Quaderni di Storia Economica

(Economic History Working Papers)

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Civic Capital and Development: Italy, 1951-2001
Giuseppe Albanese and Guido de Blasio
Quaderni di Storia Economica
(Economic History Working Papers)
Civic Capital and Development: Italy, 1951-2001
Giuseppe Albanese and Guido de Blasio
Number 32 March 2014

















The purpose of the Economic History Working Papers (Quaderni di Storia
economica) is to promote the circulation of preliminary versions of working papers
on growth, finance, money, institutions prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented
at Bank seminars by external speakers with the aim of stimulating comments and
suggestions. The present series substitutes the Historical Research papers - Quaderni
dell'Ufficio Ricerche Storiche. The views expressed in the articles are those of the
authors and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank.

Editorial Board: MARCO MAGNANI, FILIPPO CESARANO, ALFREDO GIGLIOBIANCO,
SERGIO CARDARELLI, ALBERTO BAFFIGI, FEDERICO BARBIELLINI AMIDEI, GIANNI TONIOLO
Editorial Assistant: ANTONELLA MARIA PULIMANTI
.

ISSN 2281-6089 (print)
ISSN 2281-6097 (online)
Printed by the Printing and Publishing Division of the Bank of Italy
Civic Capital and Development: Italy, 1951-2001


Giuseppe Albanese

and Guido de Blasio

Abstract


We empirically investigate the role of civic capital (proxied by voter turnout) in Italys economic
development in the second half of the Twentieth century. Using a unique dataset at the city level, we
show that over a fifty-year span voter turnout was steadily correlated with economic development
and that this reflected some causality running from the former to the latter. We also find that the
impact of civic capital was greater in the period immediately after the Second World War and
gradually waned in the following decades.

JEL Classification: O10, O43
Keywords: civic capital, development, Italy





Contents


1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 5
2. Data and preliminary evidence .......................................................................................................... 7
3. Results from IV estimates for repeated cross-sections ...................................................................... 9
4. Discussion of the findings ............................................................................................................... 11
References ........................................................................................................................................... 15
Tables and Figures .............................................................................................................................. 19
Appendix. ............................................................................................................................................ 27

Bank of Italy, Catanzaro Branch. E-mail: giuseppe.albanese@bancaditalia.it.

Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Directorate. E-mail: guido.deblasio@bancaditalia.it.

Quaderni di Storia Economica n. 32 Banca dItalia March 2014



1. Introduction
1

Following Knack and Keefer (1997) a massive literature has investigated the economic
payoffs of informal constraints (see, for instance, Hall and J ones 1999; Temple and J ohnson
1998). The point that cultural aspects such as reciprocity, trust and habits of cooperation
significantly impact on growth has now firmly established in economics (see, for a survey,
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2006). In particular, since Putnam (1993) the Italian case has
been extensively studied with regard to both the origins of large and persistent differences in
local stocks of social capital and the impact of such differences on economic performances.
This paper adds to this literature by empirically gauging the role of informal norms
over Italys development process during the second half of the 20
th
century.
2
By considering
long term data (from 1951 to 2001) we are able to look at the different stages of Italys
development path, from a developing economy to a G7 nation (see, for instance, Ginsborg
1989; Castronovo 1995; Crafts and Toniolo 1996).
3
As explained by North (1991), the role
of cultural constraints is likely to be greatest in an initial phase of development of a market
economy, as the increasing specialization raises the number of transactions between
strangers, who cannot rely on previous experience,
4
and formal constraints (such as law and
property right) that reduce uncertainty in exchange have not already emerged. As matter of
fact, we find that Norths suggestion receives empirical support for the case of Italy.
On the empirical ground, the paper tries to overcome many of the shortcomings of the
existing estimates of the impact of informal constraints on economic performance. The
informal rules that matter for economics are taken to be the set of values and beliefs that help
cooperation (which are defined as civic capital or civicness). This definition has theoretical
merits, as convincingly argued in the recent work of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010).
5

Moreover, it has a clear empirical counterpart, as civic capital can be measured with voter
1
We thank Federico Barbiellini Amidei, Guglielmo Barone, Claire Giordano, Paolo Sestito, Michelangelo
Vasta, the participants to the yearly Seminario di analisi economica territoriale (held at the Bank of Italy in
December 2011) and an anonymous referee for comments and helpful suggestions. The views expressed in the
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the Bank of Italy.
2
Also because of restricted data availability, previous works focus on estimating the effect of informal norms
for just one point in time, mostly at the turn of the 21
st
century (see, e.g., Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2008;
de Blasio and Nuzzo 2010).
3
Note that the decades following WWII were a crucial phase of the Italian long run developmental path, its
second industrial wave and its main catching up phase. According to Maddison (2010), between 1951 and 2001
GDP per capita in Italy grew from 56% to 82% of the average of the Western Countries (Western Europe,
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Rey et al. (2012) and Baffigi (2011) show that, in the
same period, the shares of value added in agriculture, industry and services sectors changed respectively from
25%, 36% and 39% to 3%, 27% and 70%.
4
Game theory suggests that wealth maximizing individuals find it difficult to play cooperatively when (i)
information on the other players is lacking; (ii) there are large number of players; and (iii) the game does not
have a track record (for instance, it is an initial stage of a possibly repeated game).
5
According to Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) civic capital is the only definition for informal constraints,
among the many proposed in the socio economic literature, that makes sense from an economic perspective. In
particular, analogously with other forms of capital, civic capital can be accumulated and depreciated; moreover,
it provides positive payoffs.
5
turnout (that is, the percentage of eligible voters who actually cast their vote).
6
Voter
participation is strictly related to civic engagement: as an individual vote cast in an election
conceivably has a negligible effect on its outcome, in presence of cost of going to the polls, a
rational individual who is not interested in the common good should abstain from voting (see
Downs 1957; Dhillon and Peralta 2002).
7

The evidence we present is based on a comparison across Italian cities
(municipalities). Cities represent a very detailed level of geographic stratification. The
choice of relatively small areas should help to minimize measurement, reverse causality and
omitted variable problems that are frequent in cross-country (and, to a lesser extent, cross-
region) regressions.
8
More importantly, a limited spatial scale should be ideal to capture
phenomena that are of a local nature. From one hand, civic capital has been shown to depend
from the long-lasting effect of cities history; on the other hand, civic capital can be
accumulated through repeated interactions and socialization, which is facilitated in small
areas (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2010).
9

Furthermore, we use an econometric approach intended to disentangle the extent to
which correlations between civic capital and economic performance reflect causality going
from the former to the latter. Our strategy relies on Putnams (1993) conjecture on the long
term persistence of civic capital and uses voter turnout in 1913 (that is, participation at the
polls of the first election with universal manhood suffrage in Italy). We argue that the
identification assumption implied in our approach that is, conditional on the controls
included in the regressions, voter turnout in 1913 has no effect on the economic performance
of Italys cities in the second half of the 1900, other than through the persistence of civic
capital seems to be sensible.
In the next section we describe the dataset and show some preliminary (cross-sectional
and overtime) evidence for our panel that includes more than 2,000 municipalities observed
for 6 consecutives Census dates. Section 3 provides the main results of our investigation,
which are based on repeated cross-sectional IV estimates. They can be easily summarized: a)
over half a century, voter turnout has been steadily correlated with measures of economic
development; b) the correlation is likely to reflect some causality going from civic capital to
economic performance; and c) the role of civic capital was stronger in the period after the
6
A long tradition in political science (see Fowler 2006; and, in particular, the concept of civic culture proposed
by Almond and Verba 1963) suggests that voter participation is a key indicator of the strength of citizens
engagement in the life of the community.
7
Note, however, that voter turnout can be a misleading proxy of the individual interest in the common good, to
the extent that it leads to personal patronage benefits (exchange voting). This is why Putnam (1993) proposes
the use of referenda turnout instead of participation at the political elections. As matter of fact, voter turnout
and referenda turnout seem to be highly correlated across Italian cities. Therefore, empirically the two
measures are largely indistinguishable. For instance, by comparing participation at referenda and that at the
political elections for the sample of 686 municipalities used by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) where
the referenda are those that took place in 1978, 1981 and 1985 and the political elections refer to 1979 and
1983 we obtain a correlation coefficient of 0.85. By using data at the provincial level, similar high
correlations are found for the entire period 1946-1989.
8
As shown by Briant, Combes and Lafourcade (2010) inappropriate spatial units are going to jeopardize
estimations.
9
Furthermore, also as effect of the increasing availability of data, cities are becoming a common point of
reference in the analysis of economic activity (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009).
6
WWII, and decreased gradually in the following decades. The concluding section draws a
possible interpretation of the findings.
2. Data and preliminary evidence
Our sample includes the universe of Italys municipalities with more than 5,000
inhabitants in 1951.
10
Summary statistics are documented in Table 1. On average, each city
had 16,840 residents in 1951 (20,760 in 2001) and extends over 71 squared kilometers. Our
outcomes of economic development are built by using Census information (provided by
Istat, the National Statistical Institute) on population, employment and plants.
11
We combine
them to obtain three different measures: the employment rate (employment over population),
employment density (employment over squared kilometers) and plant density (plants over
squared kilometers). From 1951 to 2001 these measures show a consistent pattern, as they all
increase. Data on political participation are taken from the Atlante Storico Elettorale dItalia,
produced by the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo. As the measures for economic development are
available only at 10-year intervals, we select among the dates in which Parliamentary
elections were held those close to the dates of Census availability.
12
Our measure for civic
capital displays an average of 93% (s.d. =4%) in 1951 and decreases to 81% (s.d. =9%) in
2001. This index of civic capital is highly persistent: the first order autocorrelation
coefficient over the five decades is 0.91. We also make use of a number of covariates time
invariant at the city level which are taken from the dataset assembled by Anci (Italys
Association of Municipalities). 5% of the cities in our sample are province capital, while
17% are located on the seaside. Note also that 40% of the sample is comprised of southern
cities.
Table 2 provides a first glance at the decomposition of the within and between
variances of civic capital in our panel (in a specification where the common nationwide time
trend has been differentiated out). It shows that the main source of variability is that
refereeing to the cross-municipality dimension (the within variance accounts for roughly
one-fourth of the between variance). This is consistent with the idea that civic capital has a
strong persistence.
Table 3 presents the results from an empirical exercise that exploits both dimension of
variability of our panel. We regress our outcomes for economic development on civic capital
by using three estimators: pooled LS, the between group (BE) and the fixed effect (FE)
estimators. As it is well known, pooled LS is a weighted average of the BE and FE
estimators: the former takes into account only the variation between groups, while the latter
considers only the variation within groups. The LS and BE specifications always include a
number of controls aimed to capture cities heterogeneity. Following previous literature (see,
10
Very small municipalities (with less 5,000 residents) have high heterogeneity for both civic capital and
measures of economic performance. This implies that our estimates might be biased by the presence of several
outliers, which we struggle to identify ex ante. In any case, results from the untrimmed sample are very similar
(though less precise) of those documented in the text (they are available upon request).
11
Census data are the only available at the city level for the time span we consider. For instance, GDP data are
available only at less detailed level of geographical stratification.
12
Therefore, civic capital at the various Census date (1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001) is measured
with voter turnout at the political election (Chamber of Deputies), taken respectively at 1948, 1958, 1972,
1979, 1992, and 2001 (proportional rule).
7
for instance, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2008) we use: slope and altitude, a dummy that
takes on the value of one if the municipality is located on the coast, a dummy that takes on
the value of one if the municipality is a capital city at provincial level, and a dummy for
cities located in the South.
13
The LS and FE specifications includes also a set of period
dummies, to cope with common time effects. Finally, in each regression we control for city
population and its square.
Columns 1-3 reports the results we obtain by using the employment rate as outcome.
Civic capital is estimated to be positively correlated with the employment rate in both BE
and FE regressions. The effect, however, is much higher in the former case. Columns 4-6
report the results obtained by using as outcome employment density (employment over
squared kilometers) instead of the employment rate.
14
The results mirror those previously
showed. Finally, Columns 7-9 depict the results we get by using plant density as dependent
variable. This measure (defined as number of plants over squared kilometers) is more likely
to capture the vigor of local entrepreneurship.
15
Previous findings remain confirmed: civic
capital and economic development are correlated both cross-sectionally than overtime. The
impact estimated with the BE estimator is substantially higher that that measured with the
FE estimator.
The correlations documented above between civic capital and economic performance
are unlikely to be as a signal of some causality going from the former to the latter. They are
not shielded from the usual identification flaws related to reverse causality, omitted variable
and measurement error. In the next section we provide more decisive evidence in this regard.
We focus on the cross-section dimension of our data, for which we can use a credible
instrument to tackle the identification challenges.
16
In an attempt to document the evolution
of the role of civic capital over half a century, our results are derived for any single date of
availability of Census data (from 1951 to 2001).
13
This inclusion is warranted: while high-civic capital municipalities are mostly located in North and Center
regions of the Country, these areas also differ from the South for several factors, such as infrastructures and
access to foreign markets. Thus, local civic capital may pick up differences between the areas that just happen
to be correlated with it.
14
Note that employment density is a highly celebrated proxy for local economic development in regional
science and urban economics (see Glaeser 2008).
15
Employment density also reflects the size of the industrial plants sited in a city. For instance, employment
density rises abruptly if a large scale plant is situated in the municipality. To the extent that the localization
large size plants derive from Government choices or delocalization choices from firms (perhaps,
multinationals) established elsewhere, it is likely that employment density picks up effects that might have
nothing to so with the local endowments of civic capital. Indeed, creating industrial poles, mainly through the
localization of State-owned enterprises, is a frequent occurrence in Italys industrial policy (see Colli and Vasta
2010). Moreover, in the last decades of the century the localization of large plants of multinational enterprises
was heavily subsidized.
16
The positive correlation between (within-municipality) variations in economic development and civic capital
signals that there might a role for the co-evolution of economic variables and social norms. As explained in
Sect. 3, the empirical framework employed in this paper does not allow us to disentangle what part of the co-
movements is due to a causal impact of the social norms on the economy. In a companion paper (Albanese and
de Blasio 2014), which investigates the link that goes from economic prosperity to civic capital (and uses an
appropriate framework to infer causality), we show that roughly 1/3 of the co-evolution should be attributed to
the causal impact of economic growth on social norms.
8
3. Results from IV estimates for repeated cross-sections
Figure 1 conveys the flavor of our identification strategy by illustrating, with regard to
the provinces of Florence and Naples, the joint distribution at the municipality level of civic
capital and employment rate in 1951. Figure 2 does the same with 2001.
Table 4 reports the LS cross-sectional results we obtain at the various Census waves
(the covariates included are those reported in the BE estimates of Table 3).
17
Panel A makes
use of the employment rate as outcome. The findings display a consistent pattern: over half a
century, civic capital shows a steady correlation with the employment rate (however, the
economic magnitude of the estimates decreases overtime: compared to 1951, the elasticity in
2001 is roughly 1/3). Panel B reports the results obtained by using as outcome employment
density. The findings mirror those previously showed. In every single Census date, civic
capital predicts with high statistical significance employment density. The estimated
elasticity is bounded between 1.6% and 3.0%, with no discernable overtime pattern. Panel C
depicts the results we get by using plant density. Again, they nicely confirm previous
findings. The estimated coefficient for elasticity enters very significantly; it ranges between
0.9% and 2.2% (again, no clear overtime trend emerges). Overall, LS findings suggest that
civic capital has had a significant role all over Italys stages of economic development.
There are, however, a number of important reasons for not interpreting these results as
causal. First, the civic capital variable could be measured with error, and thus it could
correspond poorly with the true civic capital that matters in practice for development. This
creates attenuation bias and may bias the linear estimates downward. Second, rich cities may
be able to afford or prefer a greater sense of civic duty. This reverse causality problem
introduces positive bias in the linear estimates. Third, there could be many omitted
determinants of economic performance that will naturally be correlated with civicness. The
omitted variable inconsistency also generates an upward bias. All of these problems could be
solved if we had an instrument for civic capital. Such an instrument must be an important
factor in accounting for the variation of the endogenous regressor, but have no direct effect
on economic outcomes.
We use past voter turnout as instrument. We take the 1913 voter turnout, that is,
participation at the polls of the first election with universal manhood suffrage in Italy.
18
The
idea of using past values of the interest variable as instruments has a long tradition in
economics. In the context of local development, Combes et al. (2010) accurately discuss the
merits and the pitfalls of relying on historical variables as instruments. They make clear that
this strategy makes sense if (i) there is some persistence in the spatial distribution of the
variable of interest; and (ii) the local drivers of economic performance totally differ from
those of a long-gone past.
17
For the sake of brevity, Tables 4 and 5 reports only the coefficients for civic capital. The complete results for
the specification with the employment rate as outcome are provided in the Appendix. Those for the
specifications with employment density and plant density as outcomes are similar and available upon request.
18
Guiso and Pinotti (2011) argues that, before the 1912 enfranchisement, voting in political elections was
driven mainly by private rent-seeking for the potential benefit that involvement with power may give to a
limited elite. After the extension of voting rights, the pattern of electoral turnout in Italy changed abruptly, due
to the impact of pre-existing civic capital on the political participation of non-elites.
9
As for persistency, our instrument relies on Putnams (1993) conjecture according to
which the endowments of civic capital across Italian territories have been highly persistent
over the centuries. In particular, it was the local political regimes in place in the Middle Ages
that shaped the degree of local civic commitment that persisted through more than 600
years.
19
This conjecture has been validated in de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010) and Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2008). As matter of fact, the instrument we use voter turnout in
1913 is suggested by Putnam (1993) himself as one of the possible good quantitative
measure of past civic capital.
20
Empirically, we show below that voter turnout in 1913 is a
significant determinant of the observed voter turnout over the second half of the 1900 (this
relationship will represent the first stage in our instrumental variable approach).
With regard to requirement (ii), which technically is referred as the condition of
orthogonality of the instrument to the (second stage) error term, and that is basically non
testable in the exactly identified case (Angrist and Pischke 2009), a few aspects have to be
noted. First, long-lagged values of civic capital clearly remove any simultaneity bias caused
by local shocks that occurred in the second half of the 20
th
century. For such simultaneity to
remain we would need these shocks to be expected in 1913 (and have affected voter turnout
at the time). However, the Italian economy at the beginning of 1900 was very different from
that it was in the second half of the century. This seems to be safe, as major events such as
the two World Wars and twenty years of dictatorship under Mussolini contributed to
change abruptly the structure of Italys economy and society (Zamagni 1993).
21
Second, the
condition might be violated if some missing permanent city characteristic drives both past
civicness and 20
th
century economic performance. However, we directly control in our
regressions for the most relevant geographic characteristics. Moreover, we also control for
population size, which differentiate away potential source of violation of (ii) related to
agglomeration.
IV estimates are presented in Table 5, where in each Census date civic capital is
treated as endogenous and instrumented by voter turnout in 1913. Our results present a
number of common features. First, the instrument is very strong: the first stage F-statistics is
always larger than 49. According the critical values of Stock and Yogo (2005), we can be
assured that weak instruments issues do not apply. Interestingly, the strength of the first-
stage relationship does not decay overtime: this suggest that our instrument is so good to
predict the current endowments of civil capital at the turn of the century as it was in the
aftermath of WWII. Second, we generally find that IV estimates are larger than LS
19
Putnam (1993) classifies the regimes in place the beginning of the 14
th
century according to their degree of
republicanism: (1) the communal republics, the heartland of republicanism; (2) the Signorie, former communal
republics fallen prey to signorial rule by the beginning of 14
th
century; (3) the Papal State, characterized by a
mixture of feudalism, tyranny and republicanism; and (4) the Kingdom of Sicily, which had the highest degree
of autocracy.
20
The other proxies suggested by Putnam (1993), which all refer to the period after the unification of Italy
(1861), are: membership in mutual aid society; membership in cooperatives; strength of mass parties; and the
longevity of local associations. Unfortunately, at the city level no information is available for these measures.
21
Notice also that local differences in development at the beginning of the century were strikingly dissimilar
from those prevailing after WWII. In particular, in 1910s the North-South divide was not so pronounced, while
within area differences were relevant. Therefore, during the first half of 1900s there was a process of
convergence within areas accompanied by a process of divergence between the South and the rest of the
Country (see, e.g, Felice 2011; Iuzzolino, Pellegrini and Viesti 2011).
10
estimates. This suggests that the attenuation bias related to measurement error is the
predominant source of bias (that is, it is larger than the positive bias associated with reverse
causality and omitted variables). This is a reassuring upshot, given that previous empirical
studies on the role of civic capital for local economic development also point to the same
conclusion.
22

Third, and crucially, IV results highlight a consistent time pattern. The role of civic
capital is now much larger for the first two decades of post WWII economic development. In
particular, the positive effect of civicness on the employment rate has vanished since 1981.
The estimated elasticities for employment density and plant density continue to remain
positive and significant all over the period; however, their magnitudes suddenly diminish as
the estimation period approaches the end of the century. For instance, our results suggest that
the causal impact of civic capital for employment density (plant density) at the turn of the
millennium was only 1/4 (1/3) of that recorded in 1951 and 1961.
We also tried to implement the IV framework to analyze the (within-city) overtime
variation between civic capital and economic performance. That is: to shed light on the
correlations documented in Table 2 referring to the FE estimator, trying to disentangle the
causal effect beyond the correlations. Unfortunately, this attempt was unsuccessful. The
instrument (1913 turnout) systematically fails to accurately predict the changes in civic
capital endowments that occurred at the city level over period under scrutiny. We note,
however, that this is in line with the notion that cultural norms have a slow-changing nature
of (see Nunn 2009). Moreover, the finding is also consistent with the circumstance that in
our data the strength of the first stage relationship (see Table 5) does not weaken overtime.
4. Discussion of the findings
This paper brings new evidence that supports the role of informal norms for the fortune
of Italys territories. Compared to the existing evidence, our results have been derived by
using a definition of informal constraints that is grounded in economic theory, a very
detailed level of geographic stratification for the spatial units of observation, and a possible
source of exogenous variation to unravel threats to identification. Once econometric biases
are appropriately eliminated, our findings suggest that the role of civic capital as driver of
development has been quite relevant for the entire period of fifty years following WWII. As
for the mechanisms through which civic capital impact on the economy, our results cannot
be informative. Previous research, however, documents that civic capital has a role both in
the goods and labor markets (de Blasio and Nuzzo 2010) and in the credit market (Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales 2004).
The results also suggest that the importance of civicness was greatest during the Fifties
and the Sixties.
23
In this respect, Italys economic history seems to provide a sensible
22
An empirical framework to double-check this finding can be found in de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010).
23
At first glance, our results seem to contrast with the fact that regional convergence in Italy occurred in the
Fifties and Sixties, but stopped in early Seventies (see Mauro and Pigliaru 2011, for an interpretation of the role
of social capital in this context). This contrast, however, is only apparent. Convergence is measured by pr
capita GDP; decomposing it in terms of productivity and rate of employment shows that the reduction of
disparities during the Fifties and Sixties is entirely due to growth of productivity, and not employment (Daniele
and Malanima 2007). This evidence has also been highlighted by Graziani and Pugliese (1979), who use the
11
rationalization for our findings. At the beginning of the Fifties, Italy was in many instances a
less developed Country (in the international scenario).
24
From 1950 to 1970, taking great
advantage of the unprecedented expansion of the world economy,
25
Italy grew more rapidly
than other European Countries (except West Germany), with a per capita income that rose by
a factor of 2.3 (1.4 in France, 1.3 in UK). As underscored by Salvati (1984), the striking
economic growth recorded during these years was basically due to a move towards a system
in which the market forces were left free to operate. By the same token, Ginsborg (1989)
explains that the economic boom was a spontaneous process, which followed the free-
market paradigm.
26
The spontaneous industrialization process
27
went to a halt at the end of
the sixties, when the relatively market friendly attitude of the Government was replaced by a
more invasive stance. Historians attributed this change to a mix of domestic and external
pressures. Among those, the 1969 hot autumn of labour conflict, which led to wage rises
that outpaced productivity and the 1973 fourfold jump in oil prices, which intensified
inflationary pressures and threatened the Countrys financial stability. Whatever the reason,
starting from the end of the Sixties the economy became increasingly regulated by the State.
As reported by Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), between 1960 and mid Nineties,
government expenditure to GDP rose from 30% to 53%, while government employment
grew from 8% to 16% of the total employment.
All in all, our results support two conclusions. First, civic capital could matter more in
the early stage of development. In the introduction to his book, North (1991) discusses as
informal constraints matter more in an initial phase of development of a market economy.
Yet, building on Gerschenkron (1962), Abramovitz (1986) argues that the Countrys
words development without jobs, and interpreted it as reflecting an industrial policy based on the installation
of external enterprises in the area, mostly operating with large plants and in high-intensity capital sectors.
24
At that time, 44% of the working population was in agriculture, against respectively 11% and 5% for United
States and UK; manufacturing had only a limited role and was confined within selected areas of the North-
West of the Country (see Broadberry, Giordano and Zollino 2011, and Iuzzolino, Pellegrini and Viesti 2011).
Private consumption was modest and so they were the living conditions of the households: only 7.4% of the
dwellings were endowed with electricity, drinkable water and an onsite restroom (Cacioppo 1982).
25
As it is well known, this period was a Golden Age for the world economy. Trade increased by a factor of
six; economic integration among industrialized Countries boomed; and standardized productions in
manufacturing allowed an unprecedented expansion of household consumption (see also Crafts and Magnani
2011, for a comprehensive discussion of Italy in the Golden Age).
26
In particular, trade barriers were dismantled (the creation of the European Common Market was a key
advance in this regard); the intervention of the Government was mainly limited to infrastructure building
(which also benefited from the Marshall Plan from 1957 to 1951) while monetary policy focused strictly on
preserving stability; wages were kept moderate, thanks to the abundant supply and a reduced power of the
labor unions (between 1953 and 1960 while industrial production increased by 89% and labour productivity by
62%, real wages remained stationary: Scalfari 1961); residents in all regions were left free to search for better
labor market opportunities all over the Country (a Fascist law limiting relocations was eliminated in 1961): as a
result migration boomed (from 1955 to 1971, 9,140,000 Italians were involved in interregional migrations).
27
The unregulated industrialization developed, other than in the traditional areas of the North-West, in some
emerging regions of the North-East and the Center, which will be later defined the third Italy, to
underscored the peculiarity of their development path, which was different from those of the North-West and
the South. In these areas, formerly farmers started their own industrial business, mainly in the sectors of textile
and clothing, footwear, leather, furniture and ceramic goods. In the Seventies, the network of SMEs localized
in selected areas of the Country was a distinguished featured of Italys economic landscape (Becattini 1987).
12
potential for development is strong not when it is backward without qualification, but rather
when it is technologically backward but socially advanced. Knack and Keefer (1997) and
Zak and Knack (2001) confirm that social capital (trust) increases economic growth more in
poor Countries than in developed ones. In a backwards Country, civic capital can circumvent
difficulties due to an underdeveloped financial sector (Besley 1995), reduce transaction costs
where formal market institutions are absent (Fafchamps and Minten 2001) or fund local
public goods in absence of a centralized provision (Miguel and Gugerty 2005).
Second, a free market environment can deepen the role of civic capital. Where public
intervention is less intrusive, social networks can play a more important role in channelling
credit, knowledge or other resources to productive uses. On the other side, the idea that an
extensive government intervention could crowd out civic capital is well-grounded in the
literature (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995). This is in line with previous findings on the
relationship between development, social capital and public intervention. For example,
Miguel, Gertler and Levine (2005) obtain that initial social capital does not predict
subsequent industrialization across Indonesian districts from 1985 to 1995 but notice that
Countrys development took place in a setting where government played a leading role in the
economy.
13
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17
Tables and Figures

Figure 1
Civic capital and economic performance: 1951


Civic capital 1951 Province of Florence
Employment rate 1951 Province of
Florence

Civic capital 1951 Province of Naples Employment rate 1951 Province of Naples
Notes: Civic capital is measured with voter turnout at the Parliamentary elections (Chamber of Deputies). There
were 137 municipalities in the two provinces (49 in Florence and 88 in Naples). The observations are divided
in quintiles and darker colors indicates higher civic capital or employment rate.



21
Figure 2
Civic capital and economic performance: 2001


Civic capital 2001 Province of Florence
Employment rate 2001 Province of
Florence

Civic capital 2001 Province of Naples Employment rate 2001 Province of Naples
Notes. Civic capital is measured with voter turnout at the Parliamentary elections (Chamber of Deputies). There
were 136 municipalities in the two provinces (44 in Florence and 92 in Naples). In 1992, 7 cities belonging to
the province of Florence were incorporated in the new province of Prato. Nevertheless, they are showed in the
figure so as to ensure comparability. The observations are divided in quintiles and darker colors indicates
higher civic capital or employment rate.

22
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.

Obs. Mean s.d. Min Max

Civic capital 1913 1988 61.3 11.5 24.8 88.4
Civic capital 1951 2002 93.5 4.4 68.4 99.7
Civic capital 2001 2075 80.8 9.3 34.6 99.4
Population 1951 2079 16834.3 60134.6 5000 1651754
Population 2001 2089 20752.7 75668.6 1241 2546804
Employment 1951 2079 2702.7 16869.2 105 545967
Employment 2001 2089 5356.6 23843.9 64 718778
Plants 1951 2079 584.3 2325.3 68 67457
Plants 2001 2089 1770.6 7401.9 58 230353
Capital city 1951 2079 0.04 0.20 0 1
Capital city 2001 2089 0.05 0.22 0 1
Area 2089 71.10 77.95 1.62 1307.71
Elevation 2089 233.87 229.22 0 1211
Difference elevation 2089 533.76 547.48 1 3282
Coastal location 2089 0.17 0.38 0 1
South 2089 0.40 0.49 0 1
Notes. Sources: Census data, Anci (Le Misure dei Comuni) e Istituto Carlo Cattaneo (Atlante Storico Elettorale
dItalia). Civic capital is measured with voter turnout at the Parliamentary elections (Chamber of Deputies).



Table 2
Variance decomposition of civic capital.


Total
variance
Variance
ratio

Civic capital (raw data) 73.5 0.59

Civic capital (after national trend removal) 56.3 0.23
Notes. Variance ratio is the ratio of within and between variation.




23
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Appendix
27
T
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*

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*
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d
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s

s
t
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l
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v
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l
.

28
PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED QUADERNI (*)
N. 1 Luigi Einaudi: Teoria economica e legislazione sociale nel testo delle Lezioni, by
Alberto Baffgi (September 2009).
N. 2 European Acquisitions in the United States: Re-examining Olivetti-Underwood
Fifty Years Later, by Federico Barbiellini Amidei, Andrea Goldstein and Marcella
Spadoni (March 2010).
N. 3 La politica dei poli di sviluppo nel Mezzogiorno. Elementi per una prospettiva
storica, by Elio Cerrito (June 2010).
N. 4 Through the Magnifying Glass: Provincial Aspects of Industrial Grouth in Post-
Unifcation Italy, by Carlo Ciccarelli and Stefano Fenoaltea (July 2010).
N. 5 Economic Theory and Banking Regulation: The Italian Case (1861-1930s), by
Alfredo Gigliobianco and Claire Giordano (November 2010).
N. 6 A Comparative Perspective on Italys Human Capital Accumulation, by Giuseppe
Bertola and Paolo Sestito (October 2011).
N. 7 Innovation and Foreign Technology in Italy, 1861-2011, by Federico Barbiellini
Amidei, John Cantwell and Anna Spadavecchia (October 2011).
N. 8 Outward and Inward Migrations in Italy: A Historical Perspective, by Matteo
Gomellini and Cormac Grda (October 2011).
N. 9 Comparative Advantages in Italy: A Long-run Perspective, by Giovanni Federico
and Nikolaus Wolf (October 2011).
N. 10 Real Exchange Rates, Trade, and Growth: Italy 1861-2011, by Virginia Di Nino,
Barry Eichengreen and Massimo Sbracia (October 2011).
N. 11 Public Debt and Economic Growth in Italy, by Fabrizio Balassone, Maura Francese
and Angelo Pace (October 2011).
N. 12 Internal Geography and External Trade: Regional Disparities in Italy, 1861-2011,
by Brian AHearn and Anthony J. Venables (October 2011).
N. 13 Italian Firms in History: Size, Technology and Entrepreneurship, by Franco
Amatori, Matteo Bugamelli and Andrea Colli (October 2011).
N. 14 Italy, Germany, Japan: From Economic Miracles to Virtual Stagnation, by Andrea
Boltho (October 2011).
N. 15 Old and New Italian Multinational Firms, by Giuseppe Berta and Fabrizio Onida
(October 2011).
N. 16 Italy and the First Age of Globalization, 1861-1940, by Harold James and Kevin
ORourke (October 2011).
N. 17 The Golden Age and the Second Globalization in Italy, by Nicholas Crafts and
Marco Magnani (October 2011).
N. 18 Italian National Accounts, 1861-2011, by Alberto Baffgi (October 2011).
N. 19 The Well-Being of Italians: A Comparative Historical Approach, by Andrea
Brandolini and Giovanni Vecchi (October 2011).
N. 20 A Sectoral Analysis of Italys Development, 1861-2011, by Stephen Broadberry,
Claire Giordano and Francesco Zollino (October 2011).
N. 21 The Italian Economy Seen from Abroad over 150 Years, by Marcello de Cecco
(October 2011).
N. 22 Convergence among Italian Regions, 1861-2011, by Giovanni Iuzzolino, Guido
Pellegrini and Gianfranco Viesti (October 2011).
N. 23 Democratization and Civic Capital in Italy, by Luigi Guiso and Paolo Pinotti
(October 2011).
N. 24 The Italian Administrative System: Why a Source of Competitive Disadvantage?,
by Magda Bianco and Giulio Napolitano (October 2011).
N. 25 The Allocative Effciency of the Italian Banking System, 1936-2011, by Stefano
Battilossi, Alfredo Gigliobianco and Giuseppe Marinelli (October 2011).
N. 26 Nuove serie storiche sullattivit di banche e altre istituzioni fnanziarie dal 1861 al
2011: che cosa ci dicono?, by Riccardo De Bonis, Fabio Farabullini, Miria Rocchelli
and Alessandra Salvio (June 2012).
N. 27 Una revisione dei conti nazionali dellItalia (1951-1970), by Guido M. Rey, Luisa
Picozzi, Paolo Piselli and Sandro Clementi (July 2012).
N. 28 A Tale of Two Fascisms: Labour Productivity Growth and Competition Policy in
Italy, 1911-1951, by Claire Giordano and Ferdinando Giugliano (December 2012).
N. 29 Output potenziale, gap e infazione in Italia nel lungo periodo (1861-2010):
unanalisi econometrica, by Alberto Baffgi, Maria Elena Bontempi and Roberto
Golinelli (February 2013).
N. 30 Is There a Long-Term Effect of Africas Slave Trades?, by Margherita Bottero and
Bjrn Wallace (April 2013)
N. 31 The Demand for Tobacco in Post-Unifcation Italy, by Carlo Ciccarelli and Gianni
De Fraja (January 2014).
(*) Requests for copies should be sent to:
Banca dItalia Servizio Struttura economica Divisione Biblioteca e Archivio storico
Via Nazionale, 91 00184 Rome (fax 0039 06 47922059).
The Quaderni are available on the Internet www.bancaditalia.it.