The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A Netuork Analysis of Technical

Change
John Law and Michel Callon

Imagine a technological project that lasts for a number of years, involves the mobilization of tens or hundreds of thousands of workers, designers,managcrs, and a ple thora of heteroscneousbits and pieces including designs,parts, machine tools, and all the rcst. Imagine that this project is developed in a constantly changing cnvironment that requirements, interests, and even the actors themselveschange during the course of its lifetime. Imagine that not hundreds but hundreds of thousands of decisions are made . And imagine that in the end it is cancelled amid a welter of acrimony. How can we describe such a project in a way that is more than "simple" history? How can we describe it in a way relevant for the analysis of other projects and technological innovations? How can we explain the decision to close the project? How can we explain its failure? And how can we do this in a way that lets us avoid taking sides? Despite the recent growth in interest in the social analysis of technology, few tools currently available are really useful. Our problem is that it is too simple (though it contains an element of truth) to say that context influences, and is simultaneously influenced by, content. What we require is a tool that makes it possible to describe and explain the coevolution o[ what are usually distinguished as sociotechnical context and sociotechnical content. In recent work we have used a network mctaphor to try to understand this kind of process (Callon and Law l9B9). We have considered the way in which an actor attempts to mobilize and stabilize what we call a global networ,tin order to obtain resources with which to build a project. In our languaee, then, a global network is a set of relations bctween an actor and its neighbors on the one hand, and between those neighbors on the other. It is a network that is built up, deliberately or otherwise, and that generates a space, a period of time, and a set of resourcesin which innovation may take place. Within this space-we call it a negotiation space-the processof building a project

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t t r ; t y l r c t r t ' i r t t ' t l l r s t l r t . r . l i r l r o r . : r l i o rtri l ' t l o t t t l r t t , l t t , o r / tlr:rr is, tlrr. d e v e l o p r n e n t< l l ' a n a r r a y < l l ' t h c h r . t t : r . g ( : ' ( ' ( ) u s scr ,l'llirs:trr<l 1li<.t.<.s that is necessaryto the successfulproduction of any worki.s clcvi<.c. we have suggested,that is, that the notions of context and contc't that are used as common analytical devices in the sociology of science and technology may be transcended ifprojects are treat as balanc_ ing acts in which heterogeneous elements from both ,.inside', a.d "outside" the project are juxtaposed. In this chapter we push our analysis a stage further by considering the dynamics of a large British aerospace project. we consider the way in which the managers of that project sought to position their project in a global network in order to obtain the iime and the resources needed to build and maintain a local network. And we discuss the way in which the shape of that project was influenced not only by the efforts of those managers, but also by events and strategies that influenced the shape of the global network. Thus we trace the strategiesand contingencies that led to the creation of both local and global networks, the fortunes or the managers as they sought to shape both networks and control the relatins berween them, and the eve'tual collapse of the project when the relationship between thcm finally got completely out of hand. At onc lcvel, thcn, our story is banal. It is the description of a large military tcch'ology pr.jcct that went wrons. But although this pro.icct h:rsc.'si<lcr.blc irtcrcst lor the ]ristory orB.itirh aero-space, here .ur .inr is ''t primarily to adcr t. the catalog of accounts of -ilitu.y w.stc. Rather it is analyticar. Like many others in this volume, we ^re corccrned to develop a vocabulary o{-analysis that will allow us to dcscribe and cxplai' ail attempts to build durable institutions. A.alytically, rhe lacr of the filurc in the present project is best seen as a methodological convenience: controversy surrounding failure tends to reveal processesthat are more easily hidden in th case of successfulprojects and institutions. A Project and lts Neighbors

lrom neighboring actors.In (,l s(.( (lltr.sti()n l l l ' i t u -s { t r l l i c i c n tr e s o u r c e s ()tll('r (.irs(.s it w:rs a question of securing their neutrality for an appropriate period. In both cases it was a question of coming to appropriate arrangements-ofdefining the relationship between the project and its neighbors.r The origin of this processcan be traced to a General Operational Requirement (GOR 339) developed by the Operational Requirements Branch and to a policy for the rationalization of the aircraft industry implemcnted by the procurement branch of the British sov(:rnmctrt, the Ministry of Supply' So far as the RAF in general w:ls c()nccrncd, it was necessarythat the end product be an aircraft. All othcr transactions were predicated on this assumption. That a ('()rnl)irtaircraft was needed was not, in fact, that clear in the late 'l'he defense policy of the United Kingdom as spelled out in l95r0s. thc 1957 Defence White Paper was that of nuclear deterrence based on ballistic missile retaliation. So far as the Ministry of Defence was concerned, it was important that the end product not be a strategic bomber-this alternative having been ruled out by the white Paper. l'his suggested that the project should be a combat aircraft, and given British defense commitments as conceived by the Ministry, it was appropriate that it should be a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft (TSR). So lar as the Treasury was concerned, it was important that the end product be cheap. Given this perspective, which was based on its perceived need for economies in defense spending, the Treasury tended to doubt the need for any aircraft at all. At most support could be found for a single combat aircraft. This meant that the aircraft would have to fulfill all the possible combat aircraft requirements of the RAF. Accordingly, there was pressure for a versatile also requirement fulfilled by the TSR definition-and aircraft-a cost. its unit cutting thereby overseas' one that might be sold So f;ar as the Navy was concerned' it was also necessary to overcome a high degree of hostility. The Navy was purchasing a small tactical strike aircraft called the Buccaneer, and was anxious to persuade the RAF to buy this same aircraft because this would cut unit costs for the Navy and relieve Pressure on the arms procurement budget overall. The responseof the Operational Requirements Branch was to proPose a large, supersonic, precision-strike, longrange aircraft that was quite different from the Buccaneer. Although this responsewas not what was sought by the Navy, it was intended to neutralize the (Treasury-assisted) attempts by the latter to impose the Buccaneer.

The TSR.2 project was dreamed up in the Operational Require_ ments Branch of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the late I950s. (TSR stands for Tactical Strike and Reconnaisance; the meaning of the 2 is a mystery.) The structure of the project and its airciaft were conceived in the course of a set of negotiations with neighboring 'rhus, actors. those who advanced the project sought to esr;blish for it a shape that would allow it to survive. In some cases it was a

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S o l . r t . r st l r c l t t t n s t r \ o l S r r l r l r l r \ r . l \ ( o n ( r ' r r r c r lt,l \ \ , r \ t r n l x r l t . r n t t l r : r tt l r t ' i r i l c r i r l li l r o j c rt l r t ' t o r r s i s t c rrrlti t l r . r p o l i rt l i r r r ; r t i o r r , r l r z r r r g thc airliamc ar)da('r()cngittt'irr<lrrstry'.'l'lrr.r'r'w ' (i.r l r l o l ; r r l o z r . r r l l(l.)rw a i r f r a m e m a n u l a c t u r c r s i n t h c U n i t c r l K i n g < k r r r ri r r t l r r . l i r t r . l l ) . ' 1 0 s . The Ministry felt that there was room firr two ()r tllr(.('ilt ln()sl. Accordingly, the project was conceived as an instrumcnt lirr lrringirrg a large and powerful industrial consortium into being: it would not be awarded to a single firm. These transactions shaped and helped to define the projcct. Lct us note a number of important characteristics of this process. The TSR.2 project displayed what we may call variable geometry: it represented different things to different actors. In other words, it possessed a high degree of "interpretive flexibility." For the Ministry of Defence and the RAF, it was not a strategic bomber but a tactical strike and reconnaissanceaircraft. For the Treasury it was relatively (though insufficiently) cheap. For the Navy it was a successful competitor to the Buccaneer, and for the Ministry of Supply it was an instrument of industrial policy. At the same time, however, it was also a relatively simple object to each of those other actors. Though our account is, of course, schematic, most o{'thc complexities of the aircraft and its project were also invisiblc to these outside actors. But the simplification involved in bringing this project into being was reciprocal: the outside actors were, in turn, simplified from the standpoint of the project. Thus 'freasury the was (and is) a highly complex bureaucracy with a wide range of policy concerns and procedures. From the standpoint ol the project most of these were irrelevant. The Treasury was a "punctualizsd" 2s1e1-an actor that was reduced to a single function, that of the provision of funds. This processof reciprocal simplification has several consequences. One is that from the standpoint of both its neighbors and an outside observer, the project can be treated as a seriesof transactions. Some of these took the form of economic exchanges: in return for the provision of funds the project would provide accounts, progress reports, and, ultimately, a working aircraft. Some were political in character: in return for a demonstrated need for a large and complex aircraft, the objections of the Navy to the project would be overruled. Yet others were defined technically (the General Operational Requirement, and the more specific Operational Requirement that followed it) or industrially (the provision of contracts in exchange for a rationalization of the aircraft industry). In an earlier paper (Callon and Law l9B9) we referred to what is passedbetween an actor and

l 'r'will lrrltllrt lris{tlr'lilrcrlrtcly r t r r r r . r g f r l x r ,t t t t i l l i l n r t l t u t r r , . t t t t n ltcrr'lo rt'li'r to wlt:ti llitsst's )r r r r i t t o l o g y qr.rr,.r.r .r l t r r lt t o t t s l r t ' r ' i l t rt'c st.t c l ,a s cl r c l t r t i v c l ys t i r l l l ct r : I r l s a ( ' t i ( ) nA l r ( . t \ \ r . r .;1 l ( l o t s i t r t l t c r ' o t t t ' so b oth to r e f e r n e t u t o r k t o g l o b a l t l t c l t r n w ' ,r . w i l l t r s c r r r r l r r . r t r . r l. r r r ' l i r . r t o those a n d t l r c s r ' t o l l c l l r t i o t t sl r c l w c t ' t ri I I l : I ( t t o r a n d i t s n e i g h b o r s , I r r lr v c c r r ils rrcigltllttrs. It is irlso irrrllortant to note that transactions leading to reciprocal .lrrrrlrlilicirtion s h a p r : dn o t o n l y t h e p r o j e c t i t s e l f b u t a l s o t h e a c t o r s tlr:rt crrtcrt'd into transactions with it. Again, this shaping operated rlrr.orrglra variety of mechanisms: often the formulated intereskof csisting irctors were redefined. In 1957 the Ministry of Defence did rrrr "know" that it needed a TSR aircraft. It simply knew that it did n()t n('ed a strategic bomber to replace the existing V bomber force lrr.r'rrtrst'ballistic missiles would fulfill this role. In the process of irrtcractins with the Operational Requirements Branch, the ministry rr.rrs persuaded or became aware of its interest in a TSR aircraft. A sirnilar processovertook the RAF. At the beginning of the processit krrcw only that it wanted a new combat aircraft, and that there were inrportant obstacles to this ambition. By the end it perceived its irrterestsin terms of the TSR.2. A similar but even more dramatic out with l)rocessovertook the airframe manufacturers. They started and new aircraft, it general interest in obtaining contracts to produce t'nded up finding that it was in their interest to merge with manuflacturers that had previously been rivals to design and manufacture a 'f SR aircraft. So profound was the process in this case that they were not simply reshaped they were turned into new actors in their own right. However, the actors shaped by the project were not, in all cases, influenced by operating on their perceived interests. Thus the expressed interests of the Navy with respect to the project remained unchanged in the following years: it was hostile and wished to see it cancelled. However, because of the definition of the aircraft described above and a seriesof bureaucratic political ploys that will not be detailed here, the project and those whose support it enlisted (notably the RAF itself) boxed in the Navy. The latter was hostile, but it was also unable to press its hostility home. In this case power plays and bureaucratic strategems acted to shape the Navy. The neutrality of the Treasury was secured in part by similar me ans. We are emphasizing this process of mutual shaping because it is important to understand that actors are not simply shaped by the networks in which they are located (although this is certainly true), but they also influence the actors with which they interact. In one

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\ \ . r \ l l l r si s o l r v i o r r s , r t l r r ' l . r t t rr lo .r l . r , ro ,l , . r rl o r \ . r r r . l l r r . r n s r . l rlro .r.rlr.rl i r r i r r r t l s l r i r p t ' r l r y i r g l , l l r l n ( . r r r ' ( ) 1 .l k l ,.u , r ' r . r . r ' t, l r r . p , i r r t i s r n . , r . t l r r n a k i r r s c x l l l i c i t l y l r t ' t ' ; r u s ti' t l l n ' i r k s < l o w r r i r r r i r l r s t r : r c tr l i s r i l r t . t i o l r c o m m o n i n s o c i a l a n a l y s i s b e t w e e n ( d c t c r r n i n c c l )a < ' t o r: r n r l ( d t . t t . r mining) structure, or between content and contcxt. Ncighlxrrs ckr indeed shape new actors as they enter into transactions with them, but they are in turn reshaped by their new circumstances.z Finally, we should note that financial resources,a set of specifica_ tions, the tolerance of certain neighbors, and the neutralization of others offered the project managers the resources to go about fulfilling their side of the explicit and implicit bargains that they had entered into. In short, like many of the other casesdescribed in this volume, the project had created for itself a time and a space within which it might deploy the resourcesit had borrowed from outside. It had, accordingly, achieved a degree of autonom!, a ,,negotiation space'" we will now consider some of the transactions that took place within this negotiation space. Designing a Local Netuork

( ,l t c g o tr , . t t r r lS i t t t p s o t l r' l l t r lt). \ ' i c k c r s o l l c r t ' < l r ' , u r \ t o rr , \ \ ' r l l r . r r r r r ( ) t r c l i r r g l r ' - r ' l r g i r r r ' : t i t ' r 'trl;tt:ltit w i t s r r : r sl i r l ; r s r r r : r ls trrr,porsilrrlrtics. 'I'hc irrnr (i()R 1139. r r l , r t r rr ' l v l l r r ' ; r p l r r t t r l i v c tu c t l t ' o t t s i < l t ' r l r b l y .tlrr'r rr';rs l i r t l r t t t t t c l t l i r t g c t r r i r t ' r : t l i t h : r t t : o t r l r l r m c dc l o s e l y t o G O R I i t ) . l l 11 1 1P 1 r o l x r s i t l si t < l r ' o t ' i t t t ' d :t "wt:apons systems" approach to , l r ' r i r . 1rrv ri t l r l r t r i n t c g r a t t ' < a l p p r o a c h t o a i r f r a m e , e n g i n e s ,e q u i p m e n t , ( W r x x l l - 9 7 5 ,1 5 6 ) . A l t h o u g h t h i s r e p r e s e n t e da d e p a r . r r r r lr l r ' ; r p o r r s rrrrr' liorrr tr:rclitionalmcthods of military aircraft procurement in *lriclr ;tirfiarnes wt--rcdesigned, built, and tested first, and weapons .rrr<lt'rltripmcnt were added afterward, the approach was well re, r'ivttl in Whitehall, in part because of an extensive selling exercise lrr Vit'kcrs and in part because it accorded with Ministry of Supply t l r i r r k i n ga n d r e c e n t A m e r i c a n e x p e r i e n c e . Nt'vt'rtheless, although the general philosophy of the submission u rrst'lcar, well articulated, and closely argued, Vickers were not able to tlo all the necessarydesign work and saw themselves going into prrrtnership with another firm, English Electric, which had designed rrrr<lmanufactured the successfulCanberra light bomber and the l,ightning supersonic fighter. However, English Electric had made its own submission, code-named the Pl7A, which was a detailed irt'rodynamic and airframe design lor a 60,000 to 70,000 lb. deltarvirrged Mach 2 strike bomber with twin engines and two seats Hastings1966,30; Williams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969, lB; and \Vood 1975, 155).Though the PlTA met many of the specifications ol'GOR 339, it lacked an all-weather capability and a vertical or short takeoffcapacity (Williams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969, l8). English Electric countered the latter deficiency by arguing that short takeoff was not the most urgent requirement (which was, in their view, the replacement of the Canberra), but suggested that this could be provided at a later date by a platform that would lift, launch, and recover the PlTA in the air. This platform was to be designed and built by Short Brothe rs, which submitted a preliminary design (Hastings 1966, 29; Williams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969, l B ; W o o d 1 9 7 5 ,1 5 5 ) . With the airframe manuf,acturers mobilized and a set of submissions in place, the second stage in the elaboration of the local network started-consideration of what design or combination of designs would best fulfill the various requirements negotiated with neighboring actors. Though the small Vickers design was favored by the Treasury because it was likely to be relatively cheap, the large submission was particularly attractive to the Air Staff, the RAF, and sectionsof the Ministry of Defence. This was becauseit strengthened

By the autumn of 1957 the nesotiation space for the project managers was quite limited. In seneral they were obliged to adopt a step-by-step approach: for instance, no funds would be forthcoming unless they produced intermediaries in the form of clearer ideas about the design of the aircraft, its likely manufacturers, the costs involved, and the probable delivery date. The first stage in this process was to specify the design features of the aircraft more fully. Thus GOR 339 was quite general, specifying the kind of perfor_ mance required rather than detailing the design of an aircraft. The latter would be necessaryif such skeptics as the Treasury were to be convinced that a consortium of manufacturers was indeed capable of producing the proposed aircraft within budget. Accordingly, the processof giving shape to the project continued. Now, however, the focus of the project managers turned inward: they started to try to elaborate a network of design teams, design features, schedules,and contractors. They started to create and mobilize actors in what we will call a local network.3 The first step in this processwas to ask the British aircraft industry to submit outline designs in the autumn of 1957. This posed no particular problem, for the firms in question were hungry for work and readily mobilized. In all there were nine submissions (Gardner l98l, 25), though here we will mention only the three most relevant

tlrc rorrrtrrrlrn('nl tlrr',\rr St.lll lrollr ln .r rlrltl-l.rlcoll .rrrr .rll ( w l r i rl r u o r r l t l l r : r v cl r , l r r 'l ; r r ( t 'l r c t . r r r silt r r o r r l r r l rccrlrr',r pouctlitl ( ' r ) t { i n c sa ) r ) ( lt ( ) i r w ( ' i r l ) ( ) n syst('lni sr l l l l r o : r r ' l r . ' l ' l rs ct i r l l , t l r r ' l \ l i r r i s t r ' 1 o[Delncc, and t]re Ministry ol'Supply wt'rt'also irnprt'sscrlry tlrr' integrated design philosophy advocated by thc comprury and wcr(' persuaded that Vickers had the management capacity to control :rnd integrate a complex project (Wood 1975, l58; Gardner l98l, 33). However, they were also impressed by the English Electric submission, which was generally conceded to be "a first class design" (Wood 1975, 155), was the product of wide experience with supersonic aircraft, and also had the advantage that it could use existing avionics equipment in the short run. In addition, though contact between the two firms had been limited (with English Electric contractually tied to Short Brothers), Vickers had indicated its wish to have English Electric as its partner. Accordingly, the Air Staffcame to the conclusion that a combination of the large Vickers-type 571 and the English Electric Pl TA would be both appropriate and capable of being used to mobilize actors in the global network.a Accordingly, with a putative design and potential contractors in hand, the Air Staff returned to the global network in June 1958. Specifically, they went to the Defence Research Policy Committee (Gardner l98l,32). This group was responsible for the overall control of defense procurement and as part of its role assessed and allocated priority to the projects put to it by user services and the appropriate supply departments (Williams, Gregory, and Simpson l98l,32). Cabinet-level approval was ultimately obtained, and GOR 339 was replaced in early 1959 by a tighter, more technical and definitive requirement, Operational Requirement (OR) 343 (Gardner l 9 8 l , 3 3 ; W o o d 1 9 7 5 , l 5 8 ) , a n d a n a s s o c i a t e dM i n i s t r y o f S u p p l y s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,R B 1 9 2 ( G u n s t o n 1 9 7 + , 4 1 ) . t A t t w a s n o w i n p l a c e : a preliminary ne twork of local actors had been mobilized and had contributed to creating the intermediaries needed to satisfy the global actors or turn their objections aside. The design for a local network of firms, technical components, management procedures, and the rest had been approvcd. Intermediaries would start to flow from the global nctwork in order to mobilize a more permanent local network. The Creation of a Local Netanork

t, l t ' s i t l t t s l.r t o t l t t ll l l ) l l l ( ' ; t l l l \ , ttl rlr'.i11ttct. lx tnt,lnt.nl l,,t.tl ttctttotI r r orrltllrlirlg :tlrottltltt' tottt l r ; r l ol\ , , , , , , , , , , , i , . , , , , . ,r trtr,r lr r r l r r , , r r l l . rl ( l rl y .,rrlrtton r)l,r'lSlt.2 r l i t l r i r r t l r c t i t t r t ' ; r r r t l l r r r t l g t ' t1 l t ' r r r r i t t t ' < 't'lrc t a kc a n d lirsf st('l) wlls t() try t() irttt:grattl t r , . r r i l r l r , r r i t r lIt t t o t s . r l t r t r o l o l l r l o t q t r i t c s t ' p t t r l t t t 'i t l < l t r s t r i a lr l r S a n i z a t i o n s a n d d e s i g n S ' rl to lrt.<lvt'rt'omc in this processof designing and \ r . r r . r ; r l 1 , r . . , 1 , 1 . ' r Irlrrs ,,,,,l,ilizirru:r lor.trl 1t'twrlrk. l'irst, the designers who had previously t('^rns somc 200 miles apart had rather different in , r 1 , 1 , r ' , l l r r ' l t tt'r sl < l c s i g n . ' l ' h u s t h e V i c k e r s t e a m , w h i c h w a s b a s e d rr,,rkr.rl irr tw'

\ i , ' r l , ri t l g c i ' S u r r e y a n d n e a r W i n c h e s t e r i n H a m p s h i r e ' h a d c o n olt t c l c c t r o n i c s y s t e m s ,o n a i r b o r n e s y s t e m si n g e n e r a l , o n r crrtr':rtt'< a nd on short takeoffand landing (Williams, Gregory' lrrsclrrqt'clcsis n ,rrrtlSirnpson 1969,29). The English Electric team was based on \\':rr.to. in Lancashire and had concentrated on supersonic aspects ,,l r lrc dcsign, the implications of low-level flight' and had, as we have submitted the more detailed airframe design' The process of rrot<'<1, qcrting to know one another and settling down to collaborative work in the end (Beamont 1968, 137; ,r irs clifficult but generally successful G r e g o ry, and Simpson I969, 47),and llcarnont I980, I34; Williams, rr .ioint team of fifty designers undertook a detailed study of the t,',lhnical and design problems raised by GOR 339 by the early nronths of 1959. Following this a division of labor evolved that 1.flected the relative skills of the two teams: the Weybridge group and weapons' while worked on systems including cost-effectiveness the Warton team worked on aerodynamics (Wood 1975' 164)' But the local network was not composed of people alone' For instance, the problems posed by the differences between the two thcsc clesigns*".. ut first considerable. The most fundamental of flight supersonic by arose out of the different requirements suggested small and a short takeoff capability' High-speed flight suggested a wing with low aspect ratio, a low thickness-to-chord ratio and a high leading edge sweep-all features of the Pl7A. A short-takeoff capaturn bility suggested the need lor a low wing loading, which -in high a Inlt tn. wing should be large, and it also suggested l-pii.a edge thickness-to-chord ratio and a low leading edge and trailing merged the of later and Vickers of head sweep. Sir George Edwards, Britiih Aircraft Corporation, is reported to have said at one stage' ,.The Vickers STOL study and the English Electric machine with a t i n y l o w l e v e l w i n g . . . s e e m e di r r e c o n c i l a b l e " ( G u n s t o n 1 9 7 4 , 4 4 ) . The team wrestled with these different requirements and eventually flaps resolved them in a single solution by: a' providing very Iarge of angle the and ratio that increased both th1 thickness-to-chord

Vickers and English Electric did not wait for contracts to be awarded formally. In late l95B they set about the difficult task of building a

. r t t . l[ ( , l r . l o r rt r r gl r r x l r - l r r ( ' \ \ u r ( ' .o l r\r (.rtlrr. l l . r l r r r ro l r l r . rl r , r n r l n ( ] \ ( . l i l i r r tl o w s p c r ' < l s ry llrcvcrrting tlr('lrlr.rrkrr op l irilll,u.ovr.r'rlrr . lr lo s u r l : r c eo l ' t h c w i r r g ; a r r < lt ' . i r r c r t . i r s i r rtg lr. tlrrtrst-to-wr.iglr rti r t i o by specifying two cxtremcly powcrlul c'gi't.s ((iurrst,' ll)74, 4(i; W i l l i a m s , G r e g o r y , a n d S i m p s o n 1 9 6 9 , 2 5 , 3 9 ; W o o d 1 9 7 5 ,1 6 5 ) . Although this was the most fundamental design decision lirr given the operational Requirement, many other decisions atrout engines, moving surf;aces, undercarriage, and integral fuel tanks were seen by the team to be foreclosed-other and somewhat separable design difficulties also arose. one of these concerned the location of the engine. The necessityfor thin, unclurtered wings suggestedthat theseshould be located within the fuselage,as in rhe English Electric design. Vickers were skeptical about this, worrying about cooling problems and the risk fire. However, in the end the Engrish Electric view carried the day (Wood 1975, lG3). Another concerned the short-takeoff capability o[ the aircraft. In 1959 the Air Sraff were hoping for this, but the designers quickly concluded that the proposed aircralt was too heavy, and they sought-and were qivenpermission to build an aircrafr that would take offinstead from half r u n w a y s a n d r o u g h s t r i p s ( G u n s t o n 1 9 7 4 ,4 l ) . In March 1960 the wing position was moved by three inches as a result of these and similar deliberations (Hastings 1966, 40; Gardner l98l, 105), but afrer this the design was changed little in concepr, and a brochure and drawings were issued to the workshops in 1962 (Wood 1975, 165).6 A putative local nerwork of technical components had been specified. All that remained was to turn these from paper into metal. Integrating their designsand their design teams were not the only problems of integration and control conlronted by the two firms. There was also a question about how the production work should be allocated. Although the conrract lrom the Ministry of Supply stated that the two firms were to share the work equally, it was also made clear that Vickers was the prime contractor and would exercise overall mangement conrrol (Hastings 1966, 35; Williams, Gregory, 'I'his and Simpson 1969, 22). led to some ill feeling in English Electric, which felt that it should have received its own contract directly from the ministry. The problem was exacerbated by the commitment to a development batch approach. The prototypes and development aircraft would be built on the production line for the main series rather than being built by hand, separately. The location of the production line had, therefore, to be determined early on, and negotiations were difficult (Gardner lgBl, 32).

Rololittst

he|woon Globel cnd l.ocel Nolworkt

t l,t t ' r t ' t l l t k r t : t l t t t ' t w o r kw t ' t t t i t l t t ' : t < 1 : t t t <r l ' t t ' : t l i o to \\ Jrrlc tlrcrlr'rigrr thc localnetl ig llitrrltics i r r t l r c i r r t t ' r i t c t i o lltl c t w t : c t r rrr.rr.r'otrtirrrrirr r r , , r k ; r r r r lt l r c L { k r l l l ttlr c l w o r k t h a t h a d l l r o u g h t i t i n t o b e i n g . A s w e n, p r i n t : i p l e t h e M i n i s t r y o f S u p p l y w a s l r . r v r ' : r l r t ' r r r l y i r r < l i t ' r t t t ' <i1 ,,,rnrrrilrr'<t l () :r w('al)onssystcms approach to procurement-the n lrok' rrrachint'int:ludine all its avionics, armaments, and other srrlrsvstt'rn ss h o u l d b e c o n c e i v e da s a w h o l e . I n t h e v i e w o f t h e M i n i s r rr , t h i s a p p r o a c h h a d i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r m a n a g e m e n t : Srrrt c thc filureof only one link could make a weaponssystemineffective, for co-ordinatingthe various rlrr.i<k'al would be that completeresponsibility (()rnl)on('nts of the systemshould rest with one individual, the designerof oJMilitarl Aircraft 1955'9) tlrr':rircr:rli.(SuPPU approach thus implied centralized control. It suggested that a sirrglelocus should shape and mobilize the local network and that tbis lot'us should have control over all transactions between the local and point of ulrrbal networks. It should, in short, become an obligatory between the two networks. ftassage As we have indicated, Vickers was indeed appointed prime contractor and was responsible in principle for controlling the entire project (Hastings 1966, 35; Williams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969, 22). In practice, however, the Ministry of Supply (later Aviation) did not vest all responsibility for control in Vickers. Rather, the project was controlled by a complex series of committees on which a range of different agencies were represented, and no single agency was in a position to control all aspects of the project. The failure of the management of the newly formed British Aircraft Corporation to impose itself as an obligatory point of passage led to a number of complaints by the latter about outside interference. These fell into two groups: l. Actors in the global network were able to make (or veto) decisions that affected the structure of the local network: a. Many of the most important contracts were awarded directly by the Ministry; the contract for the engines provides a case in point. The design team took the unanimous view that this should be awarded to Rolls Royce. This recommendation was based on the belief that a reheat version of the RB l42R offered the thrust-to weight ratio necessary for the aircraft, was lighter, and had more potential than an alternative enhanced Olympus engine made by 'l'lrc

llrr.t,,S l r r l r l c l c ,r l l . r \ t l n r , ll\t l t r l r , I l, \\,,,,r1 l t ) i l r , l t r . l , .l l o \ r ( ' \ ( ' t ,t l l ( ' l \ l i r r i s t r ro l ' S r r p p l l 'l r ; r r lo t l r c r r i c n ' s , : r p p : r l c r r t l r vl c l i v i r r gl i o r n r t s ('()n('('rn t ( ) l ) u r s u ( ' : r l ri r r t l r r s t l i ; rp l o l i t ' y ' o l r r r c l g c r ' i,l n ( l ( l ( ' s l ) i t ( ' t l l i s r c c o m m e n d a t i o n a w a r d e d t h c ( ' o n t r i l ( ' t t o B r i s t o l S i < k l c l t ' y( ( l l : r r k c 1965,77;Gardner l98l, 29; Gunston 197+,41;Williams, (ircgory, and Simpson 1969,21). In fact, overall, the BAC controlleclonly about 30 percent of the project expenditure itself (Gunston 1974, 67 ; Hastings 1966,40). b. The Air Staff tended to make decisions without reference to the BAC. The problem here was that the RAF continued to develop its ideas about the idcal performance and capabilities of the TSR.2. This tendency to upgrade specifications was encouraged by the fact that contractors would often talk directly to the Air Staffand the Air Ministry. Sometimes such discussionswould lead to changes in the specification of equipment whose specifications had already (or so the BAC thought) been fixed. One result was that, at least in the view of the BAC, progress toward lreezing the design of the aircraft was impeded (Hastings 1966, 144; Gardner l9Bl, l0l; Williams, G r e g o r y , a n d S i m p s o n 1 9 6 9 ,4 9 ) . 2. Given the number of global actors that had a right to express their views in the committee structure, arriving at a clear decision was sometimes difficult. a. It was often impossible to get a quick decision from the various sovernment agencies. Hastings (1966, 160) describes the case of the navisational computer that was thc responsibility of a firm called Elliott Brothers. The specification lor this computer was very demanding, and Elliott concluded that the only way in which this could be met within the time allowed was by buying the basic computer from North American Autonctics. The Ministry resisted this because it had sponsored basic research on airborne digital computers in 1956 57. The Ministry ultimately accepted Elliott's view, but the equipment re<luircd was complex and the price was 'l'rcasury high. This brought into play representatives,who insisted that the decisionbe rcvicwc<l:rlicr ayear. The whole argument delayed the devclopment ol'thc computer and (or so Hastings argues) added f750,000 to thc cost. b. On a numbcr ol-occitsionsthe Trcasury used its position to try to cancel the pr<rjcct,or at least reduce its cost, and there seemslittle doubt that an initial dclay in issuing contracts was in part a function of Treasury reluctancc. When the committee structure was further elaborated in 1963, the opportunities for discussion about costs be-

lt "'lrir r l t l r t l r r ( l , r t t t t t t i t t l ru r l l ' r | ) 1 rt' s r . r 1 t t .! : r r . , r t r r .1 r l l . t r r r l r . r . rl l , i r r r l t tsl i ' r l l t t t ( ' l ) t ( ' s ( ' t l t : t t i v c s t l ( ) ;, rrl P r i l ,l t r r l r . r Il r r . , r r r r tt\t t t ' t t t l r t ' t s l r li r t } 2 ) . ( l r c q o | y , l l x i { ) , S i r t t P s o n itrr<l r r \ l l , r r r i r r q sl l x r ( r .l l l t ; \ \ ' i l l i ; r r r r s , with relatively os lit'rr tltatlt' tlct:isittns lr,rrrrilittt.t. , l l r r . t r . t . l r r r i r . ;r . with CoSts l r t r l r . fl r , r r g l r l . 1 . ' s t , w l t t ' r t ' i t sl l t . s t : t : ' m t n i t t e c s c O n c e r n e d :tllout, or ability to determine' the technical lr,rrllitrk' itrlirrrtrlttiott 1966' 35; r r , ' , r ' s s i t yo ' l' tltc tasks thcy werc examining (Hastings a p p e a r st h a t i t C e r t a i n l y \ \ ' i l l i r r r r r s( ,i r c g o r y , a n d S i m p s o n 1 9 6 9 , 2 2 ) ' relatively was rlr,' l{Al" sought optimum petfotmattce in a way that S t a fftendency to A i r T h e 6 0 ) ' 1 9 6 6 , 5 9 ( H a s t i n g s ,,,st-irrst'trsitivc. y the weaPons systemsphilosophy.a-nd the ,1,'lrrvwlrs strcr.rgthened which rein,1.'r',:l,,pme.t batch approach to procurement, both of right absolutely in" Ref' desire to b. ,,rr. that the design was l,,r.t.r.rl modifilrclirlc it was frozen, because it was so difficult to introduce and Simpson r:rriols once this had occurred (Williams, Gregory' ,3 ) . | 1 X ; { )5 Dfficulties in Mobilizing a Local Netuotk

Corporation \Vc have described the reaction of the British Aircraft obligatory an as serve to the fact that outside actors refused to let it networks' local the point of passagebetween the project's global and and the BAC However, the growth of mistrust between the Ministry the prime contracwas two-way. tft. Ministry came to believe that control (Hastings tor was failing to exercise adequate management In particular' 5 1966,157;Williams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969' 4)' man" at the BAC to it was suggestedthat theie was no single "iron point the ministry dircct th'project (Wood 1975, 172), and at one the firm' Thus' to strongly very lelt obliged to represent this view as well docubeen has not althougt the Ministry's point of view of the as that of the BAC, it is pretty clear that for much -.nt. point of passage beperiod after 1959 neitheracted as an obligatory "seepage" ,r".a., local and global networks, and there was continual influenced which as local actors lobbied their global counterparts' the project' and in some casesimpeded the smooth running of presented many Indeed, the constiuction of the local network problems.PerhapsthemostSeriousoftheseconcernedtheengines. ItisclearinretrospectthatneithertheMinistrynorBristolSiddeley contract was knew what they were letting themselvesin for when the general terms' awarded. The Ministry specified the engines in very would be a fairly and it was at first thoughi that their development

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str.urllrt-l(,1\r'. rr nr.(l ll t c r. , l r r l r g r . r r l r r.rrg ..\r\trul{ rr t t . 1 r rt.l,r r . () l r r r r P r r s ( \ \ ' i fl i i r r r r s(,i r r . g o r y , i u r t l S i r r r l r s o rIrt X i t ,f , ) 7 , 5 2 ). l t t r r r . l r r .o r lr r t t l r i r t 'l'ltt' tlris was rl()t tll(' t'as<'. c t t g i r r c t l r i r t w : r s r l r . v r . k r 1 l r .l< r ilr r l i r r r r r r r . l r g r e a t e r t h r u s t t h a n i t s p r c d e c c s s o ra n r l o p c r a t c c l a t r n u c h l r i . q l r c r temperatures and pressures. when it was first proved o. thc tcst lrr.rl, it turned out that its cast turbine blades were too brittle, ancl it w^s necessaryto replace them with forged blades at considerablc cost in b o t h t i m e a n d m o n e y ( H a s t i n g s 1 9 6 6 ,4 2 ; G a r d n e r l g B l , 1 0 4 ) . This was not the only difficulty experienced by Bristol Siddeley. serious problems arose with the reheat system, it proved impossible to install the completed engine in the frrelug., a., there *u, ulro u weakness in the joint between the main engine and the jet pipe. However' the most seriousproblem appeared only late in the process of development. After proving the engine for over 400 hours on the t e s t b e d ( H a s t i n g s 1 9 6 6 , 4 3 ) ,i t w a s i n s t a l l e db e n e a t h a v u l c a n i n l a t e 1962. on December 3 this aircraft was taxiing during ground rests at the BSE works at Filton in Bristol when the engine blew up, "depositing," as Wood (1975, 174) reports it,.,a large portion of smouldering remains outside the windows of the company press office." The aircraft was reduced to burning wreckage, and although the crew was saved, a fire engine that approached the flames without d u e c a u t i o n w a s c a u g h t u p i n t h e i n f e r n o ( G u n s t o n 1 g 7 4 ,5 6 ) . within forty-eight hours ir was clear that the failure had been caused by primary failure of the low-pressure compressor shaft. what was not clear, however, was what had cause this f;ailure. Bristol siddeley hypothesized that it might be due to srress and ordered that the thickness of the shaft be doubled. At the same time it ordered an exhaustive seriesof tests .-a further, elaborately mobilized network 'f actors -to investigate the reasons for the f;ailure. These led to further unpredictable and unexplained explosions. Finally, in the summer of l9G4 rhe cause of the problem was diagnosed. In the orisinal u.modified engine, the low-pressure shaft had turned on three bearings. However, the design team had become concerned that the middle of these three bearings might catch fire at the high operating temperatures; this bearing had therefore been removed and then, to provide the shaft with sufficient rigidity, the diameter of this shaft had been increased (Beamont 1968, 139; Hastings 1966, 4 3 ; w o o d 1 9 7 5 , 1 7 4 ) . u n d e r c e r t a i n u n u s u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,t h e a i r between this shaft and its high-pressure neighbor started to vibrate at a frequency that corresponded to the natural frequency of reso_ nance of the low-pressure shaft. when this happened, disintegration

: t t r r ll ,t s o l t t l i o t t , 1 r r ,l l t l , , l l , , r r c rlll , , r r r r ' r ' t r , ' r ' r ' trtr t t l t . tr l t . t t l t t , r s i sl:tr 'rttrllt()tl('\'.7 \ r , r \ ! ' ' r n B l o t c r l t t i t rl't t ti l t t ' t t i t t t r ; ( ' ( ) t l ( ' ( ' l ' l l (t'l(rlt ' c r r g i n c s . It \ , r t . r l l o l t l r r .l r x : r l r r r . l u , o r k lrrolllctrrs ss . we have , r l r o l r r , , r c r ly c r ' \ ' t l i l l i rr r l t t o t ' l t t l t ' o l t l r t ' s u l l t ' 1 ; t t t r a c t o rA s t t l r t ' o r l l r i t ( ' l ( )a rp s p c a l t ' d< l v c rt h e h e a d o f t h e B A C r r r , l r.rr t c r l ,s ; u r t c about costs t o r l r r . r r r i r r i s t r l , i r6 r r t l t ' r t 9 < l I t a i t t | v o r a b l ed e c i s i o n s l l . r r t i r r q sI l X i ( i ,l l ( i ; ( i a r c l n c r l 9 8 l , l 0 l ) . O t h e r s c o l l u d e d w i t h t h e , r r r s t ; r l l t o s l t c t ' i l yt ' r l u i l t m e n t t h a t w a s u n d u l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d 'A g a i n , lr,rrr 11)51) rtnd tnore so lrom 1962, when the political climate l,r'ri.rrr to rrrr<lcrtnine the project many subcontractors doubted rrlrcllrt'r'rhc:rirt'rali would actually fly. This feeling was a function between the local and global networks, , 1, r r r o t l r t ' r ' k i n d ol'seepage .1,r'tilicitlly the knowledge that the project had powerful opponents Irr rt()\'('rnment.'l'he subcontractors thus sought to protect themselves ,rrrrl rc<'over their costs in full within each contract) by charging lriqlr priccs, and they also tended to give the work low priority li'urnont 1968, 143; Gardner l98l, 102; Williams, Gregory, and S i r r r p s o n1 9 6 9 , 2 8 ) . I n a d d i t i o n t h e r e w a s a t e n d e n c y t o c h a r g e a r r i r l t ' r a n g e o f d e v e l o p m e n t w o r k t o t h e T S R . 2 b e c a u s ei t w a s t h e ,rrly advanced military aircraft project in Britain (Gunston 1974, irll; (iardner l98l, 102). In any case,much of the work was not rrrrrcnable t o p r e c i s ec o s t i n gi n a d v a n c e ( G u n s t o n 1 9 1 4 , 6 0 ; W i l l i a m s , ( i rcgory, and Smith 1969, 27 ,5 I ) . Although the aim of the ministry irncl the BAC was to issue fixed price contracts as this became possiblc, this goal was not achieved for many of the most important rrreasof work because unanticipated technical problems arose or the specification of the equipment was altered. The Global Netuork ReshaPed

local network of the failure to build a satisf;actory The consequences had been RAF The made themselves felt in a number of ways. promised rhat rhe TSR.2 would be available for squadron service by 1965, but it was clear, wirh the engines still unproved in the middle of 1964, that this deadline had substantially slipped. The Ministry of Defence had likewise been promised a vital weapon with which to fight a war in Europe or the Commonwealth by 1965. This was not eoing to be available . The Treasury had been promised a cheap and versatile aircraft. Though it is true that some of the blame for the cost overrun can be laid at the door of the Treasury itself, by 1963 the estimated cost of the aircraft had nearly doubled' The Navy, which had been hostile from the outset, saw the project swallowing up more

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n ( ) t ' s : r wi t a s b c i n g i r r d c r ' 1 1 t r o u l r k ' . I t * , , , , s i r r r p l yl i r i l i r r si , , . 1 , . 1 i r , , . . t h e i n t e r m e d i a r i e st o t h e g l o b a l . c t w . r k t h a t i t h a c l P r ' n r i s c < lw h , , . it had been given the go-ahead. Thus, arthough thc crata i. tabrc I . I are calculated on a variety of bases and are not in ail cases stri.try comparable with one another, they sufficiently illustrate this scneral trend. However, although these difficulties were serious, they did not necessarily mean that the project was doomed. If the necessary intermediaries could be obtained from the global network, it would be able to continue: funds from the Treasury, expertise and support from the RAF, political support from the Ministry of Defence, and specialist services fiom such departments as the Royal Aircraft Establishment-these would allow it to continue. The RAF and the Minister, though not necessarily the whole of the Ministry or' Defence, remained strong supporters of the project. With the gov_ ernment committed, it was not possible for the Treasury, the Navy, or indeed, the hostile sectionsof the Ministry of Defence, to stop the project. Accordinely, the lunds continued to flow. However. armed Table l.l

il('l()l's i l r t l r c 1 I l o l r i r lt l ( ' l w ( ) r ' k ,n l r c t l r c r s v r r r l r i r t l r r . t i l ro . tlrr. l ) r . ( ) l ( ' (( ., 1r .

Estimatcd costsand dclive ry datcs of 'l'SR.2

Datc of estimate

Devclopmcnt estimate

Production estimate

'Iotal

January 1959 December1959 October 1960 March 1962 January 1963 November 1963 January 1964 February 1964 January 1965

d2s-s0m dBO-90m
d90m

up to d200m

up to d250m

(for 9 aircraft)

c. d237m (for l58 aircraft)

c. d330m

dl37m dl75-200m
d400m (overall, Ministry of Aviation)

d24O 26Om
d500m (overall, Ministry of Defence) d604m (overall, Ministry of Aviation) d670m (overall, contractors)(R&D and production of I 50 aircraft)

r r r t l r t l r r L t r , , r r l c r l gl c l r . r tt , t t t t cl t o t t t t l r c i t p : r l t i c i p ; r t i o i tt t t l t c c l t t ' s , r , r r l l lo l q o r ( ' r l r n ( ' n l: r t r r il r r r l r r s t lrl ' o t r r t n i t t c cts , t ' s k r ' l r t i cw lt sc r t ' i l t , r \ t r r ) n { p o s i t i o t rt o r r t r r l c t ' t t t i t t r lc r r ' l l r r r i c c tl r y i n c l i r c c t r c a n s . ' I ' h i s r r r r , , l r c rtl : r k i r r 1 t l1 r r ' l i g l r ti r r l o i r w i r l t ' ri t r c n a . I lrt' projcrt lrir<l r<'t'n c o n c c i v r : da n d s h a p e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f . r l r r r r i t c r l r r t r r r r l x ' ro 1 ' g l o l t a l a c t o r s . G o v e r n m e n t d e p a r t m e n t s , t h e , r r n r c t l s c r v i t ' r ' s ,t h c a c r o s p a c e i n d u s t r y t h e s e w e r e t h e r e l e v a n t . r (l ( ) r s t l r i r t l r : r < g l ivcn lil and shapeto the project. Though sections ,,1 tlrc spccialistprcss had some knowledge of the project, public \ r , r r ( ' n r ( ' n tb s y n r i n i s t e r sh a d b e e n v e r y l i m i t e d , a n d u n t i l 1 9 6 3 i t h a d lr,rrl rr vcry low profile. Gradually, however, this started to change as n('\\' :r('t()rsIirst learned about the project and then indicated their ,rpposition to it. 'l'lrt' rnost important of these was the Labour Party, which had ,lt'r'l:rrcd its opposition to "prestige projects" such as Concorde and l SR.2 and had promised to review them if it was returned to power in tlrc next General Election. Labour views about the TSR.2 had lrt't'rrunimportant in the early days of the project, and indeed were rrrrlirrmed. However, by 1963 this was beginning to change. The l.ubour Party was riding high in the opinion polls, and a General l'llcction was due by October of 1964 at the latest. Whispering in r.lovcrnmentand by other insiders and a seriesof admissionsfrom the Nlinistries of Aviation and Defence about delays and escalating costs lcd the TSR.2 to became an object of political controversy from 1963 onward. This process was reinlorced by a highly controversial setl>ack to the project-the failure to persuade the Australian governrnent to purchase the TSR.2 for the Royal Australian Air Force. In a blaze of publicity, the Australians opted for the rival Flll, an aircraft built to a similar specification by the American firm, General Dynamics. Thus, although supervision of the project remained in Whitehall, the number of actors, including critics, involved in its surveillance multiplied in 1963. The cost of the project was officially given as d400m. in November 1963. However, the Labour Party Opposition argued that this was a gross underestimate and put the figure closer to d1,000m., an estimate that was fiercely disputed by the Government (The Times,Nov. 12, 1963, p. 5). Furthermore, the Opposition argued that cost was one of the major reasons for the f;ailure to procure the Australian order, a charge angrily rejected by the Government, which claimed that the constant carping of critics in the United Kingdom had led the Australians to doubt whether the aircraft would ever be produced (The Times, Dec. 4, 1963, p. 7).

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( ) t l r c r < ' r i t i t ' s l t l { g ( ' s t ( 't(llr : r l t l r r ' ; r i r c r i r l il u r r l l r r . r ' o r r rtro .o r . x p r . r r s i y r . lbr its r.lc and to. expc'siv(' t() lx' riskt'cl in t."rbiri, 'l lu 'l inu.t s u g g e s t i n gt h a t a t d l 0 m . p e r m a c h i ' e , i t w a s " t h e m . s t c x p r . n s i v t ' w a y y e t d e v i s e do f b l o w i n g u p b r i d g e s " ( S e p t . 2 8 , l 9 6 4 p . l 0 ) . Further political disagreements centered around the rore 'f'tht. aircraft. The cancellation of the British ballistic missile Blue streak in 1960, followed by the 1962 cancellation of the American Skybolt, which had replaced Blue streak, had led certain commentators to speculate that it might be possible to use the TSR.2 in a strategic nuclear role. This suggestion (which had always been seen as a possibility within government) was picked up by the lg63 Defence white Paper (omnd. 1936) and attracted criticism both from those who felt that the aircraft was neither fish nor fowl, such as The Times and The Economisl,and the left wing of the Labour party, which was committed to a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. yet others including Denis Healey, the Labour defense spokesmen, concluded that this "strategic bonus" did not so much represent a change in the specification of the aircraft as an attempt by the government to persuade its backbenchers of the soundness of its nuclear defense policy (The Times, March 5, 1963 p. l4). Controversy also surrounded the continued delays in the first rest flight. Healey highlighted the symbolic importance of the maiden flight when he claimed in Parliamenr at rhe beginning of 1964 that the BAC had "been given an order that it must get the TSR.2 off the ground befiorethe election, and that (this) was a priority,' (The Times, Jan. 1 7 , 1 9 6 4 , p . l 4 ) . H o w e v e r , t h o u g h h e w a s m u c h t o o p r o f e s s i o n a la politician to let the conservarive governmenr off lightly for its alleged incompetence, he was also much too agile to loreclosehis own options by promising to cancel the project it the Labour party were to win the General Election. Endgatne By the autum'of 1964 the project was at a crucial stage. The local network was practically in place: the TSR.2 was almost ready for its maiden flight, albeit very much behind schedule and over budget. But the structure of the global network had altered. Disagreement was no longer confined to the Treasury and the Navy and the RAF, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Aviation. (Indeed, some of these agencies were starting to alter their views of the project.) The dispute was now public, and the conservative Government had committed itself firmly and publicly to the TSR.2, while the Labour

gt'ttt'rltlll riglrll't'riti( lpporrtiorrt i t s p o s i t i o t rr ,r':ts ,ll,rrglrrr.sctvittg 'l'ltt'lirttrrt'rtl'tlrt'pr<liect thus , . r l r , l t l r c c o s l : t t t t lr r t i l i r vo l t l r t ' l l r o j c t ' t . the t o d c m o n s t r a t e i t n l l o r t : r n t ( ) n w a s i t l . ' i r s t , ,l,.1,r.rrrlr.rl l$'()lirctors. w as t h i s t o d o w a y b e s t : tn , d the r r . rl r t r i t . t r( l . ( ) r n l x . t ( . n ( ' ( . o l ' t l r t ' l t r t l j c ta 'Ihis would reinforce the position first flight. l, rr it trI lurvt. lr srrcct:sslul ,,1rlrosr.wlro wishccl tcl seethe project through. At the same time, the o u t ( ( ) l n ( . o l ' t h c ( l c n c r a l E l e c t i o n w a s a l s o v i t a l . C o n s e r v a t i v es u c c e s s assure the future of the project. Labour victory uorrkl pr.[afiy r r o r r k lt ' a l l i t i n t o q u e s t i o n . 'l'lrt' p flight took place just eighteen days before the General rrraide I.,k.t.tion.Roland Beamont, the test pilot, describes the rather subtlrrr'<l gr<;up of engineers,technicians' managers, and RAF personnel rvlro :rssembledat Boscombe Down before the flight. Most knew' as rlrc large crowd beyond the perimeter wire did not, of the potenriirlly lethal nature of the engine problem, and they knew that altlrgugh its cause had been diagnosed, it had not yet been cured. In lirct the flight was highly successful,the aircraft handled well, and thcre was no hint of the destructive resonance that had plagued the t'nsines. Deep in the election battle the Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, described it as "a splendid achievement" (Beamont 1968, l5l). The aircraft was then grounded for several months in order to modify the engines and tackle minor problems with the undercarriage. The General Election took place on october 15. The result was close,and it was not until the following day that it became clear that the Labour Party had been returned to power with a tiny majority of five. The new administration started work in an atmosphere of crisis as a result of a large balance of payments deficit, and it decided to cap defence expenditure at d2,000 million. It also ordered a detailed scrutiny of the various military aircraft projects and started a review of the proper future shape and size of the aircraft industry (Campbell 1983, 79). In February the new Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, made it clear that the future of the TSR.2 would depend on four factors: first, a technical assessmentof the aircraft and its alternatives; second, the f;act that although the overseaspurchase of an alternative aircraft would save d250 million, this would also involve considerable dollar expenditure; third, the future shape of the aircraft industry, and the possible unemployment that would result from carcelling the program; and fourth, the nature of the terms that could be negotiated with the BAC.8 At the beginning of April spokespersons for the principal actors the Cabinet Ministers in the newly reconstructed global network

lhltltn,l

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,( , , , , ( . ,, ( ,, ; r k r *(l \ ,,,,r, ., r , .,,s r , r r ;r 'l'lrcV t ' o r t s i t l t ' r t 'ttllt r t ' t ' ; x r s s i l r l r ' ( ' ( ) u l r sl( 'rs ; c l i r r r : l . r ' r l r l i r r r r r . * . i t ltrl r r . 'l'SR'2; to t:itttt'ti 'l t i t n t l l r u t n o t l r i n ui r r i r s lo r.lrrrr.r . l: r r r < l it l l l l r r . cr ;r n <t r c p l a c ei t w i t h t h e s i m i l a r F l l l ( c r o s s m a ' r g 7 5 , l!)l; wirsr' l{)7r, 90)' The Treasury remained hostireto the 'rsR.2 a'd acc.rcri'ury sought cancellation. Although it was concerned that a lar.qc pur_ chase of an alternative American aircraft such as the Fll l wourcr impose severedollar costs,it was prepared to accept that an option Ir the purchase of this aircraft should e taken o.rt n the undcrstanding that this did not imply a firm commitment. The Ministry ol. Defence was also in favor of canceilation on cost grounds, and it was joined by those, such as the Navy, that f;avoredihe claims of'orher services and projects (Hastings 1966, 68, 70). The Minister of Defence was in favor of an Fl l l purchase, but there was same uncertainty whether Britain really needed this type of aircraft in view of the country's diminishing world role (Williams, Gregory, and Simpson l969, 3l) H,. was rhus huppy to rake out an op,il., on rhe American aircraft rather than placing a firm order. The position of the Minister of Defence probably in part reflecred a shift in the view of the Air staff. The comtinatio., of deray and cosr overrun' together with the much tougher policy of economies introduced by the new Minister of Defence, had convinced the Air staff that it was mosr unlikely that there would be a full run of 150 TSR.2s, and this had red to doubt about whether it would be possible to risk such a small number of expensive aircraft in conventional warfare' For some officers this pointe to the desirability of acquiring larser numbers of cheaper aircraft that might be mo.e flexity deployed. In addition, though the technical problems of the T.SR.2 appeared to be soluble, its delivery date was still at least three years away' Becausethe Fl l l was designed to essentially the same specification and was already in procruction, the RAF found this quite an attractive ahernative (Reed and Williams 1971. lBl). Ministry of Aviation was concerned that a decision lre to scrap the TSR'2 would seriously reduce the future capacity of the British airc,raft industry ro mount advanced military p.oj.cis, and tended -p.,..iuse to f,avor cancellatio', combined with th. of a lowerperlormance British substitute. However, most ministers, including the Minister of Aviation, berieved that the industry *a, -r.h too large for a medium-sized nation. The rear problem was that there was not yet in place a policy about its future shape and size. Even so, the TSR.2 was cosring abour milrion a week, and further deray in dl cancellation did not, on balance, seemjustified.

, , . , , , : , ' ; ;; i ;::'

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t ottltl t; \t . l1 \ ( r ) n ( r ' t t t rl'l< l t tr ; t t t r c l l . t t i ortv I r r l i . n , t , r l ,t l r r ' 1 1 , \ r ' t n r n ( '\ r it yt I ) i t t ' l i : t t t t t ' t t t , trrir.jolit l , , r , l t , , u r r r r r l r l , , \ r r r c n\t\.' i t l r : r t i r r r l . ; t l r o t t r rtll<lllularity. ry r l r r \ 1 . ' r \ \ \ ( ' r ( ' : u l x l ( ) u sn ( ) t l ( ) ( ( ) t t r t u l t t l ( ' ( ( ' ( ' s s i tu r c s u l t a n tunemployi'lt tlrat thc \ l i . r r r r r tt l r i s , l r o w c v c t ' ,I t t i t t i s t c t 'fs r r r . r r tr r o u l r l r n o s t l y l r c t c n t l l o r i t r y : t h : r t m a n y o l ' t h o s e w o r k i n g o n r l r , l S l t . 2 r v o r r l t l< 1 t r i t ' k l y b c a b s o r b c d b y o t h e r p r o j e c t so r f i r m s . , r c d c c i s i r ) nw a s b y n o m e a n s c l e a r - c u t : t h e r e w a s n o \r'r t'r'tlrclcss tl , , r l r . r l l ( l r r l r i r r t ' tr n a . i o r i t yl b r a n y o f t h e t h r e e o p t i o n s ( W i l s o n 1 9 7 1 , ' t {| . , \ r r r r r r r l r co r l ' m i n i s t e r s m a i n l y , i t s e e m s ,t h o s e w h o w e r e n o t rlrrcr'tlv involved wantcd to postpone cancellation until a longr . r r r r < l c f i ' n c cp o l i c y w a s i n p l a c e ( C r o s s m a n 1 9 7 5 , 1 9 0 ) . O v e r a l l , Ir,,rlr'\'r'r, those who wanted to maintain the project were outnumlrclcrl lry those in favor of cancellation with, or without, the Flll ,ption, and the vaguenessof the latter commitment ultimately made rt possible for these two groups to sink their differences. 'l'hc cancellation was announced by the Chancellor of the Excherqrrcr,James C a l l a g h a n , i n h i s B u d g e t D a y s p e e c ho n A p r i l 6 , 1 9 6 5 . 'l'hc result was political uproar as the Conservatives sought to voice tlrt'ir anger and frustration at what they regarded as a foolish and shortsighted decision. A censure motion was debated on April 13. r\rnid charge and countercharge, Minister of Aviation RoyJenkins t oncluded the debate for the government by agreeing that the 'l'SR.2 was a fine technical achievement: aircraft projects must be more than this. They must But, to be a success, they must fulfill the country'sneedsat a price that have controllablecosts; with comPathe country can afford; they must be broadly pricecompetitive and they must have the prospect rable aircraft producedin other countries, of an overseasmarket commensurate with the resourcestied up in their On all thesefour groundsI regret to say that the TSR.2 was development. (Hansard, April 13, 1965'c.1283) not a prize project but a prize albatross. The result of the censure debate was a resounding victory for the Government: it secured a majority of twenty-six, and any residual Opposition hopes that the the project might, somehow, be saved were dashed when members of the small Liberal Party voted with the Government. Conclusion In this chapter we have shown that the successand shape of a project, the TSR.2, depended crucially on the creation of two networks and on the exchange of intermediaries between these networks. From

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tlrc glolral nctw()rk cilmc a rangc ()l rcs()urccs (inancc, political support, technical specifications and, in some casesat least, a hostile neutrality. These resourceswere made available to the project and generated what we have called a negotiation space. This was a space and a time within which a local network might be built that would in turn generate a range of intermediaries-but most obviously a working aircraft-that might be passed back to the actors in the global network in return for their support. We have also noted, however, that there were continual seepages between the global and the local networks in the case of the TSR.2 project. Actors in the global network were able to interfere with the structure and shape of the local network, while those in the local network were able to go behind the back of the project management, and consult directly with actors in the global network. The result was that project management was unable to impose itself as an obligatory point of passage between the two networks, and the troubles that we have detailed followed.e The history we have described offers further evidence for several important findings of the new sociology of technology. First, it illustrates the interpretive flexibility of objects the way in which they mean different things to different social uroups. Second, as is obvious, it represents a further example of the social shaping of technology namely the way in which objccts are shaped by their o r s a n i z a t i o n a l c i r c u r n s t a n c e s( P i n c h a n d B i j k e r l 9 B 7 ; M a c K e n z i e and Wajcman l9B5;Callon l986; Law l9B7; MacKenzie l9B7; MacKenzie and Spinardi l9BB; Akrich, this volume; Bijker, this volume; L a t o u r , t h i s v o l u m t ' ) . ' l ' h r r s w c h a v e s k e t c h c do u t t h e w a y i n w h i c h thc f'SR.2 aircrali charrscd in shape both literally and metaphorically durinq the coursc ol'its development, and the relationship between thcst'r:harrr-Tcs ancl the compromises that grew up for a time between thc rclcvarrt human and nonhuman actors compromises that achievcd, as wc h:rvc seen, no final solidity but that were, in turn, reworkcd as a lirnction of new circumstances in the local and global networks. Thus back irr 1957 what we might call aircraft numberoned,id not have a physit:al slrapc at all in the minds of the Air Staff or the M i n i s t r y o f S u p p l y ( s r : ct a b l e 1 . 2 ) . I t w a s r a t h e r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e specification a rolt' to be played and some of the circumstances in which it should be built. And this role reflecred their view of whar would passmuster with other relevant actors. Thus, the RAF wanted a flying combat aircrafi, but the Ministry of Defence had a view of the future that left room for neither a strategic bomber nor a fighter.

Table 1.2 'l'hree aircraft

Interestcd actors ( * delinition ofaircraft) RAF: . combat aircralt . in and out ofEurope . dispcrsable . precision bombing/reconnaissancc Dcfcncc: not stratcgic bomber RAI': o largc, twin-cneine, sophisticatcd . 'l'SR aircraft . S'I'OL . long rangc Defcncc: . 'I'SR aircraft

Hostile actors ( + definition ofaircraft) Navy: o Buccanccr Treasury: r chcap, vcrsatile Buccaneer?

Neutral actors

long range supersonrc low altitude

{
Ir

sf

Sf'OL
all weather large

F\

lo
a a a a a

wing shape, delta, thin two powerful cngincs blown flaps engines in fusclagc twrn cngrnes intceral luel tanks

Navy: o (blockcd) Treasurt: . (blockcd)

Labour party . ln lgnorancc

?
E

BAC: . S'I'OL difficult . V'l'OL impossible 3 . o p t i o no n F l I I r 'I'SR.2 canccllcd BAC: . buy 140 Conscrvativc party: . 'l'SR.2 csscntial Unions: o maintain work
RAF: o buy chc:rPcr, rnore certain aircrafl Defcncc: r buy t'hc:rpt'r :rircraft 'l'rcasu rv: . cal) cxl)cnditure . limit ()v('rs(:aspending Navv: . adoPt }Juccancer Aviation: . bu,v thcpaer U.K. aircraft Labour party': . cancel

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A tlrt'tit tl lrotttllt'r : l t r ( ll ' ( ' ( ' ( ) n l r i r i s s i urlr(i'r(c ' r ' : r lw i i l s l l r ( . ( ) n l yr l . n l i l i n i n u p o s s i b i l i t y a n a i r ( : r a l i t h a t w < l u l dp l : r y o u t s P c t ' i l i t . n , ()ns(r.irt('gi(. r o l e s i n E u r o p e a n d B r i t i s h d e p c n d e n c i e so v c r s e a s .B y r : o n t r a s t ,t h c Treasury was quite uninterested in the delence of the westcr' Alliance. Much more important was the defence of the public pursc in the face of ever more costly military technologies. Accordingly, it wanted no aircraft, or (second best) an existing aircraft, or if this was not possible (third, fallback, option), then no more than ,ne type of new aircrafr. The RAF judged it could force the Treasury to its fallback position, so it responded by specifying a single versatile aircraft. The Navy had strong views about defence needs, but it saw these in its own, quite different, carrier-based way. Accordingly, it wanted the RAF to procure a version of its small, subsonic Buccaneer. In a more negative sense, this was a strong incentive for the RAF to argue the need for a large, supersonic aircraft that was qualitatively different from its naval rival. And the Ministry of Supply wanted an aircraft that would he built by a consortium of firms rather than one alone. Though it was rouch and go, rhe Air Staffjudged things rightly and the global ne twork required by this shadow aircraft number one was stabilized. The result was aircraft number ftry0-this time one that had, albeit on paper, a physical shape. This shape was parrly a function of the global network of institutional actors mentioned above. But many other actors, considerations, and negotiations helped to structure the design. 'I'hus the shape of the wings represented a compromise between thc dcmandine specification requircd by the RAF on the one ha.d, and dcsign skills, knowledge of aer.dynamics and materials strc'Eths, and the practice of windtunrcl tcsting on the other. How on earth was short takeoff and l.ndins to bc reconcilcd with high-altitude Mach 2.5 flight and l.w-altitudt', l'w-sust rcsp'nsc?The wing was the physical answer to this rlucsti... It rt'prcsc'tcd a compromise between these differe n t c o n s i d c r a t i o n s .B u t i t a l s o r e p r e s e n t e da c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n the English Elcctric .nd Vickers design teams-in which English Electric had tlrc upPcr hand. Similar reasoning-again in f;avor of English Elcctrir: led t'a decision about the location of the engines. These, it was decided, would lie within the fuselage to clear wing surfaces and avoid undue differential propulsive force in case of single engine failure-and this despite the potential fire hazard that so concerned the vickers team. And it is possible to travel through the aircraft explaining the shape of each system as a physical compromise between the specification, the design teams, and a range of

sr t t l r c R o y : r lA i r n r l l u l \ l r o n r , r ( ' r ( x l \ r r ; r r r rti o r st l r c v i c u ' so l ( ' x l x ' t ' l r r r . r l tl ' , s t : r l r l i s l r t r r c t r t . It t:rrr lx':rrgrrcrltlrirt irircrali rturnllcrtwo grew out of aircralt r r r r r r r l r <o ' rr r r ' . ( l c r t i r i r r l y r n a r r y o f t h e c o n s t r a i n t s a n d r e s o u r c e st h a t \r('lrt t() slrirpt'nurnlx:r ()nc hclped to shape number two. But the ( ' s si s r r o t o n c o { ' u n i l i n e a r d e v e l o p m e n t . A i r c r a f t n u m b e r t w o l)r{)( \\rs n()l sirrrplythc "unpacking" of a set of implications that were lrrrilt into aircraft number one. Aircraft number one posed a set of pr olllcms to which there were many possiblesolutions. Aircra[t numlrcr two represented a particular set of solutions to those problemstt,nrpromises negotiated by further numerous actors. Or, in some ( as('sat least, it represented refusal to accept the problems posed by (;()R 339, as is most obvious in the case of the short takeoff and lirnding requirement where the available rules of aeroloil behavior overruled the wishes of the Air Staff. In this instance, then, we see (if anything) the obverse of the social shaping of technology: it was the tcchnical around which the social was being bent. But if aircraft number two represents a translation rather than a simple development of aircraft number one, a translation shaped by a set of compromises between a somewhat different set of actors, then the metamorphosis of the project is yet more obvious for aircrafl number three.This, which is more usually known as the Fl I l, gradually took shape after the General Election. Thus we have traced the changes that took place among many of the most important actors after October 1964. The Treasury imposed rigorous economies and expressed extreme concern about the ever-increasing costs of the TSR.2 project, its short run, and its lack of export prospects. The Ministry of Aviation sought to shape a smaller and better-adapted aircraft industry. The Ministry of Delence was involved not only in cost cutting but also in a Defence Review that might lead to the abandonment of many British overseasresponsibilities and with it, part of the rationale lor the TSR.2. The Air Staffwere increasingly concerned that they would not obtain the full 140 TSR.2s. For their different reasons a// of these were prepared, with greater or lesser enthusiasm, to abandon the TSR.2 and take out an option on the Flll. Accordingly, the project fior a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft had been reshaped yet again by the relations between the actors involved, and with that reshaping the object that lay at its focal point had undergone metamorphosis yet again. This reshaping is summarized in table 1.2. So much for the shaping and reshaping of TSR.2.10 But how should we describe such a "translation trajectory?"rr This, then, is

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,tn,! l! t,hrl ( tll,,t I ht I tlt 'tu'lllr'tth,'l 'tt lrr'rrtll | \rrtt"rA lntlt'r,,'l I / t h t u t t t l( h t t n r t li

( ) u r t l t i r ' ( l( ' o n ( . ( . r l ll .l ' t r . t . l r r r o l o s i t . s irr.r.irrtt.r.Pr.t.tiv r .x ly lk i l l l r . ,i l t l r r . y , arc shapcd by thcir.o'tcxts but thcy :rrs,sirapc tht,rattt.r, th<.r, r. i r ' we say nothing general about the continsent and iterativc })r(x.(:ss(.s that generate them? our answer, as we hinted in the introduction, is to deploy a network vocabulary and, specifically, to make use ol.the concepts of global network, local network, and,obligatorlt point qf passage. our proposal is that the shape and fate of techrioroli.ut p.Jj..t, r, u function of three interrelated factors. The frst is the capacity of the project to build and mainrain a global network that will for a time p.ouid. resources of various kinds in the expectation of an ultimate return. Note that the successrirl construction of a globar network has a specific and important consequence: it offers a degree of privacy for project builders to make their mistakes in private, and without interference_it offers a negotia_ tion space (see callon and Law lg'g). In the ideal case the project builder thus obtains a degree of autonomy in its attempts to gJ.rerate a return. It also-again in the ideal case_achieves toth ciomplete control over and responsibility for those arrempts. The secondis the ability of the project to build a local ne rwork using the resources provided by the global network to ultimately offer a material, economic, cultural, or symboric return to actors lodged in the global network. Put lessformaily, it is the abirity to experrment, to try things out' and to put them tosether successfully. It is arso the ability to control whatever has been produced and feed it back into and so satisfy the understandings that have been entered into with other actors in the global network. The third lactor' which is entaired in thc first two, is the capacity of the project to impose itself as an obligatory point of passage between the tw'nctw'rks. Unressit is abie to do ro, it has t. no control over thc use .l'slobal resources that may, as a result, be misused or withdrawn, :rnd 2. it is unable to claim responsibility in the global netw.rk firr a.y successes that are actually achieved in the local network. It is' in short, in no position to profit from the local ne twork. Note' now, that the objects and actors in both globar and local networks are hetcrogeneous. Thus in the case of the TSR.2 we m,entioned a ranse of important institutional actors in the form of whitehall ministries. Bur we also rouched upon geopoliticar factors (the presumed interests of a range of nation states) and technological changes (the advance of missile and anti-aircraftiechnologies). And we might equally well have considered the role of such"naturally occurring features as prevailing winds (they were vital in the calcura-

t r o r r n ll r t t t t ; u r q ( ' s ) , : r t r r lt r ; t i t t r t ' o s s - slc r n s ( w l r i t l rw c t t t i r t t o t l t t ' lc io r , r l rr r l . r t i o r r o l t l r c r i s k s i r r v o l v t ' t li l r l o w - l c v c l l l y i n g ) , r l r , I i r r t h a t nr.rtt('r. s r r tl r l r r r n r i r ru r c o u r i t p l r i t : ab as the l u t g l c l b a lc o n s i d e r a t i o n s . r r , r i l ; r l r l i l i ta v r r << l listribution o f a i r s t r i p so f d i f f e r e n tl e n g t h s . l i r r t i l ' s k r l l a l n c t w o r k s a r e h e t e r o g e n e o u s ,t h e n s o t o o a r e l o c a l 'l'lrt"l'SR.2 n('t\1'()rks. project mobilized institutional actors in the l o r r u o f ' ( ' ( ) n t r a c t o r ss , u b c o n t r a c t o r s ,a n d s p e c i a l i s ta g e n c i e ss u c h a s rlrc lrrstitute fbr Aviation Medicine. It mobilized tensof thousands ,,1<lrirlisnrcn, designers,market personnel, and fitters. It involved the rrsr'ol'a grcat body of high-status knowledge in the form of scientific :rrr<ltcchnical expertise and a large amount of equally important slrop-floor knowledge and skills. And it involved numberless mar Irinc tools, jigs, motor vehicles, chaser aircraft, and test ries, not to rncntion an awesome quantity of paperwork in the form of drawings, irrstructions, management charts, brochures, salespamphlets, maps, rundpublicity handouts. If the elements that make up global and Iocal networks are heteroseneous, then the extent upon which they can be depended is also problematic: the degree to which they may be mobilized is variable, reversible, and in the last instance can only be determined empirically. In other words, the extent to which it is possible for a project to control its two networks and the way in which they relate is problematic, and it is the degree and form of mobilization of the two networks and the way in which they are connected that determines ofa project (figure l.l). both the trajectory and success Concentrating on the two networks, it is possible to plot any project in a two-dimensional graph, where the r axis measures the degree of mobilization of local actors (control over local network) and they axis measuresthe extent to which external actors are linked (control over global network). Furthermore, it is possible to describe the translation trajectory of any project (figure 1.2). Thus, in the caseof the TSR.2, the project started in the center of the diagram and climbed up thc vertical axis as it sought to distinguish its product from the Buccaneer (A) . Then, as the management structures were elaborated, it sought to move along the r axis to the right (B), and this tendency was strengthened as a design was agreed between the two former design teams, which in turn f;acilitated the formation of a single, unified design team (C). However, this position was not maintained. Little by little, as the subcontractors failed to fall into line, and in some casesinteracted directly with the RAF, the degree to which the project management monopolized the internal network declined (D). This process reached a nadir when the low-

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Figure 1.2 Mobilizationof localand slobalnetworks. pressureshaft of the engine disintegrated and the latter blew up (E), and the Australians opted to purchase the Fl I I (F). However, after much remedial work the successfulmaiden flight took place and a degree of control over the local network was reasserted(G). Accordingly, the project moved back into quadrant l, but with changing political circumstances and the availability otthe Fl I l, it reentered this quadrant lower down they axis. Finally, with the election of a Labour government, the Fl I I came to be seen as a realistic alternative, and the project slipped down into quadrant 4 (H), and with cancellation it concluded by losing complete control of the local network, so ending up at the lowest point in quadrant 3 (I) (see figure 1.3). The major turning points in the trajectory of the project across this diagram can be depicted as a table ofchoices and conseq u e n c e s ( s e et a b l e 1 . 3 ) . We conclude, then, with the thought that the trajectories of technological projects are contingent and iterative. Sometimes, to be sure, a project or a technology may move forward in a manner that

Weak external attachment Weak internal mobilization Weak obligatory point of passage Figure l.l Strongly and wcakly mobilizcd networks.

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A r t i c u l a t cd c s i g n Articulatc weapons Develop production facilities Undermine prime contractor Delay, mobilization of new teams and lacilities Increasing skepticism by subcontractors Technical conndence in aircraft and contractor Increases doubts among subcontractors Dissolution of project

Navy and blocked

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Minimize outside intervention Securefunding Permit direct RAF intervention Expenseand increased skepticism Increasedpoliticization o[ project supporters Strengthcns of project Strengthensopponents of project Option to purchase Flil

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Australian pu rchasing dccision Maiden flight Labour party wins clection Cancellation

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side, between backstage and front stage. The methods and materials for building such backstage negotiation spaces and relating them to the front stage are varied, and as the case of the TSR.2 shows, they are certainly not a function of strategy alone. We make use of a ne twork metaphor because we need a neutral way of talking about the barriers that shape, for a time, the seamlessweb of sociotechnology. Notes
thc award by the Nuffield Foundation of a Social John Law gratefully acknowledgcs ScienceResearchFellowship, which made possiblethe empirical researchon which this paper is based. l. Here we adopt the mcthodologicaladage of Latour (1987) and "follow the actors." 2. In an earlier paper (Callon and Law l9B9) in which we developedthis argument in greater detail, we referred to theseneighborsas "preforming networks." ofdesign are reportedin Law 1987. 3. Fuller detailsofthis process 4. Little is known about the actual processby which decisionswere reached. The best information available to us amounts to little more than hints. It does appear,

.52

|JohnInu and lltuhcl (,hllon

'l'reasury howcvcr, that thc and thc Ministry ol'l)el'enccwcrc lirught oll'agairr in February I95B (Wood 1975,158).'l'he'l'reasury was still conccrnedalrout the cost o[ the whole project, and the Ministry of Defence,noting the smallcr of thc two submissions lrom Vickers, toyed with the idea of specifying an aircraft that would fulfill some GOR 339 requirementsand also be capable of carrier-borne operations (Wood 1975, 156). However, the RAF's need for a large aircraft of the TSR typc was pressedboth formally and informally, and GOR 339 emerged unscathed. 5. This specifiedthat the TSR.2, as it was coming to be known, should be capable of high-altitude supersonicflight and a 1,000-nautical-mileradius of operations in a mixed sub- and supersonic sortie. It should alsobe capable of low-altitude treetoplevel flight, have a terrain-following radar, display a low gust response, and have a short takeoffcapacity, which in turn entailed a high thrust-to-weight ratio. It should have precision,self-containednavigational aids, be capable ofdelivering both nuclear and high-explosivebombs, have advanced photographic and linescan capabilities, and be reliable in order to minimize lossesand permit operation from poorly equipped forward bases.Finally, it should have a ferry range of 3,000 nautical miles and be capable of inflight refueling. 6. In its definitive fiorm the proposedaircraft had l. a cruising speedMach 0.9- l.l at sealevel and Mach 2.05 at high altitude; 2. a sortie radius of 1,000nautical miles, 3. a takeoffcapability of 3,000 4,500 feet on rough surfaces;4. a climbing rate of 50,000 feet per minute at sea level; 5. a takeoff weight of 95,000 pounds lor a 1,000-nautical-milemission; 6. a high-wing delta configuration with large blown flaps but no control surfaces;7. a large tailplane with all-moving vertical and horizontalsurfaces; B. two internally mountedOlympus 22R engines;9. an internal weapons bay; and 10. an intcrnal fucl capacityot5,588 gallons. 7. The developmcnt of thc cnginc and the detectivc work involved in diagnosing the cause of its failurc is discusscd in dctail in Law 1992. B. In January the governmcnt considcrcd an ofler lrom the BAC to manufacture ll0 aircraft at a price of d575 million, with the firm picking up the 6rst {9 million ofany costoverrun (F'light International 87,2928, April 22,1965, p. 622). It did not acceptthis offer primarily because it was not prepared to carry all additional losses. 9. The limits to organizational powcr arc useflully discussed in Clegg 1989. 10. Although it is outside this story, thc aircraft went through a further reshaping in 1967when the Flll was cancclcd.At that point aircraft number 4-a further version ofthe Buccaneer entered thc scene. I l. The notion of "translation trajectory" is, of course,ironic. Translations are the product of continual negotiation. They are precisely not the result of momentum imparted at their point of origin. We use the term to indicate the way in which our concernsoverlap those oftrajectory theorists see,fior instance, Sahal l98l, Dosi 1982,and Nelson and Winter l9B2 but offer an analysisof technical change that is quite different in kind.