"Lost in the fog of war: Deterring a Nuclear Iran

As the 18th largest country in the world with a population of 75 million, Iran is not particularly noted for its ancient history or its vibrant culture in western headlines, but is instead rather infamous for its nuclear pro-gram. The international community debates diplomacy and war as the two resolutions to the Iranian nuclear crisis. As the former fails to succeed, the supporters of the latter call for war. However, another alternative exists which has been lost in the fog of war: deterring a nuclear Iran. If diplomacy fails, deterring a nuclear Iran is a politically painful, but the strategically effective policy to consider.

For a better understanding of the dynamics of this crisis, let us make two assumptions. First, let us assume that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Despite Tehrans emphasis on its peaceful purposes, there remains a growing concern over its ambitions to weaponize. Much of these concerns are primarily rooted in lack of constructive diplomatic channels and the historical tensions between Iran and the West most notably with the U.S.

Second, let us assume that diplomacy fails. International and unilateral sanctions have been used as diplomatic means to increase the costs for Iran and promote negotiations. Supporters of the sanctions insist on the increa-sing pressure on the Iranian economy and its opponents emphasize the way in which sanctions have become the end instead of means for promoting negotiations. But one matter is clear: the sanctions are yet to succeed in achieving their objective of bringing parties to the negotiation table, leaving us with the scenario that diplomacy has failed.

Under such a scenario there are two propositions: a military operation by Israel or the U.S. against the Iranian ambitions, or deterring a nuclear Iran. The proponents of a military operation justify their case on the bases of the dangers of a nuclear Iran, among other arguments, prominently claiming that it will trigger a regional arms race and annihilates Israel. In doing so, they misunderstand the consequences of a nuclear Iran and underestimate the immense complexity of this military operation. They argue that if Iran obtains the weapon it will trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The Arabic neighbors of Iran and Turkey will pursue their own nu-clear weapons programs, creating hyperproliferation in an already volatile region. Support for this argument has come from the published private conversations of Arab leaders by Wikileaks, as well as public statements by the Turkish President.

But the reality is different than the rhetoric. Developing nuclear programs is far too complex to achieve in the short term. In fact, the Iranian nuclear program itself dates back to the 1950s. In 1963, U.S. President, JF Kennedy predicted additional twenty-five nuclear weapons powers within" a decade. After four decades, there are only four more. Instead, the military alliance of the United States with many countries can provide the necessary security assurances against a nuclear Iran to prevent an arms race. Ironically, after Israel obtained nuclear weapons, the same Arabic states relied on the U.S. security guarantees and did not go nuclear. A similar trend was seen with South-Korea and Japan, after the 2006 North-Korean nuclear test. Consequently, a recent study conducted by scholars at Kings College London discussed the enormous costs of developing nuclear programs in the Middle East to conclude that regional proliferation is not a very likely outcome at all.

The second prominent argument for a military operation against Iran claims that it will threaten the existence of Israel. Statements by Iranian statesmen are cited to demonstrate the irrationality of Iranian leaders and their intents to annihilate Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has gone as far as comparing the impacts of a nuclear-armed Iran to the Nazi Holocaust.

Nevertheless the Iranian leaders should be perceived as rational and fundamentally interested in the preservation of their regime. After the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has been using its Islamic political identity to obtain regional hegemony. Their statements should therefore be seen as a tool of Iranian soft power, aiming to increase Irans regional influence in the anti-Israeli atmosphere of the Middle East. Moreover, they are fully aware of the balance of power in the region. Not only does the United States have very close military alliance with Israel, but Israel is also estimated to have over 200 nuclear weapons with second strike capability. There-fore, the costs of Iran using nuclear missiles to annihilate Israel, for an Iranian regime focused on survival, would be too grave to consider.

Likewise, the proponents of this military operation underestimate its complexities. The highly secured Iranian nuclear facilities, unlike previous cases in Iraq and Syria, are spread along a large country with some centers buried deeply underground. According to U.S. and Israeli assessments, a successful operation delays Irans ambitions limiting its benefits to two to four years.

However, its costs will be enormous. The debate within the Iranian regime will shift in support of antiWestern figures that favor military retaliation rather than diplomacy. With a nationalistic society and antiWestern regional sympathies, they will be supported. As Iran has clarified, it may exit the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) to dismiss the current limited International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. Thereby it will have the justification to secretively develop nuclear weapons on defensive grounds. Meanwhile, it can blockade the Strait of Hormuz; a critical oil trading path, to threaten global economic recovery and mobilize its proxies to undermine the Israeli and American interests. Indeed, if the Iranian regime is as irrational as the proponents of such operation claim, this limited operation will turn into a full-scale war.

Considering its costs and benefits, a military operation against Iran would be a deconstructive and harmful approach that will fail to achieve its objective: preventing a weaponized Iran. Diplomacy continues to have the chance of clarifying Irans intentions and providing a successful agreement. But if it fails to do so, deterring a nuclear Iran will be the politically painful but strategically effective option. One that must involve clear red lines by the international community against use or spread of nuclear weapons by Iran, military alliances to prevent an arms race and Cold-War style communication networks with Tehran for crisis management. John Smith is a second year Business student at Kings College London.