The United Nations Security Council:

Its Veto Power and Its Reform

Sahar Okhovat

CPACS Working Paper No. 15/1

December 2011

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Author:
Okhovat, Sahar.
Title:
The United Nations Security Council [electronic resource]: its veto power and its reform /
Sahar Okhovat.
ISBN:

9780980828672 (e-book)

Series:

CPACS working paper ; no. 15/1.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references.

Subjects:

United Nations. Security Council--Voting.

United Nations. Security Council--Reform.
International agencies--History.
International agencies--Influence.
Veto.
Military policy--Public opinion.
Security, International.
International relations.

Other Authors/Contributors:
University of Sydney. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.
Dewey Number:

341.2323

ISBN 9780980828672 (e-book)

The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform
CPACS Working Paper 15/1
Author: Sahar Okhovat
Copyright 2012 Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
First published 2012, by:

The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies

The University of Sydney
NSW 2006 Australia
http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/centres/cpacs

Published by the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of Sydney. All rights reserved. No
part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the permission of the
author.

Acknowledgment
I would like to thank the Directors of Major issues and Theology Foundation, for their
comments, support and for providing the opportunity to do this report.
The Hon. Robert Hill, former Australian ambassador to the United Nations and Professor John
Langmore, the President of the United Nations Association of Australia, contributed
considerably to this report. I am grateful to them for their time and helpful comments.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Jake Lynch, the Director of the Centre for
Peace and Conflict Studies and Mr. Robert Newton, former Australian Ambassador to Egypt and
the current Vice-President of Australia-Palestine Advocacy Network, for their assistance with the
conduct of the interviews and for their invaluable comments.

SUMMARY
The United Nations Security Council, the principal organ responsible for
maintaining international peace and security, has been faced with criticism
since its establishment in 1946.
Critics and politicians alike have criticised this Council for its small size and
exclusive nature, its relations with the General Assembly, its working methods,
and its undemocratic structure.
The most criticism has been directed at the infamous power of veto, namely the
ability of the five permanent members of the Council (USA, Russia, France, UK,
and China) to quash any non-procedural matter with their negative vote,
irrespective of its level of internationals support.
Since the establishment of the Security Council, permanent members have used
their power of veto in accordance with their national interests. The use of that
power rapidly distanced from the initial reason for which it was included in the UN
Charter, namely preventing the UN from taking direct action against any of its
principal founding members. One can argue that after the end of the Cold War and
because of the elimination of ideological divisions among the superpowers, the
veto has been cast more sparingly. However, a look at the use of veto in the last
two decades reveals that although being cast less often, the veto is still exercised
for self-interest or the interests of allies. Over the last 20 years out of a total of 24
vetos, 15 have been used by the USA to protect Israel (see Table). Moreover, we
should not overlook the influence of the pocket veto, so called because on many
occasions permanent members managed to keep an issue off the Council agenda or
soften the language of a resolution without actually casting a veto by mere threats
of using that power.
3

This undemocratic privilege of the permanent five combined with other flaws of
the Council led to several calls for reform. After the end of the Cold war, when the
Council became more engaged in international matters, the calls for reform
paradoxically increased. It shows that countries started to take this body more
seriously and therefore became more eager for its reform.
However, because of the high number of proposals on the reform of the Council
and strong disagreements among advocates of different proposals, not much has
been achieved. Analysts believe that an increase in the number of seats in the
Council is much more plausible than reforming or removing the veto. At least there
is universal agreement about the former while the latter is much more
controversial. Each of the permanent members has supported one proposal for
expanding the Council. However, the main dispute is on details and countries have
not yet managed to agree on a common denominator. The main improvement in
the reform debates happened in 2008, when the Intergovernmental Negotiations
took the task of negotiating reform proposals from the Open-Ended Working
Group (on the Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the
Membership of the UNSC) which was established in 1993. In this
Intergovernmental Negotiations on UNSC Reform the African group labelled the
veto anachronistic and self-serving, and expressed its longstanding position that
it should be abolished.
Countries are not satisfied with the speed or achievements of these negotiations.
Consequently, the Group of Four (G4), an alliance of Germany, Japan, India, and
Brazil has started separate efforts to present a resolution on the reform of the
Council to the General Assembly with the aim of securing permanent seats for
each of them. Whether they can get enough support to bypass Intergovernmental
Negotiations has to be seen. This is why the 66th Session of the UN General
Assembly which will start in September 2011 is of particular importance.

The Security Council has come to the focus of Australian analysts more than
before, thanks to Australias campaign to get a non-permanent seat on it. Australia
was the first ever President of the Council in 1946 and had been an influential
member for several terms.
However, we have not been elected to the Council since the end of the Cold War a lengthy absence for a middle-power like Australia. If we succeed in winning the
seat in October 2012 and start our two-year term in January 2013, it will be 27
years since Australia last served on the Council. We definitely have tough
competition since we are competing against Luxemburg and Finland to get one of
the two seats of the Western Europe and the Others Group (WEOG). These two
European countries are likely to get the support of other European countries and
considering they are two of the biggest aid donors to Africa are much likely to get
their votes as well. We have to wait and see whether the efforts of Kevin Rudd and
others in lobbying for votes, and other measures, such as our increase in foreign
aid, more emphasis on multilateral foreign policy and engagement in UN missions
can overcome the strong credentials of our competitors for the Council seat.
As Richard Woolcott, the last Australian Ambassador to the UN who sat on the
Council, said: You can make a difference if you are on the Security Council.

Table of Contents:
Section 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................. 6
Section 2: The Veto Power ..................................................................................................... 10
Trend of Use of Veto Power after the End of the Cold War ................................. 10
Pocket Veto ......................................................................................................... 15
Veto and Initiation of Important Debates in International Law ........................... 19
Arguments For and Against Veto ........................................................................... 23
Uniting for Peace Resolution .............................................................................. 25
Section 3: The Reform of the Security Council ..................................................................... 30
Flaws of the Security Council and Reform Proposals ............................................ 30
Timeline of the Security Council Reform .............................................................. 36
Obstacles to the Reform of the Security Council ................................................... 41
Section 4: Australias Bid for Non-Permanent Membership .............................................. 45
Why Does Australia Need to Be in the Security Council? ..................................... 45
The Competition and Our Chances of Success .......................................................48
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 56
Appendixes
Appendix I: Trend of Use of Veto Power
Appendix II: The Legality of NATO Actions in Kosovo
Appendix III: Arms Exporters
Appendix IV: G20
Appendix V: Bibliography

Section 1: Introduction
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the principal organs of the United
Nations. According to article 24 of the UN Charter, the foundational treaty of the United
Nations, the UN Member States have conferred the primary responsibility of maintenance of
international peace and security to the Security Council and have agreed that this body, in order
to carry on this duty, acts on their behalf. The Member States have agreed to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council through article 25 of the Charter.1 While other organs of the
United Nations can only make recommendations to governments, the UNSC is the only organ
capable of issuing resolutions that are legally binding on all Member States.
In order to fulfil its responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and
when faced with a conflict, the first action of the Council is to recommend to the parties that they
reach agreement through peaceful means. It may appoint special representatives, may ask the
Secretary-General to appoint special representatives, and may set some principles for the
peaceful settlement of the conflict. When a dispute leads to fighting, the UNSC will try to bring
it to an end as soon as possible. It can do so by issuing ceasefire directives, sending UN
peacekeeping forces or eventually deciding on enforcement actions such as economic sanctions
or collective military action. The Councils other responsibilities include recommending the
admission of new members and the appointment of the Secretary-General to the General
Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA). Together with the UNGA, it is responsible for
electing the judges of International Court of Justice.2
Established in 1946, the UNSC currently has fifteen members. The Peoples Republic of
China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America

The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945), United Nations Website,
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>, viewed 23 August 2011.
2
The UN Security Council Website, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/index.html>, viewed 23 August 2011.

are the five permanent members of this body and the holders of veto power. Except for the
Peoples Republic of China (which replaced the Republic of China in 1971) and the Russian
Federation (which replaced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991), the current
Permanent Five (P5) are the main victors of World War II. The other ten members of the
Security Council are non-permanent. They are elected by the General Assembly through
majority vote to take on a two-year term. On the first of January each year, five new nonpermanent members start their term. To ensure better regional representation, non-permanent
members are elected from different regional groups. The African Group has three
representatives, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), the Latin American and
Caribbean Group (GRULAC), and the Asian Group each has two representatives and the Eastern
European Group has one representative. Also one member of the Council should be an Arab
country which can be chosen from the Asian or African groups. According to the Charter, nonpermanent members are not eligible for immediate re-election once they finish their two-year
term. Current non-permanent members of the Security Council are Bosnia and Herzegovina
(from East Europe, due to finish in 2011), Portugal and Germany (from WEOG, due to finish in
2012), Brazil (from Latin America, due to finish in 2011), Colombia (from Latin America, due to
finish in 2012), India (from Asia, due to finish in 2012), Lebanon (from Asia, the Arab state, due
to finish in 2011), South Africa (from Africa, due to finish in 2012), Gabon and Nigeria (from
Africa, due to finish in 2011).3
The presidency of the Security Council is held in turn by the members of the Council in
the English alphabetic orders of their names. Each president holds the office for one month. India
is the president in August 2011 and Lebanon will take this responsibility in September.4 The role
of the president is setting the agenda, chairing the meetings and overseeing any crisis. The
president is authorised to publish presidential statement, although it is subject to the consensus of
all members.5
In the voting system, the Charter distinguishes between the procedural and nonprocedural (substantive) matters.6 According to article 27 of the Charter, decisions on procedural
matters will be made by an affirmative vote of at least nine out of fifteen current members. On
3

Ibid.
It is noteworthy to mention that the first ever president of the UNSC in January 1946 was Australia.
5
The UN Security Council Website, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/index.html>, viewed 23 August 2011.
6
Procedural matters are the matters related to the procedures and are of less importance than substantive
matters. UNGA Resolution 267 provides a list of procedural matters. However it emphasises that this list is not
fixed and other matters can be considered procedural if the members of the Council conclude so. Some argue that
it has rendered the nature of procedural matters ambiguous and disputable.
4

the other hand, decisions on substantiative matters are made by affirmative votes of nine
members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; this is the clause that
gives the Permanent Five their veto power.7 In order for a resolution to fail (without failure
because of the exercise of veto by one or more of the permanent members), seven countries have
to vote against the resolution, abstain or be absent from the Council at the time of voting.
Since its establishment in 1946, the Security Council has been faced with considerable
criticism and since that time there have been many calls for the reform of the Council. A large
part of the criticism is due to the structure of the Council that many believe is undemocratic
especially because it gives considerable power and privileges to certain countries of the world.
The main example is the veto power of the Permanent Five. As Robert Hill, former Australian
ambassador to the United Nations, summarises, the Security Council is a club and P5 is a club
within a club.8 The main aim of this report is to examine the current structure and performance
of the Council mainly through analysing the trend of the use of veto power in the last two
decades. It also intends to investigate current proposals and efforts towards the reform of this
body.
This report proceeds through three main sections. The first section analyses the trend of
the use of veto power since after the end of the Cold War. The second section looks through the
history of the efforts to reform the undemocratic structure of the Council and examines current
reform proposals and their progress; furthermore this section investigates the main impediments
towards the reform of the Security Council.
As Australia is campaigning to get a non-permanent seat in the UNSC for 2013-14 term,
this body and its functioning are of special importance for us. Therefore, the third chapter
examines our UNSC bid, its progress and its chances of success as well as the problems we are
facing. Supplementary appendixes provide some additional information. Appendix I provides
information on the vetoed resolutions since 1991. Appendix II presents arguments about the
legality of NATO actions in Kosovo. Statistical information on the export of armament by the
permanent members of the Council comes in appendix III while appendix IV provides some
details about the members of the G20, such as their population and their Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).

The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945), United Nations Website,
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>, viewed 23 August 2011.
8
Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.

To prepare this report, as well as consulting academic sources and using current news
stories, I had the opportunity to interview several experts on issues related to the United Nations.
Robert Hill, former Australian ambassador to the United Nations during 2006-2009, John
Langmore, the President of the United Nations Association of Australia, and two Australian
officials to whom I spoke in Canberra,9 all provided invaluable insights into the current status of
the United Nations Security Council, the issues related to its reform and Australias campaign to
get a non-permanent seat.

Some of the interviewees requested that their comments be published in a non-attributable manner.

10

Section2: The Veto Power

As mentioned earlier, Article 27 of the UN Charter allows the permanent members of the
Security Council to quash any non-procedural draft resolution with their negative votes,
irrespective of its level of international support and popularity. This power is referred to as the
veto power of the Permanent Five although the word veto is never mentioned in the Charter.
The initial reason for the inclusion of this power in the Charter was to prevent the UN to take
direct actions against any of its principal founding members. This section illustrates how the use
of veto power has become distant from that initial reason and how this power has turned into a
tool for protecting national interests of permanent members or their strategic allies. This power
has been responsible for the silence of the Security Council on some major international conflicts
including the 2003 Iraq War, the 2008 conflict in Georgia, the 2009 massacre of Sri Lankan
Tamils and the recent Syrian conflict. Although the issue of Israel-Palestine conflict is on the
agenda of the Security Council, this body has not been successful in condemning the violence
and settlement activities through issuing resolutions.
Trend of Use of Veto Power after the End of the Cold War
The first veto was cast in February 1946 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) and since then the permanent members have used their veto power a total of 263 times.
However, there has been a considerable decrease in the use of veto in the last twenty years so
that since the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, only 22 vetoes were cast.
The period between 31 May 1990 and 11 May 1993 was the longest period without the use of
veto.10 In general, during the 1990s not only in comparison with the previous decades but also in
comparison with the following decade few vetoes were cast. From January 1990 to December
1999 only nine draft resolutions were vetoed while that number reached fourteen in the 2000s.
As the result of the relatively sparing use of veto power, the number of resolutions passed by the
UNSC in the course of the last twenty years has increased substantially. Before 1990, the UNSC
10

Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, created in 2008, Global policy Forum Website,
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/Tables_and_Charts/useofveto.pdf>, viewed 23 August 2011.

11

would adopt an average of 15 resolutions each year. It has reached a substantial annual number
of 62 resolutions in recent years.11 However, the following analysis of the use of veto power by
each of the Permanent Five and the subjects of vetoed resolutions show although they vetoed
fewer resolutions, the permanent members still use this power for the same reason, namely
protecting their own interests or those of their allies as well as providing political cover for their
strategic friends.
The Soviet Union (before it became the Russian Federation) used its veto power more
than any other country. From 1946 to the time of its fall and the subsequent succession of Russia,
this country vetoed a total of 119 resolutions. After Russia took the USSRs seat in the Council,
it has used the veto power sparingly. So far Russia has blocked six resolutions, twice jointly with
China.12 As is provided in the table in Appendix I, Russia vetoed two resolutions on Cyprus
while all other fourteen members of the Council voted in favour. Along with its extended interest
in the Balkan region, this country vetoed a resolution on Bosnia and Herzegovina and after 2008
Russia-Georgia crisis, blocked the passage of a resolution that intended to extend the UN
Observer Missions mandate in Georgia and Abkhazia. Moreover, together with China, it did not
let the Security Council condemn human right abuses in Burma and Zimbabwe; both these being
important economic allies.13
Since 1971 and after replacing the Republic of China, the Peoples Republic of China has
used its veto power six times; four of them were exercised after the end of the Cold War. As
mentioned above, China joined Russia in vetoing two resolutions which intended to condemn
human rights abuses in Burma and Zimbabwe. Like Russia, China also had economic interests in
these two countries. Burma is also politically important for China and its government is highly
reliant on China for its current level of power. In addition to these two cases, in 1997 China
vetoed a popular resolution which intended to authorise the deployment of observers to verify the
ceasefire in Guatemala and in 1999 blocked a resolution regarding the extension of the operation
of United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia. The reason for

11

Table on Number of Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements: 1988-2009, created 4 March 2009,
Global policy Forum Website,
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Number_of_Security_Council_Resolutions.pdf>, viewed 24 August
2011.
12
Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council,
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/Tables_and_Charts/useofveto.pdf>, viewed 24 August 2011.
13
Subjects of UN Security Council Vetos, created in 2009, Global policy Forum Website,
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/Tables_and_Charts/vetosubj.pdf>, viewed 24 August 2011.

12

both of these negative votes was the political ties of Macedonia and Guatemala with Taiwan. 14
Therefore, China used its veto power as a political weapon to punish countries for recognising
Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. This intention is more evident for the case of
Macedonia which just one month before that resolution established diplomatic relations with
Taiwan.
The last time France and the United Kingdom used their veto power was in 1989 in a
joint veto with the USA on the situation of Panama.15 Therefore, these two countries have not
vetoed any resolutions in the last 20 years. However, as I will discuss later, France used the
threat of veto on several occasions to prevent a matter coming to the Council for voting.
Overall, the United States of America is the second most frequent user of veto power.
More importantly, in the period after the end of the Cold War, it has become the most frequent
user. This country has vetoed 83 draft resolutions since the establishment of the UNSC; 14 of
them were cast after 1991. What is noteworthy is that out of these 14 resolutions 13 were related
to Israel and through blocking them, the USA has provided political cover and protection for
Israel, its strategic ally in the volatile region of the Middle East. The USA has been active in
preventing the UNSC from adopting resolutions condemning Israeli settlement activities in East
Jerusalem, asking for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, calling the construction of
security wall in the West Bank illegal and many other cases that involved condemnation of
actions carried out by Israel.16 While explaining the current attitude of permanent members in
avoiding frequent use of veto, Robert Hill admitted that there is an exception to that stance and
that is a category of Israeli resolutions that the US...because of domestic political reasons...will
always veto; in that regard there is not much difference between the policies of Obama and the
Bush administration.17
For all of these thirteen resolutions, the USA was the only country which cast a negative
vote (in some cases some of the members abstained as well but none of them joined the USA to
vote against the draft resolution). Moreover, in three cases all other fourteen members of the
Security Council supported the drafts. These facts illustrate the degree of political isolation of the
USA regarding its stances towards Israel-Palestine conflict. It also demonstrates how the veto

14

Ibid.
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.
15

13

power enables a country like the USA to block popular resolutions, despite the unpopularity of
its stance on that protracted conflict.
In July 2002 and during a closed-door meeting, John Negroponte, the United States
representative in the United Nations, provided a statement which resulted in the Negroponte
Doctrine. He clearly stated that any draft resolution regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict must
contain four elements, otherwise the USA would veto it. Drafts have to: (a) explicitly condemn
the acts of terrorism, (b) condemn by name the three groups of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, the
Islamic Jihad and Hamas that were responsible for suicide attacks, (c) appeal to all parties for a
political settlement of the crisis and (d) demand the improvement of the security situation as a
condition for any call for withdrawal of Israeli forces to their position in September 2000. 18 No
draft resolution has condemned Hamas, al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, and the Islamic Jihad by name
but there were some drafts that condemned the actions of both Israel and Palestine. They were,
however, also vetoed by the USA.19
The United States was responsible for the most recent case of veto which happened in
February this year. They blocked a very popular resolution that was co-sponsored by at least 130
countries and intended to condemn Israeli settlement activities and to demand their cessation. It
was the first (and so far only) resolution vetoed by the Obama administration despite his promise
to have a better relationship with the Arab world. According to Dr. John Mearsheimer, codirector of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, although
Obama was critical of Israels settlement activities, the USA eventually vetoed that resolution
because of the pressures from pro-Israel lobby. However, by casting the veto in favour of Israel
again, Obama disappointed those who hoped for different stance of his administration regarding
Israel-Palestine conflict. That decision in particular drew unprecedented criticism mainly
because the veto was cast amidst of mass protests in Egypt and the Middle East and in the
climate of the people power.20
After the end of the Cold War, there was only one resolution vetoed by the United States
which did not concern the Israel-Palestine conflict. On 30 June 2002, the USA vetoed a
18

The Negroponte Doctrine concerning UN Security Council Resolutions on the Middle East, created 6 October
2003, United States Mission to the United Nations Website,
<http://web.archive.org/web/20031224063630/http://www.un.int/usa/03jdn-me1006.htm>, viewed 24 August
2011.
19
As an example refer to the table in Appendix I and the draft resolution S/2006/878.
20
Kanya D'Almeida, Dead Peace Process Could be "National Suicide" for Israel, created 16 February 2011, Inter
Press Service News Agency, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54507>, viewed 24 August 2011.

14

resolution intended to renew the United Nations peacekeeping mandate in Bosnia. The American
representative gave an assurance that the decision was not directed at the people of Bosnia.
The US previously threatened to veto the resolutions related to the UN peacekeeping missions if
its request for the exemption of American peacekeepers from jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC)21 were not met. The veto of the aforementioned resolution happened in
order to materialise those threats.22 That action put pressure on the UNSC members to later adopt
a resolution which asked the ICC not to exercise its power over the actions of UN peacekeepers
for a year.
However, it is important to note that the permanent members are increasingly aware of
the unpopularity of casting a veto and it is one of the reasons they tend to minimise its use. It is
reported that despite the pressure from the pro-Israeli lobby, Washington came very, very
close to not vetoing anti-settlement resolution in February 2011.23 It was mainly because of the
popularity of the resolution and the fact that Washington is aware of the adverse political
consequences of vetoing a popular resolution. As John Langmore mentioned, the fact that China
is sensitive to international opinions played an important role in this country not casting a veto
on UNSC resolution 1973. That resolution authorised the international community to establish a
no-fly zone over Libya. China along with Russia, Germany, Brazil, and India just abstained from
voting.24 Robert Hill also explained that China still and on every issue loudly proclaims the
sanctity of sovereignty, the right [of a country] to manage internal affairs without external
interference but has become increasingly reluctant to use that mantra to vote down any
resolution.25
Therefore, nowadays and more than before the permanent members tend to lobby to
prevent a controversial matter coming to the Council. In these cases, they would not need to use

21

The United States is not a member to the International Criminal Court. Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute in
2000 but did not submit it to the senate for ratification. George W. Bush stated that the USA would not join the ICC
and in May 2002 formally withdrew from its ratification and unsigned the Rome Statute. Obama has reestablished a working relationship with the ICC but has not stated an intention to rejoin the Rome Statute or
submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification. Many believe the initial support of the USA for the ICC and its later
change of stance was because it became clear that the ICC would not subordinate to the Security Council and
would act independent of it and the veto power of its members.
22
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Rejects Draft Proposing Extension of United Nations Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Security Council Press Release SC/7438,
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7437.doc.htm>, viewed 24 August 2011.
23
David Horovitz, How Palestinians will Use the GA to Advance Statehood, created 25 March 2011, The Jerusalem
Post, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=213752 >, viewed 24 August 2011.
24
Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.
25
Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.

15

their veto and be seen as an impediment to the maintenance of international peace and security.
However, it is not a big step forward. Nowadays, countries are increasingly using threats of veto
to keep an issue off the agenda of the Security Council and in order to protect their international
legitimacy.
Pocket Veto
As mentioned before, instead of casting a veto and attracting criticism, countries
increasingly prefer to use the pocket veto (namely the threat of the use of veto). They use that
threat either implicitly or explicitly, either in the private meetings of the Permanent Five or in the
larger Council. On many occasions, they managed to reach their intended outcome and could
keep an issue off the Councils agenda or soften the language of a resolution. The examples of
pocket veto are abound. In this section I will focus on some examples which concern important
or very recent international conflicts.
Although France has not cast any vetoes after the end of the Cold War, it has threatened
to use that power on several occasions. The most prominent example was the case of 2003 Iraq
war when Frances threats to veto any resolution that would automatically lead to a war
successfully prevented the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain to present a draft
resolution to the Council seeking to authorise military action (although France could not
eventually prevent them from attacking Iraq).26 The issue of the Iraq war will be explored in
more details later on. France also used the threat of veto very recently. A non-violent protest in
West Sahara was crushed by Moroccan forces in November 2010. France intervened to support
its ally, Morocco. By threatening to use its veto, France could prevent the UNSC members from
presenting a resolution to the Council to look into the crimes of the Moroccan military.27
A careful analysis of the Security Councils records shows that Russia and China are the two
countries that have been relying on pocket veto more than other permanent members. Sri
Lanka is an important ally of China and Russia and it is believed in the last phase of Sri Lankan
civil war in 2009 many Sri Lankan Tamils were killed by the Sri Lankan army and the forces of
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). China and Russia managed well to keep that issue
and an inquiry or a possible resolution on the crimes of the Sri Lankan army off the agenda of
26

Tarik Kafala, The Veto and How to Use it, created 17 September 2003, BBC News Website,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2828985.stm>, viewed 24 August 2011.
27
Noam Chamsky, Libya and the World of Oil, created 5 April 2011, New York Times Syndicate,
<http://mobile.zcommunications.org/libya-and-the-world-of-oil-by-noam-chomsky>, viewed 24 August 2011.

16

the Security Council. A search through press statements and meeting records of the Council
shows that issue was not adequately discussed in the Council and apart from issuing a press
statement about the situation of Sri Lanka in May 2009, the UNSC did not take any other
actions. In a press statement issued on 13 May 2009, the members of the Security Council
expressed grave concern over the worsening humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka and called for
urgent action by all parties to ensure the safety of civilians. While condemning the actions of
the LTTE, they raised concerns over the Sri Lankan armys use of heavy calibre weapons in the
areas with high population of civilians and asked the government to fulfil its commitment in
that regard.28 Although the content of this press statement might sound powerful, it was the only
action that the Council took. This inactivity of the Council is more unacceptable if the scale of
that massacre is taken into consideration.29
During the course of the conflict and its aftermath, Russia and China opposed the
discussion of alleged violations in Sri Lanka30 (and considering they both are veto holders they
have unusual power in blocking the discussion of some issues that are against their interests).
The United Nations and its Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, were much more active regarding
that conflict. The UN press releases shows that the Secretary-General on several occasions
condemned the violence in Sri Lanka, raised concern about the humanitarian situation of that
country and called on the Sri Lankan government to bring the conflict to an end. Moreover, a UN
Panel of Experts was established and on 25 April 2011 released a report on accountability with
respect to the final stages of Sri Lankan conflict. Concluding that both the Sri Lankan army and
the LTTE forces committed grave human rights abuses, that panel recommended establishing an
international independent investigation into abuses during the armed conflict. However
according to Human Rights Watch, Russia and China intervened again and on 18 April 2011
signalled their reluctance to have Ban Ki-Moon take further action on that matter.31 On the other
hand, the Secretary-General personally is not very willing to order an investigation and wants the

28

The United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Sri Lanka, created 13 May 2009, United
Nations Website, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9659.doc.htm>, viewed 24 August 2011.
29
According to the Report of the Secretary-General Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka published on 31
March 2011, a number of credible sources have estimated that there could have been as many as 40,000 civilian
deaths.
30
Sri Lanka: UN Chief Should Establish International Inquiry, created 25 April 2011, Human Rights Watch Website,
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/25/sri-lanka-un-chief-should-establish-international-inquiry>, viewed 24
August 2011.
31
Ibid.

17

Security Council to take action; something that principally due to the strong opposition from two
of the veto-holder members has reached an impasse.32
The most recent example of the use of pocket veto by Russia and China is the situation
in Syria and the opposition of these two countries to the issuance of any resolutions by the
Council despite the bloody crackdown of Syrian military forces on pro-democracy protestors.
When the UNSC members gathered to discuss the situation of Syria on 27 April 2011, the British
and French delegates hoped they could get the members to agree on a resolution. However, they
were faced with strong opposition from the Russians who argued that the situation did not pose a
threat to international peace and security. They believed that all of the problems did not come
from one side only and that some protestors hoped to destabilise the country. China was not
happy with that resolution either and some of the non-permanent members like India, Brazil,
South Africa and Lebanon did not fully support it. Consequently the European-sponsored
resolution was not put for voting.33 In June 2011 and when the violence became more intense,
the Western European countries again tried to put a resolution to the Council which demanded
Syria end its violent crackdown against protestors. Once again China and Russia made it clear
that they would not support Councils engagement as its involvement could destabilise a
strategic country in the already unstable region of the Middle East. This was despite the fact that
the draft resolution did not ask for military intervention or even imposing further sanctions on
Syria. Furthermore, the Aljazeera report argues that Moscow has for a long time been an ally and
arms supplier of Syria34 and therefore does not want to see its strategic ally in trouble.
The violence in Syria increased significantly to a level that even Russia reluctantly
condemned it. Therefore, the European countries became hopeful that the revised version of the
June draft could get enough support and would not get blocked by either (or both) of the veto
holder countries of Russia and China. The new draft that was circulated in the Council in early
August again intended to condemn the bloody crackdown of the Syrian protestors. However, the
Russians once again opposed the draft. They said a resolution was too excessive and a

32

Jake Lynch, War Crimes in Sri Lanka and Political Options for Australia, created 4 August 2011, Crikey Website,
<http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/08/04/war-crimes-in-sri-lanka-and-political-options-for-australia/>, viewed 24
August 2011.
33
The United Nations Security Council, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Briefs Security Council on Syria,
Says Repression Is Not the Solution; Inclusive Dialogue, Reforms Needed, created 27 April 2011, United Nations
Website, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10235.doc.htm>, viewed 24 August 2011.
34
UN Security Council weighs Syria resolution, created 9 June 2011, Aljazeera News Website,
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/06/20116815955110282.html>, viewed 24 August 2011.

18

Presidential statement would be satisfactory.35 Russia was suspicious that any such resolution
could turn out to be an initial step in a sequence, with calls for military action should Syria not
respond- next on the agenda. Moscow was already concerned that NATO had, in Russias view,
exceeded the mandate given by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, on Libya.
There, military action was provided for, to protect civilians, but Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin told reporters that taking the side of one of the warring parties, [NATO] had committed a
crude violation of the UN resolution.36 So far, Russia and China have managed to block any
resolutions. As they wanted, the Council merely published a Presidential statement37which
condemned widespread violations of human rights against Syrian civilians, called for immediate
end to the violence, and urged all sides to act in utmost restraint. Reaffirming their
commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, the Council members called on
the authorities to respect human rights and hold accountable those responsible for violence.38
There are also some instances where the permanent members, Russia and China in
particular, did not keep an issue off the agenda of the Council but managed to soften the
language of the resolution issued by the Council. Irans nuclear program is an example. Russia
and China considerably affected the second resolution on that program which was issued in
December 2006. It was the first punitive resolution which imposed sanctions on Iran. Because
Iran has been one of the important trade partners of Russia and China, the language of the
resolution eventually issued by the Council was much softer than the original draft and the
imposed sanctions were lighter.39 An analysis of all seven UNSC resolutions regarding the
nuclear program of Iran shows that Russia and China did not even abstain from voting and
always voted in favour of all of the resolutions. Considering their stance towards Iran, one can
conclude that they supported the resolutions because the final drafts which came to the Council
35

Margaret Besheer, UN Security Council Again Considers Syria Resolution, created 1 August 2011, VOA News
Website, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/UN-Security-Council-Again-Considers-SyriaResolution-126555493.html>, viewed 25 August 2011.
36
Mary Dejevsky, Putin attacks Britain and US for violating Libya resolution, created 12 November 2011, The
Independent, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-attacks-britain-and-us-for-violatinglibya-resolution-6261163.html>, viewed 14 December 2011.
37
Unlike resolutions, a presidential statement needs unanimity. When India, the Council president for the month
of August, read the text of the presidential statement, Lebanon that has a pro-Syrian government dissociated itself
from that statement. The Lebanese delegate said the text of the statement did not help address the current
situation of Syria. Therefore, although that statement was issued, it did not have the requisite unanimity.
38
The United Nations Security Council, Security Council, in Statement, Condemns Syrian Authorities for
Widespread Violations of Human Rights, Use of Force against Civilians, created 3 August 2011, United Nations
Website, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10352.doc.htm>, viewed 25 August 2011.
39
UN Passes Iran Nuclear Sanctions, created on 23 December 2006, BBC World News Website,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6205295.stm >, viewed 25 August 2011.

19

for voting were in accordance with their interests and were drafted with attention to what they
wanted. However, the support of these countries for Iran has decreased over the recent years
mainly because of the economic incentives of Western and Arab countries40 as well as Irans
continuous defiance and its opposition to compromise.41 However, there is still strong chance
that these two countries will veto any resolutions authorising military action against Iran in the
future or they will use the threat of veto to prevent any such resolutions materialising.
The above and previous examples show how the use of veto power has become distant
from the initial reason it was included in the Charter. The actual use of veto or even the threat of
its use can pressure other members of the UNSC to comply with the demands of the member
who has that power. Therefore, the veto gives substantial power to France, the UK and to some
extent Russia, who otherwise would not have much power. Robert Hill confirmed that the stance
of each of the permanent members is important when a draft resolution is debated. Referring to
the importance of North Korea for China or (at least until recently) Iran for Russia and China and
the consequent delicate treatment of those issues by the Council, Robert Hill commented that
the general direction [of the Council] at the moment is to go easy on the issues that are not of
interest of some of the P5s.42
Veto and Initiation of Important Debates in International Law
There are some instances where the use of the veto has initiated important debates in the
field of international law. One of the most notable cases is the conflict in Yugoslavia and
NATOs military intervention in Kosovo. During the course of the conflict, Russia (in order to
protect Yugoslavia) repeatedly threatened that it would veto any Security Council resolution
authorising the use of force in Kosovo.43 Therefore, the Council only went as far as Resolution
1199 which asked for a ceasefire following the reports of gross human rights violations. This
resolution emphasised that if its contents were not met the Security Council would consider

40

China is still a powerful country but the fact that one of the reasons for the shift in Russias stance towards Iran
has been economic incentives of some rich countries indicates that at least some of the permanent members of
the Council are not the most powerful and stable countries of the world anymore. Therefore, some rich countries
can dictate their own positions to them.
41
Julian Borger, Medvedev: Sanctions against Irans Nuclear Program May be Inevitable, created 24 September
2009, Guardian Newspaper Website, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/23/nuclear-iran-un-gccsanctions >, viewed 25 August 2011.
42
Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.
43
Mary Ellen OConnell, The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo, Human Right Quarterly, 22, no.1
(February 2000), p.76.

20

further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region.44
Therefore, this resolution did not authorise any country or regional organisation to launch
military intervention. However, on 24 March 1999, the NATO started a bombing campaign over
Yugoslavia. The Council (perhaps because of the presence of some key NATO members like the
United States) did not condemn those actions in any subsequent resolutions.45 Only Resolution
1244, which put an end to the NATO bombing, started with a reminder of the purpose of the UN
Charter and the primary responsibility of the Security Council in maintaining international peace
and security. It did not condemn the actions of NATO either.46
Therefore NATO launched military action against Yugoslavia without the Security
Council authorisation. It generated a large amount of debate on whether or not that action was
legal in terms of international law. Mary OConnell, in her article on international law after
Kosovo, argues that the use of force by NATO was inconsistent with both of the UN Charter and
the practice of the Security Council.47 This view is shared by many commentators like Bruno
Simma.48 Unlike other occasions where countries breached Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN
Charter and then tried to justify it, the NATO members did not try to provide any legal
justifications based on the UN Charter for their actions.49 Appendix II of this report provides
insight into debate over the legality of NATO actions in Kosovo in terms of international law. In
a nutshell and as the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, an independent group of
human rights proponents, confirmed in 2000, those actions were illegal but legitimate as they
were ethically justified.50 Although some countries condemned the actions, the lack of strong
criticism also showed that in the eyes of many countries those actions were justified. Even the

44

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1199 (1998), created 23 September 1998, United Nations Website,
<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm>, viewed 25 August 2011.
45
For example the resolution 1239 which was adopted in May 1999 and after the start of NATO bombing did not
mention anything in that regard. Russia and China abstained in protest to this fact.
46
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), created 10 June 1999, Security Council Documents,
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement>, viewed 25
August 2011.
47
OConnell, The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo, p.57.
48
Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, European Journal of International Law, 10,
number 1 (1999), p.1.
49
Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community, European Journal of International Law, 10, number 1
(1999), page 24.
50
Thomas G. Weiss, Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse: The Implausible versus Plausible, Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, Occasional Paper Number 14 (January 2005), p.29; I have to point out that still many argue against
this stance and believe that the grave humanitarian situation of Kosovo was exaggerated for self-serving reasons.

21

Secretary-General did not condemn NATOs use of force and sufficed to say that normally a
U.N. Security Council resolution is required.51
Many NATO members justified their actions on humanitarian grounds. They mentioned
that the situation was exceptional and that it would not set a precedent. Furthermore, they argued
that their actions were not meant to undermine the Security Council. They declared their
commitment to abide by UNSC decisions and to seek its authorisation for future enforcement
actions. However, this was not so for the USA. American politicians never spoke of that
intervention as an exception. In fact, several high-rank officials in the Clinton administration
stated that they did not see any necessity in seeking the UNSCs authorisation for NATOs
enforcement actions.52 In this way, the USA showed its capacity in undermining the Security
Council.
After the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the legal regime for the use of force by the
regional organisations no longer reflect[ed] the [previous] neat principles.53 NATOs use of
force in Kosovo initiated different debates over that regime. Some believed that action was a
violation of law and did not change anything, while others argued that NATO did not need to
seek the UNSCs authorisations. As Cassese argues, exception is not a meaningful term here.
Once a group of countries bypass the Security Council and the UN Charter with some vague
justification, nothing can restrain them from the same action in the future.54 Appendix II, by
explaining that NATO needs to seek the UNSCs authorisation for any enforcement action,
invalidates the second argument. That event and following debates lent impetus to the concept of
humanitarian intervention, that is, the right to take military action without the UNSCs
authorisation during humanitarian disasters in order to protect human rights.55 One can say an
event which was the result of repeated use of veto power by a permanent member, to some extent
introduced a new concept in the international law and opened another way to bypass the Security
Council. It should be pointed out, however, that this new concept is still controversial and has
not yet been mentioned in any treaty or customary law.
It is debatable if the NATO military actions against Former Yugoslavia could be excused
because of the grave humanitarian situation of Kosovo people. Many believe that the level of
51

OConnell, The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo, p.82.
Ibid., p.57.
53
Ibid., p.82.
54
Cassese, Moving towards International Legitimation of Humanitarian Countermeasures, p.25.
55
OConnell, The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo, pp.70-82.
52

22

humanitarian crisis was exaggerated and by the time the bombing began many refugees had gone
back home and it triggered an exodus of non-Albanians. However, Kosovo action cannot justify
the 2003 Iraq war which shows the capacity of the USA and to some extent the UK to bypass the
Security Council when they need to. It also shows the inability of the Council to condemn those
actions. The war started without the consent of the Security Council amidst strong opposition
from many countries. At that time the latest Security Council resolution on Iraq was Resolution
1441 which found Iraq in material breach of the ceasefire terms and its obligations under
Resolution 678 (1991). It stated that the failure of Iraq in fully cooperating in the implementation
of the contents of this Resolution constitutes further material breach of Iraq obligations and
recalled that the Council had repeatedly warned this country that it would face serious
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations. However, this Resolution
was not an authorisation for war. It pointed out that the Security Council decided to convene
immediately if it received a report of Iraqs further material breach of its obligations. 56 What
some politicians said during the UNSC meeting prior to the adoption of this Resolution further
confirm this thesis. John Negroponte, the then Permanent Representative for the US, clearly
asserted that the Resolution contained no hidden triggers and no automaticity for the use of
force; what the ambassador for the United Kingdom confirmed as well, saying that if there is a
further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for
discussion.57
By threatening to veto any resolutions authorising war on Iraq, France prevented the US
and UK from presenting another draft resolution to the Council to get permission for a military
attack on Iraq. However, USA, UK and Australia waged war against Iraq without the Security
Council approval and without the consent of the majority of international community. Although
proponents of the invasion notably then UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair did put forward
humanitarian and ethical arguments, for ridding the Iraqi people of an abusive dictator, these
were not widely accepted as justifications, and did not serve to broaden support in the
international community. Kofi Annan, a year after the start of the war, called the invasion of Iraq
illegal and asserted that he believed it should have been up to the Security Council to determine
the consequences of Iraqs failure to comply with its obligations. Furthermore, since the
56

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002), created 8 November 2002, Security Council Documents,
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>, viewed 25
August 2011.
57
th
United Nations Security Council, Security Council 4644 meeting, created 8 November 2002, Security Council
Documents, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N02/680/99/PDF/N0268099.pdf?OpenElement>,
viewed 25 August 2011.

23

beginning of the war he said several times that the invasion did not conform with the UN
Charter.58
It was later clarified that the issue of Iraqs possession of weapons of mass destruction,
the main justification for the initiation of the war, was mainly fabricated by the American
authorities to get international support for the US led invasion.59 Despite all opposition and
document fabrication, the Security Council has never issued a resolution condemning the actions
of the USA, and UK since both of these countries are permanent members of the Council and can
veto such a resolution. Later on, the Council adopted American and British sponsored Resolution
1483 which recognised these two countries as the occupying powers and therefore made them
the legitimate and legal peacekeeping authorities. It asserted that it recognises the specific
authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as
occupying powers.60 Therefore, the Council legitimised their presence rather than condemning
it.
Arguments For and Against Veto
The previous sections clearly show the undemocratic nature of the veto power. They
illustrate the substantial power that it gives to a few countries to protect their interests. This
power, as will be explored later on, has been one of the main impediments against the much
needed reform of the Security Council. There are few UN Member States who support the veto
power. Back in the 1990s, 185 Member States criticised the veto as inequitable.61 Statements
against the veto abound. For instance, Ahmad Kamal, former Pakistani Ambassador to the UN,
once stated that in a democracy no one can be more equal than the others and labelled the veto
anachronistic and undemocratic. Many African countries shared that sentiment as well.62

58

Iraq War Illegal, Says Anna, created 16 September 2001, BBC News Website,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm>, viewed 25 August 2011.
59
Iraq Survey Group, Iraq Survey Group Final Report, 30 September 2004, available at Global Security Website,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-report_vol1_rsi-06.htm>,
viewed 25 August 2011.
60
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1483 (2003), created 22 May 2003, Security Council Documents,
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement>, viewed 25
August 2011.
61
Weiss, Overcoming Security Council Reform Impasse, p.30.
62
Jakob Silas Lund, Pros and Cons of Security Council reform, created 19 January 2010, Centre for UN Reform
Education, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/414>, viewed 25 August 2010; As an example of African
countries stance, I can refer to the comments of the delegate of the United Republic of Tanzania during a General
Assembly debate on the reform of the Security Council on 1 November 1996. During that meeting, he called veto
undemocratic and irrelevant to the modern age (GA/9151 available online at UN press archives).

24

However, there are still some countries that support the veto power. Obviously the
permanent members are supportive of such a power for self-serving reasons. In 2007 and after
Russia repeatedly threatened to veto any resolutions that would recognise Kosovo as an
independent state and undermine Serbias sovereignty, Vladimir Titov, the Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister pointed out that the threat of a veto would "stimulate the sides to find a
mutually acceptable mechanism".63 So far, there have been some occasions when countries or
regional groups intervened in a conflict without the explicit authorisation of the UNSC.
Sometimes this body gave its post-hoc authorisation (like when the Economic Community of
West African States intervened in Sierra Leone)64and sometimes the intervention was considered
illegal but legitimate (as discussed before with NATO intervention in Kosovo). However, there
is no justification for the USA and the UK led war in Iraq in 2003 when these two countries
chose to deploy forces to Iraq despite the great opposition from many countries. What can be
argued is that if a veto-holding country like France had not threatened to veto any resolution
authorising this war there would have been a great likelihood of the war being legitimised
through a UNSC resolution. Judging from the comments of some delegates, like the Mexican
representative who was present in the Security Council at the time of the debates on Iraq War,65
one can conclude that the USA tried hard to force some countries to support the attack on Iraq.
Therefore, if a country like France had not have the veto power, it would have been likely that
the USA and to a lesser extent the UK could have forced some countries to support the resolution
and the Council would have issued a resolution legitimising the war with a weak majority.
Although France could not eventually prevent the USA and the UK from acting unilaterally and
without the consent of the Security Council, an un-vetoed resolution would have rendered the
war legitimate and therefore those countries would have faced less criticism.
It is debatable how often and how much the veto can work constructively. Moreover, the
importance of Frances actions in regards to Iraq war has become more debatable when, as
mentioned earlier, the Security Council through Resolution 1483 legitimised the presence of the
American and British troops in Iraq.
63

Russia Threatens Veto over Kosovo, created 24 April 2007, BBC News Website,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6587497.stm>, viewed 25 August 2011.
64
Weiss, Overcoming Security Council Reform Impasse, p.30.
65
Mexico shifted its stance towards war in Iraq from supporting France to supporting the U.S. Prior to that shift of
stance, the American officials visited Mexico several times. The Mexican diplomats described their conversations
with the American officials hostile in tone. They complaint that Washington showed little concern about the
overwhelming opposition of Mexican people to the war and the consequent problems of the government (Mexico
Shifts Towards U.S Positions on Iraq, created 26 February 2003, USA Today Website,
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-02-26-us-mexico-iraq_x.htm>, viewed 25 August 2011.)

25

Furthermore, as Jakob Silas Lund explains in his article, those who oppose the abolition
of veto refer to the fall of the League of Nations because major powers like the USA refused to
join. They therefore argue that if the veto is eliminated the UN can follow the same fate with
major powers leaving this body or refusing to pay for those actions they oppose. Again, the
possibility of such outcome is questionable especially considering the current status of the UN
and the level of support for it.66 It is unlikely that any member would risk leaving the UN as it
will be a serious blow to its legitimacy but one cannot totally rule out this possibility, especially
considering that USA has the capacity to do such an action.67
Finally, there are also some apocalyptic arguments about the importance of veto which do
not necessarily carry much persuasive weight. Some commentators argue that the P5 are all
nuclear countries. They have large nuclear arsenals and the consequent ability to initiate a fullscale nuclear war. Therefore, the veto power has to stay in order to enable them to end measures
that are threatening to them diplomatically. In this way, the international community can avoid
the dissatisfaction of these nuclear powers which has the potential to result in international
tension and the possible waging of a nuclear war.68
Uniting for Peace Resolution
It may seem that there is no preventive measure against the use of veto and limitless
power of the permanent members. This is not the case. During the early phases of Korean War,
the USA, concerned by the Soviet Unions repeated use of veto power and fearing those actions
might prevent the Council from protecting South Korea (considering that the USSR supported
North Korea) took the matter to the General Assembly. With support from many countries the
UN adopted a General Assembly resolution called Uniting for Peace in November 1950.69 This
resolution reaffirms it is important that the Security Council carries out its responsibility in
maintaining international peace and security and that the permanent members limit their use of
the veto power. This resolution further recognises that the failure of the Security Council in
66

Silas Lund, Pros and Cons of Security Council reform, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6587497.stm>.

There are already some calls from some American critics like David Holcberg who argue that the United States
should withdraw from the UN. Reasons for those calls range from the constraints that the UN imposes on the US
foreign policies to the claim that most of the UN Member States do not support human rights and therefore the US
has to act on its own in order to be able to pursue the foreign policies that support human rights.
68
John Beck, The Security Council Veto Power, or Got Nuke?, created 5 December 2004, Incite Website,
<http://incite1.blogspot.com/2004/12/security-council-veto-power-or-got.html>, viewed 25 August 2011. (It is
noted that India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all have nuclear arsenals and are not P5 members.)
69
David Horovitz, How Palestinians will Use the GA to Advance Statehood, The Jerusalem Post, created 25 March
2011, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=213752 >, viewed 26 August 2011.
67

26

fulfilling those tasks will not relieve the United Nations of its responsibilities under the Charter
to maintain international peace and security. Therefore, when the permanent members of the
Security Council find themselves at odds and fail to reach unanimity on a matter that appears to
be a threat to international peace and security, this resolution authorises the General Assembly to
immediately consider that matter and issue its own appropriate recommendations to the
Member States for collective measures. Those collective measures can include the use of
armed force when necessary.70 Therefore, one can conclude that this resolution gives the GA
final responsibility rather than secondary responsibility. It can be held as a way to bypass the
Security Council and a means for the General Assembly to overrule the vetoes of the UNSC P5
members.
Although not frequent, this resolution has been applied during the GAs history. One
successful example of its application was in 1981 when South Africa was preventing the
independence of Namibia. The General Assembly by using this resolution recommended
sanctions against South Africa and assistance (including military assistance) to those who were
fighting for Namibian independence. The resolutions passed by the GA using the provisions of
Uniting for Peace are not binding (as none of the General Assembly resolutions are). However,
because of their nature, these resolutions can carry more weight and can press supportive
countries to take actions. It was what happened regarding South Africa. As Richard Schifter, the
former US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights explains, the resolution on South
Africa passed under Uniting for Peace principles, was a significant step in the process of
imposing sanctions on apartheid South Africa and de-legitimizing the country.71
Therefore, bypassing the Security Council is not impossible. It can happen through the
use of Uniting for Peace resolution or possibly, as was discussed before, through the concept
of humanitarian intervention (although this issue is more controversial and has less support).
However, many European and developing countries are reluctant to go through that path
especially when a military intervention is involved. They are reluctant to consider such actions
legitimate as they believe setting the Council aside, threatens the main rules that underpin
international society.72

70

United Nations General Assembly, Uniting for Peace (1950), United Nations Official Documents,
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/377%28V%29>, viewed 26 August 2011.
71
Horovitz, Palestinians to Advance Statehood,
<http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=213752>, viewed 26 August 2011.
72
Weiss, Overcoming Security Council Reform Impasse, p.31.

27

The UNGA Resolution 377 or Uniting for Peace has been rarely used. However, it may
be used in the very near future regarding Israel-Palestine conflict and because the Palestinians
are trying to seek UN membership. This Resolution will be further explored in that context.
According to the UN, the recognition of a state is something that only other states can grant or
withhold. There are already 122 countries that recognise Palestine as a state. Since the UN is not
a state or a government it cannot recognise a state; it can only admit or not admit a state to its
membership. In order to apply for the United Nations membership, a state has to submit an
application to the Secretary General. Then the Security Council considers the application and if
nine members out of the fifteen (including all Permanent Five) vote in favour, the Council
through a resolution recommends the membership of that state to the General Assembly. In the
Assembly a two-thirds majority vote is required for the admission.73
After the impasse in peace negotiations and continuation of Israeli settlement activities,
Palestinian officials decided to seek UN membership. Anticipating that the United States will
veto any UNSC resolutions recommending the admission of the state of Palestine to the GA,74
they intend to use Uniting for Peace resolution and therefore bypass the Council and go
straight to the GA. The experience of South Africa shows that Israels initial assumption that an
overwhelming vote for the establishment of Palestinian state in the GA is merely declaratory is
not true as under this Resolution the GA has teeth. As Horovitz discusses, the Israeli key
players made the mistake of not effectively considering the different weight and practical
backing that the Uniting for Peace can provide for the GAs recognition of Palestine
(although it cannot eventually confer the UN membership on the state of Palestine). As many
experts confirm, the consequences of such an action can be very damaging to Israel as it might
result in considerable global pressure on Israel to accept the decision. It is believed if the matters
are brought to the General Assembly, the Palestinians have strong chance of success. In order for
the GA to pass a resolution, a two-thirds majority votes is needed; namely the affirmative votes
of 128 members.75 Considering the number of countries that recognised the state of Palestine so

73

About UN Membership, United Nations Website, <http://www.un.org/en/members/about.shtml>, viewed 26

August 2011.
74
There might be a chance that the United States will not veto that resolution especially considering its reluctance
to veto the popular anti-settlement resolution in February 2011 and its awareness of the level of international
support for Palestine. However, considering the domestic political situation and the strength of pro-Israel lobby
that possibility is very slim.
75
Horovitz, Palestinians to Advance Statehood,
<http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=213752>, viewed 26 August 2011.

28

far or the number of countries that co-sponsored the recent anti-settlement resolution at the
UNSC, this majority is very much within reach.
Being well aware of the unpopularity of casting veto and expectations of the international
community from the Obama administration, the USA is lobbying hard to either dissuade the
Palestinians to seek UN membership and keep them at the negotiation table or convincing at
least seven UNSC members to abstain or vote against any possible resolution in that regard. The
latter option is not easy considering the widespread support for Palestine and the status and
stances of the current Council members.76 President Obamas speech on 19 May 2011 in which
he asked Israel to respect 1967 borders77 was an effort to convince the Palestinians that there is
still room for negotiations. Washington obviously does not want to be perceived as an
impediment to the resolution of the Middle-Easts most protracted conflict. Moreover, the
perception of the USA as a key element in any political agreement in the Middle East is a
strategic asset for Washington. Involvement of the UNGA in this matter may jeopardise this
asset and consequently the US foothold in the region may be weakened.
It was initially expected that the Palestinians submit their application to the SecretaryGeneral in July and go to the UNSC when it was scheduled to have a session on July 26th. It did
not happen, although there were some discussions in that regard in the UNSC meeting. It was
when the American Permanent Representative clearly stated that her country would veto any
unilateral campaigns at the UN.78 As mentioned before, facing with an imminent threat to its
power in the Middle East and another possible blow to its legitimacy, the USA is working hard
to prevent the Palestinians from seeking UN membership. Recently the American ambassador to
the UN, Susan Rice, said there was no greater threat to the US support and funding of the UN
than the prospect of the recognition of Palestine as a state by this organisation. It is a powerful
threat since the UN relies considerably on the financial assistance of the United States which
contributes to a quarter of the UNs annual budget.79 In addition to this, the US Senate passed a
resolution threatening to suspend financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority if they persist

76

Ibid.
Mark Landler, Obama Sees 67 Borders as Starting Point for Peace Deal, created 19 May 2011, New York Times
Website, < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20speech.html>, viewed 26 August 2011.
78
Neil MacFarquhar, Security Council Debate Offers Preview of Palestinian Bid, created 26 July 2011, The New York
Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/world/middleeast/27nations.html>, viewed 26 August 2011.
79
Jon Swaine, US could Withdraw Funding from UN if Palestine State is Recognised, created 24 June 2011, The
Telegraph, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/8597559/US-couldwithdraw-funding-from-UN-if-Palestine-state-is-recognised.html>, viewed 26 August 2011.
77

29

in turning to the UN. This resolution also calls on Obama to veto a Security Council resolution if
the Palestinians choose to go along with their initial decision.80
Rather than seeking full membership of the UN, the Palestinians have another option.
They can go directly to the General Assembly and ask for enhanced observer status (permanent
observer status). Such a request just needs the GAs approval. This status, currently held only by
the Holy See, enables them to join some of the international organisations.81 One can argue that
the recent threats of the US were not completely unsuccessful as Palestinians are assessing this
second option more thoroughly.82 On the other hand, on August 4th and after an Arab League
follow up committee meeting, Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, said the committee
members reached a final agreement to request the full support for a Palestinian state within 1967
borders and with Jerusalem as its capital. The request will be made in September and in the
meantime they aim to garner support from the UNSC members.83 Whether Palestinian officials
will finally give up to the US pressures and choose to only ask for an upgrade in their status or
will continue to seek full UN membership has to be seen. Whatever happens, it will certainly
mark an important event in the history of the Israeli-Palestine conflict and veto debates.

80

Natasha Mozgovaya, U.S. Senate Passes Resolution Threatening to Suspend Aid to Palestinians, created 29 June
2011, Haaretz Website, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/u-s-senate-passes-resolutionthreatening-to-suspend-aid-to-palestinians-1.370341>, viewed 26 August 2011.
81
MacFarquhar, Security Council Debate Offers Preview of Palestinian Bid,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/world/middleeast/27nations.html>, viewed 26 August 2011.
82
Ali Sawafta, Arabs to Seek Full Palestinian Upgrade at U.N.: Draft, created 14 July 2011, Reuters Website,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/us-palestinians-israel-statehood-arabs-idUSTRE76D21020110714>,
viewed 26 August 2011.
83
Arab League Discusses Palestinian Statehood, created 4 August 2011, Aljazeera News Website,
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/08/20118441614328796.html>, viewed 26 August 2011.

30

Section 3: The Reform of

the Security Council
The issue of the Security Council reform is one of the perennial debates that has been discussed
for at least 18 years; some even say this issue is as old as the Council itself. Because of all of the
UNSCs flaws, different debates and proposals on the reform of the Council have emerged.
However, after the end of the Cold War, when the Council became more efficient and more
engaged in international matters and peacekeeping operations, the calls for reform paradoxically
increased. One of the explanations provided in this regard is that perhaps after the end of the
Cold War, the UN Member States have regained part of their lost faith in the Council and
therefore started to try harder to make its structure compatible with the current realities of the
world. The Councils structure is still largely the same as its initial structure in 1946 and does not
reflect the current world power distribution and geopolitical situation. Today, most of the
Permanent Five are not the most stable and most powerful countries of the world but they have
kept a power which enables them to have considerable influence on the Councils decisions,
policies and agenda.
Flaws of the Security Council and Reform Proposals
The United Nations Security Council is not perfect. The fundamental flaws of this organ
have led to many calls for reform from the majority of the UN Member States. The relations
between the Security Council and the General Assembly are strained and it is not just because
the Council is an exclusive club of fifteen members that does not necessarily act according to the
best interests of the majority of the United Nations members. As Robert Hill pointed out, the fact
that this club is able to pass binding resolutions whilst the resolutions of the GA with 193
31

members are not legally binding and the belief of many UN members that the UNSC is
increasingly expanding its mandate are other contributing factors to this uncomfortable
relationship.84
The first and only reform of the Security Council happened in 1965 when the number of
non-permanent members increased. The main reason for this reform was that the number of the
UN Member States had more than doubled and had increased from 51 to 114. Since that reform,
the number of the UN Member States has increased substantially again especially because after
the fall of the Soviet Union many new members joined the UN. Today, the United Nations has
193 members. The imbalance between the number of the GA and the UNSC members has made
the UNSC very exclusive and has formed one of the main flaws of this Council. The size of the
Council is not reflective of the UNs growing membership and is at odds with the contents of
Article 2 of the Charter; namely the principle of the sovereign equality of all...Members.85 It is
why many countries are advocating for an increase in the number of the Security Council
permanent and non-permanent members. The regional representation of the Council has attracted
much criticism as well. The UNSC has two Western European permanent members while Africa,
the second most populous continent and South America have no permanent representatives.
The contents of the previous section comprehensively illustrate why veto power is one of
the biggest flaws of the Security Council and the main factor that has rendered this body
undemocratic. Lack of transparency of the Council, many of its working methods and to some
extent its agenda have all been also criticised since its establishment and have led to strong calls
for reform. Many countries are critical of the agenda of the Council because they believe the
conflicts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East are more likely to appear in the agenda than the
conflicts in Asia and South America. In fact, the maintenance of international peace and security
is approached differently in different geographical regions.86
The last weak point of the Council to be pointed out is that the permanent members of the
Council, at least in the last decade, have been five of the top ten arms exporting countries. From
2000 to 2010, together they have been responsible for 71 percent of reported conventional arms
export (Appendix III provides further information and statistics regarding the trends of arms
exports by the Permanent Five). Article 26 of the Charter states that in order to maintain

84

Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.

Weiss, Overcoming Security Council Reform Impasse, p.10.
86
Ibid., p.15.
85

32

international peace and security, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with
the assistance of the Military Staff Committee...plans to be submitted to the Members of the
United Nations for the establishment of a system of the regulation of armament.87 Therefore, the
P5 members of the Security Council, some of the biggest arms exporters, are in charge of
establishing a system of armament regulation and have to control that big trade. This conflict of
interest does not allow the Security Council to fulfil its responsibility; what Jimmy Carter
acknowledged and explained well in his 1976 presidential campaign, saying that we cant have
it both ways. We cant be both the worlds leading champion of peace and the worlds leading
supplier of arms.88
Several proposals on different categories of reform (size, veto, regional representation,
categories of membership, and working methods) have been developed during the years. The
proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council, either by addition of permanent or nonpermanent members, has gained relative headway. Germany and Japan, two of the main
contributors to the UN programs, along with India (second most populous country) and Brazil
formed a group called the G4 in order to lobby collectively and support each others bid to get
permanent membership in the Security Council. On the other hand, some countries who oppose
the G4s bid, mainly because of regional political rivalries and because of concern about their
own position if their neighbour or rival were to get a permanent seat at the Council, formed an
opposition group called the Uniting for Consensus. The core members of this group are Italy,
Pakistan, South Korea, Mexico, Argentina, Spain, Turkey, Canada, and Malta and they advocate
the addition of non-permanent seats. Considering South Korea does not want Japan to get a
permanent seat, Pakistan is opposed to India, Argentina and Mexico are against Brazils
permanent membership, and Spain and Italy can be considered Germanys regional political
rivals,89 it is fair to say, as one Australian official described, that the Uniting for Consensus
countries are united not by consensus but by their opposition to one of the G4s.90 Obviously,
those countries do not publicly admit this fact and state that their opposition to the addition of
permanent seats is because a democratic and representative reform cannot be achieved through

87

The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945), United Nations Website,
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>, viewed 28 August 2011.
88
Anup Shah, The Arms Trade is Big Business, updated 5 October 2010, Global Issues Website,
<http://www.globalissues.org/article/74/the-arms-trade-is-big-business>, viewed 28 August 2011.
89
John Langmore, A Step towards Security Council Reform, created October 2008, Nautilus Austral Review,
<http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policy-forum/2008/langmore-UNSC>, viewed 28 August
2011.
90
Personal interview, May 2011.

33

addition of permanent members. They believe this extension would only give ineffective
privileges to some countries while leaving the majority of the countries out.91
As Robert Hill said, in contrast to their stances a few years ago, the permanent members
have started to support some reform proposals on membership expansion and have become
increasingly public in that regard.92According to what Kugel discusses, the relative openness of
the Permanent Five to some reforms, such as the enlargement of the Council, was partly meant to
legitimise their own seats and decisions. Those members are well aware that a majority of the
Councils decisions affect African countries that have no permanent representative at the Council
and therefore have realised that they have to give a stronger voice to that continent. It is the main
reason for their support of the addition of African seats to the Council.93 These members started
supporting some of the G4 candidates as well. The US has recently supported the bid of India as
well as Japan and Brazil although it has never publicly supported Germany. One Australian
official, to whom I spoke in May, believed that the Americans are not supportive of the G4s bid
but are prudent not to declare their stance since they do not want to be perceived as an
impediment to the Councils reform. He believed the fact that all of the G4 members present at
the Council abstained from voting for the resolution on Libya made the Americans more hesitant
in continuing their support.94 UK, France, and Russia, however, are more supportive of the G4
members. France and UK, in particular, are supportive of the access of African countries to
permanent seats.95 The stance of China, however, is completely different. This country does not
support the addition of permanent members and opposes the G4. Although, this country is not
part of the Uniting for Consensus, it strongly supports that interest group and lobbies for them.
Although the Chinese have not publicly asserted that, it is believed the presence of Japan in the
G4 is the main contributing factor.96
There are other reform proposals for membership expansion as well. The Ezulwini
Consensus adopted in 2005 by the African Union, asks for the allocation of two permanent seats
with veto power as well as two non-permanent seats to the African continent. The unrealistic
91

Alischa Kugel, Reform of the Security Council: A New Approach, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Briefing Paper Number
12 (September 2009), p.4.
92
Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.
93
Kugel, Reform of the Security Council, p.6.
94
Personal Interview, May 2011.
95
UK-French Summit: Reform of the Security Council, created 27 March 2008, France at the United Nations
(Website of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations),
<http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article3767>, viewed 28 August 2011; it should be pointed out that all of
these countries support addition of permanent seats without the power of veto.
96
Personal Interview, May 2011.

34

ambitions of this agreement (especially in terms of asking for the extension of veto power) and
the African countries inability to agree on the potential representative(s) are all great problems
ahead of this proposal. Some of the more hopeful candidates who have comprehended the flaws
of this agreement might think about ceasing support for the Ezulwini Consensus. However, that
act may jeopardise their status in the African Union and consequently their status as African
representatives.97
During the Howard Governments term, Australia suggested reform of the Security
Council to a three-tiered body with the members of the G4 and Indonesia joining as permanent
members without the power of veto. It was argued that this proposal could give a stronger voice
to developing countries and the presence of Indonesia would give representation to the largest
Muslim country. However, it seems like the support for Indonesia has dropped off the public
discourse. After Kevin Rudd took power, in his 2008 speech to the General Assembly, he
reminded the international community of the support of our country for the reform of the UNSC,
saying Australia supports the expansion of its permanent membership to reflect changes in the
world since 1945.98 This stance has been pointed out once again in the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trades publication advocating our bid for a non-permanent seat. It says that
Australia believes that no-one should have a monopoly on decision making and therefore
supports reform of the Council and its working methods.99 Australia supports permanent
membership for Japan, India and Brazil but has not been enthusiastic about Germanys bid
because of the already large European representation in the Council. Australia has always been
public in supporting two permanent members from Africa, but considering its opposition to the
power of veto,100 it does not endorse their appeal to be granted the veto power. It is believed,
however, that our politicians are cautious not to talk about veto reform since it is a controversial
issue with little chance of success, which can possibly cut the votes in our favour in the 2012
election for non-permanent seats if we start to advocate it.101

97

Olivier Serro, South African in the UN Security Council 2011-2012, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2011, p.3.
Langmore, Security Council Reform, <http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policyforum/2008/langmore-UNSC>, viewed 28 August 2011.
99
Australia: Candidate for the United Nations Security Council 2013-2014, created April 2011, Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade Website, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_candidature_brochure.pdf>, viewed 28
August 2011.
100
In 1946 and during the establishment of the Security Council and the negotiations in San Francisco, Australia
was not supportive of the idea of veto power.
101
Personal Interviews, May 2011.
98

35

John Langmore, in his article and also during my personal interview with him, said that
one less controversial and less difficult reform proposal can be calling for an increase in the
number of non-permanent members and combining it with the elimination of the clause that
prohibits the retiring non-permanent members from immediately nominating for re-election. This
suggestion might not sound appealing to the G4 members, but it could help them stay in the
Council for a long time without attracting as much opposition as when they explicitly ask for
permanent seat. However, it is likely that they will reluctantly accept a tenth best reform rather
than none at all.102 It can also be a compromise for Uniting for Consensus members and may
reduce their opposition.
Lastly it has been suggested that that the G20 members can be suitable candidates for the
UNSC membership as they represent more than 65% of the worlds population and their
combined GDPs a great percentage of the total worlds GDP. Appendix IV further illustrates
those statistics. None of the experts I spoke to supported this suggestion. John Langmore, in
particular, strongly opposed it on the grounds that the G20 members, although well-selected in
terms of relative economic power, involvement in trade and regional representation, are selected
not elected. Therefore, their permanent inclusion to the Council would not only make the
Council unmanageable, it would make it more undemocratic since the smaller and poorer
countries with no prospect of joining the G20 cannot have access to the Council and cannot have
any representation.103 Moreover, the G20s functions and policies have recently attracted lots of
criticism especially because many UN Member States consider the UN as the principal
mechanism for global economic governance.104
Although the proposals about the enlargement of the Council are currently the leading
proposals, there is a general feeling among the UN Member States that their fulfilment should
not be a pre-requisite to other reform proposals. Veto and working methods of the Council
should be reformed as well. There have been some proposals regarding the veto reform ranging
from limiting its usage to the vital issues of national security, to its complete abolition, as well as
requests for its extension to new permanent members. This category of reform is the most
controversial one and does not have strong support. Therefore, veto is not usually on the agenda
of international debates on the reform of the USNC and not many countries canvass that. When
102

Langmore, Security Council Reform, <http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policyforum/2008/langmore-UNSC>, viewed 28 August 2011

103
Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.
104
Personal Interview, May 2011.

36

asked about his anticipation of the future of veto reform, one commentator asserted that he
would be very surprised if we made much headway on this issue. This view was shared by
other experts who believed that the permanent members would not give up their power of veto;
therefore it is easy to dispense with veto reform. John Langmore, however, thought it might be
possible that in the future the members may agree on limiting the circumstances under which the
veto can be used - but those developments are more likely to be in the form of norms rather than
legally binding limits.105 On the other hand, the majority of countries support improvements in
the working methods of the Council and have tried to make the Council more transparent about
its meetings and decisions.
Some argue that the enlargement of the Security Council makes it too large and
consequently unmanageable and ineffective. However, this body needs to be extended as was the
case in 1965. This reform will not be achieved easily. There is now more support for equity in
regional representation and enlargement of the Council than before and more countries believe in
the reform of the Council in general.106 The main problem is agreeing on the detail. It might
seem that the majority of the international community support the expansion of the Council but if
we delve deeper, we can see there are fundamental disagreements over the possible candidates
and the best proposals. This, therefore, feeds into the question of whether we can reach any
consensus on the reform of the Council and more importantly whether the more popular
proposals, namely those about the membership expansion and improvement of the Councils
procedures, can effectively enhance the accountability and performance of the Council.
Timeline of the Security Council Reform
The UN Charter has been amended only three times: twice to include the changes in the
number of Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) seats and once in 1963107 to incorporate the
enlargement of the Security Council which so far has been the only reform of this Council. In
1963 the number of non-permanent members increased from six to ten and consequently the
required number of affirmative votes to adopt a resolution (in addition to the concurring votes of
the Permanent Five) changed from seven to nine. The number of permanent members, however,
remained intact. Some argue the real impact of that reform was felt only years later and after the

105

Personal interviews with Robert Hill, John Langmore, and an Australian official, May and June 2011.
Ibid.
107
The Charter was amended on 17 December 1963 to increase the number of non-permanent members but these
amendments entered into force on 31 August 1965.
106

37

end of the Cold War because before that time the Council had been rendered ineffective as the
result of ideological divisions between the great powers.108
The question of equitable representation and the number of Security Council members
was put on the General Assembly agenda in 1979 at the request of some countries including
India and Nigeria, but was not considered until 1992. It is believed that Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghalis Agenda for Peace, published in January 1992, was influential in redirecting
attention to the issue of Council reform. In 1993, Boutros-Ghali, at the request of the GA,
submitted a report containing the comments of the UN Member States on the review of the
UNSC membership. In December that year and during the 48th session of the General Assembly,
an Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in
the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council (a
lengthy name even by the standards of the UN) was established. The group met for three sessions
and produced reports and recommendations on the issues related to the membership and veto as
well as the issues related to transparency of the Council but they could not reach an agreement
on any matters. Other subsequent meetings of this group (during the following GA sessions)
were not fruitful and at the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, the debates almost stayed
where it was at the 50th anniversary. The only difference was that in 2005 countries like
Germany, Brazil, India and Japan became more assertive in their claims.109
After the conflict generated by the US-led Iraq War, Kofi Annan, the then UN SecretaryGeneral, appointed a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to report on different
aspects of the United Nations including the Security Council. The panel recommended two
models regarding the enlargement of the UNSC. Both models suggested an increase in the
number of representatives from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Americas to six;
making the total number of the UNSC members 24.
Model A suggested adding six permanent seats with no veto power and three additional
non-permanent seats (with two-year terms).
Model B did not suggest any permanent seats but created a new category of eight 4-year
re-newable seats (meaning that the holder of that seat is eligible for immediate re-election after

108
109

Weiss, Overcoming Security Council Reform Impasse, pp. 8-10.

Ibid., pp.8-13.

38

serving its four-year term). It also suggested adding one more non-permanent seat (with two-year
term).
However, there was no suggestion of the abolition of veto. Kofi Annan, without
mentioning his own preference, passed those recommendations to the 2005 Global Summit and
urged the countries to decide on one model a result the Summit did not achieve. The countries,
however, agreed that the discussion on this issue should continue. The High-Level Panel also
referred to a Charter provision which said the non-permanent members should be elected with
more attention to their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. It
consequently proposed more involvement in decision making by the countries which contribute
more to the United Nations financially, militarily and politically. Therefore, the Panel proposed
that the developed nations who made more effort to reach the target of allocating 0.7% of their
national income to development aid be considered more worthy of being elected as nonpermanent members.110
The failure of the 2005 UN World Summit to reach any agreement on the reform of the
Security Council made the Member States reduce their efforts in that regard and the Working
Group remained idle until the early 2007 when the President of the GA resumed its functioning.
Its continued ineffectiveness led to growing calls for replacing the Group with direct
intergovernmental negotiations. Those calls bore fruit and in September 2008 the Member States
agreed to move the discussions to intergovernmental negotiations which are based on the
proposals put forward by the Member States. It was not an easy replacement and the lead up to it
was full of heated discussions. The main reason for opposition of some countries was that the
Working Group worked with consensus while the intergovernmental negotiations could decide
by a majority vote. Therefore, it was possible that some reforms, which could endanger the
interests of some countries, could be implemented without the consent of all members.111
So far, intergovernmental negotiations, chaired by Zahir Tanin, the Permanent
Representative of Afghanistan, have not been very successful either. 112 The main reason for the
lack of major success is that the countries reiterate their old stance and are reluctant to
compromise. The G4 and the African group advocate for addition of permanent seats while the
110

Langmore, Security Council Reform, <http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policyforum/2008/langmore-UNSC>, viewed 28 August 2011.

111
Kugel, Reform of the Security Council, p.3
112
When the intergovernmental negotiations started, Tanin was selected as the chair and was reappointed again in
October 2010. He still holds this position.

39

members of the Uniting for Consensus oppose them and call for the addition of non-permanent
seats only. There are too many reform proposals in each category of reform and this has proved
to be counterproductive. The first round of the intergovernmental negotiations focused on getting
the proposals of the Member States on five main topics of reform. Discussing the topics in more
depth started from the second round. Towards the end of the first round, there was some hope
that the two opposing country groups might reach an agreement on the issue of the enlargement
of the Council by considering the so-called intermediate approach. This approach proposes that
the implemented reforms, such as addition of permanent seats, are subject to review and
reassessment after a certain period of time. The intermediate approach, however, is faced with
the same problem because there have been too many variations of it put forward by different
countries. Moreover, not all countries are supportive of this solution and the strong oppositions
from India and African countries hindered its progress. Today, there is less hope that this
solution can break the stalemate in the negotiations than there was in 2009.113
In May 2010 and at the suggestion of some countries, Ambassador Tanin sent the first
draft of a text containing main proposals and parameters for the reform of the Security Council to
all Member States and asked for their suggestions and feedback. By doing so, the process of
reform entered into the phase of text-based intergovernmental negotiations. Tanin incorporated
the countries feedback into the first revision of the text and during the first meeting of the fifth
round of the intergovernmental negotiations on June 2nd 2010, countries agreed to use that text as
a basis for their negotiations.114 Since that time and during different informal plenaries, many
countries called for the revision and shortening of the text. In particular, The G4 members, who
had become increasingly impatient, emphasised the urgency for reform and called for the
shortening of the text so that the actual negotiations could start. So far, the negotiation text has
been revised three times with the last revision finalised in February 2011. It seems that the
intergovernmental negotiations are going through the same path as the Working Group.
Countries have held on to their old positions and are reiterating their stance. While the G4
countries are using every opportunity to expedite the negotiations, the members of the Uniting
for Consensus tend to slow down the process by paying too much attention to the procedures and

113

Kugel, Reform of the Security Council, pp.4-5

Text-Based Negotiations in Full Swing, created June 2010, Centre for UN Reform Education,
<http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/426>, viewed 4 September 2011.
114

40

stressing that the countries have to agree on the principles of the reform first. The latest round of
the negotiations happened in March 2011.115
The members of the G4, dissatisfied by the current pace of the intergovernmental
negotiations and the continuous interference of the Uniting for Consensus members, decided to
take the initiative and bypass those negotiations by introducing a new resolution. That resolution,
which has the potential to move the debate to some practical outcome, will call for the expansion
of the Council both in terms of permanent and non-permanent seats.116 In July 2011, Japan and
Brazil, who have been very active in lobbying to secure votes for this resolution, claimed they
have attracted the support of around 100 members, without naming the countries or the regions
they belonged to.117 Although this amount of support is a big achievement for the G4 countries, it
is still short of the necessary 128 affirmative votes (two-third majority of the GA) needed for the
adoption of a resolution. It is believed that the sponsors of this resolution want to present the
draft to the General Assembly only when they are confident of having the minimum necessary
support. Therefore, they have a considerable job to do in trying to convince more countries of the
benefits of this resolution, especially when the Tanin process is still ongoing. The African
countries, who still cling to the unrealistic Ezulwini Consensus, have proved to be major
obstacles in the way of achieving this goal, although there are some signs that the main African
aspirants, Nigeria and South Africa, have recently become more flexible and perhaps more likely
to be persuaded.118 We will have to wait and see whether this resolution can break the deadlock
in the reform of the UNSC. It might, as one Australian official pointed out, provide further
impetus to the process of intergovernmental negotiations or it may move it to a different
process.119
Although, it might seem that so far not much has been achieved in terms of the reform of
the Council, the reality is that some changes in the working methods of the Council have
happened without much publicity and albeit without any amendment to the Charter. Over the
years, the states have modified the Councils procedures. Those reforms concern the issues
115

Mie Hansen, Update on Security Council Reform, created 5 April 2011, Centre for UN Reform Education,
<http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/435>, viewed 4 September 2011.
116
Stewart M. Patrick, Security Council Reform in Sight?, created 7 July 2011, Council on Foreign Relations Website,
< http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/07/07/security-council-reform-in-sight/>, viewed 4 September 2011.
117
Brazil and Japan to Join Forces to Speed Up UN Security Council Reform, created 1 July 2011, Brazilian
Government Website, <http://www.brasil.gov.br/news/history/2011/07/01/brazil-and-japan-join-forces-to-speedup-un-security-council-reform/newsitem_view?set_language=en>, viewed 4 September 2011.
118
Patrick, Security Council Reform in Sight?, < http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/07/07/security-council-reform-insight/>, viewed 4 September 2011.
119
Personal Interview, May 2011.

41

related to the transparency of the Council, accessibility to the GA, and being more inclusive in
proceedings. Today, the Council is not as secretive as before and non-members and the press get
regular briefings on the private consultations of the UNSC members from the President of the
Council. The Council also holds meetings with the troop-contributing countries. Moreover,
different Council members meet frequently with NGOs and experts with extensive knowledge on
a conflict to achieve a better grasp of that conflict and be able to make more informed
decisions.120
As mentioned before, after the end of the Cold war, the permanent members of the
Security Council have supported each other more. Robert Hill believes that the P5 countries are
trying to minimise vetoes against each other in order to not undermine the exclusiveness of their
small club and their collective power.121 The information in Appendix I confirms this thesis. For
example since 1997, none of the anti-settlement resolutions that would obviously face the US
veto were initiated by any of the P5 members. The efforts of the permanent members to not use
veto against each other and to avoid issues that could publicly show some conflicts between
them, as Robert Hill further explained, have led to more private meetings between the P5 in
order to negotiate. Some endorse this relatively recent development as another style of reform
because the outcome is more resolutions, fewer instances of division among the P5 (at least the
public show of it) and less political theatre. On the other hand, many more are frustrated by this
trend. They argue it takes a long time for a resolution to develop and sometimes the final text
does not resemble the original draft. Moreover, some issues are not dealt with at all. They
believe those meetings have rendered the Security Council incapable of containing some
crises.122 As Jakob Silas Lund mentions, some believe that the improvements in the transparency
of the Council and an increase in the number of open meetings of the Council are some of the
reasons behind the stronger tendency of the P5 to hold private meetings as they believe there are
some issues that have to be discussed in private.123
Obstacles to the Reform of the Security Council
One can conclude that the veto power of the P5 is one of the biggest obstacles to the
reform of the Security Council. Any fundamental reform, such as any changes to the number of
120

Weiss, Overcoming Security Council Reform Impasse, pp. 38-41.

Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.
122
Ibid.
123
Silas Lund, Pros and Cons of Security Council reform, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6587497.stm>,
viewed 4 September 2011.
121

42

the Security Council seats, has to be inscribed into the Charter. On the other hand, Articles 108
and 109 of the UN Charter give veto power to the P5 over any amendment to the Charter.124
Therefore, no reform can materialise without the consent of the permanent members. For
example, China, as a veto holding member of the Council, is strongly against the addition of
permanent members. Consequently, the G4, as one of the most serious advocates of reform, does
not have high chance in breaking the stalemate of the reform process while China is actively
opposing part of its proposal. This is why Paul Kennedy, Yale University historian, calls the veto
power the Catch-22 of the Charter reform. Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter have made the
prospect of the veto reform very slim, if not impossible. It is hard to expect that veto holder
countries will support any reform of the power that gives them the last say in one of the most
important bodies of the United Nations. The UN Charter gives them the means to eventually
block any reform proposals suggesting changes to the power of veto.125
Another serious obstacle, as may be concluded from what happened during the debates
on reform, is the disagreement of countries on the details of the preferred reform proposal. The
fact that countries cannot reach an agreement on the number of additional seats, the type of those
seats (permanent or non-permanent), possible candidates, and the extension of veto power or its
abolition, as well as the fact that each country is still advocating its own old proposal without
much compromise, have proved to be big barriers against the progress of reform debates.126
As already discussed, the Charter provisions requiring the agreement of all P5 to any
reforms proved to be a great impediment against Security Council reform. However, among
those P5, the status of the United States is different. On several occasions, such as the 2003 Iraq
war or recent threats of ceasing the financial support of the United Nations in the event of the
GA endorsement of Palestinian statehood, the USA has proved that it has the capacity to bypass
the UN and its bodies and act according to its own interests. Thomas Weiss argues that currently
Washingtons domestic and foreign policies have a considerable impact on the agenda of the
Council and its actions. Considering the USAs current impact and record, the idea that the
remaining superpower will continue to participate, politically or financially, in an institution
whose purpose would be to limit its power has no precedent. Therefore, among the P5, the USA
has proved to be a bigger obstacle to the reform of the Council. It is not only unlikely to
124

The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945), United Nations Website,
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>, viewed 4 September 2011.
125
Weiss, Overcoming Security Council Reform Impasse, p.13.
126
Probably Ibid., pp. 16-18.

43

compromise, but is also capable of withdrawing from the Council or even the United Nations, if
other members of the Security Council insist on reforms that are not in accordance with the its
interests.127
The USA might have lost some of its power, especially its economic supremacy, but it is
still considered a superpower. This is not the case for some other permanent members, namely
UK, France and Russia. When the Soviet Union dissolved to leave only Russia, its status and
identity changed from a superpower to a country that aspired to become part of the capitalist
world. Therefore, Russia does not have the same credentials as its predecessor. It is not as
powerful and its economy is only half the size of the Soviet Unions economy.128 Similarly, UK
and France are no longer great powers. The question here is whether these countries will be
more willing to compromise. The ideas of the experts in this regard differ. By considering the
current power status of these permanent members and the fact that states use any available
institutions to fulfil their national interests, Thomas Weiss believes that it is very unlikely that
diminishing powers like France and UK would be willing to give up any of their power or share
it with new rivals. After all, being permanently on the Security Council and having veto power
give them the capacity to have a louder voice than their actual power merits.129 One Australian
official that I spoke with shared this idea, believing the power status of these countries more than
anything makes them very cautious in making any compromise. 130 On the other hand, John
Langmore believes they will be more willing to compromise in order to showcase their flexibility
and reasonability131 and might try to maintain their seats and status in that way.
The willingness of the permanent members to support the reform which would affect
their status and their power can be partly estimated from their stance towards the possible
resolution that the G4 is working on. This resolution can be the most serious attempt for reform
in a long time, although we have to keep in mind that this resolution is not intended to seriously
jeopardise the power of the P5 as it has not called for veto reform and has been rather vague
about the type of the additional seats it is asking for. Stewart M. Patrick says that UK and
France, which have realised their vulnerability as power shifts to new centres, support this
resolution. Russia, which has traditionally been against the addition of permanent members,
127

Probably Ibid., pp. 19-22.

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, P-5 Veto Outdated, created July 1999, Global Policy Forum Website (this article was
originally published in Egyptian Al-Ahram Newspaper),
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41142.html>, viewed 4 September 2011.
129
Weiss, Overcoming Security Council Reform Impasse, p.13.
130
Personal Interview, May 2011.
131
Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.
128

44

supported Indias bid for permanent membership in 2010. Consequently, Russia is likely to
support the G4 resolution. China, however, has been very vocal in its opposition to the G4s bid
and now is trying to dissuade the African countries from giving any concessions as they have
been the main obstacles to this resolution and can provide good support for Chinas opposition.
The USA, despite supporting Japan, Brazil and India, has not done anything in that regard and its
support has been mainly rhetorical.132 USA has not publicly supported the resolution which
shows that when that it comes down to the action, the USA is not sure of maintaining its support
for the G4 and the reform in general.

132

Patrick, Security Council Reform in Sight?, < http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/07/07/security-council-reform-insight/>, viewed 4 September 2011.

45

Section 4: Australias Bid

for Non-Permanent
Membership
Despite all of the flaws of the Security Council, being a member of this forum is important; even
if that membership is a non-permanent, two-year term without the power of veto. After all, this
body is one of the main organs of the United Nations which is in charge of the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Australia is campaigning for a Security Council non-permanent seat for the 2013-2014 term.
This campaign and the consequent measures taken to enhance the chances of success, have
brought (more than before) the issue of the Security Council to the attention of Australian
politicians and academics alike. There are increasing numbers of articles, debates, lectures and
TV programs that not only focus on our campaign and its chances of success but also analyse the
Security Council, its flaws and the prospects for its reform, as talking about the Security Council
will inevitably draw us into this.
Why Does Australia Need to Be in the Security Council?
Some might ask why we need to be in the Council. What would be the benefits of our
presence in an organ that many believe is flawed and in many cases has been unable in
containing crises? Why should we lobby and sometimes change our priorities (if we do) in order
to be able to serve for just two years in a Council that many believe is strongly influenced by
interests and policies of powerful veto holding countries who are there on a permanent basis?
Although the UNSC has attracted lots of criticism, Langmore believes this forum is still
the main organ of the United Nations mandated with the responsibility for conflict resolution, the
46

core purpose of the UN. The Security Council is where the issues of international and intranational conflicts are discussed and it has the power to act if conflict resolution fails. Therefore,
any country, including our own, which aspires to be a player in international relations, wants to
be a member of this forum and use its power as a member to act for conflict resolution. 133 This is
what Kevin Rudd, in his first public speech about our candidacy and its importance, mentioned
as well. He believes that being a member of the Security Council provides us with the
opportunity to to make a difference in shaping the international events that in turn shape our
nations future.134 As a member we can work towards conflict resolution rather than merely
being a spectator.
Furthermore, Kevin Rudd in his speech to the National Press Club put forward other
reasons why being on the Council is important for Australia. As he argued nowadays the
countries of the world are engaged in each others business more than ever before - mainly
because of globalisation. Considering the geographical distance of Australia from main centres
of power in the world, we have to engage comprehensively across the councils of the world in
order to survive as an important country that has a say. Obviously the core of this engagement is
through various offices of the United Nations and of course the core of the UN is the Security
Council. Kevin Rudd believes in the period ahead, the Security Council will be directly relevant
to our core national security interests. Therefore, being in the Council can provide a good forum
to safeguard those interests. One of the most important developments in this period will be
related to Afghanistan. It is relevant to our national security interests since we have been
deploying troops to this country for the past 10 years. In the period ahead, Afghanistan is of
special importance because in 2014 the transition to the Afghan Government for it to take the
security lead will be completed and the mandate under which ISAF operates is expected to shift
considerably. 2014 can be a year with potential risks of destabilisation. Any future UNSC
resolutions on Afghanistan can affect the Australian personnel currently in that country and can
shape our future military and economic development presence in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is
important to be on the Council and have a say on the resolutions that can affect Australian people
and Australian interests. Afghanistan is not the only example. In the period of 2013-2014, when
we hope to be in the Council, there will be some important developments in some of our
neighbouring countries whose future and stability are strategic for us and for the region. The
133

Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.

Kevin Rudd, Australia's foreign policy priorities and our candidature for the UN Security Council, Speech to the
National Press Club in Canberra delivered on 1 June 2011, Foreign Minister Website,
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2011/kr_sp_110601.html>, viewed 6 September 2011.
134

47

international security forces, including many Australians, currently present in East Timor under
existing UNSC resolutions will withdraw from this country after its 2012 elections. Being in the
Council gives us the opportunity to have a say in any future resolutions that can determine the
next steps in maintaining the stability of our northern neighbour. Further from the region, the
Security Council is also engaged with the issues related to the Middle East.135 Recent
developments in this region have made the period ahead an interesting and important time for
any countries to be on the Council - it is the same for Australia. The Middle East might not be
our neighbouring region but it is a strategic region that has become increasingly important for
Australia. Being on the Council and being able to affect the resolutions regarding this region is
important for our country.
Another reason why it is the right time to be on the Council is simply the fact that we
have not served in the Council for a very long time not since the end of the Cold War. If
Australia succeeds in winning the seat for the 2013-2014 term, it will be 27 years since we last
served on it. As Kevin Rudd says, this is a long absence for a country with the global capacities
of Australia. Since the last time Australia was on the Council, 90 other countries have served a
term, many more than once. Japan and Brazil have been elected five times. Three of the
countries in the Asia Pacific region and five of the countries in our regional group, WEOG, have
served twice in the Council since 1986 and every other G20 nation, except Saudi Arabia, has
served at least once since we last served. Many politicians including Kevin Rudd believe that
Australia, as a Security Council non-permanent member, can be an effective voice for small and
medium countries of the world.136
One might also ask what Australia can bring to the Council and how we can be an
effective and contributing member. Does Australia have any knowledge that few other countries
can offer? Are we an attractive candidate that other countries want to see on the Council and
therefore vote for us? Australia might have failed to address some vital conflicts like the
situation in Darfur but it has been quite active in some other conflicts such as those in our region,
most notably in East Timor and in Solomon Islands - both of these conflicts have been discussed
in the Security Council. Some might be hesitant to vote for us because they consider us similar to
the United States in terms of decisions and policies. This popular belief and its effects will be
discussed later on. However, it should be pointed out that there are some regions such as the

135
136

Ibid.
Ibid.

48

Asia-Pacific, where we are more knowledgeable than the USA. We have greater experience and
more knowledge regarding the conflicts related to this part of the world.137 Moreover, among the
193 members of the United Nations, Australia is the 12th largest contributor to the UNs regular
and peacekeeping budgets and our $4.8 billion development assistance budget is the worlds 11th
largest. These show the commitment of Australia to the affairs of the United Nations and
therefore its main body, the Security Council. We also have the capacity for creative middle
power diplomacy and the ability to form coalitions which help bring diplomatic solutions to
global diplomatic problems, the main goal of the Security Council.138
The Competition and Our Chances of Success
Australia last served as a non-permanent member on the Security Council between
January 1985 and December 1986. It unsuccessfully campaigned for a seat in 1996 when we
were defeated by two other candidates of WEOG, Portugal and Sweden. Australia started to
campaign again in 2004 but withdrew well before the election. As Robert Hill pointed out, there
were number of reasons associated with that withdrawal. The Howard Government was pursuing
bilateral foreign policy objectives at that time and was not much engaged with multilateral
foreign policies. There were some concerns about the cost of the campaign and stronger concerns
about our chances of success. Australia at that time had to compete against Belgium and Italy,
both strong candidates. Our involvement in Iraq War and our close alignment with the USA at
that time led to resentment from many nations, especially Arab countries. Therefore, the
politicians were not confident they could secure enough votes and consequently withdrew. 139 In
this round, Australia is competing against Finland and Luxemburg in WEOG and is making
every effort to be successful in the October 2012 election.
This time it seems that the politicians are much more determined to end our long absence.
Since the announcement of the candidacy in March 2008, there have been several steps taken to
boost our chances of success. Most importantly, Kevin Rudd in his 2008 speech to the General
Assembly renewed our commitment to the principles of the United Nations and announced our
return to full participation in the multilateral system. The withdrawal of our troops from Iraq
was an action in accordance with those commitments. Australia is also trying to focus on the
high priorities of the United Nations which include the issue of climate change. We have signed
137

Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.

Rudd, Our Candidature for the UN Security Council,
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2011/kr_sp_110601.html>, viewed 6 September 2011.
139
Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.
138

49

the Kyoto Protocol,140 had key role in the formation of the Copenhagen Accord and its
transformation into the Cancn Agreement, and co-facilitated negotiations in Cancn on the
Green Climate Fund. Australia is the Vice-Chair of the UN Commission on Sustainable
Development and is committed to the UNs work on the green economy and sustainable
consumption and production.141
As mentioned before, the High-Level Panel established by Kofi Annan in 2005
emphasised on the importance of the contribution to the United Nations and suggested the
developed countries should dedicate 0.7% of their national income to development aid. He said
this should be considered when voting for the Council. According to the United Nations target,
rich countries of the world have to allocate 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) to
foreign development aid by 2015 in order to reduce poverty. Our two competitors, Luxemburg
and Finland, are ahead of us in this regard. Luxemburg has already hit that target and currently
dedicates 1.09% of its GNI to foreign aid. Finland currently donates 0.55% of its GNI to reduce
poverty and is confident to reach the 0.7% target by 2015. Australia, however, allocates 0.32% of
its national income to development aid and is among the countries that asked the United Nations
to lower that target to 0.5% of the GNI in order to be able to fulfil it by 2015.142 To achieve this
goal, we have doubled our aid budget over the last five years to $4.36 billion and are committed
to further increase it to $8 billion over the next five years. Moreover, we are committed to
dedicate 0.15% of our GNI to the least developed countries.143
Although 87% of our aid program still goes to the neighbouring region (25% of this
amount goes to the South Pacific region and 25% to East Asia), there has been more attention to
Africa and the amount of aid to this continent has been doubled. One of the reasons for this
increase in the amount of aid to Africa is the fact that our competitors has been active in this
continent for a long time and we cannot afford to lose the 53 votes of the African countries.144
Australia might be much further behind the other two competitors in terms of international aid
but we started from a very low base, and although the aid is increasing rapidly, we still need time
140

Langmore, Security Council Reform, <http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policyforum/2008/langmore-UNSC>, viewed 6 September 2011.

141
Australia: Candidate for 2013-2014, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_candidature_brochure.pdf>, viewed 7
September 2011.
142
2010 International Aid Donated (Official Development Assistance), created in 2010 (data for 2011 will be
released in April 2012), Poverty.com Website, < http://www.poverty.com/internationalaid.html>, viewed 7
September 2011.
143
Australia: Candidate for 2013-2014, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_candidature_brochure.pdf>, viewed 7
September 2011.
144
Personal Interview, May 2011.

50

to reach to the level of our competitors. John Langmore said that our much lower rank in aid
giving in comparison to our competitors can be a serious impediment to our success. At the same
time we have to remind ourselves that we managed to increase our aid when it was very difficult
to do so and the constant increase of our aid is an achievement.145 Some commentators might
believe that we are not far behind our competitors if one considers the fact that in terms of the
actual amount, Australia donates more to the developing world. One Australian official said that
Luxemburg and Finland might be donating a higher percentage of their GNI, in terms of the
actual amount of international aid, we donate 3 times the amount of Finland and 9 times the
amount Luxemburg gives.146 However, it seems the percentage of the GNI that a country donates
matters more. Finland and Luxemburg are both smaller countries than Australia with lower total
GNI.
From the announcement of candidacy in 2008 until the 2012 election and the end of the
campaign, the total budget allocated to the campaign by the Australian Government will be $23.6
million.147 Referring to this amount, which is allocated over the course of 4.5 years and
comparing it with $26.5 billion we spent just this year on defence, John Langmore was highly
critical of those who oppose the candidacy on the grounds of the costs that it would impose. He
believes those who oppose the campaign have chosen to ignore the importance of conflict
resolution in maintaining the international peace and security and the role of the Security Council
in that regard. It seems they have chosen to believe the only way to protect a country is through
having a large military and spending with abundance on defence.148
As mentioned before, our politicians are quite serious about this campaign and are
lobbying hard in order to secure votes. However, some commentators believe that the efforts to
secure votes are distorting Australias foreign policy interests. Many, including Hugh White,

145

Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.

Personal Interview, May 2011.
147
Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2008-2009 asserted that the government will provide $1.9 million in
2008-2009 (including $0.1 million in capital funding in 2008-2009) to support initial efforts promoting Australias
candidacy for a non-permanent seat. In budget measures 2009-2010, it was stated that the government would
provide $11.2 million over the course of the next two years ($4.8 million in 2009-2010, $5.7 million in 2010-2011,
and $0.6 million in capital funding in 2009-2010) to continue Australias campaign for non-permanent seat. As the
budget paper explained this budget supports the campaign through funding additional staff at the New York
mission, deploying Special Envoys, supporting ministerial campaigning at key multilateral meetings and
undertaking public diplomacy among other things. Finally in 2011-2012 budget paper it was mentioned that
another $10.5 million is being allocated to the campaign over two years and it will support additional positions in
Canberra and New York, additional funding for small posts, Special Envoys and public diplomacy (from Mid Year
Economic and Fiscal Outlook (2008-09), Budget Measures 2009-10, and Budget Measures 2011-12)
148
Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.
146

51

Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, argue that
the Government is at a point where winning a seat in itself has become a foreign policy
objective; something that is not acceptable. It has been said that some of our recent foreign
policies and bilateral relations are being formed according to our campaign and the votes we
want to secure. The mission to secure votes from major world alliances such as the Africa Union,
the Arab League and the Caribbean community by Kevin Rudd has been criticised by some
commentator. Hugh White again criticises Kevin Rudd for travelling to the countries that we
wouldnt bother visiting otherwise merely to negotiate and secure their support for our
candidacy. It has been said that putting too much focus on the campaign is not beneficial for our
foreign policy because it makes our international policies subject to the pressure from different
countries as we need their votes.149
Considering all of the effort to get a non-permanent seat on the Council, one might ask
where we are now. Have our politicians been able to secure enough votes? Are we relatively
confident of success? Different experts that I spoke with had different ideas about our chances of
success and analysed our competitors differently. Robert Hill, despite affirming that WEOG
contests are always difficult to win, is optimistic about our success. He believes that our
competitors are two small European countries and it will be be equally hard to see us being
beaten in that competition.150 As he anticipated, not everyone shares this idea. Langmore is
among those who are not optimistic, especially when considering the credentials of our
competitors. According to him, Finland has an excellent record of development work. This
country is supporting World Institute for Development Economic Research and is very active in
the issues related to globalisation. In general, Finland has a high chance of getting to the Council.
Luxemburg has never served on the Council but is a member of the European Union and is likely
to get the support of other European countries.151 In agreeing with John Langmore, Hugh White
asserted that we are participating in a difficult contest with strong competitors; specifically he
believes that Finland will be very hard to beat. By pointing out that our competitors are likely
to get the support of European and African countries (considering they have considerable aid
programs in Africa), he is not quite hopeful for our win in 2012.152

149

Australias Bid for UN Seat under Scrutiny, created 28 July 2011, 7:30 Report Website,
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/s3280520.htm>, viewed 7 September 2011.
150
Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.
151
Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.
152
Australias Bid for UN Seat, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/s3280520.htm>, viewed 7 September
2011.

52

We should also analyse from which countries or blocks Australia is hopeful to get
support. Despite the recent increase in our development aid to Africa, Alexander Downer, former
Foreign Minister, believes that Australia does not have a high profile in this continent and is not
likely to get support from 53 members of the African Union. 153 I asked one Australian official
what she thinks about the support from the European Union, considering we are competing
against two EU members. She did not believe that European countries only vote for European
candidates and mentioned that EU members campaign and present their cases individually to
each of the European countries. Therefore, there is a chance that some of the European countries
may choose to vote for us. She also mentioned that in the last round of the election, nineteen
countries short-voted and cast only one vote. Obviously, if we can persuade some countries to
short-vote for us, it will be an additional advantage but it requires extra complication and perhaps
stronger lobbying.154 It is also believed that Australia is not doing well among the South-East
Asian countries as Fiji is lobbying hard against our country and is trying to convince other
neighbouring countries not to vote for us.155 However, when a country runs for candidacy, it will
inevitably attract these unwanted attentions and we have to continue our efforts as the amount
and type of the support might again change until the election year.
There are also some other issues that might affect the amount of support from other
countries. One is the fact that Australia has started its campaign long after the two other
competitors. Luxemburg started its campaign in 2001 and Finland announced its candidacy in
2002. However, Australia started its run in March 2008. Although there is no time limit for the
candidacy and countries can nominate themselves at any time before the election, starting late
might act as an impediment to our success. Some, like Robert Hill, might believe that this
argument is over-rated as Germany started last in the previous election and was successful,156
but it should not be overlooked that starting six years after our two competitors can be an
obstacle to our success when many countries, like Indonesia, which could be a potential
supporter, have already done deals and promised their support elsewhere.157
The resemblance between our policies and those of the USA is another issue that might
reduce the amount of support for us. Many countries may think that Australia is an adjunct of
153

Ibid.
Personal Interview, May 2011.
155
Australias Bid for UN Seat, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/s3280520.htm>, viewed 7 September
2011.
156
Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.
157
Australias Bid for UN Seat, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/s3280520.htm>, viewed 7 September
2011.
154

53

Washington while on the Security Council, and therefore might be hesitant to support our bid for
the seat. John Langmore agrees with this thesis while saying that this similarity in decision
making was particularly true under the Howard Government but the current Labour Government
has become relatively more independent. One example of this was Kevin Rudds comments that
urged the Israelis to be more open and transparent about their nuclear program; something that
the USA clearly did not support. Moreover, Australia has been critical of the USA on trade
issues. Nevertheless, some countries might still consider Australia too close to the USAs
opinions (especially on many strategic questions) and therefore do not consider us able to offer a
distinguishable input.158
The usual pro-Israeli stance of Australia can affect the support of Arab nations. Hashem
Yousseff, Chief of Cabinet for Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, by referring to the
pro-Israeli stance of Australia and the fact that it usually opposes anti-settlement resolutions in
the General Assembly in alliance with the US, Canada and some small Pacific island states,
mentioned that this support is an important element that the members of Arab League would take
into consideration when deciding who to vote for in the 2012 election. Therefore, it would be
more difficult for us to outpoll European countries that are usually more critical of Israel. It has
been discussed that the Arab League, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement
members usually tend to vote in accordance with each other. If true, the determined opposition
from any of these groups can be detrimental to our success. It seems, however, that Rudd was
aware of this fact and under his government Canberra became slightly more critical of Israel; a
stance that brought about lots of criticism from Jewish communities even though in general
Canberra maintained its support for Israel for the majority of the resolutions. 159 Jake Lynch
argues that the stance of Kevin Rudd towards Israel was among the reasons that cost him his job.
He believes under Gillard, Australia has reverted to its previous form and is again voting
without exemption against those GA resolutions that call for the withdrawal of Israel to pre-1967
borders. Yousseff in a conversation with Lynch and his colleague asserted that he had made it
clear to Canberra that Australia could only look to Arab countries for support of its candidacy if
it took some steps to distance itself from Washington on the issues related to Israel-Palestine

158

Personal Interview with John Langmore, June 2011.

Greg Sheridan, Arabs to Block Canberras UN Push, created 2 February 2010, The Australian Newspaper,
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/arabs-tobrblock-unbrpush-bybrcanberra/story-e6frg6zo1225825706028>, viewed 7 September 2011.
159

54

conflict.160 However, upon asking, an Australian official rejected the possibility of changing any
policies on this issue to secure more votes. While acknowledging the impact of our stance
towards Israel on the votes of Arab countries, she asserted that Middle Eastern policies are not
driven by the UNSC campaign.161 Despite this clear message, it still seems that one measure
that can boost our chances of success and can lead to more support from Arab countries is
supporting the Palestinian statehood bid, or at least abstaining from voting, because voting
against this resolution can be much to our disadvantage in this crucial time. However, we have to
wait and see if our Government will consider this fact.
Lastly, there are two other issues that might negatively affect our chances of success. One
of them is our membership in the G20. Kevin Rudd in his speech to the National Press Club
emphasised that the G20 is our first foreign policy priority. According to him, we want to be as
engaged as possible in this group and are working hard with other G20 members to maintain the
confidence of developing countries in this group.162 However, the amount of criticism around
this group indicates that many countries do not highly value the G20. One of my interviewees
commented that the Government is very mindful of this issue and its effects on the candidacy
bid. He mentioned that the hard-earned membership in this group is a high priority for us but we
are taking some measures to reduce the amount of criticism; one of them is encouraging the
Secretary-General to act as a link between this group and the United Nations.163 It is also
believed that the Opposition is not as keen as the Labour party to get on the Security Council. If
true, it can be a major impediment especially if we consider the example of Canada. In the
October 2010 election, Canada withdrew before the third round of voting as it became obvious
that they are not going to beat Portugal. There were many reasons involved in the defeat of
Canada such as the stance of the Arab countries towards Canada because of its policies.
However, the candidacy did not also have the necessary support from all houses.164 After the
election, Harper blamed the Opposition leader Michael Ignatieff for questioning the campaign
and leading to the belief that the Canadian politicians were not one hundred percent united and

160

Jake Lynch, Toeing the Lobby Line, created 8 February 2011, New Matilda Website,
<http://newmatilda.com/2011/02/08/toeing-lobby-line >, viewed 7 September 2011.
161
Personal Interview, May 2011.
162
Rudd, Our Candidature for the UN Security Council,
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2011/kr_sp_110601.html>, viewed 7 September 2011.
163
Personal Interview, May 2011.
164
Interview in May 2011 and Personal Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.

55

Conclusion
supportive of the bid as the Portuguese and German politicians were.165 The same thing can
happen to Australia.
In the end, we have to wait and see whether the efforts of Kevin Rudd and other
politicians in lobbying for votes, and other measures taken to enhance our chance of success can
finally overcome all of the problems and strong credentials of our competitors. After all, this
forum despite all of its flaws is important and as Richard Woolcott, the last Australian
Ambassador to the United Nations who sat on the Council said you can make a difference if you
are on the Security Council.166
The United Nations Security Council, the main body of the UN, is mandated by the Charter with
the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Thorough analysis of
the functions of this Council sheds light on the flaws of this body; the flaws that have led to
increasing calls for reform. Five permanent members of the Security Council, who are the only
veto holding members, have used the exclusive power of veto to affect the agenda and decisions
of the Council and drive them according to their own interests or those of their allies. On
numerous occasions, these countries have managed to keep an important conflict off its agenda.
Increasing calls for reform have led to numerous proposals for the better functioning of
the Council which are put forward by different countries or group of countries. So far, these
proposals have not been successful and several meetings and countless hours of discussions have
not born fruit. Countries still actively oppose each other for self-interest and paying too much
attention to the details of the procedure has distracted them from focusing on practical steps
towards reform. So far, they have not been able to agree on any proposals. Moreover, any
165

Joanna Slater, Canada Abandons UN Bid in Embarrassing Turn for Harper, created 12 October 2010, The Globe
and Mail, < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-abandons-un-bid-in-embarrassing-turn-forharper/article1753222/ >, viewed 7 September 2011.
166
Australias Bid for UN Seat, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/s3280520.htm>, viewed 7 September
2011.

56

amendment to the Charter does not seem achievable especially considering the fact that all
permanent members have veto power over Charter change. We have to wait and see whether in
the future there will be any proposals that can attract the support of the majority of the countries
and whether that proposal can be inscribed into the Charter.
No matter how flawed, the Security Council is still the only UN body with the ability to
issue binding resolutions and is the only organ in charge of conflict resolution and maintaining
international peace and security. Australia is competing against Finland and Luxemburg to get
one of the two non-permanent seats assigned to the WEOG and serve in the Council in the period
of 2013-2014. The competition is tough and our competitors have strong credentials. The
election in October 2012 will determine whether our efforts have been enough to get us onto the
Council and end our long absence from this forum.

57

Appendix I: Trend of Use of Veto Poweri

Date

Vetoing

Vote (for-veto-

Draft

member

abstain or

No.

Text Subject

Initiated by

against)
11 May 1993

Russia

14-1-0

S/25693

On the finances of UN

The UK

operations on Cyprus
Bosnia and
Herzegovina,

2 December

Russia

1994

13-1-1 (China

S/1994/1358

abstained)

On Bosnia and

Croatia,

Herzegovina (Transport

Djibouti,

of goods between the

Egypt, Nigeria,

former Yugoslavia and

Oman,

Bosnia)

Pakistan,
Rwanda,
Turkey
Botswana,

17 May 1995

USA

14-1-0

S/1995/394

On the Occupied Arab

Honduras,

Territories (East

Indonesia,

Jerusalem)

Nigeria, Oman,
Rwanda
Argentina,
Chile,

10 January 1997

China

14-1-0

S/1997/18

Authorisation for 155

Colombia,

observers for the

Costa Rica,

purpose of verification

Mexico,

of the agreement of on

Norway,

the definite ceasefire in

Portugal,

Guatemala

Spain, Sweden,
The UK, The
US, Venezuela

7 March 1997

USA

14-1-0

S/1997/199

58

Calling upon Israel to

France,

refrain from East

Portugal,

Jerusalem settlement

Sweden, The

activities

UK

Date

Vetoing

Vote (for-veto-

Draft

member

abstain or

No.

Text Subject

Initiated by

against)
Demanding Israels
S/1997/241
21 March 1997

USA

immediate cession of

Egypt and

13-1-1 (Costa Rica

construction at Jabal

Qatar

abstained)

Abu Ghneim in East

Jerusalem
Canada,

25 February

China

1999

13-1-1 (Russia

S/1999/201

abstained)

On the extension of

France,

UNPREDEP in the

Germany,

former Yugoslav

Italy,

Republic of Macedonia

Netherland,
Slovenia, The
UK, The US

27 March 2001

USA

On establishing a UN

Bangladesh,

observer force to

Colombia,

protect Palestinian

Jamaica, Mali,

Ireland, Norway,

civilians (considering

Mauritius,

the UK abstained)

report of UNSC

Singapore,

meeting SC/7040)

Tunisia

9-1-4 (France,

S/2001/270

On the withdrawal of
Israeli forces from
14 December

USA

2001

12-1-2 (Norway

S/2001/1199

Palestine-controlled

Egypt and

and the UK

territory and

Tunisia

abstained)

condemning acts of
terror against civilians

30 June 2002

USA

13-1-1 (Bulgaria

S/2002/712

abstained)

On the renewal of the

Bulgaria,

UN peacekeeping

France,

mission in Bosnia and

Germany,

the immunity of US

Ireland, Italy,

peacekeepers from ICC

Norway,

jurisdiction

Russia, The
UK

59

Date

Vetoing

Vote (for-veto-

Draft

member

abstain or

No.

Text Subject

Initiated by

against)
On the killing of the
Israeli forces of several
United Nations
20 December

USA

2002

12-1-2 (Bulgaria

S/2002/1385

employees and the

and Cameroon

destruction of the

abstained)

World Food

Syria

Programme warehouse

16 September

USA

2003

14 October

USA

2003

On the Israeli decision

Pakistan, South

to remove Palestinian

Africa, Sudan,

Germany and the

Authority leader Yasser

Syria

UK abstained)

Arafat

10-1-4 (Bulgaria,

On the security wall

Guinea,

built by Israel in the

Malaysia,

West Bank

Pakistan, Syria

11-1-3 (Bulgaria,

Cameroon,

S/2003/891

S/2003/980

Germany and the

UK abstained)

On the condemnation
11-1-3 (Germany,
25 March 2004

USA

Romania and the

S/2004/240

UK abstained)

of killing of Ahmad

Algeria and

Yassin, the leader of

Libya

the Islamic Resistance

Movement Hamas
On the termination of
the mandate of the UN
Peacekeeping Force in

21 April 2004

Russia

14-1-0

S/2004/313

Cyprus (UNFICYP)

The UK and

and replacing it with

The US

the UN Settlement
Implementation
Mission in Cyprus

11-1-3 (Germany,
5 October 2004

USA

S/2004/783

On the demand to Israel

Algeria,

Romania and the

to halt all military

Pakistan,

UK abstained)

operations in Northern

Tunisia

Gaza and withdrawal

from the area

60

Date

Vetoing

Vote (for-veto-

Draft

member

abstain or

No.

Text Subject

Initiated by

against)
On the demands for the
unconditional release of
an Israeli soldier
10-1-4 (Denmark,
13 July 2006

USA

Peru, Slovakia, the

captured earlier as well

S/2006/508

UK abstained)

as Israel's immediate

Qatar

withdrawal from Gaza

and the release of
dozens of Palestinian
officials detained by
Israel.
On the Israeli military
operation in Gaza, the
Palestinian rocket fire

10-1-4 (Denmark,
11 November

USA

2006

Japan, Slovakia,

into Israel, the call for

S/2006/878

the UK abstained)

immediate withdrawal

Qatar

of Israeli forces from

the Gaza strip and a
cessation of violence
from both parties in the
conflict

9-2-4 (South

12 January 2007

Russia and

Africa against;

China

Congo, Indonesia

The UK and
S/2007/14

On Myanmar (Burma)

US

Condemning the

Australia,

9-2-4 (Libya,

violence by the

Belgium,

South Africa and

government of

Canada,

Zimbabwe against the

Croatia,

and Qatar
abstained)

11 July 2008

Russia and

Vietnam against;

S/2008/447

China

Indonesia

civilians after the

France, Italy,

abstained)

election of June 27 and

Liberia, New

demanding an

Zealand,

immediate cease of

Netherland,

attacks against and

Sierra Leone,

intimidation of

The UK, The

opposition members

US

61

and supporters

Date

Vetoing

Vote (for-veto-

Draft

member

abstain or

No.

Text Subject

Initiated by

against)
Austria,
10-1-4(China,
15 June 2009

Russia

On the extension of the

Croatia,

UN observer missions

France,

Vietnam

mandate in Georgia and

Germany,

abstained)

Abkhazia

Turkey, The

Libya, Uganda and

S/2009/310

UK, The US
On describing the
Israeli settlement in

18 February

USA

14-1-0

S/2011/24

2011

Palestinian territory

Co-sponsored

occupied since 1967

by 130

illegal and

countries

demanding all
settlement activities
cease immediately

Country
The US

Total number of veto used between

1991-2011
14

Russia

China

The UK
France

0
0

Issue
13
regarding
Israel-Palestine
conflict, 1 regarding ICC
2 regarding Cyprus, 1 regarding
Balkans, 1 regarding Georgia, 2 to
support Burma and Zimbabwe (two
of its allies)
2 against countries supporting
Taiwan, 2 to support Burma and
Zimbabwe (two of its allies)
-----------------------------------------------------------

Subjects of UN Security Council Vetos, created in 2009, Global policy Forum Website, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tablesand-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/subjects-of-un-security-council-vetoes.html>, viewed 24 August 2011; UN Security Council (2010):
Resolutions, Presidential Statements, Meeting records, created in 2010, Security Council press releases,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2010.htm>, viewed 24 August 2011; UN Security Council (2011): Resolutions, Presidential
Statements, Meeting records, created in 2011, Security Council press releases, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2011.htm>,
viewed 24 August 2011.

62

Appendix II: The Legality of NATO Actions in Kosovo

The bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO forces generated extensive debates on the legality
of those actions in terms of existing international law. The UN Charter, the main instrument of
international law, in article 2(4) of chapter I prohibits the threat or use of force in international
relations. This prohibition is binding to all UN Member States. The Charter, however, permits
the use of force on three occasions: I) based on article 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter, if the
measures not involving the use of force proved to be inadequate, the Council can take action by
air, sea, or land forces to maintain or restore international peace and security. In order to do so
and according to article 43, all UN members, upon being requested by the Council, should make
available to the Council armed forces, assistance and facilities including rights of passage II)
according to article 51 of Chapter VII, nothing can impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack happens against a Member State, until the Security
Council takes necessary measures to restore international peace and security. Therefore, in this
case no prior authorisation from the Council is needed. Only the actions taken should be
immediately reported to the Council and should not undermine the authority and responsibility of
the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security.167 Moreover, in the case of collective
self-defence there are other parameters which must be satisfied before the attack. There should
be an actual armed attack on a victim state and that state must explicitly ask for help. The scale
of self-defence must be proportionate to the attack as well.168 III) according to article 53 of
Chapter VIII, the Security Council, where appropriate, can use regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement actions. This article explicitly states that no enforcement action shall
be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the
Security Council.169
In determining the legality of the NATO actions in Kosovo, we have to understand that
the NATO falls under which chapter of the UN Charter. NATO is a powerful security
organisation which according to its Charter is based on the provisions of article 51, Chapter VII
of the Charter. NATO Charter explains that:
167

The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945),

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>, viewed 25 August 2011.
168
OConnell, The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo, p.59.
169
The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945),
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>, viewed 25 August 2011.

63

the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.

This Charter further confirms that such an action must be reported to the Council and be
terminated as soon as the Security Council steps in and takes the matter into its own hands (in
compliance with the provisions of article 51).170 Therefore, the NATO considers itself an
organisation based on article 51. The Security Council, on the other hand, has been ambiguous
about how it considers the NATO. For the first two missions of this security organisation (Bosnia
bombing campaign and an arms embargo on Yugoslavia) and based on the language of the
UNSC resolutions, it seems that the Council considered the NATO as a regional agency or an
organisation under Chapter VIII. However, on some occasions and when the Council specifically
referred to the NATO, the only Chapter it quoted was Chapter VII. When talking explicitly about
the NATO, the Security Council usually mentioned that the NATO answered the call of the
Council for troops and never said it gave authorisation to the NATO to take actions.171
It is believed that the NATO never took an action based on the principles of collective
self-defence.172 What happened in Kosovo was not collective self-defence either as none of the
NATO members were attacked by the Yugoslav army. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 and in
Agenda for Peace confirmed, any regional organisations in order to use force (not in collective
self-defence) need Security Council authorisation.173 Therefore, considering that what happened
in Kosovo was not an example of collective self-defence, one can conclude that however the
NATO is regarded (either Chapter VII or Chapter VIII organisation), it needed the UNSC
authorisation to bombard Yugoslavia. If it is regarded as a Chapter VII organisation that can
answer the call of the Security Council for troops, it needs the authorisation. Similarly if it is

170

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), NATO Website,
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>, viewed 25 August 2011.
171
OConnell, The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo, pp.62-70.
172
Ibid., p.60.
173
Ibid., p.70.

64

regarded as a Chapter VIII regional agency, it again needs that authorisation prior to attack.
Therefore, the NATO actions were illegal in terms of international law.

65

Appendix III: Arms Exporters

The following table shows ten top arms exporting countries in the last decade:174
First
rank
in
arms
expor
t
USA
(8641)
USA
(6658)
USA
(6288)

Secon
d rank
in
arms
export

Third
rank in
arms
export

Fifth
rank in
arms
export

Sixth
rank in
arms
export

Sevent
h rank
in arms
export

Eighth
rank
in
arms
export

Ninth
rank in
arms
export

Tenth
rank in
arms
export

Contributi
on
of
other
countries

Germany
(2340)
Germany
(2432)
Germany
(2500)

Fourt
h
rank
in
arms
export
China
(1423)
France
(1865)
France
(1994)

Russia
(6039)
Russia
(5575)
Russia
(5953)

UK
(1054)
UK
(1022)
UK
(982)

France
(834)
China
(1000)
China
(586)

Italy
(627)
Netherlands
(545)
Sweden
(454)

Netherlan
ds (503)
Italy
(514)
Italy
(417)

Israel
(472)
Sweden
(383)
Israel
(281)

2249

Russia
(5426)

Germany
(3194)

France
(2432)

UK
(1018)

Israel
(438)

China
(430)

Sweden
(366)

3067

USA
(7453)

Russia
(5095)

Germany
(2567)

France
(1643)

UK
(855)

China
(597)

Italy
(502)

Sweden
(432)

Israel
(299)

3155

2005

USA
(6700)

Russia
(5134)

Germany
(2080)

France
(1724)

Netherl
ands
(1326)
Netherl
ands
(1187)
UK
(1039)

Sweden
(806)
Israel
(807)
Netherl
ands
(530)
Italy
(684)

2007

USA
(8003)

2006

Italy
(774)

Sweden
(538)

Israel
(368)

China
(303)

1776

2004

USA
(6866)

Russia
(6178)

France
(2219)

UK
(1316)

Israel
(628)

China
(292)

Italy
(212)

USA
(5698)
Russia
(5705)

Russia
(5236)
USA
(5229)

Germany
(1713)
France
(1368)

France
(1345)
UK
(1068)

China
(665)
China
(509)

Sweden
(526)
Israel
(436)

Israel
(368)
Italy
(426)

USA
(5908)

Russia
(5896)

UK
(1368)

France
(1297)

Sweden
(880)

German
y (850)

China
(499)

Israel
(407)

Netherlan
ds (342)
Netherlan
ds
(239)
Italy
(216)

Netherl
ands
(209)
Italy
(341)
Sweden
(191)

1913

2003

German
y
(1105)
UK
(741)
German
y (916)

Netherl
ands
(583)
Sweden
(314)

Netherl
ands
(203)

1879

2010
2009
2008

2002

2001

(The numbers in parenthesis are Trend Value Indicators expressed in US million dollars at constant 1990 prices.
They might not present real financial flows but are a crude instrument to estimate the volumes of arms transfers,
regardless of the contracted prices.)

The following graph shows the trend of the arms exportation of each of the P5 during the last
decade. The horizontal axis is the year and the vertical axis is the Trade Indicator Value
expressed in US million dollars constant at 1990 prices.

174

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, created in real-time, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
<http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>, viewed 28 August 2011.

66

3221
3253

2294
1820

10000
9000
8000
7000
The USA

6000

Russia

5000

France

4000

The UK
3000

China

2000
1000
0
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Trend of the P5's arms exportation in the last decade (2001-2010)

Finally, the following pie chart shows the percentage of the contribution of the P5 to arms export
in the last decade (2000-2010) in comparison with the rest of the world.

Comparing the Contribution of theP5 to Arms

Exports with the Rest of the World (2000-2010)
The USA
Russia
The UK
France
China
Rest of the world

67

Appendix IV: G20175

The following table provides some information about the current population of the G20 countries
and their GDP, both in terms of the actual numbers and in terms of the percentage of the worlds
total population and the worlds total GDP. Considering the total population of the world is 6.95
billion,176 the combined population of the G20 countries represents 67.6% of the world
population. Moreover, the GDP of the world in 2010 was 74.54 trillion dollars, therefore the
combined GDP of the G20 countries represents 95% of the worlds GDP.

Country
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
European Union
France
Germany
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Russia
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
South Korea
Turkey
The UK
The US
Total

Population (July
2011 estimate)
41.8 million
21.8 million
203.4 million
34.0 million
1.3 billion
492.4 million
65.3 million
81.5 million
1.2 billion
245.6 million
61.0 million
126.5 million
113.7 million
138.7 million
26.1 million
49.0 million
48.7 million
78.8 million
62.7 million
313.2 million
4.7 billion

GDP (PPP)*
(2010 data)
$596 billion
$882.4 billion
$2.2 trillion
$1.3 trillion
$10.1 trillion
$14.8 trillion
$2.1 trillion
$2.9 trillion
$4.1 trillion
$1.0 trillion
$1.8 trillion
$4.3 trillion
$1.6 trillion
$2.2 trillion
$622 billion
$524 billion
$1.5 trillion
$960.5 billion
$2.2 trillion
$14.7 trillion
$70 trillion

Percentage of the
world population
0.60%
0.31%
2.93%
0.49%
18.70%
7.08%
0.94%
1.17%
17.27%
3.53%
0.88%
1.82%
1.64%
2.00%
0.37%
0.70%
0.70%
1.13%
0.90%
4.51%
67.6%

Percentage of the
worlds GDP
0.85%
1.26%
3.14%
1.86%
14.43%
21.14%
3.00%
4.14%
5.86%
1.43%
2.57%
6.14%
2.28%
3.14%
0.89%
0.75%
2.14%
1.37%
3.14%
21.00%
95%

* GDP: Gross Domestic Product (the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year).
GDP is usually described on PPP basis (Purchasing Power Parity).

175
176

The data presented in this table are from CIA World Factbook.
US Consensus Bureau Website, viewed 20 August 2011.

68

Appendix V: Selected Bibliography

2010 International Aid Donated (Official Development Assistance), created in 2010,
Poverty.com

Website,

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