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John A. Bertetto July 18, 2014

Organized crime, particularly criminal street gangs, remains a persistent and deadly
problem that plagues many cities in the United States. In a 21Apr14 article in the Atlantic Cities
City Lab author Richard Florida uses recent data from the US Census Bureau to map population
migration patterns into and out of Americas ten largest cities. The maps elucidate the Census
Bureau data: a continuous increase of net migration into the cities. Of the ten largest US cities,
eight show populations that continue to rise (Chicago and Philadelphia are the two cities
experiencing net losses in population).
As our cities continue to grow, residents will find themselves in an escalating
competition for scarce local resources, including living space, employment, and access to civic
services like police, fire, sanitation, water and electricity, and health care. Municipal diasporas
are likely to remain and grow. Municipal government itself faces resource shortages, as an everincreasing population places greater demands on its services. This often results in areas that
are significantly undergoverned, even if local governance is strong. Communities bereft of civic
attention and wracked with poverty are breeding grounds for crime especially organized
crime in the form of local street gangs. It appears, then, that membership within street gangs is
not just likely to remain, but to grow and become more deeply entrenched. To strategically
disrupt and dismantle gangs, local law enforcement must balance effectiveness with efficiency.
This need comes with significant temporal pressure: gangs use violence not only to protect their
claimed turf and illegal business operations but also to intimidate those who might inform
against them. The use of violence as a tool is further compounded by its employment as a
means of resolution for even the most pedestrian of grievances. The willingness to resort to
violence is increasing at a frightening pace in many areas. When Chicagoans opened their
newspapers on the morning of 07July14, they were greeted by the staggering results of the
Independence Day holiday weekends total violence: 82 people shot, 14 fatally. Of those
numbers, 5 were shot by police, two fatally. While many of these shootings were motivated by
non-gang-related matters, the vast majority were the result of gang disputes.

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Gangs and Gang Factions

Traditional approaches toward combating organized crime have typically included
identifying and mapping criminal organizational structure, identifying kingpins and other top-tier
leaders, and removing those from power after lengthy, in-depth investigations. Organized crime
groups such as the mafia and narcotics cartels employed traditional hierarchical structures, with
a single or very small group at the top and a pyramid-shaped distribution of membership.
Within these groups, clear cut chains of command existed, and removing the upper-most
members achieved significant effect in dismantling the criminal enterprise. This approach,
having been shown effective against these types of groups, was employed against criminal
street gangs. Perhaps the most notable of these efforts was against the El Rukn/Black P Stones
and their leader Jeff Fort in the late 1980s. Fort was convicted in federal court of domestic
terrorism. He is not alone, however. Residing with Fort at the United States Penitentiary,
Administrative Maximum Facility (ADX) prison in Florence, Colorado, is Larry Hoover, who ruled
a claimed 30,000-member-strong Gangster Disciples on Chicagos west and south sides. A
lengthy RICO investigation of Hoover while incarcerated in the early 1990s resulted in a
conviction and his transfer to ADX.
Unfortunately, the convictions of Fort and Hoover did not precipitate the fall of their
respective street gangs. Instead, with the loss of leadership, many of the gangs members who
had been middle-tier managers under the previous leadership became street gang
entrepreneurs, retaining their former gang affiliations as surnames while adding new first
names to denote a separate gang faction. The results of this factionalizing of large street gangs
have been near catastrophic for gang crime investigations. Centralized hierarchical
organizations shattered into dozens of loosely affiliated factions. In the rush to fill the power
vacuum left by incarcerated leaders, existing rivalries went hot, while new rivalries created new
violence as gang members who were once united began to compete with one another over
territory they once shared. The trend toward gang factions increases today. In Chicago, a 2003
assessment of street gangs indicated 68 gangs with 500 factions. An assessment taken only 9
years later shows 59 gangs and 625 factions (http://www.chicagomag.com/ChicagoMagazine/August-2012/Garry-McCarthy-Under-the-Gun/?cparticle=4&siarticle=1).
As time has passed and older gang members are replaced by younger members many
of whom were not yet born while either Hoover or Fort were free traditional alliances and
rivalries shift with profits. Today it is not uncommon to see former or current rivals
reaching a financial agreement that allows them to share prime locations for narcotics sales.
The increase in factions over gangs has yet another critical dimension: as the number of
factions increase, both the membership of the faction as well as the size of the factions
territory decrease. The once-30,000-member Gangster Disciples is now a group of allied and
warring factions, each with typically between 50 to 200 members. This has profound
implications on organizational structure and leadership.
First, with territories typically being under a square half-mile in size many often
comprising just a couple blocks gang factions have become islands in a sea of islands. In
order to facilitate the continuation of criminal enterprises like narcotics sales factions must
align themselves with other factions to achieve needed resources. A 30,000-member criminal
enterprise can be vertically integrated, facilitating much of its own resources internally, or it can
make the connections necessary with other, often transnational, enterprises to secure its needs.

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A 100-member criminal enterprise surrounded by a dozen other 100-member enterprises does

not typically have such capability or direct access. Similarly, directly competing for the
resourcesterritory, narcotics supply, narcotics sales, etcwith neighboring factions places
such a strain on the organization that its sole purpose becomes survival. It is a far better
business model to align with others who have those resources and do business with them. The
result is that each faction exists within anotheror several otherfactions criminal enterprise
network.
Second, the combination of decreased membership and territory plus the lessons
learned from previous police operations has changed the organizational structure of many
gangs. Instead of a rigid pyramid-shaped hierarchy, many gangs today are much flatter, with
redundancies in leadership and management roles. Some simply lack a defined leadership
structure at all, and exist as a collective group who make decisions as a whole or by simple
majority. Where gangs exist that do employ a single leader organizational structure, the
leadership has insulated itself in such a manner as to make them near immune to prosecution,
or have made the cost in terms of time, energy, and manpower exceptionally high in an
effort to catch them engaged in criminal activity. While law enforcement is busy with these
investigations, the day-to-day operations of the gang narcotics sales, violence, and
intimidation continue.
The Kingpin Fallacy
The Kingpin Fallacy is law enforcements continued insistence that all street gangs are
ruled by kingpins, that the understanding of the gangs organization and operations be defined
according to a traditional pyramid organizational structure, and that targeting such a person will
result in significant degrading of the gang or its collapse.
There are a few reasons why this insistence is so prevalent. Previous investigations with
organized crime have employed the kingpin model with success. Law enforcement itself is
designed in such a way, with a chief at the top, so that it is agents default understanding of
organizations; we look for this organizational structure even where it may not exist. Law
enforcement struggles too often to fit the square peg of gangs into the round hole of traditional
hierarchical organizational structure. The result is that effective targeting of criminal actors
within the gang is significantly degraded.
Targeting Considerations for Street Gangs

Understanding Gangs as Flat Networks

To be more effective, law enforcement must first evaluate gangs as relationship-based
networks, then target those persons within the network that facilitate critical network
connections. A useful analogy can be made using the four corners of a city block. Assume that
on each corner of this block there are a total of ten gang members who are engaged in
narcotics sales. Over time, the distribution of connectivity will reveal that the ten people on
each corner tend to associate with each other more than they associate with persons on the
other cornersrelationship-based subgroups within the faction. Further analysis is likely to
reveal interconnectivity between groups; some persons from each corner are likely to associate
with persons assigned to other corners. Also revealed are relationships that span all, or most, of

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these corners. Particular attention should be paid to individuals whose association with each
subgroup is shallow (one or two of each group of ten) or temporal (occurring at habitual
intervals or within the same time frame). These subjects are most likely key facilitators, and
their presence within the network act to coordinate and hold the network together.
Identifying distinct relationship-based subgroups within gangs and gang factions also
allows law enforcement to better address gang violence. By looking at acts of violence, those
who are committing the violence, and the existing subgroups, law enforcement can often
narrow down those perpetuating the violence to one or two specific subgroups. This allows law
enforcement to more narrowly focus their efforts on those specific people whom associate most
directly with one another, rather than attempting to throw an enforcement blanket over the
entire gang. Coupled with a geographic understanding of where particular subgroups tend to
congregate within the claimed gang territory also increases efficiency in resources allocated and
time spent addressing the issue. For example, in a gang of 100 people covering a four-by-four
block square of territory, law enforcement can focus their attention on ten to fifteen key
individuals and the one block they most often frequent. Additionally, when key and influential
members of the gang or faction are identified, law enforcement can also approach these
individuals regarding violence, attempting to bring pressure on the subgroup by more
established members of the gang.

Understanding Gangs as Interconnected Networks

Understanding gang factions as networked with one another allows law enforcement to
actively search for and identify those persons who serve as the human bridges that facilitate
the connection between cooperating factions and gangs. As previously mentioned, the
increasing move toward smaller gang factions brings with it both the requirement to cooperate
and import key resources as well as fierce and often violent competition for resources. A series
of alliances and conflicts are formed. By focusing not only on the relationships gang members
within a gang have with each other but also on their relationships with members from different
gang members, law enforcement can begin to identify not only which specific persons facilitate
these interactions, but the depth of these interactions as well.
Returning to the identification of subgroups within gangs, examination of relationships
between members of gangs can identify if interaction exists across the entire gang or if it is
limited to specific people in specific subgroups. Again, this allows law enforcement to not only
gain a better understanding of the interconnectivity, but to better focus its resources where
they are most needed.
A final note about interconnectivity: It remains a critical function of law enforcement
analysts to determine if interconnectivity is cooperative or competitive. It is just as important to
understand the context of the relationship, particularly if it is violently competitive. Determining
if the violence is due to historical rivalries or more acute variables (personality clashes, personal
grievances) will help law enforcement understand how wide or deep the violence may spread
and to craft more effective responses.

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Understanding the Role of Influential Members within a Gang

Identifying influential members remains mostly within the realm of human intelligence.
These are the people most everyone in the gang knows and listens to. Identifying influential
members is the first critical point.
Overlaying an analysis of a gang as a relationship-based network with the human
intelligence ascertaining influence will not necessarily show convergence. That is, those people
who are identified as key members within the network may not be those persons whom are
most influential. This understanding is the second critical point: removing persons in key
positions within the network may not also remove persons of significant influence. Conversely,
removing influential members may not break apart the network.
The third critical point is identifying the nature of influence. While it may seem
reasonable from an operations perspective to remove influential members of a gang,
understanding the specific type of influence an individual has must drive how these gang
members are approached. Targeting influential members who drive violence or hold a nonviolent criminal group together is likely a reasonable strategy and, when coupled with targeting
and removing persons in key network positions, can have devastating effects on a gang.
However, removing an influential member whose influence keeps order within the gang and
prevents other members from engaging in violence is likely to create violence. In such
instances, it is better for law enforcement to directly engage this person with messages of
keeping violence at bay while simultaneously targeting and removing key network members and
facilitators.

Understanding Gangs as Open, Complex Systems within a Complex Environment

The environment within which gangs and law enforcement operate is an open and
complex system. Unlike complicated systems, which are composed of multiple, interacting
components that can be broken apart into their respective pieces and examined independently,
complex systems are dependant and relationship based. When any relationship within the
system is affected, the whole of the system is affected. Complex systems share the trait of
emergence, which means they can change without any outside influence. Gangs are complex
systems. They display emergence, as competition for power within the gang can change the
nature of the gang itself as well as the relationships between its members. It is also an open
system in that it is affected by outside influence, most notably by conflicts with rival gangs and
through interactions with law enforcement.
In order for effective targeting and overall counter-gang strategies to be effective,
complexity must be understood and managed. Continued reassessment of the gang its key
network members, facilitators, and influentials must be practiced. After significant acts of
gang violence, after law enforcement removes key network members, and after law
enforcement removes connections between cooperating gangs, the gang as a system may
change. The change may be minor or it may be significant, but law enforcement must reassess
the gang and determine the next best course of action. This requires law enforcement to craft
strategies that have a built-in mechanism for reevaluation and adaptation. It also requires law
enforcement to be agile, moving in real-time to new information and analysis.

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Most importantly, not only should change be expected, the nature of the change should
be anticipated. Law enforcement analysts must synthesize the sum of the gangs organizational
structure, key network members, influentials, relationships with other gangs, and the nature of
the complex environment into a detailed understanding that permits a reasonable anticipation
of what the gang is likely to do in response to incidents that affect it, be they driven by other
gangs or by law enforcement operations. Law enforcement understanding must be such so that
analysts can assess what gang responses will likely be, then have law enforcement operations
in motion if that assessment is accurate. This next step thinking by law enforcement keeps a
destabilizing pressure on the gang, preventing it from become too settled in any particular
pattern of operations. Instability can be leveraged with targeted pressure into disorder and
collapse.
Targeting Considerations for Other Criminal Groups
The above targeting considerations are not exclusive to combating street gangs and
gang factions. Criminal organizations that operate under traditional hierarchical organizational
structures contain the same networked relationships as flatter organizations, making them
equally susceptible to the network-based targeting strategies described here. They will perform
equally well and produce similar results employed against street gangs with defined leadership
hierarchies, transnational criminal organizations, and terrorist organizations.
Conclusion
Modern street gangs eschew much of the traditional, pyramid-shaped organizational
hierarchy used by their predecessors. Instead, gangs today tend to be smaller, flatter
organizations that rely on a high degree of networked connectivity to organize and operate. In
order to be effective against these organizational structures and operations, law enforcement
must make specific considerations in their targeting models. First, gangs must be understood as
flatter, relationship-based organizations and the key network members that facilitate
connectivity must be identified and targeted. Second, gangs must be understood as highly
connected enterprises that cooperate and compete for resources, and key facilitators between
gangs must be identified and targeted. Third, influential members must be identified and law
enforcement operations targeting these members must be commensurate with the nature of
their influence. Fourth, law enforcement must understand that gangs are complex systems and
that high connectivity between gangs makes them even more susceptible to the nature of the
complex environment, requiring law enforcement to craft adaptive strategies, conduct routine
reassessments, and remain highly agile in operations. Finally, effective targeting requires the
analytical sum of these component parts in order to not only focus on the best targets today,
but anticipate the best targets tomorrow so that law enforcement operations can become a
constant, focused pressure that disrupts, disorganizes, and eventually dismantles the criminal
street gang.

The thoughts, opinions, and strategies described here are the original work of the author and
are not intended to represent or speak on behalf of the Chicago Police Department, its policies,
or its strategies.

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John A. Bertetto is a sworn member of the Chicago Police Department.

His current areas of study and work include criminal street gangs, social
network analysis, and asymmetric threat mitigation. He is the author of
Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs,
Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent
Battlespace, Designing Law Enforcement: Adaptive Strategies for the
Complex Environment, and Toward a Police Ethos: Defining Our Values
as a Call to Action. Officer Bertettos most recent research article
Reducing Gang Violence through Network Influence Based Targeting of
Social Programs has been accepted to the Industry & Government Track
of the 2014 Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) annual
conference, a conference with a 20% acceptance rate. Officer Bertetto has
worked street patrol, organized crime, and research and development
assignments. His applied research projects have led to collaborative
partnerships with students and faculty at USMA West Point, George
Mason University, and the University of Maryland. He is one of the
primary designers and the law enforcement SME behind the GANG social
network analysis software, which has been featured in Popular Science,
Governing, and on MITs technology blog, as well as profiled on ABC
and BBC news. Officer Bertetto holds a Master of Science degree from
Western Illinois University and a Master of Business Administration
degree from St. Xavier University.

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