Mathematics as Fiction

A Common Sense Approach

Adam Taylor

The study of fctional discourse, while rich in enough subtle

puzzles to keep the analytic philosopher busy for a lifetime, might be
looked at as a feld of study that contains problems only for these
philosophers The problem lies in taking the truth !alue of a proposition
based on whether or not it refers to a true state of a"airs in the world#
$%ohn went to the store& comes up true if and only if the man to which
$%ohn& refers actually has the properties which are attributed to him by
the proposition, that he has in fact gone to the store The philosopher's
problem then, when dealing with propositions about fctional entities, is
that the words in these propositions fail to refer to any e(isting ob)ect
in the world *t is then impossible to check if such an entity has a
property attributed to it, and hence, to determine a truth+!alue of the
proposition *t has come to be in philosophical circles that a proposition
has been taken as false when its sub)ect fails to refer in this way
,
*t
follows that all propositions about fctional entities are false -owe!er,
regardless of the outcome of these in.uiries, the common users of the
language, those who lack a subscription to the American Philosophical
Quarterly and don't seem to care, still fnd little frustration in using and
understanding sentences which reference Sherlock -olmes They will
use the phrases $/nicorns do not e(ist&
0
and $Spongebob S.uarepants
, A proposition P(x) can be taken in this way to contain a hidden
e(istential .uantifer, such that it actually con!eys the statement
$such that P(x).& *n this way, if the ob)ect referred to by our !ariable x
does not e(ist, the proposition turns out false
0 *t is interesting to note the this specifc proposition turns out false by
the standards outlined earlier, precisely because Unicorns do not exist.
li!es under the sea& indiscriminately, and think nothing of claiming
that both are true# and what is more, unless their philosopher+uncle
has come o!er for dinner, these assertions will go completely
unchallenged by the rest of the community
*f it is true that these sentences, which refer to fctional entities,
ha!e a functional role in society that is interdependent of any
philosophizing about them, can it be said that there is any practical
purpose for this philosophizing about the nature of fctional discourse1
*t turns out that there is at least one# the ontological issues at the
foundations of mathematics can be uni.uely and practically addressed
when framed as a discussion about fctional entities And so it might be
said that the philosophical .uestion of the nature of fctional discourse
has a !ery important concrete application, if it can help to ground this
abstract science, which has more direct practical applications in our
world than any other 2f course, the initial criticism could be
readdressed# it is ob!ious that mathematics has an incredible, near+
uni!ersal range of application, which is in no way contingent upon the
)ustifcation of its a(ioms or of the ontology of its most primiti!e
entities Many of the most successful mathematicians, both applied
and purely theoretical, e(cel in their science with little to no care about
its philosophical groundings 3ottlob Frege once addressed such
possible critics in this way4
5ow, is it not humiliating for science to be in the dark about its nearest
and apparently simple ob)ects1 So much less could one say what
number is *f a concept fundamental to such a great science presents
di6culties, then it is surely a mandatory task to in!estigate it more
e(actly and to o!ercome these di6culties# especially as it may be hard
to succeed in bringing complete clarity to the negati!e numbers,
fractional, comple( numbers, as long as insight into the foundations of
the entire edifce of arithmetic is still defcient
7
* think, with Frege, that in order to ha!e a fully consistent
science, one must at least gi!e at coherent story of the fundamental
ob)ects used in constructing the scientifc edifce Mathematics
presents a particularly striking di6culty in this respect, because,
contrary to physics or chemistry, its fundamental entities appear to be
completely non+physical and non+empirical -owe!er, Frege here was
supporting a pro)ect to literally uncover and defne these mathematical
ob)ects This implies that he belie!es mathematical entities like
number hold some sort of real e(istence# that they e(ist as non+
physical, non+mental, abstract entities, which ob!iously cannot be
obser!ed but only comprehended through the use of the faculty of
reason This conception of the nature of number and other abstract
ob)ects assumes a rather non+intuiti!e ontological category under
which these ob)ects are said to subsist# it is then assumed that
mathematical propositions are true if they accurately describe the
7 3ottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, *ntroduction, 8aragraph
0
characteristics of these ob)ects -owe!er, for those of us that do not
claim to be metaphysicians, and cannot fnd it within oursel!es to
endorse 8latonism when attempting to ground a rather practical
science, it becomes useful to frame propositions which reference
mathematical ob)ects, at least casually, as fctional discourse, so that
we can attempt to preser!e their meaning without endorsing an
indefensible ontology
9hat then does it mean to say that the ob)ects which are
referenced in mathematical statements are fctional1 The simplest
answer is that they do not e(ist in any real sense# that they are
fabrications, which we use to tell a certain story 2f course the
indi!idual pro)ects of mathematics ha!e no need for philosophical
)ustifcation, as they ha!e pro!ed themsel!es o!er the course of
human history to be incredibly useful in .uantifying, understanding,
and manipulating the world# the reason why 8latonism has been
endorsed by so many mathematical thinkers is simply because it
seems most natural, practical, and un+inhibiting when employing
mathematical language to speak as if there are straightforward
mathematical entities which are being addressed, ie the number :;
or a perfect right triangle -owe!er, ease of language can ne!er )ustify
a grand metaphysical claim about a class of ontological entities, the
e(istence of which is non+falsifable Many a capable philosopher has
disagreed with this claim Consider a form of what has come to be
known as the <uine+8utnam *ndispensability Thesis
:
i= 8ropositions that reference mathematical ob)ects, ie
mathematical sentences, play an indispensable role in
empirical science and in our understanding of nature as a
whole
ii= The conclusions drawn from these applications are
accurate, useful, and appear to be correct and truthful
descriptions of the world
C= 9e ought to hold that the mathematical statements are
true and that they reference e(isting ob)ects
The argument clearly assumes that in order for mathematics to
be useful and applicable to the world, the statements within it must be
strictly true# the appeal is then to the non+8latonist to a!oid a
contradiction when assuming that scientifc conclusions are true and
reference e(isting states in the world, by adding to their ontology a set
of abstract mathematical ob)ects Assuming that theorems in
mathematics are not empirically !erifable, it seems absurd to say that
: 8erhaps the best argument * ha!e seen for the claim that we ought to
adopt an ontology that contains abstract ob)ects like number is found
near the end of <uine's Two Domas of !mpiricism 9hile the
argument is .uite con!incing, its strength lies purely in an appeal to a
coherency of the whole scientifc system * will here argue that that
coherency can be maintained without the un)ustifable metaphysical
assumptions
a change in the truth !alue of a mathematical theorem could e"ect the
practical applicability that the theorem has had in the world# as if, by
presenting a new rigorous proof that the 8ythagorean theorem is in
fact incorrect, a buttress might collapse, sending a cathedral wall
crashing to the ground The truth+!alue of a proposition cannot alter
the e"ect that its meaning might ha!e on the minds of those that
contemplate and apply it Consider, if * may drift in to metaphor, an
adherent to a false religion, who, using a set of principles therein,
brings prosperity and wealth to his family and countrymen The
benefts of his de!otion in no way pro!e the truthfulness of his beliefs#
and in the same way, the theorems of geometry and calculus ha!e
been indispensable to the ad!ancement of the human race, but not
because they are strictly true in the sense that they reference ob)ects
e(isting in a metaphysical realm *t is the theorems themsel!es that
are indispensable, not the ob)ects For e!en if the ob)ects e(isted in the
8latonic sense, they could ne!er interact with the world in any useful
way *t follows that where before it seemed natural to defend the
e(istence of a class of abstract entities, a position which was neither
!erifable nor falsifable, it now seems much less forced to liken the
structure of mathematics to a set of highly useful stories which
logically follow from one another after a series of non+e(istent entities
are, for utility's sake, assumed to e(ist
*t might seem highly unnatural, metaphorical, or perhaps
sophistical to posit that $the hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle&
and $-arry 8otter& play the same semantic role as fction within our
language 8erhaps this stems from the high pre!alence of 8latonism
with regards to mathematics, which we all may ha!e unconsciously
adopted * ha!e already argued that, if the .uestion is looked upon with
a clear head, this claim seems much more true+to+life than maintaining
that the hypotenuse, and perhaps -arry too >for the Meinongian=, e(ist
unchanging in an abstract realm, a+spatiotemporally *n this respect, *
hope that * ha!e not put the cart before the horse# what then is the
signifcance of the claim that mathematics is indeed a type of fctional
discourse1 *t has also already been claimed that this type of
philosophical switch away from 8latonism could not possibly alter the
usefulness or the progress of mathematics *s the only net+gain earned
through this e(change to dispose of unwanted ontology, to minimize
metaphysics1 Some may take issue with this, claiming that this is no
fair trade when rendering all of the belo!ed theorems of millennia of
successful mathematics false -owe!er, when doing philosophy, one
ought not be guided by a desired outcome to make metaphysical or
ontological commitments# sometimes it is wiser when critically
e(amining the world to accept conclusions that we'd rather not ha!e,
instead of making unwarranted and indefensible claims in order to
fulfll our own desires And so, the most consistent conclusion to draw
seems to be that mathematical propositions fail to refer, and are
therefore false, while remaining highly useful
-owe!er, a serious problem emerges when one claims that all
mathematical propositions are false because they fail to reference any
e(isting ob)ect Assuming that we think that mathematical statements
are true or false based on whether or not they describe real ob)ects,
and that mathematical ob)ects are non+e(istent, then we agree that
the statement $7 ? , @ :& has a strictly false truth !alue -owe!er, we
recognize instantly that there is something inherently correct about the
statement# and while $7 ? , @ 7,&, being e.ually false in that it refers
to no e(isting ob)ects, also seems to be incorrect by another standard
This seems to be the strongest possible argument against fctionalism
in mathematics, although * don't see it as crippling *t is ob!iously the
case that doing mathematics is more rigorous than simply in!enting an
arbitrary fction, and that there are right and wrong ways of doing
mathematics To argue di"erently would be indeed to argue for the
destruction of mathematics -owe!er, this added rigor still does not
imply that the propositions are true in the sense that they reference
real abstract ob)ects *t is only because of the strict assumption of
a(ioms and defnitions at the foundations of the mathematical
enterprise that there are correct and incorrect answers to
mathematical problems *f numbers, sets, geometric fgures, and the
mathematical operations which we perform on them did not ha!e a
meaning defned before the operations, then there would be no correct
or incorrect way to do mathematics, but it would follow that
mathematics would become a useless game of manipulating !ague
symbols There is a less strict standard for consistency of ob)ects in
fctions that are designed purely for artistic, aesthetic, or
entertainment purposes Consider the sentence $Sherlock -omes
suddenly sprouted se!eral -ydra's heads, which spouted fre and
incinerated Moriarty, who was donned in traditional samurai armor&
9hile those familiar with Arthur Conan Aoyle might recognize this
proposition as strange, because it is inconsistent with the fction
containing the characters referenced, there would be nothing
necessarily incorrect about it if Aoyle himself wrote it into the end of
one of his no!els 9hile this might seriously surprise or puzzle his
readers, it would not logically contradict anything strictly defned
before, and it could be !iewed as ha!ing artistic or literary !alue in a
strange way -owe!er, the proposition that $7 ? , @ 7,& has no such
!alue inside the system of mathematics, e(cept perhaps that it calls
recognition to a failure in understanding a basic mathematical
operation This di"erence between mathematical and literary fction is
an ob!ious and necessary one, as the former is supposed to be a
rigorous science, the latter a form of entertainment This is not to say
that there is no room for creati!ity and inno!ation in mathematics# it is
only that these mathematical ad!ancements, in order to be considered
as a part of the mathematical narrati!e, must be shared and
understood by others who take part in the forging of this structure For
mathematics, if !iewed as one coherent structure, is one that is formed
through highly social actions, not within one community, but within
largely !arying societies and cultures throughout time *n order to
maintain coherency o!er such broad !ariations in time and space,
mathematical terms must be strictly defned, with operations on them
limited and intricately e(plained 2f course, the most creati!e and
cutting+edge mathematicians can in!ent new notations and reference
new ob)ects in their mathematical utterances, but the community will
only accept these if they are as rigorously defned as the rest of the
structure, ft within it neatly, and ser!e some purpose within the
science *t would, howe!er, be absurd to assert that when this cle!er
mathematician performs such an action, that he is in fact ivin "irth
to a real and e(istent abstract entity, or that he is uncoverin with his
mind a timeless e(istence which has been waiting for his disco!ery -e
is merely being creati!e with language in order to sol!e a specifc
problem within an e(isting semantic system by positing the e(istence
of an unreal ob)ect, )ust as one might sa!e a hero in an ad!enture
no!el by in!enting a se(y sidekick And so, it seems that mathematics
is wildly di"erent from normal fctional discourse only in respect to its
internal rigor 8erhaps then it can be concluded without contradiction
that mathematics constitutes an e(ceptionally e(act, uni.ue type of
fction
*f this account of mathematics as a uni.ue and intricate brand of
fctional discourse is not met with any fatal ob)ections, and * can think
of none, then it appears that a $fctionalist& account of this science
e(plains its nature and success at least as well as the standard
8latonist position that its propositions reference e(isting ob)ects *f
these two philosophical accounts are e.ual in their description of the
phenomena of mathematics, * think it ob!ious that the empiricist, the
le!elheaded mathematician, and the common user of the language
would all opt to endorse the former# for the fctionalist description of
mathematics seems less like a philosophical argument and more like a
common sense description of what goes on when people mathematize
For at most it remo!es fully, and at least it minimizes, any
metaphysical speculation in connection with the practice of
mathematics *t has been argued that the rendering of mathematical
theorems as strictly false in respect to reference can in no way
negati!ely a"ect the endea!ors of pure mathematics, or its practical
application *t has also been shown that the apparently correctness and
incorrectness of statements made in the conte(t of mathematical
discourse can be accounted for while also allowing that all of the
statements are false in the sense discussed And so * conclude that the
position that mathematics is a highly useful fction ought to be adopted
by all those who ha!e no e(pressly e!ident reasons for endorsing
8latonism And if this is indeed the case, then the swelling of con!erts
to this reasonable position may !ery well breathe new life into the
philosophical study of the nature fctional discourse, as well as in the
ways that our mathematical creations interact and describe the world