The Old Turkish Hands: The British Levantine Consuls, 1856-1876 Author(s): Gordon L.

Iseminger Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Summer, 1968), pp. 297-316 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4324298 . Accessed: 05/06/2013 11:21
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THE OLD TURKISH HANDS: THE BRITISHLEVANTINE CONSULS, 1856-1876

L. Iseminger Gordon
Tr
HE late Harold in his description of the idealdiplomat, Nicolson, sugis the"seventh of theprofession.' He goes virtue" geststhatloyalty great on to say:

who have residedfor long in Thereis alwaysa tendency amongdiplomatists with theirown people andwho haveperhaps fallenout of contact foreigncountries, to findthattheirloyalties andwith theirown foreignoffice, becomea trifleblurred. in which they residewith a sentimental They are apt eitherto love the country
passionwhich blinds them to all its vices, or else to loathe it with an intensitywhich

is impervious to all its virtues.'

further andunconscious Nicolson saysthata "subtle disloyalty" maycolorthe his government reports tendered abroad. The temptation is by the diplomat to tell themembers of the foreign always strong office whattheywouldliketo thanwhattheyought hear rather to hear.3 of course, butalsoconsuls areexposed Not onlydiplomats, to thetemptation of blurred of theBritish andthemembers Levantine consular service in loyalty, the nineteenth wereparticularly A consul century susceptible. wasallowed to remain at thesame many years postandoftenbecome identified withit. As he moreand morepro-Turkish, became he lost his identity as an Englishman.4 Britain's eastern And,because policywassignificantly shaped by the information andadvice from her their obtained in loyalty consuls, lapses occasionally to thegovernment. proved embarrassing Great in maintaining Britain's interest theOttoman empire developed in the first third of thenineteenth whentheRussophobic century Lord Palmerston was Thesprawling Ottoman Foreign Secretary.! empire embraced Egypt, Suez, Syria,
1. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (New York, 1964), 65. 2. Nicolson, Diplomacy,65. 3. Nicolson, Diplomacy,66. 4. LondonTimes, May 22, 1858. 5. Palmerston'sbiographersays of him that he was "the first great British exponent" of the policy of "defendingand reinvigoratingTurkey."Herbert C F. Bell, Lord Palmerston (2 vols. London, 1936), I, 291. For Palmerston'sattempts to reform Turkey see FrederickS. Rodkey, "LordPalmerstonand the Rejuvenationof Turkey, 1830-41," Part I, Journal of Modern History, I (Dec. 1929), 570-93; and by the same author, "Lord Palmerstonand the Rejuvenationof Turkey, 1830-41," Part II, Journd of Modern History, II (June 1930), 193-225. For a complete ( GORDON L ISEmiNGER is assistantprofessor of history at the University of North Dakota, GrandForks.

297

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Arabia,the Straitsand the Principalities-all vitally importantfor Britain's eastern Mediterranean interests A furtherreason and for her lifeline to India.6 for Britain's interestin Turkeywas economic.After 1815, when continental a policyof protection, powersadopted Britainwas forcedto seek markets and raw materialselsewhere.For the first time in Englishhistorythe Near East in the Britisheconomic became important pattern.7 Anotherreasonfor Britain's interest in the Ottoman empirewas religious. In the Peaceof Parisof 1856 the Britishgovernment jointlyassumed the protection of Christians living in Muhammadan Turkey.8 Britain's primary reasonfor seekingto preserve the Sultan's empire, however, was political.Turkey,the "sickman"of Europe, possessed territory that other stateswere at least interested in when they did not covet it outright:Syria, Egypt,Crete,the Straitsand the Principalities. Britain,therefore,sought to forestallan answer to the Eastern Question in orderto preclude a disruption of the European balance of power.9
and detailed study of Palmerston's easternpolicy see CharlesK. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841 (2 vols. London, 1951). Although Palmerston wanted to strengthen Turkey, he did not believe in encouragingchange in Turkey unless it was absolutely necessary. Harold W. Temperley, "British Policy Towards ParliamentaryRule and Constitutionalismin Turkey (1830-1914)," Cambridge HistoricalJournal,IV, No. 2 (1933), 165. 6. That Britain's aim after 1833 was to prevent renewal of Russian intervention in Turkish affairsand to annul the exclusive Russianprotectorship of Turkeyis the thesis of R. L. Baker in "Palmerstonon the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi,"English Historical Review, XLIII (Jan. 1928), 83-89. Veret6 concludes, however, that Palmerston'sinsistence on supporting Turkey preceded the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. M. Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," Journal of Modern History, XXIV (June 1952), 143-51. For the beginning of English anti-Russiansentiment see John H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobiain Great Britain (Cambridge, 1950); and for a contemporary view see Philip W. Wilson (ed.), The Greville Diary (2 vols. Garden City, New York, 1927), I, 553. For the personalelement in Britain'sanxiety over Russian expansion in the East see G. H. Bolsover, "David Urquhartand the EasternQuestion, 1833-37; A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy,"Journal of Modern History, VIII (March-Dec. 1936), 44467; and CharlesK. Webster, "Urquhart, Ponsonby,and Palmerston," English Historical Review, LXII (July 1947), 327-51. 7. That British policy regardingTurkeyafter 1833 was largely economic is the thesis of Frank E. Bailey in "The Economicsof British Foreign Policy, 1825-50," Journalof ModernHistory,XII (Dec. 1940), 449-84. A more comprehensive treatmentof the thesis is found in a work by the same author, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement,A Study in Anglo-TurkishRelations, 1826-1853 (Cambridge, 1942); see also Leland H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capitalto 1875 (London, 1963), 294-325. Puryearhas also found that Britain'sinterestsin the Near East were largely economic. Vernon J. Puryear,InternationalEconomicsand Diplomacy in the Near East. A Study of British CommercialPolicy in the Levant 1834-1853 (Stanford University, 1935). For a brief but highly readableaccount of early British economic interest in the Levantand the genesis of the economicaspectsof the EasternQuestionsee ReaderBullard,Britain and the Middle Eastfrom the EarliestTimes to 1950 (London, 1951). 8. For a detailedtreatmentof the Crimeansettlementsee WernerE. Mosse,The Rise and Pall of the CrimeanSystem,1855-71 (London, 1963). British concernfor the Christiansin a specificpart of the Sultan'sempire is discussedin Abdul L. Tibawi, British Interestsin Palestine, 1800-1901 (London, 1961). 9. For the genesis of great power rivalryin the EasternQuestion see FrederickS. Rodkey,The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, Prance, and Russia, 1832-1841 (Urbana, Ill., 1923), 1-274. Webster assertsthat "the whole policy of the [British) Empire was possibly more influencedby the necessity of preserving its Easternpossessionsthan by any other single cause."CharlesK. Webster, "The Study of British Foreign Policy (Nineteenth Century) ," American Historical Review, XXX (July 1925), 728-37. Standardworks covering Britain's political

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That Britain'spoliticalinterestin Turkeywas paramount is seen in the instructions given to her consularofficialsand in the information frequently requested fromthem.In 1860, on the eve of the crisesin SyriaandLebanon, the Britishambassador at Constantinople, HenryL. Bulwer,senta twenty-four part questionnaire to eachof the Britishconsular The purpose agentsin the Levant. for the inquirywas political,to substantiate or disprovethe allegationsthat reforms promised in the Hatti-Humayun of 1856 were not being implemented andthatChristians in Turkey werestill subjected to abuseandindignities.10 The responsesto Bulwer'squestionsreveal that those consuls who had been in Turkey the longestwerethosemostsyimpathetic towards the Porte.The reports of two men in particular indicate thatlong residence in Turkey couldblurmen's loyaltiesandconfusetheirofficial thinking. Charles Blunt,consulat Smyrna, reported to Bulwerthat the generalcondition of his provincewas constantlyimproving,and the improvements were generallyin favorof the Christians. Perfectequalityexistedamongthe races, and the Christians were better off in all respectsthan the Turks."Consul WilliamR. Holmesat Sarajevo conceded thatthe Christians were agitated, but he insistedthat they magnified the most insignificant incidentinto a premeditatedcrime.The Muslimshad no deliberate intentionof persecuting or abusing the Christian population.'2 Both these men had lived the betterpart of their lives in Turkey.Holmes had been in the consularservicefor nearlytwenty years,andBlunthadbeena consulin Turkeyfor fortyyears." Equallyinstructive are the responses of the consulsto a subsequent request for information by the House of Commonsin March 1867. Becauseof the allegedunrestin the Ottoman empirethe Commons askedthatconsular agents reporton the progressof reformin their areasof jurisdiction and whether Christian and Greeksubjects of the Sultanwere being oppressed.'4 With only
interests in Turkey are Robert W. Seton-Watson,Britain in Europe, 1789-1914 (Cambridge, Eng., 1938); and George P. Gooch and J. H. B. Masterman, A Centuryof British Foreign Policy (London, 1917). 10. Accountsand Papers, State Papers, LXVII (1861), Reports Received from Her Majesty's Consuls Relating to the Condition of Christiansin Turkey, 1860, inclosure in no. 1, Bulwer to Russell, June 11, 1860. Davison has a detailed discussionof the Hatti-Humayun and its reception in Turkey.RodericH. Davison, Reform in the OttomanEmpire, 1856-76 (Princeton, 1963); see by the same author "TurkishAttitudes ConcerningChristian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," AmericanHistoricalReview, LIX (July 1954), 844-64. For Turkishdistrustof Christian reform efforts see CharlesEliot, Turkey in Europe (London, 1908), 693-94. Western European economic penetrationin the Levant also hamperedexecution of the Hatti-Humayun. FrederickS. Rodkey, "Ottoman Concern About Western Economic Penetration in the Levant, 1849-56," Journalof ModernHistory,XXX (Dec. 1958), 348-53. 11. Great Britain, 3 Hansard'sParliamentary Debates, CLXXI (1863), 77-78 thereaftercited as Hansard. All references are to the third series];Accountsand Papers,StatePapers,LXVII (1861), inclosure2 in no. 8, Blunt to Russell, July 28, 1860. 12. Ibid., inclosurein no. 19, Holmes to Russell, September3, 1860. 13. Hansard,CLXXI (1863), 77-78; Accountsand Papers,State Papers,ReportsReceivedf-rom Her Majesty'sConsuls Relating to the Condition of Christiansin Turkey, 1867: Part II, no. 4, Holmes to Stanley,July 6, 1867. 14. Ibid., [Part I].

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two or threeexceptions in Turkey the menwith long residence or long tenurein the consular in Turkey service reported thatconditions wereimproving andthat the Christians hadfew legitimate complaints. Vice-consul AlfredBiliotti,with eighteenyearsin the service,reported from Rhodesthatthe Christians werein someinstances dissatisfied. Theyweretreated no worse than the Muslims,however,and in some respectshad privileges in Turkey unknown or elsewhere."5 wereshared Biliotti's observations by consul JamesH. Skeneat Aleppo who had fifteenyearsin the service.'6CharlesJ. consulat Monastir, Calvert, couldnot exonerate the Portein all instances, but years'residence in Turkey, thirteenof them in the consular service, twenty-five allowed him to appreciate the tremendous difficulties under which Turkish officials in governing labored a heterogeneous population.'7 Much more emphaticwas the reportof vice-consulJohn E. Blunt from Adrianople. Basinghis observations on the experience afforded by seventeen yearsin the consular service, Blunt asserted that in generalthe Christians were betteroff thanthe Turks.Persecution and exaction were sectarian andoccurred of the bitterrivalry only because amongthe Christian denominations.'8 ConsulRichard Readeat Scutari and E. T. Rogers,actingconsul at Beirut, eachhadnearlytwentyyears' service or residence in Turkey. Bothattested to the improving condition of the Christians anddeclared thatChristians had no more reasonfor complaintthan Muslims.Rogers declaredthat "the Christians in Syria hardlydesireanyfurther '1 change." In 1867 a numberof men sharedthe dubiousdistinction of having been consulsin Turkeyfor morethan twentyyears.Holmes at Sarajevo had served for twenty-sixyears and in his opinion the conditionof the Christians had improvedappreciably during that time.20 Consul D. Sandisonat Bursahad twenty-eight yearsof official residence in Turkey andstrongly endorsed Holmes' impressions.2' ConsulC. H. Dicksonat Crete,who was soon to embarrass his government with his highly-colored andmisleading pro-Turkish reports on the Cretan uprising of 1866-67,hadtwenty-one years' service in Turkey.22 Althoughhe hadbeenin the consular servicefor only sixteenyearsin 1867, consul-general J. A. Longworthat Belgradehad lived in Turkeymore than thirtyyearsand was a consistently strongapologistfor the Porte.Longworth was firmlyconvincedthat the conditionof the Christians had been steadily improvedsince 1856 and that despitehis shortcomings, the Muslim would
15. Ibid., no. 6, Biliotti to Stanley,April 1, 1867. 16. Ibid., inclosurein no. 8, Skene to Lyons,April 1, 1867. 17. Ibid., no. 9, Calvertto Stanley,April 4, 1867. 18. Ibid., no. 12, Blunt to Stanley,April 4, 1867. 19. Ibid., no. 15, Readeto Stanley,April 9, 1867; no. 18, Rogersto Stanley,April 12, 1867. 20. Ibid., Part II, no. 4, Holmes to Stanley,July 6, 1867. 21. Ibid., Part I, no. 23, Sandisonto Stanley,April 20, 1867. 22. Ibid., XV (1859), Return of Consuls General, Consuls, Interpreters, etc. ApSecretaries, pointed Since Ist January1856, StatingSalaries,Date of Appointment,PreviousService,etc., 5.

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THE OLD TURKISH HANDS

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alwaysbe the betterqualified to govern.During his long residence in Turkey Longworth had gained a reputation for being ardentlypro-Turkish and had frequently reforms."Thegreatmiscautioned againstundertaking precipitant take,"he said,"is leavingnothingto time. Time alone can bridgea periodof andobliterate scars." transition, reconcile interests, 23 In 1863 RichardCobden,M. P. from Rochdale,had said of Longworth, ". * . ConsulLongworth is an enthusiast-I had almostsaid a fanatic-in his love for the Turks.. . . 24 WilliamH. Gregory, M. P. fromGalwayCountyin Ireland, wasof the sameopinionandsaid,"Mr. was a manwho was Longworth in heartand soul, andwho believedthat the Turkswere a long-sufferTurkish ing and benevolentclass of people horriblyoppressedby overbearing and
25 tyrannical Christians."

Reportsof the pro-Turkish Britishconsuls to the contrary, conditionsin Turkey werefarfromexemplary. Givena new leaseon life by the victory of the alliesoverRussiain 1856, the Sultan's empireremained steepedin corruption, ignorance, and apathy. bankruptcy Consulsof otherpowers,even thosesympatheticto the Porte,submitted reports repletewith examplesof officialmalfeasance, abuse to Christians or neglectedopportunities for reform. European travelers also recitedluridtales of unsatisfactory conditions, especiallyin the of the Sultan's outlyingprovinces far-flung empire. That deficiencies existedin the consularservicewas revealedin 1858 by a SelectCommittee on Consular Service andAppointments. The consensus of this committee was that the Britishconsularservicelacked,amongotherthings,a "Consular Code." To guide him in carrying out his responsibilities the consul hadto relyon his own commonsenseandon publicopinionin the community in which he resided.The committeealso recommended that a more regular gradation of consular officesbe established in order"to give the servicesomethingof the character of a professional 26 career." The committee also belatedly recognized the difficulties involvedin keeping consulstoo long at the samepost, a weakness in the servicethat was observed firsthand by the Constantinople correspondent for the LondonTimes. From whateverbackground the individual was recruited into the service,wrote the reporter, long residence in Turkey or familyandbusiness associations prevented the consulfromrepresenting the British government adequately.27 In 1870 and 1871 anothercommitteecollectedmaterialto be used by a of the House of Commonson the Consular Committee Service.The primary aim of the committeewas to economize,to determinewhether substantial
23. 24. 25. 26. Ibid., LXXV (1867), Part I, no. 22, Longworthto Stanley,April 10, 1867. Hansard,CLXXI (1863), 128-29. Ibid., 14. Quaterly Review, CV (Jan. 1859), 81-85.

27. London Times, May 22, 1858.

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reductions couldbe safelymadein the numberof consular establishments and personnel.28 Apartfrom the findingson the cost of the service,however,the committee hearingsrevealeda great deal about the Levantineconsularestablishment, its personnel, its politicalcharacter particularly andits deficiencies. HenryElliot, Britishambassador at Constantinople, for example,testifiedon the importance of consulsto the performance of his official Elliotexplained responsibilities. that in the Eastmost of the Britishconsulswere politicaland that he was "kept with the state of the countryby the consuls throughoutall the acquainted Turkishempire,. . ." The ambassador assertedthat consularreportswere "political even thoughthey mightto a certainextentinvolvecommerreports,

cialquestions also." 29
The committeealso indicated its cognizance of a problemby askingElliot whetherhe thoughtit advisable thatconsulsin the Levantbe frequently moved fromone post to another. The ambassador admitted that frequent rotation had bothadvantages anddisadvantages, butsaidthatit wouldbe difficult to abideby anyrigidrule.Sincethe consulsin the Ottoman empirehadmoreof a political thanelsewhere, responsibility theywerein realitysubordinate diplomats; it was crucialto havegood men at everypost.Longresidence an advantage, provided therefore, becauseover a long periodof time the consul becameknown and in the community respected and was therebybetterable to securethe kind of information on whichthe British government depended.30 Elliot'sviews were sharedby Henry L. Bulwer,an experienced diplomatic officerand one-timeambassador at Constantinople. When asked about the of keepingpersonsat theirpostsfor long periods, advisability he said it was a questionof sacrificing the good of the publicor the good of the individual. A consul who had been many years at a post, said Bulwer,acquireda "local and was, therefore, knowledge" of immensevalue and serviceto the British government. Only rarelycould a personbe transferred withoutexperiencing a periodof adjustment andacclimatization andenduring an intervalduring which he hadlittle or no influence. Ratherthantransferring a consulto a higher-paying post as a reward for satisfactory service,and therebylosing a valuableand experienced informant, the government shouldinducehim to remain at the post wherehe wasdoingwell bygranting him an increase in rankandsalary.3"
28. Accounts and Papers, State Papers, VII (1870), Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and ConsularServices;together with the Proceedingsof the Committee,Minutes of Evidence,Appendix,and Index; ibid., LX (1872), ReportsRelative to British ConsularEstablishments, 1858 and 1871. Part III. OttomanDominions. 29. Ibid., VII (1870), 89. 30. Ibid., 76. The difficultyof learning the Turkishlanguagewas also an argumentfor keeping consuls at the same post. Elliot said that a young Englishmanmight be able to translateTurkish accurately after many years'concentrated study, but he would requireat least two or three years to pick up the colloquial,even if he "threwhimself entirelyinto Turkishsociety."Ibid., 71-81. 31. Ibid.,360.

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LordHammond, UnderSecretary of State,was also askedto give his opinion on the wisdomof movingconsulsfromone post to another. Hammondadmitted that consuls were not moved frequentlyand that they were generally "witha view rather appointed to permanence thanotherwise, they riseoccasionally froman inferiorto a betterconsulate, but thereis no rule to changethem periodically, as thereis in the diplomatic If a manwas a consul-general service." in whatwas considered an important location,for example,he was understood to be there for life unless some unusualcircumstance seemed to warranta change." Desiringfurther information on whichto baseits conclusions andrecommenthe committee addressed dations, a seriesof questions to the Levantine consular officials themselves. They were askedwhethertheirpost was politicalor commercial,the amountof tradeper year,the size and cost of the consularstaff, whetherexpensesat the post had increased sincethe last inquiryin 1858, and the length of time they had spent in the service.Most consuls also took of the opportunity advantage them in one sectionof the questionnaire afforded to airanygrievance theyhadagainst theirpost,salary or the service in general.33 The answersreceived to these questions providedthe committee with valuable information on the consular servicein the Levant.Most instructive, however, were the almost universalcomplaintsthat salariesand allowancesno longerwere sufficient, that opportunity for furloughin Englandwas in reality almostnon-existent, andthat long residence at the samepost causedconsulsto lose contactwith Englishways and becomemore and more like the people amongwhomtheylived.The followinggrievances arerepresentative. ConsulJamesH. Skeneat Aleppoobserved thatalthough his salary hadbeen sufficient when he was firstappointed, nineteenyearsbefore,the cost of rent, food and servicehad tripled and his pay was no longer adequate. He also pointedout that paragraph 22 of the GeneralInstructions for Her Majesty's ConsularOfficers, publishedin 1868, providedthat leave for more than a month depriveda salariedconsularofficerof one-halfhis salaryduring his absence. Consequently, saidSkene,
however desirable it maybe, evenon publicground, thatConsuls should, fromtime to time,visit England, thisprovision putsit out of his powerto do so unlesshe has privatemeansof meetingthe expenseattending it. When he has not, it is tantamountto banishment for life from familyand friendsto be appointed to a Consulate,becausehe cannotaffordthe pecuniary sacrifice indispensable to visiting them, .. . 84

Skene's sentiments were sharedby Noel TempleMoore,who was consulat

32. Ibid., VII (1871), Second Report from the Select Committeeon Diplomatic and Consular Services;together with the Proceedingsof the Committee,Minutes of Evidence,Appendix, and Index, 25. 33. Ibid., LX (1872), Part I; Ibid., PartIII. 34. Ibid., 154.

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Jerusalem withsixteen in theservice. Moore alsocomplained years' experience of low pay and of the increase in the cost of rent,services and food. He hisreport concluded witha proposal. "Iwould saidMoore, suggest,"
thatif therewereto be no insuperable therulewhereby a Consul's objections thereto, himselffromhis poston leave,should salary is reduced by one half,whenhe absents The advantage be modified. to an expatriated and to the Englishman personally, publicService visit to England, to think, of an occasional indirectly, will, I venture be admitted. Under the presentrule the possibilityof such a visit becomesso that few can avail themselves, restricted except at very wide intervals,of the privilege.35

Vice-consul W. KirbyGreenat Damascus basedhis observations on the fromnineteen in theconsular experience gained service. He admitted that years theBritish consular system wasgenerally to thatof theother superior European powers, butcomplained thatconsuls in livingrespectably hadgreat on difficulty theirsalaries. Moreover, Greensaid,manyof the consuls in countries served thatwere unhealthy andata great distance from andwherever England, consuls to be, "thehopeof one andall mustbe to be enabled happened to return occasionally to theirnative country, in order notonlyto recuperate theirhealth butalsoto renew tieswithrelatives a longabsence andfriends which hastended to loosen." Green advised thatconsuls be allowed to visittheirnative country "before occasionally, theylearnto forgetit through a prolonged and forced 36 absence." In hisreport fromSuez, where he hadbeenconsul fortwenty years, George Westpointed outwhathe thought wasa gross injustice in theconsular service. TheGeneral Instructions provided onemonthof leaveperyearwithpay,but theleavewasnotcumulative. Although a month's leavewasadequate forthose consuls whosepostswereonlya few hours' distance fromEngland, the provisionreducing payforleaves of more thana month's duration worked a hardship on menserving in theLevant where much timewouldbe spent in travelling to andfromEngland. Unlessconsuls hadprivate means, therefore, andfew of themdid,theywereprevented fromreturning home.It appeared to Westthat
at ports,or placesout of Europe, Consuls and,indeed,anywhere in the Ottoman shouldbe allowedthe privilege,by remainingat their posts for a dominions, lengthened period,of obtaining leave,and drawing theirsalary for anyperiodnot one calendar monthfor everyconsecutive exceeding yearthey mayhaveremained at theirpost.It cannotbe considered otherwise thandesirable thatConsuls should at the Foreign themselves occasionally report Office; andI amunderthe impression that the existingregulation prevents personsfrom going home occasionally, who wouldwillingly,if they coulddo so at a moderate sacrifice, availthemselves of the it is intended leave,which,in principle, theyshouldenjoy.37
35. Ibid., 168-171. 36. Ibid., LXI (1872), Reports Relative to British Consular Establishments:1858-1871. FurtherReports,Part V, 59-63. 37. Ibid., LX (1872), Part III, 218.

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in Syria GeorgeJackson andin 1871 had nearly was consul-general Eldridge seventeenyearsin the service.Eldridge was highly criticalof a branchof the government that failedto pay its staffenoughto enablethem to live decently. Mencouldhardly be expected to "expatriate" themselves out of purepatriotism, he said,or for the smallsalaries provided by the consular service. who had not beenbackto England Eldridge, for ten years,also criticized the stipulation allowingonlyone monthof leaveperyearat full pay.Because of the distanceinvolved,a consul in Turkeycould only infrequently, if ever, avail himselfof his leaveopportunities. And,continued the consul-general,
thosewho live in out-of-the-way placeswheresocietyandamusements arewanting, andwherethe climate is frequently relaxing andsometimes mustmorereunhealthy, quirerelaxation thanthosewho haveall the resources of London at theircommand. The efficiency of manya usefulpublicservant has been destroyed throughthe wantof a little change, whichwouldhavebeenbeneficial to his moral, and mental, physicalhealth.Besidesthese considerations thereare manyothersthat renderit necesssary thata Consular revisithis nativecountry officer should fromtimeto time. A long residence him to losethe national abroad causes toneandfeelingwhichit is necessary he shouldkeepup . . .38

Alfred Biliotti held the politicallyimportant vice-consulate of Rhodes.His twenty-two yearsin the service,he felt, enabledhim to speakfrom experience whenhe declared thatit wasalmostimpossible for consulsto live on the salaries or fees they received. And, since their salarieswere reduced when they went home on leave,manymen spentyearsat theirpostswithoutonce returning to England. Biliottiadmitted that
the systemin use in the BritishServiceto keep Consular servants for manyyears in the sameplaceis certainly verygood,as theyget a thorough knowledge of the men and thingsof theirdistrict, which enablesthem,in politicalposts especially, to estimate with propriety the eventswhichtheywitnessandtheirprobable results, but a too longresidence in the sameplacemayhaveon the otherhandthe greatdisadvantage to imbuethem with the peculiarideasthat exist in each locality (in Turkey especially), and,little by little,theybecome, so to say,naturalized with the wayof thinking, andthe prejudices of the peopleamong whomtheyspend, in some cases,nearlyall theirlife. If Consuls residingin distantcountries, insteadof the leaveof absence yearly of one month,wereallowedthreemonthseverythirdyear, withoutdeduction of salary, they would be inducedto proceedto Europemore frequently, where,by recruiting a freshorderof ideas,the evil just pointedout mightbe somewhat atoned.39

Even more strikingwas the plaintivereportof RobertWilliam Cumberbatch,consulat Smyrna. The long-suffering Cumberbatch believedthat consuls wouldbenefitimmeasurably if leave time werecumulative and complained, "I
38. Ibid., 165-66. 39. Ibid., 143.

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andhave absented have never been about in theservice, from 27 years myself
40 mypost, asI could notsustain theloss." Edward T. Rogers atCairo, in theservice, summed withtwenty-four years up wellthecomplaints toolongattheirposts. of those whofelttheyhadremained "Ithink it essential," saidRogers, that

at intervals BritishConsulsshouldbe encouraged to visit their nativecountry of two or threeyears. The reasons a manliving long in a semi-civilized are obvious; an occasional visit home country becomes andrequires biased by localcircumstances to takein a freshstockof Englishfeeling,independent of this changebeing beneficialto his health.4'

In addition lowpayandinfrequent to voicing hisgrievances about furloughs, eachconsul indicated on the valueof consular his opinion poststo the British government andwhether his postwasessentially or commercial. political The British government, to prevent in Turkey, wanting disturbances or desiring to
if theyoccurred, be informed hadestablished consular postsfor politicalreasons

at strategic locations in the Levant: on the Danube; at the juncture of the Turkish, Persian andRussian frontiers; on theAdriatic andMediterranean, and at anylocation indeed, where a placeof observation wasdeemed advisable. The postsconsidered political in European Turkey were:Janina, Scutari, Adrianople, Monastir, Larissa, Volo,Rustchuk, Belgrade, Crete, Rhodes, Salonika and In Asiatic Sarajevo. thepostswithpolitical Turkey significance were:Koordistan,Trebizond, Mosul, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Aleppo, Beirut andDamascus. The committee wantedto determine whichof thesepostscouldbe reduced or butgrudgingly abolished, recognized thatthe importance of the Ottoman empire to European diplomacy required that certainpoliticalconsulates be main-

tained eventhough theconsul transacted littlecommercial business. Robert Stuart, consul at Janina in Albania, hadformed his opinions overa period of nearly fourteen years in the service anddeclared thatconsuls serving in Turkey hadto possess special qualifications. IntheEast, he said,
the Consul is always regarded as a political andrepresentative officer, andas a repositoryof the views of his Government on questions of Statepolicy.Thusaccredited, he derives fromhis position a verygreatinfluence, whichit restswith himselfhow
to use, in a way to do good or to do harm-to bring credit or discredit on his

country.

Thegovernment, therefore, couldnotbe too particular in its choice of consuls

for the Levant.
40. Ibid., 145-49. 41. Ibid., 205. Elliot was also askedby the committeewhetherhe thought it necessary for consular and diplomatic officialsto return frequentlyto England. Elliot answered: "I think it is very important;I think what you want is to keep your diplomaticservantsas English as you can keep them; the tendencyof all of us, from living abroad,is to lose our English feelings;we really do not know on many subjectswhat the feelings are in England."He agreed that it was "a matter of nationalimportancethat all membersof the professionshould frequentlycome to England."Ibid., VII (1870), 76.

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Stuartwas emphaticon one qualification that all Britishconsuls had to possess.A Britishagent, he said, had to view matters"throughthe English medium," because
his judgment, his mode of if his notionsand sympathies are local,they influence so that,writingaccordreasoning, andhabitof thought. Theycolourhis despatches, a stateof things ing to his own appreciations, he might,in all good faith,represent not verydifferent to whatit wouldappear to Englisheyes.Now, it is the English, the Eastern, view of thingsthatis required by ourGovernment.42

saidStuart, in The consulalso hadto be unusually andobservant, perceptive orderto providehis government because withpoliticalinformation
to pervert facts,and the prevailing system is to mystify, to eludeinquiry, to mislead, as possible; neverto give to everything an aspect andcharacter as unlikethe reality interourGovernment, aredirectly theless, as well as our capitalists andmerchants, estedin knowingthe realstateof thingsin Turkey. And for suchknowledge they the truth on Consular To disengage arealmost, if not altogether, dependent Reports. andbearings, frommazesof error, it in its proper outlines requires, so as to present at least,discrimination Failure on this headmight lead to serious and experience. to be Reportsare supposed misconception and seriousconsequences, for Consular . . .43 authoritative;

Charles at Monastir, years'experiJ. Calvert basinghis opinionon seventeen that in Turkey,due to peculiar circumstances, every ence as a consul,declared consulwas a politicalagent of his government. The local Turkishauthorities acts closely becausethe knew that the consulswatchedtheir administrative generalwelfareof the entireOttoman empirewas involved.And, saidCalvert, the reportsfrom theseconsuls"whofor politicalreasonsare perhaps the only of what is going on, constitutein fact the sole really disinterested spectators of a free local press,of exercising a wholesomepressure means,in the absence 44 on the Turkish officials." was Becauseof his thirty-year term of serviceconsul Holmes at Sarajevo keenlyawareof a consul'sresponsibilities. He saidthat the politicaldutiesof a were consulin Turkey
42. Ibid., LX (1872), Part III, 10-11. In this same regard Stuart also stressedthe need for frequentfurlough in England."To many in the East,"he said, "the conditionsare so onerousas to constitutean absoluteprohibitionin the matterof leave, so that, practically, they are in the position of exiles. Now . . . this difficultyaboutleave is very apt to operateto the detrimentof the Service; for protractedresidenceabroadhas generally the effect of wearing off the edge of a man's home perceptionsand ideas. . . . In such case a Consularofficerloses the essentialrequisiteof seeing and judging from the samepoint of view as his countrymen, and his communications may, consequently, lead to erroneousconclusions.On this accountit is, I think, for the interestof the Government that Consular so far from being met by pecuniaryobstructions, officers, should be affordedall reasonable facilities for going home from time to time, in order to refresh their ideas and repair the moral effectsof foreign residence.If this holds good in general, it applies in a special degree to Turkey, the country,perhaps,of all others in the world the most unlike in every respectto England." 43. Ibid., 11. 44. Ibid., 86.

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to watchover the various of the mixedandhostileraces movements andimpulses which form the population, and whose conditionis a matterof European importance, as remaining peaceful or inducing and so long as there general disorder; is any interestfor GreatBritainin what is calledthe "Eastern it is inQuestion" that our Government dispensably shouldbe exactlyinformed necessary of all that is influencing, or occurring thesepopulations.45 among, Holmes declared that the British ambassadorat Constantinople could not perform his various responsibilitieswithout trustworthyinformation from the British consuls regarding conditions and developments in the remote areas of the Sultan'sempire.' The consul, by previous knowledge of circumstancesand persons, had to be able to discern the validity of reports and to determine whether false informationwas being given him for the purposeof misleading or misinforming.47 CharlesM. Kennedy, the senior clerk in the CommercialDepartment of the Foreign Office, also attestedto the political importanceof consular posts in the On the basis of first-handknowledge gained from his tour of consular Levant.48 posts in 1870,49Kennedy declaredthat all [Levantinej postspossess a highpolitical Thepresence character. of an intelligent and impartial BritishConsular officer is of the verygreatest possibleadvantage in checking abuses, andoutbursts of fanaticism. intrigues, By preventing disturbance of internal in Turkey, tranquility they further preventthe rise of questions which must gravelyexcite publicfeeling in Europe, and causeinternational disputes, if indeed, theydo not leadto war.50 Because the committee was attempting to reduce the cost of the consular establishments in Turkey, it carefully scrutinizedany posts where there were few or no commercial interests. Those individuals who were aware of the political importanceof consulates in the Levant were, therefore, placed on the defensive. Elliot admitted to the committee that there were only 551 resident British subjects in all of Asiatic Turkey, a total that seemed rather low in relation to the number of consuls, but pointed out that the small number of British residentsdid not give a fair indication of the extent of British interests involved. The political situation in Asiatic Turkey and Britain'sdesire to prop up the tottering Ottoman empire dictated that an extensive consular establishment be maintained. Elliot also justifiedretaining a large consular staff in EuropeanTurkey, even though British commercial interests were not very extensive. At Belgrade, for
45. Ibid., 232-33. 46. Ibid., 233. 47. Ibid., 233-35. 48. Ibid., VII (1872), Reportfrom the Select Committeeon Diplomaticand ConsularServices; togetherwith the Proceedingsof the Committee, Minutesof Evidence,Appendix,and Index, 1. 49. Ibid., 2. 50. Ibid., 157.

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example, there wereonlythree British subjects no British but andalmost trade, a consulwas needed there.Belgrade was the capitalof a semi-independent vassal stateandmightat anytimebecome in which the center of a movement Britain wouldbe vitallyinterested. The samereasoning to Rustchuk applied where there wereonlytwenty-six British subjects andno trade.5" Theconsulates in Albania werealsonecessary although therewereonlysevenBritish subjects in theentire province andpractically no trade.52 LordHammond was askedby the committee to explainwhy a consulate should be maintained at Monastir, for example, whentherewas no tradeor shipping andonlyoneBritish subject. Hammond notonly justified maintaining Monastir, butall thepostsin northern Turkey because, he said,
it is of the utmostimportance for us to havea strongconsular staffin the Northern Provinces of Turkey; the advantage of a consulthereis not to be measured by his commercial duties,but by the influence thathe hasoverthe wholepopulation and overthe Turkish authorities. I neednot sayto the Committee, thatwe havea very greatinterest in keepingthingsquietin Turkey, andthe presence of a Britishconsul not only neutralises interference fromotherquarters, but has a greatinfluence in checking the misdeeds of the Turkish and thereby functionaries, the improving positionof the Christian it tendsto keepthe peaceof the country, population; and to preventany outbreaks there,which I need not say wouldhave a very serious politicalinfluence uponthe relations of the restof the worldwith Turkey. I know thereis a very strongfeelingaboutthe consulsin the northof Turkey, and I can perfectly accountfor it, if you confinethe question merelyto one of trade;but I holdthatthe consuls in Turkey area mostvaluable for the peaceof Tursafeguard key,and therefore for the general politicalinterests of this country, so far as it is connected with the well-being of the Turkish empire.53 As for Monastirspecifically,Hammond said, the commercialimportancewas

onlyincidental because
I look upon all suchplacesas reallyoutposts for the maintenance of the Turkish not so much as againsta foreignenemy,but as Empirein an indirectmanner, againstthe malversation of the Turkish authorities, which,if not checked and reportedto Constantinople, wouldproduce a stateof feeling in the provinces very to the happiness detrimental of the Christian population, andthe Mussulman populationalso;for they are in manyplacesas muchoppressed as the Christians, and even moreso; and it is important for the peaceof Europe thatwe should generally havean opportunity of bringingto the knowledge of the Portematters which,if left unchecked, mightlead to veryserious in the empire.' convulsions William H. Wylde, Senior Clerk and Superintendentof the Consular and Commercial Departments, was also asked by the committee whether some of the consulates in the Levant could be reduced or abolished. Wylde was in a unique position to answer the question because every piece of correspondence
51. 52. 53. 54. Ibid., VII (1870), 92-93. Ibid., VII (1871), 37. Ibid., 18. Ibid.

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betweenthe consulsand the ForeignOfficepassedthroughhis hands.Wylde saidhe knewof no instance wherea reduction couldbe madebecause
as long as we are interestedin keeping peace in the East, so long do I think that you must continue to maintain consularestablishmentsin those countries.Nobody but those who are unacquaintedwith the working of those consulatescan tell how much influence they have in preservingpeace in those parts; and I think that we are as much interestedas any country in the world in keeping peace there.55

On the basis of information furnished by the consuls and other informed persons, the committee concluded that the political functions of the consuls in the Levant placed them in a differentposition from those occupying consulates in other countries. The committee further conceded that the establishment of posts in what seemed excessive numbershad been necessaryin the past to watch and protect British interests.But, improved communicationand transportation and an altered condition of Europeanaffairsno longer justifiedsuch an extensive service.Some reductionsin specificposts could be safely made.56 The committee also recommendedthat the Secretaryof State recruitqualified young men for the counsular service, men whom "it may be suitable to retain, more or less, as fixtures in certain places, or, at all events, who will not be restless and dissatisfiedif the public interests require them so to continue." These qualified persons would be from among the "accustomed type."57 In other words, the argument for rotation of personnel and frequent furlough was unheeded. The observationsof the consuls and the findings of the committee had been important in showing which were the essentially political posts in the Levant. Also revealed by the committee's information was that almost without exception these importantposts were staffedwith men who had lived or served most of their lives in Turkey.Severalof these veteranshad complained at one time or another of being unable to return to England on furlough and had voiced the fear, or had borne the accusation,that they were becoming more and more like the people among whom they lived. Despite the committee members' feeling that many political posts could be reducedor abolished and that frequent furloughs and occasional rotation were not of paramount importance, the first eastern crisis following their work proved at once the worth of the political consulates in the Levant and the need to guard against persons becoming permanent fixturesat these locations. In the summer of 1875 a revolt broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina that reopened the Eastern Question. Within a year the disturbancehad spread to Bulgaria where it was quelled with the brutality afterward known as the "Bulgarian Horrors."The events in these northernmostprovinces of the Sultan's empire
55. Ibid., 44. 56. Ibid., VII (1872), viii. 57. Ibid.

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threatened to engulf all of Europein war becauseAustriaand Russiaeither shared frontiers with the insurrectionary or segments of theirheteroprovinces, geneouspopulations shared the aspirations of the rebels."8 GreatBritainsought to preventa generalEuropean war by deferringthe settlementof the Eastern Questionthat would resultin the destruction of the shakyEuropean balanceof power.In carrying out this task the Beaconsfield government reliedheavilyon information obtained fromBritishconsulsat the politicallyimportantposts in European Turkey.This information, unfortunately,was scanty, misleading, or, in somecases,patentlyfalse.On the basisof consular reports, whichstrengthened pro-Turkish predilections held by already the government, the ForeignOfficeadopted firstan attitudeand then a policy regarding the insurrection thatlaterprovedembarrassing it seemed because that Beaconsfield and membersof his Cabinetwere supporting and endorsing the brutalmethodsof a decayingstate in puttingdown a justified rebellion.The weakness of the Levantine consular systembecame painfullyobvious. The posts providingthe government with its information were staffedby men who had livedmostof theirlives or servedmostof theircareers in Turkey. They did not 59 view matters "through the Englishmedium." Althoughnewspapers suchas the LondonTimesearlypublished telegraphic accounts of the insurrection, the British government hadlittle information from its consulsto verifysuchreports. As late as May 1876 dispatches from consul J. HuttonDupuisat Adrianople, the nearest British consulate to the sceneof the 60 Nor did the reports disturbances, wereinfrequent andcertainly not alarming. of consulRichard Readeat Rustchuk, on the rightbankof the Danube,reveal undueanxiety,andAmbassador HenryElliotat Constantinople earlyinformed
58. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe,505-25; and by the same author,Disraeli, Gladstoneand the EasternQuestion (London, 1935), 51-83. For a discussionof RussianPan-Slavism see Michael B. Petrovich,The Emergenceof RussianPanslavism1856-1870 (New York, 1956); see also Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (New York, 1960); and BenedictH. Sumner,Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880 (London, 1962), 56-80. For Russia's opportunity to advance her political aims becauseof Turkishmisrulesee "Turkey and Russia,"EdinburghReview (Jan. 1877), 136-54. For the implicationsof the Balkan crisis on the Dreikaiserbund see William A. Gauld, "The 'Dreikaiserbiindnis' and the EasternQuestion, 1871-6," English HistoricalReview, XL (Apr. 1925), 207-21; and by the same author "The 'Dreikaiserbfindnis' and the EasternQuestion, 18778," English Historical Review, XLII (Oct. 1927), 560-68. Several monographsdiscuss western liberal influenceson the Bulgarianuprising.See, for example,C. E. Black, "The Influenceof Western Political Thought in Bulgaria,1850-1885," AmericanHistoricalReview, XLVIII (Apr. 1943), 507-20; and L. S. Stavrianos, "Antecedents to the BalkanRevolutionsof the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Modern History, XXIX (Dec. 1957), 335-48; also Vangel K. Sugareff,"The Constitution of the BulgarianRevolutionary CentralCommittee," Journal of Modern History, IV (Dec. 1932), 572-80. 59. The British government,unfortunately, had no consularposts in the immediatevicinity of the insurrection. On the basis of recommendations made by the Select Committeeon Diplomatic and ConsularServicesin 1872, the economy-minded Liberalgovernmentabolished the consulates at Janinaand Philippopolis.Monastirwas reducedfrom a paid consulateto an unpaidvice-consulate. Accountsand Papers,State Papers,LX (1875), Consular No. 3 (1875), 4. 60. Hansard,CCXXX (1876), 1486-87; except see W. N. Medlicott, "Vice-ConsulDupuis' 'Missing'Dispatchof June 23, 1876," Journalof ModernHistory, IV (Mar. 1932), 38-48.

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LordDerby,the BritishForeign thatthe insurrection had unquestionMinister, ablybeenput down.' The British government understandably, therefore, placed morefaithin its consulsthanin the occasional the of correspondents press. The shockingnews of Christians in Bulgaria firstreached beingslaughtered Englandnot throughthe mediumof consularreports, but in the pages of an the Daily News of June 23, in a letter from Edwin Opposition mouthpiece, Pears,a well-knownlawyerpracticing in Constantinople. The accountwas so specific thatit inflamed the Englishpublic.Namesof towns,numbers of persons killed,the namesof the Turkcommanders-all were given. Yet on June 26, when theywereaskedin Parliament if the reports weretrue,both Beaconsfield and Derby expressed doubt. Beaconsfield admittedthat excessesmight have occurred, butsaidthat"theinformation whichwe haveat various timesreceived doesnot justifythe statements" madeby the press.62 the British consulmostguiltyof slantingnewsin favorof the Turks Perhaps was William R. Holmes,"a notorious at Sarajevo.63 Turcophile," Immediately afterthe insurrection began,Holmes admitted that some oppression existedin Bosniaand Herzegovina, but insistedthat "acquainted as I am with the social condition of the country duringfifteenyears, I do not hesitate to declare thatthe oppressionin the Herzegovinain general is greatly exaggeratedby the 64 "There Christians." was no particular reason," saidHolmes,"oranyexcessof to justify oppression, or occasion a risingof the peoplein 1875 beyond whathas existedat any time since 1860, . . .. . Holmeswas also convinced that foreigninfluences were responsible for the outbreakand insistedthat "to personsacquainted with the courseof affairs duringthe last few yearsin Bosniaandthe Herzegovina therecan be no doubt that the insurrection was first broughtabout, and afterwards supported by, Ratherthan arisingfromgrievances, foreigninfluence." he said,"theso-called in Bosniamight be bettertermedan invasionby bandsopenly insurrection formed in Austrian Croatiaand Servia."It "cannotbe called a popular 66 movement."
61. Walter G. Wirthwein, Britain and the Balkan Crisis, 1875-1878 (New York, 1935), 64. Shannonwrites that by 1874 Britain'ssupportof Turkeyhad becomean "orthodoxtradition"and identified with maintaining British imperial interests. "So oppressive,"Shannon says, "was the orthodox traditionthat consuls tended to supply the ambassador with informationagreeablerather than accurate." R. T. Shannon,'Gladstoneand the Bulgarian Agitation 1876 (London, 1963), 17-18. 62. Hansard,CCXXX (1876), 425-26. 63. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstoneand the EasternQuestion,21. 64. Accountsand Papers,State Papers,LXXXIV (1876), TurkeyNo. 2 (1876), inclosurein no. 32, Holmes to Elliot, September28, 1875. 65. Ibid., TurkeyNo. 3 (1876), inclosurein no. 67, Elliot to Derby, March 10, 1876. 66. Ibid. Temperley concludes, however, that the originators of the revolt were the semiindependentclans in southern Herzegovinaand not foreign agents. Harold W. Temperley,The Bulgarianand other Atrocities,1875-8, in the Light of HistoricalCriticism (London, 1931), 4-8, 43-44. Albrecht-Carrie says that the element of personal [foreign] initiative figuredheavily in the Balkan crisis, for example with General Ignatiev. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of EuropeSince the Congressof Vienna (New York, 1958), 168. See also Sumner,Russia and the

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Manyof Holmes'assertions in the two of conditions revealed his ignorance provinces that were his specialconcern. He was contentto remainat Sarajevo and acceptalmost at face value the erroneous and misleadingreportsof the grosslyincompetent Turkish officials in theseprovinces. Beaconsfield indicatedhow very much he was influenced by reportsfrom Holmes and otherconsulsin a letterhe wroteto QueenVictoriaon June 29, 1876. Commenting on an observation madeby the Russian Tsarthat England, alwaysso philanthropic, apparently had no desireto assistthe oppressed Christiansin BosniaandHerzegovina, Beaconsfield wrotethat theprobable cause of thecomparative coolness of theEnglish andcertainly people, of yourMajesty's Government, in thisrespect, fromthefactthattheyarein arises possession of incontestable evidence thattheso-called arenotnatives insurgents of
any Turkishprovincebut are simplyan invasionof revolutionary bands,whose

strength layin the support afforded to themby Servia andMontenegro, on acting thereport of your Majesty's Consuls, .67

the instigation of foreignagentsand foreigncommittees. All this is evidentfrom

In his statements beforethe Commons on July 10 regarding the Bulgarian atrocitiesBeaconsfield again indicatedhow much he relied on consulardispatchesfor his knowledgeof the Balkancrisis.The Britishgovernment was in constant contact with its consular representatives at Belgrade, AdrianoRagusa, ple, Cetinjeandelsewhere, he said,andno information on atrocities hadreached the ForeignOfficefrom them.68 A week later,on July 17, the PrimeMinister admitted that guerillawarfareand adverse conditions in the disturbed districts hampered Britishconsulsin obtainingand transmitting reports, "but," he said, "therewas nothingin those accounts which at all justified the statements that 69 appeared in the publicPress, . . ." Becausethe Britishgovernmentwas obviouslynot receivinginformation fromthe Levant via consular channels, it is instructive to notethe lengthof time in the consular serviceof thoseconsulsoccupying the politicalpoststhat were maintainedfor the purposeof obtaininginformationon developments and eventsin the Ottoman empire. Withoutexception thesemen in 1876 had long serviceandexperience in Turkey. Holmes had been at the politicallyimportant consulateof Sarajevo since 1861 and was a veteranwith thirty-six yearsin the Britishconsularservice.70 J. HuttonDupuishad been fouryearsat Adrianople in 1876, but had nearly twentyyears'experience as a Levantine consul.71 At Scutari, a post politically
Balkans,74-76. 67. Quoted in George E. Buckle,The Life of BenjaminDisraeli (6 vols. London,1920), VI, 35. 68. Hansard,CCXXX (1876), 1181-82. 69. Ibid., 1489. 70. Accountsand Papers,State Papers,XCII (1877), TurkeyNo. 16 (1877), inclosurein no. 21, Holmes to Elliot, April 17, 1871. 71. Ibid., Returnstating the Names and Posts of all BritishConsulsand Vice-Consuls in Bulgaria and the BalkanDistrictsof Turkey,1870-76, TurkeyNo. 7 (1877).

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important because of its proximity to Montenegro, W. KirbyGreenwas consul. Greenhad been in the Levantine ConsulRichservicefor twenty-three years.72 ard Reade had served many years at Scutari,but had been transferred to Rustchuk beforethe outbreak on the of the insurrection. He basedhis reports experiencegained from twenty-eightyears in the service.73 Ragusa on the Adriatic was alsoconsidered a politically important post,andJ. G. Taylor,who hadtwenty-five yearsin the service, wasconsultherein 1876.74 ConsulEdmond Monsonwas also attached but at to the Ragusaconsulate, the height of the crisiswas dispatched on a specialmissionto reportcircumstancesand developments at Cetinjein Montenegro.75 Monsonhad more than sixteenyearsin Her Majesty's Service.76 ConsulJ. E. Blunt at Salonikaalso occupied a politically important consulate in European Turkeyand was able to keep his government informedon developments at Monastiras well. Blunt's servicein Turkeydatedfrom 1854, a term of twenty-two Blunt had years.77 underhim as vice-consul of Larissa andVolo in Thessaly, HenrySuter, who had entered the British consular servicein 1833 andwho had,therefore, forty-three yearsin the service in 1876.78 When the new sessionof the British Parliament openedon February 8, 1877, the government's eastern policywas bitterlydebatedand manyof the Opposition memberswere openly criticalof the consulsin the disturbed in districts European Turkey. HenryB. Samuelson, M. P. fromFromein Somerset County, askedwhethera Britishconsul,for exampleDupuis at Adrianople, was not instructed to communicate by telegraph to the Foreign Office"allflagrant cases of Turkishoppression that come to his knowledge;. . ." 7' A. EvelynAshley, M. P. fromPoole in DorsetCounty, recalled that at one pointwhen questioned aboutthe activities of irregular bandsof Bashi-Bazouks andCircassians, Dupuis had reportedthat he had "'no means of ascertaining'" such information. Ashley demanded to know why a consulwas sent to a districtif it was not to find such means.At anothertime, said Ashley, Dupuis, "unableto reporta betterstateof things,saidif he werecompelled to noticethe disorders committed,it was not fromanydesire to sayanything 80 adverse to the Turks." Underthe witheringfire of the Opposition Beaconsfield admitted that the governmentlackedinformation on the atrocitiesand implied that a partial
72. Ibid., LXI (1872), Part V, Green to Granville,March25, 1872; Ibid., XC (1877), Turkey No. 1 (1877), inclosurein no. 46, Green to Elliot, August 7, 1876. 73. Ibid., XCII (1877), TurkeyNo. 7 (1877). 74. Ibid., LXXXIV (1876), TurkeyNo. 3 (1876), inclosurein no. 115, Taylor to Buchanan,
76. Ibid., VII (1872),

March 29, 1876.

75. Ibid., XC (1877), TurkeyNo. 1 (1877), no. 1067, Derby to Monson,November27, 1876.
164.

77. Ibid., XV (1859), 11. 78. Ibid., 9; lbid., LX (1872), Part III, 95. 79. Hansard,CCXXXIII (1877), 115-16. 80. Ibid., CCXXI (1876), 1083-86. Also for Dupuis' lack of objectivitysee Shannon,Gladstone and the BulgarianAgitation, 55.

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that had explanation actionof the preceding lay in the penurious government the consular reduced in Turkey. establishments Saidthe PrimeMinister:
I am perfectly aware-the slight and vague information on the subjectof these as theywereat firstreported atrocities to us. I am well awarehow slightwas that occasions whenwe had information, but we gave all we could;andon subsequent
fuller informationwe gave it also.
. .

. Now there is not the slightest doubt that

Her Majesty's on that occasion-they did not receive Government was ill-served the information theyoughtto havereceived.

was not criticizing Beaconsfield Elliot. The ambassador had been preoccupied with revolutions, assassinations, changesof governmentand ill health. And, saidthe PrimeMinister, Elliot
was deficient in information in whichtheseatrocities as to the Provinces occurred. That I attributed, to the Consular and do attribute, Servicenot havingbeen adequateto the occasion, andthatit hadbeen improvidently reduced.8'

After the atrocities were over, the Beaconsfield government sent Frederick Calvert to Philippopolis as vice-consul 82 and General Arnold R. Kemball to the
headquartersof the Turkish army as English Military Attache. But, charged William G. V. Harcourt,M. P. from Oxford ICityl, this action was a case of too

little, too late.What had impelledthe government to delayso long in acting?

Why wait until an entire province had been pillaged and an entire population

The answerso often given by the government murdered? was that it had no information on the atrocities. Harcourt was aghastthat the Britishgovernment, to maintain havingundertaken the integrity of Turkey, couldfail to know that thousands of innocentandunresisting peoplehad been slaughtered by the very
government she had pledged to uphold. Harcourt called it "a spectacle of diplomatic impotence and administrative
incapacity..
.

." And, he continued, "from the First Minister of the Crown

down to the Consul at Adrianople, there seemed not to be a man who, at the moment when the East was occupying the attention of the country, knew that these massacresand horrors were going on." 84Harcourt referred to what he called "the culmination of diplomaticincapacity in these transactions,. . " and scoffed at the apology that had been given "for the ignorance and want of energy displayedby our Representativesabroad,. . 85 The levity with which Beaconsfield had referred to the atrocities with "his unrivalled powers of humour and sarcasm," accusedHarcourt,"provedthat the Government at the time [Beaconsfield] spoke was unaware of the magnitude of the events which had occurredor that language would never have been used." m
81. Hansard,CCXXXII (1877), 801. 82. Accountsand Papers,State Papers, XC (1877), Turkey No. 1 (1877), no. 29, Elliot to Derby, August 14, 1876. 83. Ibid., no. 12, Derby to Elliot, August 10, 1876. 84. HansardCCXXXI (1876), 1126-27. 85. Ibid., 1128. 86. Ibid., 1129.

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Peter Rylands,M. P. from Burnleyin Lancaster County,was even more He declared that the Englishpeoplehad long been skeptical caustic. regarding were sent to the conductof the government and even though "blindconsuls" the East,therewere sources of information otherthan the consularserviceon whichthe peoplecouldbasetheircriticisms of government policy.87 Rylands also remindedthe Commonsthat informationon the atrocities reached England,not throughdiplomatic channels,but in the columnsof the Daily News. "TheGovernment werein perfectignorance," he declared. Forweeks after theperiod of themassacres to giveany theMinisters wereunable reliable information-the onlyinformation theyprofessed to havereceived tended
to discredit the accounts given in the Daily News, and to palliatethe conductof the Turks. It wasfelt at the time throughout the country thatit wasa greatscandal thatwith our numerous and highly-paid Staffof Diplomatic and Consular Agents in Constantinople and the Turkish Provinces, the Government couldpossibly have of suchmomentous been left in ignorance That they were so left in occurrences. is now no longerdenied.' ignorance

The Duke of Argyll also castigated the government for its lack of information andits subsequent policytowards the Balkancrisis.SaidArgyll:
I confessthatthe Blue Bookshavenot impressed me with the accuracy or the extent of knowledge possessed by our Consuls. Almostall theirinformation appears to be derivedfrom Turkishsources. You almostinvariably find in their reports "Pashatoldme this," or "theTurkish General toldme that." The factis, after whatI havereadin thoseBlueBooks, I do not believea wordwhichrestsaloneon suchauthority. Therewereveryfew occasions in whichthe Consuls got into communication with the peoplethemselves.89

Mildly chasteningthe governmentfor its easternpolicy, H. Drummond in Southampton Wolff, M. P. fromChristchurch County, put his fingeron the the of crux problem.Wolff believedthat a good deal of what had taken place-the atrocities andthe policyof the government-was due
to the want of information at the ForeignOffice,owing to a certainlooseness amongsomeof our agentsabroad andof diminution in the number of our agents in placeswherethey oughtto exist.Both at Constantinople and someof the outposts our diplomatic and consular agents,were, from the societyin which they mixed,apt to havefeelingsmorein favourof the Turksthanthe Christians.90
87. Ibid., CCXXXIII (1877), 577. 88. Ibid., 445. 89. Ibid., CCXXXII (1877), 647. Blunt often relied on sourcesof dubiousvalue. On September 4, 1876, for example,he reportedto Elliot what he had heardfrom a "correspondent writing to me from the interior"and what "personswho have recently come here from Novi-Bazarsay...." Accountsand Papers,State Papers, XC (1877), Turkey No. 1 (1877), indosure 1 in no. 268, Blunt to Elliot, September4, 1876. Reade also relied on informationthat he had not gotten firsthand. On one occasionhe obtainednews from "a trustworthy on anotherfrom a BulBulgarian," garianChristian"whocan be relied upon,"and on yet anotheroccasion,"froman impartialperson." Ibid., LXXXIV (1876), TurkeyNo. 3 (1876), inclosure 1 in no. 500, Reade to Elliot, June 16, 1876; Ibid., TurkeyNo. 5 (1876), inclosure2 in no. 21, Reade to Elliot, July 19, 1876. 90. Hansard,CCXXXI (1876), 1123-24.

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