus and redistribute the
effects based on evolving friendly and enemy information. Figure H-4 provides an
example of shifting to refocus and redistribute fires. The SBCT infantry company
commander and his subordinate leaders apply the same techniques and considerations
that they used earlier to focus and distribute fires, including fire control measures. A
variety of situations dictate shifting of fires, including the following:
• Appearance of an enemy force posing a greater threat than the one currently
being engaged.
• Extensive destruction of the enemy force being engaged, creating the
possibility of target overkill.
• Destruction of friendly elements that are engaging the enemy force.

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• Change in the ammunition status of friendly elements that are engaging the
enemy force.
• Maneuver of enemy or friendly forces resulting in terrain masking.
• Increased fratricide risk as a maneuvering friendly element closes with the
enemy force being engaged.

Figure H-4. Shifting to refocus and redistribute fires.

Section III. DIRECT FIRE PLANNING

The SBCT infantry company commander plans direct fires concurrent with his troop-
leading procedures. Determining where and how the company can and will mass fires is
an essential step as the commander develops his concept of the operation.

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H-13. PLANNING DIRECT FIRES

After identifying probable (or known) enemy locations, the SBCT infantry commander
determines points or areas where he will focus his combat power. His situational
understanding (or visualization) of where and how the enemy will attack or defend assists
him in determining the volume of fires he must focus at particular points to have a
decisive effect. In addition, if he intends to mass the direct fires of more than one platoon,
he must establish a means for distributing those fires effectively.
a. Based on where and how he wants to focus and distribute direct fires, the
commander can establish the weapons ready postures for company elements as well as
triggers for initiating fires. The company commander uses the tactical information
provided by FBCB2. He must evaluate the risk of fratricide and establish controls to
prevent it. Fratricide prevention measures include designation of recognition markings,
weapons control status, and weapons safety posture.
b. Having determined where and how he will mass and distribute direct fires, the
company commander must orient platoons so they can rapidly and accurately acquire the
enemy. The commander must anticipate how the enemy will fight. He gains this
anticipation through a detailed war-game of the selected course of action to determine
probable requirements for refocusing and redistributing fires and to establish other
necessary controls. Also during the troop-leading procedures, the company commander
plans and conducts rehearsals of direct fires (and of the fire control process) based on his
analysis.
c. The company commander must continue to apply planning procedures and
considerations throughout execution. He must be able to adjust direct fires based on
combining the latest available tactical information from FBCB2. When necessary, he
must also apply effective direct fire SOPs, which are covered in the following discussion.

H-14. DIRECT FIRE SOP

A well-rehearsed direct fire SOP enhances direct fire planning and ensures quick,
predictable actions by all members of the company. The SBCT infantry company
commander bases the various elements of the SOP on the capabilities of his force and on
anticipated conditions and situations. SOP elements should include standing means for
focusing fires, distributing their effects, orienting forces, and preventing fratricide. The
commander should adjust the direct fire SOP whenever changes to anticipated and actual
factors of METT-TC become apparent.
a. Focusing Fires. FBCB2 enhances a company commander’s ability to focus the
direct fires of his platoons, but he also needs other means, such as TRPs, to do so. One
technique is to establish a standard respective position for TRPs in relation to friendly
elements and then to consistently number the TRPs, such as from left to right. This
allows leaders to quickly determine and communicate the location of the TRPs.
b. Distributing Fires. Two useful means of distributing the effects of the company’s
direct fires are engagement priorities and target array. Engagement priorities, by type of
enemy vehicle or weapon, are assigned for each type of friendly weapon system. The
target array technique can assist in distribution by assigning specific friendly elements to
engage enemy elements of approximately similar capabilities. The following are example
SOP elements for distributing the fires of an SBCT infantry company moving mounted in
a wedge formation:

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• MGSs engage medium-armored vehicles first, then tanks.

• ICVs engage antitank weapons first, then trucks.
• Javelins engage tanks first, then other armored vehicles.
• Dismounted infantry engage crew-served weapons, then infantry.
• If the company masses fires at the same target, then the MGS platoon engages
enemy armored vehicles, the left flank infantry platoon engages the left half of
the enemy formation, and the right flank infantry platoon engages the right
half of the enemy formation. The trail infantry platoon remains in reserve.
c. Orienting Forces. A standard means of orienting friendly forces is to assign a
primary direction of fire, using a TRP, to orient each element on a probable (or known)
enemy position or likely avenue of approach. To provide all-round security, the SOP can
supplement the primary direction of fire with sectors using a friendly-based quadrant.
The following example SOP elements illustrate the use of these techniques:
(1) The front (center) platoon’s primary direction of fire is TRP 2 (center) until
otherwise specified; the platoon is responsible for the front two quadrants.
(2) The left flank platoon’s primary direction of fire is TRP 1 (left) until otherwise
specified; the platoon is responsible for the left two friendly quadrants (overlapping with
the center platoon).
(3) The right flank platoon’s primary direction of fire is TRP 3 (right) until otherwise
specified; the platoon is responsible for the right two friendly quadrants (overlapping
with the center platoon).
(4) The trail platoon’s primary direction of fire is TRP 3 (right) until otherwise
specified; the platoon is responsible for the bottom right friendly quadrant (overlapping
with the right platoon).
d. Preventing Fratricide. FBCB2 is a good tool for minimizing fratricide risk but
does not supplant the company commander’s responsibility to plan for fratricide
prevention. The SOP must address the most critical requirement of fratricide prevention
with or without FBCB2. It must direct subordinate leaders to inform the commander,
adjacent elements, and subordinates whenever a friendly force is moving or preparing to
move. One technique is to establish a standing weapons control status of WEAPONS
TIGHT, which requires positive enemy identification prior to engagement. The SOP must
also cover means for identifying dismounted infantry squads and other friendly
dismounted elements. Techniques include using arm bands, medical heat pads, or an IR
light source, as well as detonating a smoke grenade of a designated color at the
appropriate time.

Section IV. DIRECT FIRE CONTROL

Acquiring the enemy is a precursor to direct fire engagement. The company commander
must not assume that his unit will always be able to see the enemy through FBCB2. He
must expect the enemy to use cover and concealed routes effectively when attacking and
to make best use of flanking and concealed positions in the defense. As a result, the
company may not have the luxury of a fully exposed enemy that it can easily see. The
acquisition of the enemy often depends on visual recognition of very subtle indicators,
such as exposed antennas, reflections from the vision blocks of enemy vehicles, small
dust clouds, or smoke from vehicle engines or ATGM or tank fires. Because of the
difficulty of target acquisition, the company commander must develop surveillance plans

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to assist the company in acquiring the enemy. The information he gains can then be
shared with others through FBCB2.

H-15. FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

Fire control measures are the means by which the SBCT infantry company commander or
his subordinate leaders control direct fires. Application of these concepts, procedures, and
techniques assists the unit in acquiring the enemy, focusing fires on him, distributing the
effects of the fires, and preventing fratricide. At the same time, no single measure is
sufficient to control fires effectively. At company level, fire control measures are
effective only if the entire unit has a common understanding of what they mean and how
to employ them. Table H-1 lists terrain-based and threat-based fire control measures.

Terrain-Based Fire Control Measures Threat-Based Fire Control Measures

Target reference point Fire patterns
Engagement area Target array
Sector of fire Engagement priorities
Direction of fire Weapons ready posture
Terrain-based quadrant Engagement criteria
Friendly-based quadrant Weapons control status
Maximum engagement line Rules of engagement
Restrictive fire line Weapons safety posture
Final protective line Engagement techniques
Table H-1. Common fire control measures.

a. Terrain-Based Fire Control Measures. The SBCT infantry company

commander uses terrain-based fire control measures to focus and control fires on a
particular point, line, or area rather than on a specific enemy element. The following
paragraphs describe the techniques associated with this type of control measure.
(1) Target Reference Point. A target reference point is an easily recognizable point
on the ground that leaders use to orient friendly forces and to focus and control direct
fires. In addition, when TRPs are designated as indirect fire targets, they can be used in
calling for and adjusting indirect fires. Leaders designate TRPs at probable (or known)
enemy locations and along likely avenues of approach. TRPs can be natural or manmade
and can be established sites, such as hills or buildings, or impromptu features designated
as TRPs on the spot, like burning enemy vehicles or smoke generated by an artillery
round. Ideally, TRPs should be visible in three observation modes (unaided, passive-IR,
and thermal) so all forces can identify them. Example of TRPs include the following
features and objects:
• Prominent hill mass.
• Distinctive building.
• Observable enemy position.
• Destroyed vehicle.
• Ground-burst illumination.
• Smoke round.
• Laser point.
(2) Engagement Area. This fire control measure is an area along an enemy avenue of
approach where the company commander intends to mass the direct fires of available

H-10
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weapons to destroy an enemy force. The size and shape of the EA is determined by the
degree of relatively unobstructed intervisibility available to the unit’s weapons systems in
their firing positions and by the maximum range of those weapons. Typically, company
commanders delineate responsibility within the EA by assigning each platoon a sector of
fire or direction of fire.
(3) Sector of Fire. A sector of fire is a defined area that must be covered by direct
fire. Leaders assign sectors of fire to subordinate elements, crew-served weapons, and
individual soldiers to ensure coverage of an area of responsibility. They may also limit
the sector of fire of an element or weapon to prevent accidental engagement of an
adjacent unit. In assigning sectors of fire, commanders and subordinate leaders consider
the number and types of weapons available. They also consider acquisition system type
and field of view in determining the width of a sector of fire. For example, while unaided
vision has a wide field of view, its ability to detect and identify targets at distant ranges
and in limited visibility conditions is restricted. Conversely, most fire control acquisition
systems have greater detection and identification ranges than the unaided eye, but their
field of view is narrow. Means of designating sectors of fire include the following:
• TRPs.
• Clock direction.
• Terrain-based quadrants.
• Friendly-based quadrants.
(4) Direction of Fire. A direction of fire is an orientation or point used to assign
responsibility for a particular area on the battlefield that must be covered by direct fire.
Leaders designate directions of fire for the purpose of acquisition or engagement by
subordinate elements, crew-served weapons, or individual soldiers. Direction of fire is
most commonly employed when assigning sectors of fire would be difficult or impossible
because of limited time or insufficient reference points. Means of designating a direction
of fire include the following:
• Closest TRP.
• Clock direction.
• Cardinal direction.
• Tracer on target.
• IR laser pointer.
(5) Quadrants. Quadrants are subdivisions of an area created by superimposing
imaginary perpendicular axes over the terrain to create four separate areas, or quadrants.
Quadrants can be based on the terrain, on friendly forces, or on the enemy formation. The
technique in which quadrants are based on the enemy formation is usually referred to as
the target array and is covered in threat-based fire control measures (paragraph H-15b).
The method of identifying quadrants is established in the unit SOP, but the unit must take
care to avoid confusion when using quadrants based on terrain, friendly forces, and
enemy formations simultaneously.
(a) Terrain-Based Quadrant. A terrain-based quadrant entails use of a TRP, either
existing or constructed, to designate the center point of the axes that divide the area into
four quadrants. This technique can be employed in both offensive and defensive
operations. In the offense, the company commander designates the center of the quadrant
using an existing feature or by creating a reference point (for example, using a ground
burst illumination round, a smoke marking round, or a fire ignited by incendiary or tracer

H-11
FM 3-21.11

rounds). The axes delineating the quadrants run parallel and perpendicular to the
direction of movement. In the defense, the company commander designates the center of
the quadrant using an existing or constructed TRP. In Figure H-5, the quadrants are
marked using the letter "Q" and a number (Q1 to Q4); quadrant numbers are in the same
relative positions as on military map sheets (from Q1 as the upper left quadrant clockwise
to Q4 as the lower left quadrant).

Figure H-5. Terrain-based quadrants.

(b) Friendly-Based Quadrant. The friendly-based quadrant technique entails

superimposing quadrants over the unit’s formation. The center point is based on the
center of the formation, and the axes run parallel and perpendicular to the general
direction of travel. For rapid orientation, the friendly quadrant technique may be better
than the clock direction method because different elements of a large formation are rarely
oriented in the same exact direction and because the relative dispersion of friendly forces
causes parallax to the target. Figure H-6 illustrates use of friendly-based quadrants.

H-12
 FM 3-21.11

Figure H-6. Friendly-based quadrants.

(6) Maximum Engagement Line. A MEL is the linear depiction of the farthest limit
of effective fire for a weapon or unit. This line is determined both by the weapon’s or
unit’s maximum effective range and by the effects of terrain. For example, slope,
vegetation, structures, and other features provide cover and concealment that may prevent
the weapon from engaging out to the maximum effective range. A MEL serves several
purposes. The company commander may use it to prevent vehicle crews and dismounted
squads from engaging beyond the maximum effective range of their weapons, to define
criteria for the establishment of triggers, and to delineate the maximum extent of battle
space on the sector sketch.
(7) Restrictive Fire Line. An RFL is a line established between converging friendly
forces (one or both may be moving) that prohibits fires and effects across the line without
coordination with the affected force. In the offense, the company commander may
designate an RFL to prevent a base of fire platoon from firing into the area where an
assaulting platoon is maneuvering. This technique is particularly important when vehicles
(ICV or MGS) support the maneuver of dismounted infantry squads. In the defense, the
company commander may establish an RFL to prevent the unit from engaging a
dismounted infantry squad positioned in restricted terrain on the flank of an enemy
avenue of approach.
(8) Final Protective Line. The FPL is a line of fire established where an enemy
assault is to be checked by the interlocking fires of all available weapons. The unit
reinforces this line with protective obstacles and with FPFs whenever possible. Initiation
of the FPF is the signal for elements, vehicle crews, and individual soldiers to shift fires
to their assigned portion of the FPL.
b. Threat-Based Fire Control Measures. The SBCT infantry company commander
uses threat-based fire control measures to focus and control direct fires by directing the
unit to engage a specific enemy element rather than to fire on a point or area. The

H-13
FM 3-21.11

following paragraphs describe the techniques associated with this type of fire control
measure.
(1) Fire Patterns. Fire patterns are a threat-based fire control measure designed to
distribute the fires of a unit simultaneously among multiple, similar targets. They are
most often used by platoons to distribute fires across an enemy formation. Leaders
designate and adjust fire patterns based on terrain and the anticipated enemy formation.
The basic fire patterns, illustrated in Figure H-7, are the following:
• Frontal fire.
• Cross fire.
• Depth fire.

Figure H-7. Fire patterns.

(a) Frontal Fire. Leaders may initiate frontal fire when targets are arrayed in front of
the unit in a lateral configuration. Weapons systems engage targets to their respective
fronts. For example, the left flank weapon engages the left-most target, and the right
flank weapon engages the right-most target. As the unit destroys targets, weapons shift
fires toward the center of the enemy formation and from near to far.
(b) Cross Fire. Leaders initiate cross fire when targets are arrayed laterally across the
unit’s front in a manner that permits diagonal fires at the enemy’s flank or when
obstructions prevent unit weapons from firing frontally. Right flank weapons engage the
left-most targets, and left flank weapons engage the right-most targets. Firing diagonally
across an engagement area provides more flank shots, thus increasing the chance of kills.
It also reduces the possibility of the enemy detecting friendly elements as he continues to
move forward. As the unit destroys targets, weapons shift fires toward the center of the
enemy formation.
(c) Depth Fire. Leaders initiate depth fire when targets are dispersed in depth,
perpendicular to the unit. Center weapons engage the closest targets, and flank weapons

H-14
 FM 3-21.11

engage deeper targets. As the unit destroys targets, weapons shift fires toward the center
of the enemy formation.
(2) Target Array. Target array permits the company commander to distribute fires
when the enemy force is concentrated and terrain-based controls are inadequate. This
threat-based distribution measure is similar to the quadrant method mentioned in terrain-
based fire control measures. The company commander creates the target array by
superimposing a quadrant pattern over an enemy formation. The pattern centers on the
enemy formation, with the axes running parallel and perpendicular to the enemy’s
direction of travel. Quadrants are described using their relative locations. The examples
in Figure H-8 illustrate the target array technique.

Figure H-8. Examples of target array.

(3) Engagement Priorities. Engagement priorities entail the sequential ordering of

targets to be engaged. They serve one or more of the following critical fire control
functions:
(a) Prioritize Targets. In concert with his concept of the operation, the company
commander determines which target types provide the greatest threat to the company and
sets these as engagement priorities. For example, he may decide that destroying enemy
engineer assets is the best way to prevent the enemy from breaching an obstacle.
(b) Employ the Best Weapons for the Target. Establishing engagement priorities for
specific friendly systems increases the effectiveness with which the unit employs its
weapons. As an example, the engagement priority for the company MGS vehicles could
be enemy fortifications first, then enemy armored vehicles. This decreases the chance that
the company’s Javelins will need to engage enemy fortifications.
(c) Distribute the Unit’s Fires. Establishing different priorities for similar friendly
systems helps to prevent overkill and achieve effective distribution of fires. For example,
the company commander may designate the enemy fortifications as the initial priority for
one infantry platoon while making the enemy vehicles the priority for another infantry

H-15
FM 3-21.11

platoon. This decreases the chance of multiple Javelins being fired against two enemy
vehicles while ignoring the dangers posed by the fortifications.
(4) Weapons Ready Posture. The weapons ready posture is a means by which leaders
use the tactical information available to specify the ammunition and range for the most
probable engagement. Ammunition selection depends on the target type, but the leader
may adjust it based on engagement priorities, desired effects, and effective range. Range
selection depends on the anticipated engagement range and is affected by terrain
intervisibility, weather, and light conditions. Within the company, the weapons ready
posture affects the types and quantities of ammunition loaded in ready boxes, stowed in
ready racks, and carried by dismounted infantry squads.
(a) For dismounted infantry squads, weapons ready posture is the selected
ammunition and indexed range for individual and crew-served weapons. For example, an
M203 grenadier whose most likely engagement is to cover dead space at 200 meters from
his position might load high explosive, dual purpose (HEDP) rounds and set 200 meters
on his quadrant sight. To prepare for an engagement in a wooded area where engagement
ranges are extremely short, an antiarmor specialist might dismount the ICV with an AT4
instead of a Javelin.
(b) For ICVs and MGSs, weapons ready posture covers the selected ammunition and
the indexed range.
(5) Engagement Criteria. Engagement criteria are a specific set of conditions that
specify the circumstances in which subordinate elements are to engage. This is often
referred to as a trigger. The circumstances can be based on a friendly or an enemy event.
For example, the engagement criteria for a friendly platoon to initiate engagement could
be three or more enemy combat vehicles passing or crossing a given point or line. This
line can be any natural or manmade linear feature, such as a road, ridgeline, or stream, or
a line perpendicular to the unit’s orientation, delineated by one or more reference points.
(6) Weapons Control Status. The three levels of weapons control status outline the
conditions, based on target identification criteria, under which friendly elements may
engage. The commander sets and adjusts the weapons control status based on friendly
and enemy disposition. In general, a more restrictive WCS relates to a higher probability
of fratricide. The three levels, in descending order of restriction, are--
• WEAPONS HOLD. Engage only if engaged or ordered to engage.
• WEAPONS TIGHT. Engage only targets positively identified as enemy.
• WEAPONS FREE. Engage any targets not positively identified as friendly.
As an example, the company commander may establish the WCS as WEAPONS HOLD
when friendly forces are conducting a passage of lines. Through awareness gained by
FBCB2, he may be able to lower the WCS. In such a case, the company commander may
be able to set a WEAPONS FREE status when he knows there are no friendly elements in
the vicinity of the engagement. This permits his elements to engage targets at extended
ranges even though it is difficult to distinguish the targets accurately under battlefield
conditions. The WCS is extremely important for forces using combat identification
systems: establishing the WCS as WEAPONS FREE permits leaders to engage an
unknown target when they fail to get a friendly response.
(7) Rules of Engagement. ROE specify the circumstances and limitations under
which forces may engage. ROE include definitions of combatant and noncombatant
elements and prescribe the treatment of noncombatants. Factors influencing ROE are

H-16
 FM 3-21.11

national command policy, the mission and commander’s intent, the operational
environment, and the law of war. ROE always recognize a soldier’s right of self-defense;
at the same time, they clearly define circumstances in which he may fire.
(8) Weapons Safety Posture. Weapons safety posture is an ammunition handling
instruction that allows the company commander to precisely control the safety of his
unit’s weapons. Leaders supervise the weapons safety posture and soldier adherence to it,
minimizing the risk of accidental discharge and fratricide. Table H-2, page H-18, outlines
procedures and considerations for the company team in using the four weapons safety
postures, listed in ascending order of restriction--
• AMMUNITION LOADED.
• AMMUNITION LOCKED.
• AMMUNITION PREPARED.
• WEAPONS CLEARED.
In setting and adjusting the weapons safety posture, the company commander must weigh
the need to prevent accidental discharges against the requirement for immediate action
based on the enemy threat. If the possibility of direct contact with the enemy is high, the
company commander may establish the weapons safety posture as AMMUNITION
LOADED. If the requirement for action is less immediate, he may lower the posture to
AMMUNITION LOCKED or AMMUNITION PREPARED. Additionally, the company
commander may designate different weapons safety postures for different elements of the
unit. For example, in the attack position, ICVs may switch to AMMUNITION LOADED
while infantry squads riding in the ICVs remain at AMMUNITION LOCKED.

H-17
FM 3-21.11

INFANTRY SQUAD
MGS WEAPONS ICV WEAPONS AND WEAPONS AND
AND AMMUNITION AMMUNITION AMMUNITION
AMMUNITION Main gun ammunition Self-defense weapon M4 rounds
LOADED loaded. ammunition on feed chambered.
Self-defense weapon tray; bolt locked to M240B and M249
ammunition on feed rear. ammunition on feed
tray; bolt locked to Smoke grenades in tray; bolt locked to
rear. launchers. rear.
Smoke grenades in Weapons on electrical M203 launcher
launchers. safe. loaded.
Weapons on electrical Weapons on safe.
safe.
AMMUNITION Main gun ammunition Self-defense weapon Magazines locked into
LOCKED in ready rack. ammunition on feed M4s.
Self-defense weapon tray; bolt forward. M240B and M249
ammunition on feed Smoke grenades in ammunition on feed
tray; bolt forward. launchers. tray; bolt locked
Smoke grenades in Weapons on electrical forward.
launchers. safe. M203 launcher
Weapons on electrical unloaded.
safe.
AMMUNITION Main gun ready rack Self-defense weapon Magazines,
PREPARED filled. ready boxes filled. ammunition boxes,
Machine gun launcher grenades,
ammunition boxes Smoke grenades in and hand grenades
filled. launchers. prepared but
Smoke grenades in stowed in pouches
launchers. or vests.
WEAPONS Main gun ready rack Self-defense weapon Magazines,
CLEARED filled. cleared, with bolts ammunition boxes,
Self-defense weapon locked to the rear. and launcher
cleared, with bolts grenades removed;
locked to the rear. all weapons
cleared.
Table H-2. Weapons safety posture levels.

(9) Engagement Techniques. Engagement techniques are effects-oriented direct fire

distribution measures. The following engagement techniques are the most common in
SBCT infantry company operations:
• Point fire.
• Area fire.
• Alternating fire.
• Sequential fire.
• Simultaneous fire.
• Observed fire.
• Time of suppression.
• Reconnaissance by fire.
(a) Point Fire. Point fire concentrates the effects of a unit’s fire against a specific,
identified target such as a vehicle, machine gun bunker, or ATGM position. When leaders
direct point fire, all of the unit’s weapons engage the target, firing until it is destroyed or

H-18
 FM 3-21.11

the required time of suppression has expired. Employing converging fires from dispersed
positions makes point fire more effective because the unit engages the target from
multiple directions. The unit may initiate an engagement using point fire against the most
dangerous threat, then revert to area fire against other, less threatening point targets. (Use
of point fire has been fairly rare because a unit seldom encounters a single, clearly
identified enemy weapon; however, with the increased tactical information gained
through FBCB2, this may become a more useful technique.)
(b) Area Fire. Area fire involves distributing the effects of a unit’s direct fires over an
area in which enemy positions are numerous or are not obvious. If the area is large,
leaders assign sectors of fire to subordinate elements using a terrain-based distribution
method such as the quadrant technique. Typically, the primary purpose of the area fire is
suppression; however, sustaining effective suppression requires judicious control of the
rate of fire.
(c) Alternating Fire. In alternating fire, pairs of elements continuously engage the
same point or area target one at a time. For example, a company team may alternate fires
of two platoons; a tank platoon may alternate the fires of its sections, or an infantry
platoon may alternate the fires of a pair of machine guns. Alternating fire permits the unit
to maintain suppression for a longer duration than does simultaneous fire. It also forces
the enemy to acquire and engage alternating points of fire.
(d) Sequential Fire. In sequential fire, the subordinate elements of a unit engage the
same point or area target one after another in an arranged sequence. For example, an
MGS platoon may sequence the fires of its four vehicles to gain maximum time of
suppression. Sequential fire can also help prevent the waste of ammunition, as when an
infantry platoon waits to see the effects of the first Javelin before firing another.
Additionally, sequential fire permits elements that have already fired to pass on
information they have learned from the engagement. An example would be an
infantryman who missed an armored vehicle with AT4 fires passing range and lead
information to the next soldier preparing to engage the same armored vehicle with an
AT4.
(e) Simultaneous Fire. Units employ simultaneous fire, also referred to as volley fire,
to rapidly mass the effects of their fires or to gain immediate fire superiority. For
example, a unit may initiate a support-by-fire operation with simultaneous fire, then
change to alternating or sequential fire to maintain suppression. Simultaneous fire is also
employed to negate the low probability of hit and kill of certain antiarmor weapons. As
an example, a dismounted infantry squad may employ volley fire with its AT4s to ensure
rapid destruction of a BMP that is engaging a friendly position.
(f) Observed Fire. Observed fire is normally used when the company is in concealed
defensive positions with engagement ranges in excess of 2,500 meters. It can be
employed between elements of the company, such as an infantry platoon observing while
the MGS platoon fires, or between vehicles of the MGS platoon. The company
commander or platoon leader directs one element or vehicle to engage. The remaining
elements or vehicles observe fires and prepare to engage on order in case the engaging
element consistently misses its targets, experiences a malfunction, or runs low on
ammunition. Observed fire allows for mutual observation and assistance while protecting
the location of the observing elements.

H-19
FM 3-21.11

(g) Time of Suppression. Time of suppression is the period, specified by the company
commander, during which an enemy position or force is to be suppressed. Suppression
time typically depends on the time it will take a supported element to maneuver.
Normally, a unit suppresses an enemy position using the sustained rate of fire of its
weapons. In planning for sustained suppression, leaders must consider several factors: the
estimated time of suppression, the size of the area being suppressed, the type of enemy
force to be suppressed, range to the target, rates of fire, and available ammunition
quantities.
(h) Reconnaissance by Fire. Reconnaissance by fire is the process of engaging
possible enemy locations to elicit a tactical response, such as return fire or movement.
This response permits the company commander and his subordinate leaders to make
accurate target acquisition and then to mass fires against the enemy element. Typically,
the company commander directs a platoon to conduct the reconnaissance by fire. For
example, he may direct an overwatching platoon to conduct the reconnaissance by fire
against a probable enemy position before initiating movement by a bounding element.
The company commander should use reconnaissance by fire only if he cannot gain
accurate information through FBCB2.

H-16. FIRE COMMANDS

Fire commands are oral orders issued by the SBCT infantry company commander and his
subordinate leaders to focus and distribute fires as required to achieve the desired effects
against an enemy force. Fire commands allow leaders in the already confusing
environment of close combat to articulate their firing instructions rapidly and concisely
using a standard format. Unit fire commands include these elements--
• Alert.
• Weapon or ammunition (optional).
• Target description.
• Orientation.
• Range (optional).
• Control (optional).
• Execution.
a. Alert. The alert specifies the units that are directed to fire. It does not require the
leader who initiates the command to identify himself. Examples of the alert element (call
signs and code words based on unit SOP) include the following--
• "GUIDONS" (all subordinate elements).
• "RED" (1st platoon only).
b. Weapon or Ammunition (Optional). This element identifies the weapon and
ammunition to be employed by the alerted units. Leaders may designate the type and
number of rounds to limit expenditure of ammunition. Examples of this element include
the following:
• "JAVELIN."
• "TWO ROUNDS HEP-T."
c. Target Description. Target description designates which enemy forces are to be
engaged. Leaders may use the description to focus fires or achieve distribution. Examples
of target description include the following:

H-20
 FM 3-21.11

• "TROOPS IN TRENCH."
• "BUNKER."
• "THREE PCs (personnel carriers)."
d. Orientation. This element identifies the location of the target. There are
numerous ways to designate the location of target, including the following:
• Closest TRP. Example: "TRP 13."
• Clock direction. Example: "ONE O’CLOCK."
• Terrain quadrant. Example: "QUADRANT ONE."
• Friendly quadrant. Example: "LEFT FRONT."
• Target array. Example: "FRONT HALF."
• Tracer on target. Example: "ON MY TRACER."
• Laser pointer. Example: "ON MY POINTER."
e. Range (Optional). The range element identifies the distance to the target.
Announcing range is not necessary for systems that have range finders or that employ
command-guided or self-guided munitions. For systems that require manual range
settings, leaders have a variety of means for determining range, including the following:
• Predetermined ranges to TRPs or phase lines.
• An MGS crew announcing the range for an infantry platoon.
• Handheld range finders.
• Range stadia.
• Mil reticles.
f. Control (Optional). The company commander may use this optional element to
direct desired target effects, distribution methods, or engagement techniques. Subordinate
leaders may include the control element to supplement the company commander’s
instructions and achieve effective distribution. Examples of information specified in the
control element include the following:
• Target array. Example: "FRONT HALF."
• Fire pattern. Example: "FRONTAL."
• Terrain quadrant. Example: "QUADRANT ONE."
• Engagement priorities. Example: "MGSs ENGAGE BUNKERS; ICVs
ENGAGE TROOPS."
• Engagement technique. Example: "ALTERNATING."
• Target effect. Example: "AREA."
g. Execution. The execution element specifies when direct fires should be initiated.
The company commander may engage immediately, delay initiation, or delegate
authority to engage. Examples of this element include the following:
• "FIRE."
• "AT MY COMMAND."
• "AT YOUR COMMAND."
• "AT PHASE LINE ORANGE."

H-21
 GLOSSARY

1SG first sergeant

AA assembly area; avenue of approach

AAR after-action review
ABF attack by fire
ACA airspace coordination area
ADA air defense artillery
ADACC air defense and aviation coordination cell
ADAM area-denial artillery munition
ADW air defense warning
AFATDS advanced field artillery tactical data system
AGC advance guard company
A/L administrative/logistics
AMD air and missile defense
AO area of operations
AOI area of interest
APC armored personnel carrier
APICM antipersonnel improved conventional munition
ARNG Army national guard
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASLT PSN assault position
AT antitank
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATK PSN attack position
ATP ammunition transfer point
AVLB armored vehicle-launched bridge
AXP ambulance exchange point

BAS battalion aid station

BDAR battle damage assessment and repair
BDU battle dress uniform
BFV Bradley fighting vehicle
BHL battle handover line
BMNT beginning morning nautical twilight
BMP Russian vehicle
BOLT brigade operational legal team
BOS battlefield operating system
BP battle position
BSA brigade support area
BSB brigade support battalion
BSMC brigade support medical company
BUA built-up area

Glossary-1
FM 3-21.11

CAS close air support

CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CBRNE-CM chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive consequence management
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
CCP casualty collection point
CFZ critical friendly zones
chem chemical
CHS combat health support
CI counterintelligence
CLS combat lifesaver
CLU command launch unit
CMOC civil military operations center
CO company commander
COA course of action
COMSEC communications security
CONOPS contingency operations
CONUS continental United States
COP common operational picture
CP command post; concrete piercing
CPHD Copperhead
CPOG chemical protective overgarments
CRT combat repair team
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CSSC combat service support company

DA Department of the Army

DEUCE deployable universal combat earthmover
DLIC detachment left in contact
DLY delay
DM designated marksman
DPICM dual-purpose improved convention munition
DOD Department of Defense
DS direct support
DSO domestic support operation
DX direct exchange
DZ drop zone

EA engagement area
EENT end of evening nautical twilight
EFST essential fire support task
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPLRS enhanced position location reporting system
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ESV engineer support vehicle

Glossary-2
 FM 3-21.11

FA field artillery
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FBCB2 Force XXI battle command brigade and below
FCL final coordination line
FDC fire direction center
FEBA forward edge of battle area
FFIR friendly forces information requirements
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FIST fire support team
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM frequency modulated; field manual
FMC forward maintenance company
FO forward observer
FPF final protective fire
FPL final protective line
FRAGO fragmentary order
FS fire support
FSCM fire support coordination measure
FSE first support element
FSEM fire support execution matrix
FSO fire support officer
FSV fire support vehicle

G/VLLD ground/vehicle laser locator designator

GPS global positioning system
GS general support
GSR ground surveillance radar
GS-R general support-reinforcing
GT gun target

HAZMAT hazardous materials

HC hydrogen chloride
HCA humanitarian and civic assistance
HCP health and comfort pack
HDC headquarters distribution company
HE high explosive
HEAT-T high explosive, antitank, tracer
HEDP high explosive, dual purpose
HEP-T high explosive, plastic, tracer
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HMEE high-mobility engineer excavator
HMEE-LHS high-mobility engineer excavator, load-handling system
HMMWV high-mobility, multiwheeled vehicle
HPT high-payoff target
HSS health service support
HTU handheld terminal unit

Glossary-3
FM 3-21.11

HUMINT human intelligence

I2R imaging infrared
ICV infantry carrier vehicle
IAW in accordance with
IBCT interim brigade combat team
illum illumination
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR infrared
IREMBASS improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
ISB intermediate staging base
IV intervisibility

JP joint publication
JP8 Army common fuel
JWARN joint warning and reporting network

KIA killed in action

K-kill catastrophic kill

LCE load-carrying equipment

LD line of departure
LOA limit of advance
LOGPAC logistics package
LOS line of sight
LRP logistics release point
LZ landing zone

MANPADS man-portable air defense system

MBA main battle area
MBC mortar ballistics computer
MC mortar carrier
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MDMP military decision-making process
MDS modular decontamination system
MEC medium engineer company
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEL maximum engagement line
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available, civilians
MEV medical evacuation vehicle
MGS mobile gun system
MI military intelligence
MICLIC mine clearing line charge
min minute(s)
mm millimeter(s)
MO multioption
MOE measure of effectiveness

Glossary-4
 FM 3-21.11

MOGAS motor gasoline

MOPMS modular pack mine system
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
MP military police
MPAT multipurpose antitank
MR moonrise
MRB motorized rifle battalion
MRE meal, ready to eat
MRP motorized rifle platoon
MS moonset
MSC maneuver support cell
MSL minimum safe line
MSR main supply route
MTC movement to contact
MWR morale, welfare, and recreation

NAI named area of interest

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBCWRS nuclear, biological, and chemical warning and reporting system
NCA National Command Authority
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCS net control station
NEO noncombatant evacuation operations
NFA no-fire area
NGO nongovernmental organization
NLT not later than
NUC nuclear
NVD night vision device

OAKOC observation and fieldsof fire, avenues of approach, key terrain,

observation, and cover and concealment
OBJ objective
OBSTINTEL obstacle intelligence
OIC officer in charge
OP observation post
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operations plan
OPLAW operational law
OPORD operations order
OPSEC operational security
ORP objective rally point
OTM on-the-move
OTN own the night

PAO public affairs officer

PC personnel carrier

Glossary-5
FM 3-21.11

PCC precombat check

PCI precombat inspection
PD point-detonating
PEWS platoon early warning system
PIR priority intelligence requirements
PL phase line; platoon leader
PLD probable line of deployment
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
POF priority of fire
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POSNAV position navigation
PP passage point
PSG platoon sergeant
PSYOP psychological operations
PVO private volunteer organization
PZ pickup zone

R&S reconnaissance and surveillance

RAAM remote antiarmor mine
RATELO radiotelephone operator
RCPA relation combat power analysis
RCU remote control unit
RD round
REDCON readiness condition
RFL restrictive fire line
ROE rules of engagement
ROI rules of interaction
ROM refuel on the move
RP release point; red phosphorous
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
rpm rounds per minute
RPOL rearward passage of lines
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

S1 adjutant
S2 intelligence officer
S3 operations and training officer
S4 supply officer
S5 civil affairs officer
S6 communications staff officer
SCATMINE scatterable mine
SCATMINWARN scatterable mine warning
SD self-destruct
SEAD suppression of enemy air defense
SHORAD short-range air defense
SINCGARS single-channel ground airborne radio system

Glossary-6
 FM 3-21.11

SITREP situation report

SITEMP situational template
smk smoke
SOI signal operating instructions
SOP standing operating procedure
SOSR suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce
SP start point
SPOTREP spot report
SQD squad
SR sunrise
SS sunset
SU situational understanding

TAI target areas of interest

TCP traffic control point
TDA table of distribution and allowances
TI tactical internet
TIME adjustable time delay
TLP troop-leading procedures
TO&E table of organization and equipment
TOC tactical operations center
TPME task, purpose, method, and effects
TRP target reference point
TSM target synchronization matrix
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UMT unit ministry team
UN United Nations
UO urban operations
US United States
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers

VT variable time
VC vehicle commander

WARNO warning order

WCS weapons control status
WIA wounded in action
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WP white phosphorus
WP-T white phosphorus, tracer
WSRO weapons system replacement operations

XO executive officer

Glossary-7
 REFERENCES

DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

DA Form 1155 Witness Statement on Casualty Incident. 1 June 1966.

DA Form 1156 Casualty Feeder Report. 1 June 1966.

DA Form 2404 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet. 1 April

1979.

DA Form 5988-E Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet. March

1991.

SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

FM 7-10 (FM 3-21.10) The Infantry Rifle Company. 14 December 1990.

FM 71-1 (FM 3-90.1) Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. 26 January
1998.

READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

FM 3-7 (FM 3-11.7) NBC Field Handbook. 29 September 1994.

FM 3-11.5 (FM 3-5) NBC Decontamination. 28 July 2000. Change 1, 31

January 2002.

FM 3-21.21 (FM 7-22) IBCT Battalion. DRAFT

FM 3-34.2 (FM 90-13-1) Combined-Arms Breaching Operations. 31 August 2000.

Change 2, 23 February 2001.

FM 3-90 (FM 100-40) Tactics. 4 July 2001.

FM 5-7-30 (FM 3-34.223) Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat

Operations (Airborne, Air Assault, Light). 28 December
1994.

FM 5-71-2 (FM 3-34.222) Armored Task-Force Engineer Combat Operations. 28 June

1996.

FM 5-103 (FM 3-34.112) Survivability. 10 June 1985.

References-1
FM 3-21.11

FM 7-8 (FM 3-21.8) Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 22 April 1992.

FM 7-10 (FM 3-21.10) The Infantry Rifle Company. 14 December 1990.

FM 7-20 (FM 3-21.20) The Infantry Battalion. 6 April 1992.

FM 7-90 (FM 3-21.90) Tactical Employment of Mortars. 9 October 1992.

FM 7-98 (FM 3-21.98) Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations. 3 October 1995.

FM 8-10-6 (FM 4-02.2) Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics,

Techniques and Procedures. 14 April 2002.

FM 17-95 (FM 3-20.95) Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996.

FM 20-32 (FM 3-34.32) Mine/Countermine Operations. 29 May 1998.

FM 21-18 (FM 3-21.18) Foot Marches. 1 June 1990.

FM 21-76 (FM 3-05.70) Survival. 5 June 1992.

FM 23-10 (FM 3-22.10) Sniper Training. 17 August 1994.

FM 27-10 (FM 1-04.10) The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

FM 90-4 (FM 3-97.4) Air Assault Operations. 16 March 1987.

FM 90-7 (FM 3-34.1) Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. 29 September 1994.

FM 90-10 (FM 3-97.10) Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) (How to

Fight). 15 August 1979.

FM 90-10-1 (FM 3-06.11) An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas. 12

May 1993.

FM 100-5 (FM 3-0) Operations. 14 June 1993.

FM 100-10 (FM 4-0) Combat Service Support. 3 October 1995.

FM 100-14 (FM 5-19) Risk Management. 23 April 1998.

FM 100-19 (FM 3-07.7) Domestic Support Operations. 1 July 1993.

FM 100-20 (FM 3-07) Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. 5 December

1990.

FM 100-23 (FM 3-07.3) Peace Operations. 30 December 1994.

FM 101-5 (FM 5-0) Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.

References-2
 FM 3-21.11

FM 101-5-1 (FM 1-02) Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.

Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.

Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. 16
June 1995

Joint Pub 3-07.2 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Antiterrorism. 17 March 1998.

Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace
Operations. 12 February 1999.

INTERNET WEB SITES USED:

The following web sites were used in the preparation of this manual.

U. S. Army Publishing Agency, http://www.usapa.army.mil

Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library, http://www.adtdl.army.mil

References-3
 INDEX
bounding overwatch
air assault, 7-27 movement technique, 3-6 through 3-8
air defense alternate, 3-8
defensive BOS, 5-8 dismounted, 3-7 (illus)
offensive BOS, 4-11 mounted, 3-8
air defense artillery successive, 3-8
combat support, 10-42 through 10-46 offensive activity, 4-59
early warning procedures, 10-44 breach, strongpoint assault, 4-38, 4-42 (illus)
employment, 10-43 breaching, 7-23 through 7-27
reaction procedures, 10-44, 10-45, 10-46 steps (SOSRA), 7-24
(illus) tenets, 7-23 through 7-25
systems, 110-42, 10-43 (illus) types, 7-25
weapons control status, 10-44 brigade organization, overview, 1-2, 1-3
ambush, type of attack, offensive, 4-34 (illus)
approach-march
technique in movement to contact, 4-28 checkpoint, establish, in stability operations,
through 4-33 8-13 through 8-15 (illus)
assembly areas, G-4 through G-7 civil considerations, analysis of during TLP,
action in, G-6, G-7 2-20
occupation of, G-5, G-6 (illus) classes of supply, 11-12 through 11-14
offensive operations, 4-7 (illus)
quartering party operations, G-5 COA (see course of action)
attack column, movement formation, 3-9 through
deliberate, 4-19, 4-20 3-11
hasty, 4-18, 4-19 dismounted, 3-10 (illus)
limited visibility, 4-45 through 4-54 mounted, 3-11 (illus)
offensive operations, 4-3 combat orders, overview, 2-4, 2-5
characteristics, 4-17 combat service support
spectrum of, 4-18 (illus) assets, 1-13, 1-14 (illus)
special purpose attacks, 4-33 through defensive BOS, 5-13
4-37 (see also individual entries) offensive BOS, 4-11
techniques, 4-37 through 4-54 (see also combat support
individual entries air defense artillery (see also separate
urban operations, deliberate, 6-21, 6-22 entry), 10-42 through 10-47
(illus), 6-23 assets, 1-12 (illus), 1-13 (illus)
command and support relationship,
battalion organization, overview, 1-3, 1-4 10-1, 10-2
(illus) engineer (see also separate entry), 10-31
battlefield operating systems (see also through 10-42
individual entries) fires support (see also separate entry),
defensive operations, 5-5 through 5-13 10-2 through 10-31
offensive operations, 4-10 through 4-13 NBC, 10-46, 10-47
overview, 1-19 through 1-21 operation, 10-1 through 10-47
battle position command and control
defensive, 5-16 through 5-18 BOS, overview, 1-19
alternate position, 5-16 (illus) concept, 2-1
engagement areas, 5-19 (illus) convoy, escort mission, 8-17 through 8-
platoon battle position, defense of, 21
mutually supporting, 5-18 (illus) definition, 2-1
supplementary, 5-16, 5-17 (illus) fundamentals, 2-2
BOS (see battlefield operating systems) responsibilities, 2-3

Index-1
FM 3-21.11

urban operations, defense, 6-40, enemy

6-41 analyzing during TLP, 2-16 through
urban operations, offense, 6-16 2-19 (illus)
counterattack assault, in defensive operations, 5-4
defense, 5-4 engagement area
type of attack, offensive, 4-36 battle position, 5-19 (illus)
course of action development, in the defense, 5-31
analysis of, during TLP, 2-24 through 5-37
development, during TLP, 2-22 through enemy avenue of approach, 5-31,
2-24 5-32 (illus)
war game, during TLP, 2-25, 2-26 indirect fires, 5-36, 5-37 (illus)
obstacles, 5-35, 5-36 (illus)
defense, 5-1 through 5-48 rehearsal, 5-37
battle position, 5-16 scheme of maneuver, enemy, 5-32, 5-33
characteristics, 5-2, 5-3 (illus)
linear, 5-26 (illus) weapons systems, emplacement, 5-34,
non-linear, 5-27 (illus), 5-28 5-35 (illus)
perimeter, 5-21 through 5-26 engineers, combat support, 10-31 through
reverse slope, 5-28 through 5-32 10-42
sector, 5-14, 5-15 (illus) countermobililty, 10-36 through 10-41
sequence, 5-3 through 5-5 mobility, 10-35, 10-36 (illus)
strongpoint, 5-19, 5-20 (illus) organization and capabilities, 10-31
techniques (see also individual entries), through 10-34, 10-33 (illus), 10-34
5-13 through 5-41 (illus)
types, 5-1 envelopment, form of maneuver, 4-3, 4-4
urban operations, in, 6-30 through 6-51 (illus)
types, 6-42 through 6-51 exploitation, type of offensive operation,
delay, 5-42 through 5-44 (illus) 4-3, 4-33
techniques, 5-43, 5-44
alternating positions, 5-44 feint, type of attack, 4-36
subsequent positions, 5-43, 5-44 file
(illus) movement formation, 3-14 through 3-16
types, 5-42 dismounted, 3-15 (illus)
demonstration, type of attack, offensive, mounted, 3-16 (illus)
4-37 fire support
direct fire planning and control, H-1 through close support, 10-22, 10-23
H-21 combat support, 10-2 through 10-31
control measures, H-10 (illus) indirect fire capability, 10-2, 10-3
fire commands, H-20, H-21 (illus), 10-4 (illus)
fire patterns, H-14 (illus) communications, 10-20, 10-21 (illus)
friendly-based quadrants, H-13 (illus) defensive BOS, 5-7, 5-8
target array, H-15 final protective fires, 10-17 (illus)
terrain-based quadrants, H-12 (illus) fire support team, 10-23
weapons safety posture levels, H-18 matrix, 10-14, 10-15, 10-16 (illus)
(illus) mortars, 10-23, 10-24 (illus), 10-25
linkup, 7-6 (illus), 10-26 (illus)
planning, H-7 through H-9 offensive BOS, 4-10
principles, H-1, H-2, H-3 quick fire channel, 10-21, 10-22 (illus)
process, H-3 through H-6 targets, 10-16, 10-17
team organization, 1-12, 1-13 (illus)
echelon, 3-16 through 3-18

Index-2
 FM 3-21.11

urban operations, employment of, 6-36 relationship to movement, 3-1, 3-1

through 6-40 (illus)
fratricide avoidance, F-1 through F-3 medical team organization, 1-13, 1-14 (illus)
frontal attack, form of maneuver, 4-7 METT-TC
urban operations, factors in, 6-11
guard, security oeprations, 7-13 through 7- through 6-16, 6-15 (illus)
17, 7-16 (illus) use of, during TLP, 2-8 through 2-20
MDMP (see military decision-making
health service support process)
casualty evacuation, 11-24, 11-25, military decision-making process
11-26 (illus), 11-27 (illus) integration of, in TLP, 2-5, D-1, D-2
in CSS, 11-23 through 11-27 (illus)
mission
infantry rifle company, organization receive the mission, in TLP, 2-7 through
overview, 1-4, 1-5 (illus) 2-22 (see also individual entries)
infiltration analysis of, in TLP, 2-7 through 2-9
form of maneuver, 4-5, 4-6 (illus) mobile gun system
offensive activity, 4-54 through 4-58 capabilities, B-3
search-and-attack, 4-25 (illus) defensive operations, B-7, B-8, B-9
Javelin employment, A-1 through A-12 (illus)
capabilities, A-3 limitations, B-3
considerations in employment, A-4 offensive operations, B-4 through B-7
firing pair, A-5 (illus) support by fire, B-5 (illus)
flight profile, top attack mode, A-7 bypass, B-5, B-6 (illus), B-7 (illus)
(illus) platoon, B-1 through B-20
direct attack mode, A-8 (illus) organization, 1-10, 1-11 (illus), B-1
limitations, A-4 (illus)
range, A-10, A-11 (illus) responsibilities, B-2
sectors of fire, A-5 (illus) stability and support operations, B-15
standoff range, A-6 (illus) through B-20
technical characteristics, A-1 (illus) traffic control points, B-19 (illus)
urban operations, 6-35, 6-43, A-7 cordon and search, B-20 (illus)
urban operations, B-9 through B -15
line, movement formations, 3-11, 3-12 dead space, B-13 (illus)
dismounted, 3-12 (illus) employment in, 6-3, 6-4 (illus), 6-5
mounted, 3-12 (illus) (illus), 6-6 (illus), 6-9 (illus),
linear assault 6-35, 6-36, 6-44
follow-and-support, 4-53 (illus) vehicle hide position, B-15 (illus)
offensive, 4-51 (illus) mobility, countermobility, survivability (see
modified, 4-50 also engineer)
support element, 4-52 (illus) defensive BOS, 5-9
linkup, tactical enabling operation, 7-5 offensive BOS, 4-11
through 7-8 mortar
combat support, 10-23 through 10-31
maintenance operations, in CSS, 11-21, section organization, 1-12 (illus)
11-22 movement
maneuver control techniques, 3-22
defensive operations, 5-5 through 5-7 defined, 3-1
defined, 3-1 formations (see also individual entries),
offensive operations, 4-8, 4-9 3-8 through 3-19
considerations, 3-9

Index-3
FM 3-21.11

selection, 3-18 types of operations, 4-2, 4-3 (see also

comparison, 3-19 (table) individual entries)
use of, 3-19 through 3-21 urban operations, 6-10
initiation of, during TLP, 2-26 operation order
relationship to maneuver, 3-1, 3-2 (illus) higher headquarters, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-17
security during, 3-23 (illus), 3-24 issue, during TLP, 2-28
techniques, 3-2 through 3-8 (see also preparation of, in TLP, 2-6
individual entries) OPORD (see operation order)
urban operations, 6-20 through 6-29 overwatch, 4-58
movement to contact
considerations for, 4-31, 4-32 (illus) passage of lines
offensive operations, 4-3 forward passage of lines, 7-21, 7-22
planning considerations, 4-21 (illus)
techniques, 4-27 through 4-33 (see also planning, 7-20
approach-march) (see also search- rearward passage of lines, 7-22, 7-23
and-attack) (illus)
reconnaissance coordination, 7-20
NBC (see nuclear, biological, chemical) tactical enabling operation, 7-19 through
night vision devices, 4-46 (illus), 4-49, 4-50 7-22
nuclear, biological, chemical penetration, 4-6, 4-7 (illus)
combat support, 10-46, 10-47 perimeter defense
reconnaissance support, 10-46 company, 5-22 (illus)
decontamination support, 10-47 Y variation, 5-23, 5-24 (illus)
priority of work, defensive, 5-38 through
OAKOC (see terrain) 5-41
observation post, established, during pursuit, offensive operation, 4-3, 4-33
stability operations, 8-12, 8-13 (illus)
obstacles raid, 4-35
actions at, during stability operations, Raptor/Hornet, 10-39, 10-40 (illus)
8-20, 8-21 reconnaissance
combat support, countermobility, 10-36 conduct of, during TLP, 2-27
through 10-41 defense, 5-3
lanes, 5-12 NBC, in combat support, 10-46
plan and integrate, in engagement areas, offense, 4-8, 4-47
5-35, 5-36 (illus) passage of lines, 7-20
protective, in defensive operations, 5-11 tactical enabling operation, 7-1 through
tactical, in defensive operations, 5-10, 7-5, 7-3 (illus)
5-11 (table) relative combat power
urban operations, 6-33 (illus) analysis of, during TLP, 2-23
wire, 5-12 (illus) matrix, 2-23 (illus)
offense, 4-1 through 4-63 reserve, offense, 4-62
actions on contact, 4-13 through 4-17 resuply
four steps of, 4-14 company techniques, 11-18
attack, 4-17 through 4-21 (see also emergency, 11-17
attack) LOGPAC, 11-15
bypass, 4-60 methods (mounted), 11-15
clear an objective, 4-60 service station, 11-16 (illus)
follow and support, 4-59 tailgate, 11-17 (illus)
forms of maneuver, 4-3 through 4-7 (see prestock, 11-17
also individual entries) routine, 11-14
sequence of, 4-7 through 4-10

Index-4
 FM 3-21.11

retirement (see also retrograde operations), stability operations, C-5

5-48 team organization, 1-11, 1-12 (illus)
retrograde operations, 5-41 through 5-48 soldier’s load, 11-4 through 11-8
delay, 5-42 through 5-44 (illus) Javelin employment, considerations,
retirement, 5-48 A-7
withdrawal, 5-45 through 5-47 (illus) load echelon, 11-5 (illus)
rifle platoon SOSRA (see breaching)
headquarters, 1-7, 1-8 (illus) spoiling attack, type of attack, offense, 4-35
mounted element, 1-8, 1-9 (illus) stability operations, 8-1 through 8-22
organization, 1-6, 1-7 (illus) planning considerations, 8-1 through 8-4
rifle squad, 1-9, 1-10 (illus) tasks, 8-6 through 8-22
weapons squad, 1-10 (illus) types, 8-4 through 8-6
risk assessment, during TLP, 2-21 strongpoint
risk management, E-1 through E-6 assault of, as attack technique, 4-37
command climate, E-6 through 4-45
potential hazards, E-2 (illus) defense, 5-19, 5-20 (illus)
risk levels, E-3 (illus) urban operations, defense of, 6-48, 6-49
worksheet, E-3 (illus) (illus), 6-50
road march, G-1 through G-4 Stryker brigade combat team
control measures, G-2 capabilities and limitations, 1-1, 1-2
march columns, G-1 (illus)
planning considerations, G-1 characteristics, infantry rifle company,
quartering party, G-2 1-1
rules of engagement, stability operations, CSS, 11-9 through 11-12
8-1 key personnel duties, responsibilities,
rules of interaction, stability operations, 8-2 1-14 through 1-19
operational premise, 1-1
SBCT (see Stryker brigade combat team) organization, 1-3 through 1-14 (see also
scatterable mines individual entries)
countermobility in combat support, urban operations, 6-1 through 6-3
10-38 (illus), 10-39 (illus) support operations, 9-1 through 9-7
delivery systems, 10-39 CBRNE consequence management, 9-3
marking, 10-40, 10-41 (illus), 10-42 considerations for, 9-5, 9-6
(illus) domestic support, 9-1
search-and-attack foreign humanitarian assistance, 9-2
technique in movement to contact, 4-22 phases of, 9-6, 9-7
through 4-27 (illus) relief operations, 9-2
security
defensive operations, 5-3 terrain
offensive operations, 4-63 analysis of, during TLP, 2-9 through
security operations, tactical enabling 2-15
operation, 7-8 through 7-18 avenue of approach, 2-12, 2-13 (illus)
forms of operations, 7-8 classifying terrain mobility, 2-10
guard, 7-13 through 7-17 cover and concealment, 2-15 (illus)
local security, 7-17 key terrain, 2-13, 2-14 (illus)
planning, 7-8 through 7-11 OAKOC, 2-10, 2-11 (illus)
screen, 7-11 through 7-13 observation and fields of fire, 2-14, 2-15
sniper, C-1 through C-7 (illus)
built-up areas, C-6 obstacles, 2-11, 2-12 (illus)
defensive operations, C-4 prioritizing terrain analysis, 2-10
offensive operations, C-3 visual aids, 2-10

Index-5
FM 3-21.11

time available, analysis of, during TLP,

2-19, 2-20 (illus)
TLP (see troop-leading procedure)
trains, combat service support, 11-8, 11-9
traveling
movement technique, 3-3, 3-4 (illus)
dismounted, 3-4 (illus)
mounted, 3-4 (illus)
traveling overwatch
movement technique, 3-5, 3-6
dismounted, 3-5 (illus)
mounted, 3-6 (illus)
offensive activity, 4-59
troop-leading procedure, 2-5 through 2-28
application, 2-5 (illus) through 2-7
integration with MDMP, D-1, D-2
(illus)
turning movement, 4-4, 4-5 (illus)

urban operations, 6-1 through 6-51

battle command in, 6-16 through 6-18
defense in, 6-30 through 6-51
employment considerations, SBCT, 6-1
through 6-3
MGS, employment in, 6-3 through 6-9
movement, 6-20 through 6-29
offense in, 6-10 through 6-29
task organization, 6-18 through 6-20

vee, ovement formation, 3-13, 3-14

dismounted, 3-14 (illus)
mounted, 3-14 (illus)
vehicle laager, tactical enabling operations,
7-18, 7-19

war game (see course of action)

warning order, 2-6, 2-22
WARNO (see warning order)
weapons replacement, in CSS, 11-28, 11-29
wedge, ovement formation, 3-12, 3-13
dismounted, 3-13 (illus)
mounted, 33-13 (illus)
withdrawal (see also retrograde operations)
assisted, 5-45, 5-47
unassisted, 5-46, 5-47 (illus)

Index-6
 FM 3-21.11
23 JANUARY 2003

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0307708

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed

in accordance with initial distribution number 115894, requirements for
FM 3-21.11.
PIN: 080698-000