08 | Taking the long view

This chapter examines trends since 1995 to explore the extent to which
humanitarian assistance is used to address short-term or enduring needs and the
part it plays in sustainable poverty reduction and development assistance. It raises
questions about the type of aid architecture that is needed to address the cycles of
crisis, vulnerability and poverty that dominate many people’s lives.

Humanitarian assistance is traditionally distinguished from development assistance

by being short-term, life-saving and exceptional, rather than longer-term, poverty-
reducing and promoting sustainability. Much attention and time is given to trying
to ‘fill the gap’ or identifying how people ‘move’ from humanitarian to development
modes. But the reality for many people is a lifetime of extreme vulnerability and
constant insecurity. While this manifests itself in periodic acute crises it also
forces people into choices that reduce their resilience to future disasters,
creating a downward spiral of increasing, and often inter-generational, poverty
and vulnerability.

What distinguishes humanitarian and

development assistance?
Humanitarian assistance is perceived as being more about saving lives and
protecting people than it is about sustained poverty reduction; more about timely
responses than capacity development or long-term relationships; more about
people than states or institutions. It can waive some of the rules and procedures
that apply to development assistance and work in places where development
assistance is politically difficult because of sustained human rights abuses or
where the state itself is fragile or non-existent.

The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative has defined the scope of
humanitarian assistance and set out the objectives as follows: “to save lives,
alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of
man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen
preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.”

Humanitarian action is guided by principles: “humanity, meaning the centrality of

saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; impartiality,
meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without
discrimination between or within affected populations; neutrality, meaning that
humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute
where such action is carried out; and independence, meaning the autonomy of
humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives
that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being
implemented.”

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GHA Report 2009

What does the data tell us about how humanitarian We have classified humanitarian
assistance has been spent? spending into three groups based on the
number of years that countries have
received more than 10% of their official
Most humanitarian assistance is long-term. It is spent in the same countries year development assistance (ODA) in the
after year and protracted crises have been taking an increasing share of total form of humanitarian assistance.
humanitarian assistance. Globally humanitarian assistance has
averaged around 10% of ODA since 1995.
This has been used as the benchmark to
Since 2002, long-term humanitarian assistance has accounted for over half of differentiate occasional and small scale
humanitarian spending. In 2003 and 2004, long-term humanitarian assistance humanitarian responses from countries
accounted for 79% and 76% of the total respectively, falling to around 50% in the where humanitarian assistance has been
last three years. That compares with a range of 29%-41% for the period between a more significant component of ODA.
Long-term humanitarian assistance is the
1995 and 2000. funding that goes to countries receiving
more than 10% of their ODA in
humanitarian assistance for more than
eight years between 1995 and 2007.
Medium-term humanitarian assistance is
14,000
the funding that goes to countries
receiving more than 10% of their ODA in
12,000 humanitarian assistance for between four
US$ million (constant 2007 prices)

and eight years between 1995 and 2007.

10,000 Short-term humanitarian assistance is
the funding that goes to countries that
8,000 have received more than 10% of their
ODA in humanitarian assistance for three
6,000 years or less between 1995 and 2007
Unspecified by country
4,000
Long-term (more than 8 years)
2,000
Medium-term (3–8 years)

0 Short-term (3 years or less)

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

Figure 1: Long, medium and short-term humanitarian assistance 1995-

2007 [Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC1 and 2a data]

The countries that receive long-term humanitarian assistance fall into two
categories. The majority of spending is in large countries in crisis: Sudan, Iraq,
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan and Ethiopia. But the other
11 recipients of long-term humanitarian assistance include neglected emergencies,
countries in protracted conflicts and places where the environment for
development assistance is extremely unfavourable.

Iraq

Sudan

5,000 Afghanistan

Ethiopia
4,500
Somalia
4,000
Sierra Leone
US$ million (constant 2007 prices)

3,500 Myanmar

Liberia
3,000
Korea, Dem Republic
2,500
Iran

2,000 Eritrea

Tajikistan
1,500
Congo, Republic
1,000
Congo, Dem Republic

500 Burundi

0 Angola

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Figure 2: Countries that have received long-term humanitarian assistance 1995-2007

[Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC 2a data]

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 Taking the long view

Chronically poor countries account for 98% of long-term humanitarian assistance

1
and 37% of medium-term humanitarian assistance. This is not a surprise given the
strong links between chronic poverty and conflict, disasters and insecurity. But it
does emphasise the importance of humanitarian assistance for countries in chronic
poverty. In sub-Saharan Africa, 30% of the population live in countries receiving
long-term humanitarian assistance.

9,000

8,000

7,000
US$ million (constant 2007 prices)

6,000
Iraq

5,000 Short-term humanitarian

assistance
4,000 Long-term humanitarian assistance
to chronically poor countries
3,000
Medium-term humanitarian
assistance to chronically poor
2,000 countries

Medium-term humanitarian
1,000
assistance to other countries

0 Long-term humanitarian assistance

to other countries
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Figure 3: Humanitarian assistance to chronically poor countries 1995-2007 [Source: Development

Initiatives based on DAC data]

Within individual chronically poor countries, humanitarian assistance is often a very

large proportion of the total aid flow. In Chad, humanitarian assistance has been
between 44% and 58% of total official development assistance (ODA) for the past
four years; DRC has received around 40% of total ODA in the form of humanitarian
assistance annually since 1994. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, humanitarian assistance is
now down to between a quarter and one-fifth of ODA respectively, but was over
50% in the early years of the millennium. In Burundi nearly three-quarters of ODA
was in the form of humanitarian assistance in 2004 and in most years since 1995
it has been over half of ODA.

Burundi’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is US$118 a year or 32 cents a
day for each of its 8.5 million people. Life expectancy at birth is 51 for women and
48 for men and one child in ten dies in infancy. In this chronically poor environment,
it is humanitarian assistance – structured around responses to crises and based on
assumptions of short term involvement – that has been the primary source of ODA.

2007

2006

2005

2004 Remaining ODA

2003 Burundi general budget support

2002 Burundi humanitarian assistance

0 100 200 300

US$ million (constant 2007 prices)

Figure 4: Humanitarian assistance, general budget support and ODA to Burundi, 2002-2007
[Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data]

1
Countries in chronic poverty have relatively low initial levels of welfare (relatively low GDP per capita and relatively high
mortality, fertility and undernourishment) plus relatively slow rates of progress over time across all available indicators.
See Chronic Poverty Report 2008-9, Escaping Poverty Traps, page 14. www.chronicpoverty.org

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GHA Report 2009

The box below sets out the need for coherence with government policy in the
2
context of conflict, climate variability and chronic poverty in Northern Uganda.
The humanitarian reflex, driven by the principles of impartiality and neutrality, is to
work outside government. So where humanitarian assistance is the primary source
of finance, the question of how to engage with the government on longer term
poverty reduction may be less likely to come to the top of the agenda. In protracted
conflicts, donors are faced with a difficult balancing act. The role of national and
local government in longer term poverty reduction has to be balanced by financing
that by-passes government structures in the interests of protecting people and
providing basic services. This is further complicated because donors’ financing
choices also carry political messages which can signal support or disapproval.

2007 Uganda humanitarian assistance

2006 Uganda general budget support

2005
Remaining ODA
2004

2003

2002

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200

US$ million (constant 2007 prices)

Figure 5: Humanitarian assistance, general budget support and ODA to Uganda, 2002-2007
[Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data]

3
Financing humanitarian assistance and attention to climate change, chronic poverty and conflict in Northern Uganda

Northern Uganda has been locked in armed conflict for nearly 20 years. The war has resulted in displacement, abduction
and death for thousands of people and the disruption of economic activity. Karamoja, the poorest region in the country,
has faced chronic insecurity fuelled by cattle rustling and the proliferation of small arms. For Northern Uganda, climate
variability in the form of unprecedented rainfall, floods, and stretched droughts especially in the north and north-east
has exposed
4
local populations to immediate food deficits (which have in turn led to the need for emergency food aid and
relief). Because of long-term conflict, climate variability and poor service delivery
5
among other factors, vulnerability and
poverty remain high, accompanied by low development and high deprivation.

During these crises in Northern Uganda, the majority of the population has relied on humanitarian assistance provided
by international, local and national institutions including UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Médecins Sans Frontières, Action Against Hunger, and other international NGOs and faith-based organisations.
In the broader framework of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the Ugandan government has prioritised conflict,
security and disaster management issues and subsequently established security, conflict resolution and disaster
management as a separate sector under the office of the Prime Minster. Guided by the PEAP, donors align their
assistance with government priorities through sector and general budget support. However, the needs of conflict-affected
6
areas in the north are largely addressed through off-budget donor funded projects. This separation undermines the
government’s role in service delivery and reinforces the perception of the government’s neglect for the north. While some
donors are linking conflict and development in specific projects, they are doing little to encourage the integration of
conflict and armed violence issues across sectors through dialogue and support, linked with sector wide approaches.
In 2007 the government launched the National Plan for Peace Recovery and Development of Northern Uganda (PRDP) to
spearhead stabilisation and recovery, initially for three years. The next three years of the plan are expected to cost
approximately US$600 million. In 2007 humanitarian assistance to Uganda totalled US$164 million and total ODA was
just over US$1 billion. The new plan will be financed through international co-financing, direct budget support and
district-level allocations by way of block grants, setting up a multi-donor trust fund, parallel projects and reallocation of
national expenditures.

It is crucial to establish the coherence of these policies and programmes in incorporating humanitarian response
and vulnerability.

2
See also International Crisis Group (14 April 2004) Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict. Africa Report
N°77. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2588 and Elizabeth Stites (June 2006) Humanitarian Agenda
2015--Northern Uganda Country Study. Feinstein International Center. https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/
Elizabeth+Stites
3
This analysis on Northern Uganda is part of an ongoing programme of work by Development Research and Training (DRT),
Uganda, on coherence in policy and humanitarian assistance for sustainable livelihood outcomes in Northern Uganda.
www.drt-ug.org
4
Many districts have been affected including Katakwi, Amuria, Kumi, Kaberamaido and Soroti in the Teso region, and
Nakapiripirit and Moroto in the Karamoja region. Pader and Kitgum districts in Northern Uganda were also affected by
torrential rains displacing people and in some instances leading to loss of lives
5
According to the UNHS 2005/06, 60.7% of the population lives below the poverty line, a figure that is nearly twice the
national poverty average
6
Sarah Bayne (2007); Aid and Conflict in Uganda

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 Taking the long view

Defining humanitarian assistance ‘by exception’

Humanitarian assistance is defined by the principles that govern it but also by
exception to the rules and norms for development assistance.

Donors did not start monitoring their humanitarian aid flows until 1973 – 13 years
after the establishment of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and
four years after the Pearson Commission, which set the standard that 0.7% of gross
national income (GNI) should be allocated to ODA.

It was not until the advent of the GHD initiative in 2003 that humanitarian
assistance was even included in the DAC peer review process – the primary tool for
monitoring the quality of donor assistance. And when the DAC developed a new
clustering of types of ODA that are considered to make a particular contribution to
poverty reduction in 2007 (country programmable aid), humanitarian assistance
was excluded.

One of the key aspects of treating humanitarian assistance and aid to post-conflict
countries as an exception is that it allows donors to finance activities in countries
that are not priorities under their development cooperation policies. In the 1990s,
when there was a strong policy push to channel development assistance to ‘good
policy’ environments, humanitarian assistance was the exception that enabled aid
7
to flow to countries like North Korea.

As aid effectiveness principles including concepts like division of labour become

more embedded, donors may increasingly concentrate on a limited number of
bilateral partnerships. This will mean that donors will need to find other ways to
contribute to situations of protracted poverty and vulnerability that fall outside
their own priority countries. Financing mechanisms for crisis and post-conflict
countries, such as Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and Multi-Donor Trust
Funds (MDTFs), are growing in number and more donors are participating in them.

Humanitarian and development assistance

drawing closer
The need to ‘link relief and development’ has been a recurring theme of the last 20
years. The concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) to
address protracted crises emerged in the mid-1990s. In the 1980s there was a
growing distinction between development aid that was subject to political and
economic conditionalities, on the one hand, and relief aid that was provided
outside state structures and relatively free of such restrictions, on the other. There
have been and continue to be many attempts to set up ‘gap-filling’ funds and
processes. Although there is no global standard for a process or mechanism to link
relief and development, in practice what has happened has been greater
convergence between humanitarian and development agendas.

The scope of humanitarian work has expanded. In many situations there is reliance
on humanitarian assistance funding to finance early recovery and transition and, as
the data shows, to support countries in protracted crisis. The humanitarian
community has been putting increasing emphasis on addressing people’s
vulnerability as well as the capacity to respond competently to events and hazards.
UN consolidated appeals include significant ‘early recovery’ and longer term
development components. For instance the 2009 consolidated appeal for the
Central African Republic (CAR) starts with the words “Now is the opportunity to
break the cycle of violence and start reducing poverty” and the team delivering the
consolidated appeal process (CAP) is called the ‘Humanitarian and Development
Partnership Team’.

7
See Aid, Policies and Growth, by Craig Burnside and David Dollar, World Bank Policy Research Department, 1997.
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/WPS1700series/wps1777/wps1777.pdf

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GHA Report 2009

The link between crisis, risk, vulnerability and the impact of disasters is
increasingly visible in donor humanitarian policies as well. Denmark’s new
humanitarian strategy for 2010-2015 sets humanitarian action explicitly in the
framework of improving human security and reducing poverty: its objectives are to
save and protect lives, alleviate suffering and promote the dignity and rights of
civilians in crisis situations; as well as to initiate recovery, build resilience to and
8
prevent future crises by breaking the cycle between crises and vulnerability. Many
other donors such as Japan, Germany and Ireland specifically recognise the links
between vulnerability and disasters in their policies.

Development assistance has become increasing concerned with issues around

conflict and fragility. In 2007 38% of development assistance (i.e. ODA net of debt
and humanitarian assistance) went to fragile states. Funding to sectors related to
peace, security and conflict has also been increasing. Civilian peace building has
more than doubled to reach US$1.2 billion in 2007 and security system
management and reform has nearly tripled over four years from US$232 million to
US$875 million.

2,677
3,000
US$ million (constant 2007 prices)

2,500
1,581

2,000
1,476

Child soldiers (prevention and

1,476

demobilisation)
1,500 Land mine clearance
1,242
Reintegration and small arms
1,000 and light weapons control
796 907
Civilian peace-building, conflict
500 554 prevention and resolution
875
0
232 318 259 Security system management
and reform
2007
2004

2005

2006

Figure 6: ODA to security-related sectors, 2004-2007 [Source: Development Initiatives based on

DAC CRS data]

Vulnerability and the consequences of uninsured risk for both individuals and
economies are also more visible on the development agenda. The World Bank has
9
been initiating vulnerability funds. Social protection and cash transfers are now
seen as mainstream instruments to fight poverty and meet humanitarian needs,
because they reduce risk and increase the resilience of people in the face of shocks
and disasters. They are financed from development assistance including budget
support.

But despite the convergence of agendas, the institutions and people that manage
humanitarian and development assistance often work separately, use different
financing mechanisms and are aligned to different governmental structures. As a
result, humanitarian, recovery and development actors do not have the opportunity
to coordinate, debate or build on each other’s plans and achievements, many
important opportunities for early and sustainable recovery from sudden-onset and
protracted crises are missed and life-saving issues are not prominent enough in
development assistance.

8
Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 201 – 2015 forthcoming, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
9
In 2008 the World Bank initiated a food vulnerability fund and in 2009 President Robert Zoellick proposed a vulnerability
fund in response to the financial crisis, to speed up the delivery of resources to safety net
programmes.http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22049582~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437
376~theSitePK:4607,00.html

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 Taking the long view

Climate change – a different pattern of disasters and

consequences
Climate change is also focusing more attention on the importance of reducing risk
and increasing resilience.

The number of natural disasters has been increasing since the 1970s as has the
10
number of people affected – although not the number of people killed.
The evidence suggests that smaller disasters are increasing in frequency more
quickly than larger disasters. But while the scope of individual disasters may be
reduced, the impact on each community may be equally severe. A localised
mudslide can destroy homes and livelihoods just as completely as an
internationally recognised large-scale event.

600

528

506

489
460
450

449
500

420
US$ million (constant 2007 prices)

413

401

384
362
400

324
296
272

277
272
266
256
232

300
237
231
211

188
181
174
160

158
143
141

200
137
125

100

0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Figure 7: Total number of natural disaster per year, 1978-2008 [Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED
International Disaster www.emdat.be-Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels – Belgium]

Shocks including natural hazards but also economic crises and ill-health are often
followed by sustained periods of poverty. Shocks increase the number of people
who fall into poverty and the persistence of poverty among those who are already
poor. Very small external events can be catastrophic if the capacity of a vulnerable
household to protect itself is already diminished and, with each disaster,
household resilience is likely to be reduced as assets are sold and livelihoods
compromised. Faced with these high levels of vulnerability and insecurity, people
are already adopting strategies that minimise their vulnerability in the short run,
but may keep them in poverty in the long run. These include reducing the number
and quality of meals, postponing health-related expenditure, shifting into informal
11
or hazardous employment, and adopting less productive but safer crops. More
seriously, as the projected frequency of climatic shocks increases, so intervals for
recovery shorten, threatening to transform cycles of poverty into acute and
enduring crises.

10 Data from International Emergency Disasters Database www.emdat.be and cited in The Humanitarian Costs of Climate
Change, Mackinnon Webster, Justin Ginnetti, Peter Walker, Daniel Coppard, Randolph Kent. Development Initiatives,
Humanitarian Futures Programme, Tufts University. Feinstein International Center. www.fic.tufts.edu
11 Chronic Poverty Report 2008 -9 chapter 3. www.chronicpoverty.org

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GHA Report 2009

While undermining the viability of individual livelihoods, climate change threatens

the resilience of entire social and economic systems. For example, recent analysis
commissioned by OCHA points out that natural disasters also interact with political
and economic processes to cause much larger and more complex emergencies.
“Natural disasters significantly increase the risk of violent civil conflict both in the
12
short and medium term. [...] A community that is already under economic and
political stress may tip from survival to collapse under the impact of extreme
13
weather events and the increasing vulnerability of its population.”

The changing pattern of natural disasters also challenges the current appeal based
framework for raising funds. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC) noted the huge increase in small and medium-sized
disasters and highlighted the implications for funding in its 2007 annual report. For
the first time, the funds released from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)
for small-scale disasters exceeded the amounts for major operations. Humanitarian
agencies, both non-governmental and official, are highly dependent on an appeal
structure to mobilise resources. Widespread and small-scale disasters do not lend
themselves to this type of funding.

Changing humanitarian actors

Long-term analysis confirms that humanitarian actors change over time, with
shifting patterns of donors as well as recipients.

When the DAC first started to monitor its humanitarian assistance in 1973, Greece,
Ireland and Portugal were recipients of ODA; now they are donors. Korea will join
the DAC in 2010. 85 non-DAC donors now contribute to the Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF) – and many of them are also recipients of humanitarian
assistance. In 2008, 12% of the humanitarian contributions reported to UN OCHA’s
Financial Tracking System (FTS) came from non-DAC donors.

Within donor governments many different agencies are engaged. As well as the
traditional humanitarian assistance departments, there are rapid response units
that often draw on the expertise and capacity of civil society, the military and
‘whole of government’ approaches.

Voluntary public giving through NGOs adds around one-fifth to official

humanitarian assistance. Public support flows direct to UN agencies through
national committees and direct donations. Volunteering and gifts in kind add to the
resources from the public.

Remittances are hard to calculate but known to be significant. In some crises where
there is a large diaspora, remittances may be the most significant source of
finance. In 2005 in Guatemala, remittances received totalled US$413 million –
14
20 times the amount raised by the UN appeal.

NGOs, private givers and non-DAC donors do not necessarily draw the line between
humanitarian and developmental activity in the same place as official donors, and
some do not try to draw it at all. An example of this is revealed by the data on how
humanitarian aid is channelled. Non-DAC donors channel the bulk of their
humanitarian assistance direct to recipient governments. In the past, this has
accounted for over two-thirds of non-DAC donor humanitarian spending. Although
the share fell to 30% in 2008, it is still a different order of magnitude to the 4% of
DAC humanitarian assistance that is channelled to recipient governments.

12 Philip Nel and Marjolein Righarts, “Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict,” International Studies
Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008): 159–185
13 The Humanitarian Costs of Climate Change, Mackinnon Webster, Justin Ginnetti, Peter Walker, Daniel Coppard,
Randolph Kent. Development Initiatives, Humanitarian Futures Programme, Tufts University. Feinstein International Center.
www.fic.tufts.edu
14 IFRC World Disasters Report 2006, Focus on Neglected Emergencies http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2006/index.asp

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 Taking the long view

Changing and diverse actors not only place demands on coordination, but they also
shape the nature of the humanitarian response. Financing mechanisms will need to
adapt in order to make the most of the comparative advantages of different sources
of funding and increased transparency on a wider range of resource flows at
country level will be necessary for good coordination.

What are the implications for the future of humanitarian

assistance?
The changing patterns of disasters, the recognition of the links between chronic
poverty and exposure to shocks and crises, and the long-term practice of spending
the bulk of humanitarian funding in situations of protracted emergency are all
challenges to humanitarian assistance as currently conceived and issues that are at
the heart of sustainable poverty reduction.

If the same people move between endemic food insecurity, chronic poverty and
periodic acute crisis, does it make sense to classify our responses into
humanitarian and developmental and then try to fill the gaps between them?

If the nature of disasters is that they are small, widespread and frequent, can
appeals for individual crises remain the tool for mobilising response?

If humanitarian assistance is the main source of aid over long periods, does it make
sense for it to be treated as separate from policies on poverty reduction?

And what does that demand in terms of partnerships with domestic organisations,
including governments, to build and use existing capacity to reduce risk and
increase resilience?

As we move towards 2015, it is being recognised that the strategies that have
driven progress on the MDGs will not necessarily work for the people who will still
be in poverty, even if the targets are achieved. These people will be the ‘hard to
reach’ poor, often living in insecure environments and facing multiple
disadvantages. These are the same people that are today’s recipients of long-term
humanitarian assistance.

Eliminating poverty will require a re-cast aid architecture that goes beyond current
and often artificial classifications of humanitarian and development assistance. All
aid instruments and capacities are needed to serve a common overarching
objective of advancing solutions to the cycles of crisis, vulnerability and poverty
that dominate so many people’s lives.

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