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UtilitarianPoliticalMorality

1. Introduction Wearediscussingutilitarianpoliticalmorality.Bututilitarianismisprimarilyatheoryofethicsatheory ofmoralrightnessoftheindividualactor/agentorthecommunity.Fromthisperspective,utilitarianism prescribesthatanactionismorallyrightifitproducesthegreatesthappiness/benefit/good/utility/ welfareforthegreatestnumberofpeopleincludingtheactor.Inpoliticalmorality,utilitarianism prescribesthatthemorallyrightpolicyisthatwhichproducesthegreatestwelfareforthemembersof societyatlarge.Inpoliticalmorality,utilitarianismappliesnottoindividualconductbutthebasic structureofsociety:theinstitutionswithwhichitdistributesbasicliberties,opportunitiesandrightsto itsmembers.Utilitariancalculationscanbeusedtoevaluatewhetherthebasicstructureofsociety,and whetherpoliticalpoliciesanddecisionsarejust.Inmodernsocieties,utilitarianismoperatesasakindof tacitbackground.Alotofmajoritariandemocraticpoliticsissimplybasedonutilitariancalculations. WhenwearguethattherighttoliveintheNarmadaValleyshouldbedeniedtotheindigenouspeople ofthatvalleybecauseadamthatwillbenefitamuchbiggernumberofpeoplewillhavetobebuilt there,weareinfactmakingautilitarianargument. UtilitarianmoralitywassystematicallyarticulatedforthefirsttimeinthewritingsofJeremy Bentham(17481832),anEnglishlegalandpoliticalphilosopher.However,variousformsofutilitarian ideaswerealreadyprevalentinlate18thandearly19thcenturyEngland.Althoughcertainvarietiesof ChristianutilitarianismwereprevalentinEngland,itwasasuspicionofreligionbasedmoralitythatled toBenthamsclassicalformulationofutilitarianism.Benthamsprincipleofutilityis:greatesthappiness ofthegreatnumber.Another,maybethemostimportantutilitarianphilosopher,isJohnStuartMill (Britain,18061873).Heisfamousfortheideathatgovernmentshouldnotordinarilyinfringeon individualliberty;reasonforinterventioniswhenoneinterfereswithothersliberty.Onlytoprevent harmtootherscanpowerbeexercisedagainstanindividualswillinacivilizedsociety.Thisisgenerally calledtheharmprinciple.HewritesinOnLiberty:Thatprincipleis,thatthesoleendforwhich mankindarewarranted,individuallyorcollectively,ininterferingwiththelibertyofactionofanyoftheir number,isselfprotection.Thattheonlypurposeforwhichpowercanberightfullyexercisedoverany memberofacivilizedcommunity,againsthiswill,istopreventharmtoothers.Hisowngood,either physicalormoral,isnotasufficientwarrant. Ifyouwanttoknowmoreaboututilitarianethicsanditshistoricaldevelopment,pleashavea lookhere:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianismhistory/Myfocusinthislectureisonthe contemporarydebateonutilitarianpoliticalmorality.Iammainlybasingmyselfbelowonthesecond chapterofWillKymlickasContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy:AnIntroduction.Letmenowgointothat.

2 2. AttractionsofUtilitarianism Thefirstattractionofutilitarianismisitshumanism;itisamoralitythatisdistancedfromanythingextra human(agod,ascripture,aking,atradition,whatever).Theproblemofmoralityisahumanproblem; thesolutiontomoralityisahumansolution.Moralityisthusattachedtosomethingthatwelook forwardtoandvalueinourlives:happiness/welfare/wellbeing/utility.Bututilitarianismdemandsthat myseekingofmywelfareshouldnotbetooselfish;myactionstoestablishmywelfareshouldalso benefitmostothersinmysociety. Thesecondattractionofutilitarianismisitsconsequentialism.Inutilitarianism,itisnotenough toshowthatmypreactionintentionwasmoraloraimedatproducinghappinessofmostpeople.Itis necessarytoshowhowmyactionisgoingtoresultinorhasalreadyresultedinhappyconsequences.To autilitarianwecannotarguethathomosexualityisinherentlywrongorimproperornonnatural.We havetoconvincehim/herwhatbadorpainfulconsequencesitwillproduce.Hence,utilitarianismis againstarbitrarymoralprohibitionsandtaboos.Inthissenseutilitarianismisratherscientificand progressive. Bututilitarianism,despiteitsprogressivism,hasseveralproblemsandhasbecomeunpopular recently,though(wemustunderscorethis)itstillisunavoidableindemocraticpoliticalargumentation becauseofitsmajoritarianargumentativedirection.Iamgoingtopointouttoyouseveralproblems withutilitarianismbelow.Iwouldurgeyoutorejectutilitarianpoliticalmoralityonaccountofthese problems.Butfinallyitisyourownreasoningthatshouldleadyoutoyourchoice.Now,totheproblems ofutilitarianism,whatisunattractiveaboutit. 3. TheIdeaofConsequentialism Thethreecentralideasofutilitarianismare:(i)utility,(ii)maximizationofutility,and(iii) consequentialism.Letmebeginwithashortremarkontheproblemwithconsequentialism.Some concernwithconsequenceofactionispartofallmoraltheory,andsoamoralitycannotbecompletely blindtoconsequencesofaction.Butamoralitybasedcompletelyonconsequenceofactionalone(the happyconsequencesanactionproduces)hastheproblemofmoralluck.Modernmoraltheory assumesthatthedoeristheresponsibleagentwhoproducestheactionanditsconsequences,and he/shewasfreeindoingtheactionandknewaboutitsconsequencessothatresponsibilityforthe actioncouldbeplacedonher/him.Typically,utilitarianethicsdoesnotbotherwhetherthedoer intendedtheconsequencesher/hisactionproduced;theutilitarianbothersonlyaboutconsequencesof theaction.Manytimesthehappyconsequencesweintendedmaynotbematerializedonaccountof factorsoutsideourcontrol(utilitarianismwillstillblameus);similarly,ouractionmayproducegood consequenceswedidnotintendinreality(utilitarianismwillstillpraiseus).Thisisbecauseutilitarianism isbotheredtypicallyonlyabouttheexternalconsequencesofaction(moralexternalism)andnotthe internalintentionforaction(moralinternalism).Allmoralityshouldbebotheredprimarilyaboutthe internalintentionofthedoeroftheactionforawardingpraiseorblame(responsibility)tothedoer. Praiseandblamegoestothedoer,onthebasisoftheaction,nottotheactionassuch.Thisiswhatour

3 legalsystemusuallytriestoestablish:intentionbehindthecrime.Bututilitarianismcanclaimtobe scientificduetoitsmoralexternalismbecauseitiseasiertoestablishthehappyconsequencesofthe actionassuchratherthantheintentionbehindtheaction. 4. TheIdeaofUtility Thecentralideaofutilitarianismisutilityitself.Now,whatistheproblemwiththat?Ishallnowexamine fournotionsofutility,andwillchoosethefinaloneasthemostplausibleoneforanacceptable interpretationofutilitarianism. (i)Welfarehedonismissimplytheideathatwelfareorutilityispleasure(hedonism).Bentham championedthis,anditistheeasiesttoscientificallyverify.Accordingly,wecansimplyaskpeople whethertheyarehappywithanactionorpolicy,andthendecidethatitisgood(iftheyarehappy). Benthamsaysthatthepushpinisasgoodaspoetryifbothproducethesameintensityofpleasure. Nothingisintrinsicallygoodorbad;whatisbadorgoodisthesentimentthatitproducesinus.While thisideaisverysimpleandthusattractive,itissurelyproblematicbecausemanythingswevaluedoing inlifenotbecauseitispleasurablebutbecauseweattachsomevaluetoitirrespectiveofwhetheritis goingtoproducepleasureorpain.Writingandreadingpoetrymaynotbealwayspleasurable,butwe mayvaluedoingitasanelementofgoodculture.Afamousobjectionagainsttheideaofhedonismis raisedbythephilosopherRobertNozick,alibertarianphilosopher(whomwewillstudyindetaillater). Nozickasksustoimagineanexperiencemachine,whichgivesuspleasurableexperiencesofallsorts justbypressingabutton.Ifwecouldwearthismachineforalllife,wouldwechooseit?Theintuitive Noanswer,Nozicksays,isgivenbecausewevaluenotapleasurablelifeassuchbutaworthwhilelife. Sopleasecrossoutwelfarehedonism. (ii)Itisthereforethoughtthatwelfaremeansallpositivementalstatesorexperiences.Notonly pleasurableexperiencesbutallpositiveexperiencesshouldbecountedunderwelfare.However,the experiencemachineproblemstillpersists.Evenifthemachinegivesusonlypositiveexperiences,we willnotchooseitbecausewhatwevalueisnotmerelyexperiencebutsomethingrealandtangible.We wanttofallinlovewitharealperson,notwithapersoninadreamexperience;wewanttowinthereal battleagainstdiscrimination,notthebattleagainstdiscriminationasimaginedinadaydream. Sometimeswegoforanexperiencefortheheckofit(thinkofdruguse).Butweintuitivelyknowthat theworldsuchexperiencecreatesisapoorsubstitutefortherealworld.Sopleasecrossouttheidea ofwelfareasamentalstateorexperience. (iii)Canwelfaremeanpreferencesatisfaction?Underpreferenceisincludedallpreferences, realandimagined,thatapersonhasreasontovalue.Allpreferencesareequalinmoralevaluation; noneispreferredoverothers.Nowiftheideaofhedonismandmentalismdenytoomuch(thereal worldandworthwhilelife),theideaofpreferencesatisfactionallowstoomuch(everypreference withoutanyqualitativedistinctionbetweenthem.)Butweknowthatsatisfyingpreferencesneednot countuptowellbeing.Wemayorderanattractivemenuinarestaurant,butifitispoisoneditdoesnot addtoourwellbeing.Ourpreferencesonlyimagineourwellbeing;itneednotreallybeaddingtoour

4 wellbeing.Secondly,AmartyaSenraisestheobjectionofadaptivepreferences.Ifwegobythemaxim thatathingisgoodifpeoplepreferit,weareactuallygoingagainsttheutilitarianprogressivism.People maypreferagreatdealofthingssimplybecausetheyareusedtoit,theyhavenootherchoice,theyare adaptedtoitbecausetheydonotsimplyseeanotherpossibility.Thisisaverystatusquoistposition. Womenmaythemselvessupportpatriarchalvaluesystemsbecausetheydonotseethepossibilityof anythingelse.Politicalmoralityshouldchallengeentrenchedsystemswhichareimmoraland oppressive.Amoralvalueshouldinformourpreferenceinorderforittobejustifiedasapreference. Peoplemaypreferobjectionablethings.Ifwegobypreferencealonewearegoingbypopulism,not morality.MostpeopleintheUSmightdislikeblacks;mostpeopleinIndiamightdisliketribals,Muslims orlowercastes.Theseadaptedpreferencesshouldbechallengedbyasoundmorality.Sopleasecross outtheideaofindiscriminatepreferencesatisfaction. (iv)Utilityshouldthereforebeconsideredasinformedpreference.Weshoulddoawaywith adaptedwrongpreferences,andadaptinformed,rationalpreferences.Utilitarianism,inthisview, demandsthatweshouldaiminourpoliticalsystemtosatisfythecitizensinformedrational preferences.Goodpreferencesgiveusgoodreasonstovaluethemandtheymakeourlivesbetteroff. Buttherearemanyproblemswiththisidea.Firstofall,itmakesthesimpleutilitarianideaofpleasure rathercomplicated,andthereforedifficulttomeasure.Hence,thissolutiontotheutilitariandefinition ofutilitytakesaway,atleastpartially,utilitarianismsscientificattraction.Theremaybethequestionof whatisgoodorinformedpreference,forwhomitisgoodorinformed,whodecideswhatisgoodand informedforthewholepoliticalsociety,whosereasonsdominateindecidingwhatisgoodinpolitical lifeetc.Thiscontroversyisapartoflife;itcanneverfullydisappearinmattersofmorality.Wecanonly makethedebateasopenandknownaspossible.Thistaskistobedoneinamodernpoliticalsocietyby themedia.Asecondproblemwiththisconceptionisthateveninthecaseofanindividualsdifferent preferences,therecanbeaconflictofchoice.Ourromanticchoicesmayconflictwithourcareer choices.Thistooinanunavoidableprobleminrealhumanlife.However,weeitherdecidethroughour moralstruggleorwetalktoandseekadvicefromprominentothers(parents,friends,relatives)inour lives.Andyetwemustadmitthatthemanygoodsweseekareincommensurableanddonoteasilyfall intoanysimpleutilityscale.Thirdly,whataboutotherspreferencesthatimpactuswithoutour knowing?Iactontheassumptionthatmyhusbandisfaithfultomeandfeelhappy,butactuallyheis notandmylifeisreallygoingworse.Aremypreferencesinformedinsuchcases?Shouldmy unexperiencedpreferencescountinthevaluationofmywellbeing?Wemaythinkintuitivelythatit shouldcountinordertoassesswhetherIammakingmeaningfulmoralchoices.Butwemustrecognize thatsuchconsiderationsinfactmaketheideaofinformedchoicesverydifficulttomeasure.Fourthly, wemayalsoarguethatinterpersonalutilitycompatibilityisactuallyamyth.Whatsatisfiesmemaynot satisfyyou,andviceversa.Andyet,generallyinlifewecomparebetweenpeopleschoicesand preferencessomewhatinaccurately.Utilityunderstoodasinformedpreferencescannotavoidsuch ambiguities.Theonlysolutiontotheseproblemsasfaraspoliticalmoralityisconcernedisthis: governmentscannotguaranteefullpreferencesatisfactionofallcitizens;itcanonlycreateconditions forthesatisfactionofsomepreferenceswhichareuniversallyvaluable.Governmentdoesnothavethe fullinformationtosaywhichpreferenceisvaluable.Itthereforehastodecideoncertaingeneralnon controversialsocialconditionsthathelpallpeopletosatisfytheirpreferencestothebestmaximum

5 extentlikeeducation,security,minimumstandardoflivingetc.Governmentcanprovideindirect resourcesnecessaryforpreferencesatisfaction,andthisiswhatmostliberalsocietiesdo. 5. TheIdeaofMaximization Ideally,utilitarianismwouldliketosatisfyallinformedpreferencesinasociety,whichisimpossible. Hencetheschemetomaximizeasmanyinformedpreferencesaspossible.Inmaximizingpreferences, utilitarianismsaysthatnoonespreferenceisaboveotherspreferences,unlesssomeonespreference fallsoutsidetheoverridinglymajoritarianpreferences.Withinthemajoritarianpreferences,each preferencecountsforoneunit,notmore.Thisistheschemeofequalitythatutilitarianismproposes. Whataboutthosepreferencesthatfalloutsidethemajoritarianones?Utilitarianismsaysthatthisis unfortunate,butcannotbehelped.Winnersareanoverridingmajority;losersfew.Winnerstherefore takeitall.Thisinjusticeisnotaproblemforutilitarianism.Hence,thequestionisaskedwhetheritis morallysensibletofollowtheutilitarianschemeofmaximization.Theanswerthatisoftenfoundtoday isaNoforthefollowingreasons. (i)Maximizationschemeleadstothediscountingofspecialrelationshipsandcommitments.Our livesaremadeworthwhileonaccountofseveralspecialrelationshipsthatwecherish.Theseimposeon usavarietyofspecialcommitments,whichwefindmeaningfultofulfill.Mostofthesearerelatedto family,community,friends,countryandsoon.Wefinditmorallyalrighttofulfillacommitmenttowards ourchildreninsteadoffulfillingthesamecommitmenttowardsotherschildrenwhomaybe,onan impartialassessment,needier.Thinkofthisscenario:IhaveborrowedRs.1000fromafriend.Ihave promisedtoreturnthemoneyafteramonth.Whenthetimecomes,Ifindanotherpersonneedier. Utilitarianismtellsmetogivethemoneytotheneedierpersontomaximizeutility.Buttheethicsand theinstitutionofpromisetellmetogivethemoneytotheoneIborroweditfrom.Someutilitarians explainthatifweanalyzethingsproperlywewillknowthatkeepingpromisesmaximizesutilityeven more;forinstance,notkeepingpromisesleadstothecollapseoftheinstitutionofpromise,whichleads tothepainofmany.Bututilitarianismdoesnotrecognizethatwithoutanyreferencetomaximization, theinstitutionandtheethicsofpromisearevaluableinthemselves.Thisisbecauseforutilitarianism everyone,includingtheagentoftheact,isequallythebeneficiaryofanact;noneisspecial;everyone hasanequalmoralclaimonouraction.Thisistooflat,tooleveledamoralpicture.Itwilloverrideour commitmentsandattachments,whichmakeushumanandourlivesworthwhiletolive.Thisisa psychologicallyimpossibleproposal.Specialrelationshipsandspecialcommitmentsshouldbe consideredmorallyvaluableinthecaseofourindividualandpoliticalaction.Ifthiswerenotthecase, neitherisitpossibletobecommittedtoourfamilynortoournation.Asanation,itwouldnotbe possibletocarespeciallyforourvulnerablesections.SomethinglikereservationinIndiaandaffirmative actionintheUSwouldbecomeimpossiblefromthepointofviewofutilitarianassessment. (ii)Maximizationschemeleadstothevaluingofillegitimatepreferences.Forutilitarianismevery informedpreferenceisequallyvaluable.Whataboutdiscriminatorypreferencesofthemajority? Accordingtoutilitarianism,denyingtherightsofothersisnotintrinsicallywrong;itisproblematiconly becauseitdoesnotmaximizeutility.Informedpreferenceisthatwhichmaximizesutility;thatwhich

6 mostpeoplethinkisvaluabletopursue.Informedpreferenceisnotintrinsicallygoodpreference. Satisfactioniswhatutilitarianismcounts.Theassumptionisalwaysthatwhenthequestionisaboutthe satisfactionofthemajority(maximization),strangeandwhatusuallyareconsideredimmoral preferenceswillgetruledout.Thereisanoverwhelmingdegreeofevidencetodaythatthisisnotthe case.Preferencesareformedthroughsocialandculturalupbringing.Ifthereareprejudiceswithin society,utilitarianism,despiteitsprogressivism,cannotchallengethemunderthisassumption. Accordingtoourintuitivemoralsensibility,weseektoattaingoodconsequencesofthemorally acceptablepreferences.Thisisnotwhatutilitarianismprescribes.Someutilitariansproposerule utilitarianism:makeutilitymaximizingrulesandevaluateonlyiftheserulesarefollowed.Evenifin particularcasesitdoesnotmaximizeutility,theseutilitariansassumethatutilitywillbemaximized overalliftheutilityrulesarefollowed.Ruleutilitarianismrunsintotheproblemofelitism,which utilitarianswanttoavoid.Whowilldecidetherulesandonwhatbasis?Inthatcase,whyisutilitarianism needed?Cantwegowithaprinciplebasedmorality,amoralitywhichwillclearlyupholdtherightsof individuals?Utilitarianismdoesnotrecognizearightbeforehandonthebasisofaprinciple.Whatis rightiswhatsatisfiesmostpeople.Thus,ruleutilitarianism,doesnotanswerourobjection:itisnot enoughtosaythatbettermaximizationschemesarepossible;itisnecessarytodiscountanddevalue illegitimatepreferencesaltogetherattheoutsetitself.Manyutilitariansarguethatifweactaccordingto ourmoralintuitionandsentiment,whatwouldfollowismaximization.Theysaythatutilitarianism shouldsaynothingbeforehand;itwouldthenbeonlyatechniquetosayhowmoralactionsmaximize utility.Thisiscalledindirectutilitarianism.But,inthatcasewhyweneedutilitarianism? (iii)Totheabovequestionwhyweneedutilitarianism?twoanswersareusuallygivenby indirectutilitarians.Thefirstisthatpeopleandtheirpreferencesarevaluableinthemselvesandthey aretobegivenequalweight.Maximizationwillresultasabyproduct.Nooneneedstobotherabout whetherutilityisachieved;itwillbeachievedifweupholdpeopleslegitimatepreferences.Butherewe areadmittinganotionofpriorright.Noticethatherewearegoingbymoralinternalism,notmerelyby thehappyconsequencesproducedbyastateofaffairs(moralexternalism).Itcanbearguedthatthere arebettermoralphilosophiestodealwithaconceptionofpriorrightthanutilitarianism.Inthiscase utilitarianismbecomesredundant.(Wewillcomebacktothispointandshowhowutilitarianism becomesredundant.) (iv)Accordingtoasecondview,whatismorallyrightisthatwhichmaximizesthegoodstatesof affairs.Thisleadsto,asIhavealreadypointedout,amoralitywherepeopleandtheirinternalintentions donotmatter;whatmattersarehappystatesofaffairs.Suchmoralitygoesagainstourmoralintuitions. Itmilitatesagainsttheideaofmoralpraiseandblame,againstthenotionofmoralresponsibility. Moralitywilldependthenonluck.Withthisutilitarianismssecular,humancentricattractionalsogoes. Hence,(iii)abovevaluingtherightpreferencesofpeopleseemstobethebetteroption.Now,itcan beshownthateventhisversionofutilitarianismvaluingthepreferencesofindividualsequallyhasits ownshareofproblems.Inowgointothem. (v)Utilitarianismdoesnotseemtovaluethepreferencesofothersasopposedtothepreferences oftheself.Itcannotgiveadequatereasontosaywhyautilitariancalculationshouldvalueexternalor

7 otherspreferencesoverandabovepersonalorinternalpreferences.Indirectutilitarianismarguesthat excludingprejudicedpreferencesagainstothersmaximizesoverallutility,butitdoesnotsaywhether thesepreferencesshouldbebracketedfromourmoraluniversebeforehandonthebasisofaprinciple ofwhatisright.Forutilitarians,thiswouldbeadenialoftheequalityofindividualpreferences. Individualpreferencescanbeaxedonlywhentheydonotadduptothemaximizationscheme.Sothe veryutilitarianschemeofvaluingequallyeveryonespreferencesdisallowsthediscountingofprejudiced preferencesasamatterofmoralprinciple. (vi)Utilitarianismseemstosupportthemaximizingofselfishpreferencesbecausesomeofthem atleastmayadduptooverallutility.Forutilitarians,afairshareofresourcesrequiredforanhonorable lifecannotbepredecidedexceptthroughtheschemeofmaximizingutility.Nothingisselfishor unselfishbeforehand;maximizationwilldeciderightness.Imayhavealotofwealth,butmydesirefor evenmorewealthwillcountequallywithinthemaximizationscheme.Onehastoconvincethe utilitarianthatadditionalwealthofawealthypersonwillnotmaximizeutilityasmuchastheadditional wealthofapoorperson.Thisisrequiredbytheprincipleofequalconsiderationofallindividual preferences.Whynotpredecidingafairshareintermsoftheprinciplesofjustice?Thisisnotallowedin utilitarianismbecausethiswilldiscountindividualpreferences.Somepeoplemaybeabletosatisfy themselvesonlywithexpensivetastes.Itisimmoralaccordingtoutilitarianismnottoallowthese peopletosatisfytheirtasteswithintheschemeofmaximization,whereprobablytheirsatisfactionwill countevenmorethanthatofthepoorpersonsneedforcertaingoodslikeeducation.Thepoorperson inarichsocietyshouldthussacrificehersatisfactionforthesakeofoverallmaximizationofsatisfaction. Thinkofthis:Ihavealargelawninfrontofmyhouse.Peopleinmylocalityalsohavelawnsbuttheyalso havegardenswithinthelawns.SinceIhavenogardeninmylawntheyusemylawnforstrollsand walkingtheirdogs.Ineverobjectedtotheirdoingit.ButlaterIbegantolikeagardenformyselfand wantedtomakeone.Butmyneighborsobjectsayingthatintheschemeofmaximizationitisbetterthat mylawnstaysalawnwithoutagarden.Insuchcases,isntitnecessarytodecidewhoiswronged?Isnt theirobjectionselfish?Utilitarianismsequalweighingofindividualpreferencesandtheschemeof maximizationwillnotallowmetomakethegardenonmylawn.Denyingthesatisfactionofothers expensivetastesforutilitarianswillbedenialoftheequalityofallpreferences.Utilitarianismhonorsthe claimsofeveryoneonmyaction;anditdoesnotdistinguishbetweenwhatistherightshareof resourcesIcanjustlyclaimtosatisfymypreferencesandhowmuchIneedtoleaveforothers.Weneed tomakeadistinctionbetweenwhatshareisjustlymineandwhatshareshouldrightfullybelongto othersinpoliticalmorality.Ourpreferencesshouldbenurturedfromthebeginningbythese considerationsofjustice.Utilitarianismlooksonlyatpreferencesandnothowtheyareformedin society.Prejudicedandselfishpreferencesshouldbeoutofourmoralconsiderationsfromthestart becausetheyareagainsttheconceptofequalconsideration.IfIpursuetheinterestsofmyfamilywithin ajustschemethereisnothingwrongwithit.Withoutitmylifewillbecomedisorientedand meaningless.Utilitarianismhasstrangeconsequences:itdoesnotvaluespecialrelationshipsthatmake humanlifemeaningfulbutitvaluesselfishpreferencesandcannotdelgetimizediscriminatorypolicies fromthestart.Hence,betterthanutilitarianismisatheoryofjusticethatvaluesthefairdistributionofa fairshareofresourcesinasocietyinorderforindividualstopursuethingsthattheyvalue.Again,within

8 thebasketofthingsthattheyhavereasontovalueweneedtomakeadistinctionbetweenwhatisat leastbroadlyworthytopursueandwhatnot. 6. UtilitarianPoliticsToday AlthoughutilitarianismwasaradicalmovementinthenineteenthcenturyandwasusedbytheEnglish utilitarianstoargueforthewiderdistributionofwealthandprivilege(evenforabettercolonial administration),todayitappearstobeaphilosophyofthestatusquo,politicallyspeaking.Thereason forthisstateofaffairsisthis:whileutilitarianismcanbeusedtoattacktheprivilegesmonopolizedbya minority(asintheEnglandofearlynineteenthcentury),itfailswhilebeingusedtoattacktheprivileges monopolizedbyamajority.Itstenorisbasicallymajoritarian.Whenthemajorityhasbecomemiddle classinthewest,utilitarianismseemstohavelostground.Todayspoliticalconcernsinthewestcenter aroundunpopularminoritiesliketheblacks,gays,indigenouspeoples,physicallyandmentally challengedpersons,nonChristians,Asians,Hispanics,theenvironment,animalsandthelike.These concernscannotbeimaginedtomaximizesatisfaction.IncountrieslikeIndia,utilitarianargumentcan beusedtodemandbetterdistributionofwealth,butitcanalsobeusedtosacrificeunpopular minoritiesatthealtarofmajoritybenefit,astheNarmadaagitationshows.(Wemustrememberthat therethequestionwasnotonlydisplacementoftheminoritytribes,butalsojustcompensationandjust rehabilitation,whichseemedtobeimpossiblewithsuchahugepopulation.)Onaccountofthis, althoughutilitarianjudgmentsroutinelyhappeninpolitics,especiallyvotebankpolitics,utilitarianpublic moralreasoninginpoliticsandinthemediaisbecomingincreasinglyrare.Theyappeartoocrude, exceptforthepurposeofrabblerousing. Butwemustrememberthatargumentsinpoliticalmoralityarenotargumentsinthe mathematicalsense.Thesametheorycanbeusedtoarguecontradictoryoutcomes.Wemaythinkthat themajorityisnotconcernedaboutanimalrights,andsoutilitarianismcannotbeusedforit.ButPeter Singerhasusedutilitarianismtheprincipleofnotcausingpaintoothersasanargumenttodefend animalrightsandtheresponsibilityoftherichcountriestohelppoorerones.Someutilitarianspropose theredistributionofwealthduetothediminishingmarginalutilityofmoney;othershavecalledfor laissezfairecapitalismbecauseitcreatesmorewealthforthesatisfactionofthemost.Henceutilitarian argumentationshouldnotbedisparagedasuselessintodaysdebatesofpoliticalmorality.