Social

Justice
Report

2003
Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander
Social Justice Commissioner
Report of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner
to the Attorney-General as required by section 46C(1)(a) Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.

 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.

This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no
part may be reproduced without prior written permission from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.
Requests and inquiries concerning the reproduction of materials should be directed to the
Executive Director, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, GPO Box 5218, Sydney
NSW 2001.
ISSN 1321-11

Cover Design and Desktop Publishing by Jo Clark

Printed by J S McMillan Printing Group
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner acknowledges the work
of Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission staff (Giovanna Castellani, Janis
Constable, Darren Dick, Eleanor Hogan, Christopher Holland and Natalie Walker) as well as
Caroline and Judy Atkinson and the students of Gnibi College of Indigenous Australians,
Southern Cross University in producing this report.

Artist Acknowledgement
All images reproduced on the cover are by photographer Wayne Quilliam of Tribal Vision
Photography. Wayne created Tribal Vision Photography 15 years ago and is based in
Melbourne. Waynes vision is to work with the community at all levels to create photographs
that accurately depict all aspects of our culture while respecting everyones values. While
Waynes vision remains he is now trying to encourage more people to become photographers
to ensure we build a solid bank of talent that will represent our people in the future.
Wayne can be contacted either by calling 0413 812 222 or by email at TribalVision@hotmail.com.
Wayne has provided an explanation of each image reproduced on the cover. From left to right
Eyes to the Soul, 2003, was taken on Horn Island in the Torres Strait Islands after the photographer
met the students at the Croc Festival in Weipa earlier that year; Shades of Black, 2002, was taken
at the Sydney Olympic stadium when the first Australian Rules football match was ever played
there. To celebrate the night the AFL dedicated the night to Indigenous footballers and the
community and a huge celebration was held; and Untitled, the girls in the image are a part of a
dance group on the Gold Coast called Guma Dhagun Bugeram Dancers which means strong
spiritual country. Their aim is to preserve our culture and tackle family issues in a culturally
appropriate manner.
We thank Wayne and Tribal Vision Photography for granting us permission to reproduce these
images. Copyright is held by the artist.

About the Social Justice Commission logo

The right section of the design is a contemporary view of a traditional
Dari or head-dress, a symbol of the Torres Strait Islander people and
culture. The head-dress suggests the visionary aspect of the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission. The dots placed
in the Dari represent a brighter outlook for the future provided by the
Commissions visions, black representing people, green representing
islands and blue representing the seas surrounding the islands. The
Goanna is a general symbol of the Aboriginal people.
The combination of these two symbols represents the coming together
of two distinct cultures through the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Social Justice Commission and the support, strength and unity which it can provide through
the pursuit of Social Justice and Human Rights. It also represents an outlook for the future of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice expressing the hope and expectation that
one day we will be treated with full respect and understanding.
Leigh Harris.

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

30 January 2004
The Hon Phillip Ruddock
Attorney-General
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

Dear Attorney
I am pleased to transmit to you the Social Justice Report 2003.
The report is provided in accordance with section 46C of the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission Act 1986, which provides that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Justice Commissioner is to submit a report regarding the enjoyment and
exercise of human rights by Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders, and including
recommendations as to the action that should be taken to ensure the exercise and
enjoyment of human rights by those persons.
This years report addresses issues relating to reconciliation, government accountability
for service delivery, progress in the Council of Australian Governments whole-ofgovernment community trials, capacity building and governance reform in Indigenous
communities, ATSIC reform, progress in addressing petrol sniffing issues on the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara Lands, and programmes addressing family violence in Indigenous
communities.
The report contains a number of recommendations relating to these issues, which are
reproduced at the beginning of the report. I look forward to receiving the Governments
response to the issues raised in the report in due course.
Yours sincerely

Dr William Jonas AM
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Social Justice Commissioner

Office of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner
Level 8, Piccadilly Tower, 133 Castlereagh Street, Sydney, NSW 2000
GPO Box 5218, Sydney, NSW 2001
Telephone: 02 9284 9600 Facsimile: 02 9284 9611
Website: http://www.humanrights.gov.au ABN 47 996 232 602

Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction
Structure of this report
Postscript An annual progress report on reconciliation

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Reconciliation and government accountability

1
3
5
7
8
9
9
13

Reconciliation
National progress towards reconciliation in 2003 Key developments
a) A highly controlled commitment to practical reconciliation
b) Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage
c) Implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian
Governments
Conclusion Government accountability for reconciliation

24
54

Indigenous participation in decision making

Transforming the relationship between
government and Indigenous peoples

57

A relationship of dependence Challenging the existing service

delivery approach
Facilitating Indigenous participation and moving beyond welfare
dependency The governments approach
Capacity building in Indigenous communities and governance reform
ATSICs framework for capacity building and sustainable development
Capacity building and governance reform an agenda for change
Strengthening the role of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission
Conclusion

58
62
67
82
88
89
105

Chapter 4

Responding to petrol sniffing on the Anangu

Pitjantjatjara Lands: A case study
Petrol sniffing and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities
Petrol sniffing on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands: A case study
Progress in responding to the recommendations of the Coronial
Inquest into petrol sniffing on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands
Conclusion a blueprint for action

Chapter 5

Addressing family violence in Indigenous

communities
Indigenous perspectives on family violence
The extent of family violence in Indigenous communities
Government Responses to Family Violence in Indigenous communities
Improving the programmatic responses to family violence in
Indigenous communities Future challenges
Conclusion

107
108
116
122
152

155
157
161
168
179
191

Appendix 1 A statistical overview of Aboriginal and Torres

Strait Islanderpeoples in Australia

195

Appendix 2 The Council of Australian Governments wholeof-government community trials initiative

227

Appendix 3 Extract from findings of Coronial inquests on

petrol sniffing on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands

251

Recommendations
In accordance with the functions set out in section 46C(1)(a) of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), this report includes
12 recommendations. The recommendations appear in the text of the report
and are also reproduced here.

Recommendation 1 on reconciliation:
Data collection
1.

That the federal government request the Australian Bureau of Statistics

(ABS) to provide to COAG information on the actions that need to be
taken in order to improve Indigenous data collection. The ABS should
respond to the suggestions made by the Steering Committee for the
Review of Government Service Delivery in the Overcoming Indigenous
Disadvantage Report 2003, as well as identify actions that they consider
necessary to ensure the availability of relevant data on a regular basis. In
providing this information, the ABS should:
identify those issues that could be addressed through improvements
to its existing data collection processes, as well as those issues which
would require additional one-off funding allocations and those issues
which would require additional recurrent funding from the federal
government or COAG;
estimate the cost of any additional one-off and recurrent funding
needs, including the cost of conducting the Indigenous General Social
Survey on a triennial basis; and
consult with the Steering Committee for the Review of Government
Services, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, and
other relevant agencies.

Recommendations 2 -5 on Reconciliation:
Ministerial Council Action Plans
2.

That the federal government, through its leadership role in the Council of
Australian Governments, ensure that all Commonwealth / State Ministerial
Councils finalise action plans on addressing Indigenous disadvantage
and reconciliation by 30 June 2004. These action plans must contain
benchmarks, with specific timeframes (covering short, medium and long
term objectives) for their realisation. Where appropriate, these
benchmarks should correlate with the strategic change indicators and
headline indicators reported annually by the Steering Committee for the
Provision of Government Services.

3.

4.

5.

That the federal government, through its leadership role in the Council of
Australian Governments, request the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC) to advise COAG whether it endorses these action
plans and the benchmarks contained within, following consultations
through its Regional Councils. ATSIC should be required to advise COAG
of its endorsement or any concerns about the action plans within a
maximum period of six months after being furnished with the action plans.
That the federal government ensure that all Commonwealth / State
Ministerial Council Action Plans are made publicly available as a
compendium of national commitments to overcoming Indigenous
disadvantage.
That COAG publicly report on progress in meeting the benchmarks
contained in each Commonwealth / State Ministerial Council Action Plan
on an annual basis.

Recommendations 6-9 on reconciliation:

COAG Whole-of-government community trials
6.

7.

8.

9.

That the federal government, through the Department of Immigration,

Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, commit to the existence of the
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce for a minimum of the
five year duration of the COAG whole-of-government community trials
and accordingly commit resources to the Taskforce until 2007.
That federal government departments participating in the COAG wholeof-government trials increase their staffing commitments to the Indigenous
Communities Coordination Taskforce by placing additional officers in the
Taskforces Secretariat.
That COAG request the Productivity Commission (as Chair of the Steering
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) to provide
advice on aligning the benchmarks and outcomes agreed at the local
level with COAGs National Framework for Reporting on Indigenous
Disadvantage. This advice should include any recommendations for
adapting the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce Database
to enable reporting of outcomes against this National Framework.
That COAG agree and fund an independent monitoring and evaluation
process for the whole-of-government community trials initiative. The
Productivity Commission, Commonwealth Grants Commission or ATSICs
National Office of Evaluation and Audit would be suitable agencies to
conduct this review.

Recommendations 10-12 on capacity building and

governance reform
10.

11.

12.

That COAG adopt ATSICs Integrated framework on capacity building

and sustainable development as a central component of its Reconciliation
Framework.
That COAG also provide funding for research into best-practice models
of governance reform and capacity building relating to Indigenous peoples
in Australia. Such research should be based on overseas models such
as the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, and
build on the findings of existing work on governance reform in Australia.
That the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (Cth)
ensure that reform of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976
(Cth) is treated as a high priority of the federal government and ensure
extensive consultation is undertaken with Indigenous peoples about
proposed amendments to the legislation. Any proposed legislative
reforms should be in accordance with the recommendations of the 2002
review of the Acts operation. In particular, proposed amendments should
recognise the need for special regulatory assistance for Indigenous
organisations and maintain a distinct legislative framework for regulation
outside of the Corporations Act as a special measure.

Chapter 1

Introduction
This is my fifth Social Justice Report as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Social Justice Commissioner. In the course of this report I look back at
developments over the past five years to ascertain the extent to which we are
moving towards achieving long term, sustainable improvements in the situation
of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the extent to which government
policy making and program delivery is inhibiting such improvement.
As I have prepared this report, I have had a number of questions in mind such
as, when we look at the current approaches and priorities of governments to
Indigenous policies and programs, what is working well? What is not? Where
are we making progress? Where are we going backwards? And ultimately, what
needs to be done?
In addressing these questions, I have not sought to provide a comprehensive
overview of every area of life of Indigenous peoples and of governmental activity.
Not only is such a review beyond the scope of the resources available to me,
but we already have a number of processes in place which provide us with
partial answers to these questions.
In 2003, we have had the release of 2001 Census data and various analyses of
that which provides a clear picture of the level of progress in improving the
material conditions of Indigenous peoples lives. We also had the first report of
the Steering Committee on the Provision of Government Services on overcoming
Indigenous disadvantage, which has drawn this and other statistical information
together within an integrated, multi-dimensional framework. Other significant
processes included the annual report on government services (or Blue Book)
by the Productivity Commission, which provided an overview of expenditure
and programs for Indigenous peoples; and the report of the Senate Legal and
Constitutional References Committee on national progress towards
reconciliation.
Instead, I have approached these questions in three ways. First, I have provided
an overview of key developments in relation to Indigenous well-being and socioeconomic status based on recently released data, including the 2001 Census.
Second, I have approached the issue thematically by examining progress in
relation to the following key themes: accountability (including monitoring and

Chapter 1

evaluation frameworks, benchmarking and measuring progress within a human

rights framework), participation (including representation of Indigenous peoples
in decision making and service delivery, and the role of ATSIC), moving beyond
welfare dependency (including sustainable development and capacity building),
and reconciliation.
Third, I have examined some critical issues that raise significant challenges for
governments in the short, medium and long terms, such as the responsiveness
of governments to specific, urgent issues relating to family violence and petrol
sniffing.
Overall, this report concludes that there are a number of recent initiatives which
are moving us in the right direction, as well as small gains being made in some
areas. Of particular note are recent developments in implementing the Council
of Australian Governments commitments to reconciliation through the finalisation
and first release of the national indicators on overcoming Indigenous
disadvantage and the whole-of-government community trials.
There is also a lot of talk from governments about the need to change the way
they interact with and provide services to Indigenous peoples and communities.
There is a level of optimism created by the determined words of senior
government members to pursue a changed approach, particularly through their
efforts in the eight Council of Australian Governments whole-of-government
community trial sites.
Processes for moving towards such change are, however, still in the preliminary
stage and action or results are yet to be achieved. Developments over the
coming year in relation to support for capacity building, corporate governance
reform of Indigenous organisations and reform to ATSIC will be critical issues in
this regard.
What is not yet entirely clear is whether the emphasis of governments is on
doing better exactly what they do now or whether it involves a more radical
transformation of the relationship, with governments instead attempting to do
what they currently do differently.
This optimism that there might be change in the air is accompanied, however,
by a level of uncertainty for Indigenous peoples. This uncertainty relates in
large part to the upheaval that has centred on the role of the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) over the past year.
During the year, the federal government has issued directions to ATSIC aimed
at preventing conflicts of interest in funding decisions by ATSICs elected officials,
and from 1 July 2003 stripped ATSIC of over $1 billion in funding through the
creation of a new executive agency to manage ATSICs programs. The newly
created Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS) was declared by
the Minister to be an interim measure pending the outcomes of the review of
ATSIC announced in 2002 by the Minister. The ATSIC Review Team produced a
discussion paper in June 2003 expressing significant concerns about the way
ATSIC currently operates and in November 2003 released a final report with
recommendations for reform. In between these events, the Minister took the
first steps towards suspending the elected Chairman of ATSIC.

Social Justice Report 2003

Addressing this uncertainty, principally through renewing the role of ATSIC, is a

critical issue that is dealt with at length in this report. It is a central feature of an
agenda for change in Indigenous policy.
These developments are also accompanied by serious concerns that the pace
of progress, where it exists, is too slow and may not necessarily be sustainable
into long term. The release of Census data from 2001 shows that such progress
is in fact minimal. Overall, it is difficult to see any progressive trend towards
reducing the level of inequality experienced by Indigenous peoples compared
to non-Indigenous people (even in areas where there might have been some
marginal improvement in absolute terms).
There is an overwhelming sense that the crisis situation that Indigenous peoples
face is highly likely to worsen substantially over the next decade due to the
faster growth rate of the Indigenous population (in other words, that government
programs will not be able to keep up with the growth of the Indigenous population
with the result that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain the status quo
or prevent a further deterioration in key areas of well-being). The absence of a
clear accountability framework for governments, including benchmarks and
targets, is a matter of great urgency in addressing this situation.
Consequently, rather than having an overwhelming sense of optimism that there
is a consistent forward trend in addressing Indigenous disadvantage and wellbeing, I feel apprehensive that the genuine efforts being made by governments
at this time may not be sufficient to overcome the significant legacy of Indigenous
disadvantage and marginalisation.
For a range of reasons that are outlined in this report, there is not sufficient
commitment by governments at any level to do whatever it takes to progressively
improve the life chances and opportunities for Indigenous people, in terms of
both absolute improvement in socio-economic conditions and in terms of
reducing the level of inequality that exists compared to the life chances and
opportunities for non-Indigenous Australians. I am encouraged that there is
recognition by government of the scope of the issues faced, within the confines
of practical reconciliation, and some significant movement towards addressing
these problems. But ultimately, we are not progressing as well as we can or as
well as we need to. This needs to change.

Structure of this report

This report is divided into five chapters and three appendices.
Chapters 2 and 3 of the report provide an overview of developments in relation
to key themes in Indigenous policy. They consider current progress in addressing
a range of issues in relation to reconciliation, accountability, participation and
moving beyond welfare dependency. It considers the adequacy of the structures
and processes that have been put into place at the national level to progress
programs and services to Indigenous peoples.
Chapter 2 focuses on developments relating to reconciliation and ensuring
accountability of government for their responsibilities. It considers progress in
addressing Indigenous disadvantage within the confines of practical
reconciliation; and COAG initiatives such as the reporting framework on

Chapter 1

Indigenous disadvantage, benchmarking and actions plans by Ministerial

Councils, and the whole-of-government community trials initiative.
Chapter 3 then focuses on processes relating to Indigenous participation in
decision-making and changing the relationship of Indigenous peoples to
government. It focuses on developments relating to capacity building and
governance reform; ATSICs proposed integrated framework for capacity
building and sustainable development; and the reform of ATSIC.
Chapters 4 to 5 of the report then analyse current progress by governments in
addressing three critical issues relating to Indigenous peoples.
Chapter 4 looks at the response of the federal and South Australian governments
to the recommendations of the South Australian Coroner following the deaths
of three young Anunga men from petrol sniffing on the Anunga Pitjantjatjara
Lands (AP Lands) between 1999-2001. Petrol sniffing has reached endemic
proportions on the AP Lands and is not susceptible to short term or quick fix
solutions. This chapter examines progress in addressing petrol sniffing issues
within the context of the COAG whole-of-government community trial on the AP
Lands.
While acknowledging that there are deeply entrenched problems relating to
petrol sniffing and service delivery in general on the AP Lands, it is essential
that governments are able to respond to an issue of such destructive impact in
a timely manner. This chapter raises significant concerns about the ability of
governments to do so.
Chapter 5 then examines the responses of governments to issues of family
violence in Indigenous communities. Despite considerable attention to this issue
in public debate in recent years, commitments and programs to address it are
still minimal and limited in scope. This chapter reviews the current approach of
governments to addressing family violence issues and alternative strategies
that they could adopt to be more effective.
The report also contains three appendices.
Appendix 1 provides a statistical overview of the current circumstances of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations in Australians. Where possible
it shows progress over the past five and ten year periods, comparisons to the
situation of non-Indigenous Australians and international comparisons with socalled third world countries and to Indigenous peoples in other countries.
Appendix 2 then provides a detailed overview of the structure of the eight Council
of Australian Government whole-of-government community trials and current
progress in each trial site.
Appendix 3 contains an extract from the findings of the South Australian Coroner
in the inquests into three deaths on the AP Lands from petrol sniffing. The
appendix includes the executive summary of the Coroners findings, as well as
his comments about compliance with the Royal Commission into Aboriginal
Deaths in Custody and the recommendations of the Inquests.
The report also contains a number of recommendations for addressing concerns
raised throughout the report. These recommendations are reproduced in full at
the front of this report, and are also contained at the relevant sections of each
chapter of the report.

Social Justice Report 2003

Postscript An annual progress report on reconciliation

In the Social Justice Report 2000, I committed to providing a national progress
report on reconciliation within the annual Social Justice Report. This was in
response to a proposal of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation in draft
legislation for promoting reconciliation that was contained in their final report to
Parliament. Each subsequent Social Justice Report has contained such a
national progress report.
In 2003, the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee concluded
their inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation. The inquiry considered
the adequacy of the response of the federal government to the recommendations
of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation as well as to the recommendations
on reconciliation in the Social Justice Report 2000 and Social Justice Report
2001.
In the course of the inquiry, the Committee considered mechanisms for improving
accountability for reconciliation. The Committee stated that progress towards
reconciliation would be greatly improved if an independent body scrutinised
that progress on an ongoing basis.1 The Committee noted the proposal of the
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation that the Social Justice Commissioner report
annually on reconciliation and endorsed this proposal as follows:
Recommendation 7: The Committee recommends that the Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner be required by statute

to report publicly on progress towards reconciliation (as proposed by
clause 10 of the Reconciliation Bill).
Recommendation 9: The Committee recommends that the Government
should be required by statute to respond to the reports of the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner2

They argued:
While the Social Justice Commissioner already includes reporting on
reconciliation in his annual Social Justice Reports, the Committee notes
that the Governments Australian Human Rights Commission Bill 2003
proposes the abolition of this specialist position. Earlier this year the
Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee unanimously
opposed the abolition of the position, and the Committee endorses that
position most strongly. The Committee also considers that a statutory
reference to reporting on progress towards reconciliation would be
desirable, and that the government should be obliged to respond to the
Social Justice Commissioners reports, as recommended in the Social
Justice Report 2001.3

Consistent with the Committees recommendation, and in absence of such a

statutory requirement, this years report also includes a progress report on
reconciliation in Chapters 2 and 3. Due to the nature of the issues considered
throughout the report, other chapters of the report are also relevant to progress
on reconciliation.
1
2
3

Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Reconciliation: Off Track, Parliament
of Australia, Canberra 2003, p120.
ibid, p121.
ibid, p120.

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Reconciliation and government accountability

In the Social Justice Report 1999, my first report as Social Justice Commissioner,
I identified four key themes and challenges that existed in the approach of the
federal government to Indigenous policy making at the time. These were moving
beyond welfare dependency, accountability, participation and reconciliation.1
Since the release of that report approximately four years ago, the key themes
and challenges facing the government have remained relatively constant. The
fundamentals of the governments approach to Indigenous affairs have not
changed substantially, with only subtle refinements and a locking down of their
approach across all program and policy areas and at the inter-governmental
level. These refinements have taken place through the consistent use of coded
language such as practical reconciliation, mutual obligation, agreement
making and partnerships, and more recently shared responsibility.2
To the phrase moving beyond welfare dependency we could now add
sustainable development, capacity building and mutual obligation. For
accountability we could add governance reform, shared responsibility,
whole-of-government approach and changing the way we do business with
Indigenous communities. For participation we could add self-management,
agreement making and partnerships. For reconciliation we can directly
substitute practical reconciliation and divide issues into so-called real and
symbolic ones.
The next two chapters examine current progress in addressing a range of issues
in relation to these four themes. They consider the adequacy of the structures
and processes that have been put into place at the national level to progress
programs and services to Indigenous peoples; and ultimately, based on this
analysis, identify an agenda for change with recommendations to improve
Indigenous policy and program design. This chapter focuses on developments
1
2

See: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report
1999, HREOC Sydney 2000, pp2-24.
For an analysis of these themes see: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2001, HREOC Sydney 2001, Chapters 2,3,6 and Appendix
2 (Herein Social Justice Report 2001); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2002, HREOC Sydney 2002, Chapters 2,3 and 4 (Herein
Social Justice Report 2002).

Chapter 2

relating to reconciliation and mechanisms for government accountability. Chapter

3 then focuses on the participation (and accountability) of Indigenous
organisations and peoples in government activity and developments relating
to the objective of moving Indigenous peoples beyond welfare dependency.
The subject matter of the two chapters is inter-related and together they constitute
my annual progress report on reconciliation.

Reconciliation
In 2003, there have been three main sets of developments in relation to the
governments approach to reconciliation. First, there has been continuity in the
implementation of programmes and in the policy direction of the federal
government towards reconciliation. The primary focus of activity during the year
has been on advancing initiatives that were announced or committed to in
either 2002 or previous years (such as through the Council of Australian
Governments Communiqus on Reconciliation in 2000 and 2002).
There has been a high level of commitment by the federal government to
continuing to implement programmes in accordance with its practical
reconciliation agenda. There have been significant developments in
implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) to conduct a number of whole-of-government community trials across
Australia and to establishing an annual reporting framework on Indigenous
disadvantage. There has also been an increased focus on debilitating problems
affecting Indigenous communities such as family violence, with the convening
of a national summit by the Prime Minister and the announcement of new funding
for programs to address it (these were described as a down-payment and are
expected to be backed up with further funding in the 2004 Budget).
Second, and concurrent to this continuation of the existing approach, has been
public debate about the adequacy of accountability mechanisms for government
service delivery to Indigenous peoples and for reconciliation. Specifically in
relation to reconciliation, this debate has taken place through the Senate Legal
and Constitutional References Committees inquiry into national progress
towards reconciliation and through the commencement of the second reading
debate in the Senate on the Reconciliation Bill 2001 (which seeks to introduce
monitoring and evaluation processes for reconciliation, in accordance with the
recommendations of the final report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation).
Through both of these processes the government has revealed that it considers
it unnecessary to introduce formal legislative monitoring mechanisms for
progress towards reconciliation at the national level.
In more general terms, this debate has taken place through the review of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). The review process
saw a clear expression of dissatisfaction with progress in addressing the
disadvantage experienced by Indigenous peoples and in government service
delivery to Indigenous peoples, as well as at the perceived failure of ATSIC to
effectively represent Indigenous peoples. The findings and recommendations
of this review are discussed in detail in the next chapter. Of note here, however,
is that while the review was intended to review mechanisms for service delivery
to Indigenous peoples (i.e., not to be solely focused on ATSIC) its ultimate

Social Justice Report 2003

focus from an accountability perspective was on the role of ATSIC. It provided

only limited focus on accountability mechanisms and the responsibilities of the
rest of government.
The third main set of developments in relation to the governments approach to
reconciliation has been that the limits of practical reconciliation were exposed
through a number of processes and events during the year. These included the
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committees inquiry into national
progress towards reconciliation, the release of data from and analysis of the
2001 Census, the release of the first national report on overcoming Indigenous
disadvantage by the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service
Provision, and the public debates about service delivery to Indigenous peoples
that took place as part of the ATSIC Review.
The Social Justice Report 2002 had noted that the dominant feature of the
governments approach to reconciliation and Indigenous affairs the previous
year was the refinement and bedding down of its practical reconciliation
approach.3 The report expressed the concern that by continually reinforcing
that its commitment is to addressing key issues of Indigenous disadvantage
and nothing else the government had developed a tunnel vision that renders it
incapable of seeing anything that falls outside the boundaries that it has
unilaterally, and artificially, established for relations with Indigenous peoples.4
It also expressed the concern that as a consequence of this, the limited
processes that existed for accountability were not directed to those issues with
which the government did not agree or which fell outside of its limited approach.
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine key developments relating to
reconciliation at the national level during 2003. The focus of this progress report
is on the adequacy of processes for accountability of the government for
reconciliation, particularly as they relate to practical reconciliation.

National progress towards reconciliation in 2003

Key developments
This section considers developments over the past year relating to reconciliation
under the following headings:
A highly controlled commitment to practical reconciliation;
Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage; and
Implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian
Governments.

a) A highly controlled commitment to practical reconciliation

On 27 November 2003, the Senate began the second reading debate on the
Reconciliation Bill 2001. The Bill was identical to that included in the final report
of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and which the Council had
recommended should be passed by the Parliament in order to provide a
legislative framework to deal with the unfinished business of reconciliation. The
Bill was first introduced by Senator Ridgeway on 5 April 2001, with debate on
3
4

Social Justice Report 2002, p58.

ibid, p87.

Chapter 2

10

the Bill adjourned that same day. It has taken more than two and a half years for
the Bill to be reconsidered and reach the second reading stage in the Senate.5
As Senator Ridgeway noted in his second reading speech, the Bill provided an
opportunity to debate essentially what the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation
recommended.6 It was the first extensive debate to take place directly on
reconciliation in the Senate chamber since the Council released its report in
December 2000 (notwithstanding the debates that took place through the
parliamentary committee system with the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committees inquiry into reconciliation and estimates processes).
The debate on the Bill was acrimonious. The opposition parties stated that
there has been a clear lack of responsibility on the part of the government
whichseems to be intent on destroying the spirit of what reconciliation is
about by putting forward a policy of practical reconciliation;7 that reconciliation
is clearly an issue that has fallen off the Howard governments agenda;8 and
that the government has a record of not performing when it comes to
reconciliation in this country.9
Government Senators responded angrily to these comments. One government
minister interjected that criticisms of the governments performance were
sanctimonious rubbish and that you could be a bit gracious and comment on
some of the positive things.10 Another member of the government accused a
fellow Senator of being one of the phoney people There is a lot of phoniness
in this debate. People come in here and make symbolic speeches and then go
home and forget about it. You want to live it.11
A striking feature of the debate is the deeply impassioned nature of the speeches
made by members of the government and their outrage at the suggestion that
the government is not committed to reconciliation. Senator Ferris put the position
of the government as follows:
If one were to listen to the contribution of (the Opposition) one would
believe that reconciliation is dead in this country. Nothing could be further
from the truth. Reconciliation between Indigenous Australians and the
wider community is an objective that the federal government is fully
committed to, and all of us on this side of the chamber are fully committed
to. The Australian government strongly reaffirms its support for
reconciliation, as expressed in the historic motion of reconciliation that
was passed by both houses of the federal parliament on 26 August 1999
[T]his motion confirmed a whole-hearted commitment to reconciliation
as an important national priority for all Australians.12

There is a subtle but important factor illustrated by comments such as these

that must be acknowledged about the governments approach to reconciliation.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

The debate on the Bill was interrupted after 2 hours and it is unclear when it will recommence.
Senator Ridgeway, Hansard Senate, 27 November 2003, p17988.
ibid.
Senator Evans, Hansard Senate, 27 November 2003, p17988.
Senator Brown, Hansard Senate, 27 November 2003, p17993.
Senator Patterson, Hansard Senate, 27 November 2003, p18003.
Senator Heffernan, Hansard Senate, 27 November 2003, p18008.
Senator Ferris, Hansard Senate, 27 November 2003, p17990.

Social Justice Report 2003

Members of the government are committed to achieving reconciliation. Analyses

of how the government is performing on reconciliation, such as this report, do
not seek to present the governments position as if it were opposed to achieving
reconciliation. Instead, the crucial issue is the nature of the commitments made
by the government and whether they are sufficient (or in other words, do they
progress reconciliation or instead impede progress, either through commission
or omission?).
Senator Ferris explained what the government means by reconciliation in the
debate on the Reconciliation Bill as follows:
Of course, the concept of reconciliation is one that means different things
to different people But there is one common thread to peoples view of
reconciliation in this country and that is that all Australians are entitled to
equal life chances, to equality of opportunity, and that true reconciliation
will not exist until Indigenous disadvantage has been eliminated. The very
sad truth is that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Australia
still remain the most disadvantaged group in our society despite the
best efforts of hundreds, perhaps thousands of individuals in this country
over many years
The federal government believes that the best way it can act to achieve
reconciliation is through the provision of practical and effective measures
that address the legacy of profound economic and social disadvantage
that are experienced by many Indigenous Australians, particularly in those
crucial areas of health, education, housing and employment. Practical
measures in these key areas have a positive effect on the everyday lives
of Indigenous Australians.13

I have extensively criticised this approach to reconciliation in the Social Justice

Reports for 2000-2002.14 At core, concerns about the governments approach
to reconciliation focus on the limited scope of the commitments that they make;
the lack of a process for dealing with issues that fall outside the parameters set
by the government; the derisive and somewhat arbitrary way that the government
discards issues which it does not agree with as symbolic and then simply
ignores them; and the lack of a rigorous monitoring framework to hold the
government accountable for its commitments and for any lack of progress in
areas which it has chosen to ignore.
The governments approach to reconciliation is also malleable. In 2003, for
example, the design and wording for a memorial on the stolen generations for
inclusion at Reconciliation Place in Canberra was agreed between the
government and the National Sorry Day Committee.15 While there is a clear
preference for practical measures of assistance rather than symbolic
measures, the governments approach does involve and recognise the
importance of such symbolic measures. It is often not clear, however, why
13

14
15

ibid, pp17990-91. See also: Department of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Indigenous

Affairs, Fact Sheet No.3 Reconciliation, online at www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/facts/
index.htm, accessed 10 November 2003.
See in particular: Social Justice Report 2001, Chapter 6; Social Justice Report 2002, Chapters
2,3 and 4.
Ruddock, P and National Sorry Day Committee, Recognition of removal practices at
Reconciliation Place, Joint Media Statement, 29 June 2003.

Chapter 2

11

12

particular issues are acceptable and fall within the parameters of practical
reconciliation while others do not.
These concerns about the governments approach do not, however, suggest
that there is an absence of a commitment to reconciliation. Instead they identify
that this commitment is to a particular type of reconciliation around which the
boundaries are tightly proscribed by the government.16
Jackie Huggins has effectively addressed the issue of the nature of the
governments commitment to reconciliation as follows:
There is little doubt that the current Government in Canberra would like
to make an impact in Indigenous affairs, though its vision of a reconciled
Australia would be very different to that of many of us Although, there
are strong indications that Ministers across a number of Commonwealth
portfolios are becoming more open to looking at creative solutions to
persistent problems.
But the bottom line for this Prime Minister and his governmental has always
been the compartmentalising of reconciliation and Indigenous affairs into
so-called practical and symbolic measures, the latter having been rejected
as unacceptable to mainstream Australia
In this highly controlled context it is true to say that many in the
community have been left with the impression that the reconciliation
agenda in Australia has run into the sand. Others have been basking in
the mistaken belief that reconciliation has already arrived. The truth is
somewhere in between17

The continuity over several years of this highly controlled approach of the
government towards reconciliation has inevitably seen policy debates shift
towards the governments framework. This was increasingly the case in 2003.
Progressively each year has seen less focus on issues that do not fall within the
governments approach, such as an apology, the plight of the stolen generations,
the treaty debate and native title. As Reconciliation Australia notes, these issues
have not gone away however those involved in reconciliation have chosen to
engage with the government where constructive progress can be made.18 This
reflects political reality rather than an embracing or endorsement of the
governments position. As Jackie Huggins has noted:
Those of us involved in reconciliation and Indigenous affairs have had to
make a choice about whether to keep beating our heads against a wall
on issues (of unfinished business) or whether we look to what can
be achieved in the political context in which we find ourselves, and try to
move forward. And that is the choice we have made. We have a

16

17

18

In the Social Justice Report 2001 I described the consequences of this approach as follows:
Recent years have seen the emphasis of the reconciliation process shift dramatically. Currently,
it is not about mutual accommodation on the basis of equality it is about whether one group,
Indigenous people, are prepared to conform to the rest of society. If not, then the offer is
closed.: Social Justice Report 2001, p221.
Huggins, J, The figures seem to confirm that practical reconciliation is not enough, On Line
Opinion, 19 November 2003, p2, <www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=872>,(5
December 2003).
Reconciliation Australia, 2003 Reconciliation report, Reconciliation Australia, Canberra 2003,
p10.

Social Justice Report 2003

responsibility to keep the rest of the agenda alive but we also have a duty
to engage and to continue to progress things that can be progressed.19

Similarly, processes for sustaining and monitoring progress towards

reconciliation are increasingly focused on practical reconciliation. In 2003, the
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee concluded its inquiry
into national progress towards reconciliation and made several
recommendations to implement a broader approach to reconciliation which
incorporates all aspects of reconciliation that were identified by the Council for
Aboriginal Reconciliation.20 A similarly based debate also commenced in the
Senate on the Reconciliation Bill 2001. The government has indicated that it
does not consider the mechanisms in either of these processes as necessary,
on the basis that it already has mechanisms in place for progressing practical
reconciliation. Consequently, it is unlikely that there will be mechanisms
introduced which will enable issues that do not fit exactly within the governments
framework to be advanced.

b) Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage

The government has emphasised time and again that the key focus of
reconciliation should be on practical and effective measures that address the
legacy of profound economic and social disadvantage that is experienced by
many Indigenous Australians. As quoted above, the governments position is
that true reconciliation will not exist until Indigenous disadvantage has been
eliminated.
Newly released data in 2003 provided the opportunity to establish whether we
are progressing towards this ultimate goal of the governments reconciliation
agenda and to determine whether the pace of such progress is adequate.
The Social Justice Reports for 2000 through to 2002 raised a number of
challenges for the government in order to determine whether they are meeting
their commitment to address the social and economic inequality experienced
by Indigenous Australians. These challenges include the establishment of
benchmarks and targets which commit to a rate of progress in improving the
socio-economic conditions of Indigenous peoples and improved data collection
to enable such progress to be more accurately measured. There have been
some developments over the past year relating to data collection and reporting,
such as the establishment of the national reporting framework on key indicators
of Indigenous disadvantage (which is discussed more fully in the next section
of this chapter).
However, the long-standing commitment of governments to develop benchmarks
and action plans for key areas of Indigenous disadvantage through the various
inter-governmental ministerial councils remains largely unfulfilled. Accordingly,
it is not possible to determine whether government efforts to address Indigenous
disadvantage have progressed at a rate that meets the expectations (and
targets) of governments and Indigenous peoples. There are no publicly reported

19
20

Huggins, J, op.cit, p3.

Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Reconciliation: Off track, Parliament
of Australia, Canberra 2003.

Chapter 2

13

14

goals setting out what is an acceptable rate of improvement against which we

can determine whether current progress is adequate and fully matches the
potential of available resources and programs. This is a critical issue of lack of
accountability of government and I return to it later in this chapter.
Despite the lack of publicly reported benchmarks and action plans, we can still
evaluate progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage from the following
three perspectives.
First, we can see whether there have been improvements in the circumstances
of Indigenous peoples on a number of key indicators over the past five and ten
years. Generally, due to difficulties in comparing data over time periods the
Australian Bureau of Statistics recommends that such comparisons be made
on the basis of changes in percentages over time rather than raw figures.21
Second, we can see whether there have been improvements in the situation of
Indigenous peoples compared to non-Indigenous people over the past five
and ten years. In other words, given the prime goal of the government of
eliminating the inequality in socio-economic conditions experienced by
Indigenous peoples, is there relative improvement in the situation of Indigenous
peoples compared to the rest of Australian society? If the governments approach
is working then we can reasonably expect a continual closing of the gap between
the two groups.
Third, we can make comparisons between the situation of Indigenous peoples
in Australia and Indigenous peoples in other similar countries, as well as to
people in less developed countries. By doing so we can establish whether we
are progressing at a rate comparable to that in other countries or whether we
are lagging behind in the improvements being achieved.
The governments view is that it is making progress in addressing Indigenous
disadvantage. In October 2003 the Minister for Indigenous Affairs stated:
The wellbeing of Indigenous people is improving under this Government.
Record amounts of money and effort are now being spent on trying to
solve the problem of Indigenous disadvantage. Since coming to
Government, real steps forward have been made. Between the 1996 and
2001 censuses, many indicators of Indigenous disadvantage show real
improvement. For example:
Indigenous unemployment rate fell from 22.7 per cent to 20.0 per
cent, and there were an additional 18,000 Indigenous people in
employment
the proportion of Indigenous people employed in the private sector
rose from 46.3 per cent to 48.5 per cent
the proportion of Indigenous adults who had left school before their
15th birthday fell from 44.2 per cent to 33.4 per cent, and
the proportion of Indigenous adults with post school qualifications
rose from 23.6 per cent to 27.9 per cent
the proportion of Indigenous children who stayed on at school through
to Year 12 increased from 29.2 per cent in 1996 to 38 per cent in 2002

21

See Appendix 1 of this report for discussion of data collection issues.

Social Justice Report 2003

 there were 5566 Indigenous students enrolled in a bachelors level

degree or higher degree course in 2002, 24.3 per cent more students
than were enrolled in 1996
there were 59 763 Indigenous people who undertook post-secondary
vocational and educational training in 2002, nearly twice the number
of Indigenous students registered for training in 1996.
While things are getting better, I am not saying everything is good or that
we can sit back and be complacent. This Government will remain
committed to building an Australia where Indigenous people enjoy the
same standards of living as other Australians while maintaining their
unique cultural identities.22

In the debate on the Reconciliation Bill 2001 in November 2003, Senator Ferris
also stated the governments position as follows:
Despite (the oppositions) claims of economic failure and government
policy failure, let us have a look at some of the improvements that have
taken place in Indigenous affairs since this government came to office in
1996.
In terms of education, from 1996 to 2002 the proportion of Indigenous
children who stayed on at school increased from a very poor 29.2 per
cent to 38 per cent. I know that 38 per cent is still very low, but an
improvement of 10 per cent since this government came to office is very
significant. More importantly, the number of Indigenous students
registered for post-secondary vocational and educational training has
nearly doubled from 1996 to 2002 to a total of 59,763... if that is failure
of government policy, one can only imagine what would be determined
to be successful. The number of young Indigenous Australians who are
undertaking post-secondary training has almost doubled. Over the same
period of time, there was a 32 per cent increase in the number of
Indigenous men and women involved in bachelor-level degree courses
or higher degree courses in Australian universities. I know that those
figures are still low, but we are starting to build a base of economic
advantage through higher education and training for young Indigenous
men and women
In terms of unemployment, the unemployment rate for Indigenous people
actually fell from 22.7 per cent to 20 per cent between the 1996 census
and the 2001 census. Again, I am the first to say that we have a long way
to go before we can honestly in this place say that there is equality of
opportunity for jobs for young Indigenous people. However, between 1996
and 2001 the number of Indigenous people in employment increased
from 82,346 to 100,348, an increase of 22 per cent...
In terms of health, the Australian government has substantially increased
its spending on Indigenous-specific health programs. Such spending is
now at record levels. So much for failure Our total spending on specific
Indigenous health services this year will rise to more than $258 million
more than has ever been spent before. Again I say that we know this
does not indicate we are going to solve this problem, but it is a significant
first step. This is a real increase of nearly 90 per cent since this government

22

Senator Vanstone, Indigenous wellbeing is a top priority, Media Release, 15 October 2003,
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/media/media03/v03002.htm

Chapter 2

15

16

took office in 1996... how can you say that this is a failure of government
policy? We have increased real spending on Indigenous-specific health
by more than 90 per cent since 1996. In the last five years, 46 remote
communities have gained access to primary health care for the very first
time. Indigenous infant and perinatal death rates have fallen by a third
over the last decade...
Commonwealth spending on Indigenous programs has increased by onethird in real terms since 1996 and is now at record levels. In 2003-04, the
Commonwealth government will spend $2.7 billion on Aboriginal affairs,
on Aboriginal policiesmore than has ever been spent by any government
in this nations history. There is still much that we can do and still much
that state governments can do to help with the practical measures that
improve the day-to-day lives of Indigenous Australians, but, as we all
know, many of those problems will not be solved with money. You cannot
continue to just throw money at the issue without looking at some of the
other measures
This government is committed to seeing that every policy initiative is
carried out to reconcile Indigenous Australians and the broader
community. Improvements are being made, and the statistics that I gave
to this chamber earlier indicate that. We are making steps forward. There
is a long way to go.23

These statements have been reproduced here at length to ensure that I have
authentically represented the governments position on the rate of progress in
addressing Indigenous disadvantage.
There are a number of notable features about these statements. First, the
governments position on reconciliation clearly states that the ultimate test of
success is whether the inequality experienced by Indigenous peoples compared
to non-Indigenous people is eliminated. Despite this, in its claims to success
above there is not a single reference to progress in reducing the gaps that exist
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.
The only reference by the Minister to this inequality gap can be found in a press
release dated 12 November 2003, which comments on the release of the first
national report on national indicators for overcoming Indigenous disadvantage.24
The Minister stated: While there has been improvements in many key indicators,
greater rates of improvement for non-Indigenous people, tend to mask the gains
that have been made.25
In my progress report on reconciliation in the Social Justice Report 2002, I noted
a tendency of the government to misrepresent progress towards reconciliation
through the way that it presents statistics.26 This statement by the Minister is a
further example of this. Greater rates of improvement in key indicators for nonIndigenous Australians do not mask the gains that have been made for
Indigenous people. Instead, they indicate that the gains made have not been

23
24
25

26

Senator Ferris, Hansard Senate, 27 November 2003, pp17991-2.

This report is discussed in the next section of this chapter.
Senator Vanstone, Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage, Media Release, 12 November
2003, www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/media/media03/v03003.htm, accessed 12 November
2003.
See Social Justice Report 2002, pp85-87.

Social Justice Report 2003

sufficient to reduce the level of inequality or that improvements for Indigenous

peoples are not keeping pace with the rest of society. There is a substantial
difference between presenting information in this way and the way that it has
been presented by the government.
Second, there are significant omissions in the indicators that the government
presents as demonstrating real improvement. This is most obvious in relation
to indicators of health status, where the only achievement listed above is that
the government has substantially increased its spending on Indigenous-specific
health programs to record levels. There are also no indicators cited relating to
contact with criminal justice processes or care and protection systems, for
example.
At no stage does the government state that there are areas where the situation
is not improving. The Ministers statement above, for example, is unequivocal
that the wellbeing of Indigenous people is improving under this Government.
The only qualification, that there is still a way to go, also does not admit lack of
progress in key areas: While things are getting better, I am not saying everything
is good or that we can sit back and be complacent. It is hardly a frank
assessment of the actual situation.
Third, some of the measures of success are presented purely as raw numbers
and as percentages of increases in raw numbers (for example, 5566 Indigenous
students enrolled in a bachelors level degree or higher degree course in 2002,
24.3 per cent more students than in 1996). As noted above, the ABS cautions
against such presentation of statistics as they do not account for changes in
the accuracy of data collection or increased rates of identification of people as
Indigenous. This can result in the presentation of the level of progress being
misleading. Indeed, as discussed shortly, there are significant concerns being
expressed about poor rates of achievement by the government in education
over the past five years, particularly in relation to higher education.
Taking these factors into account, and examining the statistics on Indigenous
well-being from the different perspectives listed above (namely, on the basis of
absolute change in the situation of Indigenous peoples; relative change
compared to the non-Indigenous population; and where available, international
comparisons), it can be seen that the claim of the government that the wellbeing
of Indigenous people is improving under this Government cannot be verified
across many core areas of practical reconciliation. There are undoubtedly some
areas where improvements are being realised. Overall, however, there is no
consistent forward trend in improving the well-being of Indigenous peoples,
and particularly no forward trend towards a reduction in the disparity between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.
Appendix 1 of this report provides a statistical profile of the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander population. It includes information on the current status of
Indigenous peoples on key measures of socio-economic well-being including
health status, employment, income, education, housing, and contact with
criminal justice and care and protection systems. The main findings in the
appendix in terms of progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage across
these areas are summarised below.

Chapter 2

17

18

Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage

Income
Gross household income for Indigenous people increased by 11%
between 1996 and 2001. In 2001, it was 62% of the rate for nonIndigenous Australians, compared to 64% in 1996.
Median gross individual income for Indigenous people increased by
19% from 1996 to 2001, compared to an increase of 28.4% for nonIndigenous people. There has been a considerable increase in the
disparity in individual income between these two groups between 1996
and 2001, as well as over the decade from 1991 to 2001.

Employment
In 2001, 54% of Indigenous people of working age were participating
in the labour force compared to 73% of non-Indigenous people.
In 2001, the unemployment rate for Indigenous people was 20% an
improvement from the rate of 23% in 1996. This is three times higher
than the rate for non-Indigenous Australians.
18% of all Indigenous people in employment in 2001 worked on a
CDEP scheme. If CDEP were classified as a form of unemployment,
the Indigenous unemployment rate would rise to over 34%.

Education
69% of Indigenous students progressed from year 10 (compulsory)
to year 11 (non-compulsory) schooling, compared to 90% of nonIndigenous students in 2001.
38% of Indigenous students were retained to year 12 in 2002
compared to over 76% for non-Indigenous students. This was an
increase from 29% in 1996.
In 2001, Indigenous people participated in post-secondary education
at a similar rate to non-Indigenous people, although they had a slightly
higher attendance rate at TAFE colleges and lower attendance rates
at universities. The proprtion of Indigenous youth (aged 15-24 years)
attending a tertiary institution declined between 1996 and 2001.

Housing
In 2001, 63% of Indigenous households were renting (compared to
27% of non-Indigenous households), and 13% owned their home
outright (compared to 40%).
Indigenous people are 5.6 times more likely to live in over-crowded
houses than non-Indigenous people.

Contact with criminal justice system

Indigenous people have consistently constituted 20% of the total
prisoner population since the late 1990s, compared to 14% in 1991.
Indigenous people are imprisoned at 16 times the rate of nonIndigenous people. Indigenous women are imprisoned at over 19
times the rate of non-Indigenous women. These rates are higher than

Social Justice Report 2003

in 1991, when the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody

reported.
Since 1997, Indigenous juveniles have constituted at least 42% of all
incarcerated juveniles, despite constituting 4% of the total juvenile
population. In 2002, Indigenous juveniles were incarcerated at a rate
19 times that of non-Indigenous juveniles, an increase from 13 times
in 1993.

Contact with care and protection system

Indigenous children come into contact with the care and protection
system at a greater rate than non-Indigenous children, and are
increasingly represented at the more serious stages of intervention.

Of particular concern is the lack of achievement in relation to improving the

health status of Indigenous Australians. Appendix 1 illustrates the following.

Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage Health status

Life Expectancy
Life expectancy for Indigenous females declined slightly from 19972001 to 62.8 years. This rate is lower than the life expectancy rate for
females in India and sub-Saharan Africa (with the impact of HIV-AIDs
factored out).The gap with non-Indigenous female life expectancy
increased from 18.8 to 19.6 years in the same period.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander females can also expect to live
between 10.9 and 12.6 years less than Indigenous females in Canada,
the United States of America and New Zealand.
Life expectancy for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander males
increased slightly from 1997-2001 to 56.3 years. This rate is lower
than the life expectancy rate for males in Myanmar (Burma), Papua
New Guinea and Cambodia. The gap between Indigenous and nonIndigenous male life expectancy increased slightly from 20.6 to 20.7
years in the same period.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander males can also expect to live
between 8.8 and 13.5 years less than Indigenous males in Canada,
the USA and New Zealand

Median death age

In 2001, the median age of death was 24 years lower for Indigenous
Australians than for non-Indigenous Australians. There has been no
identifiable trend towards a reduction in this gap for either Indigenous
males or females over the past decade.

Infant health
There are twice as many low birth-weight babies born to Indigenous
mothers than to non-Indigenous mothers. The rate of low birth-weights
has increased for both groups in recent years, with a slight increase
in the disparity between the two groups over the decade.

Chapter 2

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20

There are higher rates of low birth-weight babies among Indigenous

Australians than there are for mothers in countries that are classified
as low development countries by the United Nations, such as Ethiopia,
Senegal, Zimbabwe, Lebanon and Indonesia.
There are 2.5 times as many deaths among Indigenous infants than
non-Indigenous infants in Australia, with no discernable reduction in
the number of deaths or the rate of inequality since 1995.
Rates of infant mortality for Indigenous people in Australia are
significantly higher than rates for Indigenous people in Canada, the
USA and New Zealand.

These figures indicate that there are clear disparities between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous people, and limited progress in reducing these disparities across
many key areas of socio-economic status.
These findings are confirmed by significant research published by the Centre
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) in late 2003. CAEPR released
analysis by Professor Jon Altman and Dr Boyd Hunter of 2001 Census data
which sought to monitor progress towards reconciliation by measuring absolute
and relative changes in Indigenous peoples labour force status, income,
housing, education and health over the period 1991-2001.
As the authors of the study noted, for the first time ever there was a relatively
close correlation between the conduct of the five-yearly national census and
political cycles:
The change in government shortly before the 1996 Census means that
the 1996 data reflect the Labor legacy rather than the effect of early policy
initiatives of the new government. While arguably there are various types
of policy lags the second inter-censal period (1996-2001) can be readily
interpreted as the policy domain (and legacy) of the Howard
government.27

The research aimed to answer the following question:

How do the outcomes in the period 1991-1996, represented by the Federal
government and many conservative commentators as a period when
symbolic reconciliation was too dominant, compare with those in the
period 1996-2001 when a change in government saw greater policy focus
on practical reconciliation? 28

The research concluded that in the period 1996-2001, labour force status for
Indigenous people worsened relative to the rest of the population when measured
by labour force participation rates, unemployment rates, the employment to
population ratio, and rate of full time employment. There was, however, a slight
improvement in employment of Indigenous people in the private sector. The
authors expressed concern about this general worsening in Indigenous labour

27

28

Altman, J and Hunter, B, Monitoring practical reconciliation: Evidence from the reconciliation
decade, 1991-2001, Discussion Paper 254/2003, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research, Canberra 2003, p1. Available online at: www.anu.edu.au/caepr/discussion2.php.
ibid, p2.

Social Justice Report 2003

force status as it moved against the trend for the rest of the population.29 They
noted:
Unemployment rates fell by less for the Indigenous population than for
other Australians, despite rapid economic growth over the five year period
and growth in numbers participating in the CDEP scheme. There is little
evidence of trickle down improving Indigenous economic participation
and reducing the significance of non-employment (welfare) income. Given
that low skilled workers are often the first to lose work in an economic
downturn, the lack of improvement is worrying, especially if there is any
significant deterioration in the Australian and international economies in
the near future.30

In terms of income, the research noted a continued relative decline in income

for Indigenous individuals, but a slight improvement in the relativity in median
family income between Indigenous and non-Indigenous families.31 In terms of
housing, the research also noted marginal improvements in the relativity between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people for both home ownership rates and
household size.
The research expressed significant concern about the lack of improvement in
relation to both health and education. The authors expressed concern at the
substantial inertia in Indigenous health32 as indicated in the lack of improvement
in relativities relating to life expectancy and proportion of the population aged
over 55 years. In relation to education, the research notes a slight reduction in
the disparity in the proportion of adults who have never gone to school, but a
worsening in the comparative rate of early school leavers. There was a slight
improvement in the proportion of Indigenous adults with post-school
qualifications, but a significant decline in the comparative rate of Indigenous
youth currently attending a tertiary institution. The authors commented that:
it is an indictment of current education policy that there was a large decline
in the Indigenous to non-Indigenous ratio between 1996 and 2001 future
prospects for improved socio-economic outcomes for the Indigenous
population are not good when attendance of Indigenous youth at tertiary
institutions fell by 2.2 percentage points
Even in its own terms the government is failing in the education arena.33

When these results are compared to the results achieved by the previous
government in the period from 1991-1996, the research revealed that:
in absolute terms, it is difficult to differentiate the performance of
governments pre-1996 and post-1996. However, in relative terms that
is when comparing the relative wellbeing of Indigenous people as a whole
with all other Australians there is some disparity between the periods,
with the early period 1991-1996 clearly outperforming the more recent

29
30
31

32
33

ibid, p9.
ibid.
Although note that the Australian Bureau of Statistics produced alternative adjusted figures
for household income (as presented in Appendix 1 of this report) which showed a slight
increase in the disparity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.
Altman, J and Hunter, B, op.cit, p11.
ibid, pp10-11.

Chapter 2

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22

period34 Of particular concern was relative decline over the period in

educational and health status.35

As a consequence, the authors offered the following appraisal of the

achievements of practical reconciliation in addressing Indigenous disadvantage:
Despite the policy rhetoric of three Howard governments, there is no
statistical evidence that their policies and programs are delivering better
outcomes for Indigenous Australians, at the national level, than those of
their political predecessors36 It is of particular concern that some of
the relative gains made between 1991 and 1996 appear to have been
offset by the relative poor performance of Indigenous outcomes between
1996 and 200137 This intractability is worrying in part because it is
evident during a time when (in) Australia the macro-economy is growing
rapidly. This suggests, in turn, that problems are deeply entrenched it
is not just a matter of choosing between practical and symbolic
reconciliation.38

There is one further issue of grave concern relating to progress in addressing

Indigenous disadvantage. As CAEPR note:
A major problem for both Indigenous Australians and the nation is that
other research suggests that the situation described using the latest
2001 Census statistics is likely to get worse, rather than better, over the
next decade.39

This is due to the demographic characteristics of the Indigenous population.

As I noted in the Social Justice Report 2002, there is a well-documented,
emerging crisis facing Indigenous policy design. Not only is the Indigenous
population growing at a faster rate than the non-Indigenous population (2.3 per
cent compared to 1.2 per cent annually), but the Indigenous populations median
age is younger (20 years compared to 35 years) and nearly twice as many
Indigenous compared to non-Indigenous people are under 15 years of age
(almost 40 per cent compared to just over 20 per cent). Similarly, only 2.8% of
the Indigenous population are aged over 65 compared to 12.5% of the nonIndigenous population.40 The consequence of this age structure and rate of
population growth is that there will be a significant increase in the number of
Indigenous people entering the age group where they will be seeking
employment.
Based in this demographic profile, research by CAEPR forecasts that there will
be a further widening of the disparity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
employment rates over the next decade:
Because the rate of employment growth is anticipated to be slower than
population growth, the overall employment rate is expected to fall from
40 per cent to 36 per cent over the projection period (2001-2011).

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

ibid, pv.
ibid, p12.
ibid, p16.
ibid, pv.
ibid, p16.
ibid.
Social Justice Report 2002, pp59-60.

Social Justice Report 2003

Assuming no change in the labour force participation rate, the reverse

side of this equation will see unemployment numbers rise from an
estimated 32,808 in 2001 to 58,565 by 2011, with a consequent increase
in the unemployment rate from 22.5% to almost 31% of those in the labour
force.
These projections point clearly to a worsening in the labour force status
of Indigenous adults. Moreover it should be noted that they are based on
the inclusion of working CDEP scheme participants in the estimates of
persons employed. If these were excluded, and instead counted as
unemployed then predicted labour market outcomes for Indigenous
people would become far worse, with an unemployment rate of 43 per
cent rising to 50 per cent...41
It is worth recalling that the equivalent rates for the rest of the Australian
population are presently around 6.0 per cent for unemployment these
are likely to remain relatively unchanged The medium term prognosis,
then, all other things being equal, is for a substantial worsening of the
overall labour force status of Indigenous people both relatively and
absolutely.42

These figures from CAEPR update analysis that they conducted in 1997 and
1998 into the likely growth in employment disparity for Indigenous peoples.43
Consequently, the government has been aware of the likelihood of deterioration
in employment status for Indigenous peoples since at least 1997. The absence
of benchmarks and an action plan to address this potential situation is a serious
omission from the practical reconciliation agenda.
These projected high rates of Indigenous unemployment and low rates of
Indigenous participation in the labour force have impacts not only on the overall
financial wellbeing of Indigenous individuals and communities, but it also has
major direct impacts on the Australian economy at large. For example, CAEPR
estimates the cost of the current level of Indigenous employment (including
unemployment, underemployment, CDEP participation and discouraged
workers) to be approximately $700 million in total foregone tax revenue.44 CAEPR
have made the following projections for the situation over the decade to 2011:
If Indigenous unemployment was reduced to a level commensurate with
the rest of the population, and assuming that this latter rate remained
constant, then the savings to government in payments to the unemployed,
in real terms, would be $328 million in 2006 and $450 million in 2011. On
the credit side, if all those formerly unemployed were to gain mainstream
employment (excluding CDEP scheme employees) with an annual income
equivalent [similar to reported income of non-CDEP employees in
1994] then the estimated tax return to government would approximate
$211 million and $290 million in 2006 and 2011 respectively.
41

42
43

44

Hunter, H, Kinfu, Y and Taylor, J, The future of Indigenous work: Forecasts of labour force
status to 2011, Discussion paper 251/2003, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research,
Canberra 2003, p3. Available online at: www.anu.edu.au/caepr/discussion2.php, p9.
ibid, p10.
Taylor, J, and Altman, J, The job ahead Escalating economic costs of Indigenous employment
disparity, ATSIC, Canberra 1997; Taylor, J, and Hunter, B, The job still ahead: Economic costs
of continuing Indigenous employment disparity, ATSIC, Canberra, 1998.
Hunter, H, Kinfu, Y and Taylor, J, The future of Indigenous work: Forecasts of labour force
status to 2011, op.cit, Table 12, p17.

Chapter 2

23

24

These estimates are conservative because they hold the Indigenous

participation rate at their 2001 levels. If all the Indigenous people outside
the labour force who wanted jobs found them, then the government would
save an additional $416 million in 2006 and $472 million in 2011 on
government payments. That is, the additional welfare cost of not finding
work for discouraged workers is even greater than that for the unemployed.
The cost of lost tax revenue from discouraged workers will be as much
as $345 million by 2011.45

CAEPR have summarised this situation as follows: the current fiscal cost of
this failure to eradicate Indigenous employment disparity is massive in 2001,
it was estimated to be around 0.5 per cent of Australian GDP. Findings from this
new analysis indicate that the cost will be even higher in the future.46
Overall, the statistics across key areas of Indigenous disadvantage for the past
five years indicate that there is no consistent forward trend in reducing the
extent of disadvantage experienced by Indigenous peoples, and limited progress
in eradicating the disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians. There is some evidence that in relation to key measures, this situation
may deteriorate further in the coming decade. The outcomes being achieved
by governments are not adequate on any measure of success and despite the
investment of significant resources by governments. This situation needs to
change.

c) Implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian Governments

An area where there has been significant progress in advancing the reconciliation
process over the past year is the efforts of governments, lead by the federal
government, in implementing the commitments made by the Council of
Australian Governments (COAG) towards reconciliation.
In its communiqu of 3 November 2000, COAG agreed to take a leading role in
driving change to address Indigenous disadvantage. COAG agreed to focus
on three priority areas: community leadership; reviewing and re-engineering
programs and services to support families, children and young people; and
forging links between the business sector and indigenous communities to
promote economic independence. As part of this process, Ministerial Councils
were to develop action plans, performance reporting strategies and
benchmarks with COAG to review progress regularly.
In its communiqu of 5 April 2002, COAG agreed to conduct a number of wholeof-government community trials across Australia and to commission an annual
reporting framework on key indicators of Indigenous disadvantage. This reporting
framework had its genesis in the efforts of the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs in progressing COAGs communiqu of
November 2000.
This section reviews developments in relation to the disadvantage reporting
framework, COAG trials and Ministerial action plans over 2003.

45
46

ibid, p19.
ibid, p20.

Social Justice Report 2003

i) Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage Annual report against key indicators

In his capacity as Chairman of COAG, the Prime Minister wrote to the Steering
Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision47 on 3
May 2002 to request the Committee to develop a framework for reporting to
COAG against key indicators of indigenous disadvantage. COAG had agreed
to the production of such a regular report at its April 2002 meeting.
The Steering Committee developed a draft reporting framework in 2002 and
consulted with Indigenous organisations and governments about it in 2002
and 2003. This draft framework was the subject of a workshop convened by the
Social Justice Commissioner in November 2002, and was discussed in detail
in Chapter 4 of the Social Justice Report 2002.
On 22 August 2003, the Prime Minister wrote to the Steering Committee on
behalf of COAG to formally endorse the Committees proposed framework for
reporting progress in addressing indigenous disadvantage. The finalised
framework is reproduced in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: COAG Framework for reporting on Indigenous disadvantage

Priority Outcomes
Safe, healthy and
supportive family
environments
with strong

Positive child
development and prevention
of violence, crime and
self-harm

Improved wealth
creation and economic
sustainability for individuals,
families and communities

Headline indicators
Life expectancy at birth
Rates of disability and/or
core activity restriction
Year 10 and 12 retention and
attainment
Post-secondary education:
participation and attainment

Substantiated child
protection notifications
Deaths from homicide and
hospitalisations for assault
Victim rates for crime
Imprisonment and juvenile
detention rates

Labour force participation

and unemployment
Household and individual
income
Home ownership
Suicide and self-harm

Strategic areas for action

Early child
development
and growth
(prenatal to
age 3)

Early school
engagement
and performance
(preschool to
year 3)

Positive
childhood
and transition
to adulthood

Substance use
and misuse

Functional
and resilient
families and
communities

Effective
environmental
health
systems

Economic
participation
and
development

Strategic change indicators (see Table 1 below)

47

The Committee has since been renamed the Steering Committee for the Review of Government
Service Provision.

Chapter 2

25

26

COAG and the Prime Minister nominated two core objectives for the Report:
namely, to identify indicators that are of relevance to all governments and
indigenous stakeholders and demonstrate the impact of programme and policy
interventions.48
As the Chair of the Steering Committee has stated about the report:
The commissioning (of this report by COAG) demonstrates a new
resolve, at the highest political level, not only to tackle the root causes of
Indigenous disadvantage, but also to monitor the outcomes in a
systematic way that crosses jurisdictional and portfolio boundaries. In
doing so, the Report will henceforth also raise the transparency of
governments performance.
This reports purpose, therefore, is to be more than just another collection
of data. It seeks to document outcomes for Indigenous people within a
framework that has both an agreed vision of what life should be for
Indigenous people and a strategic focus on key areas that need to be
targeted if that longer term vision is to be realised.49

The vision of the reporting framework is that Indigenous people will one day
enjoy the same overall standard of living as other Australians. They will be as
healthy, live as long, and participate fully in the social and economic life of the
nation.50 This vision is encapsulated in the three, inter-related priority outcomes
of the reporting framework, namely:
Safe, healthy and supportive family environments with strong
communities and cultural identity;
Positive child development and prevention of violence, crime and selfharm; and
Improved wealth creation and economic sustainability for individuals,
families and communities.51
The report also seeks to present the statistics within a strategic framework.
There are two key features to this framework. First, it seeks to report on
Indigenous disadvantage on a holistic and whole-of-government basis. As the
Committee has explained:
[T]he report is predicated on the view that achieving improvements in the
wellbeing of Indigenous Australians in a particular area will generally
require the involvement of more than one government agency, and that
improvements will need preventative policy actions on a whole-ofgovernment basis52
Without detracting from the importance of individual agencies being
responsible and accountable for the services they deliver, the structure
48

49

50
51
52

Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming Indigenous
Disadvantage Key indicators 2003, Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne 2003, pxvii (Herein,
Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage).
Banks, G, Indigenous disadvantage: assessing policy impacts, Speech, Pursuing Opportunity
and Prosperity conference, Melbourne, 13 November 2003, pp1-2, available online from:
www.pc.gov.au. Emphasis added.
Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage, pp1.1, 1.2.
ibid, p2.4. The Steering Committee notes that these outcomes were widely supported by
Indigenous peoples during their consultations on the draft framework.
ibid, p2.2.

Social Justice Report 2003

of this Report seeks to facilitate interaction between sectors and between

governments on programs that are delivered to Indigenous people.
Furthermore, it can assist agencies to consider how they can strategically
develop programs which have the capacity to deliver outcomes outside
of their traditional sphere of action.53

A recurring theme of the framework is acknowledgement that areas such as

health, education, employment, housing, crime and so on are inextricably linked.
Disadvantage or involvement in any of these areas can have serious impacts
on other areas of well-being. Acknowledgement of, and action based on, these
interconnections is therefore critical in assisting COAG to inform policy
development with respect to Indigenous peoples.
Second, the framework is premised on a realisation that there are a range of
causative factors for Indigenous disadvantage. This necessitates reporting on
progress in addressing both the larger, cumulative indicators (such as life
expectancy, unemployment and contact with criminal justice processes) which
reflect the consequences of a number of contributing factors, as well as
identifying progress in improving these smaller, more individualised factors.
To reflect these strategic considerations, the framework seeks to present
progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage at two levels. The first level is
a series of twelve headline indicators that provide a snapshot of the overall
state of Indigenous disadvantage. The twelve indicators are:

Life expectancy at birth;

Rates of disability and/or core activity restriction;
Years 10 and 12 retention and attainment;
Labour force participation and unemployment;
Household and individual income;
Home ownership;
Suicide and self-harm;
Substantiated child protection notifications;
Deaths from homicide and hospitalisations for assault;
Victim rates for crime; and
Imprisonment and juvenile detention rates.

These headline indicators are measures of the major social and economic
factors that need to be improved if COAGs vision of an improved standard of
living for Indigenous peoples is to become reality. But as the Chairman of the
Steering Committee notes, these headline indicators:
reflect desired longer term outcomes and therefore are themselves only
likely to change gradually. Because most of the measures are at such a
high level and have long lead times (eg life expectancy) they do not provide
a sufficient focus for policy action and are only blunt indicators of policy
performance.
Indeed, reporting at the headline level alone can make the policy
challenges appear overwhelming. The problems observed at this level
are generally the end result of a chain of contributing factors, some of
which may be of long standing. These causal factors almost never fall
53

ibid, p2.1.

Chapter 2

27

neatly within the purview of a single agency of government, or indeed a

single government.54

28

Hence, the Steering Committee has devised a second level of reporting which
breaks down these broader, longer term measures. The Committee has identified
seven strategic areas for action and a number of supporting strategic change
indicators to measure progress in these. The particular areas and change
indicators have been chosen for their potential to respond to policy action
within the shorter term (and to indicate) intermediate measures of progress55
while also having the potential in the longer term to contribute to improvements
in overall Indigenous disadvantage (as reflected through the headline
indicators).56 The seven strategic areas and related indicators are set out in
the following table.

Table 1: COAG Overcoming Disadvantage framework:

Strategic areas for action and strategic change indicators57
Strategic areas for action

Strategic change indicators

1. Early child development and

growth (prenatal to age 3)

Infant mortality
Birth weight
Hearing impediments

2. Early school engagement and

performance (preschool to year 3)

Preschool and school attendance

Year 3 literacy and numeracy
Primary school children with dental caries

3. Positive childhood and transition

to adulthood

Years 5 and 7 literacy and numeracy

Retention at year 9
Indigenous cultural studies in school curriculum and
involvement of Indigenous people in development and
delivery of Indigenous studies
Participation in organised sport, arts or community group
activities
Juvenile diversions as a proportion of all juvenile offenders
Transition from school to work

4. Substance use and misuse

Alcohol and tobacco consumption

Alcohol related crime and hospital statistics
Drug and other substance use

54
55
56
57

Banks, G, op.cit, p3.

ibid.
For a more detailed overview of the rationale for choosing each strategic area and the change
indicators underneath these, see: Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage, pp2.6-2.10
ibid, p2.5.

Social Justice Report 2003

5. Functional and resilient families

and communities

Children on long term care and protection orders

Repeat offending
Access to the nearest health professional
Proportion of indigenous people with access to their
traditional lands

6. Effective environmental health

systems

Rates of diseases associated with poor environmental

health (including water and food borne diseases,
trachoma, tuberculosis and rheumatic heart disease)
Access to clean water and functional sewerage
Overcrowding in housing

7. Economic participation and

development

Employment (full-time/part-time) by sector (public/

private), industry and occupation
CDEP participation
Long term unemployment
Self employment
Indigenous owned or controlled land
Accredited training in leadership, finance or management
Case studies in governance arrangements

The Steering Committee published its first report against this framework, titled
Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage Key Indicators 2003, in November 2003.
The report confirms that Indigenous disadvantage is broadly based, with major
disparities between Indigenous and other Australian in most areas. As the
Chairman of the Steering Committee has commented on the findings of the
report:
[The report] confirms the pervasiveness of Indigenous disadvantage. It
is distressingly apparent that many years of policy effort have not delivered
desired outcomes; indeed in some important respects the circumstances
of Indigenous people appear to have deteriorated or regressed. Worse
than that, outcomes in the strategic areas identified as critical to
overcoming disadvantage in the long term remain well short of what is
needed.58

The presentation of information within the strategic areas also highlights the
inter-related nature of the challenges faced in improving Indigenous well-being.
As the Chairman of the Committee notes, in the three strategic areas that focus
on young Indigenous people, the potential for cumulative disadvantage is plain
to see.59 The presentation of what are generally well known statistics in this
way under the strategic areas of action are not rocket science60 but the ability

58
59
60

Banks, G, op.cit, p9.

ibid, p5.
ibid, p3.

Chapter 2

29

30

to highlight cumulative disadvantage factors is a significant breakthrough which

should assist policy making in relation to Indigenous peoples.
There are, however, two main issues relating to the framework which have a
bearing on how influential it will be in promoting change to policy and program
approaches by governments and ultimately in improving the well-being of
Indigenous peoples.
First, a critical issue for the reporting framework is the availability of adequate
and regular data. The Social Justice Report 2000 identified limitations in data
collection as a critical problem that must be addressed in order to ensure
government accountability for progress towards reconciliation.61 This has been
an issue that the Steering Committee has had to grapple with in establishing
the framework and in reporting against it.
The Committee has noted that the existence of data sets or ease of developing
them was a practical consideration that influenced the choice of indicators in
the framework:
In many cases, the selected indicators are a compromise, due not only
to the absence of data, but also to the unlikelihood of any data becoming
available in the foreseeable future In some cases, however, an indicator
has been included even when the data are not available on a national
basis, or are substantially qualified. These are indicators where there is
some likelihood that data quality and availability will improve over time. In
two cases where there were no reliable data available, the indicators were
nevertheless considered to be so important that qualitative indicators
have been included in the report.62

In reporting against each of the headline indicators and strategic change

indicators in the first report, the Steering Committee has noted limitations in
data availability and quality. Each chapter of the report contains a section titled
future directions in data which notes current developments which will contribute
to addressing the difficulties in data availability and quality in future years, and
how exactly specific initiatives will do this. It also identifies major deficiencies
and areas where there is an urgent and outstanding need for improved statistical
collection methods.63
I envisage that in future years the Committee is also going to face additional
issues relating to the regularity of data availability and hence the ability to report
progress over time. In this regard, I have previously recommended that the
Indigenous General Social Survey (IGSS) should be conducted on a triennial
basis, alongside the General Social Survey, to ensure the regularity of
comparable data on the unique issues covered in that survey. Currently, the
IGSS is intended to occur every 6 years, with the results of the first IGSS
conducted in 2002 due to be released in early 2004.
On the positive side, it was announced in the federal budget for 2003 that a
national longitudinal study on Indigenous children will be conducted. This study
will track the development of 4,000 Indigenous children over a nine year period

61
62
63

Social Justice Report 2000, pp96-100 and recommendations 6-10, pp131-32.

Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage, p2.9.
For a summary of these see the overview of the report: ibid, pLII.

Social Justice Report 2003

and will be a rich source of ongoing data for the Steering Committee. The
study, however, is not due to commence until at least 2005 in order for extensive
consultations to be conducted with Indigenous peoples and communities prior
to its introduction.
There may also be issues in future years relating to the ability to disaggregate
available data from the national and state or territory level, down to a regional
level.
It is critical that the recommendations and suggestions of the Steering Committee
in relation to improved data collection are addressed as a matter of urgency in
order to ensure that the reporting framework is able to fully realise its potential
and to be viable into the longer term. As the Chairman of the Steering Committee
notes:
[the] immediate contribution [of the report] is constrained by serious gaps
and deficiencies in data. For example, we know that hearing impediments
in young children can seriously undermine their ability to succeed at
school, yet we have little basis for knowing whether this problem is getting
better or worse. We know that attendance at school is critical to lifelong
achievement, but we have inadequate data to monitor it. Substance abuse
is blighting young lives, but we have little systematic information on it.
Data on the extent of disabilities among Indigenous people is almost
non-existent. The Review documents these and a range of other data
priorities that will need to be addressed if the Report is to realise its
potential and meet COAGs needs.64

In producing this report I am mandated to make recommendations on actions

which should be taken to secure the enjoyment and exercise of the rights of
Indigenous peoples. In light of the crucial nature of this issue, I have chosen to
make the following recommendation about improving data collection in the
context of the Steering Committees report.

Recommendation 1 on reconciliation:
Data collection
1.

64

That the federal government request the Australian Bureau of Statistics

(ABS) to provide to COAG information on the actions that need to be
taken in order to improve Indigenous data collection. The ABS should
respond to the suggestions made by the Steering Committee for the
Review of Government Service Delivery in the Overcoming Indigenous
Disadvantage Report 2003, as well as identify actions that they consider
necessary to ensure the availability of relevant data on a regular basis. In
providing this information, the ABS should:
identify those issues that could be addressed through improve-ments
to its existing data collection processes, as well as those issues which
would require additional one-off funding allocations and those issues
which would require additional recurrent funding from the federal
government or COAG;
Banks, G, op.cit, pp9-10.

Chapter 2

31

32

estimate the cost of any additional one-off and recurrent funding

needs, including the cost of conducting the Indigenous General Social
Survey on a triennial basis; and
consult with the Steering Committee for the Review of Government
Services, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, and
other relevant agencies.
The second main issue that impacts on the potential of the Steering Committees
report is how it is incorporated into policy design and programmes across
governments and between government departments. As the Chairman of the
Steering Committee notes:
The Reports contribution to this important national endeavour is
essentially informational. It does not (and cannot) in itself provide policy
answers. But it can (and hopefully will) help governments and Indigenous
people to identify where programs need to deliver results, and to assess
whether they are succeeding. For it to be effective in this, it will be important
that governments integrate elements of the reporting framework into their
policy development and evaluation processes.65

This is the most critical issue relating to the report ultimately it does not matter
how refined the statistics that are reported are if the report is not utilised by
governments to inform and change the way they go about delivering services
to Indigenous peoples.
In the Social Justice Report 2002, I expressed the concern that the Steering
Committees framework currently exists in isolation from any other form of
performance monitoring, particularly on identifying progress on important goals
such as capacity building and governance reform, as well as identifying the
unmet need and accordingly whether policy approaches are moving forward
or in fact regressing.66 If the reporting framework is not integrated into policy
development then the Steering Committees report risks becoming, in the words
of the Chairman of the Steering Committee, an annual misery index67 which
simply reminds us on an annual basis of continuing Indigenous disadvantage
without action to change this situation.
At this stage, it is not clear how the report will inform policy development and
how governments will use the report to review their approach to Indigenous
issues. This is in part because COAG has not yet formally considered and
responded to the first report of the Steering Committee. It is anticipated that
further guidance will be provided when COAG next meets.
It is clear, however, that the other two main activities of COAG relating to
reconciliation have a vital role to play in drawing lessons from the reporting
framework and connecting the framework to day to day policy development
processes. As the Chairman of the Steering Committee has noted:

65
66
67

ibid, p9.
Social Justice Report 2002, p133.
ibid, p130.

Social Justice Report 2003

One important national vehicle for this is the Action Plans that are being
developed by Ministerial Councils in such areas as health, education,
employment, justice and small business. The whole-of-government,
outcomes orientation of the framework also complements the coordinated
service delivery trials in eight different regions across Australia that was
initiated by COAG.68

It is notable that when developing the framework for reporting it was debated
whether there should be a third level of indicators added to the framework
which could report on service delivery. Ultimately, this was seen as a role for the
Ministerial Council action plans, which are intended to link service delivery with
the reporting framework. These action plans form the vital link in drawing lessons
from the reporting framework. Progress in developing these action plans is
discussed in the next section of this report.
Overall, as I noted in the Social Justice Report 2002, the Steering Committees
framework is a significant institutional development in measuring progress for
Indigenous peoples and the only positive form of monitoring and evaluation
that the Government has provided for practical reconciliation.69
The endorsement of the framework by COAG in August 2003 and the production
of the first report by the Steering Committee in November 2003 are both
substantial achievements. And as the Chairman of the Steering Committee has
stated, one of the most significant contributions of the reporting framework is
that it challenges us to do better. It also vindicates COAGs decision to give
new impetus to the development and coordination of Indigenous policies and
programs.70

ii) Developing Ministerial Council action plans and benchmarks

The COAG Communiqu on reconciliation of 3 November 2000 commits to an
integrated framework for addressing Indigenous disadvantage. As the former
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs notes:
Under the aegis of the Framework to Advance Reconciliation agreed by
the Council of Australian Government s(COAG) in November 2000, all
Australian governments are collectively establishing a comprehensive
regime of performance monitoring and reporting that supports (the
governments) overarching performance benchmark and objective of...
a society where Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples enjoy
comparable standards of social and economic wellbeing to those of the
wider community, especially in the areas of education, health,
employment, and law and justice, while maintaining their unique cultural
identities
This regime has two key elements:
a regular national report on Indigenous disadvantage; and
a series of sectoral performance monitoring strategies and
benchmarks oversighted by the responsible Commonwealth/State
Ministerial Council.

68
69
70

Banks, G, op.cit, p9.

Social Justice Report 2002, pp132-33.
Banks, G, op.cit, p9.

Chapter 2

33

34

The purpose of this regime is to enable governments, community

organisations, indigenous people and other Australians to monitor
progress of the nation in overcoming Indigenous disadvantage. The
regime is still in its development phase and the government anticipates
that it will be firmly in place by the third quarter in 2003.71

Each Ministerial Council is to develop action plans, performance reporting

strategies and benchmarks for addressing Indigenous disadvantage. In its action
plan, the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs
(MCATSIA) resolved to review all of the other Ministerial Council action plans,
performance reporting strategies and benchmarks in order to identify gaps to
COAG and comment on those gaps.72 Progress under the action plans would
then be regularly reviewed by COAG.
The COAG communiqu of 5 April 2002 admits that progress by the Ministerial
Councils in developing action plans and benchmarks in the year and a half
after this commitment was made has been slower than expected.73 The
communiqu indicates that COAG will continue to review progress and that a
report on the state of the action plans would be submitted by MCATSIA to
COAG for consideration no later than the end of 2003.
In his submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee
inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation, the Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs noted that MCATSIA had provided its
initial report of comments on the action plans to the Prime Minister (in his role
as the Chair of COAG) in June 2003.74 At the time of writing, MCATSIAs report
had not been made public and a number of action plans were still not finalised.
It has now been three years since COAG agreed to the production of these
action plans and benchmarks.
The federal government noted in November 2002 that:
Already a number of Ministerial Councils have performance monitoring
strategies and benchmarks in place. A leading example is the annual
performance report against the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health
indicators. Other ministerial councils also have specific data agreements
that will support the development of performance monitoring strategies
and benchmarks.75

The government noted that the following Ministerial Councils have, or had prior
to COAGs decision in 2000, developed action plans:

71

72
73
74
75

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission Senate Legal
and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation,
26 November 2002, p10.
Council of Australian Governments, Communiqu, COAG, Canberra, 5 April 2002, p18
(contained in Attachment 1: COAG Reconciliation Framework Report on progress in 2001).
ibid, p4.
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Reconciliation: Off track, Parliament
of Australia, Canberra 2003, p75.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission Senate Legal
and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation,
op.cit, p12.

Social Justice Report 2003

35

Community Services Ministers Conference;

Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources;
Australian Transport Council;
Sport and Recreation Ministerial Council;
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General;
The Online Council;
Primary Industries Ministerial Council;
Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, Training
and Youth Affairs;
Australian Health Ministers Conference;
Cultural Ministers Conference;
Housing Ministers Conference; and
Small Business Ministerial Council.76

Examples of Ministerial Council action plans, performance reporting strategies

and benchmarks include the following:

76
77

Community services and juvenile justice: The central aspect of the

community services action plan is the National Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Community Services Information Plan. This implements
the report Principles and Standards for Community Services Indigenous
Population Data and aims to improve data collection across this sector,
with a key focus on child protection and welfare, juvenile justice, the
Supported Accommodation Assistance Scheme and agencies funded
under the Commonwealth/State Disability Agreement.
Housing: In 2001, state and territory Housing Ministers and relevant federal
Ministers committed to new directions in housing through Building a better
future: Indigenous Housing to 2010.77 An agreement on national housing
information was also signed by all jurisdictions in 1999. All jurisdictions
have agreed to a performance monitoring system through improving the
availability of reliable data; developing reporting systems which will enable
performance appraisal at the national, state/territory and regional levels;
and reporting annually to relevant ministers at the federal and state/territory
level against outcomes identified in Building a better future. A reporting
framework has also been developed by ATSIC and the Department of
Family and Community Services to facilitate this performance reporting.
Employment: Indigenous specific employment data is collected at the
federal level. Quarterly reports of outcomes data are published by the
Department of Workplace Relations.
Justice related areas: The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General have
agreed to performance indicators in five areas, namely prevent crime
and community safety; improve access to justice related services;
improved access to bail; improved access to diversionary schemes; and
enhanced participation of Indigenous peoples in justice administration
systems.
ibid, p13.
Available online at: www.facs.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/aboutfacs/programs/
community_indig_housing_2010.htm.

Chapter 2

36

Health: Processes have been in place since 1998 for reporting on national
performance indicators, although data required to report on some
indicators are either unavailable, of poor quality, or require substantial
development.78 Indigenous health care agreements with the states and
the Commonwealth/State Australian Health Care Agreements also have
requirements relating to data collection. The National Strategic Framework
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health was endorsed by health
ministers in July 2003. It includes reporting on three key result areas
which relate largely to reforming the structure of the health system to
increase its accessibility to Indigenous people.
Education: The Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training
and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) has agreed on national performance
indicators for all students (not just Indigenous). The main measures are
national literacy and numeracy benchmarks for years 3 and 5 (with
benchmarks for year 7 still under development). The objective is that all
students meet the standards. Under the National Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Education Policy (NATSIEP), all governments have made
commitments to bring about equity in education for Indigenous
Australians.79 The main goals of the policy are improved Indigenous
participation in educational decision-making; equality of access to
education services; equity of educational participation; and equitable
and appropriate educational outcomes. These goals are enshrined in
the Indigenous Education (Targeted Assistance) Act 2000 (Cth).
One of the main federal programs under the NATSEIP is the Indigenous
Education Strategic Initiatives Programme (IESIP). IESIP funding is
provided on a quadrennial basis and States/Territories are required to
acquit the spending of IESIP funds against negotiated indicators which
include numeracy and literacy, Indigenous workforce, retention rates and
attrition. Service providers are required to submit annual reports against
annual targets. This information is tabled, along with progress in
addressing other performance indicators, in Parliament through the
National Report to Parliament on Indigenous Education and Training by
the federal Department of Education Science and Training. The first report
was tabled in 2002. Programs under the IESIP, such as the National
Indigenous English Literacy and Numeracy Strategy, also have targets
for improving literacy and numeracy rates of Indigenous people to levels
comparable to other Australians.80

The federal government admits that these action plans vary in their
sophistication.81 In fact, many of these action plans are rudimentary in scope
78

79
80
81

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission Senate Legal
and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation,
op.cit, p15.
Department of Education, Science and Training, National Report to Parliament on Indigenous
Education and Training 2001, DEST, Canberra 2002, p2.
See: www.dest.gov.au/schools/indigenous/nielns.htm.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission Senate Legal
and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation,
op.cit, p12. For details of a number of these action plans see: ibid, pp13-17.

Social Justice Report 2003

and deal almost exclusively with data collection and performance monitoring
issues. Very few have any benchmarks or targets.
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation defined a benchmark as an agreed
standard or target that reflects the community aspirations that either have been
met or are desirable to be met.82
Benchmarking is a critical aspect of ensuring human rights compliance and
accountability. This is in accordance with the guiding principle of progressive
realisation under international human rights law (and as reflected in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). The Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Development
Programme has explained this obligation as follows:
The idea of progressive realization has two major strategic implications.
First, it allows for a time dimension in the strategy for human rights
fulfilment by recognizing that full realization of human rights may have to
occur in a progressive manner over a period of time. Second, it allows for
setting priorities among different rights at any point in time since the
constraint of resources may not permit a strategy to pursue all rights
simultaneously with equal vigour
The recognition of a time dimension is accompanied by certain conditions
aimed at ensuring that the State does not take it as a licence either to
defer or to relax the efforts needed to realize human rights. In particular,
the State is required to do the following.
First, the State must acknowledge that with a serious commitment to
poverty reduction it may be possible to make rapid progress towards the
realization of many human rights even within the existing resource
constraint Second, to the extent that the realization of human rights
may be contingent on a gradual expansion in the availability of resources,
the State must begin immediately to take steps to fulfil the rights as
expeditiously as possible by developing and implementing a time-bound
plan of action. The plan must spell out when and how the State hopes to
arrive at the realization of rights.
Third, the plan must include a series of intermediate preferably annual
targets. As the realization of human rights may take some considerable
time, possibly extending well beyond the immediate term of a Government
in power, it is with regard to these intermediate targets (or benchmarks)
rather than the final target of full realization that the State will have to be
held accountable.
Fourth, as a prerequisite of setting targets, the State will have to identify
some indicators in terms of which targets will be set... Realistic timebound targets will have to be set in relation to each indicator so as to
serve as benchmarks.83

82

83

Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Towards a benchmarking framework for service delivery
to Indigenous Australians, CAR and Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra
1998, p16.
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Development
Programme, Draft Guidelines: A Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies,
OHCHR, Geneva 2002, Guideline 4, pp14-15. See also: Social Justice Report 2002, Chapter
4; Social Justice Report 2000, Chapter 4.

Chapter 2

37

38

The Social Justice Report 2000 described the key attributes of a benchmark as
that it is:
specific, time bound and verifiable;
set with the participation of the people whose rights are affected, to
agree on what is an adequate rate of progress and to prevent the
target from being set too low; and
re-assessed independently at their target date, with accountability for
performance.84
In relation to benchmarking, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliations national
strategy to overcome Indigenous disadvantage also recommended that
governments and ATSIC:
set national, state, territory and regional outcomes and output
benchmarks that are measurable, include time-lines and are agreed
in partnership with Indigenous peoples and communities;
ensure that they have appropriate methods to enable accurate and
consistent output and outcome reporting for mainstream and
Indigenous specific programs; and
publicly and annually present an outputs and outcomes based report
to their parliaments, on a whole-of-government basis, against these
agreed benchmarks.85
Even the most sophisticated of these action plans, in education, does not meet
the attributes necessary for adequate benchmarking. Like the Steering
Committees framework, a target of statistical equality between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Australians can be implied into some of these action plans.
But the establishment of benchmarks requires more than the identification of
this ultimate goal. It requires an identification of an agreed rate of progress
towards this goal, within a short, medium and longer term context, and an
evaluation of issues relating to the prioritisation, resourcing and re-engineering
of programs and services that will be needed in order to achieve this. The
action plans and strategies adopted at the inter-governmental level to date do
not contain critical elements for benchmarking.
The absence of appropriate benchmarks is perhaps the most significant failure
of governments in implementing practical reconciliation since the year 2000.
On this basis, I make the following recommendations to improve government
accountability for reconciliation.

84
85

Social Justice Report 2000, p97; quoting the United Nations Development Programmes Human
Development Report 2000.
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Overcoming disadvantage, as quoted in Social Justice
Report 2000, p99.

Social Justice Report 2003

39

Recommendations 2-5 on Reconciliation:

Ministerial Council Action Plans
2.

3.

4.

5.

That the federal government, through its leadership role in the Council of
Australian Governments, ensure that all Commonwealth/State Ministerial
Councils finalise action plans on addressing Indigenous disadvantage
and reconciliation by 30 June 2004. These action plans must contain
benchmarks, with specific timeframes (covering short, medium and long
term objectives) for their realisation. Where appropriate, these
benchmarks should correlate with the strategic change indicators and
headline indicators reported annually by the Steering Committee for the
Provision of Government Services.
That the federal government, through its leadership role in the Council of
Australian Governments, request the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC) to advise COAG whether it endorses these action
plans and the benchmarks contained within, following consultations
through its Regional Councils. ATSIC should be required to advise COAG
of its endorsement or any concerns about the action plans within a
maximum period of six months after being furnished with the action plans.
That the federal government ensure that all Commonwealth/State
Ministerial Council Action Plans are made publicly available as a
compendium of national commitments to overcoming Indigenous
disadvantage.
That COAG publicly report on progress in meeting the benchmarks
contained in each Commonwealth/State Ministerial Council Action Plan
on an annual basis.

iii) The COAG whole-of-government community trials

In its communiqu of 5 April 2002, COAG agreed to trial a whole-of-government
cooperative approach in up to ten communities or regions of Australia. It was
subsequently decided that there will be eight trial sites, one in each state or
territory of Australia. The eight trial sites are:

Murdi Paaki region (New South Wales);

Wadeye (Northern Territory);
Shepparton (Victoria);
Cape York (Queensland);
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (South Australia);
Northern Tasmania;
East Kimberley region (Western Australia); and
The Australian Capital Territory.

Appendix 2 of this report provides a detailed overview of the trials, the

mechanisms that have been put into place for inter-agency and intergovernmental coordination, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the trials,
as well as progress in each of the trial sites.

Chapter 2

40

The COAG Communiqu of April 2002 recognised that outcomes and

management processes in Indigenous policy and service delivery need to be
improved. The COAG initiative is intended to trial a different approach as current
and past approaches have not achieved the desired outcomes. As the
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce notes:
Many people are saying that the relationship between the community
and the governments has got to change. It is clear that some of the ways
that governments and communities approach their responsibilities needs
to be done differently if we are going to move forward together.
Recently, Commonwealth and State and Territory governments have
agreed to improve their approach. They have agreed to work together.
And they have agreed to work in partnership with Indigenous communities
to support them find and manage sustainable solutions to local problems.
This means government have agreed to learn new ways of doing business
with Indigenous communities.86

It is intended that the trials will be flexible in approach in order to reflect the
specific needs of each community trial site, to build on existing initiatives and
to improve the compatibility of the approaches currently undertaken by the
federal and state or territory governments in order to achieve better outcomes.
COAG will be looking for transferable outcomes from the trials, to be applied
more broadly in service delivery to Indigenous peoples.87
The objectives of the COAG trials are to:
tailor government action to identified community needs and
aspirations;
coordinate government programmes and services where this will
improve service delivery outcomes;
encourage innovative approaches traversing new territory;
cut through blockages and red tape to resolve issues quickly;
work with Indigenous communities to build the capacity of people in
those communities to negotiate as genuine partners with government;
negotiate agreed outcomes, benchmarks for measuring progress and
management of responsibilities for achieving those outcomes with
the relevant people in Indigenous communities; and
build the capacity of government employees to be able to meet the
challenges of working in this new way with Indigenous communities.88
It is anticipated that the trials will encourage governments to modify the way
they conduct their program and service delivery responsibilities, including by

86

87
88

Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Towards better outcomes for Indigenous

Australians, DIMIA Canberra 2003, www.icc.gov.au/publications?MySourceSession
=6c119361b7d1a3a6cffc8b581a0eba82, accessed 15 November 2003.
Council of Australian Governments, Communiqu, 5 April 2002, www.pmc.gov.au/docs/
coag050402.cfm, accessed 12 December 2003.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Trial Objectives, online at: www.icc.gov.au/
communities/objectives/, (29 October 2003).

Social Justice Report 2003

encouraging the pooling of funding, breaking down internal administrative

barriers and improving the way government manages and awards contracts.89
Overall, the broader policy context for the COAG trials is the federal governments
emphasis on mutual obligation and the responsibility of all players (government,
communities, families and individuals) to address issues of social and economic
participation. It is a continuation of the approach adopted by the government in
its welfare reform package as well as through practical reconciliation.90
The philosophy that underpins the trials is shared responsibility shared future.
The ICCT has stated that the Shared Responsibility approach will involve
communities negotiating as equal parties with government91 and asserts that
the wellbeing of Indigenous communities is shared by individuals, families,
communities and government. All parties must work together and build their
capacity to support a different approach for the economic, social and cultural
development of Indigenous peoples. This partnership approach is formalised
in each trial site through the negotiation of a Shared Responsibility Agreement
(SRA) between governments and Indigenous peoples.
The Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs has overall
federal responsibility for the trials. A federal government department is also
identified for each trial site to lead the federal governments involvement in that
particular trial. It is then responsible for coordinating all federal government
input into the trial. The involvement of state and territory governments is generally
coordinated through the departments of the premier or chief minister. Senior
state and territory government officials meet through the COAG processes every
six months.
Federal government involvement in the trial is also coordinated through three
main processes. First, meetings are held every three to four months by federal
Ministers with program responsibilities for Indigenous affairs. Second, monthly
meetings are held of federal government departmental secretaries (the
Secretaries Group). Third, a coordinating taskforce (known as the Indigenous
Communities Coordination Taskforce or ICCT) has been established, located
within the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA)
to implement the directives of these groups. The ICCT is comprised of senior
officers seconded from each of the government departments participating in
the trials.
As demonstrated by the descriptions of current progress in the eight trial sites
in Appendix 2, there are significant differences between the selected sites. These
differences include the location of the trials (across urban, regional and remote
areas), the representative structures for involvement of Indigenous peoples and
communities (varying from heavy involvement of ATSIC Regional Council

89

90
91

Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Imagine What Could Happen if we Worked

Together: Shared Responsibility and a Whole of Governments Approach, Conference Paper
The Native Title Conference, Alice Springs, 3 June 2003, www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/
conf2003/papers/hawgood.pdf, 24 December 2003.
For a detailed evaluation of mutual obligation in an Indigenous context see: Social Justice
Report 2001, Chapters 2 and 3.
Hawgood, D, Hansard House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 13 October 2003, p1294.

Chapter 2

41

42

structures through to traditional governance models), and the priority areas for
action identified in each site.
While the trials remain in the preliminary stages of development, rapid progress
has been made during 2003. At this initial stage, this progress has involved the
selection of appropriate trial sites and consultations with Indigenous communities
in those sites to determine their willingness to participate in the trials and the
key issues that the trials will focus on. For three of the sites, Shared Responsibility
Agreements have also been finalised.
In meetings and correspondence about the trials, I have noticed an air of
enthusiasm and optimism among government departments about the potential
of the trials. Government departments are embracing the challenge to re-learn
how to interact with and deliver services to Indigenous peoples. There are no
illusions among government departments that the trials are as much about
building the capacity of governments as they are about building the capacity of
Indigenous communities.
Through the active involvement of Ministers and secretaries of federal
departments in the trials, a clear message is being sent through mainstream
federal departments that these trials matter and that government is serious
about improving outcomes for Indigenous peoples. Even at this preliminary
stage, this is a significant achievement for the trials. ATSIC have stated that to
date there has been clear success through improved relationships across
governments at trial sites.92
Governments have not turned up in Indigenous communities with pre-determined
priorities and approaches. This has been of great symbolic value. The ICCT
has noted that much of the initial stages have involved building up trust between
governments and Indigenous peoples. This has in turn had an impact on
relationships within Indigenous communities in some of the trial sites, with an
increased focus from Indigenous communities on organising themselves in
ways that facilitate dialogue with governments.93
It is too early to determine whether the trials will have a positive impact in
improving government service delivery to communities in each trial region in
the longer term or whether transferable lessons will be learnt which are able to
more broadly benefit other Indigenous communities. At this stage, I have the
following observations and concerns about the conduct of the trials and their
potential.
First, it appears that the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce is
inadequately funded and supported to complete its ever-expanding role in
coordinating federal government involvement in the trials.
As the trials have progressed, the ICCT has become an integral, indeed the
central, coordinating agency for the trials. While the day to day operation of
governmental activities in each of the trial sites is the responsibility of the
respective lead federal government agencies, the ICCT has taken on a vital role
in oversighting developments in each trial. This has allowed lessons from
92
93

Quartermaine, L, Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner on COAG trials, 15 January 2004, p4.
Discussions with ICCT, November 2003.

Social Justice Report 2003

individual trial sites to be applied to other trial sites and ensured a level of
consistency in the approach of different federal agencies to the trials.
Examples of how the ICCT has fulfilled this role is the development of a template
Shared Responsibility Agreement from which negotiations can commence in
each trial site (and be customised to local circumstances), the development of
a information database on the indicators for each trial, and a performance and
monitoring framework for the trials. The role of the ICCT continues to evolve,
and expand, as the trials develop.
At present, the federal government appears to be equivocal as to the longer
term future of the ICCT. It is not clear that the ICCT will exist for the full five years
of the trials and if it does, in what form.
This uncertainty is compounded by the recommendations of the report of the
ATSIC Review team. While the review does not explicitly consider the role of the
ICCT, it recommends that the Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Affairs (currently located within DIMIA) be replaced by a small office within the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to provide a whole-of-government
approach to Indigenous issues.94 The proposed roles of this group would include
progressing COAG initiatives, achieving the cooperation of all spheres of
government in addressing Indigenous needs and achieving whole-ofgovernment approaches to addressing Indigenous needs.95 These are roles
that the ICCT fulfils specifically in relation to the COAG trials. It is not clear
whether implementation of this recommendation would involve disbanding or
substituting the role of the ICCT.
Related to this uncertainty in the future of the ICCT for the full five year period
are uncertainties in staffing of the ICCT. It is my clear impression that the ICCT
is understaffed to complete the large task that it has been set. In part this is
because the role of the ICCT has evolved and expanded as the trials have
developed. It is understandable that no one envisaged the full extent of the
resources required to implement the trials, nor the central role that the ICCT
would assume in the trials.
There is a clear need for the Commonwealth to commit to the existence of the
ICCT for the full five years of the COAG trials and to increase staffing levels to
ensure that the ICCT is able to be fully responsive and continue to make high
quality contributions to the COAG trials. I note that, currently, officers are placed
in the ICCTs Secretariat from a variety of federal departments who are
participating in the trials. The costs of these officers are met by the participating
departments as a contribution to the trials. It is feasible that the cost of expanding
the number of staff on the ICCT, perhaps by doubling it, could easily be absorbed
within existing departmental budgets.
From discussions with the ICCT, it was noted that despite the eight trial sites
having already been announced, they continue to receive requests from other
departments as to whether there will be an expansion of the trials beyond the
eight sites or for assistance and advice in new initiatives that these departments
94

95

Hannaford, J, Huggins, J and Collins, B, In the hands of the regions A new ATSIC. Report of
the Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra 2003, Recommendation 32, p55.
ibid, p51.

Chapter 2

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44

are considering. An increased staffing capacity would contribute greatly to the

ability of the ICCT to provide advice and assistance more generally on
approaches to improving government coordination across government. The
cost of this increased capacity would be insubstantial, particularly in light of the
potential for transferring the lessons learnt from the trials more broadly across
government.
It is also notable that there is no coordinating taskforce similar to the ICCT for
coordinating state and territory involvement in the trials. In part this is a reflection
of the fact that there is only one trial in each state or territory and hence that
each government is not involved in more than one trial. State and territory
involvement in the trials could, however, benefit from a regular forum of
departmental officials across trial sites to share experiences, best practice and
to trouble shoot. The existing processes for involving state officials i.e.,
meetings of heads of state departments ahead of COAG meetings, and through
the Ministerial Council of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs are held
at an extremely high level and do not engage officers engaged in the trials on a
day to day basis. Consideration should be given to mechanisms to facilitate
such exchange between state and territory governments based on the success
of the ICCT in coordinating federal government involvement.
On the basis of these concerns, I make the following recommendations.

Recommendations 6-7 on reconciliation:

COAG Whole-of-government community trials
6.

7.

That the federal government, through the Department of Immigration,

Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, commit to the existence of the
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce for a minimum of the
five year duration of the COAG whole-of-government community trials
and accordingly commit resources to the Taskforce until 2007.
That federal government departments participating in the COAG wholeof-government trials increase their staffing commitments to the Indigenous
Communities Coordination Taskforce by placing additional officers in the
Taskforces Secretariat.

Second, there are concerns relating to the use of the Flexible Funding Pool that
has been established to support the trials. This Funding Pool consists of $3million
for each of the 2003-04 and 2004-05 years. The ICCT have explained the purpose
of this funding pool as follows:
The idea of this flexible funding pool was that it would only be a short
term mechanism to kick-start some whole-of-government activity on the
basis that the whole-of-government or joined-up activity had to come
from mainstream and big Indigenous specific programs already in
operation. The government was not trying to create a superficial
mechanism to take the place of joining up existing programs and
services The trials were not about new money. The COAG decision

Social Justice Report 2003

was actually more about more effective use of existing government

expenditure.96

There is no commitment to any funding pool for the final two years of the trials.
The ICCT expects that funding will ultimately be provided in a more informal
way97 through the joining up of existing programs and changes to program
approaches. This is an important goal for the trials and a way of ensuring that
the outcomes of the trials are sustainable and able to be more broadly applied
to other Indigenous communities. There will, however, need to be close attention
paid in the implementation of the trials to the reality of this goal and a degree of
flexibility from the government to allocate funding to the ICCT for the final two
years of the trials should such funding ultimately prove necessary.
ATSIC has expressed concern about how funding from this Funding Pool is
allocated.98 They state:
Generally, proposals to use the Flexible Funding Pool [FFP] are developed
by Lead Agencies and should be consistent with the relevant Regional
Council plan. However, concerns remain regarding the manner in which
the requirement for FFP proposals take account of, and are informed by,
Regional Council plans. Greater engagement of Regional Councils in
the submission and evaluation of FFP proposals will provide valuable
opportunities to progress ATSICs involvement in the FFP process at a
regional and national level.99

Third, there is concern from ATSIC that it is not being sufficiently engaged in the
trials. The matching of the use of the Flexible Funding Pool with ATSIC Regional
Council plans is a specific example of this concern. More broadly, the acting
Chairman has stated that:
While the Commission believe that the most important level of Indigenous
engagement in this initiative is the local community, it should be
recognised that the Commission and ATSIC Regional Councils have
significant responsibilities to these particular communities and, for this
reason, have sought to improve their involvement in the initiative. As the
initiative has enormous relevance and potential implications for all
Indigenous communities across the country, the Commission does not
want its roles and responsibilities in this regard overlooked or ignored. In
particular, Commissioners are concerned that Indigenous representation
is both welcomed and supported especially in political interaction at the
most senior levels.100

The acting Chairman has noted that ATSIC-ATSIS are considering ways to
strengthen their engagement in the trials to promote national discussions,
informed by an Indigenous perspective, regarding the utility of the trials. The
acting Chairman identifies the following issues as needing to be addressed:

96

Hawgood, D, Hansard Senate Legal and Constitution Legislation Committee, (Estimates), 4

November 2003, p8.
97 ibid.
98 As noted in Appendix 2, ATSIC has contributed $1million (of the $3million total) per annum to
this Flexible Funding Pool.
99 Quartermaine, L, op.cit p6.
100 ibid, p5.

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46

the fragmented involvement of Regional Councils in both the signing

of Shared Responsibility Agreements and selection of trial sites;101
the status of relationships between Commissioners, ATSIC Regional
Councils, ATSIS staff, Lead Agencies and the ICCT; and
a lack of engagement of and by Regional Councils with Lead Agencies
and other government partners.102
The next chapter discusses proposed reform to ATSIC, which includes greater
support and emphasis on regionalisation and regional planning processes. At
this point, it is important to note that many ATSIC Regional Council Plans are
not developed at a sufficient level of detail to lead trial processes. There is a
need for developing the capacity of many Regional Councils, including their
capacity to develop targeted regional planning documents that can form the
basis of inter-governmental coordination and service delivery approaches.
Fourth, it is not clear at this stage that the performance monitoring framework
for the trials will be sufficiently rigorous. It is anticipated that the first two years
of the trial will be reviewed in mid-2004 and a further review conducted at the
end of the 5 year trial phase. It is not clear at this stage how these reviews will
be conducted, by whom or whether the results of the reviews will be made
public.
The lack of a clear evaluation strategy is of great concern. It may be that the
uncertainty in this regard is largely the product of the evolving nature of the
trials and that there will be much greater clarity during 2004. I have previously,
however, expressed concern at reliance by COAG on internal monitoring and
evaluation strategies. In particular, I have expressed concerns about the lack of
information that is publicly reported about such evaluations (thus limiting
government accountability), the lack of appropriate consultation with Indigenous
peoples and lack of independence in the monitoring process.103
My concern about such processes is reinforced by the failure in recent years of
the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs to complete
two significant evaluations on COAGs behalf and in a timely manner. The first
is the review of progress by all levels of government in implementing the
recommendations of the Bringing them home report. The second is an audit of
family violence programmes to guide the response of COAG to this crisis issue.
Approximately three years after these reviews were announced, neither has
been presented to COAG nor made public.
ATSIC has also expressed significant concern about the monitoring framework
for the trials. It states:

101 ATSIC note that the involvement of the Commission and Regional Councils in the selection of
the trial sites has varied from none to limited, with the exception of the Murdi Paaki Regional
Council, which nominated its region as a trial site and since its announcement has been
integrally involved in the development of the trial: ibid, p6.
102 ibid.
103 Social Justice Report 2001, p201; and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee
inquiry into the stolen generation, HREOC Sydney 2000, online at: www.humanrights.gov.au/
social_justice/senate_submission/index.html.

Social Justice Report 2003

The Commission is particularly concerned that a comprehensive national

evaluation strategy is not in place. This is likely to lead to unclear
judgements later on, as the starting point for assessing change has not
been clearly established. In addition, the Commission is concerned that
there is no commitment to an independent evaluation of the initiative.
The reliance on a systems-based internal evaluation strategy might not
provide the most objective perspective on the successes and failures of
the initiative, and may produce an inadequate basis upon which to make
long term policy and program reforms.104

A related issue is the existence of adequate data to contribute to the monitoring

and evaluation process.
In the initial stages of the trials, there has been a significant focus on developing
local level priorities, outcomes and benchmarks. The Indigenous Communities
Coordination Taskforce Database has been developed to capture this
information across the eight trial sites. A number of government agencies have
informed me that it is intended that this local level information will be able to be
aggregated into a national level analysis. The intention is that this information
will be able to be aligned with the headline and strategic change indicators
developed by the Steering Committee for the Provision of Government Services,
and that data will able to be compared against existing portfolio budget
statements and other cross-government frameworks at the national level.105
It is not, however, clear how the local level data will be able to be matched up to
the national level in these ways. There is very little ability to disaggregate, on a
regional or local basis, the statistics which form the basis of the headline
indicators and strategic change indicators in the national reporting framework.
The emphasis of the trials to date has also, quite rightly, not been on improving
data collection at this local level. Hence, existing systems of data collection are
very poor at identifying the status of Indigenous people in a particular locality or
region across a broad range of social and economic indicators. Accordingly
they are also ill equipped to measure change in such indicators.
It is quite likely that it will not be possible to match up local level indicators with
the national reporting framework, other than through the provision of case studies
which can illustrate links between particular types of policy interventions and
outcomes. This will, of itself, be valuable information. The concern is that the
trials have set objectives for data analysis and performance monitoring that will
not be able to be achieved because of the existing limitations in data quality
and collection.

104 ibid.
105 Indigenous Community Coordination Taskforce, Shared responsibility shared future
Indigenous whole of government initiative: The Australian government performance monitoring
and evaluation framework, DIMIA Canberra 2003, p3. See Appendix 2 of this report for further
information.

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On the basis of these concerns, I make the following recommendations.

Recommendations 8-9 on reconciliation:

COAG Whole-of-government community trials
8.

9.

That COAG request the Productivity Commission (as Chair of the Steering
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) to provide
advice on aligning the benchmarks and outcomes agreed at the local
level with COAGs National Framework for Reporting on Indigenous
Disadvantage. This advice should include any recommendations for
adapting the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce Database
to enable reporting of outcomes against this National Framework.
That COAG agree and fund an independent monitoring and evaluation
process for the whole-of-government community trials initiative. The
Productivity Commission, Commonwealth Grants Commission or ATSICs
National Office of Evaluation and Audit would be suitable agencies to
conduct this review.

Fifth, it is not clear how the lessons learnt from the trials will be transferable and
contribute to broader reform of program design and service delivery for
Indigenous peoples. The adequacy of the performance monitoring framework,
as discussed above, will be one of the key determinants of such lessons.
ATSIC have expressed some preliminary concerns about the conduct of the
trials and the transferability of lessons learned. Their concerns relate to three
broad factors. The first is limited experimentation of new approaches by Lead
Agencies in the trials. ATSIC argue that to date:
there has been little progress in doing business differently Silos
continue to characterise government relationships and the way in which
funds are provided and accounted for, leading to restrictions in the
experimentation of interventions. Lead Agencies are struggling to balance
different priorities with trial partners leading to difficulties in progressing
joined-up projects on the ground. As little obvious progress has been
made in re-engineering programs, Lead Agencies are tending to use
existing programs in the trial sites with little flexibility or creativity.106

They note, significantly, that programs that are used more flexibly tend to be
Indigenous-specific rather than mainstream.107
The second concern identified by ATSIC is that there has been a blurring in
some instances of Commonwealth and state responsibilities, attracting the
possibility of cost shifting between parties compounded by the inexperience
of Lead Agencies and their personnel when engaging with Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander communities.108 ATSIC sees a need for clearer mechanisms

106 Quartermaine, L, op.cit, p4.

107 ibid.
108 ibid.

Social Justice Report 2003

to facilitate a more cohesive joined-up approach accompanied by greater

flexibility in the availability of fund to improve outcomes combined with effective
and timely evaluation.109
The third concern identified by ATSIC relating to transferability of outcomes is a
perception that initiatives in one trial are not being identified as having potential
application in other trials. They state:
One of the strengths of the initiative is the opportunity to develop locally
based solutions to meet locally identified needs. It seems reasonable
therefore, that where a Lead Agency has proceeded to implement a
program differently, such as increasing the provision of housing to one of
the communities in the trial site, then that initiative should be considered
for the other trial sites. This would address basic needs that are common
to most of the sites.110

It is clear that there are many common issues across trial sites that could be
advanced more quickly if each trial can work from the experiences in other trial
sites. This has been identified as a critical issue by the ICCT. As noted earlier, a
mechanism for coordinating state and territory activity could also be of great
value in addressing this significant issue.
Ultimately, the transferability of outcomes from the trials in the longer term will
depend on whether the trials are able to more broadly change the status quo of
service delivery and program guidelines. A significant challenge will be ensuring
that the adoption of more holistic, whole-of-government approaches is not a
transient feature and that departments do not simply slip back into their usual
ways of doing things once the trials have ended. Factors that will need to be
addressed to ensure that this is not the case include the following:
Continued engagement of mainstream departments and programs: It
is clear that a significant factor in the early success of the trials has
been the high level involvement and commitment of ministers and
departmental secretaries at the federal level in taking responsibility
for particular communities (as the lead agency) and harnessing the
services and programs of mainstream departments. The lead agency
approach is not sustainable beyond a limited number of communities
in its current format. Mechanisms such as the Ministers group and
the Secretaries group may be more sustainable, so long as
departments continue to have a significant investment in promoting
improved coordination of services.
Coordinating funding of proposals in non-trial sites: Similarly, the
identification of a region or community as a trial site has naturally
elevated the priority with which the service delivery needs of that
community or region are dealt with. Governments and departments
have been able to look to how they can relax program guidelines or
join up funding from different programs and areas for more holistic
solutions. A significant challenge is identifying how proposals in non-

109 ibid, p5.

110 ibid, p5.

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trial sites can also benefit from this approach where such proposals
do not enjoy such priority attention.
Resource constraints: While the emphasis of the trials is not on new
money but on better coordinating and getting value from existing
money, there is a broader context of significant under-funding of key
areas of Indigenous disadvantage. The focus on a limited number of
communities, and the availability of a short term funding pool, shields
the trials from this broader issue. Funding restrictions will become a
significant issue when seeking to more broadly implement the lessons
learnt from the trials. This will be complicated further by an emphasis
on addressing relative need and reallocating funding towards those
areas and issues of greatest disadvantage.
Capacity development of Indigenous communities: Each of the trials
has built on local Indigenous initiatives that were already under
development to improve service delivery to their communities. For
example, processes such as the ATSIC Murdi Paaki Regional Council
initiatives of community working parties, the incorporation of the
Tharmarrurr Regional Council under local government legislation in
the Northern Territory, and the Cape York Partnerships in Queensland
were relatively developed when the decision was made to make each
of these areas a trial site. The trials have undoubtedly greatly advanced
processes that were previously underway in these and other trial areas.
However, the broader concern is how transferable lessons will be
drawn from the trials for those communities which experience a high
degree of dysfunction and which are not, at least at this stage, capable
of organising themselves so that they can better interact with
governments.111 In other words, how do we avoid the situation where
governments focus their attention on improved coordination of service
delivery to those communities that are relatively organised? Even in
the trial sites, where there has been a great deal of activity by
communities to address these issues, it has taken a long time to
develop the capacity of the communities to the point where they can
determine what the priorities of the community are and the approaches
that should be adopted. It is critical that in the longer term other
communities do not get left behind because they do not have such
capacity.
There are also a number of processes available to ATSIC and Indigenous
peoples to build on the achievements of the trials and more broadly inform
policies and programs.
There are three significant processes which ATSIC currently utilises which provide
ATSIC with some leverage for advancing inter-governmental coordination and
improved service delivery.

111 It is the interaction of these factors that is critical many of the communities in the trial sites
would describe themselves as experiencing high levels of dysfunction. It is the determination,
and in most cases simply the ability, to address this that is missing in some other communities.

Social Justice Report 2003

First, ATSIC has entered into a number of partnership agreements with states
and territories. An overview of these agreements was provided in Appendix 1 of
the Social Justice Report 2002. As an example, the Statement of commitment
for a new and just relationship with Aboriginal Western Australians was signed
by ATSIC, the Western Australian government and other Indigenous
representative organisations in October 2001. This commits the parties to the
agreement to a whole-of-government approach with the negotiation of regional
agreements based on an acknowledgement of shared responsibility, as well as
the negotiation of framework agreements in areas such as health, housing,
essential services, justice and native title.
ATSIC has also negotiated agreements and compacts with federal government
departments such as the Department of Workplace Relations (DEWR), the
Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) and the Department of
Health and Ageing.112
Second, is through the operation of ATSICs Regional Councils and the
development of their regional plans. As ATSIC have stated about their approach
to the COAG trials:
ATSIC-ATSIS approach has been to promote the Regional Councils as
the pre-eminent source of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander advice in
all trial sites. This is easier in regions where Regional Councils are the
main source of leadership but it has proved difficult where other
organisations compete for this role or the trial boundary differs from the
Regional Council boundary.113

The better utilisation of ATSIC Regional Councils and the capacity of ATSICs
regional planning process is discussed in detail in the next chapter. Regional
plans offer a significant opportunity for coordinating government activity within
regions. Recent agreements between ATSIC, DEWR and DEST, for example,
commit these departments to using the regional planning process to better
coordinate their activities regionally.
As noted earlier, however, some regional plans may not be of sufficient quality
and depth to guide some of the trials at this stage. There is a significant challenge
to build the capacity of Regional Councils over the coming decade. It is possible
that a further benefit of the trials will be improvements in the development of
regional plans, combined with greater engagement of mainstream agencies in
identifying key priorities for communities through the planning process.
Third, ATSIC leads the Community Participation Agreements (CPA) initiative
under the Australians Working Together package. The CPA process provides
ATSIC with a significant tool for advancing the objectives of Indigenous
communities or regions as they relate to aspects of government service delivery.
The CPA initiative was announced in the 2001-02 Federal Budget, with $30.5
million allocated to ATSIC over four years to develop and implement agreements
in remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. The agreements
involve the community identifying practical ways people can contribute to their
112 See comments on this approach by the CEO of ATSIC in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission, Annual Report 2002-03, ATSIC Canberra 2003, pp15-16.
113 Quartermaine, L, op.cit, p4.

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families and communities in return for their income support payments. To date,
ten CPA initiatives have commenced in the Northern Territory, Queensland, South
Australia, Western Australia and New South Wales. These ten processes cover
a mix of individual communities and regional negotiations, and involve the
following 27 communities:
Mutitijulu (NT);
West Macdonnell Ranges (NT) covering the communities
of Papunya, Ikuntji, Kintore and Mt Leibig;
Tennant Creek (NT) involving the communities of Ali Curung, Elliot
and Mungkarta;
Canteen Creek (NT) involving the communities of Kunlinjara,
Canteen Creek, Epenarra and 10 Mile communities;
Barrow Creek (NT) involving the communities of Tara, Barrow
Creek and Wilora;
Coen (Qld);
Aurukun (Qld);
Tjurabalan (WA) involving the communities of Yagga Yagga,
Billiluna, Mulan, Ringers Soak and Balgo;
New South Wales involving the communities of Bourke,
Brewarrina, Walgett and Wilcannia; and
Oodnadatta (SA).
CPA initiatives are under negotiation in a number of COAG whole-of-government
trial sites. This includes Tjurabalan (WA) which corresponds to the west Kimberley
trial, and a number of specific communities in the Murdi Paaki region and Cape
York respectively. CPA negotiations are occurring on a community-by-community
basis and in remote COAG regions their potential is being explored as a
subsidiary measure to support the COAG shared responsibility approach. In
addition to the aforementioned COAG sites, preliminary discussions are
occurring in Wadeye (NT) and the Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) Lands in South
Australia about their interest in implementing a CPA agreement.
Progress in advancing Community Participation Agreements has been slow to
date. It is hoped that there will be significant progress in implementing these
agreements over the coming year.
A further tool which is available to Indigenous communities to build on the
advances of the COAG trials are the Indigenous Land Use Agreement provisions
of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). In discussions with government officers
concerning the trials it was noted that there are similarities between the issues
raised in some native title agreement negotiations and the negotiation of Shared
Responsibility Agreements in the COAG trials. It was noted that while native
title issues have not emerged as central issues in the initial stages of the trials,
it is anticipated that these issues will become more prominent in some trial
sites as the trials progress.
My Native Title Report 2003 provides a detailed analysis of how federal, state
and territory government policies and approaches to native title negotiations
promote the utilisation of native title as a tool for economic and social

Social Justice Report 2003

development within a cultural context. It suggests that the full potential of native
title as contributing to these processes is not being utilised and in many instances
is being actively prevented by the approaches of governments. The report states:
In many cases the role of native title is glaringly absent from States policy
responses to the reconciliation process. Native title negotiations and
agreements are not seen as part of the States policy toolbox directed
towards transforming the conditions of Indigenous peoples lives
The two important policy responses to emerge from the reconciliation
process as necessary to facilitate the economic and social development
of Indigenous people are, firstly, a whole-of-government approach to
Indigenous policy and secondly, partnerships between government and
Indigenous communities [A] whole-of-government approach, which
requires government to integrate the responsibilities and policies of all
the agencies concerned with providing services to Indigenous
communities, is a very important element of achieving the sustainable
development of these communities. However the application of this
approach is very limited and fails to ensure that Indigenous policies in all
their manifestations are underpinned by consistent objectives. In particular
it fails to ensure that native title programs are brought within or are
consistent with strategies for achieving economic social and cultural
development.
The second policy response to reconciliation, the establishment of
partnerships between Indigenous communities and governments, is also
an important element of sustainable development ... government plays
an important role in the group achieving its development objectives: it
facilitates the group in identifying its development goals; it assists the
group to build upon its assets, skills and knowledge so as to achieve its
development goals; it assists the group to identify which aspects of its
asset skills and knowledge base may need to be supplemented, and it
facilitates the group to monitor and evaluate the strategies it adopts to
achieve its goals. This policy framework can be summed up as a
partnership approach. It is a partnership, however, with special
characteristics.
First, for the approach to achieve sustainable development of the
community, the dominant partner is the Indigenous side. It is the
community that must determine its policy objectives and strategies and
control the way they are achieved. Decisions to this effect must be
conducted through processes and institutions which the community
respects and which reflect the groups cultural values native title
provides a framework to ensure decisions are made in this way.
Second, the governments role in this partnership directed to the
sustainable development of the group is to facilitate and assist the group
to achieve its goals. The government should not take over the control of
the process. Indigenous leader Gerhardt Pearson has put the situation
thus:
It is easy for government bureaucracies to accept so-called whole-ofgovernment approaches, coordinated service delivery and so on. It is
much harder for them to let go of the responsibility. On one hand we
have the almost complete failure on their part to lead and facilitate social

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and economic development in Indigenous Australia. On the other hand,

our experience is that the government bureaucracies are resistant to the
transfer of responsibility to our people.114
Despite the limitations in the way the whole-of-government and partnership
approaches have been applied these two responses to reconciliation
have provided an important foundation for economic and social
development to occur in Indigenous communities. Yet in many cases
States have not included native title in their response to reconciliation.115

Overall, the COAG whole-of-government community trials have advanced

significantly during 2003 and offer much potential for reforming inter-government
and whole-of-government approaches to service delivery to Indigenous peoples.
There have already been a number of achievements from the process. There
remain a number of challenges and some structural issues (particularly relating
to monitoring and evaluation) that remain to be addressed. The long term
success of the process will, however, depend on how the trials promote structural
change in the way that governments go about delivering services to Indigenous
peoples. A number of challenges and options for this have been identified in
this section of the report.

Conclusion Government accountability for reconciliation

During 2003, the governments approach to reconciliation has continued to be
restricted to measures that fall within its practical reconciliation approach. The
government has rejected the introduction of measures (such as those
recommended by the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee
and contained in the Reconciliation Bill 2001) to progress issues that fall outside
the parameters it has set. This has the consequence of there being a partial
framework for progressing reconciliation with significant issues of unfinished
business left in abeyance.
The focus of this chapter has largely been on processes for government
accountability for practical reconciliation. It has sought to evaluate progress
of the government on their own terms. It establishes that progress in advancing
practical reconciliation over the course of the year has been variable.
The statistical data indicates that there has been limited progress over the past
five years in achieving the central purpose of practical reconciliation, namely
improved Indigenous well-being. Of particular concern is the fact that the
disparities that exist between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians have
remained substantially the same, or have widened over the past five and ten
years. Indigenous Australians also presently endure health standards worse
than those in some so-called third world countries. The lack of progress in
achieving substantial improvement in Indigenous well-being is also in marked
contrast to outcomes in similar settler countries such as the United States of
America, Canada and New Zealand.

114 Pearson, G, Man Cannot Live By Service Delivery Alone, Conference Paper, Opportunity and
Prosperity Conference, Melbourne November 2003, online at www.capeyorkpartnerships.com,
(14/11/2003).
115 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report 2003,
HREOC Sydney 2004. Note: this quote is from the draft report.

Social Justice Report 2003

The Social Justice Report 2000 set out a human rights approach for progressing
reconciliation. It identified five integrated requirements to ensure sufficient
government accountability for addressing Indigenous disadvantage from a
human rights perspective. These five requirements are:
1) Making an unqualified national commitment to redressing Indigenous
disadvantage;
2) Facilitating the collection of sufficient data to support decision-making
and reporting, and developing appropriate mechanisms for the
independent monitoring and evaluation of progress towards
redressing Indigenous disadvantage;
3) Adopting appropriate benchmarks to redress Indigenous
disadvantage, negotiated with Indigenous peoples, state and territory
governments and other service delivery agencies, with clear
timeframes for achievement of both longer term and short-term goals;
4) Providing national leadership to facilitate increased coordination
between governments, reduced duplication and overlap between
services; and
5) Ensuring the full participation of Indigenous organisations and
communities in the design and delivery of services.116
The year 2003 saw the development of significant measures for advancing
reconciliation within the framework of the Council of Australian Governments.
The national reporting framework on Indigenous disadvantage and whole-ofgovernment trials under COAG have contributed to meeting aspects of the
second, fourth and fifth of these requirements. These initiatives are in fledgling
stages and there are a number of issues that remain to be addressed before
success is assured.
These initiatives have not, however, been backed up by a range of other
commitments and processes that are necessary to ensure the long term
sustainability of improvements in the well-being of Indigenous peoples. There
remains an absence of an appropriate national commitment to redressing
Indigenous disadvantage, sufficiently rigorous monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms, and benchmarks with both short term and longer term targets
agreed with Indigenous peoples. There are also critical issues relating to the
depth of inequality experienced by Indigenous people, the size and growth of
the Indigenous population and under-resourcing of services and programs to
Indigenous peoples that cannot continue to be ignored if there is to be any
genuine improvement in Indigenous peoples circumstances.
Ultimately, the process of practical reconciliation is hampered by its lack of a
substantive action plan for overcoming Indigenous disadvantage in the longer
term, with short term objectives to indicate whether the rate of progress towards
this goal is sufficient.

116 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000,
HREOC Sydney 2000, p100.

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The failure of the government to address these factors as part of its practical
reconciliation approach reflects a fundamental flaw in the process. By committing
to provide full access to citizenship entitlements and nothing more, practical
reconciliation is a blank cheque and amounts to a commitment into the
foreseeable future to pay the increased economic and social costs associated
with Indigenous disadvantage. In relation to employment alone, this cost is
estimated by the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research to rise to the
vicinity of 0.5 to 1% of gross domestic product within the decade.
At this stage, it is not possible to foresee a time when record levels of
expenditure of the Commonwealth on Indigenous services will not be necessary.
It is also not possible to foresee a time when a continuation of the current
approach will result in significant improvements in the lives of Indigenous
peoples. Practical reconciliation does not have a plan for overcoming rather
than simply managing Indigenous disadvantage.
Ultimately, deficiencies in monitoring and evaluating processes for reconciliation
indicate that there are problems of accountability of governments for their
contribution to reconciliation. This lack of accountability allows governments to
unilaterally establish the boundaries of issues that they will address in the first
place and then to avoid public scrutiny when material improvements in
Indigenous well-being are not achieved and sustained. A number of
recommendations have been made throughout the course of this chapter to
address this situation.
The focus of this chapter has been on government accountability. This is,
however, only half of the story. The next chapter examines initiatives over the
past year relating to the role of Indigenous communities and organisations. It
also builds on the analysis in this chapter by considering how Indigenous people
can play a more meaningful role in setting the priorities of governments in
achieving sustainable improvements in Indigenous well-being and in monitoring
and evaluating their performance.

Social Justice Report 2003

57

Chapter 3

Indigenous participation in decision making

Transforming the relationship between
government and Indigenous peoples
The twin pillars of the governments approach to Indigenous policy in 2003
continued to be practical reconciliation, with its emphasis on service delivery in
core areas of disadvantage, and mutual obligation, with its emphasis on
reciprocity and individual responsibility. Through both of these policies, the
government has identified moving Indigenous people beyond welfare
dependency and enabling Indigenous participation in program delivery and
design as key features of its approach.
Within this framework, there has been increased attention over the past year to
the nature of the relationship between government and Indigenous peoples.
There has been a lot of talk from governments about the need to change the
way they interact with and provide services to Indigenous peoples and
communities. This has largely occurred as a result of the significant policy focus
of Indigenous peoples and governments on capacity building and governance
reform in recent years, and progress in 2003 in advancing the whole-ofgovernment community trials by the Council of Australian Governments. It has
also been influenced by the conduct of a number of significant inquiries during
the year, including parliamentary inquiries into national progress towards
reconciliation and capacity building in Indigenous communities, as well as the
conduct of the Indigenous business review, and the review of the role of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC).1
Debates during the year about the relationship of Indigenous peoples and
government have identified three key, inter-connected, issues. First, the need
to change the way government interacts with Indigenous peoples. For
governments, the emphasis here has been on the need to change the way
services are provided to Indigenous peoples, including through improved
coordination between governments and among government agencies. Second,
the need to build the capacity of Indigenous communities, coupled with demands
1

Of these inquiries and reviews, only the ATSIC Review and the inquiry into national progress
towards reconciliation released final reports in 2003.

Chapter 3

58

for improved corporate governance among Indigenous organisations. Third,

the need to review the structures and operations of ATSIC, such as through
introducing improved corporate governance mechanisms and by making ATSIC
more representative and participatory.
Indigenous peoples and governments alike have focused on the importance of
these issues during the past year. There are, however, differences on how to
best address these issues. This chapter examines current debates about the
nature of government service delivery, building the capacity of Indigenous
communities, and ATSIC reform. Ultimately, a key focus of the chapter is on the
role of ATSIC as a critical agent in facilitating change to the relationship of
Indigenous peoples and government. It makes proposals for a changed
relationship between Indigenous peoples and governments by ensuring the
effective participation of Indigenous peoples in decision making and addressing
Indigenous issues within a framework of promoting sustainable development.

A relationship of dependence
Challenging the existing service delivery approach
Indigenous peoples seek to challenge the underlying basis of their relationship
to governments in Australia. Indigenous peoples have increasingly come to
realise that the current system perpetuates a cycle of dependency and is also
not contributing to or promoting sustainable improvements in Indigenous
communities and individual well-being.
As ATSIC noted in 2002, it is now widely recognised that Indigenous programs
have perpetuated dependence, not development. Our communities have had
to face arbitrary, complex, inconsistent and inflexible demands from program
providers.2
From the 1970s through to the present, a particular operational environment
has been established which has consisted of governments funding Indigenous
organisations to provide services to Indigenous people. Despite criticising the
failure of this community development model (and of the self-determination
principle that underpins it) there has been virtually no change in the underlying
basis of this relationship since the current government came into power in 1996,
and a continuity in government approaches since the 1970s.3
ATSIC have described this operating environment as a directed community
services model:
Current funding arrangements for Indigenous organisations are directed
in that it is the various Commonwealth, State and Territory government
agencies that decide the functional areas and guidelines for expenditure.
The agencies determine also whether particular applicants proposed
projects are of high enough priority within those guidelines to warrant
funding and, if funded, they hold the grantees accountable for the

2
3

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Annual Report 2001-02, ATSIC Canberra
2002, p33. NB: The Commission is herein referred to as ATSIC.
For an analysis of this approach and the governments position on self-determination see:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2002,
HREOC Sydney 2002, Chapter 2, especially pp8-11. (Herein: Social Justice Report 2002).

Social Justice Report 2003

expenditure of funds according to those guidelines. The current

arrangements constitute a directed community services model in at least
two other senses. First, the arrangements envisage that the major purpose
of the funding is the provision of services to people within the community
and, second, when the arrangements direct resources to incorporated
bodies they conceive of those bodies as non-government community
service organisations4

This approach has created a model of dependency on two levels from

government to organisation, and from organisation to clients.5 The first level of
dependency in the existing approach to Indigenous service delivery is of
Indigenous organisations to government agencies:
A very significant proportion of Australian Indigenous organisations are
service delivery agencies that are totally dependent on annual grant
funding arrangements from one or more of a range of government
departments and agencies. Even though some of the larger organisations
have been in existence for at least ten years their continued existence,
and functioning, are dependent on changing government priorities and
budget allocations. The primary activity of many of the organisations is
the delivery of government services in accordance with government
programs and priorities. Few of the Indigenous organisations have clearly
defined service or other responsibilities other than those set out in their
often limited and outdated constitutions. Very few have the legal authority
to exercise any governmental responsibilities apart from those delegated
through the terms of their grant6

The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody identified changing

this relationship of dependence which disempowers Indigenous people
through governmental control as integral to achieving the equal enjoyment of
rights by Indigenous peoples.7
While Indigenous organisations have become dependent on government
agencies under this approach, governments have also become dependent on
such organisations as agents for service delivery. This is also problematic. In
its 1996 review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth), the
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies identified the
following structural problems with the present system of funding service delivery:
being application based, the initiative for program design rests largely
outside the authority of the funding agency;
furthermore, the funding agency generally cannot directly influence
in advance the nature and composition of the applicant groups;
it follows that matters of critical importance to the equitable, effective
and efficient delivery of publicly-funded services (such as
4
5
6
7

ATSIC, Resourcing Indigenous development and self-determination A scoping paper, Australia

Institute, Canberra 2000, p4.
ATSIC, Changing perspectives in ATSIC from service delivery to capacity development, ATSIC
Canberra 2001, p4.
ATSIC, Resourcing Indigenous development and self-determination A scoping paper, op.cit,
p21.
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report Volume 1, AGPS
Canberra 1991, pp9-10.

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representativeness, consultation and staff engagement) cannot be

built into the planning for service provision at an early stage;
accordingly, the planning and implementation of service provision is
compromised by the need to accept the groups intended to provide
the service in the form in which they have already incorporated
themselves;
accountability controls are then applied via the conditions of grant
and enforcement of compliance with the incorporation law concerned;
but this is largely ex post facto accountability (by grant acquittance
and audited financial statements) and cannot cure basic defects which
might exist in the groups suitability and capability as the service
provider, stemming from its manner of incorporation;
thus handicapped in its capacity to plan for service provision, the
funding agencys efforts to ensure performance of funding objectives
are frustrated;
service provision by existing corporations is less than satisfactory so
new corporations are established and the whole process begins
again.8

The second level of dependency is of Indigenous people to Indigenous

organisations. The activities of Indigenous organisations are substantially defined
and controlled by government decision making processes over which
Indigenous peoples exercise minimal, if any, control. As a result, such
organisations are based on non-Indigenous models of governance and do not
necessarily reflect the priorities and needs of Indigenous communities. As stated
by ATSIC:
[T]he overall legal frameworks within which Indigenous organisations
operate do not adequately provide for the establishment of Indigenous
models of governance. Few Indigenous people can exercise any
substantive jurisdictional responsibilities over matters of the most direct
concern to them. They are almost totally dependent on government
funding arrangements designed to deliver programs and services based
on non-Indigenous models of governance. Commonwealth, state and
local governments do not share any of their substantive jurisdictional
responsibilities, few are prepared even to consider negotiations with
Indigenous peoples. As a result, Indigenous peoples governance
structures have not developed beyond the establishment of
incorporated associations.9

This operating environment continues today. In the words of ATSIC, it has in

many cases replaced one form of dependence with another. Not the welfare
dependency of the Pearson theory, but the dependence on permanent service
delivery by external agencies.10
8

9
10

Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Final Report of the Review
of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976, AIATSIS, Canberra 1996, Volume 1,
pp145-146 as cited in ibid, pp27-28.
ATSIC, Resourcing Indigenous development and self-determination A scoping paper, op.cit,
p22.
ATSIC, Changing perspectives in ATSIC from service delivery to capacity development,
op.cit, p4.

Social Justice Report 2003

Concerns about dependency on permanent government service delivery are

accompanied by concerns that this service delivery model is not delivering
long term and sustainable improvements in Indigenous communities.
The current approach reduces the idea of development to one of community
development devoid of any economic dimension and provides little
encouragement to Indigenous economic development since the resourcing of
Indigenous organisations does not increase with increases in economic activity
in their local area.11 Service delivery of itself brings few economic benefits.
The discussion in Chapter 2 and the statistics provided in Appendix 1 illustrate
this. They show that there is no evidence that the existing service delivery model
is achieving sustained improvements in Indigenous well-being. There is no
consistent forward trend in reducing inequalities compared to the broader
Australian population and there is a very real prospect of a worsening in the
situation of Indigenous peoples over the next decade.
As a consequence of these factors, Indigenous people seek to move from a
position of dependency on government service delivery to being active
participants in governing their own communities. This requires a changed
approach by governments and Indigenous organisations and communities.
Overall, it requires two main but inter-related changes. First, it requires changes
to the approach of government to funding in order to increase Indigenous
participation and control.
Twelve years ago the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
made recommendations for longer term, more flexible funding arrangements
which would ensure increased Indigenous participation and control. In particular,
it recommended the introduction of triennial block grant funding for Indigenous
organisations and that this funding be allocated through a single source with
one set of audit and financial requirements combined with maximum devolution
of power to the communities and organisations to determine the priorities for
allocating such funds.12
These and similar recommendations have been reiterated time and again over
the past decade. This includes through the landmark report of the
Commonwealth Grants Commission on Indigenous Funding in 2001. As the
discussion in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2 of this report demonstrates, addressing
these issues is also a key priority of the COAG whole-of-government trials through
the concepts of shared responsibility and of a joined up approach to
government activity and pooled funding.
Second, it raises challenges for Indigenous people to develop structures that
are capable of interacting with governments while also being representative of
and accountable back to Indigenous communities and people. This requires
building the capacity of Indigenous communities to be self-determining as well
as reforming the structures of ATSIC to provide effective representation within

11
12

ATSIC, Resourcing Indigenous development and self-determination A scoping paper, op.cit,

p5.
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report Volume IV, AGPS
Canberra 1991, p21.

Chapter 3

61

62

government at the regional, state and national levels. It is this second set of
challenges that this chapter focuses on.
In ATSICs Annual Report for 2002-03, the acting Chairman describes the
challenge facing Indigenous communities and ATSIC as follows:
A central issue is how to empower people at the community and regional
levels, so that policies and service delivery are driven by the people and
the communities themselves. In this vision of the world as it should be,
service delivery by governments and agencies is driven by the needs of
the community rather than by one-size-fits-all policies and models which
are imposed from above and afar. We want Indigenous people and
communities to drive change and shape their own futures. But that means
we have got to get two things right:
the capacity of community members and the community as a whole
to make good policy and to campaign and negotiate for the outcomes
they want; and
the good governance and self-management of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people at national, regional and local levels.
Capacity building and good governance are buzz words around at the
moment. But the issues that they cover are fundamental. Basically, they
mean building the skills of all Indigenous people to improve ourselves, to
shape our own lives, to run our own affairs, and to take our rightful place
as a unique part of Australian society.
Whichever way you look at it, capacity building and good governance lie
at the heart of our [i.e., ATSICs] current agenda. How we deal with them
will determine our future. Our focus must be to build the framework of
capacity and governance within which we can develop relevant, wellresearched policy reflecting what Indigenous people want, and oversee
the delivery of effective programs flowing from those policies. Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islanders need a renewed, reinvigorated, focused and
high performing ATSIC. Dare I say it: the nation needs a new ATSIC.13

Facilitating Indigenous participation and moving beyond

welfare dependency The governments approach
A key focus of the government, in implementing its practical reconciliation and
mutual obligation policies, has been on processes for fostering Indigenous
participation and moving Indigenous people beyond welfare dependency.14
The central element of the governments approach to these issues has been a
focus on the need for partnership and shared responsibility between government
13
14

Acting Chairpersons review in: ATSIC, Annual Report 2002-2003, ATSIC Canberra 2003, p9.
Note: The governments approach places considerable emphasis on achieving outcomes in
employment in order to address Indigenous welfare dependency. The Social Justice Report
2001 provided a detailed analysis of the governments mutual obligation approach to welfare
reform and employment issues. See: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2001, HREOC Sydney 2001, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3
(Herein: Social Justice Report 2001). It set out and analysed the key role of the Indigenous
Employment Policy and Community Development Employment Projects Scheme and the
then newly commenced trial of Community Participation Agreements. While it is acknowledged
that mutual obligation and employment form a key part of the governments overall approach
to Indigenous issues, this chapter is not focussed specifically on these issues.

Social Justice Report 2003

and Indigenous peoples. As the Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and

Indigenous Affairs stated in August 2003:
[There is a] need to recognise that there is a partnership of shared
responsibility between governments and Indigenous people.
Governments and outsiders alone cannot effect the necessary changes.
Indigenous Australians have rights like all other Australians rights to
education, health services and the like. Governments therefore have
obligations to provide those services in a fair, reasonable and
appropriate way.
But rights and responsibilities are inseparable, and there is a view,
well founded I believe, that the responsibility of the individual has not
been given sufficient attention.15

Recent developments in the governments position on fostering Indigenous

participation and the objective of moving Indigenous people beyond welfare
dependency can be briefly summarised as follows.16
In 2002, the Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs set
out a five point plan for Indigenous affairs which consists of:
implementing a shared responsibility approach between Government
and indigenous people that recognises that each side has rights and
obligations;
shifting the emphasis of policy towards the needs of individuals and
families, with a focus on empowering individuals as members of
families and communities rather than viewing the Indigenous world
through the construct of community, and considering the functioning
of Indigenous organisations to identify whether they are providing
services that can demonstrate tangible outcomes;17
tackling substance abuse, particularly alcohol, as a major health
priority and as a absolute necessity in terms of breaking the shackles
of family violence, welfare dependency and the like;18
pursuing English literacy and numeracy as the most basic foundation
to securing the long-term economic self-sufficiency of Indigenous
people; and

15

16

17
18

Ruddock, P, ATSIC and its future, Speech, Bennelong Society Conference An Indigenous
Future? Challenges and Opportunities, 29 August 2003, online at www.bennelong.com.au/,
<20 October 2003>, p2.
See further: Ruddock, P, ATSIC and its future, ibid.; Ruddock, P, Agreement making and
sharing common ground, Speech, ATSIC National Treaty Conference, 29 August 2002;
Ruddock, P, Changing direction, Speech, ATSIC National Policy Conference Setting the
agenda, 26 March 2002; Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,
Government response to the Commonwealth Grants Commission Report on Indigenous
Funding, DIMIA Canberra 2002; and Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs, Submission House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs inquiry into capacity building in Indigenous communities, DIMIA Canberra
2002. These documents (except the Bennelong society speech) were considered in detail in:
Social Justice Report 2002, Chapters 2 and 3.
Ruddock, P, ATSIC and its future, op.cit, p2.
ibid.

Chapter 3

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64

ensuring that mainstream funding caters to Indigenous needs to

enable better targeting of Indigenous specific resources.19
In responding to the Commonwealth Grants Commissions report on Indigenous
funding, the government also committed to a series of guiding principles for
equitable provision of services to Indigenous people. These principles seek to
identify the basic requirements and parameters for effective and equitable
approaches to service delivery to address Indigenous disadvantage. They
include:
flexibility in the design and delivery of services, and the importance of
developing partnerships and shared responsibilities with Indigenous
peoples;
developing a long term perspective in funding, design and
implementation of programs;
improving access to mainstream services for Indigenous peoples and
access to services being based on need and equity;
improving coordination of service delivery within and between
governments;
improving community capacity in order to achieve sustainable
outcomes for Indigenous communities; and
improving data collection to enable performance reporting of
outcomes and better alignment of resources to need.20
Two processes are also seen as central to the governments shared
responsibility approach. First is building the capacity of Indigenous communities
and governance reform. As stated in the governments submission to the
parliamentary inquiry into capacity building in Indigenous communities, the
governments overall approach is to locate capacity building firmly at the heart
of policy and programme design An emerging policy challenge for
governments is to actively support Indigenous people in their efforts to develop
the individual and community capacity necessary to achieve self-management
and self-reliance.21
Second, agreement making processes were identified as the mechanism for
implementing the governments shared responsibility and partnership approach.
In August 2002, the Minister stated that we need agreements that are a twoway undertaking that change the relationship from one of passive welfare
dependency to a much more equal relationship based on empowerment.22
Such agreements, he stated, should be guided by principles of involvement of
the local Indigenous community in decision making; shared responsibility;
flexibility to meet local circumstances; and an outcomes focus with clear
benchmarks to measure progress.
19
20
21

22

Ruddock, P, Changing direction, op.cit, pp7-8.

Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Government response to the
Commonwealth Grants Commission Report on Indigenous Funding, op.cit, p3.
Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs inquiry
into capacity building in Indigenous communities, op.cit, p20.
Ruddock, P, Agreement making and sharing common ground, op.cit, p3.

Social Justice Report 2003

As noted in Chapter 2, the government has also made a series of commitments

through the communiqus of the Council of Australian Governments. These
include investing in community leadership initiatives and promoting links between
Indigenous people and the private sector to increase economic independence.
The whole-of-government community trial initiative has also been discussed at
length in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2 of this report.
The government has also initiated a number of inquiries and reviews in 2002
and 2003 on matters that are related to these priorities and this approach.
These include:
Inquiry into capacity building in Indigenous communities, commenced
by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs in July 2002 and still underway;
Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, which
delivered its final report in November 2003 and which will form the
basis of legislative proposals for reforming ATSIC in 2004;
The Indigenous Business Review, which is due to report shortly; and
Review of the Aboriginal Corporations and Associations Act 1976 (Cth)
in 2002, with the government recently announcing that it would
introduce legislative amendments to the Act in 2004 to improve the
effective of Indigenous organisations.23
In the Social Justice Report 2002, I examined the approach of the government
in some detail. I sought to establish whether government activity and programs
backed up the weighty commitments that they make or whether the broader
approach of the government to Indigenous issues, particularly through the
confines of practical reconciliation, constrained the enabling environment in
which such directions were to be implemented.
Overall, I have noted the significance of the governments commitments to
improved coordination and efficiency in service delivery, on focusing on building
the capacity of Indigenous communities and in seeking to enter into partnerships
of shared responsibility with Indigenous peoples to promote economic
development. The commitments of the government offer significant potential
for making real advances in the situation of Indigenous peoples.
I have also expressed concern, however, that the government appears reluctant
to relinquish any control over decision making or resource allocation and
accordingly, that they have set a narrow basis for the relationship with Indigenous
peoples.24 As noted in the previous chapter, the absence of any benchmarking
and agreement of targets in the short, medium and longer terms also means
that the governments approach lacks a longer term perspective to issues of
funding, program design and implementation.
There are a number of implications that flow from the governments approach
that are relevant in considering developments in fostering Indigenous

23
24

Minister Vanstone, Indigenous organisations to benefit from reforms, Press Release, 15

January 2004.
For details, see: Social Justice Report 2002, Chapters 2 and 3.

Chapter 3

65

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participation in decision making processes and seeking to move Indigenous

peoples beyond welfare dependency.
First, the governments approach is a narrow one in that it is primarily directed
to improving the existing service delivery framework. While the government seeks
to engage Indigenous people in making this system more responsive to their
needs, the primary focus of the government is not on transforming the current
approach. The focus is on addressing the needs of Indigenous people (at the
individual, family and community level) as disadvantaged citizens and on
improving their access to citizenship entitlements. Distinct cultural attributes of
Indigenous peoples are secondary concerns in this framework.
Second, as a consequence, the process of re-drawing the boundaries of the
relationship between Indigenous peoples and government through partnerships
and agreements does not contemplate a change in the relationship based on
acknowledgement of distinct Indigenous identity and cultures or recognition of
the distinct status and inherent rights of Indigenous peoples. It is not based on
recognising Indigenous jurisdictions or on sharing power. This distinguishes
the governments approach from a treaty process and from the broader
comprehensive agreement making approach proposed by ATSIC in the mid1990s in negotiations on a social justice package.25
Third, the governments focus in on achieving greater efficiency and outcomes
for Indigenous peoples from within the existing service delivery framework. The
government is not, for example, contemplating radical change to existing
financial commitments and approaches to addressing Indigenous disadvantage.
Instead it is focused on improving the performance and accessibility of existing
mainstream programs and services; freeing up Indigenous specific services to
address issues that cannot be addressed through these mainstream services;
improving the allocation of existing funding on the basis of need; and addressing
fragmentation of service delivery that exists across government departments
and between governments. These are important issues to focus on, but without
a broader frame of reference they confine the scope of the relationship between
government and Indigenous peoples.
Ultimately, these factors suggest that the governments approach, and their
efforts to date to engage Indigenous peoples, do not seek to transform the
existing model of service delivery to Indigenous peoples. Instead, they focus
on improving the effectiveness of the existing approach and consequently, the
outcomes achieved by it in relation to Indigenous disadvantage.
The governments approach is not, however, completely closed. Their
commitment to capacity building in Indigenous communities and governance
reform of Indigenous organizations offers much potential to unshackle the
constraints that exist through the current service delivery approach and has the
potential to lead to more radical transformation in the relationship into the future.

25

For the relevance of this approach see: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000, HREOC Sydney 2000, Chapter 4 (Herein: Social
Justice Report 2000).

Social Justice Report 2003

67

Capacity building in Indigenous communities

and governance reform
In setting out a human rights framework for reconciliation, the Social Justice
Report 2000 noted the pivotal importance of building the capacity of Indigenous
peoples and supporting Indigenous governance structures. Such a focus, the
report suggested, provides the potential for a successful meeting place to
integrate the various strands of reconciliation by tying together the aims of
promoting recognition of Indigenous rights with the related aims of overcoming
Indigenous disadvantage and achieving economic independence.26
The Social Justice Report 2001 then provided an overview of developments in
relation to community capacity building and governance reform, and provided
some detailed case studies of current developments.27 That report referred to
capacity building and governance as follows:
Capacity building relates to the abilities, skills, understandings, values,
relationships, behaviours, motivations, resources and conditions that
enable individuals, organisations, sectors and social systems to carry
out functions and achieve their development objectives over time.28
Governance concerns the structures and processes for decision making,
and is generally understood to encompass stewardship, leadership,
direction, control, authority and accountability.29

There is currently an emerging consensus among governments and Indigenous

peoples in Australia about the importance of supporting governance reform
and capacity building of Indigenous communities. These terms are now reflected
in the policy approaches of all Australian governments and commonly appear
in debates about Indigenous policy.
There are four main features of developments over the past few years relating
to capacity building and governance reform that I highlight in this chapter.

a) The existence of significant capacity in Indigenous communities

The first is that the significant attention paid over the past three years to issues
of governance and capacity building in Indigenous communities has
demonstrated that there already exists much capacity at the community level.
There are numerous examples of the ingenuity and initiative of Indigenous
peoples in developing solutions to meet their local needs. These range across
all areas of life for Indigenous people as well as all areas of government activity.
They include justice related issues, health, education, employment and training,
through to business development, dealing with substance abuse, healing,

26
27

28
29

Social Justice Report 2000, p107. See also Social Justice Report 2001, Chapter 3.
Social Justice Report 2001, Chapter 3. The focus of that chapter was on the necessary
requirements for capacity building to be effective and contribute to sustainable improvements
in the well-being of Indigenous peoples, as well as case studies of recent governance and
capacity building initiatives.
Social Justice Report 2001, p67, citing: ATSIC, Discussion paper on ATSICs approach to
community capacity building, Unpublished paper, ATSIC Canberra 2001, p1.
ibid, citing: ATSIC, Regional autonomy for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities
Discussion paper, ATSIC, Canberra 1999, p22.

Chapter 3

68

processes for applying customary law and improved community coordination.

As an example, Figure 1 over the page provides a case study of the approach
of the Murri School in Queensland in addressing Indigenous educational
achievement in a culturally appropriate and community controlled environment.

Figure 1: Case study: The Aboriginal & Islander Independent School

(The Murri School), Acacia Ridge, Queensland
The Murri School in Acacia Ridge, Queensland, has been in operation since 1986.
The aim of the Murri School is to promote the development of Indigenous students
as independent and skilled people who are culturally, morally, and socially
responsible, employable, capable of self-fulfilment and of contributing to society.30
The Murri School is the only Independent Aboriginal owned and controlled school
in Queensland.31 The Murri School is fully registered with Education Queensland,
the Association of Independent Schools Queensland and the Commonwealth. The
Murri School is governed by an eight member board comprised of Indigenous
Elders, Indigenous professional/business people, Indigenous academics and a
school staff representative. The community-controlled nature of the Murri School
allows it to be truly reflective of its students and communitys needs.
17 years on, the Murri School has a total of 54 teaching and non-teaching staff (the
majority being Indigenous) and now provides schooling to approximately 250
Indigenous students from years one through to year 11 as well as adult students
through its skills share centre, Kulkathil. In 2004, the Murri School will be equipped
for preparatory school and year 12 enrolments.
The Murri School provides a range of programs to students designed to support
their learning. These support programs include the nutrition program where all
children are supplied with breakfast, morning tea and lunch; tutoring assistance;
and speech therapy to assist children with their speaking and literacy.
Its community-controlled nature makes the Murri School accessible to children in
care (of which are 30 per cent of the enrolled students) and children who have
been in detention or who been involved in the juvenile justice system. In some
cases, these are children who have been excluded from the mainstream education
system. In addition to providing education to Indigenous young people involved in
the juvenile justice system, the Murri School also maintains a detention centre
visitation program for the families of detainees.
With approximately one third of children commencing year one at the Murri School
not having attended kindergarten, the school has formed a partnership with the
University of Queensland to provide its Occupational Therapy students to get these
children school ready by developing their gross motor skills. In addition to this
partnership, Education Queensland will fund a Preparatory Years Trial, to further
assist children to become school ready.
In addition to the standard school curriculum, the school has a Family Support
Worker and a Child and Family Worker on site as well as a weekly medical and
dental service. The school has also engaged the local CDEP in maintaining the
school grounds.
30
31

Aboriginal and Islander Independent Community School, Handbook, p2.

Examples of Aboriginal community controlled schools and colleges in other states and territories
include Papunya School (Northern Territory), Institute for Aboriginal Development (Alice Springs,
Northern Territory); Tranby College (Glebe, New South Wales); Tauondi College (Port Adelaide,
South Australia); and Batchelor College (Batchelor, Northern Territory).

Social Justice Report 2003

In terms of its curriculum, the Murri School has adapted the standard school syllabus
to incorporate culturally appropriate methods of teaching and culturally appropriate
subject matter. For example, Elders are encouraged to join classroom activities
and share stories with the students. The Murri School also teaches history from the
perspective of Indigenous Australia, including the points in time before and after
colonisation.
Students from the Murri School have made significant achievements academically,
culturally and in sports. Children who attend the Murri School perform at a rate 5-10
per cent higher than Indigenous children in mainstream schools. In 2002, years
three, five and seven students performed with distinction in the state-wide numeracy
and literacy tests. Further, the Murri School Dance Troupe performed traditional
dance and song during the Olympic Torch Ceremony in Brisbane in 2000.
Students and families of the Murri School are not required to pay fees. Funding for
the Murri School comes from a range of sources including the Commonwealths
Indigenous Education Strategic Initiatives Programme (IESIP) and one of its
component programs, the National Indigenous English Literacy and Numeracy
Strategy (NIELNS), as well as block grants from the Queensland Government and
the schools own fundraising initiatives.
The Murri School now owns the land on which the school is located as well as the
school building itself. The ownership of the land and premises further adds to the
schools ability to be self-managed and controlled.
Unfortunately, despite the gains and successes the Murri School has achieved, it
continues to be under-funded. This means, for example, the level of professional
development that teaching staff can access is limited. As the teaching staff are
employed independently by the Murri School, they are unable to access professional
development and training which is provided by Education Queensland. The
inaccessibility of professional development to these teachers within a school which
specifically educates Indigenous children seems to contradict the guiding principles
of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Education Policy (NATSIEP)
and Partners for Success policies which both place particular emphasis on the
employment of Indigenous teachers and their professional development.
However, on a positive note, the Murri School has recently been identified by
Education Queensland as being a potential partner in learning how to increase
Indigenous participation in the education system. To this end, it is hoped by both
parties that a formal partnership agreement will be developed in the future. This
agreement may result in teachers of the Murri School having access to Education
Queenslands professional development program, among other things.
Overall, the Murri School is a positive example of how an holistic approach to
education based on community control and establishing partnerships can contribute
to addressing the inequality gap which exists in Indigenous participation in
education.
Not only is the Murri School an outstanding example of the benefits of culturally
appropriate teaching methods, curricula and schooling environment, it is also a
model example of how to involve the community, with respect to recruitment of
local Indigenous people to the day-today operations and management of the school.
It could be said that the Murri School is a model for balancing the mainstream
expectations and outcomes of education with the cultural needs of its students and
community.32
32

Further information on the Murri School can be obtained by emailing info@murrischool.

bigpond. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Murri School for the assistance they
provided HREOC staff in compiling this case study.

Chapter 3

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Examples of community initiatives such as this have predominately been brought

to the attention of governments, policy makers and Indigenous communities
through the following events and processes over the past two years:33
The first national Indigenous governance conference convened by
Reconciliation Australia, ATSIC and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Studies in 2002;34
The Northern Territorys Indigenous economic forum of May 2003;35
The Northern Territorys Indigenous governance conference (Building
effective governance) of November 2003;36 and
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs inquiry into capacity building in Indigenous
communities, which commenced in July 2002 and is due to report in
the first half of 2004.37
These conferences, forums and inquiries have revealed that activities currently
taking place in Indigenous communities all across Australia encompass a
startling variety of processes and cover an enormous range of activities. While
these activities achieve varying levels of success and generally operate under
difficult conditions, their mere existence provides an antidote to the regular
public image of Indigenous people which almost entirely defines our people as
victims and according to the disadvantage that many of us suffer, and which
presents our communities as dysfunctional and riddled with problems.
As Reconciliation Australia notes, the Building Effective Governance conference
in the Northern Territory in November (2003) for example, uncovered multiple
positive initiatives unknown even to other Territorians.38 The identification of
positive stories about Indigenous peoples having a go and seeking to change
the circumstances that exist in communities, has two main benefits. It suggests
that problems that exist in Indigenous communities are not insurmountable
and can be challenged; and it chips away at the negative portrayal of and
misconceptions about Indigenous peoples.
The realisation that there is already a significant accumulation of capacity and
skills in communities also provides a platform for reform. As the Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research note:
The capacities of individual Indigenous community members can certainly
be increased, through education, training, and experience However, it
should also be noted that in our experience it is often the case that many

33

34
35
36
37
38

For an overview of research on capacity building and governance in Indigenous communities

in Australia, see Dodson, M and Smith, D, Governance and sustainable development: Strategic
issues and principles for Indigenous Australian communities Discussion Paper 250/2003,
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra 2003, pp3-4. Available online at:
www.anu.edu.au/caepr/discussion2.php.
See: www.reconciliation.org.au/media/speeches.asp.
See: www.indigenousforums.nt.gov.au/
See: www.governanceconference.nt.gov.au/
See: www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/atsia/indigenouscommunities/inqinde.htm
Reconciliation Australia, 2003 Reconciliation Report, Reconciliation Australia, Canberra 2003,
p11.

Social Justice Report 2003

Indigenous community members have enormous capacities, acquired

from past experience and training, but they are somewhat reluctant to
use those capacities in difficult organisational environments. Community
members get burnt out in such environments and end up withdrawing
from them, either as employees or active members of governing bodies.39

A key challenge is therefore to identify existing capacity in Indigenous

communities and to understand and deal with the circumstances that prevent
this capacity from being fully utilised.

b) The importance of capacity building in building a more

effective service delivery framework
The second feature of the attention to capacity building and governance reform
in Indigenous communities in recent years is the growing realisation of the
integral role that these issues play in addressing the deficiencies of the existing
service delivery approach.
Building community capacity and promoting good governance in Indigenous
communities is increasingly being seen as necessary to developing a more
effective service delivery framework that can contribute to sustainable
development in Indigenous communities.
In a discussion paper released in 2003, Mick Dodson and Diane Smith explore
the linkage between capacity building and sustainable development. They
sought to consider in the Australian context one of the main findings of the
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, namely, that there
is a vital link between governance and sustainable development.40
They approached the issue by identifying the key ingredients for sustainable
development and examining these according to the level of local control that
Indigenous communities presently have over them. They state:
On the evidence available, many Indigenous communities and their
organisations have been going about development backwards, getting
caught up in issues over which they have little or no control. The most
common way communities and organisations proceed is to focus all their
energy on:
starting up a never-ending variety of new business projects that are
uninformed by wider whole of community needs and realities;
responding to externally driven development proposals and other
peoples economic agendas;
chasing transitory opportunities, usually single major development
projects;
chasing transitory grant funding, and tying their scarce local expertise
into whatever repackaged programs are on offer from government
and the private sector; and

39

40

Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Submission to the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity
Building in Indigenous Communities, CAEPR,Canberra 2002, p4.
Dodson, M and Smith, D, op.cit, p1.

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72

focusing on short-term outcomes where success is usually measured

by immediate economic impacts such as money and jobs (neither of
which seem to last).
Given local conditions of socioeconomic disadvantage and great need,
this approach is both tempting and understandable. But the result is that
the overall direction of development in communities is usually
haphazard.41

They describe this approach as a tatslotto approach to economic development

which produces the inevitable outcome the odds are against winning and
most of the time communities lose their money.42 They argue that international
best practice and research suggests that instead of this focus, Indigenous
communities should focus on issues over which they exert a high level of control:
[T]he key ingredients over which Indigenous communities can currently
exercise the greatest degree of control are their own local processes and
structures for governing themselves, and their local development policies
and strategies. Communities and their representative organisations can
create the local conditions for more legitimate and broadly representative
rule, more effective decision-making, capable delivery of services and
collective action.
Arguably then, the best approach for communities to follow in trying to
achieve sustainable economic development would be to focus initially
on those key ingredients over which they have the greatest degree of
local control: that is, their governance arrangements43 [T]hey should
concentrate on building up stable, capable and legitimate governing
institutions, structures and processes.44

Dodson and Smith suggest that based on international evidence, it is only

when effective governance and holistic development strategies are in place
that economic and other development projects have the chance of becoming
sustainable. Or put differently, sustainable development is fundamentally
a governance issue.45
This creates a challenge for Indigenous communities and organisations:
Communities do not have to suspend all development initiatives until
they get their governance in order, but neither should they embark on
new development initiatives without also commencing the harder work of
building effective governance. For many communities and their
organisations this may mean having to create a whole new mindset; and
it will be hard not to fall back into reactive mode.46

It also creates challenges for government in supporting the building of such

capacity and appropriate governance. These include not locking Indigenous
communities into a service delivery model that is not responsive to their needs
and which distracts or dilutes the focus of Indigenous peoples from establishing

41
42
43
44
45
46

ibid, p11.
ibid, p12.
ibid, p11.
ibid, p12.
ibid.
ibid.

Social Justice Report 2003

and pursuing their own priorities, as well as providing appropriate recognition

of the role of Indigenous people in setting priorities and developing processes
for allocating funds on this basis.

c) The importance of corporate governance standards

The third, related, feature to emerge from the focus on capacity building and
governance reform in recent years is an identified need to improve corporate
governance in Indigenous communities and of Indigenous organisations.
This issue has received extensive public coverage during the past year in relation
to the operations of ATSIC and prompted the introduction of a separation of
powers within ATSIC by the Minister for Indigenous Affairs in early 2003. As
ATSICs Chief Executive Officer notes, there was also a significant level of
negative reports on ATSIC published in the media that intensified from February
2003, and which drew strength from a widespread public acceptance that ATSIC
had not been vigorous in pursuing problems of accountability.47 The issue of
improved corporate governance for ATSIC is discussed in the next section of
this chapter.
Corporate governance is an issue that has also been prominently reflected in
the media following allegations of fraud and mismanagement among some
Indigenous organisations. In Western Australia, for example, a parliamentary
committee inquiry was established during the year into the handling by the WA
Health Minister of allegations of financial impropriety relating to a peak
Indigenous representative body.
The most recent review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976
(Cth), conducted in 2002, highlights a range of challenges for Indigenous
communities and government relating to corporate governance standards.48
It is estimated that there are nearly 3000 associations incorporated under the
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act, fulfilling a range of diverse functions
in relation to Indigenous communities. Associations incorporated under the act
play an integral role in delivering services to Indigenous communities at the
federal, state and territory level. A vast majority of these associations are nonprofit organisations delivering services to Indigenous communities, such as
health, housing, employment and legal services. There is great fragmentation
of service delivery through the vast range of corporations that exist in
communities, with a loss of economies of scale and lack of focus on the holistic
needs of communities.
As the Review notes, the formation and regulation of corporations is a very
prominent feature of Indigenous social and economic life.49 While this is very
much a reflection of the level of dependency of Indigenous people on
government services, the prominence of regulatory systems in Indigenous
communities comprises a level of intrusiveness into Indigenous lives that is
experienced by no other group of people in Australian society.
47
48

49

ATSIC, Annual Report 2002-03, ATSIC Canberra 2003, p10.

Corrs Chambers Westgarth Lawyers, Anthropos Consulting, Dodson, M, Mantziaris, C, and
Rashid, S, A Modern Statute for Indigenous Corporations: Reforming the Aboriginal Councils
and Associations Act, Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations, Sydney, 2002.
ibid, p7.

Chapter 3

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The reliance of governments on Indigenous organisations to deliver government

services creates a high level of dependency for Indigenous peoples on these
organisations. The consequence of this is that whole Indigenous communities
may be dependent on the services provided by a corporation. When such
corporations fail, there may be no alternative service providers.50 The standard
of corporate governance thus has a major impact on service delivery and
accessibility of programs for Indigenous peoples.
As the Review notes, the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act has been in
operation for more than 25 years and has not been amended in the past decade.
Since the act was introduced, however, there have been significant changes in
the circumstances of Indigenous peoples and in the uses which Indigenous
people make of corporations as well as in corporate governance standards.51
These changes range from broader Indigenous involvement in program delivery,
legal recognition of Indigenous rights (such as native title), and significant
changes to the approach to corporate regulation.
As a consequence of this, the Review concludes that the Act is now out of date,
suffers from a series of technical shortcomings and that successive amendments
to the act prior to 1992 have meant that it has drifted from its original legislative
purpose. This legislative purpose, the provision of a statute of general application
to provide Indigenous people with a simple and flexible mean of incorporation,
also reflects an outmoded conception of corporate governance and does not
reflect changes that have taken place in the relationship of Indigenous peoples
and governments.52 As a consequence, the incorporation statute has now itself
become a source of disadvantage for Indigenous people.53
Despite this, incorporation of Indigenous organisations under the act is often
involuntary in the sense that Indigenous organisations are required to
incorporate to comply with legislative provisions and government policy. Under
certain circumstances, for example, Indigenous organisations are required to
incorporate under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth)
and Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). Similarly, governments have adopted policies
of self-management which give the responsibility for the delivery of a wide
range of essential services to Indigenous communities themselves.
Government funding bodies often require the communities to form corporations
before they are eligible to receive the funding to perform these services.54
There are consequences to such involuntary incorporation, including:
People who would not have otherwise formed a corporation, and who
may not understand the consequences or technical requirements of
incorporation are required to do so.
The requirement for incorporation can force together Indigenous
groups which would not otherwise have joined together, and which
might not share the same views or goals, making the corporation
vulnerable to destabilising competition between groups.
50
51
52
53
54

ibid.
ibid, p1.
ibid, p2.
ibid.
ibid, p6.

Social Justice Report 2003

 The requirement for the establishment of communitybased

organisations to perform community services can result in confusion
between the membership of the community or group and the
membership of the corporation itself.55
ATSIC have similarly noted concerns about the incorporation of communitybased organisations that has occurred over the last thirty years which has
occurred through a reactionary process with no real strategy underpinning
the proliferation of incorporated bodies. They note that the culturally
inappropriate structures of these organisations have led to organisations being
dominated by larger families. Ultimately, this process commonly did not
contribute to social capital and, in fact, often undermined existing capacities
with the consequence that the effects of this history now have to be undone.56
In essence, government policy and legislative requirements have foisted on
Indigenous peoples regulatory frameworks that contribute to an absence in
Indigenous organisations of what the Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development refers to as a cultural match. As Dodson and Smith
explain:
Underlying principles of good governance is the issue of legitimacy
and mandate. Each community and region will have to find some degree
of match or common ground between the types of governing structures
and procedures it wants to develop, and the culturally based standards,
values and systems of authority of community members. For example,
common ground must be found about issues such as who should hold
power, how power should properly be exercised, how decision making
and disputes should be handled, and about the respective rights and
responsibilities of different members and leaders. The more a governing
body finds some cultural fit or match in these matters, the more it will
secure the ongoing mandate of its members
Cultural match is not simply a matter of importing romanticised views of
traditional Indigenous structures or authority, and expecting them to
handle economic development decisions, financial accounts and daily
business management. Creating a cultural match is more about
developing strategic and realistic connections between extant cultural
values and standards, and those required by the world of business and
administration [W]hile Indigenous governance arrangements need to
be informed by local cultural standards if they are to be regarded as
legitimate by community members, the governing arrangements also have
to work governing bodies have to be practically capable of responding
and taking action in the contemporary environment.57

The Review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act concluded that, on
the basis of the concerns expressed about the Act, there is a pressing need for
reform to the corporate governance regulatory framework for Indigenous
organisations. The Review recommended two main aspects to this reform: the

55
56

57

ibid.
ATSIC, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities, ATSIC,
Canberra 2003, p5.
Dodson, M and Smith, D, op.cit, pp18-19.

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provision of special regulatory assistance for Indigenous peoples, through

the provision of measures for the corporate regulator (currently the Registrar of
Aboriginal Corporations) to assist and encourage directors of corporations to
develop the skills and good governance practices necessary for long term
viability of corporations; and significant reform to the Aboriginal Councils and
Associations Act, but maintenance of an Indigenous specific incorporation
approach. 58 Accordingly, the Review proposes the introduction of a new
Indigenous Corporations Act.59
On 15 January 2004, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs announced that the government was shortly to introduce
proposed legislative reforms to the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act.
These proposed amendments are intended to:
rationalise the number of corporations through a focus on preincorporation scrutiny and support for alternatives to incorporation;
provide conferencing opportunities to encourage agencies to resolve
co-ordination issues;
provide accredited training for Directors and members of corporations;
expand assistance for dispute resolution; and
establish a rolling program of healthy corporation checks tailored
to Indigenous corporations, coupled with more streamlined responses
to critical problems.60
The provision of greater support for addressing corporate governance issues
in Indigenous organisations and amending the Aboriginal Councils and
Associations Act are vital components in seeking to build the capacity of
Indigenous communities. The governments proposed legislation should be
treated as of the highest priority. This should be reflected in the treatment of the
draft legislation in the legislative programme in Parliament. The draft legislation
must also be subject to broad consultation, given the necessity that any
legislative reform should facilitate rather than obstruct the development of
Indigenous organisations that achieve an appropriate cultural match between
cultural legitimacy and corporate governance requirements.

d) Definitions of capacity building and a reform agenda

The fourth main feature to emerge from the focus on capacity building and
governance in Indigenous communities over recent years is that, despite the
convergence of views on the need for capacity building and governance reform,
there is no commonly agreed definition of what capacity building is, nor an
agenda for progressing capacity building and governance reform in a wholeof-government and holistic manner.

58
59
60

Corrs Chambers Westgarth Lawyers, Anthropos Consulting, Dodson, M, Mantziaris, C, and

Rashid, S, op.cit, pp8-13.
See: ibid, pp16-30.
Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Indigenous organisations to benefit
from reforms, Media Release, 15 January 2004.

Social Justice Report 2003

Submissions to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal

and Torres Strait Islander Affairs inquiry into capacity building in Indigenous
communities (herein referred to as the parliamentary inquiry into capacity
building) reveal that there are significant differences in the understanding of
what the terms capacity building and governance reform mean to different
governments, service delivery agencies and Indigenous peoples and
organisations.61 The Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Studies comment in their submission to the Inquiry on the widespread and
uninformed use of the term capacity building and its permeation across all
levels of public policy and research.62
Submissions reveal that different organisations apply the term capacity-building
to refer to anything from political processes, self-determination, Indigenous
rights, citizenship rights, corporate governance, self-governing community
structures, regional autonomy, government service delivery reform, education
and training, partnerships, economic development to sustainable development.
Some of these descriptions equate potential outcomes of capacity building
with the process of capacity building.
The lack of a common understanding of what capacity building and governance
reform entail promotes policy confusion. It is a significant problem that has the
potential to render commitments by governments to support such processes
meaningless. As ATSIC have stated:
In this country the rhetoric of capacity building has been adopted by
state governments and by Commonwealth agencies What is missing
is an agreed setting for the programs and activities which, these agencies
claim, incorporate capacity building or capacity development processes.
Each agency derives its own view of capacity building and development,
and there is a danger that this reinforces the stovepipe program
environment.63

A potential consequence of this policy confusion is the adoption of an extremely

limited approach to capacity building that equates developing the capacity of
Indigenous organisations and communities with improving the delivery of
government services. This has the potential to co-opt the process of capacity
building so that it reinforces the characteristics of the existing system, with all
the structural problems noted earlier in this chapter. As I discuss in Chapter 4 in
relation to developments on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands, this raises the
concern that the emphasis of governments on capacity-building could amount
to nothing more than a bureaucratisation of what was formerly called community
development.

61

62

63

The submission of the Western Australian government to the House of Representatives inquiry
into capacity building is a good illustration of this. It is a collection of statements and policies
from different agencies and departments of the government and reveals different
understandings and approaches between these agencies.
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Submission to the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry
into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities, 28 August 2002, pg 4 & 5.
ATSIC, Changing perspectives in ATSIC from service delivery to capacity development, op.cit,
p6.

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This limitation is implied in the terms of reference of the parliamentary inquiry

into capacity building which requires the Committee to examine strategies to
assist Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders better manage the delivery of
services within their communities.64 The Committee has, however, been
presented with arguments from many witnesses and in many submissions urging
that it not make the mistake of confining discussions about capacity development
to the realm of service delivery.
ATSIC Commissioner Kim Hill referred to the need for capacity development to
be applied outside a formal service delivery framework by the Committee as
follows:
The terms of reference are limited to service delivery only. If the aim of the
inquiry is to overcome disadvantage and failing policies then we have to
look beyond just service delivery. I believe the inquiry should be based
on the human element of the problems which we face and not on service
delivery. It should be about how our people can become full and active
partners with agencies as part of our participation in the economic, political
and social environment of Australia. So capacity building should
concentrate on the participation of people, with human and citizenship
rights, rather than on organisations, which are only deliverers of such
services to the communities. In terms of access and equality, I think
governments have a responsibility to provide services. The inquiry should
not just be looking at ways to hand over this responsibility to communities;
it has to take a broader view of capacity buildingor capacity
development, which is the term I prefer to use.65

In their submission to the inquiry, the Fred Hollows Foundation emphasises the
importance of acknowledging the broader structural environment within which
capacity building strategies take place:
[C]apacity building and service delivery must take place in a broader
context of policy and funding arrangements which are likely to constitute
significant barriers to these approaches.66

They note the following seven structural issues relating to the approach of
governments that impacts on the successful implementation of capacity
development initiatives:
The current socio-economic and health status of remote communities
and their members;
Lack of basic infrastructure in which capacity-building can occur;
The lack of availability of services and lack of funding equity;

64

65

66

House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs,
Terms of reference Inquiry into capacity building in Indigenous communities, online at:
www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/atsia/indigenouscommunities/inqinde.htm, 11 November
2003.
Hill, K, Hansard House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs inquiry into capacity building in Indigenous communities, 27 November
2002, p209.
Fred Hollows Foundation, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee
on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity Building in Indigenous
Communities, Fred Hollows Foundation, Sydney 2002, p1.

Social Justice Report 2003

 The complexity of Government funding arrangements and lack of

coordination of services at various levels of Government;
Lack of sustainability in Government programs the impact of electoral
and funding cycles;
The lack of accountability of Government departments to achieve
measurable outcomes in the delivery of services; and
The lack of Indigenous control of decision-making.67
Failure to acknowledge and address these features of the existing service delivery
model will result in any benefits from capacity building only ever being marginal
or short-term. This is also illustrated by the case study of infrastructure provision
in remote communities provided in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Case study: Achieving sustainable improvements in the provision of

water and sanitation services to remote Indigenous communities
In 1994, the Race Discrimination Commissioner at HREOC published a report on
the state of water and sanitation systems in ten remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander communities.68
The report identified significant problems in the supply of water and sanitation
services to these communities, and made a number of recommendations relating
to community control in service provision, training and employment opportunities,
and developing sustainable solutions to infrastructure needs. One of the
recommendations of the report was for HREOC to return to the ten communities
considered in the report after five years to evaluate progress in addressing the
recommendations.
In 2001, the acting Race Discrimination Commissioner published the findings of
this evaluation (which had been undertaken for HREOC by the Centre for Appropriate
Technology).69 The Review identified improvements in services in the ten case study
communities. It specifically noted improvements in technical delivery, consultation
processes and the cultural appropriateness of service delivery processes. The review
found, however, that the delivery of water and sanitation services to these
communities had not addressed the core issues and recommendations of the 1994
water report.
The Review identified the difficulty of sustaining meaningful Indigenous community
involvement within a service delivery framework that is not linked to longer-term
institutional or strong local or regional frameworks. As a result, resources revolve
around the project and projects become one-off, isolated interventions instead of
being one stage in a longer process of community development and planning.
Community involvement in the project becomes an event within the project rather
than one part of a strategic, long term process for community improvement.70
67
68
69

70

ibid, p4.
Race Discrimination Commissioner, Water report, HREOC Sydney 1994.
Race Discrimination Commissioner, Review of the Water report, HREOC Sydney 2001. See
also: Grey-Gardner, R and Walker, B, What lies beneath: Sustainable groundwater management
for communities of Indigenous people, Speech, International Association of Hydrogeologists,
International Groundwater conference Balancing the groundwater budget, Darwin 2002;
Centre for Appropriate Technology, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity Building in
Indigenous Communities, CAT, Alice Springs 2003.
Race Discrimination Commissioner, Review of the Water report, op.cit, p61.

Chapter 3

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The Review also concluded that Indigenous people in the ten communities could
not be confident that their water and sanitation services would be sustainable and
made the following comments on developing a sustainable development approach
to infrastructure provision to remote communities:
The Review also finds that, as with international experience, programs
delivering infrastructure development mainly in response to poor
health, disadvantage and system failure, can foster a supply paradigm
of service delivery. Internationally such service delivery models are
found to be locally unsustainable without maximum Indigenous
participation, and levels of investment matched to local willingness
and ability to pay for and manage the level of services provided.
Government has a responsibility to facilitate services that directly
address disadvantage and poor health through programs that
enhance human capacity and well-being. While there is always
pressure to address or relieve immediate and obvious disadvantage,
such a rationale for major infrastructure works has been questioned
in international experience.
While there are significant differences between the international and
the Australian experience there is sufficient evidence to warrant further
examination of the implications of the current direction of service
delivery for remote Indigenous communities and the rights that
members of those communities may seek to exercise
Overseas experience has shown that programs have more chance
of succeeding when infrastructure, service levels and cost are
matched to local consumer realities. Sustainable solutions take
account of the economic, social and human development of the
community, including skills, knowledge and organisational capacity.
The success of these processes directly influences whether services
are used, sustainable and have an impact on quality of life and health.
Such a process is only beginning to become a reality in Australia
today. Many solutions currently applied continue to view recipients
as beneficiaries, often using urban or peri-urban solutions and
standards without holistic consideration of remote social, economic
and environmental realities and resources. To move towards
sustainable development, a conceptual shift needs to take place
whereby the notion of beneficiaries is replaced by that of consumers
of services. When services are consumer driven, demand has
reached a point where there is significant appreciation and
understanding from consumers about what they can and cannot
afford, and how the system they have chosen works.
As with the Water Report, this review concludes it is imperative that
the design and implementation of systems that deliver water to
Australias Indigenous communities reflects a cooperative process
of negotiation, community education, forward planning and cultural
awareness. Factors influencing the process might include
affordability, technical appropriateness, current service delivery
structures and the level of skills and resources available in the
community. Clearly the involvement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
people as empowered consumers is paramount to sustainable water

Social Justice Report 2003

provision, regardless of the capital outlay or the necessity for external

technical expertise.71
The Centre for Appropriate Technology, drawing on the findings of this review as
well as those of a 20 year study on international water and sanitation systems in 49
countries, have also argued that the failure of current service delivery approaches
is based on communities being approached as passive recipients of services rather
than active participants. It believes that to address this failing, service delivery needs
to be reformed from a supply-driven mentality to one that is demand-responsive
and cognisant of the needs of Indigenous peoples:
For people to be active consumers, i.e. actively involved in service
delivery, they need to have the capacity to make the decisions about
the kinds of services they need. To make decisions about these
services people first of all need for these issues to be high enough
up their priority list to think about them. They also need to be able to
access the resources and support to work on their own agendas.72
They argue that the definition of successful service provision must undergo a radical
shift from being the technical perfection of a project to whether services are used,
sustainable and have an impact on health and quality of life.73 Success cannot be
measured by a well-administered program that is not utilised by the people it is
meant to serve. CAT note:
Capacity building in this sense is about people developing the ability
to take action and make change according to their own agenda. It is
essential that space is created for communitys agendas to emerge.
Driving a project according to an external agenda does not support
the development of self-reliance.74

It is essential that capacity building be properly understood as complementary

to reforming government approaches to service delivery and not as a substitute
for such reform. As ATSIC state:
ATSIC believes that appropriate service delivery and a developmental
approach [that incorporates capacity building] are different and that these
differences need to be understood by everyone involved in service delivery
in Indigenous communities. Both are required, and the best outcomes
are obtained when there is a synergy between the two.75

To address the lack of an agreed framework for advancing capacity building,

ATSIC has developed an integrated framework for progressing capacity building
and promoting sustainable development in Indigenous communities. ATSIC
have recommended to the parliamentary committee into capacity building that
this framework be adopted through the Council of Australian Governments and
71
72

73
74
75

ibid, pp71-72.
Centre for Appropriate Technology, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity Building, CAT,
Alice Springs 2003, p10.
ibid, p11.
ibid, p14.
ATSIC, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities, op.cit,
p5.

Chapter 3

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form the platform from which all governments would work with Indigenous
communities. ATSIC have also entered into a partnership with OXFAM
International to provide technical assistance within ATSIC to pilot this approach.
This framework is an important initiative and is considered in more detail in the
next section.

ATSICs framework for capacity building

and sustainable development
ATSICs framework for capacity building and sustainable development has its
origins in a number of reports and discussion papers that have been prepared
by or for ATSIC over the past six years. These include the discussion paper and
report on greater regional autonomy;76 scoping paper on resourcing selfdetermination;77 the Dillon report on service delivery in Doomadgee and Palm
Island;78 discussion papers on capacity building;79 and other documents.80
Each of these documents reveals a continual engagement by ATSIC, and one
that has generally not been acknowledged, on finding new and improved ways
to exert its leverage and utilise its functions to achieve lasting improvements in
Indigenous communities. As the 2001 discussion paper Changing perspectives
in ATSIC states:
More than ten years after the establishment of ATSIC, more than twenty
five years after the establishment of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs,
socio-economic indicators for many of the Indigenous peoples of this
country are still a source of shame. The question being asked both
internally and externally is whether there are some aspects of the way
ATSIC does business which do not have a positive impact on these
indicators81
The history of our structure (ie, ATSIC), and the history of our programs
and program priorities, tend to enshrine the service delivery approach
to community development. Service delivery is of course an agreed
function of government. But, in the words of Paul Streeton, we know very
little about how to transform social services, adequate food and certain
institutional arrangements into long, healthy, productive, creative,
enjoyable lives. The continued adherence to a service delivery model
at the expense of seeking additional approaches to dealing with endemic
social and economic issues confronting some Indigenous communities
means that this transformation is still some way in the future.82

76
77
78
79

80
81
82

ATSIC, Report on greater regional autonomy, ATSIC Canberra 2000; and ATSIC, Regional
autonomy for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities Discussion paper, op.cit.
ATSIC, Resourcing Indigenous development and self-determination A scoping paper, op.cit.
ATSIC, Review of Indigenous communities of Doomadgee and Palm Island, ATSIC Canberra
2000 (Herein Dillon report).
ATSIC, Changing perspectives in ATSIC from service delivery to capacity development, op.cit,
and Gerritson, R, Community capacity building: An ATSIC Discussion paper, Unpublished,
ATSIC 2001.
For example: ATSIC, Directions for change ATSIC 2001/02 Budget outlook, op.cit..
ATSIC, Changing perspectives in ATSIC from service delivery to capacity development, op.cit,
p3.
ibid, p13.

Social Justice Report 2003

As ATSIC notes in its submission to the parliamentary inquiry into capacity

building, they have made a concerted effort over the past three years to
understand the limitations of the current service delivery model83 and to identify
ways of overcoming them. They emphasise international trends in development
practice, which has moved from the needs-based approach (needs determined
by external experts) of the 1970s to activities based on theories of participation,
capacity building and capacity development.84 Their integrated framework for
capacity building and sustainable development is the product of this
consideration.
The focus of ATSICs integrated framework is on capacity development, involving
the active participation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes.
Capacity is defined as the abilities, skills, understandings, values, relationships,
behaviours, motivations, resources and conditions that enable individuals,
organisations, sectors and social systems to carry out functions and achieve
their development objectives over time.85 The focus on capacity development
rather than capacity building emphasises two things that considerable capacity
already exists at the community level; and that the emphasis is on a continual
process rather than on completing an activity.
This approach is characterised by broad based participation and a locally driven
agenda; building on local capacities; ongoing learning and adaptation; long
term investment by government agencies; integration of activities at various
levels to address complex problems; and a systems approach to problem
solving. It aims to enhance skills, abilities and resources; strengthen
understandings and relationships; and address issues of values, attitudes,
motivations and conditions in order to support sustainable development.86
In accordance with this, there are three defining features of ATSICs approach.
The first is that it is a people-centred developmental approach focused on
building the human and social capital necessary for Indigenous participation in
planning, organising and administering programs. As stated in the Dillon Report:
[C]ommunity development87 is about people development, not service
delivery. It is participatory in nature, specific and not focused on
compliance. It is about process. It is about engagement of people of
their well being. No amount of programs will bring about development
in people unless (the programs) are linked to a community development
process (Such a process) is supplementary to the service delivery
function of governments.88

83

84

85
86
87
88

ATSIC, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities, op.cit,
p5.
ATSIC, Changing perspectives in ATSIC from service delivery to capacity development, op.cit,
p5. Note: developments in theories relating to development and sustainability since the 1970s
are discussed in detail in the Native Title Report 2003, Chapters 1 and 2.
ibid, p7. This was the definition adopted by the Social Justice Report 2001 and discussed
earlier in this chapter.
ibid, p9.
Note: There are slight variations in the terminology used by ATSIC over the past three years as
their approach has evolved.
ATSIC, Dillon Report, op.cit, p2.

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Second, it emphasises process elements such as access to choice, participation

in planning, and access to decision making. ATSIC states:
What distinguishes capacity development from service delivery is its
holistic nature, and its suggestion that individuals, families, and
organisations have a definite and active part to play in the process
rather than as passive recipients of services if the program is simply
delivered to passive recipients, dependency is reinforced and capacity
is not strengthened [C]apacity development recognises the importance
of thinking about individuals, organisations, programs, policies, etc, as
part of a broader whole rather than as discrete, or loosely connected
concerns. It requires change in the way problems are addressed. The
traditional service delivery mode, which breaks a large issue into separate
chunks does not necessarily deal with the whole or the space
between the inter-related elements.89

The third is that a capacity development approach incorporates a focus on

sustainability, continually re-assessing whether a program or project can become
self-sustaining or how to maintain the impact of a program intervention in a
community over time. ATSIC see this as involving a subtle change form the
current service delivery approach, which focuses on the following key stages:

Where are we now? (current situation);

Where do we want to be? (vision, goals);
How do we get there? (planning, strategies);
Did we get there? (monitoring, evaluation);
Where are we now? (current situation);
and so forth.90

By contrast, the capacity development approach introduces a new element to

this cycle as follows:
Where are we now? (current situation);
Where do we want to be? (vision, goals);
How do we get there? (planning, strategies);
Did we get there? (monitoring, evaluation);
How do we stay there? (sustainability);
Where are we now? (current situation);
and so forth.91
ATSICs integrated framework for capacity building and sustainable development
is reproduced in figure 3 on the next page.

89
90
91

ATSIC, Changing perspectives in ATSIC from service delivery to capacity development, op.cit,
pp7-8.
ibid, p10.
ibid, p11.

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Figure 3: ATSICs integrated capacity building framework for sustainable

development92
LEVEL OR TIER OF ACTIVITY

METHODOLOGY HOW TO

COMMUNITY

Focus on Empowerment:

Individuals
Families
Extended Families/Clans
Small Groups
Non-Incorporated Organisations
(with private Interests)

Traditional Community Development

methodologies such as:
ABCD Asset Based CD (Kretzmann)
NGDO Best Practice
These are essentially participative
interventions.

ORGANISATIONS

Focus on Governance:

Community-based Organisations
(Incorporated, with public interests)
Resource Agencies
Native Title Representative Bodies
Local Government Authorities
Land Councils

Harvard Project American Indians

(First Nations Approach)
NGDO Best Practice
Community Participation Agreements
(ATSIC/ATSIS)
ORAC Legislative reforms and initiatives
These align organisations structures to
Indigenous decision-making processes.

GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING
STATUTORY BODIES)
Regional Commonwealth Agencies
Regional/State/Territory Agencies
State Governments
Commonwealth Government
Commonwealth Agencies
Council of Australian Governments (COAG)
ATSIC Board of Commissioners
ATSIC Regional Councils
S13 Committees (SAC)

Focus on Integration:
Whole-of Government
ICCT Community Trial Sites
DoTARS Sustainable Regions
Bilateral or other agreements based on
regional/community plans.
ATSIC/ATSIS Corporate Plan
These will lead to homogenous, policies
programs driven by joint strategic planning
rather than submission based interventions.

92

ATSIC, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities, op.cit,
p8.

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This framework highlights that there are three levels of interventions for capacity
development the community level; Indigenous organisations; and government
level (including ATSIC). There are different approaches needed for each level.
The focus of capacity building strategies for individuals and community members
is on empowerment, with interventions to be essentially participative. For
Indigenous organisations the focus is on governance and aligning organisational
structures to community-based Indigenous decision-making processes. At the
government level, the focus is on integration and whole-of-government
coordination and cooperation.
As ATSIC Commissioner Kim Hill noted at a public hearing for the capacity
building inquiry:
all three (levels or tiers of activity) have to embark on a new relationship
with capacity building as a key focus. Concentrating on communities will
not make any significant changes. Agencies have to change the way
they deal with and interact with communities and community people. For
communities, I believe, the aim is empowerment. For organisations, the
aim is appropriate government systems. For agencies, the aim is to have
a whole-of-government approach with community aims in mind.93

ATSICs framework suggests that by reforming and improving the way

Indigenous organisations and government undertake their obligations and
responsibilities to individuals, families and small groups, the resulting space
will reinvigorate the strengths and creativity of Indigenous people and
communities. Indigenous community capacity will be given the opportunity to
emerge and be supported if the surrounding structures reform (and develop)
their existing practices. Community-based organisations can do this by seeking
to align their organisations structures to Indigenous decision-making processes
and government can integrate and coordinate their policies and programs to
facilitate strategic planning (at the regional and community level) rather than
submission based interventions.
ATSIC describes the different focus and emphasis at each level as follows:

Community level: A focus on empowerment using participative community

asset development techniques. Family/clan panning could also include
participation in situational analyses, demographic projection and
feasibility assessment of economic development aspirations. These
approaches mean local responses to local issues and active involvement
in identifying problems and contributing to solutions.94

Community organisations: A focus on good governance. ATSIC

recognises and endorses the broader role of Indigenous communitybased organisations, and believes that (this) integrated framework will
reinvigorate community-based organisations in a way that will build human

93

94

Hill, K, Hansard House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres

Strait Islander Affairs inquiry into capacity building in Indigenous communities, 27 November
2002, p210.
ATSIC, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities, op.cit,
p9.

Social Justice Report 2003

and social capital, as well as capacity.95 The potential of community

based organisations as vehicles for community capacity building depends
on good governance, including how representative they are of individuals,
families and small groups (with their private interest) that make up
community. Negotiation of roles and responsibilities between
organisations, and between organisations and kinship based groupings,
is a critical aspect of organisational reform. Changes to legislative and
regulatory frameworks are required to enable culturally appropriate forms
of governance.96

Government: A focus on whole-of-government approaches. The diversity

and complexity of contemporary Indigenous societies and cultures point
to the need for location specific responses by service delivery agencies
in all jurisdictions. Such location specific responses should be driven by
local and regional perspectives, through community and regional plans,
and by formalising a shared partnership arrangement through agreement
making, based on those plans.97 Whole of government engagement
with whole-of-community would build on the emerging capacities within
communities and constituent groups, as well as government agency
representatives, and allow flexible service delivery across coordinated
agencies in all jurisdictions. Agencies would deal with communities in
structured planning environments (Sec. 13 and Sec 94 of the ATSIC Act,
1989 are critical in the application of this strategy).98

In their submission to the parliamentary inquiry into capacity building, ATSIC

highlight two crucial issues to drive change across each of these levels.
The first is concentrating on local level planning processes that can better
match vertical sectoral resource supply systems with local development
planning so as to build integrated horizontal environmental, economic, social
and governance systems.99 ATSIC intends to develop a model of local level
planning that has the following features:
is participative, raises awareness and empowers;
incorporates or is consistent with principles of mutual obligation and
sustainable development;
supports the development of greater economic self-reliance which
working to reduce passivity and dependency;
can be part of the process of program and service delivery reform by
better matching planning and coordination to local level need; and
integrates community planning with ATSIC Regional Council planning
processes.100

95
96
97
98
99
100

ibid, p3.
ibid, p9.
ibid, p4.
ibid, p9.
ibid, p7.
ibid.

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The second is building the internal capacity of ATSIC (and in its present form,
ATSIS) as well as the wider bureaucracy to support and manage a developmental
approach with communities. To this end, ATSIC/ATSIS signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) with OXFAM International in early 2003 to undertake
joint development activities aimed at building the capacity of ATSIC/ATSIS
officers.
The first activity under the MOU is a capacity building training program being
trialled with ATSIC/ATSIS staff in three regional offices (Cairns (Qld), Kalgoorlie
(WA) and Bourke (NSW)). There are two stages to the training the first stage
and level is staff in regional offices to understand and implement a developmental
approach; and the second stage and level for regional managers and more
senior staff to manage staff and programs in undertaking a developmental
approach.101 The purpose of the training is not to turn ATSIC/ATSIS staff into
development workers but instead to institute within the agency an understanding
of capacity development principles to apply within a service delivery environment.
The trial is managed by the Community Development and Education branch of
ATSIS, working in conjunction with the ATSIC Board. An advisory committee is
oversighting the initiative and will evaluate its progress.

Capacity building and governance reform

an agenda for change
Overall, it can be seen that there have been significant advances in the past
three years in relation to capacity building initiatives. There is a broader
acceptance of the need for capacity building and governance reform within
Indigenous communities and to changing the way that governments go about
delivering services. There is also a broader acknowledgement of the breadth of
initiatives currently underway to address the overall circumstances of Indigenous
peoples. This is let down, however, by the lack of a consistent understanding of
what capacity building entails which promotes a more limited focus purely on
the operations of existing service delivery mechanisms.
The proposal of an integrated capacity development approach by ATSIC
demonstrates the potential for transforming the relationship of Indigenous
peoples and government through a focus on governance reform and capacity
building. It provides a holistic, whole-of-government approach that serves as
an agenda for change. The adoption of this framework would not only provide
a long term framework and vision for improving Indigenous well-being, it would
also ensure that all governments proceed in addressing capacity development
issues with a consistent understanding of the goals and objectives of such a
process. Many current initiatives of governments such as the COAG wholeof-government trials, proposals to reform corporate governance standards
relating to Indigenous corporations, and agreement making with ATSIC fit
within or is consistent with this integrated framework.

101 For details of OXFAMs approach see: OXFAM Community Aid Abroad, Submission to the
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs
Inquiry into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities, OXFAM, Melbourne 2003.

Social Justice Report 2003

On the basis of the issues discussed in this section, I have chosen to make the
following recommendations to advance progress on capacity building in
Indigenous communities.

Recommendations 10-12 on capacity building and

governance reform
10.

11.

12.

That COAG adopt ATSICs Integrated framework on capacity building

and sustainable development as a central component of its Reconciliation
Framework.
That COAG also provide funding for research into best-practice models
of governance reform and capacity building relating to Indigenous peoples
in Australia. Such research should be based on overseas models such
as the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, and
build on the findings of existing work on governance reform in Australia.
That the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (Cth)
ensure that reform of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976
(Cth) is treated as a high priority of the federal government and ensure
extensive consultation is undertaken with Indigenous peoples about
proposed amendments to the legislation. Any proposed legislative
reforms should be in accordance with the recommendations of the 2002
review of the Acts operation. In particular, proposed amendments should
recognise the need for special regulatory assistance for Indigenous
organisations and maintain a distinct legislative framework for regulation
outside of the Corporations Act as a special measure.

Strengthening the role of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander Commission
This chapter and the previous chapter have highlighted a number of positive
developments as well as deficiencies in the current approach of the government
to Indigenous policy. Both the positive initiatives currently underway and
outstanding concerns point to the need to strengthen the role of ATSIC as a
way of facilitating increased and improved Indigenous participation in decision
making processes. On this basis, I have chosen to conclude this chapter by
presenting an agenda for reforming the role and functions of ATSIC. Such reform
is needed to extend ATSICs influence and to support ATSIC in adopting an
expanded leadership role within government, as well as to facilitate greater
Indigenous participation in the processes of government.
I particularly focus on the challenges of greater regionalisation and strengthening
the influence and leadership role of ATSIC at the national level.102 These are
102 The discussion in this section is based on: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Submission to the ATSIC Review, HREOC Sydney 2003 (Herein: Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Submission to ATSIC Review). Available
online at: www.humanrights.gov.au/social_justice/submissions/

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crucial issues for advancing capacity building in Indigenous communities,

improving accountability of governments to Indigenous peoples and ultimately,
in creating a new relationship between Indigenous peoples and governments.
They are also issues which will in all likelihood dominate debates about
Indigenous issues in 2004, with proposals for legislative reform to ATSIC likely
to be debated in Parliament in the first half of the year.

a) Developments in 2003 Corporate governance issues and the ATSIC Review

Much of the focus on Indigenous issues in 2003 centred on the performance of
ATSIC and proposals for reforming its structure and functions.
During the year, the Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
issued directions to ATSIC aimed at preventing conflicts of interest in funding
decisions by ATSICs elected officials.103 These directions prevented ATSIC
from making grants or loans, or offering contracts or guarantees to organisations
in which ATSIC full-time office holders were directors or in which they had a
controlling interest. The purpose of the directions was to address both the
perception of conflicts of interest in ATSIC and the potential for serious conflict
of interests when an ATSIC officeholder is also a director of a body seeking
ATSIC funding.104
These concerns about conflicts of interest led the Minister to announce on 17
April 2003 that the government had decided to strip ATSIC of over $1 billion in
funding by creating a new executive agency to manage ATSICs programs in
accordance with the policy directions of the ATSIC Board.105 The basis of this
decision was to promote good governance and accountability; address the
current breakdown in community confidence in ATSIC; allow ATSIC to refocus
its attention on more significant policy issues rather than be distracted by the
micro-management focus on ATSICs own spending; and to enable the Board
and Regional Councils to take a more strategic approach in future so that their
influence is extended not only with regard to the programs for which they are
directly responsible, but also by enabling them to engage with mainstream
agencies with greater credibility and authority.106
The newly created Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS)
commenced operations on 1 July 2003. The Minister issued directions to ATSIS
on 1 July 2003 requiring it to:
take all reasonable steps to ensure that ATSIS conforms to the policies
and strategic priorities established by ATSIC, and reflects the priorities
set by ATSIC Regional Councils in their regional plans;
facilitate linked approaches with other government agencies and
coordinate its activities to achieve effective synergies with overall
103 The Directions were issued on 24 December 2002 and amended on 3 February 2003.
104 Ruddock, P, Directions to ATSIC concerning conflicts of interest, Press Release, 24 December
2002, www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/media/ruddock_media02/r02080.htm, 12 December
2003.
105 For an overview of the directions see: ATSIC, Annual Report 2002-03, op.cit, pp10-11, 17-18.
106 Ruddock, P, Good governance and conflicts of interest in ATSIC, Press Release, 17 April
2003, www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/media/ruddock_media03/r03028.htm, 12 December
2003.

Social Justice Report 2003

Government policies and priorities as well as have appropriate regard

to overall Government policies and priorities;
take all reasonable steps to allocate resources on the basis of relative
need, taking account of the availability of alternative services, as well
as the supplementary nature of ATSIS funding and the priorities for
addressing relative need spelt out by the ATSIC board;
ensure best practice in its relationship with service providers, for
example through adopting outcome-based funding and performancebased contracts;
ensure compliance with the conflict of interest directions described
above; and
work in partnership with the ATSIC Board and Regional Councils,
including by providing support for regional planning and policy
development.107

The Minister declared that the creation of ATSIS was to be an interim measure
pending the outcomes of the review of ATSIC announced in 2002.
This review of ATSIC produced a discussion paper in June 2003 expressing
significant concerns about the way ATSIC currently operates.108 In November
2003 it released its final report, titled In the hands of the regions a new ATSIC,
with recommendations for reform. The final report of the Review Team
acknowledges the importance of ATSIC:
ATSIC should be the primary vehicle to represent Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples views to all levels of government and to be an
agent for positive change in the development of policy and programs to
advance the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians.109

Ultimately, however, they conclude that ATSIC:

is in urgent need of structural change. ATSIC needs the ability to evolve,
directly shaped by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people at the
regional level. This was intended when it was established, but has not
happened. ATSIC needs positive leadership that generates greater input
from the people it is designed to serve. One of its most significant
challenges is to regain the confidence of its constituents and work with
them and government agencies and other sectors to ensure that needs
and aspirations are met. ATSIC also has to operate in a fashion that
engages the goodwill and support of the broader community.110

The report of the Review Team particularly emphasises the need to improve the
connection between ATSICs regional representative structures and national
policy formulation processes. The Review Team state that:
107 ATSIC, Annual Report 2002-03, op.cit p11.
108 Hannaford, J, Huggins, J and Collins, B, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission, Public Discussion Paper June 2003, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra
2003, online at: www.atsicreview.gov.au.
109 Hannaford, J, Huggins, J and Collins, B, In the hands of the regions Report of the Review of
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra
2003 (Herein ATSIC Review Report), p24 and Recommendation 2.
110 ibid, p5.

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As it currently operates, the review panel sees ATSIC as a top down body.
Few, if any, of its policy positions are initiated from community or regional
levels. The regional operations of ATSIC are very much focused on
program management. To fulfil its charter, engage its constituency and
strengthen its credibility, ATSIC must go back to the people. The
representative structure must allow for full expression of local, regional
and State/Territory based views through regional councils and their views
should be the pivot of the national voice111

In terms of capacity building, this identifies a challenge to develop a cultural

match between the structures of ATSIC and Indigenous peoples at the local
level to ensure that ATSIC is representative and participative.
Significantly, the Review Team note that public perceptions of how ATSIC have
performed have been burdened by unrealistic expectations, with the organisation
blamed for failures which lie outside its control. They have noted that:
In the wider public arena, perceptions of ATSICs performance have been
influenced by a number of factors totally beyond its control. It is true that
most Australians had not appreciated the extent of inequality and injustice
suffered by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders until the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody started making its findings
public Similarly, the inquiry into the separation of children from their
families, which report in 1997, uncovered a period of history and ongoing
pain that Australian society had swept under the carpet Some of the
initial goodwill extended to ATSIC began to fade when these factors kept
creating an impression that little progress was being made on the difficult
issues.112

Similarly, they note that ATSIC has also not lived up to unrealistic expectations
of what it can achieve:
[I]n many eyes ATSIC has not lived up to expectations ATSIC was
intended to be a supplementary funding body and was never intended,
or funded, to be the provider of all programs and services to Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people. Its establishment did not absolve
mainstream agencies from their responsibility to meet their obligations to
Indigenous citizens. The hopes pinned on the organisation that it could
and would effect instant change were not realistic.113

They state that these unrealistic expectations have also operated to shield
governments from being accountable:
mainstream Commonwealth and State government agencies from time
to time have used the existence of ATSIC to avoid or minimise their
responsibilities to overcome the significant disadvantage of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people. Because public blame for perceived
failures has largely focused, fairly or unfairly, on the Aboriginal and Torres
Stair Islander Commission, those mainstream agencies, their ministers
and governments have avoided responsibility for their own shortcomings.
This avoidance of accountability and responsibility must be overcome
with the new ATSIC
111 ibid, p32.
112 ibid, p30.
113 ibid.

Social Justice Report 2003

Accordingly, they approach the issue of reform of the role of ATSIC pragmatically,
stating that:
A more realistic recognition that ATSIC cannot be the vehicle to serve all
Indigenous needs for government services is the starting point for defining
the areas where ATSIC can work and make a difference. This means that
ATSIC s role must be more positive, focused and clearly defined.114

b) The ATSIC Reviews proposal for a new ATSIC

The report of the Review Team outlines the Review Teams vision of what a
reformed ATSIC should look like. They consider that ATSIC reform should result
in an organisation that:
Enables Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to build a future
grounded in their own histories and cultures within the broader
Australian framework;
Represents and promotes the views of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people, including their diversity of opinion;
Vigorously pursues the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people through partnerships with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
communities, governments and other sectors of Australian society;
Influences priorities, strategies and programs at the national, State/
Territory and regional level;
Minimises and streamlines the government interface with Indigenous
communities;
Promotes good Indigenous governance;
Recognises the complexity of relationships between Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander individuals, communities, organisations and
governments and the values and limitations created by this;
Is an equal partner in all negotiations, resourced adequately to achieve
this equality, and commands goodwill and respect;
Increases womens participation and expression of views;
Ensures that there is transparent accountability of all organisations
that are funded to provide services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people;
Maintains its unique status;
Recognises that ATSIC is a key player, but not the only player, that
seeks to advance the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians with government and others.115
To achieve this vision, the Review Team recommends a revised structure for
ATSIC that includes the following features:

114 ibid, p30.

115 ibid, p25.

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The retention of ATSICs 35 Regional Councils;

The replacement of the ATSIC Board, which is currently constituted of
18 zone commissioners, with two new structures a national body
and a national executive;
The new national body would be the governing body of ATSIC and
determine ATSIC policy, primarily through the development of a
national plan which would be drawn from ATSIC Regional Council
plans and ultimately form the basis of the policies and programs of
all governments;
The national body would meet at least twice every four years;
The new national body would have 38 members and be comprised
of the 35 elected Regional Council chairs, the chair of the Torres Strait
Islander Advisory Body and the chair and deputy chair of the new
national executive;
The new national executive would be delegated by the national body
the role of leading ATSIC and advocating on behalf of ATSIC on a day
to day basis;
The new national executive would have up to10 members, comprised
of 8 people elected by the national body including a chair and deputy
chair, as well as up to 2 people appointed by the Minister from elected
regional councillors;
A series of national committees would be established to provide policy
input to the national body to ensure the incorporation of regional
priorities into national planning, with membership drawn from the
national body and national executive;
The Regional Council planning process would be accorded higher
status in establishing ATSICs priorities; and
The elected and administrative arms of ATSIC (and presently ATSIS)
would be reunified in one organisation with a clear delineation of roles
incorporated into the ATSIC Act.116
The ATSIC Review Team observes that this proposed new ATSIC is underpinned
by a number of principles. These include that:
ATSIC should be the peak State/Territory and national body, which
advocates for the development of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
communities;
The regional councils (and relevant members of the national body)
should provide the State/Territory policy interface with the governments
co-coordinating regional activities;
Representatives from each State/Territory should then constitute the
national body, achieving a direct relationship between the regional,
state and national levels;

116 ibid, pp7-8, 14-15.

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 The national body should provide the policy interface for the Australian
Government setting and advocating a national strategic direction and
monitoring progress against ATSICs national plan to reinforce the
accountability of program and service providers;
ATSICs primary focus should be on building strong local communities
through development and implementation of a needs-based regional
plan;
State/Territory and national programs should be informed by, and
undertake activities consistent with, regional plans;
All government funded programs should be subject to an independent
assessment of outcomes; and
The role of elected officials should be clearly delineated from that of
the administration.117
Overall, the ATSIC Review Team made 67 recommendations which broadly
address issues of the relationship between ATSIC and Indigenous peoples, the
federal government, the states and territories, and between its elected and
administrative arms.118

c) Responding to the ATSIC Reviews proposals and the

conflict of interest directions
There are a number of important findings and recommendations made by the
Review Team in their final report that provide a starting point for developing a
renewed ATSIC. In particular, I support the Review Teams recommendations to
retain ATSICs 35 Regional Councils; accord higher priority to the Regional
Council planning process as the basis of national policies; and reunify the elected
and administrative arms of ATSIC in one organisation with a clear delineation of
roles incorporated into the ATSIC Act.
In supporting the reunification of ATSIC and ATSIS, I support the retention of
the conflict of interest directions within ATSIC by which ATSICs elected
representatives would continue to set policy priorities and to decide the broad
program allocation of funding but not have any involvement in making individual
funding decisions. The reunification of ATSICs structure would overcome a
potential tension that has been created through the creation of ATSIS whereby
it is required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that ATSIS conforms to the
policies and strategic priorities established by ATSIC on the one hand, and
coordinate its activities to achieve effective synergies with overall Government
policies and priorities as well as have appropriate regard to overall Government
policies and priorities on the other hand.
Despite supporting these recommendations, however, I also have reservations
about the Review Teams proposals for the creation of a national body and
national executive in the format that they propose. I also consider that the Review
Teams model does not provide adequate support to ATSICs national structure
and consequently would not provide ATSIC with sufficient leverage or powers
117 ibid, p26.
118 See: ibid, pp8-13.

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to undertake a broader role of monitoring performance by other government

agencies (at all levels) and in setting priorities to apply across government.
I am also concerned that there are also significant gaps in the Review Teams
analysis which overlook issues relating to the broader service delivery
environment in which ATSIC operates, as well as deficiencies in the model that
it proposes.
In August 2003, I made a submission to the ATSIC Review Team following the
release of its discussion paper. In that submission it was noted that the Review
Team does not appropriately contextualise ATSICs role within the broader
framework of government policy making and delivery of services relating to
Indigenous peoples.119 There are two aspects to the concern that I had initially
expressed to the Review Team in this regard that have not been addressed in
their final report.
First, is that the Review Team had on the one hand acknowledged that ATSIC
has wrongly been used as a scapegoat for failures by governments in addressing
key areas of Indigenous disadvantage yet on the other hand replicated this
scape-goating itself. In their final report, the Review Team acknowledge that
ATSIC is not primarily responsible for service delivery to Indigenous people and
that its funding is of a supplementary nature. Despite this, they also set out the
following test for determining the accountability of ATSIC:
The Review Panel believes that the real test of accountability within ATSIC
is whether, at the community level, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians are actually getting the outcomes that the investment by
agencies at all levels of government is designed to achieve.120

As quoted above, the expectations on which such a test of accountability is

based were described by the Review Team itself as not realistic. Such a test
also does not provide the more positive, focused and clearly defined role for
ATSIC that is needed, based on a more realistic recognition that ATSIC cannot
be the vehicle to serve all Indigenous needs for government services.121 This
test of accountability wrongly conflates ATSICs accountability (as demonstrated
through normal auditing requirements which apply to all government agencies
and through which ATSIC has demonstrated a high level of accountability) with
effectiveness in improving Indigenous peoples lives.
It is one thing to suggest that ATSIC should strive to improve Indigenous peoples
lives something that they undoubtedly do. But it is entirely a different thing to
hold them accountable for the failure of successive governments to address
the consequences of history and to do so within a system in which ATSIC
exercises a marginal role.
The second related concern is that the Review Teams report does not
acknowledge the broader framework of government policy making and service
delivery in which ATSIC operates. This includes recognition of the significant

119 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Submission to ATSIC Review,
p3.
120 ATSIC Review Report, op.cit, p69.
121 ibid, p30.

Social Justice Report 2003

under-funding in key areas of Indigenous marginalisation, which is a key factor

in preventing needs-based funding from being implemented (as the
Commonwealth Grants Commissions inquiry into Indigenous funding clearly
demonstrated).
This is also reflected in the failure of the ATSIC Review Team to acknowledge a
number of recent initiatives undertaken by ATSIC to reform the way that it
operates and to advocate for changes to the way the existing service delivery
environment operates. A number of these processes have been referred to
earlier in this chapter (culminating in ATSICs Integrated framework for capacity
building and sustainable development). Ironically perhaps, one of its criticisms
of ATSICs current approach is that it is a top down body where its regional
operations are very much focused on program management the very criticism
that ATSIC has made about the constrained environment in which it operates.
Perhaps the most disappointing feature of the Review Teams final report,
however, is the lack of detailed discussion and recommendations relating to
supporting more flexible structures at the Regional Council level. The Review
Teams discussion paper devoted significant attention to proposed reforms to
strengthen ATSICs Regional Council structure. It identified three models for
strengthening Regional Councils which they termed the regional authority,
regional council and devolution models. In the final report, the Review Team
note that:
At Regional council meetings and in discussions with the panel, Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people expressed their desire to build their
personal capacities and those of their organisations. While many
supported a model for great regional autonomy and for regional councils
to be replaced by regional authorities, they indicated a need for more
capacity building and resources in order to achieve this goal.122

On this basis, the Review Teams final report contains no recommendations

relating to including provisions in the ATSIC Act to allow regional council
structures to evolve over the longer-term in accordance with the aspirations of
Indigenous peoples within the various council regions. Such proposals have
now been under discussion since the conduct of ATSICs Section 26 review in
1998 and the regional autonomy consultations of 1999 and 2000 without result.
ATSIC have also responded to the Review Teams final report by stating that the
proposal for a new national executive and national body is flawed and
unacceptable on the basis that it extinguishes the right of Regional Councillors
to vote directly for their full-time national representatives and drastically reduces
the full-time Indigenous representation at the national level.123 They state:
While seeking to improve representation the report proposes to:
extinguish the right of Regional Councillors to have a direct vote for
their full-time national representatives;
have a two-tiered structure of national-level Indigenous decisionmaking, with one tier comprising 41 members;

122 ibid, p36.

123 ATSIC, A stronger ATSIC regionally and nationally, Press Release, 5 December 2003, p1.

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establish an executive structure that is likely to disadvantage small

States and rural and remote communities;
reduce the level of full-time Indigenous representation at the national
and regional level from the current 53 positions to 39 and increase
the current levels of responsibilities of Regional Council Chairs with
no apparent additional support; and
reduce the level of full-time national Indigenous representation from 18
to 2.
This is about the capacity of Indigenous Australians to be properly
represented at the national, State and regional levels. This (proposed
structure) would impose an intolerable burden on the proposed new
executive, particularly as it and the new national body over time would be
increasingly held responsible for the ongoing crisis in Indigenous
communities by the Indigenous community as well as by mainstream
Governments seeking to identify a convenient scapegoat for their own
shortcomings. It would be impossible for two full-time representatives a
Chair and Deputy Chair to carry out all the many national tasks and
responsibilities which are required to represent effectively the interests of
Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders, nationally and internationally.
The national body of 35 Regional Chairs which would elect most members
of this executive would be dominated by those States with the most
regional councils. With the best will in the world, genuine national
representation from all States and Territories could not be guaranteed.124

ATSIC have also noted that the Review Teams proposed model for a national
body:
would set ATSIC up to fail because the larger national assembly would
meet only once every two years while the national executive was too small
a body which could not faithfully represent Indigenous people nationally
and would be greatly under-resourced with only two full-time members.125

In the alternative, ATSIC have proposed that ATSIC Elections be extended so

that ATSIC Commissioners are directly elected at the same time as ATSIC
Regional Councillors, and that subsequently, all Regional Councillors then elect
the Chair of the Commission (rather than the current approach where the
Regional Councillors elect the Zone Commissioner, and the Zone
Commissioners elect the Chairperson).126
I join with ATSIC in its concerns about the proposals for a national body and
national executive. I note however that in general, there is much potential in
the Review Teams proposal that there be a new mechanism such as the
proposed national body to involve Regional Council Chairs in establishing
national priorities and policies. It is desirable that such a national body
determine ATSIC policy, primarily through the development of a national plan
which would be drawn from ATSIC Regional Council plans.
It is fanciful, however, to suggest that a national body comprised of such a
membership and charged with such responsibilities could effectively acquit
124 ibid.
125 ATSIC, A new ATSIC in the hands of the people, Press Release, 8 December 2003, p1.
126 ibid.

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their responsibilities to Indigenous peoples through the national body, particularly

when the national body would only be meeting once every two years.
The infrequency of meetings of the proposed national body combined with
the reduced size of the national board (or new national executive) could
significantly impact on the ability of ATSIC to advocate for reform at the national
level, and on its ability to develop national policies. This would consequently
affect its ability to influence the approach of other government departments
and different governments. As I noted in my submission to the ATSIC Reviews
discussion paper:
ATSICs current powers must be enhanced at the each of the national,
state/territory, and regional levels. Crucially, what is required to make ATSIC
more effective is not a redistribution of ATSICs current powers from the
national to the regional level but instead an enhancement of the existing
powers at both levels.127

Consideration could, however, be given to an intermediate position whereby

the ATSIC Board of Commissioners or equivalent national executive is retained
and charged with the day to day responsibilities of advocating ATSICs position
at a national level. Such a body would need to address issues of
representativeness. Such a body could then be supported by a national congress
or national body made up of all Regional Council Chairs which meets with the
Board of Commissioners on a regular basis (perhaps 3 to 4 times per year) to
determine ATSICs national policies and priorities.

d) Proposed features of a new ATSIC

Having identified a number of concerns with the ATSIC Review Teams proposed
reforms to ATSIC, it is important to identify ways in which ATSIC could be
reformed to meet the key objectives identified by the ATSIC Review.
ATSIC has appropriately identified the starting point for any discussion of
program design and service delivery for Indigenous peoples in its 2001 budget
advocacy document titled Directions for change. ATSIC stated that for all
programs and policy proposals the values and aspirations that are meaningful
to, and express priorities of, Australias Indigenous peoples must be the basis
for the policy approaches being taken. Accordingly, the question that they saw
as being the central one was:
Will this activity enhance Indigenous peoples capacity to achieve what
is important to them and, in its development and implementation,
contribute to the empowerment of Indigenous peoples and the
achievement of their objectives and priorities?128

Proposals for reform of ATSIC should be considered in light of this overall

objective for all government service delivery to Indigenous peoples. This requires
that ATSIC be representative at the regional level and must be able to reflect
the objectives and priorities identified at this level up to the state/territory and
national levels. It also requires that ATSIC must have the capacity to set the
127 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Submission to ATSIC Review,
op.cit, p1.
128 ATSIC, Directions for change, op.cit, p1.

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agenda and subsequently evaluate the performance of other government

agencies at both the federal and state/territory level in achieving this objective.
To achieve this, ATSICs current powers must be enhanced at the each of the
national, state/territory, and regional levels. As noted above, what is required to
make ATSIC more effective is not a redistribution of ATSICs current powers
from the national to the regional level but instead an enhancement of the existing
powers at both levels. It should also be noted that at present, ATSIC does not
fully utilise its existing powers at either the national or regional level. There
remains much potential for ATSIC to achieve many of the objectives identified
in the ATSIC Review within its existing structures and powers.
In my submission to the ATSIC Review Team, I identified the following proposals
for strengthening ATSIC at the national, state/territory and regional level.

Reform to ATSIC at the national level

There must be sufficient attention paid to the importance of ATSIC maintaining

a strong voice at the national level. Any diminution of ATSICs role at the national
level will ultimately affect its ability to influence the national policy agenda and
will lead to less effective advocacy for Indigenous peoples. This will be the
case even where a diminution of the national focus is accompanied by an
enhanced role for regional councils.
In my submission to the ATSIC Review, I proposed a number of mechanisms to
enhance ATSICs powers at the national level to provide increased ability to set
national objectives and to monitor and evaluate the performance of other
government departments in addressing the service delivery needs of Indigenous
peoples. It is noted that ATSIC has extensive powers which could be used for
this purpose under Section 7 of the ATSIC Act but that these powers are not
fully utilised at present.
In particular, I have suggested that ATSICs existing powers should be enhanced
by strengthening the scrutiny role of ATSIC over service delivery and program
design by other government departments. This could be achieved through
amendments to the ATSIC Act which:
empower ATSIC to set the objectives and guiding principles for service
delivery to Indigenous peoples across all issues (which they can do
under the present legislation), but also to empower them to be able
to develop legally binding directions for service delivery agencies that
accord with these principles;
require the Minister to table in Parliament all such directions set by
the ATSIC Board;

Social Justice Report 2003

 provide that all directions issued by the ATSIC National Board and
subsequently tabled in Parliament have the status of legislative
instruments (or delegated legislation);129
require all government departments to include in their annual reports
to Parliament information as to how they implement the directions of
the ATSIC Board in delivering relevant services and programs;
empower ATSIC to evaluate how government departments and
agencies (at all levels) comply with these directions in delivering
services. Consequent to this would be providing powers to ATSIC to
request documents from government agencies at all levels (the Social
Justice Commissioner has such a power under the Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986) and to require
government officials (including secretaries of departments) to appear
before the ATSIC Board to inform the Board of the department or
agencys approach and any action that they are taking to address
deficiencies in their departments performance or compliance;
provide for regular scrutiny of compliance with these directions by
the Australian National Audit Office or through an enhanced Office of
Evaluation and Audit within ATSIC; and
provide for scrutiny processes by the Parliament, including through
ATSIC reporting to Parliament about deficiencies in departments
complying with directions and for parliamentary committees to
scrutinise the actions of departments through specific inquiries or
senate estimate processes.
Legislative instruments remain subject to the scrutiny of the Parliament and
may be disallowed on the passage of a motion by one of the houses of
parliament. Providing ATSIC with the power to issue legally binding directions
would create a direct relationship between the ATSIC Board, the elected
representatives of Indigenous peoples, and the federal Parliament, the elected
representatives of the whole Australian community. Such recognition of ATSIC
would be appropriate.
ATSIC should also have an enhanced monitoring role at the inter-governmental
level. Current processes at this level, such as through COAG commitments
and Ministerial Councils including the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs, have provided an ineffective monitoring framework.
For example, I have previously expressed concerns in relation to the monitoring
of Bringing them home by MCATSIA on behalf of COAG due to the insufficient
information that is publicly reported which limits the accountability of
governments, as well as the lack of consultation with Indigenous peoples and

129 Legislative instruments are governed by the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), see section
46A. For an overview of delegated legislation and the scrutiny role that is exercised over it by
the Parliament see Odgers Australian Senate Practice, 9th Edition, Department of the Senate
Canberra 1999, Chapter 15. An example of a similar legislative instruments process is Public
Service Commissioner Directions. There are many other variations of such instruments, see
for example disability standards issues under section 31 of the Disability Discrimination Act
1992 (Cth).

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lack of independence in the evaluation of governmental progress.130 ATSICs

national role should be enhanced by ensuring that it has a permanent role in
the COAG and MCATSIA processes.

Reform to ATSIC at the state/territory level

I also support enhancing the structure of ATSIC for interface with state and
territory government through improved support for ATSICs State Advisory
Committees (SACs). There are two key issues that must be addressed to achieve
this goal.
First, ATSICs governing legislation should provide for the organic growth of the
relationship between ATSIC and state and territory governments. The ATSIC
legislation should provide the minimum features of the State Advisory Committee
structure by being extended to authorise SACs to enter into agreements with
state and territory governments. The ATSIC Act should provide that the SACs
are empowered to undertake any activity that falls within the terms of any such
agreements between ATSIC and the relevant state or territory. This should extend
to agreeing on funding arrangements whereby the SAC may pool state or territory
funds with Commonwealth funds, and run state or territory programs. This may
require that a mechanism is included in the ATSIC Act for agreements struck
with state or territory governments to be scheduled to the Act, in order that it is
clear what ATSICs powers extend to in this regard.
Second, there remains a significant problem of accountability for service delivery
to Indigenous peoples at the state and territory level. Very few parliaments in
the states and territories have extensive audit and parliamentary committee
structures to hold state departments and agencies accountable for their service
delivery. The distribution of state and territory funds for Indigenous service
delivery is also the area where there exists the least transparency and greatest
cost shifting. It is crucial that ATSICs role in monitoring state and territory
performance is addressed as a preliminary issue in expanding the role of ATSIC
at the state/territory level.
It would be appropriate for ATSICs Office of Evaluation and Audit (OEA) to
have its role expanded to focus on state and territory level service delivery, with
a particular view to developing recommendations for improving the relationship
and interaction of ATSIC with the relevant government. ATSIC should seek to
negotiate a funding contribution from the states and territories for such audits
to be undertaken on a regular basis within their agreement making function.
The additional benefit of this audit process being undertaken by ATSICs OEA
would be the capacity to tie this work into both the regional level and into the
national policy framework. It would also facilitate comparative analysis on
progress between different states and territories. This would facilitate the
identification of best practice and of transferable models which could then be
applied in other states and territories.

130 See further: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Submission to
the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee inquiry into the stolen generation,
HREOC Sydney 2000, http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/senate_submission/index.html.

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103

Reform to ATSIC at the regional level

The ATSIC Review report rightly emphasises the need for enhanced powers at
the regional level and for input from the regional and local levels to inform
policy development and decision-making processes at the state/territory and
national levels. The need for more effective regional structures for ATSIC that
prioritise local needs and build greater community-capacity has long been
recognised. This has in part been motivated by a desire for better representation
of community interests, but also in response to the need to develop structures
and arrangements to facilitate improved service delivery to Indigenous peoples.
In regard to service delivery to Indigenous people, the following issues have
been noted:
Lack of planning and poor coordination or duplication of services;
Lack of clear delineation of responsibility for service delivery at federal,
state, territory and local government levels;
Fragmented and inconsistent policies and programs across
governments; and
Failure to integrate Indigenous involvement into the planning and
delivery of services.
Problems have also been identified in relation to the inflexibility and short-term
nature of funding arrangements to Indigenous community organisations. The
need for greater powers for regional councils in terms of setting funding priorities,
determining outcomes, entering purchaser/provider agreements, developing
more representative and effective regional governance arrangements that have
the capacity to facilitate greater Indigenous participation and sustainable
economic development are fundamental and significant issues that deserve
serious consideration.
It is necessary for all levels of ATSIC to be enhanced in order to address policy
and service delivery issues effectively at a regional level. The profile of ATSIC
representatives, such as ATSIC Commissioners and Regional Chairpersons,
has ramifications for their capacity to represent regional concerns adequately
and to exert sufficient leverage at state and national levels. However, an
outstanding issue that needs to be addressed is that of the level of state and
territory governments accountability to their Indigenous constituents, and the
need to have greater transparency in monitoring the funds and services directed
to Indigenous people. Without effective external evaluation of the states and
territories performance, and the capacity for regional planning to identify and
to target services towards specific outcomes at a state level, the potential to
address community needs adequately at the regional level will be greatly limited.
In addition, longer-term commitments at the level of planning and funding are
fundamental to addressing the outstanding deficits in Indigenous service delivery
and the entrenched nature of Indigenous disadvantage.
Accordingly, in my submission to the ATSIC Review I supported the transition to
what the Review Team described as a devolution model, with some qualifications.
Implementation of the devolution model must address the following issues
effectively:

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The provision of the ability for regional councils to enter into agreements.
This includes:
the capacity to seek more flexible funding arrangements, including
purchaser/provider agreements; and
enhanced regional planning processes that target funds more
effectively for example, through an outcomes-based funding
approach and longer-term funding frameworks.

The need to enhance the profile of ATSIC representatives at the state

level to ensure that regional needs are prioritised. This should include
consideration of:
Capacity to monitor funds directed to Indigenous needs at the state/
territory level, for example, through review of specific purpose payment
arrangements;
Empowerment of State Advisory Committees to enter agreements
with state/territory governments; and
Strengthening of the profile and support for State Advisory Committees
at state/territory level, including potential parliamentary representation.

The creation of flexibility for regional councils to adapt to their local needs
through developing alternative governance arrangements. This would
include:
The capacity to represent a range of local interests, including those
of traditional owners;
The ability to address service delivery needs more efficiently and
appropriately within a designated region; and
The time-frame and capacity to develop an appropriate regional model
from the ground up.

Consideration of alternative governance arrangements must not be restricted

to one model, such as the regional authority structure adopted in the Torres
Strait. The need for flexibility in developing new forms of governance and the
unworkability of a one-size-fits-all model should be recognised. In addition,
the limited applicability of the regional authority model in meeting the needs of
Indigenous people in certain areas, particularly metropolitan and urban centres,
must be taken into account.

e) The challenge of ATSIC reform

Overall, the acting Chairman of ATSIC identifies the challenges that currently
face ATSIC as follows:
The challenge for ATSIC is to become the core organisation which:
develops the policies and programs to deliver what Aboriginal people
and Torres Strait Islanders need and want;
play a key role to ensure that they are implemented across
government; and

Social Justice Report 2003

 holds governments, agencies and service providers including ATSIC

itself accountable for achieving outcomes.131

The ATSIC Review goes part of the way to identifying an agenda for change to
ATSIC to meet these objectives. There is, however, a need to go beyond what
the Review Team have proposed and ensure that there is no relative weakening
in ATSICs national structure while also increasing the focus on supporting
innovation at the regional level.
Reform of ATSIC is a critical aspect in achieving the effective participation of
Indigenous peoples in decision making processes and supporting sustainable
development. The extent to which the government supports ATSIC over the
coming year to more effectively drive an agenda for change, including by
providing it with sharper legislative powers, will be the litmus test of their
commitment to achieving sustainable improvements in Indigenous communities.

Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the increased attention over the past year to the
nature of the relationship between government and Indigenous peoples. There
is clear dissatisfaction with the way that the current service delivery model
operates to reinforce Indigenous dependency on government services rather
than promote sustainable development. Capacity building in Indigenous
communities and governance reform of Indigenous organisations is increasingly
being seen as a panacea for overcoming the limitations of this approach.
Despite this, capacity building initiatives are progressing within the existing
service delivery model and with little reform to this system. There is also a lack
of agreement on an agenda for change into the future, which again operates to
restrain reform to within the strictures of the existing approach of governments.
This needs to change. As ATSIC have outlined in their Integrated framework for
capacity building and sustainable development, there needs to be reform at the
governmental, organisational and community levels simultaneously if there is
to be any transformation in the relationship of Indigenous peoples to government.
The focus needs to be broader than improved efficiency of Indigenous
organisations. No amount of change at one level of the system will result in
sustainable improvements for Indigenous peoples if it is not accompanied by
reform at the other levels.
A key challenge in this is reforming the role of ATSIC so that there is an
appropriate cultural match between ATSICs organisational structure and its
constituents, Indigenous peoples at the local level. ATSIC also needs to be
strengthened so that it is equipped to exercise a more pivotal role in policy
making at all levels of government particularly through strengthening its ability
to monitor the performance of government.
In committing to an approach defined by partnerships and agreements, capacity
building and a more targeted role for ATSIC in the broader policy framework,
the government has opened up the potential for significant and lasting reform
in the relationship of government with Indigenous peoples. There are clear limits

131 ATSIC, Annual Report 2002-2003, ATSIC Canberra 2003, p2.

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in these commitments it is not, for example, underpinned by any recognition

of Indigenous rights or distinct cultural attributes of Indigenous peoples; and it
is not clear that these commitments envisage much change to existing forms
of service delivery.
Whether this potential is realised will depend on the legislative reform program
that the government embarks on in 2004; their willingness to be increasingly
innovative and flexible with service delivery arrangements; and the commitments
that they are prepared to make at the inter-governmental level. Realising this
potential will also, of course, depend on the efforts of Indigenous peoples and
ATSIC as they seek to define a new relationship with government.

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Chapter 4

Responding to petrol sniffing on the Anangu

Pitjantjatjara Lands: A case study
In September 2002, the South Australian Coroner brought down his findings in
the inquests into the deaths of Kunmanara1 Ken (who died on 3 August 1999),
Kunmanara Hunt (who died on 27 January 2001) and Kunmanara Thompson
(who died on 26 June 2001). Each of these young Anangu was a chronic petrol
sniffer (they had been sniffing for at least ten years) in their mid to late twenties
living on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (AP Lands). All three were found to
have died as a result of inhalation of petrol fumes.2
Indigenous community organisations on the Pitjantjatjara lands had lobbied
hard for the inquests to take place in order to bring public attention to the
devastating impact that petrol sniffing was having on the AP Lands and to the
lack of government action in addressing the situation. The Coroner identified
that socio-economic factors such as hunger, poverty, illness, low education
levels, almost total unemployment, boredom and general feelings of
hopelessness form the environment in which such self-destructive behaviour
takes place.3 He stated: That such conditions should exist among a group of
people defined by race in the 21st century in a developed nation like Australia is
a disgrace and should shame us all.4
The Coroner identified the failure of governments (both federal and state) to
provide adequate services on the AP Lands to address these factors as
contributing to the problems associated with and leading to petrol sniffing. The
findings and recommendations of the inquests provide a blue print for action in
addressing issues relating to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands within a systemic
and long term framework.

1
2

3
4

It is a custom of the Anangu people to avoid using the first name of the deceased during the
period of mourning. Instead, the Pitjantjjatjara word Kunmanara is used.
Chivell, W, Findings of the South Australian State Coronial Inquest into the Deaths of Kunmanara
Ken, Kunmanara Hunt and Kunmanara Thompson, 6 September 2002, http://
www.courts.sa.gov.au/courts/coroner/findings/findings_2002/kunmanara_ken.finding.htm
ibid, p2.
ibid, p2.

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In this chapter, I examine progress in implementing the recommendations of

the Coroner in the year since they were released. It is critical for the South
Australian and federal governments to respond in a coordinated and timely
manner to this most difficult, entrenched and devastating issue. An analysis of
how they have approached this task and the processes that they have committed
to is also of broader relevance for addressing chronic substance misuse and
petrol sniffing issues in other Indigenous communities across Australia. The
chapter commences with an overview of research on the extent of petrol sniffing
in Indigenous communities across Australia and its impact on Indigenous
communities. It then discusses issues relating to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands
and the Coroners findings, as well as considers the adequacy and
appropriateness of governmental responses and processes that are currently
in train on the AP Lands to deal with petrol sniffing issues.

Petrol sniffing and Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander communities
a) The impact of petrol sniffing on Indigenous communities
There are two main ways that petrol sniffing impacts on Indigenous communities.
First, at an individual level it can be life-threatening and poses significant risks
to health. It can also result in increasing levels of disability. Second, it has
disruptive and destructive effects on the functioning of families and communities.
The impact of petrol sniffing on a persons health has been described as follows:
Petrol is a mixture of C4 to C12 hydrocarbons, the relative amounts of the
various constituents depending on the origin and preparation of the petrol.
The unsaturated hydrocarbons have mild anaesthetic properties while
the saturated hydrocarbons have a narcotic effect. The principle additive
is tetraethyl lead which also has intoxicant properties. Tetraethyl lead and
its metabolites are highly neurotoxic.
Fifteen to 20 inhalations of petrol will cause euphoria and intoxication for
three to six hours. Prolonged inhalation or rapid inhalation of a highly
concentrated vapour, such as when petrol-soaked cloth is held to the
nose, may lead to violent excitement followed by a loss of consciousness,
coma or death. Organic lead toxicity is regarded as the major long term
health hazard of petrol sniffing, although some other components (toluene,
n-hexane) may contribute to neurological damage
Other long term sequelae of chronic sniffing include nutritional
disturbances, anaemia, and cardiac, liver and renal effects. Cognitive
functioning may also be impaired and there is evidence that some of
these changes are irreversible.5

The South Australian Coroner also describes the risks to the health of sniffers
as follows:

Western Australian Task Force on Drug Abuse 1995, quoted in Parliament of Victoria, Drugs
and Crime Prevention Committee, Inquiry into the inhalation of volatile substances: Final report,
DCPC, Parliament of Victoria, Melbourne 2002, fn 156, p139.

Social Justice Report 2003

Individuals who sniff petrol are at a high risk of pneumonia and chronic
lung disease; trauma; burns and injury. In addition there have been some
deaths in which sudden death has clearly occurred during acute episodes
of inhalation. These deaths may be related to cardiac arrythmias,
respiratory arrest because of acute effects on the brain stem or cerebral
oedema
Lead toxicity of the brain is clearly well established in the literature and
has been a major cause of brain damage related to petrol sniffing.
However there are significant data now suggesting that aromatic
hydrocarbons (eg benzene) are also responsible for neurotoxicity.6

Petrol sniffing can also be a significant cause of physical disablement,

necessitating full-time attendant care. The Northern Territory Parliaments Select
Committee on Substance Abuse in the Community noted earlier this year that:
The direct impact of inhalant abuse is usually contained to the sniffer and
family and immediate community. However, it has implications for the
broader community also. The end result of petrol sniffing other than early
death is brain damage which leaves the sniffer in a vegetative state. A
conservative estimate of the cost to the NT of maintaining an ex-sniffer in
this state is $150,000 pa. While there are presently 15 such persons in
central Australia, it is estimated that this could escalate to upwards of 60
in the near future, an ongoing (and growing) cost of $9m per annum.
These figures argue strongly for action to curb the practice and stem the
damage now.7

In his findings of the coronial inquests on petrol sniffing on the AP lands, Coroner
Chivell outlines the social impacts of petrol sniffing, specifically on the Anangu
population, as follows:
Petrol sniffing poses a range of problems to sniffers, their families,
communities and to the wider society. Among the problems which have
been associated with petrol sniffing are: serious health consequences
including death or long-term brain damage, social alienation of sniffers,
social disruption, vandalism and violence, increased inter-family conflict
and reduced morale on communities, incarceration of sniffers and costs
to the health system in terms of acute care and providing for the longterm disabled8

In her earlier work, Maggie Brady states that: it is not possible to provide an
unequivocal answer to the question of whether Aboriginal people define petrol
sniffing to be a problem.9 However, evidence to the recent Coronial Inquests

6
7

Chivell, W, op.cit, p4.

Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory, Select Committee on Substance Abuse in the
Community, Interim report of the committee to date issues of alcohol abuse, cannabis use
and inhalant abuse, Parliament of the Northern Territory, Darwin 2003, p13.
Chivell, W, op.cit, p14. In an internet forum on petrol sniffing Andrea Mason argued that many
AP communities experiencing problems with petrol sniffers experience a kind of cultural
suffocation. Petrol sniffers are slowly but surely suffocating and snuffing out the cultural vitality
and cultural norms and traditional authority structures in their communities. They incite violence
and inflict pain for purely selfish gain. The Australian, Online Forum, 25 November 2001,
www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,5061578,00.html, accessed 29 July 2003.
Brady, M, Heavy Metal: the Social Meaning of Petrol Sniffing in Australia, AIATSIS, Canberra,
1989, p10.

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on the AP Lands makes clear that the Anangu certainly perceive petrol sniffing
as a devastating contemporary problem facing their communities. One
community member commented at the Inquest:
they create endless trouble for us and it just goes on and on. What I
would really like to do is to help them stop but I love them and would
care for them but the problem is with their sniffing they start to not be able
to understand properly so I cant even intervene because they cant
understand what I am on about anyway.10

In his findings the Coroner also stated that:

Many attempts over the years to combat petrol sniffing [on the AP Lands]
have been unsuccessful. Anangu continue to try and care for sniffers
even when they continue to sniff, and even after they are violent and
disruptive to their families and the community. Some Anangu are
concerned that if they try and stop sniffers they will harm them, or that the
sniffers may harm themselves. They look to the broader community to
help them deal with a problem which has no precedent in traditional
culture.11

b) Recent concern about petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities

In the year since these Coronial inquests, there has been significant concern
expressed about petrol sniffing in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
communities at the national level. In October 2003, the Senate Legal and
Constitutional References Committee made the following recommendation in
the report of its inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation:
The Committee recommends that during the Spring sitting 2004 the
Senate refer to it an inquiry on progress in addressing the problems
surrounding petrol sniffing in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands, including
progress as it relates to the COAG whole-of-government trial conducted
there.12

The Dissenting Report of Government members of the Committee questioned

such a distinct focus on addressing the issue on the AP Lands. Instead, their
Dissenting Report proposed that recommendation 20 of the committee (quote
above) be amended to:
provide at a later date the Senate refer to it an inquiry on progress in
addressing the problems surrounding petrol sniffing in remote Aboriginal
communities. Government members believe that petrol sniffing is a
problem in many regions of Australia and any inquiry should be able to
review strategies employed in different regions to assess their
effectiveness.13

10

11
12
13

South Australian Coroners Court, Pitjantjatjara Lands, Before Mr W Chivell State Coroner,
Inquest into the Deaths of Kunamanara Ken, Kunmanara Hunt and Kunmanara Thompson,
Transcript of Proceedings, No.11/2002,. Inyika XN (Mr Goetz), p309.
Chivell, W, op.cit, p2.
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Reconciliation: Off track, Parliament
of Australia, Canberra, October 2003, pxiv, Recommendation 20.
ibid, pp135-6.

Social Justice Report 2003

In its submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Inquiry into Capacity-building, the
Aboriginal Land Rights Movement (ALRM) of South Australia recommended
that the Social Justice Commissioner monitor the implementation of the
recommendations of the recent coronial inquests on the AP Lands:
It is submitted that a recommendation should be made that the Human
Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission, Social Justice Commissioner
should monitor the progress of the State and Federal governments in
implementing the recommendations flowing from the inquest into the
deaths of three petrol sniffers.14

In March 2003, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family

and Community Affairs also released the report of its inquiry into substance
abuse in Australian communities. It noted that the use of inhalants such as
petrol and aerosols was relatively rare in the Australian community, but
nevertheless was a matter of concern to the committee due to the serious impact
of inhaling and its prevalence among particularly disadvantaged groups such
as Indigenous people.15 The Committee recommended that:
the Commonwealth government take a leading role as a matter of urgency
in establishing a national committee to coordinate policy and programs
to prevent the use of inhalants and treat dependent users.16

The issue of petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities has also been raised as
an issue in recent parliamentary inquiries in Victoria and the Northern Territory
(discussed further below).

c) Information about petrol sniffing by Indigenous people

These processes have identified the need for greater attention to be paid to
petrol sniffing, including at the national level, and for more urgent responses to
it where it exists. The phenomenon of petrol-sniffing is, however, not wellunderstood and there is no reliable national data on the number of people
involved and the extent of resulting damage to individuals and communities.
Peter dAbbs and Maggie Brady have noted that:
The situation today remains in many respects little different to what it was
thirty years ago. There are still practically no clear policies at any levels of
government; there is no accumulated body of knowledge about the nature
and causes of sniffing, or even about the efficacy or effectiveness of
different kinds of interventions, and most initiatives are forced to rely on
short-term project funding, the continuance of which rarely has anything
to do with program effectiveness.17
14

15

16
17

ALRM, Supplementary submission of Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement Inc, Adelaide,

Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Inquiry on Progress Towards
National Reconciliation, 24 June 2003, p14.
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Road to
recovery: Report on the inquiry into substance abuse in Australian communities,, Parliament of
Australia, Canberra 2003, pp 198-199.
ibid, Recommendation 71, p200.
dAbbs, P, and Brady, M, Other drugs, other people, other places: the policy response to
Indigenous petrol sniffing in Australia, Conference paper, Inhalant Use and Disorder
Conference, Australian Institute of Criminology, Townsville, 7-8 July 2003, p2.

Chapter 4

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In fact, petrol sniffing in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities

continues to occupy a marginal position as a drug issue at the national level:
As an issue for Australian drug policy, indigenous petrol sniffing is all but
invisible. The National Drug Strategic Framework 1998-99 to 2002-03,
endorsed by the Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy in November 1998,
makes just two references to the issue. The first is to tell us that we dont
know anything about its prevalence (among Indigenous Australians)
The second reference, in effect, states that petrol sniffing is not good for
you
Similarly, the National Action Plan on Illicit Drugs 2001 to 2002-03,
endorsed by the Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy in July 2000 skirts
around the issue of inhalants by stating that they would be covered by a
separate complementary strategy for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander drug issues. A background paper prepared to accompany the
National Action Plan includes a section titled Illicit drug use among
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples which makes no reference
to inhalants, volatile substances or petrol sniffing.18

Compared to the information available on other categories of substance misuse,

dAbbs and Brady suggest that the vast untapped pool of professional
expertise [on petrol sniffing] looks somewhat shallow19 Paul Torzillo has
commented that the lack of any sustained institutional interest in petrol sniffing
among government agencies is matched by a dearth of high quality research.20
Consistent with this, there is a lack of systematic and comprehensive data on
the extent, location and changes over time in petrol sniffing in Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander communities.
There are, however, reported instances of petrol sniffing as a significant issue
in several Indigenous communities across Australia. In its recent report into the
inhalation of volatile substances, the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee
of the Victorian Parliament summarised some published materials as follows:
Petrol sniffing occurs in some Indigenous communities and not others.
In 1989 it was reported as occurring mainly in Arnhem Land in the Northern
Territory, in central Australia and in the Riverina region of New South
Wales. In 1994, Brady and Torzillo argued that patterns had changed:
It appears that the intensity of sniffing has increased over the past 20
years, with more users sniffing over longer periods, which has resulted in
an increase in reported morbidity and mortality from the 1980s onward.
However, since 1994 a further shift in patterns and prevalence of petrol
sniffing seems to have occurred. A little-publicised but positive
development of recent years has been the move by many Indigenous
communities to use aviation fuel rather than petrol for vehicles. In several
communities where a long and established history of petrol sniffing has
existed, sniffing has been reduced or even stopped.

18
19
20

ibid, p6.
ibid., p10.
Torzillo, P, Petrol sniffing on the AP Lands: Report to the Coroner, Nganampa Health Council,
2002, p11.

Social Justice Report 2003

Conversely, some communities which had previously been free of petrol

sniffing are now reporting the practice. It has been reported in the
Katherine region of the NT, Cape York in Queensland, south-west
Queensland, western NSW and Northern Victoria.
There is also evidence that Indigenous children are turning to the use of
other volatile substances. Although petrol sniffing remains the primary
form of volatile substance misuse among young Indigenous children,
there are increasing reports of other forms (particularly glue and aerosol
paint sniffing) in urban areas.21

The Victorian parliamentary committee report also refers to studies identifying

petrol sniffing by Indigenous youth as an issue in Perth. While acknowledging
that there is very little research on the situation in Victoria, it also states that it is
believed that chroming is a far more prevalent form of volatile substance abuse
in Victoria, including among Indigenous Victorians, than petrol sniffing. It may
be that this is an erroneous assumption.22
Petrol sniffing has also been identified as a major problem among young
Aboriginal people in recent years on Cape York Peninsula in the communities
of Kowanyama, Aurukum, Napranum and Lockhart River; and as existing
periodically and to a lesser extent in northern Cape York towns such as Mapoon,
Injinoo, Umagico, Bamaga and New Mapoon.23 The Queensland government
has also stated that petrol and aerosol sniffing are two of the most common
kinds of substance abuse in Torres Strait Islander communities For some
families, petrol and aerosol sniffing is an even bigger issue than grog abuse.24
There are also reports that petrol sniffing is periodically an issue faced in remote
Aboriginal communities in Western Australia. Concern was recently expressed
that petrol sniffing may have been a contributing factor in three deaths in the
past two years at Balgo;25 and the Shire of Ngaanyatjarraku and community of
Warburton have also recently expressed concerns about chronic substance
abuse and difficulties in law and justice responses to it.26
In its interim report on issues of alcohol abuse, cannabis use and inhalant
abuse, a Select Committee of the Northern Territory Parliament noted in February
2003 that:

21
22
23
24

25

26

Parliament of Victoria, op.cit., pp139-140.

ibid, pp137, 139.
James, M, Petrol sniffing on Cape York Peninsula, <http://www.boysfromthebush.org.au/
PETROLSniffingPaper.DOC>, accessed 20 November 2003, p1.
Queensland Government, Kainedbiipitli A new dawn. Torres Strait Island crime prevention
resource manual, online at: http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/About_the_department/
publications/crime/kainedbiipitli/, accessed 20 November 2003.
ABC Online News, Government agencies promise schemes to fight petrol sniffing, 30
September 2003, www.abc.net.au/message/news/stories/ms_news_956496.htm, accessed
20 November 2003.
Ngaanyatjarraku community, Law and justice submission to the Attorney-General of Western
Australia, Shire of Ngaanyatjarraku, Kalgoorlie, April 2002, p1.

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Petrol sniffing and other inhalant substance abuse is known to affect up

to 30 remote communities in the Northern Territory. Inhalant substance
abuse is most entrenched in the Central Australian region and the Tri
State border region of the Northern Territory, South Australia and Western
Australia [i.e, the Ngaanyatjarra, Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara
lands]...
In remote Central communities it is estimated that there are up to 350
sniffers. Sniffing is an endemic practice in at least six remote Central
Australian communities.27

The limited research also suggests that there are different patterns of use of
petrol and other volatile substances by Indigenous people compared to nonIndigenous people. The Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee of the Victorian
Parliament notes the following findings of several studies:

A survey of Indigenous and non-Indigenous students in Perth showed

that Indigenous users of volatile substances tended to use much more
regularly, often on a daily basis and over a longer period of time than
non-Indigenous users; and that petrol was one of the predominant
solvents used (unlike for non-Indigenous youth);
Other studies have found that Indigenous youth are likely to use inhalants
more intensively and for a longer duration than non-Indigenous urban
youth, with one study reporting a mean duration of eight years for petrol
sniffing (compared with only a brief period of experimentation for most
non-Indigenous youth); and
a further study has argued that there are differences in inhalation culture
and practices for Indigenous people depending on locality/remoteness.
Relevant factors which influence this include the degree of community
cohesion, local traditions, customs and the degree of cultural
identification, the number of volatile substance abusers, access to
resources and support, and other local factors.28

In 2001, the Australian National Council on Drugs published a report examining

the structural determinants of substance abuse. It states that petrol sniffing
and volatile substance abuse by young Indigenous people, while clearly having
some similarities with non-Indigenous people, must be viewed as part of a
broader picture of Indigenous disadvantage:
When combined with an environment stressed by poverty, racism and
frequent bereavement, some remote Aboriginal communities have been
beset by petrol sniffing among their young people. Indigenous
communities with a history of involvement in the cattle industry were found
by Brady to have resisted solvent-sniffing problems. This resilience was
attributed to the independence, self-esteem and outlet for risk-taking
afforded by involvement in the cattle industry. Individuals who had adopted

27

28

Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory, op.cit., pp12-13. There are also communities
that have overcome significant petrol sniffing problems in recent years, such as Yuendumu:
see further, Siegel, N, The interaction between petrol sniffers and bush court in Aboriginal
communities, Conference paper, Inhalant Use and Disorder Conference, Australian Institute
of Criminology, Townsville, 7-8 July 2003.
Parliament of Victoria, op.cit, pp138-139.

Social Justice Report 2003

Christianity or who valued other activities such as sport or fishing were

also found to be resilient to sniffing solvents. Brady concluded that social
and cultural factors are paramount in solving youth health problems such
as solvent sniffing in Aboriginal communities.29

d) Defining petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities as a public policy issue

In her landmark 1989 publication Heavy Metal: the Social Meaning of Petrol
Sniffing in Australia, Maggie Brady raises the question of how petrol sniffing is
defined as a problem. She observes that while [p]etrol sniffing by young people,
often in groups, constitutes a threat, both physically and metaphorically to the
social order, it is one among many behaviours that lead to impaired health
and social functioning.30 Certainly other forms of addictive behaviour such as
tobacco and alcohol addiction constitute more widespread sources of death
and disease across Indigenous populations.
With Peter dAbbs, Maggie Brady has recently commented on how petrol sniffing
makes its way onto the public policy agenda:
Petrol sniffing erupts periodically into the living rooms or onto the breakfast
tables of the public through highly sensational media exposes The
media portrayal of Aboriginal petrol sniffing is worthy of a study in its own
right; in particular, one might ask why acts of petrol sniffing are implicitly
and sometimes explicitly represented not merely as instances of
individual self-harm, but as evidence of a broader community social
disintegration in a way that heroin use, for example, is never portrayed. 31

dAbbs and Brady argue that this is indicative of structural problems in the way
governments address issues of petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities. They
argue that because of the lack of reliable data and the absence of any powerful
lobby groups or other agencies with the capacity to ensure that petrol sniffing
remains on the public agenda in anything more than a transient manner, petrol
sniffing as a public issue owes almost everything to media outbursts what
pressure for action that exists as a result is for quick, short term action.32
They argue that due to pressures to deal with other, chronic health issues in
Indigenous communities combined with petrol sniffing not being a major
contributor to indigenous morbidity or mortality, bureaucrats are more often
than not pre-occupied with other health priorities. When there is media attention
to the issue, they find themselves caught in a crossfire: pressured from outside
to take action in response to a problem that is not, from where they sit,
among their most critical challenges.33 dAbbs and Brady see three inter-related
consequences of this:

29
30
31
32
33

first, the agency will take some action but not be willing to divert
resources from other areas that are seen as ongoing priorities;

Australian National Council on Drugs, Structural determinants of youth drug use, ANCD Canberra
2001, cited in Parliament of Victoria, Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee,ibid, p140.
Brady, M, op.cit, p14.
dAbbs, P, and Brady, M, op.cit, p3.
ibid, p4.
ibid, p5.

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second, the pressure to return to what are seen internally as more

important priorities provides an incentive to make a one off gesture
and refocus on other issues; and

third, there is unlikely to be within the agency or department much

experience or networks of people with an ongoing interest in
keeping petrol sniffing high on the agenda of priorities.34

Petrol sniffing is therefore unlikely to become the subject of a long-term,

sustained policy focus:
[B]ecause petrol sniffing is not seen as a genuine on-going priority issue
that falls neatly into any one departments or even one governments
scope of responsibility, governments have tended not to engage in direct
service provision, but rather to fund community-based groups and other
non-government organisations to provide services. This, of course, also
fits with the view of petrol sniffing as a community responsibility. [I]n
light of petrol sniffings low ranking as a priority, most initiatives have
been funded on an ad hoc, short term basis, with virtually no commitment
to rigorous evaluation or to providing ongoing funding to those programs
that demonstrate successful outcomes.35

In these circumstances, it is difficult to consolidate an evidence base, to build

and sustain links with existing expertise, or to maintain extensive corporate
knowledge on the subject. By identifying petrol sniffing as an Indigenous
problem it has also been marginalised as a policy issue, with the result that it
has not received the attention and resourcing that it may have if it had been
positioned within mainstream substance misuse policy frameworks. Accordingly,
DAbbs and Brady comment that governments have tended to establish
interagency committees as the main response to petrol sniffing:
[I]n the absence of an evidence base, and because petrol sniffing where
it occurs straddles political jurisdictions as well as departmental silos,
governments have tended to respond to petrol sniffing crises by
convening high level inter-governmental committees involving
commonwealth and state/territory officials. In no instances to date,
however, have these committees succeeded in implementing a coordinated, sustained approach to the prevention or treatment of sniffing.36

Petrol sniffing on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara

Lands: A case study
a) Why a case study of the AP Lands?
In the second half of 2003, the Social Justice Commissioners unit of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) conducted a research
and consultation project into progress in addressing the Coronial
recommendations on petrol sniffing on the AP Lands. HREOC staff visited the
AP Lands as part of this project in September 2003. Interviews and meetings
were conducted in Adelaide and across the AP Lands with various government
34
35
36

ibid.
Ibid, p9.
ibid, p10.

Social Justice Report 2003

agencies (including those involved in the Council of Australian Governments

whole-of-government community coordination trial on the AP Lands),37 Aboriginal
organisations,38 and community members and elders on the lands.39 HREOC
also received a whole-of-government response from the South Australian
government to the issues being considered.
The decision to conduct a case study specifically on petrol sniffing on the AP
Lands was based on a number of factors. The Social Justice Commissioners
office had been considering for some time ways that it might best be able to
assist communities on the AP Lands to address problems associated with petrol
sniffing. This was largely the result of concerns raised with HREOC by
organisations such as the NPY Womens Council about petrol sniffing.40
Similarly, the inquests conducted on the AP Lands in 2002 had provided much
impetus for addressing petrol sniffing issues. The recommendations of the
Inquests provide a blueprint for government to consider as the means best
able to address the problems and provide the most likely long-term solutions.41
There is a clear need for expediency in following up the recommendations. This
is particularly so given that the tardiness of government and other players in
addressing petrol sniffing to date has been identified by the Anangu themselves,
as well as by the Coroner, as a contributory factor to the escalation and
embeddedness of the situation on the AP Lands.
In the absence of systematic and comprehensive data on the extent and nature
of petrol sniffing by Indigenous people, there is also much potential value in
provide a discrete focus on the AP Lands in order to secure a higher policy
profile for the issue of petrol sniffing. The AP Lands are also one of the areas
across the country where there is some data on petrol sniffing and a history of
dealing with the issue, as Nganampa Health Council has collated such
information since 1984.
As a case study, the AP Lands Coronial Inquest also has currency in light of
recent policy debate about the need to address urgent problems in communities
(drug and alcohol misuse, violent behaviour) versus the need to focus on the
underlying causes of family and community dysfunction (inter-related social,
economic, cultural and psychological factors) in overcoming Indigenous
disadvantage. While the Coronial Inquest endorses a systematic, concerted
approach to the AP Lands situation, indications are that interventions into petrol
sniffing will need to be adapted to meet the needs of specific contexts:

37

38

39
40

41

Agencies and Departments included the Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health
(Cth); Department of Correctional Services (SA); Department of Aboriginal Affairs and
Reconciliation, SA; Department of Human Services (SA); South Australian Police (SAPOL);
and the Sheriffs Office.
Including the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement; Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara
Womens Council; Ngannyatjarra Council Aboriginal Corporation; and Nganampa Health
Council.
Including at Fregon, Waturra, Wantinna Homestead and Warburton.
In fact, one of the first events that I attended as Social Justice Commissioner was a conference
convened in Alice Springs in 1999 to discuss the use of aviation gas as a substitute for petrol
in order to address the problem of sniffing on the AP Lands. See further: NPY Womens
Council, AVGas / COMGas conference, 28-39 July 1999, Alice Springs.
ALRM, op.cit, p17.

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An important aspect of the Coroners findings and recommendations is

his recognition that petrol sniffing is such a complex problem or indeed
series of problems to be faced by outback communities, that no individual
measure will fix it, rather there needs to be a series of measures all
operating synergistically together to have any prospect of long term
success. For that reason alone progress should be monitored.42

The AP Lands experience may also have ramifications for addressing other
forms of addiction and at risk behaviour in communities (such as cannabis
use, which is believed to have dramatically increased over the last five years on
the AP Lands). 43 In previous Social Justice Reports, the Social Justice
Commissioner has taken an interest in developing a human rights framework
for monitoring and evaluating progress in addressing Indigenous
disadvantage.44 Given the Coroners contextualisation of his recommendations
in regard to underlying socio-economic factors and disadvantage, the use of
benchmarks based on human rights standards could provide a framework for
monitoring progress in addressing the AP Lands situation.
Ultimately, the considerable poverty and socio-economic marginalisation
identified as incubating and precipitating endemic petrol sniffing in Indigenous
communities raises significant human rights concerns about the lack of equality
in the provision of government services to Indigenous people on the AP Lands.
It raises concerns regarding rights to adequate food, the highest attainable
standard of health, education, decent work and adequate housing, and the
lack of reasonable access to police services, in particular protection from self
harm or harm to others in the community (rights to personal security, and to
equal access to justice).
There are also concerns regarding protection of the right of children. The
Convention on the Rights of the Child affirms the right of children and young
people to protection against drug abuse and other forms of abuse and neglect;
and protects the enjoyment of the right to a reasonable standard of living, health
and basic services; the right to education and the right to leisure. Under CROC,
children and young people with special circumstances, such as those suffering
disabilities or orphaned must be provided for, and there are also requirements
concerning cultural sensitivity to Indigenous and other minority groups, and
rehabilitative care for children suffering from deprivation. The disadvantage
experienced by the Anangu is indicative of the ongoing failure to provide the full
measure of human rights to which all Australians, including Indigenous peoples,
are entitled. It is worthy of detailing the current situation for this reason alone.

b) The extent of petrol sniffing on the AP Lands

[I]ts the biggest shame that young people today in this part of the world
are dying from petrol sniffing. And the neglect that I think has happened,
has been going on for some time and that there is a reluctance for the
wider community in Australia to take any responsibility or concern about

42
43
44

Ibid, p15.
Torzillo, P, op.cit, p9.
See for example: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2002, HREOC Sydney 2002, Chapter 4.

Social Justice Report 2003

it well lets be honest, theres been 30 years of neglect from government

in this region across the whole board, not just petrol sniffing. But I do
believe that if you address the issues of petrol sniffing, youre addressing
the wider issues of the problems on the communities. It goes hand in
hand. And you know, we have documented time and time and time again
communities have, the women have that what is needed. We dont
need more reports, we dont need more enquiries, we dont need more
meetings with the government to say, What do you want. Anangu have
written it down time and time again.45

The Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (AP Lands) cover an area of 160,000 square
kilometres in the far north-west of South Australia. The area comprises one fifth
of the state. The AP Lands were handed back to the traditional owners, the
Anangu, under the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA). They form part of
the larger remote cross-border region of Western Australia, South Australia and
the Northern Territory known as the Ngaanyatjarra, Pitjantjatjara and
Yankunytjatjara lands.
It is thought that petrol sniffing emerged as a problem on the AP Lands during
the late 1960s. The recent Coronial Inquest found that the extent of petrol sniffing
on the AP Lands had diminished in the early 1990s. However, there was also a
reduction in effort towards tackling the problem in the mid-1990s. This has led
to a resurgence of petrol sniffing from at least 1998, with little achieved since
then to restore the situation on the AP Lands to its pre-1995 position.46
Data collected by Nganampa Health Council in 2000 indicates that the number
of people engaged in petrol sniffing has increased from 1999 to 2000 (from 111
to 166 people). This represents approximately 6% of the Anangu population
and 12% of the population aged between 10 and 35 years of age.47
This is a similar number to that observed on the AP Lands in 1984. This suggests
a decline in the proportion of this age group engaged in petrol sniffing, given
the overall growth in the total population (from approximately 1,700 in 1984 to
2,800 by the year 2000).48
Available data also indicates that despite the increasing number of new recruits
to petrol sniffing in the late 1990s, the total number of sniffers and people
recruited to sniffing over the decade declined over the course of the decade.
The data also reveals a fairly dramatic cohort effect since the 1980s:
[T]he median age of petrol sniffers has increased markedly over this time
and that in many communities the number of petrol sniffers over 25 years
of age are in the majority. This means that a number of those who took up
petrol sniffing 10, 15 or 20 years ago are still sniffing. This cohort effect
has major implications for understanding the breadth of problems that
occurs as a consequence of petrol sniffing and the different interventions
that would be required.49
45
46
47
48
49

Maggie Cavanagh, former coordinator of the Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara

Womens Council in evidence at the Coronial Inquest. Quoted in Chivell, W, op.cit, p32.
ibid., p1.
Torzillo, P, Petrol sniffing on the AP Lands: Report to the Coroner, Nganampa Health Council,
2002, p2.
Ibid.
ibid, p2.

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One of the implications of an increase in the number of long-term or chronic

sniffers is a greater degree of visibility of the problem and a higher level of
impacts on the public order and functioning of communities. It also indicates a
need for intervention at both ends of the problem, in addressing the increase in
recruitment of sniffers as well as the issues associated with long term or chronic
sniffers, such as rehabilitation and harm minimisation.

c) The findings of the Coronial Inquests into petrol sniffing, September 2002
Coroner Chivell concluded in the Coronial Inquests conducted on the AP Lands
that the situation in 2002 is that:
Petrol sniffing is endemic on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands. It has caused
and continues to cause devastating harm to the community, including
approximately 35 deaths in the last 20 years in a population of between
2,000 and 2,500. Serious disability, crime, cultural breakdown and general
grief and misery are also the consequences.50

The first recommendation of the Coroner in the inquest reflects the serious
contemporary impact of petrol sniffing on the community:
1. That Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments recognise that
petrol sniffing poses an urgent threat to the very substance of the Anangu
communities on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands. It threatens not only
death and serious and permanent disability, but also the peace, order
and security of communities, cultural and family structures, education,
health and community development.51

A summary of the findings of the Coroner and his recommendations for action
have been extracted as an appendix to this report (see Appendix 3). A key
finding of the Coroner was that the recommendations of the Royal Commission
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody have not been complied with by the
Commonwealth or state governments, and that this will, if it is not addressed,
lead to severe disability and further deaths, not to mention continuing social
dislocation, crime, loss of culture and general community degradation and loss52
on the AP Lands. The concerns of the Coroner regarding this are also extracted
in Appendix 3.
The findings and recommendations of the Coroner can be grouped into the
following two key issues:

50
51
52

i) Coordination, funding and action by Government: Concerns were

expressed about the failure of governments to consult appropriately and
significant delay in implementing programs, with a need for governments
to move beyond the information gathering stage. The Inquest highlights
the need for governments to re-assess their coordination of policy and
funding approaches to service delivery on the AP Lands;
ii) Specific interventions for addressing petrol sniffing: The Inquest identifies
the need to adopt a combination of primary, secondary and tertiary
interventions relating to health and justice issues in order to combat petrol
Chivell, W, op.cit, p1.
ibid, Recommendation 1, p65.
ibid.

Social Justice Report 2003

sniffing, combined with strategies to address the significant disadvantage

and lack of services on the AP Lands, which forms the environment in
which petrol sniffing takes place.
The Coronial Inquest recognised the need for broader government and
community responsibility, and made a series of recommendations (Recs 1-7;
8.14, 8.15) urging re-assessment of current Commonwealth and State funding
and policy strategies in finding solutions to the problem of petrol sniffing in the
AP Lands. The recommendations directed towards the Commonwealth, State
and Territory governments included the need to:

recognise the threat which petrol sniffing poses to Anangu

communities on the AP Lands (Rec 1);
recognise the role played by broader socio-economic factors in
causing petrol sniffing on the AP Lands (Rec 2);
recognise the responsibility of government and the broader
Australian community to address petrol sniffing (Rec 3);
move existing intergovernmental approaches beyond the
information-gathering stage and to utilise existing knowledge and
expertise to find solutions to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands
forthwith (Rec 4);

address existing fragmentation of service delivery through

improved inter-governmental coordination (Rec 5);

establish a more substantial Commonwealth and state government

presence on the AP Lands and develop more stable relationships
with Anangu, including greater certainty of funding arrangements
(Rec 6);
recruit qualified and experienced staff to the AP Lands (Rec 8.11);

recognise the interdependent nature of program interventions and

adopt a longer term, multi-faceted approach to addressing petrol
sniffing (Recs 7, 8.14); and
assess initiatives against the recommendations of the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Rec 8.15).

The remaining recommendations address more specifically the different levels

of interventions needed from prevention and deterrence through to rehabilitation.
Recommendations which have become the responsibility of health agencies
include:

appointing four youth-workers and a youth-work coordinator (Rec

8.1);

Assessing petrol sniffers on a neurological and neuro-physical

basis for rehabilitation and disability services (Rec 8.2);

Establishing a culturally appropriate Homelands/Outstations

Programme (Rec 8.3);

Continuing funding for the Commonwealth Avgas initiative (Rec

8.4);

Evaluating the role of the Department of Families and Youth

Services (SA) in relation to children at risk on the AP Lands,
including considering the adoption of a more proactive community
development approach (Rec 8.8); and

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Urgent upgrading of the level of services for disabled victims of

petrol sniffing (Rec 8.9).

Justice issues covered by the recommendations relate to strengthening of the

police presence in the AP Lands and the need for greater deterrence of petrol
sniffing and related disruptive behaviours. They include:

Increasing the range of sentencing options available to courts

sitting on the AP Lands, resourcing non-custodial options such
as outstations and a secure care facility, as well as increasing the
presence of Correctional Service supervisors to ensure that
undertakings, bonds and community service orders can be
enforced (Rec 8.5);

Amending the Public Intoxication Act to extend its application to

the AP Lands and declare petrol or hydrocarbons a drug for the
purposes of the Act (Rec 8.6);

Canvassing support for the establishment of night patrols as part

of an overall crime prevention strategy on the AP Lands (Rec 8.7);
Planning for the establishment of secure care facilities on the AP
Lands, to fulfil a range of roles including detention, detoxification,
treatment and rehabilitation (Rec 8.10);

Immediate establishment of a police presence on the AP Lands,

through implementation of the recommendations of the SAPOL
review of the Community Constable Scheme (Rec 8.12); and
Improvement to existing levels of policing on the AP Lands, through
addressing issues relating to staffing at Marla (Rec 8.13).

Progress in responding to the recommendations

of the Coronial Inquest into petrol sniffing on the
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands
In this section, progress in addressing the recommendations of the Coronial
Inquest is considered in relation to the following four themes:

Inter-governmental and inter-agency coordination;

Resourcing issues;
Health related issues; and

Justice related issues.53

a) Inter-governmental and Inter-agency coordination

Fundamental to the recommendations made by the Coroner is the observation
that government agencies have been stuck for too long in the informationgathering stage at the expense of taking action to address longstanding service
delivery issues confronting the AP Lands:

53

Note: This analysis of the adequacy of response to the Coronial recommendations includes
processes or initiatives that may not have been developed or undertaken by governments
directly in response to the Coronial recommendations.

Social Justice Report 2003

There is no need for further information gathering, and there is a vast

untapped pool of professional expertise to be utilised. What is missing is
prompt, forthright, properly planned, properly funded action.54

The Coroner recognised that properly planned and funded action is reliant on
the development of an [i]nter-Governmental coordination of approach in
order to avoid the fragmentation of effort and confusion and alienation of serviceproviders.55 He also stipulated that the support of the broader community be
enlisted in addressing petrol sniffing on the AP Lands:
The fact that the wider Australian community has a responsibility to assist
Anangu to address the problem of petrol sniffing, which has no precedent
in traditional culture, is clear. Governments should not approach the task
on the basis that the solutions must come from Anangu communities
alone.56

The need for interagency coordination or holistic or whole-of-government

approaches, and the need to avoid duplication of services and to target
Indigenous disadvantage more effectively, have become familiar themes in policy
debate on Indigenous service delivery. The necessity of changing the ways in
which governments do business with Indigenous communities has particular
pertinence in light of the recent focus of Indigenous policy on capacity-building
and governance.57
Since the Coronial Inquest, one of the most consistent comments made about
the inter-agency approach to the Coroners recommendations by those whom
HREOC consulted with is that it has continued to be piecemeal rather than
systematic and has been characterised by a reluctance to take action. In the
words of one community organisation member, there have been many
references to the Coroners recommendations but a failure to act. In response,
government officials often highlight the difficulties in making progress on petrol
sniffing-related issues on the AP Lands, given the long-standing and intractable
nature of the problems, and the need to consult properly and effectively with
Anangu.
This section of the chapter will address concerns in regard to the question of
the degree of responsibility to be exercised by both Anangu and government in
responding to the Coronial recommendations.
I

Government coordination of policies and programmes

It is necessary to begin with some background on the history and composition

of the coalitions of government agencies responding to petrol sniffing and related
service delivery issues on the AP Lands. Recommendation 4 of the Coronial
Inquest identifies the major government avenues for coordination of services
and action in addressing petrol sniffing:

54
55
56
57

Chivell, W, op.cit, pp32-3.

ibid, p64.
Ibid.
See, for example: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2001, HREOC Sydney 2001, Chapter 3.

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The Commonwealth Government, through the Central Australian Cross

Border Reference Group [CBRG], and the South Australian Government
through the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Inter-Governmental Inter-Agency
Collaboration Committee [APLIICC], should accelerate their efforts to find
solutions to these issues and get beyond the information gathering phase
forthwith. They should use the extensive knowledge, published material
and professional expertise that is already available.58

The Coroner had acknowledged that the establishment of bodies such as the
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Inter-Governmental Inter-Agency Collaboration
Committee (or APLIICC Tier One & Tier 2 committees) and the Central Australian
Cross Border Reference Group (or CBRG) was met with a generally favourable
response.59 He noted, however, that there were concerns that resources are
not making a significant difference to the lives of people on the AP Lands. The
APLIICC (also known as Tier One) was established in August 2000 by the
previous South Australian state government in order to facilitate a cross-portfolio
commitment of senior executives at State and Commonwealth levels to respond
to disadvantage in the region, particularly issues such as the persistence of
poor health and impoverished conditions on the AP Lands despite the level of
expenditure on services.60
Tier One of the APLIICC comprises a core group of chief executives from the
state government, APY Land Council, Nganampa Health Council and the
Commonwealth Department for Health and Ageing. Originally, there was a
second tier of working groups composed of senior project and policy officers
from state and commonwealth agencies based in Adelaide who were
responsible for implementing the directives of Tier One. This has since been
replaced by a series of task forces that are to implement projects and activities
identified as Tier One priorities. There was also a Petrol Sniffing Task Force
(PSTF), established in November 2001 by the previous SA Minister for Aboriginal
Affairs to tackle petrol sniffing specifically, which has since been subsumed
into the activities of the Tier One Committee.
There are two further groups with Commonwealth and state representation to
address issues emerging from the Ngaanyatjaraa Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara
cross border region which straddles the Northern Territory, South Australia and
Western Australia. The Central Australian Cross Border Reference Group on
Volatile Substance Abuse (CBRG) was established in response to the findings
of a review of Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Substance
Misuse Programs in 1999. A cross-jurisdictional forum was held in Adelaide on
20 March 2001, which agreed to address the issue of improving coordination in
the delivery of volatile substance use through the establishment of a tri-state
reference group (the CBRG), who would have carriage of the implementation
and monitoring of the framework to address volatile substance abuse in the
area.
The NPY Lands Tri-Jurisdictional Justice Group was established in early 2003
to examine legislation and policies that will enable the courts and police to
58
59
60

Chivell, W, op.cit, p64.

Ibid, pp32-3,.
ibid, p23.

Social Justice Report 2003

operate across borders in order to establish collaborative mechanisms and

infrastructure to police the NPY Lands. The working group includes
representatives from police, justice, health, education, Aboriginal Affairs
agencies and local government. In addition to commissioning a study on the
demographics of the region (population breakdown, movement patterns,
offending and prison population data, language profiles and so forth), the group
aims to develop a coordinated approach to shared facilities and programs,
including culturally appropriate early release and rehabilitation programs
(including community detention options), the potential establishment of a low
security detention/alternative facility in Alice Springs or on the Lands, and the
possible use of the Alice Springs Correctional Centre by WA and SA.
Since the Coronial Inquest, the AP Lands have also been designated as the
South Australian trial site for the Council of Australian Governments (COAG)
whole-of-government, whole-of-community trials. The APLIICC has been chosen
to provide the interface between government and the communities on the AP
Lands. In the joint media release announcing the nomination of the AP Lands
as a trial site, the SA Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation Terry
Roberts states:
This trial will build on positive initiatives already under way on the AP
Lands, such as the work of the AP Lands Inter-government Inter-agency
Collaboration Committee (Tier One), of which the South Australian
Government, the Commonwealth, ATSIC and AP Council are all
members.61

The AP Lands were identified by the South Australian government as an

appropriate focus for the COAG trial because of the level of need in the area,
the existence of the APLIICC as a structure to facilitate the trial and the
compatibility of its aims with those of COAG.
In early September 2003, there was a meeting (the Shared Responsibility
workshop) in Alice Springs of government and community representatives which
sought to set priorities for the COAG trial. The two priorities which were nominated
for action were Mai Wiru, a stores policy program addressing issues of nutrition,
pricing and stores management training, and rural transaction centres, a project
to establish permanent facilities in each major community for banking,
government agencies and service providers.
Another significant decision included agreement that an Allocation Committee
consisting of nominees from Community Councils, Homelands Groups,
Nganampa Health and APY Womens Group be established. This fifteen member
committee is to be chaired by the Chairperson of the APY Land Council and is
to assist in the disbursement of funds. This decision aims to ensure that all
stakeholders will have a clear understanding of the funding situation for the AP
Lands, as well as a say in the distribution of monies on the Lands. The Allocation
Committee will also work in conjunction with the State Government in considering

61

Ruddock, P, (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), Patterson, K,
(Minister for Health and Ageing), Roberts, T, (SA Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and
Reconciliation) and Lewis, G, Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) Lands Communities to Work Together
with Federal-State Partnership, Joint media release, 22 May 2003, p1.

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budget bids for future years. The APY Land Council will be given additional
financial support for their role in assisting the Allocation Committee.
To support these new arrangements an Office of the APY Lands has been
established within the SA Department for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation,
which will include a liaison person on the Lands to work with the APY Executive
and then to develop relationships with Aboriginal communities. This initiative
responds to Recommendation 6 from the Coronial Inquest which directed
Commonwealth and State Governments to establish a presence in the region,
if not on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands then at least in Alice Springs, of senior
trusted officials,62 and to criticism made by the Coroner that too much of the
bureaucratic activity was Adelaide or Canberra-based. The liaison person is to
be well-briefed in order to deal with a range of issues. There is a perceived
need to discuss with APY Land Council Executive what appropriate liaison with
communities would constitute to take a partnership approach rather than to
impose a structure.
Canberra and Adelaide-based bureaucrats from the Cross-Border Reference
Groups have also made attempts to spend time defining their relationship with
the APY Executive. Officials also acknowledged the need to learn how to work
with local Indigenous governance structures, time frames and ways of doing
business, and that maintaining continuity of staff over time was a significant
issue, as well as the development of longer-term relationships and processes
in order to bring about lasting change on the AP Lands. They noted the need to
consult appropriately with Anangu and the need for adequate time in which to
conduct culturally-appropriate consultations:
While an appropriate consultation process takes time and can be seen
to delay the introduction of urgently needed resources, it is considered
vital to successful work in the APY Lands.63

The South Australian government also has allocated funds to support a series
of initiatives on the AP Lands, including $76,000 towards implementing an
improvement in road planning projects with ongoing planning assistance;
$155,000 to commence a three-year program for redeveloping the arts centres
in the region; $200,000 to support programs for the removal of feral animals
from Indigenous owned protected areas and to enhance native plants and
animals; and programs aimed at developing mining activity on the Lands,
particularly in working with traditional owners from APY to identify exploration
opportunities on the land, and in facilitating opportunities such as a youth
geotechnical traineeship scheme.
It is also anticipated that the allocation of $2 million over four years for the
Department of Administrative and Information Services to provide staff housing
on the AP Lands will assist in responding to the establishment of a state and
commonwealth government presence in the region. Options for duplex style
housing have been recommended to the Tier One Committee and have been
approved for tender.
62
63

Chivell, op.cit, p64.

Roberts, T, Re: South Australian Government response to the findings of the State Coronial
Inquest into the deaths of Kunmanara Ken, Kunmanara Hunt and Kunmanara Thompson,
Correspondence to HREOC, 14 November 2003, p4.

Social Justice Report 2003

A critical issue for the APLIICC/COAG trial process as the major interface between
government and AP Lands communities is whether it will have the capacity to
overcome some of the previous issues of coordination facing the various
committees (i.e, Tier One, CBRG and PSTF) in order to facilitate a more effective
approach to tackling the problem of petrol sniffing. That is, whether these
interagency structures and processes will be able to provide a different way of
working with Anangu.
Related to this question are issues concerning the representation of the Anangu
and their level of participation in identifying and progressing solutions.
Consideration also needs to be given to the question of whether it is possible to
change the way governments do business with communities or whether policymaking and bureaucratic processes inevitably foreclose the potential to make
progress on an issue such as petrol-sniffing on the AP Lands.
I

A different way of doing business?

The COAG whole-of-government trials, of which the AP Lands are a trial site,
are being piloted to develop a whole-of-government, whole-of-community
approach to capacity-building and governance issues in designated areas
across the country. Shared Responsibility, Shared Future, the information
pamphlet for participating communities, describes the purpose of the COAG
trials in the following terms:
Many people are saying that the relationship between the community
and the governments has got to change. It is clear that some of the ways
that governments and communities approach their responsibilities needs
to be done differently if we are going to move forward together.
Recently, Commonwealth and State and Territory governments have
agreed to improve their approach. They have agreed to work together.
And they have agreed to work in partnership with Indigenous communities
to support them find and manage sustainable solutions to local problems.
This means government have agreed to learn new ways of doing business
with Indigenous communities.64

Similar comments were made at the Inquest by Albert Barelds, the Executive
Manager of the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Project Team, who said that both
commonwealth and state governments have acknowledged that there is:
A need for a different way of working with Anangu; there is a clear
understanding that what government has undertaken to date has not led
to the lifestyle, the improvements that were anticipated. In order to do so,
it was felt that a different way of working with Anangu is needed and
therefore a number of initiatives were taken to talk with both the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara and elected members of all the community councils, as well
as the service providers, to communicate directly with the Anangu to see
how a new relationship between government and Anangu could be built
to improve their situation.65

64

65

Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Towards better outcomes for Indigenous

Australians, DIMIA Canberra 2003, www.icc.gov.au/publications?MySourceSession
=6c119361b7d1a3a6cffc8b581a0eba82, accessed 15 November 2003.
Chivell, op.cit, p31.

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The broader policy context for the COAG trials is the federal governments
emphasis on mutual obligation and the responsibility of all players (government,
communities, families and individuals) to address issues of social and economic
participation that has featured in its welfare reform package and practical
reconciliation approach to Indigenous issues. It is also aligned with an emphasis
on self-empowerment and self-management in contrast to the perceived failure
of self-determination and the rights agenda to bring about change to Indigenous
peoples socio-economic circumstances.
One of the challenges for this policy framework is achieving an appropriate and
equitable balance of responsibilities between all participating parties. The federal
Minister for Indigenous Affairs in 2002 described this challenge as follows:
The key to this initiative is that neither governments nor Indigenous
communities can do it all on their own. We must work together, work in
partnership and share responsibility for improving outcomes and building
the capacity of people in communities to manage their own affairs.66

Government departments participating in the COAG trial on the AP Lands have

emphasised their need to develop culturally-appropriate structures and
processes, and to learn how to work with local Indigenous governance
arrangements, time-frames and ways of doing business. As discussed above,
the APLIICC Tier One / COAG process has given a substantial role to the APY
Executive as the gateway to local Indigenous communities and groups in
consultation and decision-making processes, including those relating to the
allocation of funds for activities on the Lands. This approach has been taken in
the interests of supporting Indigenous self-empowerment and participation,
with joint agreement to be reached with the APY Executive on outcomes, and
support for Anangu by the bureaucracy with grants and services through this
structure.
However, concerns have been raised about the appropriateness of
representative structures for Anangu to date in this process, particularly in regard
to the level of responsibility given to APY Executive. While government
departments and agencies present the APLIICC Tier One / COAG process as a
means of self-determination, the perception of community-controlled
organisations with a longstanding history of involvement in the AP Lands (such
as Nganampa Health Council and NPY Womens Council) is that this process
has shifted the focus away from Anangu and how they do business.
These organisations suggest that in marrying the APLIICC Tier One process to
the COAG Trial, the intergovernmental approach to addressing problems on
the AP Lands has become increasingly bureaucratic, impeding the possibility
of responding effectively to substance misuse and other issues. There are also
continuing complaints about the distance of bureaucrats from the AP Lands,
their level of experience and corporate knowledge in dealing with AP issues,
especially those of volatile substance misuse.67

66
67

Ruddock, P, op.cit, p2.

For example, the convening of the COAG Shared Responsibility workshop in Alice Springs,
rather than on the AP Lands, and the venues proximity to the casino was cited by some as
highly inappropriate.

Social Justice Report 2003

Community-controlled organisations claim that better use could be made of

their corporate knowledge and established networks with the Anangu. The
response from government officials to this criticism is that APLIICC Tier One
was limited to representation by key executives from Indigenous organisations
and government agencies in order to be more streamlined in their processes.
The appropriateness of the APY executive as an appropriate representative
body for liaison with the Anangu communities has also been raised as a matter
of concern. At the Inquest, John Tregenza, a consultant with a background in
community development on the AP Lands, commented that there was a general
lack of understanding by government about Anangu forms of representation.
Whereas governments tend to identify a boss for liaison and negotiations with
a community, the concept of democratic representation is alien to Anangu culture
you represent yourself and your family. Additional issues relate to the capacity
of APY Executive to represent Anangu on matters other than those relating to its
traditional core business, that of land management.
In his Review of delivery of services to people with disabilities on Anangu
Pitjantjatjara lands,, Tregenza articulates the case for extending representation
beyond the networks of the APY Executive to include those of other organisations
as follows:
From time to time a misconception seems to arise among policy-makers
and funding agencies that AP [Anangu Pitjantjatjara Executive] is the
peak body in all matters. While it is true that AP have responsibility for all
matters relating to the administration of the Lands on behalf of all the
traditional owners of the lands (all Anangu), responsibility for the delivery
of many other services has always been in the hands of other Anangu
regional organisations.
The administrative structure on the AP Lands does not parallel State or
Commonwealth governments. AP is not the parliament and only decision
making forum, and, every other service organisation is not a department
tof [sic] AP. AP Council is one of a group of independent, community
controlled organisations with their own governing Boards of Management
(Councils) elected by the same group of traditional owners. Currently
these organisations are Nganampa Health Council (which came into
existence at the same time as AP and well before AP Services), NPY
Womens Council (1980), Pitjantjatara Yangkuntjatjara Education Council
(PYEC). Each of the organisations was established, and has a separate
elected governing body, because Anangu considered that the area
covered by each was so complex that no single organisations could do
all the issues justice.
It is therefore essential that any consultation and discussions of issues
with Anangu representatives from the Lands must include representatives
from all the Anangu community-controlled organisations, and not just
from AP Council and/or AP Services. Failure to include all the stakeholders
in the consultative, planning and decision-making processes will only
ensure the long term failure of regional programs and projects.68

68

Tregenza, J, Review of delivery of services to people with disabilities on Anangu Pitjantjatjara

lands an Anangu perspective, SA Department of Human Services, Adelaide 2002, pp35-6.

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The existence of serious governance and service delivery issues in the Executive
Board of the Anangu Pitjantjatjara and the Pitjantjatjara Council executive were
also identified in a report by Dr Mick Dodson. In August 2002 the Dodson Report
found problems with the administration of the Pitjantjatjara Lands Rights Act
and the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Board, with Dr Dodson observing that:
I think there are some serious governance issues that need to be
addressed. At the moment, it is my strong view that the AP Executive
Board is unrepresentative, undemocratic, unaccountable, and seriously
confused about its role and future role. I also have had numerous
anecdotal commentaries on the possible misuse of Board funds to
suggest at the very least it should be explored. From what I have been
told I suspect the problem is a systemic one69

The SA Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation has since headed a
Parliamentary Select Committee inquiry into the Pitjantjatjara Lands Rights Act,
with an administrator now having been appointed to administer the Act. The
APLLICC Tier One Committee has also focused intensively on issues of
governance and service delivery with the APY Executive over the last twelve
months. However, Mr Tregenzas and Dr Dodsons comments would seem to
corroborate concerns about the capacity of the APY Executive to represent
Anangu effectively and the need to access broader networks of representation
beyond its structures.
A further expressed concern is that government is setting the communities up
to fail, partly through over-reliance on the APY Executive as a gateway, but
more particularly through the expectation that the communities should address
their own problems, especially those relating to volatile substance abuse. This
is frequently framed not only in the discourse of shared responsibility but also
that of self-determination. In their article recent article on the policy response to
Indigenous petrol sniffing in Australia, dAbbs and Brady observe:
Central to these changes in the domain of governing Indigenous
Australians is the strategy of enlisting communities to the work of
governance. Under this strategy, Aboriginal communities are expected
to articulate desires and aspirations which are then taken as authentic
manifestations of self-determination as long as they accord more or
less with what the state wants them to choose.70

A kind of moral panic has emerged in the emphasis on responsibility in the

public discourse on Indigenous policy and the expressed need for Indigenous
individuals and communities to address problems such as violence, drug and
alcohol abuse. This predominantly moral perspective has the effect of narrowing
the focus of Indigenous policy debate to obscure the broader systemic factors
contributing to the marginalisation and disadvantage experienced by Indigenous
families and communities.
It is undoubtedly empowering for individuals and communities to exercise control
over and to participate in finding solutions to problems that threaten their security

69
70

Dodson, Dr M, cited in Roberts, T, Report reveals serious problems in Anangu Pitjantjatjara

lands: Minister welcomes parliamentary inquiry, media release, 29 August 2002.
dAbbs, P, and Brady, M, op.cit, p7.

Social Justice Report 2003

and survival. While there is some evidence that strong governance in

communities can have a role to play in addressing substance abuse, as the
success of zero tolerance policies in petrol sniffing in communities such as
Watarru and Ngaanyatjarra indicates, there are limits to what good community
governance can achieve. The level of responsibility by government in providing
services and resources, particularly when there is an outstanding history of the
failure to provide access to services commensurate with the mainstream
population, needs careful evaluation.
In the case of volatile substance abuse on the AP Lands, it seems problematic
to suggest that the Anangu through the auspices of the APY Executive (an
organisation with a background in land management), should assume
responsibility for the carriage of programs and services relating to problems
such as the rehabilitation of sniffers that is, beyond consultation about and
participation in determining solutions to these problems. dAbbs and Brady
pose the following question: How, one must ask, can communities said to be
wracked by disempowerment and social deterioration be expected to originate
and control actions in response to petrol sniffing?71
The Coronial Inquest emphasised the Anangus need for outside assistance in
addressing issues of volatile substance abuse, which has no precedent in their
traditiional culture. At the inquest, the father of Kunmanara Thompson likened
the introduction of petrol sniffing to the imposition of the Maralinga bomb tests:
There has been petrol sniffing since the 1950s. Who is responsible? The
petrol doesnt belong to us. It is not part of Anangu law. It was introduced
to the Lands by white people. It is important that Anangu revive their
culture and hold on to their culture. The problem with petrol comes from
outside, its like the Maralinga bomb tests, the solution should come from
the outside too.72

As Dr Paul Torzillo, the Medical Director of Nganampa Health Council, points

out, mainstream communities with higher living standards and more available
services and resources would not be expected to solve their own substance
abuse problems:
[T]here seems to be a widespread view within government that this is
a problem which the community should solve, this is their responsibility.
This is a community with less resources and ability to control a tough
problem than any mainstream community thats not a demand thats
put on any other community in the country. No-one, no politician and no
bureaucracy expects that a suburb like so the people of Cabramatta
are not told that they have to solve the heroin problem and its up to them
to do it. No-one makes that demand of them and they dont make that
demand of them because its a stupid thing to do, its clearly not possible.73

The implicit danger of the current government discourse on shared responsibility

in Indigenous policy is that it will not provide resources which are adequate or
even commensurate with those it provides to the non-Indigenous population in
addressing the problems surrounding volatile substance abuse.
71
72
73

ibid, p8.
Chivell, W, op.cit, p20.
Ibid, pp23-4.

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The bureaucratisation of community development?

There is a conflict of opinion about whether these governmental and bureaucratic

processes are appropriate for pursuing self-determination on the AP Lands,
and moreover, whether they might in fact impede progress in petrol sniffingrelated issues. It is sometimes suggested that the governments current
emphasis on capacity-building, which is a feature of the COAG trials, merely
amounts to the bureaucratisation of what was formerly called community
development.
One concern that has been commonly expressed to HREOC is that the alliance
with the COAG trial will merely contribute to an unnecessary degree of
bureaucratisation already implicit in the APLIICC Tier One committee process
and that an adequate response to the Inquest might be overlooked in giving
carriage to the business of the COAG trial and the other priorities nominated for
address on the AP Lands.
Despite these reservations about the bureaucratically top-heavy way of doing
business that capacity-building and inclusion in the governments COAG trials
might represent, there is also some optimism that the involvement of the
Commonwealth might be a source of greater leverage to achieve some effective
outcomes where the actions of states and territories have been ineffectual in
the past.
Responsibility for tackling petrol sniffing lies across several government agency
portfolios and as an issue, Indigenous petrol sniffing has a tendency to fall
through the gaps in public policy. The COAG trial could have the capacity to
make a more concentrated effort in addressing the problems facing the AP
Lands as a discrete area, and provide greater impetus for Commonwealth and
state governments to make a coordinated and consolidated effort in addressing
petrol sniffing. In addition, the national spotlight of the COAG trials has the
potential to engender a greater degree of accountability from all levels of
government.

b) Resourcing issues
There were three main areas of comment about funding issues in the findings
of the Coronial Inquest. The Coroner perceived the need for a greater injection
of funding and resources; funding of programmes on a triennial basis, as
recommended by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody;
and the provision of funding for interventions into petrol sniffing, including
continued Commonwealth funding of the Avgas initiative through the Comgas
scheme (this final issue is discussed in relation to health related issues later in
this chapter).
I

An inadequate level of resourcing

Information presented to the Coronial Inquest indicated that the combined

Commonwealth and State funding for the AP Lands is:
approximately $60 million per year for around 3,000 people of whom 2,500
are Anangu, making a per capita funding rate of about $20,000 per year.

Social Justice Report 2003

When the CDEP and Centrelink funds ($16 million) are excluded, the
figure drops to around $15,000 per capita.74

Very substantial increases in government funding are required to deal with

problems relating to remoteness, such as access to mainstream services, and,
more specifically in regard to petrol sniffing, to achieve the continuum of care
from prevention to treatment and rehabilitation.
The issues surrounding Indigenous funding needs, and equity and access to
services particularly in remote areas were canvassed by the Commonwealth
Grants Commissions Report into Indigenous Funding 2001 (the CGC Report).
A significant aspect of the terms of reference set by the federal government for
the CGC Report was an approach based on redistribution of funding according
to the principle of relative need (that is, between regions) as opposed to absolute
need (that is, in contrast to the rest of the population), with the intention of
considering redistribution of funds to favour remote areas. However, the CGCs
final report found that this approach was flawed in terms of addressing the
inequity in this area. It commented that:
Indigenous people in all regions have high needs relative to the nonIndigenous population. An important question is whether new methods
of distribution should be applied to existing programs and funds. Any
change in methods of distributing existing resources means that some
regions would lose funding and others would gain. Large redistributions
risk losing the benefits of investments made over long periods of time,
including those in developing organisational capacity and people. The
real costs of redistribution may be high.75

A further dimension of the funding issue is the significant problem of

accountability for service delivery to Indigenous peoples which remains at the
state and territory level. There is a longstanding need for clear agreement among
the states and the federal government about their respective responsibilities to
Indigenous peoples, how they will act to meet these responsibilities and the
resources to be committed by all parties. The distribution of state and territory
funds for Indigenous service delivery is also the area where there exists the
least transparency and greatest cost shifting.
In July 2003 the South Australian government announced a series of additional
funding commitments totalling almost $12 million over four years for initiatives
on the AP Lands in its 2003-04 budget. In doing so, it acknowledged the
longstanding social problems created by petrol sniffing on the AP Lands
and the recommendations of Coroner Chivells report.76 The four main areas
of commitment are:

74
75
76

$8.163 million over four years for Department of Health Services

health and wellbeing initiatives that impact directly on petrol
sniffing, and for regional office and respite initiatives;

$1 million over four years for policing and justice initiatives on the
Lands;

ibid, p23.
Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report on Indigenous funding, Commonwealth of
Australia, Canberra 2001, p xvii.
Roberts, T, State government action on petrol sniffing, Media release, 23 July 2003.

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$797,000 over four years to the Department of Aboriginal Affairs

and Reconciliation for the introduction of legally licensed electrical
operators; and

$2 million over four years for the Department of Administration

and Information Services to provide staff housing on the Lands.

Some of the questions that emerge from AP Lands situation concern not only
what would be a sufficient injection of funds to address petrol sniffing and its
attendant problems, but what kind of funding arrangements, commitments and
time-frames could be implemented, in conjunction with the Commonwealth, to
do so?
In an article that appeared earlier this year in the Adelaide Review, Chris Charles
commented that the findings of the CGC Report could be used by the SA govt
to secure a greater share of per capita Commonwealth funding by highlighting
the funding needs of the Anangu.77 Working with an assumption that the cost
difference for delivering services to the AP Lands as a whole will be greater
than the 212% difference between NSW and the NT, they put forward the following
hypothetical calculation to support their argument for greater funds for the AP
Lands:
NT is dominated by Darwin and so lets say delivery to remote areas such
as the AP Lands is twice the difference, translating to a dollar figure of
$4890 per head. The relative capacity to pay for these services can be
estimated from data presented by Mr Chivell which show that personal
per capita income of Anangu people is around $7000 per capita (mainly
from CDEP, the Aboriginal peoples work-for-the-dole scheme which
provides $16 million to 2,500 people). If we add to that some of the value
of services delivered to the AP Lands and already under Anangu control,
we might double the per capita income, making it 63% of the average
South Australian income of about $22000. When the adjustments are
made, this comparison says that to bring education, health, law and order
and welfare of the 3000 people on the AP Lands up to the standards the
rest of us enjoy, we need to spend at least $22 million more, each year,
on an accrual basis. Of course, before we spend the money a proper
plan and an itemised costing needs to be done but we know that more
than the $12.4 million is justified and that more than $12.4 million will be
needed.78

It appears that the current allocation of funds by the South Australian and
Commonwealth governments combined is not enough to address the needs of
the petrol sniffers in terms of intervention and service delivery needs. The SA
governments allocation of the $12.4 million will not be sufficient if it is to be a
one-off allocation, and continuous assessment of these funding issues is
necessary in any future budgetary arrangements in order to make inroads on
the issues confronting the AP Lands.
One interesting possibility raised by the choice of the AP Lands as a COAG trial
site is whether this may provide leverage for negotiating a greater injection of
funds in the future. While the COAG Trials are not primarily a source of funding

77
78

Quoted in Chapman, P, The budget for petrol sniffing (2003) 238 Adelaide Review 3, p4.
ibid.

Social Justice Report 2003

in themselves, the emphasis on finding better ways for government agencies

to work with Indigenous communities, including improvement of service delivery
coordination and outcomes, should have the potential to negotiate more targeted
funding arrangements.
Another strategy might be the use of the COAG trial to set and ensure compliance
with performance conditions on grants to states and territories (for example,
specific purpose payments) affecting service delivery to the AP Lands. Given
that the COAG Trials have the potential to support sustainable development in
Indigenous communities, they could also provide a forum for exploring the
implementation of some of the longer-term and more flexible funding
arrangements recommended by reports such as the Royal Commission into
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and the Commonwealth Grants Commission.
I

More flexible, long term funding arrangements

In 1991 the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody made

recommendations for longer term, more flexible forms of funding arrangements
which would ensure increased Indigenous participation. In particular, it
recommended that Commonwealth, State and Territory governments introduce
triennial block grant funding for Indigenous organisation, and that wherever
possible this funding be allocated through a single source with one set of audit
and financial requirements but with the maximum devolution of power to the
communities and organisations to determine the priorities for the allocation of
such funds.
In part, Coroner Chivells rationale for recommending the funding of programmes
on a triennial basis relates to the difficulties of implementing bureaucratic
parameters in a remote area:
Many of the people in the field complained of the remoteness of
bureaucracies, and their incessant demands for written reports on
performance outcomes and so forth. It would be better if the bureaucracies
appointed trusted representatives who could monitor and evaluate
projects and programmes for themselves, rather than insisting that
dedicated professionals in the field continue to spend valuable time and
resources preparing reports in order to ensure continued funding.79

The implementation of funding on a triennial basis would also have greater

potential to make significant inroads into the problems surrounding petrol
sniffing, an opportunity that is not available within the pilot project funding
paradigm.
The over-reliance of governments on pilot project funding was singled out for
particular criticism in the Coronial Inquest. Anne Mosey, a community
development consultant, observed that:
[C]ommunities were very tired of pilot project funding. I think it is still
pretty evident that there is still a tendency for governments to rely on pilot
project funding. Again, because it is very difficult for them to access
recurrent funding for new positions, so the tendency is on government
departments to be able to put it in a pilot project because they are able to

79

Chivell, W, op.cit, p3.

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provide that kind of funding a lot more readily, but they are not able to
access recurrent funding in terms of being able to provide ongoing
support for that project, so it falls over. It then takes x number of years to
get the funding up again, and, often state bureaucrats are as frustrated
by that as community organisations are. They would like to be able to
provide recurrent funding, they have a great deal of difficulty with the fact
that they are so constrained by budgetary processes and by their annual
accountability processes.80

Unreasonable expectations often accompany short-term funding allocations

such as pilot projects in Indigenous Affairs, particularly in relation to a complex
issue such as petrol sniffing. Torzillo comments:
[T]here is a widespread view that if funds are expended the problem
should be solved. That is, we gave you people some money but petrol
sniffing still exists, therefore you didnt fulfil the requirements of the
program. I mean, Im not aware of any reasonable government anywhere
in the world who has that sort of expectation in social policy elsewhere.
No-one expects that funds expended on heroin addiction in Australia will
cease heroin addiction in fact, a consequence of that is that when that
doesnt happen there tends to be a response from government that
somehow the population has failed to deliver and that sets up a hostile
relationship between service agencies out here and government, which
is not a productive one if we are going to tackle this problem.81

In short, there is a need to give concerted and focused attention to the issue of
coordinating long-term funding arrangements effectively at state and
commonwealth government levels to engender the necessary prompt, forthright,
properly planned, properly funded action identified by the Coroner.
It is understandable if government departments do not wish to commit to timeframes without appropriate consultation, negotiation and the agreement of
Anangu at this stage. However, there remains a pressing need for a long-term
commitment from governments to address petrol sniffing on the AP Lands.
Such a commitment needs to extend beyond the governments four-year budget
cycle, and include a time-frame for progressing issues, including with projected
outcomes that enable equitable participation by Anangu and ensure the
progressive realisation of their rights. It is disturbing that there remains an
absence of a clear commitment from all levels of government to do whatever it
takes to address the endemic petrol sniffing issues on the AP Lands.
Community participation agreements, an initiative introduced in the 2001 federal
budget and administered by ATSIC, offer much potential from a capacity-building
perspective for achieving this. They may ultimately provide the appropriate
framework for locking down government commitments alongside directions
established by Anangu communities. As I observed in the Social Justice Report
2001 about community participation agreements:
Equitable participation by all partners should be further reinforced by
ensuring that the model is applied to meet assessable goals and
objectives over a prescribed time-frame.... There would need to be clarity

80
81

Ibid, pp30-1.
Ibid, p31.

Social Justice Report 2003

about what form of commitment various partners are prepared to make,

particularly in regard to the implementation of the model over a period of
time and the level of resources required, and careful monitoring of all
partners participation as well as the flexibility to make any necessary readjustments to the model.82

A long-term framework would provide the structure to ensure that the response
to Indigenous petrol sniffing is targeted and that adequate resources channelled
within APLIICC Tier One / COAG process. Greater evaluation of the resourcing
of the responses by government is also necessary, and links should be
developed with existing knowledge bases and expertise on petrol sniffing to
inform this. The COAG Trial should also be viewed as an opportunity for piloting
more flexible, longer-term approaches to funding commitments, as
recommended by both RCIADIC and the CGC Report, and as a lever for
increasing the level of state accountability on service delivery to the AP Lands.

c) Health-related issues
Part of the South Australian governments commitment to funding initiatives for
the AP Lands over the next four years included an allocation of $7 million to the
Department of Health Services (DHS) for health and wellbeing initiatives that
will directly impact on petrol sniffing and $1.163 million to provide regional office
and respite initiatives. $100,000 has been allocated to Nganampa Health Council
for supplementary funding for the patient transport scheme. Discussions are
currently taking place with key Anangu stakeholders and APY Land Council
representatives regarding preliminary proposals by the DHS for improving
primary health and safety. At the Shared Responsibility workshop in Alice Springs,
Anangu confirmed petrol sniffing programs, nutrition, child health and safety
as priority areas.
Representatives from government health departments emphasised the degree
of difficulty in responding to the health issues surrounding petrol sniffing, given
that the problem is multi-faceted and has become entrenched over several
decades. Quick-fix solutions are clearly not possible, and interventions need to
be progressed at several levels. Importantly, the Coroner recommended the
following to address this concern:
Recommendation 7: Many of the strategies for combating petrol sniffing
which have been tried in the past should not be discarded simply because
they failed to achieve permanent improvements. Some of them might be
regarded as having been successful for as long as they were extant. For
any strategy to be successful will require broad Anangu support. Most
strategies fail unless they are supported by others as part of a multifaceted approach. Strategies should be aimed at primary, secondary and
tertiary levels, as I have outlined in these findings.83

82
83

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2001,
HREOC, Sydney, 2001, p89.
Chivell, W, op.cit, p66.

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The three necessary levels of intervention have the following goals:

Primary interventions to reduce recruitment into substance abuse

(targeted at occasional and non-sniffers);

Secondary interventions to seek to achieve abstinence and

rehabilitation (aimed at those who have been sniffing for some
time and may be responsive to intervention); and

Tertiary interventions to provide services to the permanently

disabled (chronic sniffers and those who may have sustained brain
damage).84

Forms of intervention that could be implemented at the various levels include:

Primary interventions programs to reduce recruitment to sniffing,

such as the provision of sports and recreation activities, and the
employment of youthworkers;
Secondary interventions programs aimed at harm minimisation
or cessation including policing, neuropsychological assessment,
outstations/homelands, the Avgas scheme, legal sanctions, night
patrols, programmes for children at risk, and crime prevention;
and
Tertiary interventions disability services including hospital care,
chelation therapy and custodial care.

Paul Torzillo has grouped petrol sniffers on the AP Lands into the following
three categories:
1.

25-40 year olds who are long-term chronic sniffers, often with
sustained and irreversible damage, sociopathic tendencies and
disability issues: disability services are the response to this issue;

2.

an unknown number of young people established on sniffing who

might be rehabilitated and need a mixture of interventions; and

3.

new recruits who need sustained, long-term, flexible adaptable

activities on an ongoing basis.85

The view of the Nganampa Health Council is that strong support is needed for
both youth activities and disability services. This section will examine the
responses led by health agencies to these areas of intervention against relevant
recommendations by the Coroner.
I

Primary interventions

At the time of the Coroners report, matters on the agenda of the APLIICC Tier
One Committee relating to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands included the immediate
placement of four youth-workers, development of alternatives to incarceration
for young offenders, and residential disability services, all of which were
highlighted for attention in the Coronial recommendations
Recommendation 8.1 of the Coronial Inquest was that the proposal before the
APLIICC Tier One Committee to appoint four youthworkers and a coordinator
be implemented immediately. At the time of the Inquest, there was $300,000
84
85

ibid, p50.
Torzillo, P, op.cit, p3.

Social Justice Report 2003

($246,000 was recurrent) set aside by the Aboriginal Service Division within the
South Australia Department of Human Services to fund these positions on the
AP Lands, initially for a period of twelve months. There have been complaints
about the length of time taken to implement this proposal of two-years standing
from the previous government, although an Anangu youthwork coordinator was
appointed in late 2003.
Some service providers see prevention of the recruitment of new sniffers as the
most crucial level of intervention in avoiding escalation of the problem. They
also argue that there is more chance to make an intervention at an earlier age.
Recruitment into petrol sniffing is perceived to stem from the boredom and
futility experienced by young people in response to the degree of poverty and
marginalisation on the AP Lands.
The youthworker proposal has been seen as the most substantial form of
intervention at the level of primary intervention, including as a basis from which
to access other youth programs and funds for Anangu and for the provision of
after-school and holiday programs and activities. However, there have been
comments made about the lack of adequate planning and consultation that
preceded the proposal, as there are issues about its implementation that required
more careful thought. For example, no real operational money has been provided
to establish a youth council or youth groups, or to set up an office. There have
been suggestions that some of the youthworkers be paid on a part-time or
casual basis via the CDEP scheme in order to free up some of the funding for
these purposes.
The basis of employment is another issue in itself: part-time employment may
suit Anangu youthworkers better (particularly women), because of difficulties in
factoring their other family and community commitments within a standard nine
to five hour day. Other relevant considerations include difficulties working with
people from other moiety systems, in travelling into other areas and sometimes
also a lack of support for women working beside their husbands. It has been
suggested that funding needs to be as local as possible, with a number of
workers employed across families on a part-time basis.
There is also a role for longer-term interventions, such as case management.
Potentially schools could play a role in terms of working with youthworkers to
provide preventative education programs and resources for afterschool activities.
If school counsellors were appointed, there would be scope for them to liaise
with youth-workers in managing youth at risk where appropriate. Previously,
community elders have provided preventative activities, such as taking young
people to herd camels or to outstations, but it is hardly a role for which they can
assume total responsibility, given their range of other community commitment,
including dealing with chronic and disabled sniffers. The reliance on the CDEP
Scheme to support interventions such as youthworkers and night patrols is
also questionable, especially on a long-term basis, and proper funding for parttime and casual positions and development of potential career pathways should
be considered.

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Secondary interventions

In accordance with recommendation 8.2 of the Coronial Inquest regarding

neurological assessment, an assessment team with a multidisciplinary approach
visited the lands and assessed a group of people in terms of the extent of brain
damage. In certain individuals, there is no hope of reversing the effects of brain
damage; the question now is how to treat them. Options are being considered
in terms of how their counterparts in Adelaide would be treated and whether
these options would be appropriate in the AP Lands.
In relation to recommendation 8.3 of the Coronial Inquest regarding the
establishment of outstations/homelands, the success of outstation programs
such as Mt Theo near Yuendumu in providing a venue for community respite,
recreation, skills training education and the like in the context of abstinence
from petrol sniffing was noted by the Coroner.86 During the 1980s, homelands
were utilised with some success by community elders on the AP Lands in running
diversionary activities for petrol sniffers.
While they provide a significant avenue through which community members
can intervene in petrol sniffing and do so in culturally-appropriate ways, they
tend to be short-term measures (a reflection of available funding), often
personality-driven and difficult to sustain as a long-term intervention. They are
not suitable for dealing with petrol sniffers with a high level of security or
rehabilitation needs. Outstations and homelands nevertheless provide a valuable
option as a harm minimisation strategy and have a place within a multi-faceted
approach to petrol sniffing on the AP Lands.
Recommendation 8.4 of the Coronial Inquest calls for the continuation of Avgas
(aviation fuel) under the Comgas scheme as a successful harm minimisation
strategy. Avgas is supplied to about thirty Aboriginal communities under the
Comgas Scheme administered under the Commonwealths Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Substance Use Program in the Department of Health and
Ageing. The Scheme ensures that communities using aviation fuel do so at no
additional cost. Avgas is not permitted otherwise for use in motor vehicles as it
does not meet several of the fuel specifications under the Fuel Quality Standards
Act 2000.
Data collected by Nganampa Health Council in the mid-1990s demonstrates:
an unequivocal and marked reduction in petrol sniffing as a consequence
of the introduction of Avgas to all communities. Not only was there a
significant decline in the number of petrol sniffers for the following three
years but there seemed to be a marked decline in fitting among petrol
sniffers, probably as a consequence of less frequent sniffing being
possible because of limited access to petrol.87

The Avgas scheme is currently being evaluated. It is anticipated that a successful

application will be made for a continued exemption under the Fuel Quality
Standards Act 2000 before the end of the 2003.

86
87

Chivell, W, op.cit, p65.

Torzillo, P, op.cit, pp3-4.

Social Justice Report 2003

In relation to recommendation 8.8 of the Coronial Inquest regarding the

evaluation of the role of the Department of Family and Youth Services (FAYS) in
relation to children at risk, a common statement from FAYS, teachers, and health
service providers was that just about every child on the AP Lands could be
classified as at risk.
More specifically, the lack of employment and education opportunities, and
also of sport and recreation facilities and other forms of entertainment and
activity, are contributory factors here. Although there is some opportunity to
attend a boarding school near Adelaide, there is little incentive to pursue an
education or a career on the AP Lands, and a perception that you can always
get CDEP later [i.e. The lifetime destination]. Afterschool employment of the
kind available to youth in mainstream communities (such as packing
supermarket shelves) is scarce, and there are limited career paths within service
delivery to the communities (for example, healthworker) and many of these
positions are filled by non-Indigenous people. A further aspect of this problem
is disability employment, the need to provide meaningful employment for youth
(and adults) with acquired brain damage from petrol sniffing.
In 26 March 2003 FAYS released Our Best Investment: A State Plan to Protect
and Advance the Interests of Children, the Report of the Review of Child Protection
in South Australia, which has a chapter on children and youth on the AP Lands.
The Review endorses the recommendations of the Coronial Inquest and urges
that they be implemented quickly.88
Child intervention and protection is important in regard to volatile substance
abuse in terms of protecting children at risk of self-harm or harm by others
(such as violent or abusive behaviour by sniffers or others). The current system
for responding to children at risk on the AP Lands requires the notifier to contact
the Child Abuse Report Line in Adelaide; it was asserted to the Review that in
some cases, there were as many as twenty-five notifications but no outcomes.89
Visits by FAYS workers to remote areas are infrequent, the caseload for FAYS
workers is high, and FAYS is seen as reluctant to use its statutory authority in
regard to child protection. There is a perceived need for Anangu ownership
and participation in the issue of child protection to give FAYS work credibility.90
The Coronial Inquest recommended that FAYS role be expanded into one of
proactive community development (and noted in this context service delivery
issues such as the need for early childhood centres, after-school activities and
holiday programs). Similar comments that have been made in relation to other
government agencies were also made of FAYS, such as the lack of corporate
knowledge, continuity of staff and skilled workers addressing the issues on the
AP Lands, their need for a holistic, regional plan with planned outcomes, and
the need to move beyond pilot programs and inflexible service arrangements.

88

89
90

Layton QC, R, Our best investment: A state plan to protect and advance the interests of children,
Government of South Australia: the Review of Child Protection in South Australia, 23 March
2003, [http://www.dhs.sa.gov.au/childprotectionreview/cpr-report.asp, para 8.35.
Ibid, para 8.34.
ibid.

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An issue specific to FAYS on the AP Lands is that of child protection and

intervention. It is said that FAYS is often reluctant to act in cases of children at
risk because of the history of enforced removal, leaving children in situations of
abuse and neglect. It is also suggested that the desire to respond to the
legislative requirement that Indigenous children be placed within their own culture
takes precedence over the wellbeing of the child, as well as concerns about
being seen to satisfy the recommendations from Bringing them home. The
situation needs to be circumvented through consultation and participation with
Anangu in working out solutions for children at risk that may not involve removal
from families.91
The Review states that FAYS has recognised that levels of community education
and community development with the Aboriginal community has diminished
over recent years, and that they could take on key roles with Aboriginal families
and communities in this regard, particularly in developing programs that
incorporate education and awareness about child protection.92
I

Tertiary interventions

In relation to recommendation 8.10 of the Coronial Inquest regarding the need

to urgently upgrade services for disabled victims of petrol sniffing, an appropriate
response to the need for disability services and facilities for petrol sniffers who
have incurred a serious degree of disability is currently under review. While the
Coroners report recommends the establishment of secure care facilities with a
potentially multifunctional role that might include rehabilitation, the issue being
canvassed at present concerns the most appropriate model for treatment and
rehabilitation.
dAbbs and Brady make the following comments about the need to clarify
whether elements of the mainstream paradigm, such as the construction of
rehabilitation facilities, are correct for Indigenous petrol sniffers:
Calls from various community groups and others for money to be allocated
to residential rehabilitation facilities for petrol sniffers owe more to a
widespread faith in the efficacy of this form of intervention than to any
evidence supporting such faith.93

There are a series of questions concerning the location of the facility on the AP
Lands, its potential long-term use, its relevance to other groups of people at
risk, and the necessary level of security and its potential enforceability. The
South Australian Police and the Department for Correctional Services argue
that rehabilitation of disabled sniffers is not appropriate as a function of a secure
care facility as intensive personal care is needed, and that it is more appropriately
the province of health agencies and disability service providers.
Another suggestion has been the development of disability services across the
AP Lands, probably to be located at six centres. The Review of delivery of services
to people with disabilities on Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands found support for the
provision of disability care in communities across the AP Lands:
91
92
93

ibid.
ibid.
dAbbs, P, and Brady, W, op.cit, p5.

Social Justice Report 2003

The Anangu preferred position is to have Anangu disability care

workers based in their own communities supported and trained
by a regionally based community controlled professional team.

Given the situation in all the communities across the Lands, and
while some communities may be able to deliver services in the
short term, none are able to maintain effective and ongoing
services to the aged and disabled. They do not have the
infrastructure and resources nor capable, qualified and dedicated
staff to deliver such services.

While people may prefer to have everything delivered close to

home, unless services are delivered by one of the regional
agencies it is an impossible task. NPY Womens Council,
Nganampa Health Council and AP Council through AP Services
for housing and community infrastructure, are the current functional
organisations.94

Planning for the proposed petrol sniffing rehabilitation facility is being led by
DHS. As part of this planning process, the CBRG has reached agreement on
the terms of reference for a feasibility study on different models for treatment.
Letters of request have been sent to health agencies (Commonwealth and state
/ territory jurisdictions), and it is expected that the study will start by the end of
2003 or in early 2004, and will be finalised by September 2004. Agreement on
the terms of reference has taken longer than expected because of the number
of stakeholders involved and the complexity of the issues. The terms of reference
include a survey of the available data on volatile substance abuse, an analysis
of the efficacy of available models of detoxification, rehabilitation and treatment,
and examination of what approaches are most likely to be successful on the AP
Lands.
A further consideration is the need for consultation with communities at the
local level to inform a regional response, and the likelihood that different models
may suit different communities, requiring a more flexible approach to the issue.
The feasibility study is also seen to be of value in collecting data that will assist
in understanding the dimensions of the problem and in developing appropriate
responses to the situation. The findings of this study are to be fed back to the
CBRG, with the APY Executive to make the final decision over the allocation for
disability services.

d) Justice-related issues
In 2003 the APLIICC formed two new sub-committees to review the Justice
response to last years Coroners recommendations and to more recent
criticisms from Magistrate Hiskey who convenes the court circuit on the AP
Lands. The Department of Justice has allocated $1 million over four years for
policing and justice initiatives on the AP Lands.
The justice issues that the Coroner identified as requiring redress fall largely in
the category of secondary interventions and relate to:

94

the range of sentencing options available to the courts sitting in

the AP Lands (recommendation 8.5);

Tregenza, J, op.cit, p37.

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amendment to the Public Intoxication Act (receommendation 8.6);

establishment of night patrols (recommendation 8.7);

planning for the establishment of secure care facilities on the AP

Lands (recommendation 8.10);

implementation of the recommendations of the SAPOL review into

the Community Constable Scheme, particularly the establishment
of a permanent police presence (recommendation 8.12); and

further measures by SAPOL to ensure that staffing at Marla is at

full strength (recommendation 8.13).

Significant issues relate to the provision of deterrence to petrol sniffing and

some of the disruptive and harmful behaviour that accompanies it, and the
risks this behaviour presents to both the individuals involved and to the rest of
the community. This situation could be alleviated through the provision of
deterrence in the form of a strengthened police presence in the area and the
capacity for courts to have a range of sentencing options and to direct court
orders to higher-tariff options.
Currently there are problems with providing appropriate supervisors to implement
community service orders or to direct orders at rehabilitation facilities, as there
is not an adequate level of personnel or facilities. Without significant penalties
and disincentives, destructive behaviour continues, threatening community order
and stability. However, it is imperative that any justice measures be factored
into an overall, multi-faceted strategy: it is not the responsibility of the police to
compensate for the lack service delivery and infrastructure otherwise available
on the AP Lands. It has also been suggested that other service providers
sometimes use the lack of a police presence on the Lands as an excuse for
inadequate service provision.
The Coronial Inquest frames the lack of security on the AP Lands specifically as
a human rights concern. The Coroner highlights the observations of Ann Mosey
in this regard:
It seems to me that in the Lands there is actually a human rights issue
here. Everywhere else in Australia communities are able to feel a certain
level of security in the knowledge that they have access to reasonably
rapid police services, and the fact that at a minimum it takes two hours
for the police from Marla to get to most communities, that is not including
the ones that are a lot further away, to me this is really an issue of basic
human rights and not being able to be accessed by the community
members in the Lands, and I believe they have a right to a range of
government services in terms of say health, education and so on and
somewhere along the line there seems to have been a decision made
that they dont have the right to the protection of the community itself
from people who may be at risk of either harming themselves or harming
other people in the community 95

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations
Development Programme has developed Draft Guidelines on Poverty Alleviation,
which incorporate existing human rights standards on economic, social and
cultural rights. These make particular recommendations concerning the right to
95

Chivell, W, op.cit, p62.

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personal security which are especially pertinent to the issue of access to police
services and protection on the AP Lands. Guideline 11: Right to Personal Security
states that:
174. Poor people usually suffer from various forms of insecurity. As well
as experiencing financial, economic and social insecurity, they are often
homeless, marginalized, discriminated against and subject to physical
violence by State and non-State actors. Accordingly, efforts to strengthen
the right of poor people to personal security shall have a crucial place in
poverty reduction strategies
178. Police protection should be provided in poor areas particularly
affected by violence, harassment, intimidation and discrimination. Poverty
reduction strategies should identify the worst affected areas, such as
slums, and provide them with a sufficient number of specially trained law
enforcement personnel.96

In relation to recommendation 8.5 of the Coronial Inquest regarding the

availability on non-custodial options, Court circuits are held on the AP Lands
every two months where approximately twenty to thirty good behaviour bonds
are imposed. It is not possible to make treatment orders or other orders directed
at rehabilitation because there are no facilities available. The maximum penalty
for possessing petrol for the purpose of inhalation is a $100 fine; by contrast,
within the Shire of Ngaanyatjarra (in Western Australia, under different state
legislation) fines up to $5,000 can be imposed.
Recommendation 8.5 stipulated that the SA Department for Correctional
Services must provide supervisors so that bonds, undertakings and community
service obligations can be enforced. Since the Coronial Inquest, the Department
for Correctional Services has increased the number of Community Correctional
Officers servicing the AP Lands by changing the operational boundaries of the
Officer at Cooper Pedy to complement the work already being carried out from
Marla. There are also plans for a mobile Community Service team to visit the AP
Lands three times a year, enabling greater opportunity for offenders to work off
their hours.
In August 2003 the main obstacle preventing this initiative was lack of funding;
it was only partly affordable under internal reallocations. It is anticipated that
these initiatives will result in an increase of up to five Community Correctional
Officers assigned to duties on the AP Lands, culminating in a weekly presence
from the beginning of 2004.
The Department for Correctional Services also emphasised the need for a multiagency approach, highlighting the need for community constables to play an
increased role in collecting offenders for supervision. They stressed that they
were not necessarily able to provide an appropriate level of supervision for
offenders, particularly in the case of chronic petrol sniffers:
People with severe petrol-sniffing behaviour require a form of supervision
more akin to attendant care, familiar in the disability service system, than
96

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Development
Programme, Draft Guidelines: A Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies,
UNHCHR Geneva 2002, www.unhchr.ch/development/povertyfinal.html, accessed 15
November 2002, paras 174, 178.

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to the periodic supervision we offer, hence the need for multi-agency

based solutions.97

The potential for these arrangements to increase the range of options for
sentencing, and to an appropriate level, will need serious evaluation. Magistrate
Hiskey, one of the two magistrates on the court circuit for the AP Lands, recently
expressed his frustration with current arrangements in sentencing remarks
relating to a twenty-seven year old man charged with petrol sniffing.
In his comments in Police v Yakiti, Magistrate Hiskey drew attention to the fact
that while a bond with supervision was the appropriate penalty, DCS was unable
to offer appropriate supervision and intervention services in such matters: The
advice given to the court by the department is not acceptable. This defendant,
Casper Yakiti, deserves the benefit of a supervised bond.98
He further observed that he was under obligation when sentencing offenders
to impose whatever penalty is most appropriate in law, and that the court expects
and requires supervision to be provided in this case and others where required.99
While neither the court or DCS could be held responsible for conditions on the
AP Lands, they were not absolved from implementing the recommendations.
In relation to recommendation 8.6 of the Coronial Inquest regarding amending
the Public Intoxication Act, the Coroner recommended that the Public Intoxication
Act 1984 be introduced onto the AP Lands, with petrol and hydrocarbons
recognised as drugs and the police empowered to apprehend petrol sniffers,
remove their petrol cans and take them into custody. Some see this amendment
as crucial intervention in terms of deterrence and in offering families respite
from sniffing. They advocate that it should be implemented immediately,
particularly in light of the success of sanctions in the Shire of Ngaanyatjarra,
where petrol sniffing is an offence under local by-laws (the Aboriginal
Communities Act).100 However, others query the value of such legal sanctions
in the absence of safe or adequate places to hold sniffers, such as sobering
up places or a secure care facility. At present, people can only be detained at
the police lock-up. This is not an appropriate option, especially following the
findings and recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths
in Custody. The availability of an appropriate facility for drying-out would be
significant in terms of protecting the offender from harming themselves or other
members of the community.
In relation to recommendation 8.7 of the Inquest regarding the establishment of
night patrols and a crime prevention strategy, the Inquest noted the success of
97

Severin, P, Chief Executive, Department for Correctional Services, Re: Findings of the State
Coronial Inquest into the Deaths of Kunmanarra Ken, Kunmanarra Hunt and Kunmanarra
Thompson, Correspondence with HREOC, 20 August 2003, p2.
98 Hiskey, G, Police v Yakiti, cited in These people cant be allowed to die: Magistrate speaks
out on petrol sniffing, Koori Mail, 30 July 2003, p5.
99 ibid.
100 Offenders can be fined up to $5,000 under the Act. Similarly, under the Young Offenders Act
children can be ordered to do community service activity or required to go at a community
substance abuse facility for up to one week. There is, however, criticism of changes to
sentencing legislation from 1995 which meant that the option of sentencing offenders for up
to three months in a rehabilitation centre was no longer available has seriously undermined
the success of addressing petrol sniffing problems: See further, Shire of Ngaanyatjarra, op.cit.

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night patrols in other communities. While night patrols have been mooted for
some time on the AP Lands as a potential crime prevention strategy, they are
yet to be implemented. At the time of the Inquest, there was also no overall
crime prevention strategy for the AP Lands (the Office of Crime prevention
within the Attorney Generals Department and Crime Prevention Section within
SAPOL are both responsible for addressing petrol sniffing) from which, for
example, night patrols could be coordinated. Since the Inquest, the Marla Action
Plan has been revisited as the basis for a crime prevention strategy. Police
officers have been assigned to work in partnership with individual communities
and Community Council to develop Community Safety action plans. This is
conceived as a long-term capacity-building exercise as well as a community
safety one, which to aims to build on community structures, to enhance
leadership and to engender a greater sense of responsibility among community
measures.
Support for the establishment of night patrols has been offered by the police as
part of this process, but to date, only Mimili has shown an interest in this option.
It should be noted that the resources of the CDEP Scheme as well as the police
can be deployed to support such a program. The implementation of night patrols,
however, is dependent on the existence of commitment and capacity in the
communities to such a program.
In relation to recommendation 8.10 regarding the establishment of secure care
facilities on the AP Lands, the Tri-Jurisdictional Justice Group is considering
the Coroners recommendation. They have acknowledged that the Northern
Territory government is building a new prison in Darwin. More appropriate to
the AP Lands, however, are the existing medium to low term facilities at Alice
Springs. While this option is closer than the Port Augusta prison, it still may not
be close enough to obviate concerns expressed by Anangu about the distance
of offenders from family and the potential for offenders to re-offend on their
release or to become itinerants. Once again, those working in the justice area
express concern about dealing with offenders with rehabilitative needs, and
while the Tier 2 committee originally discussed the development of a bilateral
bid for a co-located DCS/SAPOL facility to service the AP Lands, this has been
shelved in respect to the DHS-led discussions of a feasibility study of
rehabilitation services.
The ALRM has commented on the situation as follows:
It is of concern for instance that the latest 2003-4 budget bids have not
included provision for a small correctional facility on or near the APY Lands,
of the kind that was recommended by the Coroner. ALRM understands
that budget bids for such a facility have not been made or have not been
successful for the last several years, because of lack of necessary
provision in recurrent funding. If the State of South Australia does not
have the necessary resources, outstanding needs should be identified
and met by the Commonwealth, perhaps through specific purpose
payments in the areas of health, housing infrastructure and education.101

101 ALRM, op.cit, p17.

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In regard to the Coroners recommendations on the implementation of the

recommendations of the SAPOL review into the Community Constable Scheme,
particularly the establishment of a permanent police presence on the AP Lands
(recommendation 8.12) and further measures by SAPOL to ensure that staffing
at Marla is at full strength (recommendation 8.13), there is no permanent police
presence on the AP Lands. Historically, the AP Lands have been policed from
Oodnadatta and are now policed from Marla. It is difficult to police the Lands
effectively from this town, which is situated just outside the border as in good
conditions it can take six to seven hours to travel from Marla to Pipalyatyara or
Watarru communities, and in adverse conditions it may not be possible to get
through at all.102
The community constable scheme was introduced in the late 1980s and early
1990s to employ local Anangu as police aides, and in doing so, increase the
police presence. There are now Community Constables in each of the major
communities who are supervised by the police at Marla (twelve positions) but
no sworn police officers stationed to support, train and supervise them.103 The
Coroner recommended that non-Anangu police officers be reintroduced into
the AP Lands, as there are cultural problems with Community Constables: if a
Community Constable had [a] difficulty with a family member in his community,
then a Community Constable from another community might be called upon,
or mainstream police may come in and try to handle the situation.104 The Coroner
stated that:
It seems to me that to rely on Aboriginal police officers in communities is
a great failure of the South Australian government to provide those sort
of services to people on the Lands and I think that at the very least there
needs to be a well equipped police station with say protective custody
facilities in it which would be possibly placed either at Umuwa or one of
the other major communities and it may be that there needs to be two or
three police stations set up and they need to be provided with adequate
staffing levels so that the police themselves feel that they are able to
carry out their duties and that they feel safe and that their families feel
safe in the environment that they are in.105

In addition, the Coroner noted the positive effects of the short but targeted
Operation Pitulu Wantima, run during January to February 2002, where sniffers
were to be identified, and where possible, the contents of their cans emptied
and crushed. The operation involved the presence of four police officers, together
with all the community constables, every day. The report found that the
community response to the operation was largely positive and that sniffers
became more cooperative over time.
Communities appreciated the increased police presence and
communicated that their needs were better addressed. This manifested
in an increase in inquiries made to police and resulted in some officers
completing very lengthy shifts

102
103
104
105

Chivell, W, op.cit, p51.

Ibid, p53.
Ibid, p54.
Ibid, p60.

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This information suggests that there is considerable under-reporting of

crime on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands when police are not so available.
The additional police officers deployed resulted in improved reporting of
crimes which were resolved usually straight away. Response times
improved and Community Constables performed at a higher level with
the support they received from the additional patrols. Break-ins continued
to occur, but the incidence of these crimes lessened, as did the incidence
of violent crimes normally attributed to petrol induced rages.106

Since the Inquest, the South Australian Police Department (SAPOL) has
implemented Operation Safe Lands, which is aimed at increasing police
presence, improving safety and reducing public disorder on the AP Lands. The
operation, which initially ran from October 2002 to January 2003, has
recommenced and will run until June 2004 as an interim measure pending the
implementation of a longer term strategy. Operation Safelands involved bringing
five officers on to the AP Lands for discrete periods of time to make a
concentrated effort in targeting problems such as violence, theft, cannabis use
and petrol sniffing, and develop a greater intelligence base regarding crime
prevention.
A further initiative has been SAPOLs partnership with NPY Womens Council
targeting family violence on the AP Lands. At the time of the Inquest, the Coroner
noted that there was very little protection under existing arrangements, for
example, for community members who might be the subjects of violence as a
result of substance-abuse related behaviour, because of the prohibitive distances
the police had to travel. As a result, police response times to violence and other
issues had improved, and it has been agreed that the partnership should be
adopted on a permanent basis.
In 1998 a review of the Community Constable Scheme recommended that two
officers be stationed at Umuwa and a further two at another centre on the AP
Lands. In late August 2003 the provision of two extra police officers per week
was facilitated through the Marla Support Plan; under these arrangements, the
extra police are rotated through Marla to patrol the Lands for week-long blocks.
This is an interim arrangement and there is general agreement with the Review
of the Community Constable Scheme that a minimum of four, maybe six, police
officers need to be permanently stationed in the Lands, two operating out of
Umuwa and at least two out of another community centre. Discussions are
under way concerning the infrastructure and housing needs for stationing the
officers. The possibility of establishing multi-jurisdictional facilities on the AP
Lands has also been discussed by the Tri-State Jurisdictional Justice Group.
While communities express some frustration with the stop/start nature of police
interventions over the past two years, there is also optimism that these initiatives
will lay the basis for a long-term police presence and will increase the capacity
of communities to provide a safe environment for their members.

106 Ibid, p59.

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e) Summary of key issues and concerns in responding to the

Coronial Inquest and petrol sniffing on the AP Lands
In summary, the Coronial Inquest has identified the need for prompt, forthright,
properly planned, properly funded action and the importance of effective intergovernmental coordination to achieve this and sustain it into the longer term. In
the year since the Coronial Inquest, there has been some movement in this
direction but overall not enough.
There is no lack of inter-departmental and inter-governmental forums for tackling
issues relating to petrol sniffing, with the existence over the past few years of
the APLIICC (Tier One Committee and Task Forces), CBRG, Petrol Sniffing Task
Force (now submerged within APLIICC Tier One Committee) and TriJurisdictional Justice Group. The COAG whole-of-government community trial
is also now super-imposed over these structures.
There have been some positive initiatives emerging from these committees,
such as the agreement to conduct a study of demographics on the AP Lands
and to explore coordination and sharing of facilities and programs across the
NT, SA and WA; the creation of an Office of the APY Lands within the South
Australian Indigenous affairs department; the allocation of additional funding
by the SA government to address related issues on the AP Lands; and the
creation of an Allocation Committee to coordinate funding on the AP Lands.
The decision to conduct the COAG trial on the AP Lands is also a positive
acknowledgement of the urgent needs of the area and of the importance of
governments changing the way they work with the Anangu.
The establishment of these committees has also been met favourably by
communities on the AP Lands in general. However, communities on the AP
Lands have expressed concerns about the continuing piecemeal approach to
petrol sniffing and a reluctance to act by governments in the twelve months
following the Coronial Inquest. Governments cite the intractable nature of the
issue and the need for appropriate consultation as reasons for the slow progress
to date.
There is significant concern that the discrete focus on petrol sniffing is potentially
being obscured by the level of bureaucracy. There is concern that petrol sniffing
will be submerged within a sea of other significant issues and not receive the
focussed attention called for by the Coronial Inquest and communities on the
AP Lands.
Concerns that have emerged in the initial twelve months since the Coronial
Inquest include that the COAG trial might, in the name of being more
streamlined, in fact be distancing key representative bodies on the AP Lands
from service delivery and decision making as it relates to substance misuse.
This is particularly due to concerns about the over-reliance on the APY Executive
as the gateway and peak body representing all Anangu interests. This seems
to extend beyond its community acceptance and expertise. Significant concerns
about its corporate governance and service delivery performance have also
been raised as related concerns.
There are also concerns that the emphasis of the COAG Trial and these
processes on community ownership obscures the bigger picture of a lack of

Social Justice Report 2003

adequate and appropriate service delivery and funding. The expectations that
appear to be placed on the APY Executive to take carriage and responsibility
for issues, beyond coordinating consultations and participating in priority setting,
is indicative of this. The Coronial Inquest makes clear the need for outside
assistance and improved government performance. This may be being obscured
by the emphasis on joint responsibility.
There is also, however, optimism that the COAG trial may ultimately breakthrough
and achieve improved inter-governmental and inter-agency coordination where
it has not been achieved in the past, and that it may result in greater accountability
for all levels of government. There is also hope that the involvement of the
Commonwealth may also provide greater leverage and ultimately achieve more
effective outcomes. It is, however, too early to say whether these potential benefits
will be realised.
A barrier to achieving such results remains the clear under-resourcing of service
delivery on the AP Lands. The allocation of nearly $12 million by the SA
government specifically to petrol sniffing related issues over the next 4 years is
a welcome announcement. Concerns have been expressed that this quantum
may not be enough. There is a need for ongoing assessment of the resourcing
need, and for funding to be ongoing beyond the 4 year budget cycle. In particular,
there is concern at the failure to date to fund projects beyond the pilot stage.
The Coroners suggestion of moving to block funding on a triennial basis is
aimed to addressing this concern.
It remains of great concern that alongside the establishment of the various
committees and inter-governmental forums, there is no clear, long term
commitment to do whatever it takes to overcome the petrol sniffing problem or
movement towards establishing benchmarks and targets towards this end. It
may be that the Commonwealth governments community participation
agreement process (coordinated by ATSIC) may provide a way forward in this
regard.
At a practical level, there has been variable progress in implementing initiatives
at the primary, secondary and tertiary intervention stages, relating to both health
and justice issues. There have been practical problems in placing youth-workers
and a youth work coordinator, with differing views as to the potential role of the
CDEP scheme, where such workers are placed and whether more part time
appointments would be more appropriate to the needs of communities.
Significant issues relating to homelands / outstations, a changed approach to
child protection issues and the provision of appropriate disability services and
a secure care facility for offenders remain under consideration or subject to
feasibility studies.
There have been positive developments relating to service delivery with an
increased presence of correctional services officers, police and expansion of
the community constable scheme as an interim measure. This has resulted in
an improved response time from police. These issues require much greater
attention, but there is greater optimism about the ability of police to have a
more effective presence on the AP Lands, with consequent benefits for
community safety.

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The police continue, however, to face pressures of being heavily relied upon in
the absence of other necessary forms of service delivery. Overall, there also
remains a significant challenge of balancing law and order responses with
adequate provision of services, particularly those which are health related. The
dilemma relating to the proposed application of the Public Intoxification Act, in
absence of detoxification and other support services, is an example of this
ongoing, longer term problem.

Conclusion a blueprint for action

When Australia appeared before the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2000, the committees country rapporteur
made the following comments and asked the following question:
I think we all have to welcome the increase in government resources
going into what seem to be a multiplicity of programs and activities to
address the social and economic disadvantage within the Aboriginal
community
Now I note that you said today that theres been great improvement over
a short period of time, and Im sure there has been, but you know its
interesting to me, and again I will say this because I come from a country
myself where there is a disadvantaged community and a lot of government
programs et cetera, its of serious concern the extent of the dramatic
inequalities that are still being experienced by these population groups
when they represent only, you know, no more than 2% of the population
of a highly developed, industrialised state, and it makes me wonder
about things like the effectiveness of the programs, monitoring,
benchmarking, what are the standards, is anybody watching this to see
whether or not they really are designed to meet the disadvantages that
are real in the communities, you know the real history of systemic
discrimination, institutional racism?107

The same questions could be posed in relation to the issue of petrol sniffing on
the AP Lands and the underlying socio-economic circumstances. Namely, given
the smallness of the Anangu population, and the proportion of petrol sniffers
within it, why has there been so little progress in addressing these problems,
despite the plethora of governmental service delivery agencies and committees
already in existence? Magistrate Hiskey recently put this issue more directly:
People cannot be allowed to die when intervention and assistance may save
them. The communities upon the Pitjantjatjara lands need assistance.108
Given the history of neglect of petrol sniffing and its attendant problems on the
AP Lands, the Coronial Inquest has provided an opportunity to focus on these
issues. They should not be allowed, like the recommendations of so many
other reports, to drift away unheeded. Instead, Coroner Chivells
recommendations should be capitalised on as the basis for a blueprint for a

107 McDougall, G, CERD Transcript 21-22 March 2000, 1393rd meeting, Part II, p4; quoted in
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000,
HREOC Sydney 2000, p58.
108 Cited in These people cant be allowed to die: Magistrate Speaks out on petrol sniffing,
op.cit.

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long-term sustained, comprehensive strategic plan for tackling these issues

even if some aspects of his recommendations are ultimately superseded by
better alternatives decided at the local level.
The issue of addressing Indigenous petrol sniffing on the AP Lands should be
recognised in terms of the specific challenge it presents to governments and
bureaucracy in terms of changing the way in which they do business with
communities and in developing effective whole-of-government approaches. The
designation of the AP Lands as a COAG Trial adds particular impetus to this
challenge for governments to show that they are genuine about reforming their
relationship to communities.
The uncomfortable question which Indigenous petrol sniffing on the AP Lands
raises is whether the structures of bureaucracy and the ways governments do
business need to be radically altered: if not, will serious human rights issues
such as petrol sniffing confronting Indigenous people keep on falling through
the cracks? dAbbs and Brady comment as follows on the respective level of
responsibilities on both sides of the government and community partnership:
[W]hile communities must be partners in any program to address petrol sniffing,
the notion that government agencies can sit back and insist that communities
take ownership of the problem, and that all governments need to do is provide
intermittent project grants to community groups, needs to be exposed and
rejected.109
HREOC has advocated a progressive realisation approach in which incremental
steps are taken to address aspects of Indigenous disadvantage with a specified
time-frame. Most of the responses to the Coroners recommendations in the
past year have been both thoughtfully considered and incremental. The series
of interventions that the Coroner has advocated target all levels of the problem,
from potential through to chronic sniffers, and from precipitating causes through
to situational and underlying factors. However, in order to keep the momentum
of the response to Coronial recommendations going, there needs to be longterm, bipartisan agreements put in place in regard to Indigenous petrol sniffing
that will withstand changes in governments and bureaucracies, their agendas
and personnel. Attention also needs to be given to developing the capacity of
people across all sectors government, NGO and communities to address
petrol sniffing-related problems on the AP Lands. Capacity-building of this nature
must necessarily be allied to the development of evidence bases relevant to
petrol and other inhalants, including strategic approaches and best practice
examples, so that a corporate knowledge base can be maintained. Frameworks
for progressing a long-term strategic plan for eradicating petrol sniffing must
also be negotiated in consultation with the Anangu.
Given the limits on information which exists in relation to petrol sniffing and
other substance misuse problems in Indigenous communities, the AP Lands
situation also presents a significant opportunity to road-test strategies and
solutions that may be applicable to other regions of Australia. Of particular
interest are the models and the implications for Indigenous Australia that might
emerge from the meeting of petrol sniffing as a public policy issue and the
109 dAbbs, P, and Brady, W, op.cit, p12.

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COAG trial as an interagency, inter-community challenge. Whether such

initiatives as the COAG whole-of government trials ultimately prove to be more
of a hindrance, obscuring and obstructing an effective response to issues such
as Indigenous petrol sniffing, or whether its role might be pivotal in reforming
service delivery at the Commonwealth and state level is a question that remains
to be answered.

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Chapter 5

Addressing family violence in

Indigenous communities
There is no issue currently causing more destruction to the fabric of Indigenous
communities than family violence. This has been acknowledged by all levels of
government in recent years, with a number of significant inquiries and initiatives
undertaken or commenced at the federal, state and territory level to address its
impact. The intensive scrutiny and public awareness of this issue has not,
however, led to sufficient commitments of resources and effort to date. Nor has
it led to continuous support for innovative, community led solutions to address
the violence or the adoption of an holistic, coordinated approach to it. Overall,
there is still not enough action being taken to address this issue with the priority
and urgency that it requires.
In light of the significant attention being devoted to this issue in public debate
and the need for a more far reaching response, I asked Professor Judy Atkinson
and Caroline Atkinson to prepare an overview of the existing approaches of
governments to addressing issues relating to family violence in Indigenous
communities. Both are respected Aboriginal researchers with a history of
conducting research and advocating for improved responses to family violence
issues within Aboriginal communities. This chapter is based on the report on
current approaches to family violence in Indigenous communities that they
prepared for me in the second half of 2003.1 I thank them and the students of
Gnibi the College of Indigenous Australian Peoples at Southern Cross University
for their contribution to this report.2
This chapter provides a broad overview of the current situation regarding family
violence in Indigenous communities in Australia from both a statistical and policy
and program perspective. It provides an Indigenous specific perspective on
family violence. An examination of the western traditional approach to domestic
1

Atkinson, C, Atkinson, J, and Students of Gnibi the College of Indigenous Australian Peoples,
Southern Cross University, Review of Programs and Policies Addressing Family Violence in
Indigenous Communities Final Report, Unpublished paper prepared for the Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2003. (Herein referred to as Atkinson, C, and Atkinson,
J, Review of Programs and Policies Addressing Family Violence in Indigenous Communities).
I also, of course, accept full responsibility for the contents of this chapter and its accuracy.

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violence, including its narrow interpretation, and the limitations of this approach
in addressing violence in Aboriginal communities is presented. Alternative
models for addressing family violence in Indigenous communities are also
considered. There is a particular focus on restorative justice models and healing
approaches, as well as consideration of the vital role of community control,
capacity building and governance reform in restoring health and wellbeing to
Indigenous communities.
Recent initiatives such as the Prime Ministers family violence roundtable in
July 2003 and subsequent commitment of $20 million as a down payment to
address family violence issues, the response of the Western Australian
government to the Gordon Inquirys findings, and the focus on family violence
issues in several of the COAG whole-of-government community trials,
demonstrate a genuine commitment from governments to address family
violence issues. This chapter is intended to build on the significant goodwill
and commitment of governments to addressing family violence in Indigenous
communities. It is intended to promote an understanding of the wide-ranging
and multi-faceted issues that contribute to, or affect the responsiveness of
government interventions relating to, family violence in order to improve policy
responses to it.
Professor Judy Atkinson vividly demonstrates and reminds us of the urgency
for identifying and implementing such improvements:
When I started my PhD in 1993, seeking to understand the context of this
violence, and find a healing way forward, I was asked by an academic to
find words that would explain what I saw as I sat with people who had
experienced violence, as children and young people, as adult men and
women and as elders.
The word I chose was pain. Layers and layers of pain, and in the
unresolved pain the anger and grief that ensures its continuation. We
carry this pain across generations, and we pass it down to others in our
families and communities.
I came to understand that the pain of a child or a woman, or a man, is the
pain of us all. Often we deny the pain we experience in others because it
mirrors our pain. Some of us numb ourselves with alcohol and other drugs
and other addictive forms of behaviour and some with work. Work that in
no way begins to address our needs.
Any Aboriginal person who works in the field, and chooses not to close
their eyes and hearts, is haunted by the immensity of the pain.
While government demands statistical evidence, we do not need to count
the dead and wounded as data for institutional archival files. We daily
bury our dead and are so shell-shocked we can neither fully grieve our
losses nor properly tend our wounded.
What is important now is we truthfully name the pain in its many shapes
and forms, and make the connections between the feelings and the
behaviours that ensure, if we do not get about the work of healing, that it
will continue across the generations.3

Atkinson, J, Foreword in Atkinson, C, and Atkinson, J, Review of Programs and Policies

Addressing Family Violence in Indigenous Communities, p5.

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157

Indigenous perspectives on family violence

Violence is undermining our very lifes essence, it is destroying us, and
there are very few Aboriginal families that are not struggling with the
debilitating effects of trauma, despair and damage resulting from their
experiences with violence.4

Indigenous concepts of violence are much broader than usual mainstream

definitions of domestic violence.5 For Indigenous peoples, the term family
violence better reflects their experiences.
Family violence involves any use of force, be it physical or non-physical, which
is aimed at controlling another family or community member and which
undermines that persons well-being. It can be directed towards an individual,
family, community or particular group. In Tjunparni: Family Violence in Indigenous
Australia family violence is defined as behaviours and experiences including:
beating of a wife or other family members, homicide, suicide and other
self-inflicted injury, rape, child abuse and child sexual abuse. When we
talk of family violence we need to remember that we are not talking about
serious physical injury alone but also verbal harassment, psychological
and emotional abuse, and economic deprivation, which although as
devastating are even more difficult to quantify than physical abuse.6

Family violence is not limited to physical forms of abuse. It also includes cultural
and spiritual abuse:
People get hurt physically you can see the bruises and black eyes. A
person gets hurt emotionally you can see the tears and the distressed
face but when youve been hurt spiritually like that its a real deep hurt
and nobody, unless youre a victim yourself, could ever understand
because youve been hurt by someone that you hold in trust.7

Family violence in Indigenous communities also takes place in the broader

context of violence committed at a systemic level:
It is violence to move people forcibly from their place of birth and to dump
them in strange places... It is violence to separate family members by
policy or by designed economic hardship and necessity. It is violence to
classify people by race in order to deny privileges to some and heap
privileges on others. It is violence to systematically deny the most basic
human rights in the service of such a system. The obvious physical
violence that reaches wide attention is the merest tip of the iceberg of
such ignored, routinized, structural violence.8

4
5
6
7
8

Dodson, M, Violence Dysfunction Aboriginality, Speech, National Press Club, 11 June 2003,
p2.
Bennett, B, Domestic Violence, (1997) 21(4) Aboriginal and Islander Health Worker Journal
11, p11.
Mow, K E, Tjunparni: Family Violence In Indigenous Australia, Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission, 1992, p10.
Atkinson, J, Beyond Violence: Finding the Dream, National Domestic Violence Education
Program, Office for the Status of Women, Canberra, 1990, p7.
Simpson, M A, Bitter Waters: Effects on Children of the Stresses of Unrest and Oppression,
International Handbook of Traumatic Stress Syndromes, Eds Wilson J P, & Raphael, B, Plenum
Press, New York, 1993, p603.

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Hence, it is crucial to acknowledge the impact of broader systemic violence

when considering the impact of family violence in Indigenous communities. It is
vital that definitions of violence incorporate not only physical dimensions, but
also emotional, social, economic, spiritual and institutional dimensions. The
expansive framework of family violence is imperative in developing and
implementing broad, holistic, prevention/intervention strategies at various levels
of critical need.
Such a frame of reference brings into focus the interconnecting and transgenerational experiences of violence within Indigenous families and
communities. As Caroline and Judy Atkinson state:
The term Family Violence is more suitable as it brings focus to the trauma
of the interconnecting and trans-generational experiences of individuals
within families, to show the continuity between how Indigenous peoples
have been acted upon and how in turn they may then act upon others
and themselves.9

Further, family violence embraces the historical nature of violence occurring in

Indigenous communities, including the violence perpetrated by non-Indigenous
people. As Harry Blagg states:
[F]amily violence represents an historical narrative about the collective
suffering of a people, rather than a simple term demarcating a discrete
social problem or one specific set of power relationships.10

A critical aspect of this broader conception of what constitutes family violence

is that it recognises the centrality of Indigenous culture in framing the
experiences, choices and ultimately the responses to violence, of Indigenous
women:
In understanding Aboriginal world views in relation to Family Violence, it
has to be understood that an Aboriginal woman cannot be considered in
isolation, or even as part of a nuclear family, but as a member of a wider
kinship group or community that has traditionally exercised responsibility
for her wellbeing as she exercises her rights within the group.11

This factor is often overlooked by current policies and other intervention strategies
aimed at addressing violence against women which are primarily guided and
directed by a liberal feminist framework. The major criticism of western feminist
based intervention strategies for dealing with violence against Indigenous women
is that they have evolved from the very structures that served to subordinate
and oppress Indigenous peoples. Moreover they embody white middle class
womens experiences. Indigenous women, however:
do not have a purely gendered experience of violence that renders them
powerless. They, along with their men, experienced and continue to
experience, the racist violence of the State. Aboriginal women do not

9
10
11

Atkinson, C, and Atkinson, J, Review of Programs and Policies Addressing Family Violence in
Indigenous Communities, p10.
Blagg, H, Crisis Intervention in Aboriginal Family Violence: Summary Report, Partnerships
Against Domestic Violence, Canberra, 2000, pp2-3.
Judy Atkinson quoted in Atkinson, C, and Atkinson, J, Review of Programs and Policies
Addressing Family Violence in Indigenous Communities, p11.

Social Justice Report 2003

share a common experience of sexism and patriarchal oppression, which

binds them with non-Aboriginal women in a unified struggle
The notion of patriarchy is foreign to traditional Aboriginal communities,
which were relatively separate but equal in terms of male/female roles.
While Aboriginal societies were gendered, women were not victims of
mens power, but assertively affirmed their place and role in the community.
According to Berndt & Berndt (1964) this provided both independence
yet an essential interdependence between gender groups.12

Accordingly, Indigenous womens experience of discrimination and violence is

bound up in the colour of their skin as well as their gender. Strategies for
addressing family violence in Indigenous communities need to acknowledge
that a consequence of this is that an Indigenous woman may be unable or
unwilling to fragment their identity by leaving the community, kin, family or
partners13 as a solution to the violence.
As Harry Blagg notes, choosing to leave the family with all its complexly
embedded ties of mutual responsibility and obligation, and connection with
country and culture is not an option. These considerable limitations on the
ability of Aboriginal women to abrogate responsibilities to family must be
accepted as the starting point rather than the problem in victim support.14
A practical example of how this manifests is the different way that Indigenous
and non-Indigenous women use refuges and shelters. The latter tends to use
them as an exit point from abusive relationships, whereas Indigenous women
use them as a temporary respite.15
Liberal feminist approaches to domestic violence also tend to emphasise the
experience of the victim, as opposed to the experiences of the perpetrator. This
differs from an Indigenous community-based perspective, which includes the
issues of both perpetrator and victim. Indigenous women are saying that mens
issues must also be addressed if real solutions are to be found and lasting
changes are to happen.
Overall, these factors point to the need to recognise that:
The unique dimensions of violence against Aboriginal women are a result
of complex factors and socio-historical and contemporary experiences
and must be considered when attempting to provide solutions that are
relevant to the specific situations and needs of Aboriginal women.
Solutions to problems, no matter how well-intentioned, can create further
problems for subordinated groups within a society, particularly when the
solutions are based in a systemic structure that has functioned abusively
on the subordinated group.16

12
13
14

15
16

ibid, p12.
Bennett, B, Domestic Violence, Aboriginal and Islander Health Worker Journal, 1997, p14.
Blagg, H, Crisis intervention in Aboriginal family violence Summary report, Office for the
Status of Women, Canberra 2000, quoted in Northern Territory Law Reform Committee,
Aboriginal communities and Aboriginal law in the Northern Territory Background Paper 1
Inquiry into Aboriginal Customary Law, NTLRC Darwin 2003, p18.
Blagg, H, Intervening with adolescents to prevent domestic violence: phase 2 the Indigenous
rural model, National Crime Prevention, Canberra 1998.
Atkinson, C, and Atkinson, J, Review of Programs and Policies Addressing Family Violence in
Indigenous Communities, p14.

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Of particular concern in this regard is that the typical western response to

family violence is to criminalise such behaviour through specific domestic
violence legislation, with the strong possibility of imprisonment being the
outcome for those convicted of offences. As Caroline and Judy Atkinson note,
however, tighter controls from the criminal justice system in dealing with violence
against Indigenous women can in fact make their situation worse.17 They argue:
Aboriginal women say that when their men go to jail, they emerge more
violent, and their voices are ignored. Because of this, and despite having
no real option apart from the criminal justice response, these women are
still hesitant to use the legislation to its full intent. Whilst it is important to
acknowledge that violence against women is an offence, the question
that needs to be asked in relation to Aboriginal perpetrators, is how can
we also recognise that their behaviours have been influenced by the
violence of the State against Aboriginal communities, while at the same
time holding perpetrators accountable and providing programs whereby
the perpetrators are able to change their behaviour?
What has been revealed is that using Western law in isolation is not
necessarily a viable option due to issues of access, particularly for women
in isolated and rural communities, and a general reluctance to use the
criminal justice system based on past and present experiences of
abuse18

An emphasis on criminal justice responses to family violence poses two main

concerns for Indigenous women. The first is that the system is generally
ineffective in addressing the behaviour of the perpetrator in the longer term.
The effect of imprisonment is to remove them from the community and then,
without any focus on rehabilitation or addressing the circumstances that led to
the offending in the first place, to simply return them to the same environment.
The second is that there are a range of barriers in the accessibility and cultural
appropriateness of legal processes which discourage Indigenous women from
using the criminal justice system in the first place. Such barriers include an
historic distrust of the police and legal processes which has developed due to
factors such as an historically high level of police surveillance of Indigenous
peoples 19 ; a negative relationship with police due in part to the overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples, including Indigenous women, in public
order and other petty offences; as well as experiences of inaccessible and
culturally inappropriate court processes.20
It is not being suggested that incidents of family violence in Indigenous
communities should be condoned or that responsibility of perpetrators be
diminished. Instead, these barriers, highlight a failure to acknowledge the unique

17
18
19

20

ibid.
ibid, p17.
For further discussion see Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National
Report , AGPS, 1991; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Report of the National
Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia, AGPS, 1991; also Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commissioner, Indigenous Deaths in Custody 1989 to 1996, A report prepared for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commission, October 1996.
For further details see NSW Department for Women, Heroines of Fortitude Experiences of
women in court as victims of sexual assault, 1996.

Social Justice Report 2003

characteristics of Indigenous family violence has the potential to render

approaches for dealing with this violence ineffective, with the consequence
that Indigenous women ultimately do not enjoy the protection of the law.
Accordingly, responses to family violence in Indigenous communities need to
be cognisant of these broader issues and responsive to them. I return to current
initiatives and proposals for making the criminal justice system more responsive
in protecting Indigenous women from family violence later in this chapter.

The extent of family violence in Indigenous communities

There are significant deficiencies in the availability of statistics and research on
the extent and nature of family violence in Indigenous communities. Data that is
available tends to be confined to situations where there has been a criminal
justice or welfare intervention, and also significantly under-counts the true extent
of family violence due to under-reporting by Indigenous peoples.
Recent reports such as the Gordon Inquiry in Western Australia and the Cape
York Justice Study in Queensland, for example, have relied on the limited
available data rather than gather new quantitative evidence. The 2001 report
Violence in Indigenous Communities, commissioned by the Commonwealth
Attorney-Generals Department, provides the most recent and comprehensive
analysis of the available data and is consistently cited by other reports on the
subject.21 It is anticipated that the Indigenous General Social Survey, conducted
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2002, will provide some new information
when it is published in mid-2004.
Despite this dearth of statistics, numerous inquiries have concluded that rates
of family violence are significantly higher among Indigenous peoples than for
other Australians. Statistics and research dating back to the 1980s also reveal
that this situation has existed for at least the past two decades with no identifiable
improvement.22
At the national level, the Steering Committee for the Review of Government
Service Provisions national report on key indicators of Indigenous disadvantage
for 2003 notes higher rates of substantiated child protection notifications for
Indigenous children, as well as higher rates of deaths from homicide,
hospitalisation for assault and of being a victim of murder, assault, sexual assault
and domestic violence for Indigenous peoples than for non-Indigenous
peoples.23 The report identifies that in Western Australia the rate for substantiated
child protection notifications is eight times higher than for non-Indigenous
children. Caution must be taken in interpreting these figures in terms of rates of
21
22

23

Memmott, P, Stacy, R, Chambers, C & Keys, C, Violence in Indigenous Communitie Full

Report, Commonwealth Attorney Generals Department, Canberra, 2001.
For an overview of statistics in the late 1980s and early 1990s see: Atkinson, C, and Atkinson,
J, Review of Programs and Policies Addressing Family Violence in Indigenous Communities,
pp27-31. See, for example: National Committee on Violence, Violence: Directions for Australia,
Australian Institute of Criminology Canberra 1990, Family Violence Professional Education
Taskforce, Family violence: Everybodys business somebodys life, Federation Press Sydney
1991; and Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force, Beyond these walls, Department of
Family Services and Welfare Housing, Brisbane 1988.
Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming Indigenous
disadvantage Key indicators 2003, Productivity Commission, Melbourne 2003, pp3.44-3.57.

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violence however. For instance, there is a clear trend for Indigenous children to
be substantiated on the basis of neglect rather than abuse.
Significantly, there are real variations in the pattern of substantiations for
Indigenous and non-Indigenous. For example, sexual abuse is reported at a
higher rate among non-Indigenous children, although this may simply reflect a
lack of reporting in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. Similarly,
the over-representation of Indigenous children in the reporting statistics may
be due to over-monitoring of some Indigenous communities.
A further key concern highlighted in the Steering Committees report was the
high rates of hospitalisation experienced by Indigenous Australians. Data
collected by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) revealed that
per 1000 Indigenous people entering hospital 13.3 were admitted due to an
assault, whereas the figure is only 1 in 1000 for non-Indigenous people. The
figures for Indigenous females were highest in Western Australia (27.2 per 1000)
and the Northern Territory (25.7). These rates are approximately 10 times higher
than those of the non-Indigenous female population. These figures may, however,
reflect a number of factors of which family violence is but one.24
The available statistics for the Indigenous adult population equally presents a
grave picture. The Australian Institute of Criminology analysis of Indigenous
and non-Indigenous homicides in Australia found that between 1989 to 2000
Indigenous persons comprised 15.1% of all homicide victims and 15.7% of all
homicide offenders, even though Indigenous people make up only 2.1% of the
total population of Australia.25 In relation to family violence 54.2% of Indigenous
homicides occurred between family members, in contrast with 38.1% of nonIndigenous murders occurring between family members.
Available statistics also suggest that there is a clear link between alcohol and
drug misuse and violence within Indigenous communities, with between 70
and 90 percent of all assaults being committed while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs.26
In Queensland, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Womens Violence Task
Force Report on violence in Indigenous communities (the Robertson report)
from 1999 identifies the following statistics which relate to Queensland
Indigenous communities:
In 1988, the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force estimated
that domestic violence affects 90 per cent of Indigenous families living
in Deed of Grant in Trust (DOGIT) communities;27

24
25

26

27

Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming indigenous
disadvantage Key indicators 2003, Productivity Commission, Melbourne 2003, pp3.51-3.53
Mouzos, J, Indigenous and non-Indigenous homicides in Australia: A comparative analysis,
Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no2, Australian Institute of Criminology,
Canberra, 2001, pp1-6
Atkinson, J, Making Sense of the Senseless Feeling Bad, Being Mad, Getting Charged Up!,
Having it Both Ways: Dual Diagnosis, Alcohol, Drugs and Mental Illness ,Conference
Proceedings, Melbourne University, 1998, p5.
Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force, ibid, pp198-256 as cited in Robertson, B, Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Womens Task Force on Violence Report, Queensland Department
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy, Brisbane 1999, p97.

Social Justice Report 2003

 Barber, Punt and Albers reported over 70 per cent of all assaults on
Palm Island were committed against females, and most of these
involved boyfriends or husbands who were said to be drunk at the
time;28
In another North Queensland community, with a total female population
of 133 women over 15 years of age (107 were over 20 years of age),
there were 193 cases of injuries due to domestic assault in a twelvemonth period to 30 June 1990;29
The Study of Inquiry in Five Cape York Communities in 1997 found that
86 per cent of domestic violence injuries affected people in the 16-44
years age group and that 91 per cent of these injuries were suffered
by women;30 and
The Queensland Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)
1997 report Indigenous Women within the Criminal Justice System
found sufficient evidence to suggest that the degree of violence being
experienced by Indigenous women was much higher than the statistics
recorded.31
The key findings of the Robertson report into violence in Indigenous communities
in Queensland concluded that:
Dispossession, cultural fragmentation and marginalisation have
contributed to the current [family violence] crisis in which many
Indigenous people find themselves;
A more rigorous understanding of the impact of high unemployment,
poor health, low educational attainment and poverty on the incidence
of family violence is warranted;
Family violence in Indigenous communities has a critical issue for
many years which is continually recognised by Indigenous
communities as being a problem;
At times, government representatives appeared to regard violence
as a normal aspect of Indigenous life, therefore, interventions were
dismissed as politically and culturally intrusive in the newly acquired
autonomy of Indigenous communities;
Violence in all its forms, whatever its locale and in any circumstances,
is unacceptable, and both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples
must work together to help in its eradication;

28
29

30

31

Barber, J, Punt, J and Albers, J, Alcohol and Power on Palm Island, (1988) 23(2) Australian
Journal of Social Issues 87 as cited in Robertson, B. ibid, p97.
Miller, B, Crime Prevention and Socio-legal Reform on Aboriginal Communities in Queensland,
in McKillop, S and Vernon, J, (eds.), The Police and the Community: Conference Proceedings,
Monograph 5, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra 1989, as cited in Robertson, B,
ibid, pp97-98.
National Injury Surveillance Unit, Study of Inquiry in Five Cape York Communities, Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare and Queensland Health, Brisbane 1997, pp43-45, as cited in
Robertson, B, ibid, p98.
Department of Public Prosecutions Queensland (DPP), Indigenous Women and the Criminal
Justice System Report, DPP, Brisbane 1997, as cited in Robertson, B, ibid, p99.

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164

While governments have made funding available to address the issues

pertinent to violence in the lives of Indigenous peoples, only minimal
intervention has occurred to date;
Violence in Indigenous communities must be stopped through
proactive intervention as opposed to prevention alone; and
A whole-of-government approach to tackling violence is required along
with Indigenous people taking responsibility to repair the broken lives
as a result of violence. 32
The Cape York Justice Study similarly noted that up to 90% of families living in
DOGIT communities are affected by violence. This Study also revealed that
abuse of Elders is increasing:
Research in the Rockhampton area concluded that abuse of older people
is a relatively recent phenomenon in Aboriginal communities following
colonisation, and is related to the loss of traditional culture and values,
including respect for elders.33

In Western Australia, the Gordon Inquiry into the Response by Government

Agencies to Complaints of Family Violence and Child Abuse in Aboriginal
Communities in Western Australia identifies the situation as follows:
Family violence and child abuse occur in Aboriginal communities at a
rate that is much higher than that of non-Aboriginal communities. The
statistics paint a frightening picture of what could only be termed an
epidemic of Family Violence and child abuse in Aboriginal communities.
Aboriginal women account for 3 percent of the population but 50% of
domestic violence incidents reports to police. Aboriginal children were
the subject of substantiated child abuse at more than 7 times the rate of
non-Aboriginal children. These figures stand within the context of under
reporting.34

An earlier study on domestic violence in Western Australia concluded that:

The rates of domestic violence amongst Aboriginal women were
staggering. Although these women make up only 3% of the adult female
population in WA, they accounted for half of the domestic violence
incidence reported to the police in 1994. Based on police figures
Aboriginal women are more than 45 times more likely than non-Aboriginal
women to be victims of domestic violence.35

That study also noted that it was not only Indigenous men who were the
perpetrators of violence against Indigenous women but increasingly Indigenous
women are becoming violent against other Indigenous women.36 It has also
32
33
34

35

36

Robertson, B, ibid, Executive Summary, ppx-xi.

Justice Fitzgerald, Cape York Justice Study, Queensland Government, Brisbane 2001, p9394.
Gordon, S, Putting the Picture Together: Inquiry into Response by Government Agencies to
Complaints of Family Violence and Child Abuse in Aboriginal Communities, State Law Publisher,
Perth, 2002, p424.
Ferrante, A, Morgan, F, Indermaur, D, and Harding, R, Measuring the Extent of Domestic
Violence, University of Western Australia, Perth, 1996. See: www.law.ecel.uwa.edu.au/crc/
publications/books/dv.htm.
ibid.

Social Justice Report 2003

been suggested that the violence perpetrated by Indigenous women against

Indigenous women, comes in part from the sexual and psychological violence
they themselves have experienced.37
Statistical data from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research
(BOCSAR) shows that in New South Wales:
Aboriginal females are four times more likely than other females to be
a victim of murder;
Aboriginal females are four times more likely to be a victim of an
assault or domestic violence;
Aboriginal females are seven times more likely to be a victim of
grievous bodily harm;
In 73 percent of sexual assaults where the victim was Aboriginal the
offender was also Aboriginal;
In 80 percent of assaults where the victim was Aboriginal, the offender
was also Aboriginal; and
In 85 percent of domestic violence related assaults, where the victim
was Aboriginal, the offender was also Aboriginal.38
In a 2001 discussion paper, the NSW Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council (AJAC)
also cited statistics compiled from BOSCAR which reveal that:
Approximately 270 per 100,000 of alleged sexual assault offenders in
NSW are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in comparison with
only 90 per 100,000 of the general NSW male rate. That is, Aboriginal
men are 3 times more likely than the general population to be sexual
assault offenders.
At least 130 per 100,000 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander men are
alleged child sexual assault offenders compared to only 50 per 100,000
of the general population. That is, Aboriginal men are 2.6 times more
likely than non-Aboriginal men to be child sexual assault offenders.
Approximately 3400 per 100,000 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
men are alleged domestic violence assault offenders compared to
550 per 100,000 of the general population. That is, Aboriginal men
are 6.2 times more likely than non- Aboriginal men to be the offender
of (domestic) violence.39
The NSW Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council observe that:
The facts indicate a significant level of over representation of Aboriginal
males in the criminal justice system for family violence related offences
and [in rates] of Aboriginal victimisation...40

37
38
39
40

ibid.
NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Aboriginal Victimisation and Offending: The
Picture from Police Records, Crime and Justice Statistics, December, 2001.
Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council, Holistic Community Justice a proposed response to
Aboriginal Family Violence, AJAC, NSW Attorney-Generals Department, Sydney 2001, p6.
ibid.

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The discussion paper further claims that:

68% of Aboriginal women surveyed said they had been abused as a
child, and approximately 75% of those women said they were sexual
assaulted as children. Over 82% of those women did not tell anyone
what had happened. In some instances the women revealed that the
survey was their first point of disclosure.
Approximately 68% of women abused as children said they still need
counselling and or support to deal with the abuse they had suffered
as children.
Over 73% disclosed that they were victims of abuse as adults. Of
those women who were assaulted as adults, 42% had been sexually
assaulted, 6% of those disclosed they were sexually assaulted by a
relative, 79% were physically assaulted (including family/domestic
violence).
61% of those women abused as adults said that they did not tell
anyone what was going on at the time.41
The paper comments that:
at least 80% of the women surveyed said that their experience of abuse
was an indirect cause of their offending. Some women revealed that the
underlying cause of their drug and criminal habits was to avoid dealing
with, or because they had not been able to address, the abuse that they
had suffered as a child, in particular child sexual assault. A significant
number of women interviewed suggested appropriate ways to deal with
abuse, nearly all which included Aboriginal healing programs, in particular
involvement with Elders.42 [11]

In 2003 AJAC conducted research into the experiences of Aboriginal women in

New South Wales prisons which revealed that:
70% of the women participating in the survey said that they been
sexually assaulted as children;
Of this group 98% say they now have a drug problem;
78% said they had been victims of abuse as adults;
44% said they had been sexually assaulted as adults and 5% said
they had been sexually assaulted by a family member; and
Approximately four in five said they had experienced domestic
violence. 43
In 2000, the South Australian report Reshaping Responses to Domestic Violence
detailed that:
90% of Aboriginal families are affected by family violence;
Aboriginal men are four times more likely to die a violent death than
non-Aboriginal men, and women are six and half times more likely to
die a violent death than non-Aboriginal women;
41
42
43

ibid, p7.
ibid.
AJAC (NSW), Speak out speak strong: Researching the needs of Aboriginal Women in Custody,
AJAC, NSW Attorney-Generals Department, 2003, p6, p54.

Social Justice Report 2003

 The incident rate of domestic violence for Aboriginal women is 45

times higher than for non-Aboriginal women;
Aboriginal women are more likely to be killed as a result of family
violence as compared to non-Indigenous women their rate of
homicide is 10 times that of all Australian women; and
South Australian Government statistics suggest that the instances of
family violence are likely to be between seven and 16 times higher
than rates among non-Aboriginal people.44
The Northern Territory Law Reform Committee noted in 2003 that family violence
is a major concern for Indigenous people, eclipsing issues such as property
crime.45 They summarise research on family violence as follows:
rates of violence in Aboriginal communities are significantly higher
than in non-Aboriginal communities;
improving the situation for Indigenous victims requires a whole-ofgovernment approach;
programs need to be delivered within a cultural framework as only
Indigenous people can challenge the myth of Aboriginal male
entitlement to violence;
strategies must include recognising Aboriginal law as fundamental to
the long term health of Indigenous communities;
Aboriginal youth are the most vulnerable gourp in society to become
the direct or indirect witnesses of violence.46
The 2002 Tasmanian report on family violence ya pulingina kani Good to
See You Talk documents in a narrative form the stories of experiences of
Tasmanian Aborigines with violence. It demonstrates the devastation of family
violence in Indigenous communities in Tasmania and most importantly, the
desires of the community to take responsibility for it, work in partnership with
government to address and to heal.47 The report recommends:
Reciprocity through the government forming an Indigenous Violence
Working Party to enable healing of Indigenous Tasmanians, the
provision of adequate funding to implement the strategies the
community wants and that the stories contained within ya pulingina
kani are protected;
Healing by training Aboriginal participants in the grief and healing
work;
Partnerships between the Aboriginal community, government and
community service providers; and

44
45

46
47

Bagshaw, D, et al, Reshaping Responses to Domestic Violence Final Report, University of

South Australia, April, 2000, p123.
Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, Aboriginal communities and Aboriginal law in the
Northern Territory, Background Paper 1 Inquiry into Aboriginal Customary Law, NTLRC Darwin
2003, p18
ibid.
Pugh, R, ya pulingina kani Good to See You Talk, Government of Tasmania, Hobart 2002.

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Funding of Indigenous art, performance and culture to bring out the

stories of ya pulingina kani to mainstream Tasmania.48
The findings of these reports, and of the available statistical data, indicate the
existence of serious problems relating to family violence in Indigenous
communities and the need for governments to address these issues as a matter
of the highest priority, in partnership with Indigenous peoples.

Government Responses to Family Violence

in Indigenous communities
Addressing family violence is a shared responsibility between all levels of
government with prime responsibility resting with health and community service
agencies in federal, state and territory governments. A list of recent intergovernmental, federal, and state/territory initiatives follows.

1) Commonwealth Initiatives
The main program at the federal level for responding to family violence issues
is the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (PADV) scheme administered
by the Department Family and Community Services. This was launched in 1997
at the National Domestic Violence Summit. The federal government has allocated
$50 million to PADV over the 1999-2003 quadrennium, including $6 million for
the Indigenous Family Violence Grants Program.49
The Ministerial Council of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (MCATSIA)
Working Group on Family Violence established a set of principles for funding
community-based organisations addressing family violence. These principles
have now been incorporated into the design of the National Indigenous Family
Violence Grants Program under the PADV.50
In 2000, 30 Indigenous organisations from across Australia received funding of
$2.2 million for 31 projects addressing family violence. Three of these were
funded through ATSIC, with the majority of the remaining initiatives funded
through the Department of Family and Community Services.51
There was no new funding for Indigenous family violence in the 2001-02 or
2002-03 Budgets. It was revealed, however, that the Office for the Status of
Women underspent by $4.3 million in administering its programs for domestic
violence in 2001-02. ATSIC claimed they could easily have spent this funding
on programs to improve community safety for Indigenous women and children.52
There was new funding in the 2003-04 Budget to ATSIC under its working for
families initiative. This funding was for the wages component of 1000 additional
48
49

50
51

52

ibid, pp87-89.
Newman, J, Minister for Family and Community Services, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister
for the Status of Women, Launch of New Partnerships against Domestic Violence Initiatives,
Media Release, October 1999.
Commonwealth of Australia, Working Together Against Violence: The first three years of
partnerships against domestic violence, Office of the Status of Women, Canberra, August 2001.
Herron, J (Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs) and Newman, J (Minister
Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women), $2.2 million for Indigenous communities
to design solutions to family violence, Joint News Release, 14 August 2000.
Lawrence, C, House of Representatives, Hansard, 17 June 2002.

Social Justice Report 2003

places in the CDEP program over 4 years53 at a cost of $61.5 million to address
family violence and substance abuse issues. ATSIC is providing on-costs
components for the initiative from its existing budget allocation. The focus of
the initiative is on remote Indigenous communities.
In July 2003, the Prime Minister held a national roundtable on Indigenous family
violence. Following the roundtable, a working group was established to advise
the Prime Minister on ways of advancing strategies to address family violence
in Indigenous communities. ATSIC Commissioner Alison Anderson, Lowitjia
ODonoghue, Jackie Huggins and Ian Anderson were selected from the national
roundtable to form this working group to draft a family violence strategy with
the aid of government representatives.54 At the time of forming the working
group it was envisioned that the draft family violence strategy would inform the
public about the violence crisis as well as be discussed and supported by
COAG.55
Subsequent to the roundtable, the Prime Minister announced a commitment of
$20 million as a down payment to address the consequences of violence in
Indigenous communities.56 It is anticipated that there may be further budget
announcements in the 2004-05 budget. The approach to addressing family
violence in Indigenous communities proposed by the Prime Minister includes
focussing on support for non-government organisations; diversion programme
for alcohol and drugs; communities in crisis; and community initiatives to combat
sexual assault.57
The Prime Minister advised the community that he will seek COAGs support
for his approach to family violence. COAG has not yet endorsed his family
violence approach. However, despite the absence of COAGs support, in
December 2003, the new Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs renewed the governments commitment to addressing family violence
when she announced that in 2004 she will be focussing on Indigenous
governance and family violence with a particular emphasis on harnessing
womens leadership.58

2) ATSIC initiatives
As the peak advisory body for Indigenous affairs, ATSIC provides another major
avenue for Commonwealth funding of Indigenous Family Violence programs
and policy advice in this area. Historically, approximately 70 percent of ATSICs
budget has been quarantined, with the remaining discretionary funds to be
spread across a range of social, cultural and economic programs, including
family violence.

53
54
55
56
57
58

ATSIC, Working for Families 1000 extra CDEP places, at www.atsic.gov.au.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), PM meets Indigenous leaders to
discuss violence, ATSIC News, Winter 2003, p9.
ibid, p9.
Howard, J (Prime Minister), Media Release, Government Tackles Violence in Indigenous
Communities, 28 August 2003.
Howard, J (Prime Minister), Media Release, Government Tackles Violence in Indigenous
Communities, 28 August 2003.
Schubert, M, Vanstone plans year of black reform, The Australian, 23 December 2003.

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In recent years, ATSICs expenditure on family violence initiatives has increased

from $4.9 million for the financial year 2001-0259 to $8.2 million in the financial
year 2002-2003.60
In 2002-2003 this included $4.69 million through its Legal and Preventative
Program on 13 Family Violence Prevention Legal Services (FVPLS) to provide
support to the victims of violence and sexual assault and to work with the families
and communities affected by violence. The services provided by the FVPLS
include:
legal assistance;
information and referral (eg medical help, food, clothing and
accommodation);
crisis counselling and ongoing support;
court support and other support and awareness raising activities;
community education, consultation and planning;
production of publications and other resources; and
advocacy.
These FVPLS are located in Kempsey, Moree and Walgett in NSW; Cairns (Cape
York) and Mt Isa in Queensland; Port Augusta in South Australia; Kalgoorlie,
Fitzroy Crossing, and Geraldton in Western Australia; Darwin, Katherine and
Alice Springs in the Northern Territory; and Melbourne in Victoria. A further FVPLS
will be established in 2003-04 in Victoria, and each service will also receive
additional technical and administrative support, with an emphasis on specialised
training to increase capacity in sexual abuse services.
$3.4 million was also spent on Regional Council family violence projects in
2002-03.61 The type of initiatives supported includes alcohol restriction trials;
family violence prevention/outreach workers providing support and referral to
women escaping violence; safe houses for women and children; youth and
childrens services; mens and womens counselling and support groups; night
patrols; mens, womens and youth conferences; service evaluation; and
strategic planning.
During 2001-02, ATSIC also convened a series of roundtable meetings on family
violence in accordance with commitments it had made to the Ministerial Council
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (MCATSIA).62 These roundtables
included separate mens and womens roundtables, in October 2001 in Adelaide
and September 2001 on Palm Island respectively, as well as a combined
roundtable to consider culturally appropriate responses to family violence.63
59
60
61
62

63

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Annual Report 2001-2002,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2002, pp154-155.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Annual Report 2002-03,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003, p189.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Overcoming family violence: We
must all do better, ATSIC News, Winter 2003, p7.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Indigenous Womens Roundtable
meets to tackle family violence, Media Release, ATSIC, 11 September 2001; Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Overcoming family violence: We must all do better,
op.cit, p7.
Clark, G (Chairperson), National Indigenous Group on Domestic Violence, Media Release,
ATSIC, Canberra, 22 August 2001.

Social Justice Report 2003

As a result of these roundtable meetings, ATSIC has created a National

Indigenous Working Group on Violence to lobby for the coordination of programs
and the resourcing of community-driven approaches to violence based on
Indigenous self-determination. The NIWGOV operated from February to
December 2002 and played an integral role in informing the development of
the ATSIC Family Violence policy.64
The most significant development from ATSIC on family violence to date is the
adoption by the ATSIC Board of a national family violence policy statement and
action plan in March 2003. The ATSIC Commissioners national statement is
reproduced on the next page.

Figure 1: Our Family ATSIC Board of Commissioners Family Violence

Policy Statement
Family violence has a deep and lasting effect on us physically, mentally and spiritually.
All Indigenous people have the right to enjoy life and security in our own country,
free from violence, fear and conflict. Our extended family as the basis of our culture
is entitled to the widest possible protection and assistance in relation to family
violence.
Indigenous people hold the key to stop family violence through self-determination,
ownership and empowerment at the local, community and family level.
Urgent interventions must take place to ensure the well-being and safety of our
children so that they can take their rightful place in Indigenous society.
This Board of Commissioners of ATSIC accepts its mandated responsibility to act
against family and sexual violence and therefore as leaders we declare that:
Family and sexual violence is not part of the Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander culture.
We will stand against it in our communities and personally commit to
changing and reducing its escalating and unacceptable levels.
We must help break the silence by empowering our peoples to speak out
and at the same time protect them from reprisals.
All interventions must focus primarily on the child and must be culturally
appropriate.
Women, children and men have the same rights before the law and their
interests must be represented equally in public policy.
At the national, community and state level we will advocate for action and
monitor and report on progress to achieve a significant reduction in the
elimination of family violence, in line with our statutory obligations.
We will formally partner government, non-government and community in
developing a responsible, coordinated and holistic approach to bring about
change and healing for Indigenous family violence.
We will place the highest priority on delivering locally appropriate strategies
We will engage all levels of our communities through capacity building
and collaboration, building on their strengths and resources in advocating
action to eliminate the underlying causes of family violence.
ATSIC Board of Commissioners, 2003
64

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Overcoming family violence: We
must all do better, op.cit, p7.

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This policy includes a Family Violence Action Plan65 which identifies the following
three guiding principles:
Interventions must focus on children and young people and provide
protection;
Women and children have the same rights as men before the law and
their interests must be represented equally in public policy; and
Adults deserve to be supported to break the pattern of violence by
working with victims and perpetrators to prevent and reduce family
violence.
The Action Plan also recognises that:
All individuals have the right to be free from violence;
All forms of family violence are unacceptable;
Most forms of family violence are against the law and must be dealt
with accordingly;
The safety and wellbeing of those subjected to family violence must
be the first priority of any response;
Those who commit family violence must be held accountable for their
behaviour;
Those who commit family violence are in need of appropriate
interventions; and
The community has a responsibility to work toward the prevention of
family violence and to demonstrate the unacceptability of all forms of
family violence.
The Action Plan identifies four key areas for action to address family violence in
Indigenous communities:
Develop an overarching family policy framework that incorporates
prevention of violence in families.
Take a lead role in identifying and promoting new initiatives to reduce
family violence.
Engage with Commonwealth and State government agencies, nongovernment agencies and communities to work in partnership on
family violence strategies.
Support and strengthen the capacity of ATSIC Regional Councils to
develop, implement and monitor family violence action plans.
Enhance the capacity of ATSIC to develop and implement
(appropriately resourced) initiatives at the national and local level.

65

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Our Family, August 2003 at
www.atsic.gov.au/issues/Our_Family/Family_Violence_Information_Kit/Family_Violence_
Action_Plan/Default.asp.

Social Justice Report 2003

Over the past six months various regional councils have endorsed the national
family violence policy by announcing their region-specific action plans to combat
family violence. In particular, the Yilli Rreung Regional Council in the Northern
Territory, the Many Rivers and Kamilaroi Regional Councils in New South Wales
and the Central Queensland Regional Council have all expressed support for
the national policy and announced plans to address family violence in their
respective regions.66

3) Inter-governmental initiatives
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has made a commitment to
address family violence and other forms of social dysfunction in Indigenous
communities in its communiqu on reconciliation of 3 November 2000. It
committed itself to an approach based on partnerships and shared
responsibilities with Indigenous communities, program flexibility and
coordination between government agencies, with a focus on local communities
and outcomes.
Family violence is to be considered within the priority action area of reviewing
and re-engineering programs and services to ensure they deliver practical
measures that support families, children and young people.67 As discussed in
Chapter 2 of this report, COAG also agreed to take a leading role in driving
changes, with the various Ministerial Councils to develop action plans,
performance reporting strategies and benchmarks.
Reconciliation Australia stated in their Reconciliation Report Card for 2002 that
progress had been slow in addressing family and community violence, despite
the COAG commitment of November 2000. 68 Progress in responding to
Reconciliation Australias call for an audit of services, capacity-building and
identification of best practice models for addressing violence had been
particularly slow. COAG itself also reported that ministerial councils progress in
developing action plans under the reconciliation framework has been slower
than expected.69
In April 2002, COAG commissioned the Steering Committee for the Review of
Government Services to produce a regular report against key indicators of
Indigenous disadvantage. The finalised framework is discussed in detail in
66

67
68
69

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), ATSIC takes strong stand against
family violence in CQ, Media Release, Central Queensland Regional Council, 25 November
2003; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Family Violence Plan for
Many Rivers, Media Release, Joint statement by ATSIC NSW East Zone Commissioner Rick
Griffiths and Many Rivers Regional Council Chairperson Stephen Blunden, 26 November 2003;
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), Family violence Kamilaroi Regional
Council Priority, Media release, Statement by ATSIC Kamilaroi Regional Council Chairperson
Lyall Munro, 31 October 2003; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC),
ATSIC Yilli Rreung Regional Council takes a tough stand against Family Violence, Media
Release, Statement by Yilli Rreung Regional Council, 4 December 2003. All media releases
can be found at: www.atsic.gov.au/News_Room/media_releases
Council of Australian Governments, Communique, Canberra, 3 November 2000 <http://
www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/2000/media_release531.htm>
Reconciliation Australia, Words, Symbols, Actions: Reconciliation Report Card 2002,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2002, pp19-20.
Council of Australian Governments, Media Release, Canberra, 5 April 2002.

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Chapter 2 of this report. Issues relating to family violence are included within
the headline indicators and strategic change indicators of the framework.
In 2003, northern Tasmania was identified as a trial site for the COAG whole-ofgovernment community trials. This trial is particularly focussing on family violence
issues. This focus arose out of the report commissioned by the Tasmania
government on Indigenous family violence, ya pulingina kani Good to see you
talk. The COAG trials are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2 of
this report.
On 28 July 2001, MCATSIA was addressed for the first time by an Indigenous
delegation, which consisted of representatives from the ATSIC Indigenous
Womens Roundtable. MCATSIA agreed to conduct an audit of existing
Indigenous family violence strategies, and to a seven-point strategy for
addressing Indigenous family violence by focusing on:

reducing alcohol and substance abuse;

child safety and well-being;
building community capacity (including cultural strength);
improving the justice system;
creating safe places in communities;
improving relationships (focusing on perpetrators and those at risk of
offending); and
promoting shared leadership.70
Two and half years after the commitment to conduct the audit of family violence
strategies, MCATSIA has not finalised or released the audit.

4) Significant State and Territory initiatives

New South Wales
The New South Wales Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council and the New South
Wales Attorney General signed an Aboriginal Justice Agreement on 13 June
2002. The overall aims of the Aboriginal Justice Agreement are to improve
Aboriginal access to justice and improve the quality and relevance of justice
that Aboriginal people receive.71 It provides a framework for ongoing partnership
in addressing justice issues and allows Aboriginal people to take leadership
and make key decisions in solving their own justice problems.
The Justice Agreement includes among its key actions local community justice
forums, which provide a mechanism for addressing local justice concerns
through local solutions, the implementation of circle sentencing and Aboriginal
community justice groups. These ensure Aboriginal communities can be actively
involved in taking some control over local justice issues, especially for offenders
and victims.
The NSW Aboriginal Family Health Strategy is a framework for immediate
government action to family violence and sexual assault. This strategy:
70
71

Ruddock, P, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Agreement on
Indigenous Family Violence Welcomed, Media Release, 28 July 2001.
Debus, B (NSW Attorney General) and Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council, Aboriginal Justice
Agreement, New South Wales Government, 13 June 2002.

Social Justice Report 2003

is the first step in the Departments commitment to work in conjunction

with Aboriginal communities to put in place a range of services and other
resources to alleviate the factors leading to violence, the suffering
occurring daily as a consequence of that violence and the long term
effects of family violence on the wellbeing of Aboriginal communities.72

The strategy acknowledges that the success of any proposed solutions to family
violence is hinged upon Aboriginal community control of responses to family
violence.
In December 2001 and March 2002 the NSW Department of Aboriginal Affairs
co-hosted two roundtable meetings which brought together a number of
Aboriginal community workers from across the State and relevant government
agencies to discuss appropriate ways toward addressing Family Violence. A
committee has been established to manage the implementation of the
roundtable actions.

Northern Territory
The Northern Territory government has committed to the development of
Aboriginal Law and Justice Strategies in communities across the Territory. These
aim to provide a whole-of-community and whole-of-government approach to
addressing community justice issues within a law and justice planning process.
This approach was originally implemented at Ali-Curung in 1996 and in Lajamanu
in 1999 and emerged from initiatives of these communities. Representatives
from both communities are engaged in peer modelling with the Yuendumu
community.
The Tangentyere Night Patrol and Social Behaviour Project (Central Australia)
has become a best practice example of community solutions for addressing
substance abuse, public order issues and family violence in Indigenous
communities. Funding for night patrols is now available from a mixture of
Commonwealth and State agencies.

Queensland
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Womens Task Force on Violence (the
Robertson report), established in December 1998 at the instigation of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander women, finalised its report in December 1999. The
report made 123 recommendations regarding actions required by the
government to address family violence in Indigenous communities.73
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Advisory Board (ATSIAB), formed in
1999 to advise the Queensland Government on Indigenous matters, was
responsible for monitoring Queensland Government responses to the Robertson
report. Part of the response was to include an audit of what the Queensland
Government is currently doing to address issues associated with family violence.

72
73

Department of Health (New South Wales), NSW Aboriginal Family Health Strategy, Preface, at
www.health.nsw.gov,au/policy/aboriginal-health/afhs/
Robertson, B (Chair), The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Womens Task Force on Violence
Report, Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy and Development, op.cit.

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Family violence was identified as one of eight key priority areas under the
Queensland governments Ten Year Partnership with Indigenous peoples, which
aims to reduce the incidence of family violence in Indigenous communities
over the next decade. It was also a significant focus of the Cape York Justice
Study into alcohol and violence in Cape York.
In April 2002, the Queensland Government introduced a new whole-ofgovernment policy called Meeting Challenges, Making Choices (MCMC) which
is designed to address the alcohol and violence issues in Indigenous
communities, such as those highlighted in the Cape York Justice Study.74
MCMC focuses on the key areas of alcohol intervention, economic development,
healthier people, education and training and land and sustainable natural
resource management. MCMC is hinged upon the premise that alcohol and
violence are inextricably linked. Therefore, within this framework, strategies to
combat violence in communities, concentrate on alcohol abuse intervention.

South Australia
The state vision for domestic and family violence prevention is set out in the
State Collaborative Approach for the Prevention of Domestic Violence. Preventing
domestic and Indigenous family violence has been identified as an area of
core business of the Justice Portfolio planning documents, Strategic Directions
and Priorities for Action. Prevention of domestic and Indigenous family violence
has also been identified as a key result area for the Crime Prevention Unit in its
Strategic Plan 2001-2004.

Victoria
An Indigenous Family Violence Task Force has been appointed to lead the
Victorian Indigenous Family Violence Strategy, which aims to resource and
support an Indigenous-led approach to prevent, reduce and respond to violence
in Victorian Indigenous communities. The key components of the strategy are:
establishment and operation of the task Force;
establishment and resourcing of nine Indigenous family Violence
Action Groups;
employment of a state-coordinator and nine family violence support
officers; and
establishment of an Indigenous Family Violence Community Initiative
Fund.75
This Indigenous community-led approach is endorsed by the Victorian
Government and is part of a parallel and complementary whole-of-government
approach.
The successful implementation of the strategy requires maintenance of a
partnership between the Indigenous community and the Government through
the establishment of appropriate structures to oversight implementation and to
74
75

Meeting Challenges, Making Choices: The Queensland Governments response to the Cape
York Justice Study, Queensland Government, Brisbane, April 2002.
Department of Justice (Victoria), Victorian Indigenous Family Violence Strategy, Government
of Victoria, Melbourne, 1999.

Social Justice Report 2003

monitor progress. The Victorian Aboriginal Justice Agreement, which formalised

arrangements under the Aboriginal Justice Plan, is a likely model.

Western Australia
In December 2002, the Western Australian government tabled in Parliament
Putting People First the Governments implementation plan in response to the
findings of the Western Australian governments Inquiry into Response by
Government Agencies to Complaints of Family Violence and Child Abuse in
Aboriginal Communities (the Gordon Inquiry).
The Gordon Inquiry was established as a direct result of a coronial inquest into
the death of a 15 year-old Aboriginal girl in the Swan Valley, Western Australia.
The coronial inquest found that the deceased girl had experienced sexual abuse,
violence and drug and alcohol misuse, which led to her death despite
government department intervention.76 One of the aims of the inquiry was to
examine how government departments could better deal with family violence
and child abuse in Indigenous communities.
The Gordon Inquiry made 193 recommendations in relation to the prevention of
violence, service delivery and development, alternative models for service
delivery, best practice principles for addressing family violence as well as
recommendations regarding the implementation of the reports findings.77
In June 2003, the WA government released its first progress report on
implementation of Putting People First. This identified a range of specific priority
initiatives which are designed to strengthen responses to child abuse and family
violence; responses to vulnerable children and adults at risk; the safety of
communities; and the governance, confidence, economic capacity and
sustainability of communities.78
The Western Australian government has committed $75 million to implementing
initiatives to address family violence. Examples of the specific priority initiatives
include:

76
77

78

Establishing an independent Child Death Review Committee;

Employing 25 additional Child Protection workers;
Developing culturally appropriate counselling services;
Funding community-based initiatives to strengthen families and
communities;
Provision of remote policing services and multi-function facilities;
Recruiting domestic violence liaison officers within the police service;
Expanding Victim Support and Child Witness Services;
Extending community based offender programs;
Expanding Sexual Assault Resource Centre services; and

Online at: www.gordonresponse.dpc.wa.gov.au/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.

introduction, accessed: 10 November 2003.
Gordon, S, Hallahan, K, Henry, D, Putting the picture together, Inquiry into Response by
Government Agencies to Complaints of Family Violence and Child Abuse in Aboriginal
Communities, op.cit, 2002.
Western Australian Government, First Progress Update on the Implementation of Putting People
First Addressing Family Violence and Child Abuse in Aboriginal Communities, Perth, June
2003, pp8-10.

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Developing the Community Futures Foundation to provide financial

assistance to support creative initiatives to develop Aboriginal
leadership.79
To date 15 out of the 25 new child protection workers, 8 of whom are Indigenous,
have been employed as part of the governments commitment to implementing
the recommendations of the Gordon inquiry.80 Additionally, the government
contributed $26,000 towards the development of a brochure which uses
Aboriginal artwork to highlight the issue of family violence81 and an educational
video aimed at sending the message babies break if you shake them to
Indigenous parents which was launched in September 2003.82

Australian Capital Territory

In response to MCATSIAs request for States and Territories to assess their
respective models for addressing family violence, the ACT government
commissioned the Report on the Extent of Family Violence in the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Communities in the ACT, which was completed in August
2001.
This report made 23 recommendations regarding the issues of funding, legal
issues, mens programs, government agencies, training, housing and
accommodation, community development and data collection with respect to
family violence. The overall thrust of this report emphasised the importance of
holistic approaches to addressing family violence which are determined by the
community and supported by the government. Of these recommendations, the
government supported 15, seven were given in principle support and one
recommendation was not supported. Specifically, the government acknowledges
the importance of working in partnership with the Indigenous community to
address family violence in the ACT.83
During 2001-2003, in response to the supported recommendations, a number
of activities to address family violence have been undertaken by a range of
ACT Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander service providers. These activities
include a Boys to Men program, run by Gugan Gulwan Aboriginal Corporation,
which deals with the impact of family violence on young Indigenous boys as
well as a series of young womens, parenting and gambling programs,
discussion groups and the development of young womens hostel and policy

79
80

81

82

83

ibid, and Department of Indigenous Affairs, Media Release, PM failing to solve domestic
violence and abuse in Indigenous communities, Perth, 24 July 2003.
McHale, S (Minister for Community Development, Womens Interests, Seniors and Youth,
Disability Services, Culture and Arts), Media Release, Recruitment of child protection workers
involves Aboriginal communities, 23 October 2003.
McHale, S (Minister for Community Development, Womens Interests, Seniors and Youth,
Disability Services, Culture and Arts), Media Release, Aboriginal artwork raises family violence
awareness, 25 September 2003.
McHale, S (Minister for Community Development, Womens Interests, Seniors and Youth,
Disability Services, Culture and Arts), Media Release, New video alerts Aboriginal parents to
the dangers of shaking babies, 9 September 2003.
Australian Capital Territory Government, The Extent of Family Violence in the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Communities in the ACT ACT Governments response, Act Government,
Canberra 2003.

Social Justice Report 2003

statement against family violence by the Winnunga Nimmityjah Aboriginal Health

Service.

Tasmania
Recent developments in Tasmania were discussed above in relation to the COAG
whole-of-government community trial.

Improving the programmatic responses to family violence

in Indigenous communities Future challenges
The range of recent initiatives identified in the previous section of this chapter
reflects an increasing level of attention to addressing family violence in
Indigenous communities at all levels of government. Despite this, there remain
a number of challenges to be addressed to ensure that adequate and
appropriate attention is paid to addressing family violence. The remainder of
this chapter identifies concerns with the existing programmatic response of
governments to family violence issues, and also identifies approaches which
could be furthered to respond to family violence in an holistic, coordinated way.

Promoting greater coordination and an holistic

approach to family violence programs
There are a patchwork of programs and approaches to addressing family
violence in Indigenous communities among federal, state and territory
governments. There remains a lack of coordination and consistency in
approaches to addressing these issues between governments and among
different government agencies. Significant gaps also exist.
Existing family violence programs that are available to Indigenous peoples are
limited in number, ad hoc and often of limited duration. Due to the interconnections between family violence and other issues faced by Indigenous
peoples, work being done at a grass roots level may also be overlooked and
programs may not necessarily be identified or identify themselves as violence
prevention programs. Proposed programs may also have difficulty obtaining
funding, on either a pilot or ongoing basis, due to the overlap in jurisdictional
and departmental responsibilities.
In Violence in Indigenous Communities, Memmott, Stacy, Chambers and Keys
identified 130 Indigenous family violence programs that had been implemented
or were planned for implementation in Indigenous communities, in the 1990s.84
They categorised these programs into the following broad areas of intervention:

84
85

Support programs including one-on-one counselling and advice

services, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Aid Services and
strategic advice for actual or potential victims to prevent or avoid
violence, including referrals to other programs and centres.85 Issues
relating to the provision of legal advice and access to justice for

Memmott, P, Stacy, R, Chambers, C, & Keys, C, Violence In Indigenous Communities, op.cit,

p59.
ibid, pp64-65.

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Indigenous women relating to family violence are discussed in more

detail shortly.
Accessible and appropriate counselling is essential, not only for the
victims and perpetrators of violence, but also for family and community
members who not only deal with the issue of violence itself but to
also provide post-violence counselling to family members who have
lost someone as a result of violence, suicide, and more particularly
for issues of female and male rape and child sexual assault.

Identity programs Identity programs are those that are aimed to

develop within the individual, family or community, a secure sense of
self-value or self-esteem.86 This can be achieved through diversionary
programs such as, sporting, social and cultural activities, education
and skills training aimed at youth and young adults and also through
therapy based programs that focus on culturally specific psychological
or spiritual healing. Examples of this approach include the Muramali
project as well as the Social and Emotional Well Being Centres being
established in the Northern Territory. All these programs may be
accessed prior to, and after involvement with violence, and offer a
longer-term response through attempting to change the situational
factors underlying violence.

Behavioural change (men and womens groups) as the majority of

family violence is perpetrated by men, strong support for mens
behavioural reform programs is required. These programs are
described as Mens Healing Programs. 87 The Ending Domestic
Violence Programs for Perpetrators study, undertaken by Keys Young,
found that collaborative projects must be adopted that link Indigenous
people and agencies with domestic violence services, to develop
services appropriate to the community.88 It is also important that
complementary groups and support services for Indigenous women
be run parallel to mens programs and complementary preventative/
intervention programs for youth be an integral part of the whole
strategy. An example of this is the Rekindling the Spirit Program in
Northern New South Wales which works with men, their partners, youth
and children.89
Night patrols which have the potential to build cooperation and mutual
respect and support with local police.90 As reported by the Australian

86
87
88
89

90

ibid, pp65-66.
ibid, pp66-67.
Young, K, Research/Evaluation of Family Mediation Practice and the Issue of Violence: Final
report, Legal Aid and Family Services, Canberra, 1996.
Ozols, E, Rekindling the spirit: An appeal from the heart, Paper presented at the Best Practice
Interventions in Corrections for Indigenous People conference convened by the Australian
Institute of Criminology held in Sydney, 8-9 October 2001, pp10-14, Australian Institute of
Criminology website, < www.aic.gov.au/conferences/indigenous2/ozols.pdf > (Accessed 14th
January 2003).
Memmott, P, Stacy, R, Chambers, C, & Keys, C, Violence In Indigenous Communities, op.cit,
pp67-68.

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91
92
93
94

Institute of Criminology, the Tangentyere Night Patrol (TNP) in the

Northern Territory is a best practice example of a properly managed
program that builds on the cooperation and mutual respect of local
police.91 TNP patrolled the Aboriginal town camps on a regular basis
to help minimise violence using non-violent methods. TNP uses and
strengthens Aboriginal mechanisms for social control, thereby
ensuring that traditional methods are afforded a key role in the control
of anti-social behaviour, minor criminal infractions and potentially
serious criminal incidents in the Aboriginal community;
Refuges and Shelters while an important part of any family violence
intervention strategy, are not a sufficient response to the difficulties
produced by high levels of violence in Indigenous communities.92
They represent a reactive strategy in addressing the underlying causes,
thereby creating no possibility of a change in the pattern of violent
behaviour. Refuges and womens shelters need to be coupled with
other proactive strategies targeted at the perpetrators of violence and
other situational factors. Indigenous specific shelters are essential.
At the very least, Indigenous workers at shelters are vital.
Justice programs the roles of justice programs, which are
characteristically aimed at the perpetrators of violence, are to mediate
between people in conflict, designate appropriately cultural
punishments for victims, for example through circle sentencing and
the prevention of recidivism.93
The NSW Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council and the NSW Judicial
Commission have recently released a joint report Circle Sentencing
in New South Wales a Review and Evaluation. The report reviewed the
first twelve months of the operation of circle sentencing in Nowra in
South East New South Wales. The report found among other things
that circle sentencing helps to break the cycle of recidivism, introduces
more relevant and meaningful sentencing options for Aboriginal
offenders with the help of respected community members, reduces
the barriers that currently exist between the courts and Aboriginal
people, leads to improvements in the level of support for Aboriginal
offenders, incorporates support for victims, and promotes healing
and reconciliation and increases the confidence and generally
promotes the empowerment of Aboriginal people in the community.94
Dispute resolution Anecdotal evidence suggests that flexibility within
NSW Community Justice Centres, although not aimed at Aboriginal
people specifically, has proven to be successful in certain Indigenous

Australian Institute of Criminology, Tangentyere Night Patrol, in the Australian Violence

Prevention Awards 1993, Canberra, 1998, pp.34-42.
Memmott, P, Stacy, R, Chambers, C, & Keys, C, Violence In Indigenous Communities, op.cit,
pp69-70.
ibid, pp70-71.
Potas, I, Smart, J, Brignell, G, Thomas, B & Lawrie, R, Circle Sentencing in New South Wales
a Review and Evaluation, New South Wales Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council and the New
South Wales Judicial Commission, Sydney, 2003.

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communities in NSW.95 Specifically, success has been achieved where

impartial members of the Indigenous community are used as
facilitators and traditional dispute-resolution techniques are
incorporated into the overall mediation process.

Education and awareness raising Education and training programs

are vital to raise awareness about family violence prevention; as well
as develop the skills within communities to resolve conflicts and identify
the need for interventions with perpetrators.96 The National Indigenous
Legal Advocacy Courses, which are aimed at Indigenous peoples
working in justice related fields including legal services and on
community justice mechanisms, include competencies addressing
awareness of family violence and conflict resolution.97
Gnibi, the College of Indigenous Australian Peoples at the Southern
Cross University, has also developed undergraduate and postgraduate
degrees that are specifically designed to address the educational
needs of Indigenous Australians from an Indigenous theory and
educational practice dealing with issues of violence, trauma and
healing.98
Violence in Indigenous Communities reported that there were no
educational programs targeted at young children for use in Indigenous
pre-schools and schools. With the knowledge we now have about
the detrimental effects of violence on children, or witnessed by children
and the generational cycles by which violence is transmitted, it is
essential to provide violence prevention education programs within
pre-schools and schools. The Masters in Indigenous Studies
(Wellbeing) program99 at Southern Cross University has developed
formal units of study for adults providing such services to children,
however these have not yet been evaluated.

Holistic composite programs Programs which are comprised of

elements of the above categories. These operate to target different
forms of violence in the community, target different categories of
offenders or victims, or employ different methods of combating or
preventing violence.100

There is also increasing recognition of the links between family violence and
substance abuse, particularly alcohol. A number of recent initiatives, particularly
in Queensland, have focused on restricting the availability of alcohol and
introducing changes to canteen management to promote reduced alcohol
consumption.
95

Memmott, P, Stacy, R, Chambers, C, & Keys, C, Violence In Indigenous Communities, op.cit,

pp71-72.
96 ibid, pp72-73.
97 See: www.humanrights.gov.au/social_justice/nilac/.
98 See: www.scu.edu.au/schools/ciap/
99 See Southern Cross University website: www.scu.edu.au/schools/ciap/courses.html,
(Accessed 16th January 2003).
100 Memmott, P, Stacy, R, Chambers, C, & Keys, C, Violence In Indigenous Communities, op.cit,
pp73-74.

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These programs function at different stages. Some are implemented during or

immediately after the occurrence of a violent incident (early reactive programs);
some are implemented some time after the incident and are aimed at resolving
the negative impact of the violence (late reactive programs); some aim to counter
any likelihood of violence at an early stage (early proactive strategies); and
others are implemented prior to violence occurring but triggered by signs that
violence may be imminent (late proactive strategies).101 This additional form of
classification of programs highlights the need for a holistic composite set of
programs to be made available for communities to address the various
dimensions of family violence.
Overall, Memmott observes in relation to existing programs and approaches
that:
The classification and review of violence programs indicated that there is
a scarcity or under-representation of programs in certain key areas of
violence, and that there is clearly a need to focus support resources into
developing such programs for wider application.
A number of omissions in the available literature on Indigenous violence
and violence programs were detected, including (i) a failure of program
designers to clearly define the forms of violence they were targeting, (ii) a
lack of program evaluation studies, and (iii) a lack of objective studies on
the nature of program failures. The review of violence programs was also
accompanied by a general finding that there was a general lack of
programs in many Indigenous communities.102

Memmott also states that a review of existing programs and approaches reveals
three recurring strategic aspects that need to be present to address family
violence in Indigenous communities, namely that programs be communitydriven; that community agencies establish partnerships with each other and
with relevant government agencies; and that composite violence programs are
able to provide a more holistic approach to community violence.103
The report notes the importance of programs that adopt an holistic or broad
approach to violence. These:
often do not focus directly on any particular kind of violent behaviour,
rather their efforts are aimed at either preventing at-risk people from falling
prey to their vulnerability, or they attempt to heal the emotional and spiritual
injury that is causing them to behave violently. Therefore, while the
possibility of self-harming behaviour is reduced, rates of other forms of
violence such as physical assault leading to homicide, spousal assault,
rape and sexual assault and child violence might also be influenced104
The implementation of composite programs, particularly in communities
displaying multiple forms of increasing violence, is shown to be an
emerging and preferred approach that reflects a more systematic way of
combating violence, combining both proactive and reactive methods
which target different age and gender groups.105
101
102
103
104
105

ibid, pp3-4.
ibid, p4.
ibid.
ibid, p76.
ibid, p4.

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The report notes that a sensitive aspect of governments introducing services is

how to best trigger such programs in communities where they are obviously
needed while at the same time creating a climate whereby the programs are
community-originating, motivated and controlled. Memmott recommends that
government agencies take a regional approach to supporting and coordinating
local community initiatives, and assisting communities to prepare community
action plans with respect to violence.106
This approach is consistent with the approach adopted in ATSICs Family
Violence Action Plan. The Plan, as previously outlined in this chapter, recognises
the critical need to adopt an holistic approach to the problem of family violence
and identifies the crucial importance of engagement with Commonwealth and
State government agencies and communities to work in partnership on family
violence strategies, as well as supporting and strengthening the capacity of
ATSIC Regional Councils to develop, implement and monitor family violence
action plans.

Ensuring access to justice for Indigenous women

A matter of great concern in relation to current debates about addressing family
violence in Indigenous communities is the lack of attention paid to issues of
access to justice for Indigenous women.
In their recent submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References
Committee inquiry into legal aid and access to justice, ATSIC note that
Indigenous women have been identified as the most legally disadvantaged
group in Australia.107 A matter of particular concern is the limited ability of
ATSIC/ATSIS, through its funding role of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Legal Services (ATSILS) to provide access to justice for Indigenous women
through legal representation and family violence services.
ATSIS note that:
ATSILS are required to prioritise provision of services in accordance with
ATSIS National Program Policy Framework for ATSILS (The ATSILS Policy
Framework) affording priority assistance to those clients who potentially
face custodial sentences. Accordingly, in face of sheer demand for
assistance, ATSILS predominantly provide legal aid services for criminal
matters (89% of case and duty matters in 2001-02; compared with only
2% family matters and 2% violence protection matters).108

This trend has, ATSIS state, discouraged Indigenous women from approaching
ATSILS for assistance initially, particularly given the likelihood of ATSILS
defending the perpetrator. They note:
The problem has often been attributed to the first-in, first-serve nature
of ATSILS work. The lack of alternative service providers in many of the
jurisdictions in which ATSILS operate means that even if the victim sought

106 ibid.
107 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Services, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee inquiry
into legal aid and access to justice, ATSIC/ATSIS, Canberra 2003, p6.
108 ibid, p7.

Social Justice Report 2003

ATSILS assistance first, if refused, they at least have the option of seeking
police assistance. However were the ATSILS to turn away the perpetrator,
he would have nowhere else to seek representation. ATSIS acknowledges
that wherever possible LACs have attempted to represent indigenous
women in cases of conflict where the partner is represented by the ATSILS.
However it remains that in many instances the victim lacks any legal advice
beyond that provided by the police.109
Indigenous women are further disadvantaged in the justice process by
the Courts (particularly the Bush Court) inadequate approach to dealing
with domestic violence and violence against women. The need for
expeditious process in domestic violence assault charges and restraining
order applications, particularly concerning the victims safety, is
compromised due to the handling of such matters by inexperienced
community police officers. Frequently a case may reach its fifth
adjournment (five months after the original hearing date at most Bush
Courts) without a plea still having been entered. It is a very challenging
demand that inexperienced police officers are required to provide what
is in effect, legal aid assistance.110
The effect of delayed access to justice for Indigenous women is even
more severe given the cultural inhibitions in their own communities such
as beliefs in the sanctity of kinship and fear of community retribution. If
they overcome this threat and seek representation, only to be met with
refusal by the under-resourced ATSILS the lesson can be devastating.
These considerations have often led to reluctance in seeking legal advice
by many women.111

As noted above, ATSIC have introduced the Family Violence Prevention Legal
Service Program (FVPLS) as a response to Indigenous womens lack of access
to Legal Aid services. However with only 13 services across Australia, they do
not provide coverage to all regions. ATSIS notes that This relatively small and
under-resourced program is unable to address the barriers Indigenous women
face in accessing Indigenous Legal Aid services, nor to provide the range of
legal services available through ATSILS.112 They express concern that:
There is an urgently growing demand for ATSILS to provide child
protection, civil and family related, (including family violence) services.
However, providing these services as well as continuing assistance in
criminal matters will require additional resources or, alternatively a change
in the priorities set for provision of legal aid services. If priorities are reset
then this will simply postpone unmet demand that will be unlikely to be
satisfied through referrals and alternative services.113

ATSIC/ATSIS note further that while they and the ATSILS that it funds are
committed to stamping out family violence, the prioritising of scarce resources
to criminal matters means that in practice, victims are not assisted while those
responsible, are. Accordingly, constraints of existing resources for legal support
limits the capacity of ATSIC/ATSIS to give its own policies concrete substance.
109
110
111
112
113

ibid, p14.
ibid, p15.
ibid, p16.
ibid, p14.
ibid, p10.

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This contradiction will be overcome only through additional resourcing of ATSILS

and Indigenous women specific legal service providers.114
ATSICs submission to the Department of Finance and Administration Pricing
Review in 2001 found a $12 million annual funding shortfall of ATSILS compared
to Legal Aid Commission benchmarks. An Office of Evaluation and Audit (OEA)
evaluation in 2003, reported the following findings in relation to the performance
of ATSILS:
ATSILS are providing legal services at a cost that is significantly lower
than that paid by mainstream LACs for legal work undertaken on a
referral basis by private practitioners, and that it is achieved at a level
of client satisfaction no different from that reported by LAC clients;
The national shortfall in ATSIC funding to ATSILS, if their outputs are
costed at the same level as LAC-paid legal work, is $25,605,598;
There is low morale and high staff turnover among ATSILS
practitioners; and
Evidence suggests that ATSILS clients are more likely to plead guilty
than mainstream offenders.115
In the context of the increased focus on family violence in recent years coupled
with the lack of progress in reducing the over-representation of Indigenous
people in custody in general, it is a matter of great concern that there is not a
greater emphasis on the legal needs of Indigenous women.
There is an urgent need to ensure appropriate funding levels for ATSILS in
order to provide a greater focus on the legal needs of Indigenous women as
well as a greater focus on preventative action and community education. At the
very least, there is also an urgent need for the federal government to allocate
additional, quarantined, funding to expand the Family Violence Prevention Legal
Service Program. Such funding needs to be new money as there is clearly no
capacity for ATSIS/ATSIC, through its support for ATSILS, to re-allocate existing
resources.

Community justice responses to family violence

The criminal justice system is extremely poor at dealing with the underlying
causes of criminal behaviour and makes a negligible contribution to addressing
the consequences of crime in the community. One of the consequences of this,
and a vital factor that is often overlooked, is that Indigenous victims of crime
and communities are poorly served by the current system.
Accordingly, the current system disadvantages Indigenous people from both
ends it has a deleterious effect on Indigenous communities through overrepresentation of Indigenous people in custody combined with the lack of
attention it gives to the high rate of Indigenous victimisation, particularly through
violence and abuse in communities. Reform to criminal justice processes,
including through community justice initiatives, must be responsive to these
factors.
114 ibid, p16.
115 ibid, p10.

Social Justice Report 2003

The past decade has seen an increased emphasis on restorative justice

mechanisms for addressing criminal behaviour in Indigenous communities to
address the needs of victims (including of family violence) as well as to make
the system more meaningful to offenders.
The most accepted definition of restorative justice is that of Tony Marshall which
states that it is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular
offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of
the offence and its implications for the future.116 The Law Commission of Canada
provides a useful commentary on restorative justice as:
fundamentally concerned with restoring social relationships, with
establishing or re-establishing social equality in relationships. That is,
relationships in which each persons rights to equal dignity, concern and
respect are satisfied As it is concerned with social equality, restorative
justice inherently demands that one attend to the nature of relationships
between individuals, groups and communities. Thus, in order to achieve
restoration of relationships, restorative justice must be concerned with
both the discrete wrong and its relevant context and causes.117

This does not necessarily seek to return a relationship to the position prior to
the commission of some wrongdoing, but instead to address the underlying
issues. Restorative justice can thus incorporate concepts of restitution and
healing, while focusing on the transformation of relationships.
There are numerous new initiatives in Australia developing community based
justice mechanisms for Indigenous people which are based on restorative justice
principles. Some of these processes, such as Law and Justice Committees in
the Northern Territory and Community Justice Groups in Queensland incorporate
an holistic response to family violence into strategies for addressing offending
in communities.

Community Justice Groups in Queensland

The Community Justice Group project was started in Kowanyama,
Hopevale and Palm Island in 1993 as a pilot project of the Queensland
Corrective Services Commission. The Community Justice Group model
aims to provide Aboriginal people with a mechanism for dealing with
problems of justice and social control which is consistent with Aboriginal
Law and cultural practices as well as utilising aspects of the AngloAustralian legal system. The justice groups have no statutory authority.
The source of authority for the group is based on the collective and
personal authority of group members deriving from the place of individuals
within kinship systems and the personal respect they are accorded by
others. Ultimately the groups authority lies in Aboriginal Law and cultural
practices.

116 Marshall, T., Criminal mediation in Great Britain (1996), 4(4), European Journal on Criminal
Policy and Research , p37.
117 Llewellyn, J and Howse, R, Restorative justice a conceptual framework, Law Commission of
Canada, Ottawa 1999, p2. See: www.lcc.gc.ca/en/sr/rj/howse/index.html

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The Community Justice Groups use traditional structures and cultural

principles to develop and apply their own system of justice and social
control. They seek to restore social order by curbing anti-social behaviour
and by creating a more positive and supportive environment. Group
actions that they handle within the existing legal framework include familyrelated dispute settlement, crime prevention and community development
projects, co-ordination with government and community agencies and
providing information and advice to the judiciary, Community Corrections
Boards and other government decision making bodies.
Perceived positive outcomes for the model to date include: decline in
crime rate and in the level of violence; an effective community corrections
program at Palm Island that has kept people from appearing before court
and from possible incarceration; dramatic decrease in juvenile crime at
Kowanyama; changes in social patterns; more effective government
service delivery, leading to savings in time and money for government
and community agencies, courts, law enforcement agencies and
correctional centres.
Perceived negative outcomes for the model include: harsh punishments;
potential drain on the communitys resources; acting without statutory
authority; and a lack of indemnity for justice group members.
The Community Justice Panel (CJP) now works with clan groups on Cape
York. The CJP model is an evolutionary process, with options at each
stage to be trialled before the justice groups go on to the next stage.
The CJP model is supplemented by monthly programs run by the
Department of Corrections and the Department of Family and Community
Services in substance abuse and anger management. There are also
womens shelters in all communities. Greater support is needed however
for people on the alcohol management program in terms of counseling
and support. Without better infrastructure, such programs will fail over
the long-term.

The Kurduju Committee Law and Justice Strategy

The Aboriginal Law and Justice Strategy of the Northern Territory seeks
to provide a whole-of-community and whole-of-government approach to
addressing community justice issues within a law and justice planning
process. It was originally implemented at Ali-Curung in 1996 and in
Lajamanu in 1999. Both these communities now have their own law and
justice plans and are engaged in peer modeling with Yuendumu
community.
In each community a law and justice committee has been established.
These committees have a wide range of responsibilities and comprise
key community representatives from the Tribal Council, Community Elders,
Safe House Committee, womens group, traditional owners, outstation
representatives and other community organisations. Representatives from
the Ali-Curung, Lajamanu and Yuendumu communities also sit on the
Kurduju Committee, which provides an opportunity for information-sharing
and peer modeling, and also to address a perceived deficit in policy and

Social Justice Report 2003

program knowledge, and expertise in regard to remote communities.

The aim of the law and justice plans was to facilitate the empowerment
of the local community to assume a greater role in law and justice, and
to address law and justice concerns through local dispute resolution
where practical. There was a perceived need for low-level intervention
by Aboriginal communities in early crime prevention and more productive
participation in the justice system.
At Ali-Curung, Lajamanu and Yuendumu, individuals and community
organisations had largely lost their capacity to resolve their own law and
justice issues through the introduction and consequential reliance on
external dispute resolution. Subsequently, the Law and Justice Strategy
sought to incorporate Aboriginal dispute resolution principles into
community law and justice processes. This was not a straightforward
revival of customary law but an innovative adaptation of traditional decision
making in a contemporary situation through the merging of mainstream
community based dispute resolution with mainstream law and justice.
The process is negotiated and agreed to between community
organisations and government agencies.
The Ali-Curung and Lajamanu law and justice committees are involved
in diversionary programs, pre-court conferencing, victim offender
conferencing, community service orders, and the operation of night patrols
and safe houses. Ali-Curung, Lajamanu and Yuendumu have adopted
an approach to family violence that involves local dispute resolution and
healing methodology.
As in the case of the community justice panels in Queensland, the
experience of the Law and Justice Strategy to date indicates that any
initiatives seeking to formalise an interface between aspects of customary
law and the western legal system should be organic, evolutionary and
holistic. In order to be effective, any community justice initiatives will also
involve a considerable investment in community consultation, participation
and education: the emphasis should be on devolving power to the
communities. A one-size-fits-all approach or the top-down application of
a preconceived model is unlikely to yield long-term results and could
even be counterproductive in resolving law and justice issues.
The last two years has also seen the development of community justice
mechanisms for involvement of Indigenous peoples in sentencing. Examples
include the Ngunga Court and Ngunga Youth Court in South Australia; the Murri
Court in Queensland; the Koori Court in Victoria and circle sentencing in New
South Wales.118 Generally, these processes seek to incorporate an Aboriginal
traditional customary law approach to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders
within the framework of existing legislation. While there are variations between
the various models, they all involve Aboriginal Elders sitting alongside the

118 For an overview of these processes see: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Submission to the Northern Territory Law Reform Committees inquiry into
recognition of Aboriginal customary law, HREOC Sydney 2003.

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magistrate to advise on sentencing options, with members of the offenders

family, the victim, the victims family and other interested community members
participating in the sentencing process.
These processes have been extremely successful in their initial years. Currently,
however, they are limited to dealing with particular non-violent offences.
Accordingly, offences relating to violence and sexual offences cannot be
addressed within these sentencing processes.
In a discussion paper titled Holistic community justice, the NSW Aboriginal
Justice Advisory Council proposes that restorative justice approaches such as
these sentencing options should be available for dealing with family violence.
Specifically, they have proposed the establishment of localised community
controlled justice and healing centres combined with alternative sentencing
processes for offenders which seek to establish formal links with local Aboriginal
communities.119 In this approach, community justice and healing centres would
be established as a single point of contact for victims of family violence. They
would assess their needs (such as emergency accommodation, financial
assistance, health care, counselling or healing) and negotiate with appropriate
service delivery agencies on their behalf. Should the victim wish to pursue their
matter through the criminal justice system, the centre would also provide
assistance with this. The centre would also be community controlled, and actively
engage the local Aboriginal community with the consequence that it could assist
the victim and provide a direct community sanction on the offenders behaviour
and demonstrate the communitys intolerance of family violence.120 Alternative
sentencing processes, such as circle sentencing, would also be available to
ensure that the causes and consequences of the offence are dealt with
holistically.121
AJAC argues that this approach:
Provides an alternative model to address the serious matter of family
violence in Aboriginal communities. The urgency of actually making an
on the ground impact where communities can actually be involved directly
in programs ensures a level of community re-empowerment. This
approach also exposes family violence as an unacceptable crime in
Aboriginal communities, but to actively ensure a service for victims whilst
offenders take responsibility and deal with the underlying causes of their
offending behaviours.
It is argued that long term effects will be an overall reduction of family
violence, and that communities can be positioned to actively heal the
wounds of family violence according to their unique and local needs.122

There are similarities in this proposal with the Northern Territory Law and Justice
Committee and Queensland Community Justice Group approaches, as well as
similarities with the roles of services established under ATSICs Family Violence
Prevention Legal Service Program. It also provides what the Memmott report,

119
120
121
122

Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council, Holistic community justice, op.cit, pp10-11.

ibid, p10.
ibid.
ibid, p11.

Social Justice Report 2003

as discussed earlier, identified as an holistic composite set of programs for

addressing family violence.
It also has similarities to Canadian models for addressing sex offending by
Indigenous people. The Canadian approach emphasises the need for restorative
justice, community-based initiatives beyond the justice system such as victimoffender mediation, family group conferencing, sentencing circles and formal
cautioning. It also highlights the gaps that exist in addressing Aboriginal sex
offender needs and the need for Aboriginal control of appropriately cultural
services. The report Aboriginal Sexual Offending in Canada identifies four areas
where action is necessary to address Aboriginal sexual offending: community
development; program development; research and human resources.123 The
effectiveness of this model and whether aspects could be transferred to the
Australian context, particularly in regard to community capacity-building and
service coordination, is an avenue for further investigation.
These models and proposals suggest that the full potential of community justice
mechanisms for addressing family violence has not been explored sufficiently,
and may provide an appropriate way forward for addressing some aspects of
need.

Conclusion
This chapter has identified a range of commitments and recent initiatives by all
governments to address its impact. These commitments are welcome and long
overdue. As yet, they are not sufficiently wide-ranging in their scope or effectively
funded. There are also significant gaps in service provision, including through
a general paucity of programs and lack of legal assistance to Indigenous women
in many areas. As a consequence, there remains a need for ongoing, continuous
support for innovative, community led solutions to address family violence and
the adoption of an holistic, coordinated approach by governments. ATSICs
Family Violence Plan provides a platform for improving this situation, with the
development of regionally targeted programs and action plans. The escalating
and debilitating affects of family violence on Indigenous people and communities
requires urgent attention.

123 Hylton, J H, Aboriginal Sexual Offending in Canada, The Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2002,
p157.

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Appendices

194

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195

Appendix 1

A statistical overview of Aboriginal and Torres

Strait Islander peoples in Australia
Introduction
This appendix is a collection of statistics chosen for their relevance in highlighting
the key characteristics of the Indigenous population. It focuses on key areas
such as health, education, employment, housing, and contact with criminal
justice and welfare systems. Where possible, the data is presented in a way
that identifies absolute and relative change in the situation of Indigenous peoples
over the past five and ten years, and provides some international comparisons.
While reducing people and their experiences to percentages and numbers is
problematic, statistics are useful as indicators of disparities and inequalities,
and of similarities, between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. The
statistics reproduced are intended to be representative of the current situation,
although not exhaustive or comprehensive.
The main source of information used is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)
and the Census data, various surveys and data collection projects that it
undertakes.1 Recently, the Steering Committee for the Review of Government
Service Provision has also released the first national report on key indicators for
overcoming Indigenous disadvantage which draws together data collected
across all levels of government.2
Compiling an accurate profile of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
remains an ongoing task. There are a range of different limitations in current
collections of census, survey and administrative data which must be borne in
mind.

For a description of other data collected on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, see
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, The Health and Welfare of Australias Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Peoples 2003, cat no 4704.0, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003,
pp231-2.
Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming Indigenous
Disadvantage: Key indicators 2003: Report, Productivity Commission, Canberra, 2003.

Appendix 1

196

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders were first counted as citizens in the 1971
Census.3 Since then, censuses have shown a significant increase in people
identifying as Aborigines and/or Torres Strait Islanders. These increases cannot
be accounted for by the birth rate alone. Between the 1991 and 1996 Census
there was a 33% increase recorded in Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander population, while between the 1996 and 2001 Census there was a
16% increase. In contrast, the total population in Australia increased by five per
cent between 1991 and 1996 and four per cent from 1996-2001. The ABS
attributes the increase to a growing propensity of people to identify as Aboriginal
and/or Torres Strait Islander, and the greater efforts made to record Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people in the censuses.
Because of the recorded increases in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
population, the ABS has warned that comparisons made between two censuses
must be made with caution. They recommend comparing percentages from
two censuses, rather than directly comparing counts or numbers.4
Despite the increases in people identifying as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
in censuses, however, there are still believed to be significant undercounts of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people occurring. Identifying as Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander, or any other group, is voluntary. In the 2001 Census,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status is unknown for 767,757 people who
completed the census questionnaire: that is 4.1% of the total population.
Because some of these people will be Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander
the ABS calculates what it calls experimental estimates to give a figure for the
true size of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population. It is important
to distinguish actual counts from censuses from the experimental estimates.

Population figures
a) Size and growth of the Indigenous population
Table 1 below shows that 410,000 people identified as of Aboriginal and/or
Torres Strait Islander origin in the 2001 Census. This was a 16% increase since
the 1996 Census. The ABS estimate that three-quarters of this growth over the
five years from 1996-2001 can be explained by demographic factors (births
and deaths), with the remaining increase the result of other factors (such as
improved Census collection methods and increased tendencies of people to
identify as Indigenous).5

3
4
5

Australian Bureau of Statistics, op.cit, p226.

ibid, p245.
ibid, p13.

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197

Table 1: Census count of Indigenous population, 1991-20016

Recorded by the Census

Increase on previous census (per cent)
% of the total population (per cent)

1991

1996

2001

265,500
17.0
1.6

353,000
33.0
2.0

410,000
16.0
2.2

Due to the undercount in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people believed
to occur in the census, the ABS has estimated that the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander population in 2001 was 458,500 people or 2.4% of the total
Australian population.7 There were approximately 409,729 people of Aboriginal
origin and 29,239 of Torres Strait Islander origin. A further 19,552 people identified
as of both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander origin.8 There are slightly more
women (231,000) than men (227,500) in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
population. This is a similar distribution to the non-Indigenous population.9
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population is growing faster than the
non-Indigenous population. The annual rate of growth for Indigenous people
has been estimated at 2.3% compared with approximately 1.2% for nonIndigenous people.10 It is estimated that the Indigenous population will grow to
more than 550,000 by the year 2011.11

b) Age structure of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Population

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have a different population age
structure to the rest of the Australian population. In common with many other
western nations, the non-Indigenous population of Australia is rapidly ageing,
whereas the Indigenous population is facing increased growth in young age
groups. Table 2 below demonstrates the different age structures of Indigenous
and non-Indigenous Australians.

6
7
8
9
10

11

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population characteristics: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians 2001, cat no 4713.0, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003, p15.
ibid.
ibid, p19, Table 2.2.
ibid, p20.
Department of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Indigenous Affairs, Indigenous people in
Australia (Fact sheet) Department of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Indigenous Affairs
website, http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/facts/index.htm (2 December, 2003).
Hunter, Kinfu, Taylor, The future of Indigenous work: Forecasts of labour force status to 2011,
CAEPR Discussion paper no. 251/2003, Australian National University, Canberra, 2003, p2.

Appendix 1

198

Table 2: Proportion of Indigenous and non-Indigenous population

in specific age groups, 200112
Age group

Indigenous: % of population
Non-Indigenous: % of population

0-4

5-14

15-24

25-44

44-64

65+

13.1
6.4

25.8
13.6

18.4
13.6

28.1
30.2

11.8
23.4

2.9
12.8

The Indigenous population is considerably younger than the non-Indigenous

population. The median age for Indigenous people is 20 years, whereas it is 35
years for non-Indigenous Australians. There are also relatively fewer Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people aged 65 or over.

c) Where Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people live

Almost 60% of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population lived in two states
in 2001: New South Wales and Queensland. Despite this, Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people make up a small minority of the total population of these
States (2.1% and 3.5% respectively). As a proportion of the total population,
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders constitute 28.8% of people in the Northern
Territory.13 Table 3 below details the percentage of the Indigenous population
that lives in each state and territory, and the proportion of each state and territory
that is Indigenous.

Table 3: Location of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples

by State and Territory14
Percentage of the
Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander population
living in a State or Territory

Percentage of the
Non-Indigenous
population living in a
State or Territory

Percentage of the State

or Territory population
that is Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander

29.4
6.1
27.5
5.6
14.4
3.8
12.4
0.9

34
25.2
18.5
7.8
9.7
2.4
0.7
1.7

2.1
0.6
3.5
1.7
3.5
3.7
28.8
1.2

NSW
Vic
Qld
SA
WA
Tas
NT
ACT
12
13
14

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population characteristics: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians 2001, op.cit, p20, Table 2.3.
ibid, p19, Table 2.1.
ibid.

Social Justice Report 2003

Most Torres Strait Islanders (86.2%) live on mainland Australia, with 13.8% living
in the Torres Strait region. 58.4% of the Torres Strait Islander population live in
the state of Queensland and a further 18.3% in NSW.15

d) Remoteness
While the majority of Indigenous people live in either major cities, inner or outer
regional areas of Australia, the proportion of people that live in remote or very
remote areas is much higher than for the non-Indigenous population. Table 4
below illustrates that 30% of Indigenous people live in major cities, as opposed
to 67% of the non-Indigenous population; with over 26% of Indigenous people
living in remote or very remote areas, which compares to just two per cent of
the non-Indigenous population.16

Table 4: Location of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

population by remoteness17
Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander

Non-Indigenous

30.2%
20.3%
23.1%
8.8%
17.7%

67.2%
20.7%
10.1%
1.5%
0.5%

Major cities
Inner regional
Outer regional
Remote
Very remote

Indigenous households and families

An Indigenous household is defined by the ABS as being one in which an
Indigenous person was resident and present on census night. These can be
further classified as family, group or lone person households. There were
approximately 145,000 Indigenous households recorded in the 2001 Census.
Of these, the vast majority (78%) contained one family. Of the remaining 22%,
five per cent were multi-family households and five per cent were group
households. Approximately 13% of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
live in lone person households.18

15
16
17
18

ibid, p19, Table 2.2.

ibid, p22, Table 2.5.
ibid.
ibid, p27.

Appendix 1

199

200

Couples with dependent children comprise 31% of Indigenous families, whereas

24% were one parent families (as opposed to 10% of non-Indigenous families)
and 23% were couples without children (compared with 36% of non-Indigenous
couples).
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are more likely to live in one or
multi-family households than non-Indigenous people (82% compared with 70%)
and less likely to live in lone person households (13% compared with 24%).
Living arrangements vary according to remoteness. For example, multi-family
households increase with remoteness whereas one parent families tend to live
in major cities.19

Language and culture

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures today reflect both traditional
elements and the influence of non-Indigenous cultures.
80% of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people reported speaking
only English at home, which is about the same as the non-Indigenous
population.
12% of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people reported speaking
an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander language at home; with three
quarters of those recording they were also fluent in English.
Many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are bilingual;
however, the pattern varies with geographical location. 55% of those
living in remote areas reported speaking an Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander language, compared withone per centin urban centres.
Older Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (over 45 years) are
more likely to speak a language than younger people.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages are more likely to be
spoken in the centre and north of Australia than in the south.20

In 1994, the NATSIS survey reported approximately 60% of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people identified with a clan, tribal or language group.21

19
20
21

ibid, p28-29.
ibid, p35-36.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey 1994
Detailed Findings, cat no 4190.0, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1995, p9, Table 8.

Social Justice Report 2003

201

Health
a) Life expectancy
During 1999-2001, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimated the
adjusted life expectancy22 of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander newborn males
to be 56.3 years and 62.8 years for females.23 Life expectation for Indigenous
males is similar to the life expectancy rate for the total male population in 19011910. The rate for Indigenous females is similar to the rate for the total female
population in 1920-22.24
For Indigenous females, the current life expectancy rate is lower than that given
in the United Nations Human Development Index for India (63 years) and about
the same as in sub-Saharan Africa with AIDS factored out (62 years) according
to the World Health Organisation.25 For Indigenous males, life expectancy is
lower than the UN figure for Myanmar (57 years), Papua New Guinea (57 years)
and Cambodia (57.4 years).26
There are issues relating to the quality of data collected about life expectancy
which make comparisons over time difficult. Nationally such information is
unobtainable because death certificate data from New South Wales, Victoria
and Queensland is unreliable before 1997 and due to changes in methods for
calculating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander life expectancy from 1997
onwards.27 Table 4 and 5 below illustrate changes in life expectancy for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islanders and the general population since 1997.
These figures indicate that in the period 1997-2001, life expectation for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander females decreased slightly from 63 to 62.8 years. For
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander males it increased from 55.6 to 56.3 years.28
The disparity in life expectancy between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people and the general population in Australia increased over the period 19972001. For males, the gap increased from 20.6 to 20.7 years and for females,
from 18.8 to 19.6 years.29

22

23
24

25
26
27
28
29

The ABS produces two estimates for the life expectation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people. One is an observed estimate, based directly on available data. However, because of
problems with data, it also produces an adjusted estimate, which it expects would be more
accurate. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Deaths (2001), cat no 3302.0, Commonwealth of
Australia, Canberra, 2002, p102.
ibid, p101.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, The Health and Welfare
of Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, 2001, cat no 4704.0, Commonwealth
of Australia, 2001, p121.
World Health Organisation, World Health Report 2002: Overview, WHO, Geneva, 2002, http://
www.who.int/whr/2002/overview/en/index1.html (4 December, 2003).
United Nations Development Programme, UN Human Development Report 2003, Oxford
University Press, 2003, p237.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Deaths, op.cit, p102.
ibid, p101.
Comparing data from the following sources: ibid, p101 (unnumbered table: Experimental
Estimates of Life Expectancy at Birth, Adjusted Life Expectancy) [Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander data, 1997-1999 and 1999-2001]; p92, Table 6.51 [Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
adjusted data for period 1998-2000]; p76, Table 6.32 [General population data].

Appendix 1

202

Table 5: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander life expectation compared

with that of the general population (males)
Period

General population
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Difference
Inequality gap

1997-1999

1998-2000

1999-2001

76.2
55.6
20.6 years

75.6
56

77
56.3
20.7 years

Increase of
0.1 year

Table 6: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander life expectation compared

with that of the general population (females)
Period

General population
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Difference
Inequality gap

1997-1999

1998-2000

1999-2001

81.8
63.0
18.8 years

82
62.7

82.4
62.8
19.6 years

Increase of
0.8 year

b) Life expectancy Comparison with other Indigenous peoples

Approximately thirty years ago, life expectancy rates for Indigenous peoples in
Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America were similar to the
rates for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in Australia. However, significant
gains in life expectancy have been made in the past two decades.30 As shown
on Graph 1 below, Australia has fallen significantly behind in improving the life
expectancy of Indigenous peoples. Although comparisons should be made
with caution (because of the way different countries calculate life expectation)
data suggests Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander males live between 8.8 and
13.5 years less than Indigenous males in Canada, New Zealand and the USA.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander females live between 10.9 and 12.6 years
less than Indigenous females in these countries.

30

Ring, I, Firman, D, Reducing Indigenous mortality in Australia; lessons from other countries,
Medical Journal of Australia website, 1998, http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/nov16/ring/
ring.html (4 December 2003).

Social Justice Report 2003

Graph 1: Comparisons of life expectancy for Indigenous peoples in Australia,

Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America31

82

Australian national average

1999-2001

76.3

Canada, First Nations

2000

76.6

74.2
68.9

USA, First Nations

1996-1998
71.6

Years

67.4
New Zealand, Maori
1995-1997

67.2

Aboriginal and
Torres Strait
Islander
1999-2001

62.8

56.3
56.3

Male life
expectancy

Female life
expectancy

c) Median age at death, 1990-2001

Median death age is the age at which half of a population group will have died.
In 2001, the median death age of Indigenous people (male and female
combined) was 54 years, around 24 years less than that in the general
population.32 Graphs 2 and 3 below show that while the median death age for
the general population has increased steadily over the past decade, the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander age has fluctuated. This in part reflects
data quality issues such as the smaller population samples involved and the
changing proportion of people being identified as Indigenous on death
certificates.

31

32

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Deaths, op.cit, p 92, Table 6.51 [Data for Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people, New Zealand and the United States of America]. Statistics Canada, A
Statistical Profile of the Health of First Nations in Canada, p16, Table 2.3.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Deaths, op.cit, p20.

Appendix 1

203

Graph 2: Median age at death (male), 1990-200133

80
75.8

Non-Indigenous male

75
72.3

Median death age

70
65
No reduction in inequality gap
60
55

52

50
46.2

45

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

male, with trendline

40
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Years

In 2001, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander males had a median death age of
52 years. It was highest in New South Wales (56 years) and lowest in the Northern
Territory (45 years).34

Graph 3: Median age at death (female) 1990-200135

85
Non-Indigenous female

81.9

80
78.9
75
Median age at death

204

70

Inequality gap increases

65

60

57.6

55
55.5

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

female, with trendline

50
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Years

33
34
35

ibid, p79, Table 6.35. Note: Indigenous data for the period 1991-1997 excludes figures for
NSW, Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania.
ibid.
ibid, p80. Note: Indigenous data for the period 1991-1997 excludes figures for NSW,
Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania.

Social Justice Report 2003

In 2001, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander females had a median death age
of 58 years in 2001. It was highest in Victoria (64 years) and lowest in the Northern
Territory (53 years).36

d) Infant health Low Birth weight babies

A low birth weight baby weighs less than 2500 grams at birth.37 Connections
have been made between low birth weight and life-long health impacts including
coronary heart diseases, type 2 diabetes, central obesity and hypertension. All
of these are highly prevalent among Indigenous adults.38
Despite gains made in the 1980s, the number of low birth weight babies born to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women has increased over the late 1990s.
It is presently double the non-Indigenous average as set out in Graph 4.39 In the
same period, there have also been increases in low birth weight babies born to
non-Indigenous women (from 6.2 to 6.5). Despite low birth weight worsening in
both population groups, the disparity between them has increased slightly.

Graph 4: Low birth weight babies 1994-2000

Low birth weight babies,

per 1000 births

16
14
12

12.4

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rate

13

12.8

10
8
6

6.2

6.1

6.5

Non-Indigenous rate

4
2
94-96

96-98

98 -00

Years

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rates of low birth weight babies are greater
than those in some low development countries according to the Human
Development Index collated by the United Nations Development Program. Graph
5 shows how Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rates compare with those in
the UN Human Development Index.

36
37
38

39

ibid, p20.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, op.cit, p125.
Gray, M, Hunter, B, Taylor, J, Health Expenditure, Income and Health Status among Indigenous
and Other Australians, CAEPR Research Monograph No 21, Australian National University,
Canberra, 2002, p38.
Australian Bureau Of Statistics and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, The Health and
Welfare of Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples cat no 4704.0, Commonwealth
of Australia, Canberra, 1999, p86, Table 6.6 [1994-1996 data]; Australian Bureau Of Statistics
and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare: The Health and Welfare of Australias Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples 2001, cat no 4704.0, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra,
2001, p63, Table 5.5. [1996-1998]. Australian Bureau Of Statistics and Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare, The Health and Welfare of Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Peoples 2003, op.cit, p126, Table 6.5. [1998-2000].

Appendix 1

205

Graph 5: Low birth weight babies, international comparisons (2000)40

Low birth weight babies per 1000 births

14
13

Aboriginal and
Torres Strait
Islander Australia
12.8
Ethiopia,Senegal ,
12

12

Tanzania
11

11
10
9

Zimbabwe
10
Lebanon, Mexico, Indonesia
9
Non-Indigenous
Australia
6.5

8
7
6
5
4
Population groups, by country

e) Infant health Infant mortality

Infant mortality is a death that occurs in the first year of life. It can reflect poor
infant and mother health. Graph 6 shows that approximately 2.5 times as many
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander infants die before their first birthday as nonIndigenous children. The infant mortality rate for Indigenous children in the
Northern Territory is four times the national rate.

Graph 6: Infant mortality Australia, 1993-200141

Deaths in the first year of life, per 1000 births

206

14
12

12.8

Indigenous:
national, with trendline

12.7

10
8
6
5.8
4

National average,
with trendline

5.2

2
0

95-97

96-98

97-99

98-00

99-01

Years

40

41

Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, The Health and
Welfare of Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples 2003, op.cit, p126
[Indigenous]. United Nations Development Programme, op.cit, pp171-3 [International
comparisons].
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Deaths, op.cit, p 23, Table 3.7 [Indigenous national average];
p71, Table 6.27, [National averages]. Note: the ABS calculates the Indigenous figure over
three year periods, whereas the national figure is calculated annually.

Social Justice Report 2003

Because of the fluctuations in birth rate, no reliable trend is evident. However,

the data suggests a widening in the disparity between the two groups since the
mid 1990s as illustrated in Table 7. Note that the ABS calculates the Indigenous
figure over three year periods, whereas the national figure is calculated annually.

Table 7: Disparity in the infant mortality rate (IMR)42

Indigenous IMR
National IMR
Disparity in IMRs

1995-7

1996-8

1997-8

1998-2000

1999-2001

12.8

12.7

13

13.5

12.7

(1996)
5.8

(1997)
5.3

(1998)
5.0

(1999)
5.7

(2000)
5.2

7.4

7.8

7.2

Approximately thirty years ago, Indigenous peoples in countries such as Canada,

New Zealand and the United States of America suffered similarly high infant
mortality rates. However, these countries have significantly reduced the rates
of infant mortality in recent decades, as shown in Graph 7.

Graph 7: Infant mortality and Indigenous peoples, international

comparisons (selected years)43

Deaths in first year of life, per 1000 infants

20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6

Indigenous
NT
99-01
19.2
Indigenous
Australia
99-01
12.7

USA
First
Nations
96-98
8.9

New
Zealand
1999
8.1

Canada
Indigenous
2000
8
Australia
non-Indigenous
99-01
4.6

4
2
0
Country and Indigenous status

42
43

ibid.
ibid, Australian Bureau Of Statistics, Deaths, op.cit, p 93, Table 6.52 [Australia, New Zealand,
United States of America]; p23, Table 3.7 [Northern Territory]. ibid, Statistics Canada, p22
[Canada].

Appendix 1

207

208

f) The six main causes of death of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
Table 8 sets out the six main causes of death for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples in the period 1999 to 2001. These causes of death are presented
as Standardised mortality ratios (or SMRs). These are calculated by first
determining the number of deaths per 1,000 head of population caused by a
particular illness or disease, and then expressing this as a ratio of deaths from
the same causes in a different population group.44
Table 7 shows that 11.7 times more Indigenous females (compared with nonIndigenous females) and 7.9 times more Indigenous males (compared with
non-Indigenous males) die of endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases
such as diabetes; and 4.8 times more Indigenous females and males die of
diseases of the digestive system. Indigenous people are also significantly overrepresented in deaths caused by respiratory diseases, neoplasms (such as
cancers), diseases of the circulatory system (including heart disease), and
external causes such as accidents and suicide.

Table 8: Standardised mortality ratios for the six main causes of

death for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people45
Cause

Diseases of circulatory system (inc. heart disease)

External causes (inc. accidents, suicide etc)
Neoplasms (inc. cancers)
Diseases of respiratory system
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases (inc. diabetes)
Diseases of the digestive system

ATSI
Female SMR

ATSI
Male SMR

2.8: 1
3.2: 1
1.6: 1
3.9: 1
11.7: 1
4.8: 1

3.2: 1
2.9: 1
1.6: 1
4.4: 1
7.9: 1
4.8: 1

The ABS has demonstrated the impact of these six causes of death on life
expectancy for Indigenous peoples. It has sought to calculate the impact of
eliminating the disparities experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples in relation to these six causes of death. The years of life expectation
gained is shown in table 9. Note that given the complex interaction between
diseases and causes of death, the impact would not necessarily be cumulative.46

44
45
46

Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, The Health and
Welfare of Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples 2003, op.cit, p181.
ibid, p192, Table 9.11.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends 2002, cat no 4102.0, Commonwealth
of Australia, Canberra, p90.

Social Justice Report 2003

209

Table 9: Potential years of life expectancy gained by Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander people if selected causes of death
reduced to that of the total population 1998-200047
Cause

Diseases of the circulatory system

External causes
Malignant neoplasms
Diseases of the respiratory system
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic disease
Diseases of the digestive system

Male years of life

expectation gained

Female years of life

expectation gained

6.5
3.7
2.4
2.0
1.6
1.0

6.4
1.7
2.5
1.7
2.5
0.8

g) Health risk factors

In 2001, the ABS National Health Survey classified 63% of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people over 15 years of age as overweight or obese compared
with 50% of non-Indigenous people. The proportion of the population in both
groups defined as overweight or obese has increased since 1995.48 Excess
body weight is a risk factor for diabetes, heart disease and other conditions.
The Survey reported 49% of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people aged
18 years and over were smokers, compared with 24% of the general population.49
Smoking is a risk factor for coronary heart disease, stroke and cancers. Generally,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are less likely to consume alcohol
than non-Indigenous people. The Survey reported 56% of Indigenous
respondents did not drink alcohol, compared with 38% of non-Indigenous
respondents. 10% of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were likely to
consume alcohol at risk or high risk levels, compared with 11% of non-Indigenous
people.50 However, this finding contrasts with other surveys that report Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people consuming alcohol at risk levels twice that of
the non-Indigenous community.51

47
48
49
50
51

ibid.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, National Health Survey, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Results, Australia 2001, cat no 4715.0, p33, Table 14.
ibid.
ibid.
Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, The Health and
Welfare of Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples 2003, op.cit, p174.

Appendix 1

210

Income
a) Household income
Estimates of household income are adjusted by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics according to equivalence factors in order to recognise the impact of
different household compositions and different household sizes.52
In 2001, the mean (or average) equivalised gross household income for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people was $364 per week, or 62% of the
rate for non-Indigenous people ($585 per week). The ABS has stated that this
disparity reflects the lower household incomes received by households with
Indigenous person(s), and the tendency for such households to be larger than
other households and hence for the equivalised gross household income to be
lower.53
For Indigenous persons, income levels generally decline with increased
geographic remoteness. In major cities and regional areas, average equivalised
incomes for Indigenous persons were approximately 70% of the corresponding
income for non-Indigenous persons. This declines to approximately 60% in
remote areas, and just 40% in very remote areas.54
Between 1996 and 2001, average equivalised gross household income for
Indigenous persons rose by 11% (after adjustment for inflation using the
Consumer Price Index) compared with 13% for non-Indigenous persons. As a
consequence, the relative income disparity between Indigenous and nonIndigenous persons slightly increased over the five year period (with Indigenous
persons earning 62% the non-Indigenous rate in 2001, compared with 64% in
1996).55

b) Individual income
The median weekly gross individual income for Indigenous people in 2001 was
$226 (a $36 or 19% increase from the 1996 rate). This compares to $380 for
non-Indigenous people in 2001 (an increase of 28.4% from the 1996 figure of
$296).56
The disparity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people increased
noticeably in relation to individual income over the decade 1991-2001. The
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research have estimated that median
individual income for Indigenous adults, expressed as a ratio to non-Indigenous
adult income, fell from 0.70 in 1991 to 0.65 in 1996 to 0.59 in 2001 (where 1.0
indicates a situation of equality or parity).57
52
53
54
55
56
57

For a full explanation of equivalisation factors see Australian Bureau of Statistics, op.cit,
Population characteristics: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians 2001, p81.
ibid.
ibid, p82.
ibid.
ibid, p88, Table 7.2.
Altman, J and Hunter, B, Monitoring practical reconciliation: Evidence from the reconciliation
decade, 1991-2001, Discussion Paper 254/2003, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research, Canberra 2003, pp 5-6, Tables 1 and 2.

Social Justice Report 2003

Much of the difference is due to the large numbers of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people who derive their income from unemployment benefits or
who are engaged in Community Development Employment Projects. There are
also a larger number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in lowerskilled jobs. The ABS has also noted that Indigenous persons tend to earn less
money than non-Indigenous persons within the same occupational categories.
For example, in 2001 the median income of Indigenous persons in managerial
positions was 81% of the non-Indigenous median; for professionals it was 73%
and among labourers just 53%.58

Employment
a) Participation in the labour force
In the 2001 Census, 52% of Indigenous people aged 15 years and over reported
that they were participating in the labour force (meaning that they were engaged
in mainstream employment, participating in CDEP or unemployed). This
compares to 53% in 1996. The participation rate was higher for Indigenous
men (60%) than Indigenous women (45%).
The labour force participation rate for non-Indigenous people was 63% in 2001
(i.e. 11% higher than for Indigenous people). When adjusted to include only
people aged 15-64 years, the disparity in labour force participation widens further
with 54% of Indigenous people in this age group in the labour force compared
with 73% of non-Indigenous people.
Table 10 shows that labour force participation rates for Indigenous people
declines with remoteness, with a 57% participation rate in major cities compared
with 46% in very remote areas.59

Table 10: Labour force participation, by remoteness, 200160

Major cities
Inner Regional
Outer regional
Remote
Very remote

58
59
60

Indigenous
Australians

Non-Indigenous
Australians

57.3
52.0
50.7
50.5
46.2

64.3
59.9
63.3
71.8
78.1

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population Characteristics: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians 2001, op.cit, p85.
ibid, p65.
ibid, p71,Table 6.1.

Appendix 1

211

212

Nationally, 46% of all Indigenous people aged 15-64 years were not in the labour
force in 2001. This indicates that they were not actively engaged in the labour
market, for reasons including carer responsibilities, illness, disability or lack of
market opportunities. By comparison, 27% of non-Indigenous people in the
same age group were not participating in the labour force.61

b) Unemployment
The unemployment rate is the number of people unemployed expressed as a
proportion of the total labour force. The ABS does not classify participation in
the CDEP scheme as unemployed.
In 2001, the unemployment rate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
was 20%. The rate in 1996 was 23%. This is approximately three times higher
than the rate for non-Indigenous Australians.62
Table 11 shows the unemployment rate for Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians by remoteness. It shows that Indigenous people living in inner and
outer regional areas have the highest unemployment rate. The low rate of
unemployment in very remote areas relates to low levels of labour force
participation, combined with high levels of CDEP participation ad limited
mainstream labour market opportunities.

Table 11: Unemployment rates by remoteness, 200163

Major cities
Inner Regional
Outer regional
Remote
Very remote

Indigenous
Australians

Non-Indigenous
Australians

20.1
25.0
23.1
19.2
8.3

6.9
8.1
7.4
4.9
3.5

Table 12 shows that unemployment rates were highest for Indigenous people
aged 15-17 years (31.8%), and 18-24 years (27.3%). These rates were
approximately double the non-Indigenous rate.

61
62
63

ibid, p66.
ibid.
ibid, p71, Table 6.1.

Social Justice Report 2003

213

Table 12: Unemployment rates by age group, 200164

15-17 Years
18-24 Years
25-34 Years
35-44 Years
45-54 years
55-64 Years

Indigenous
Australians

Non-Indigenous
Australians

31.8
27.3
20.7
16.0
11.7
10.4

16.3
12.8
7.1
5.7
4.9
5.7

c) Employment and CDEP Participation

Indigenous people employed in 2001 had the following characteristics:
93% were employees, with four per cent self-employed and two per
cent employers;
55% worked in the private sector and 23% in government;
52% were full time and 38% part time;
60% worked in low skill occupations, 21% in medium skill occupations
and 15% in high skill occupations;
29% reported having a non-school qualification.65

In 2001, 18% of all Indigenous people who were classified as employed were
engaged in Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP). The CDEP
Scheme enables participants to exchange unemployment benefits for
opportunities to undertake work and training in activities managed by local
Indigenous community organisations. Compared with all Indigenous people
who were employed, Indigenous people identified as CDEP participants were:
twice as likely to work part time (74% compared with 38%);
more likely to report working in a low skilled occupation (79%
compared with 60%); and
one third as likely to report having a non-school qualification (nine
per cent compared with 29%).66

Education
The 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey demonstrated
that the lack of secondary and tertiary qualifications impacts negatively on an
Indigenous persons ability to obtain ongoing, gainful employment.67 The Centre
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) also notes that if Indigenous
64
65
66
67

ibid, p70, Table 6.2.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population Characteristics: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians 2001, op.cit, p68.
ibid.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey 1994,op.cit.

Appendix 1

214

Australians do not keep up with the rest of the Australian population in

educational attainment this will result in Indigenous Australians being less
competitive in the labour market and increase the risk of continuing the cycle of
severe poverty and disadvantage.68
CAEPR reports there have been absolute improvements in Indigenous education
outcomes such as Indigenous post-secondary education qualification rates
between 1986 and 2001. They caution however that:
It is of concern that relative to the rate of improvement for non-Indigenous
Australians there has been little or no gain. This relative lack of
improvement occurs not only in the proportion of the population with
post-secondary qualifications, but also in the proportion of Indigenous
teenagers staying at school. By any measure the Indigenous population
remains relatively disadvantaged.69

a) Secondary education
Table13 below compares the highest level of secondary schooling completed
by Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. It shows that 39.5 per cent of nonIndigenous Australians had completed Year 12 or equivalent compared with
16.8 per cent of Indigenous Australians. Further, one per cent of non-Indigenous
Australians reported that they did not go to school compared with three per
cent of Indigenous Australians.

Table 13: Highest level of schooling completed, 200170

Year 8 or below
Year 9 or equivalent
Year 10 or equivalent
Year 11 or equivalent
Year 12 or equivalent
Still at school
Did not go to school
Not stated

68

69
70

Indigenous
students (%)

Non-Indigenous
students (%)

16.8
13.8
27.0
9.2
16.8
5.1
3.0
8.4

9.4
7.6
24.5
9.9
39.5
3.5
1.0
4.6

Hunter, B, and Schwab, G, Practical reconciliation and recent trends in Indigenous education,
No. 249/2003, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University,
p18.
ibid, p14.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census of Population and Housing: Selected Indigenous
Characteristics 2001, op.cit, p57, Table 5.4.

Social Justice Report 2003

Table 14 below shows the noticeable difference between Indigenous and nonIndigenous students transition to non-compulsory Year 11 schooling. The
retention rate for Indigenous students fell from nearly 90% in year 10 to 67% in
year 11. By comparison, the rate for non-Indigenous students falls less
dramatically from year 10 to year 11 from nearly 99% to 90%.

Table 14: Grade progression rates, 200171

Year level

8-9
9-10
10-11
11-12

Indigenous
students (%)

Non Indigenous
students (%)

96.1
89.7
67.6
66.6

99.8
98.6
89.4
86.5

Graph 8 below indicates that there has been an increase in Year 12 retention
rates for Indigenous students from 1997 to 2001 from 32% to 36% respectively.
These rates remain substantially lower than the rates for non-Indigenous
students.

Year 12 retention, % of students

Commencing secondary school

Graph 8: Apparent year 12 retention rates for Indigenous and non-Indigenous

students from commencement of secondary school72
80

73

73

75

70
Non-Indigenous

60
50

Indigenous

40
30
20

32

35

36

1999

2001

10
0
1997

Years

71
72

Department of Education, Science and Training, derived from National Schools Statistics
Collection 4221.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, p56.
Department of Education, Science and Training, derived from National Schools Statistics
Collection 4221.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, p57.

Appendix 1

215

216

b) Post-secondary education
Census data for 2001 identifies people aged over 15 years who were attending
a technical or further educational institution (such as a TAFE college) or a
university or other higher educational institution. The ABS has reported that
Indigenous people participate at a similar rate to non-Indigenous people in
post-secondary education, although this varies across age groups, type of
institution attended and across geographic regions.
Indigenous people were more likely to attend a TAFE and less likely to be
attending university. Five per cent of all Indigenous people aged over 15 years
attended TAFE in 2001, compared with three per cent of the non-Indigenous
population. However, when this figure is restricted to people aged 15-17 years
and excludes people still attending school, 14% of Indigenous people were
attending TAFE compared with 22% of non-Indigenous people of the same
age. Attendance rates at TAFE for Indigenous students aged 18-24 years were
also lower than for non-Indigenous students (8% and 11% respectively).73
Indigenous people aged 15 years and over were less likely than non-Indigenous
people of the same age groups to attend university (three compared with five
per cent ). For Indigenous peoples aged 18-24 years, this rate is significantly
lower than for non-Indigenous people (five and 23% respectively).74
Table 15 below shows that Indigenous people are also less likely to have a
post-graduate degree, bachelor degree, advanced diploma or diploma than
non-Indigenous people.

Table 15: Highest non-school qualification, Percentage of

persons aged 15 years and over, 200175

Postgraduate degree
Bachelor degree
Graduate Diploma
Advanced diploma/Diploma
Certificate
Other/Level not determined
No qualification
Not stated

73
74
75

Indigenous
people (%)

Non-Indigenous
people (%)

0.28
2.26
0.36
2.49
9.38
2.76
72.14
10.33

1.91
10.23
1.44
6.29
16.43
3.56
55.30
4.84

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population Characteristics: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians 2001, op.cit, p48.
ibid.
ibid, p59, Table 5.6.

Social Justice Report 2003

217

Housing and homelessness

a) Housing tenure
In 2001, households with Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders were much more
likely to be renting than purchasing a home, or owning a home outright. Table
16 shows that 63% of households with Indigenous people were renting
(compared with approximately 27% of other households); 19% were purchasing
their home (compared with 27% of other households); and 13% owned their
home outright (compared with 40% of other households).

Table 16: Housing Tenure, 200176

Renting
Purchasing
Owner
Other/not known

Households with
Indigenous persons

Other
households

63.5
19.4
12.6
4.5

26.6
27.0
40.5
5.9

Generally speaking, in remote areas, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
are less likely to own their home than in urban centres. This, in part, reflects the
type of tenures available to people on traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander lands.

b) Household size and overcrowding

Households with Indigenous persons tend to have more residents than other
households. At the 2001 Census, there was an average of 3.5 persons in
households with Indigenous people, compared with 2.6 persons in other
households.
A measure of over-crowding is the availability of bedrooms for household
residents. 16% of Indigenous households were accommodated in dwellings
that required at least one extra bedroom, compared with three per cent of other
households.
Both household size and the proportion of households requiring at least one
additional bedroom rose with increased geographic remoteness. Average
household size increased from 3.2 residents in major cities to 5.3 in very remote
areas. Table 17 shows that the proportion of households requiring at least one
extra bedroom rose from 11% in major cities and inner regional areas to 46% in
very remote areas. By comparison, the rate of other households requiring at
least one additional bedroom does not reach four per cent in any geographic
region.
76

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population characteristics: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians 2001, op.cit, pp93-4.

Appendix 1

218

Table 17: Households requiring an extra bedroom, by Indigenous status and

remoteness, 200177

Major cities
Inner Regional
Outer regional
Remote
Very remote

Indigenous
Australians

Non-Indigenous
Australians

11.0
10.9
14.7
21.5
45.8

3.8
2.5
2.8
3.2
3.9

The Steering Committee for Government Service Provision has reported that
Indigenous people were 5.6 times more likely to live in overcrowded houses
than non-Indigenous people. This rate rises to 18.8 times the non-Indigenous
rate in very remote areas.78

c) Discrete Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities

Discrete Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities are those that
comprise largely, or only, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. They are
located in both urban and remote areas. Conditions in these communities were
until very recently far poorer than conditions in non-Indigenous communities.
The Community Housing and Infrastructure Needs Surveys (CHINS) have been
carried out every two years since 1997 by the ABS. They are commissioned by
ATSIC. They aim to provide a picture of life in discrete communities and allow
government programs to improve conditions there to be monitored.
A total of 1,216 discrete Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander communities were
covered in the 2001 CHINS, These communities had 16,960 permanent dwellings
and a total reported population of 108,085.79
While many problems with housing and infrastructure in discrete Indigenous
communities were reported, a number of improvements since the 1999 CHINS
were observed. These include a reduction in the proportion of people living in
temporary dwellings, an increase in the proportion of permanent dwellings
connected to water, power and sewerage systems and a reduction in sewerage
system overflows and leakages.

77
78
79

ibid, p105, Table 8.4.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census of Population and Housing: Selected Indigenous
Characteristics 2001, op.cit, p57, Table 5.4.
Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, The Health and
Welfare of Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples 2003, op.cit, p43.

Social Justice Report 2003

Selected findings in relation to discrete Indigenous communities were that water

quality was either not tested, or had failed testing in the 12 months prior to the
survey, in 46% of the 213 Indigenous communities which had a population of
50 or more and were not connected to a town water supply. This is a decrease
from 52% of such communities in 1999.80 Further, overflows or leakages from
sewerage systems in the 12 months prior to the survey occurred in 48% of
Indigenous communities with a population of 50.81

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders

and criminal justice systems
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody reported in 1991. In
the 12 years since there has been little progress in reducing the level of contact
of Indigenous peoples with criminal justice processes.

a) Indigenous adult prisoners

In 1991, Indigenous people made up 14% of the total prison population.
Consistently since 1999 Indigenous peoples have constituted approximately
20% of the prison population.82 Figures for 1991-2002 are shown in Graph 9
below.

Graph 9: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander prisoners in Australia 1992-2002

20% of prisoners
Indigenous 2001

21

Percentage of prison population

18
15
12
9

14.3% of prisoners
Indigenous at time of
Royal Commission
into Aboriginal Deaths
in Custody

6
3

Line representing proportion of Indigenous people as a percentage of total population

0
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Years

80
81
82

ibid, p46.
ibid, p47.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Prisoners in Australia 30 June 2002, Series: cat no 4512.0,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p33, Table 15.

Appendix 1

219

220

In June 2003, the highest rate of imprisonment for Indigenous persons was
recorded in Western Australia (2,846 Indigenous persons per 100,000 adult
Indigenous population) followed by New South Wales (2,128), the Northern
Territory (1,768) and Queensland (1,710). The Northern Territory recorded the
highest proportional increase in the Indigenous rate of imprisonment (33%)
between the June quarters 2002 and 2003. Western Australia recorded the next
highest proportional increase (12%). Tasmania, Queensland and Victoria
recorded decreases in the Indigenous rate of imprisonment since the June
quarter 2002 of 18%, three per cent and two per cent respectively. Nationally,
the Indigenous rate of imprisonment was 16 times the non-Indigenous rate.
The highest ratios of Indigenous to non-Indigenous rates of imprisonment were
recorded in Western Australia and New South Wales with Indigenous rates of
imprisonment 22 and 17 times the non-Indigenous rates respectively.83
On 30 June 2002, the night of the annual National Prisoner Census, there were
4,494 Indigenous prisoners in Australia. This is a rate of 1,806 prisoners per
100,000 population (compared with 148 prisoners per 100,000 for the total
Australian population).84 The age profile of Indigenous prisoners is younger
than for the total prisoner population, with a median age of 28.9 years (compared
with 31.2 years for all prisoners). On 30 June 2002, nearly six per cent of
Indigenous males aged 25-29 years were in prison (compared with 0.6% of all
males aged 25-29 years).85
A recent study in the state of New South Wales demonstrates the extent of
contact of Indigenous people with criminal justice processes. Between 1997
and 2001, a total of 25,000 Indigenous people appeared in a NSW Court charged
with a criminal offence. This constitutes 28.6% of the total NSW Indigenous
population. In the year 2001 alone, nearly one in five Indigenous males in NSW
appeared in Court charged with a criminal offence. For Indigenous males aged
20-24 years, this rate increased to over 40%.86
Recent statistics for the Northern Territory also indicate that Aboriginal people
constitute between 75-78% of all prisoners, and up to 82% of juveniles in
detention in the Territory in the 2002-2003 year.87

b) Indigenous women in corrections

Since the Royal Commission, the greatest relative increase in incarceration has
been for Indigenous women. The Indigenous female prison population increased
by 262% between 1991 and 1999 (compared with an increase in non-Indigenous
83
84
85
86

87

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Corrective Services June 2003 Quarter, Series 4512.0,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 2003, pp2-3.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Prisoners in Australia, 30 June 2002, cat no 4517.0,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 2003, p4.
ibid, p5.
Weatherburn, D, Lind, B, and Hua, J, Contact with the New South Wales court and prison
systems: The influence of age, Indigenous status and gender 78 Crime and Justice Bulletin
(NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research) 1, 2003, pp4-5, www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/
bocsar1.nsf/pages/cjb78text
Northern Territory Government, Northern Territory Quarterly Crime and Justice Statistics, Issue
4: June Quarter 2003, Office of Crime Prevention, Department of Justice, Darwin, 2003
www.nt.gov.au/justice/ocp/pages/stats.shtml (12 October 2003).

Social Justice Report 2003

women of 185%). In June 2003, Indigenous women were incarcerated at a rate

19.3 times that of non-Indigenous women. The highest rates of incarceration
for Indigenous women were recorded in Western Australia (428.6 per 100,000),
New South Wales (383.1 per 100,000) and South Australia (286.3 per 100,000).88

Graph 10: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander female prisoners 1995-200189

Percentage of prisoners

30

20

32.8% of the
total female prison
Population Aboriginal
and Torres Strait
Islander in 2001

24.4 % of the female

prison population
Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander in 1995

10
Line representing proportion of Indigenous people as percentage of total
population in 2001
0
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Years

c) Indigenous juveniles and corrections

Indigenous juveniles (up to age 18) remain over-represented in criminal justice
processes. Since 1997, Indigenous juveniles have consistently constituted 42%
of all juveniles in detention nationally despite comprising less than four per
cent of the total juvenile population.90 In June 2002, Indigenous juveniles were
detained at a rate almost 19 times that of non-Indigenous juveniles.91 This
compares to a rate of 13 times the non-Indigenous rate in 1993. Juvenile
detention rates nationally are on the decline. Since 1998, rates of detention for
Indigenous juveniles have declined faster than rates for non-Indigenous
juveniles.92

88
89
90
91
92

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Corrective Services June Quarter 2003, op.cit, p22.
Australian Bureau of Statistics Prisoners In Australia, Cat no 4517.0, Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, p33, Table 15.
Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian Institute for Health and Welfare, The Health and
Welfare of Australias Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, op.cit, pp109-10.
Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, op.cit, para 3.63.
Australian Institute of Criminology, Juvenile corrective institutions: Indigenous status in
Australian Crime: Facts and Figures 2002, AIC Canberra 2002, www.aic.gov.au/publications/
facts/2002/fig76.html (15 October 2003).

Appendix 1

221

222

A recent study in Queensland has tracked the criminal trajectory of young

offenders who have appeared in the juvenile justice system from 1994-95
onwards. The study tracks their rate of entry into the adult court system (through
custodial and non-custodial orders served up to September 2002).93 The study
reported 86% of Indigenous juveniles who had been on supervised orders
progressed to the adult criminal justice system (compared with 75% of nonIndigenous juveniles) and that 65% served a prison term (compared with 41%
of non-Indigenous juveniles). By September 2002, 89% of Indigenous male
juveniles on supervised orders had progressed to the adult system, with 71%
having served at least one term of imprisonment.
The study reported there was an increased likelihood that those juveniles who
were subject to a supervised justice order and had been the subject of a care
and protection order would proceed to the adult criminal justice system, with
91% of all such juveniles having some contact with the adult system, and 67%
having served at least one term of imprisonment.94 The study concluded that
over time, the probability of those juveniles on supervised orders in 1994-95
who are subject to multiple risk factors (e.g. male, Indigenous, care and
protection order) progressing to the adult corrections system will approach 100
per cent.95

d) Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander deaths in custody

In the decade from 1990-1999, 115 Indigenous people died in custody. A
significant feature of these deaths was that there were significantly fewer deaths
in police custody (as opposed to in prisons) which tends to indicate that the
implementation of recommendations of the Royal Commission relating to
conditions and design of police custody had some impact.96 Despite these
improvements, Indigenous deaths in custody over the past decade still
represented 18% of all deaths in custody. This figure has risen from 2000-2002
to 20% of all deaths in custody. In 2002, there were 14 Indigenous deaths in
custody.97

e) Victims of crime
There is no national data on the extent to which Indigenous peoples are victims
of crime. A study in New South Wales in 2001 reported that Indigenous people
are 5.5 times more likely (6.2 times for Indigenous females) than non-Indigenous
people to be a victim of a domestic violence related assault; 3.4 times (rising to
5.2 times for Indigenous females) more likely to be the victim of assault; 2.8
times (2.9 for Indigenous females) more likely to be the victim of a sexual assault;
93

94
95
96
97

Lynch, M, Buckman, J and Krenske, L, Youth justice: Crime Trajectories, Australian Institute of
Criminology and Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission, AIC Trends and Issues in
Crime and Criminal Justice, Issues Paper 165, September 2003, AIC Canberra 2003.
ibid, p4.
ibid, p2.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2001,
op.cit, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Sydney, 2002, pp15 -16.
Collins, L and Ali, M, Deaths in Custody Australia 2002, National Deaths in Custody Program
Annual Report, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra 2003, p25.

Social Justice Report 2003

2.5 times (1.9 for Indigenous females) more likely to be the victim of murder;
1.4 times (same for Indigenous females) more likely to be the victim of a sexual
assault against a child aged 0-15 years. Indigenous people were, however,
less likely to be the victim of robbery. The study also reported that victimisation
in violent crimes is also predominately the result of offending by other Aboriginal
people.98 This identifies the challenge to find solutions for Indigenous people
being victims of crime, within the context of addressing the over-representation
of Indigenous people in criminal justice processes.
A study in Western Australia in 2001 reported Indigenous people were nearly
seven times more likely to be a victim of assault (and nearly 13 times for
Indigenous females); seven times more likely to be a victim of homicide; and
3.2 times more likely to be a victim of sexual assault (rising to 3.3 times for
Indigenous females).99

Child protection
There are three areas of child protection services for which national data is
compiled:
Child protection notifications, investigations and substantiations;
Children on care and protection orders; and
Children in out-of home care.

Children who are perceived to be in need of protection can come into contact
with community services departments or child protection agencies (in the states
and territories) by someone expressing concern about the welfare of a child or
making a report to the department. From the reporting stage, if it is decided
that the child is prima facie under risk of harm (neglect or abuse) the report is
classified as a notification. Most notifications are investigated and classified as
substantiated or not substantiated according to the degree of risk to the child.
A range of services are then provided to that child and the childs family. In
extreme cases, state departments can apply to the court for a care and protection
order. Children can also be placed in out-of-home care, either temporarily or
more long term, by order of the court.100

a) Child protection notifications, investigations and substantiations

In 2001-02, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children (aged 0-16 years)
were more likely to be the subject of a substantiation that non-Indigenous children
in all states and territories except Tasmania. Table 18 below shows that the rate
of Indigenous children who were the subject of a substantiation was 7.9 times
higher than the rate for non-Indigenous children in Western Australia and Victoria;
7.2 times in South Australia; and 3.6 times in New South Wales.

98

Fitzgerald, J and Weatherburn, D, Aboriginal Victims and Offenders: The Picture from Police
Records, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney 2001, p1,
www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/bocsar1.nsf/pages/pub_atoc#aboriginality (15 October 2003).
99 Steering Committee for the Provision of Government Service Delivery, op.cit, Table 3.11.2.
100 For a detailed explanation of care and protection classifications and statistics see: Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare, Child protection 2001-02, AIHW Canberra 2003, Chapter 1.

Appendix 1

223

224

Table 18: Rate of children the subject of substantiations: by Indigenous status and
state/territory, 2001-02101
State/Territory

Indigenous
(rate per 1,000)

Non- Indigenous
(rate per 1,000)

Indigenous to
non-Indigenous ratio

15.3
48.1
14.3
13.5
31.6
9.7
0.3
6.5

4.3
6.1
7.9
1.7
4.4
3.2
2.6
2.6

3.6
7.9
1.8
7.9
7.2
3.0
0.2
2.5

NSW
Vic
Qld
WA
SA
NT
Tas
A.C.T

The pattern of substantiated abuse and neglect for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander children differs from the pattern for other children. Indigenous children
were much more likely to be the subject of a substantiation of neglect. For
example, in Western Australia 50% of substantiations for Indigenous children
were of neglect (compared with 24% of other children).102

b) Children on care and protection orders

There were 4,264 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children on care and
protection orders nationally on 30 June 2002. This translates to a rate of 20.5
Indigenous children per 1,000. The rate for the rest of the population is 3.5 per
1,000. The rate for Indigenous children is 5.9 times the non-Indigenous rate.
Table 19 shows the rate of Indigenous children on care and protection orders
across all states and territories, and comparisons to the rate for other children.
It shows that the rate per 1,000 children is 10.4 times the non-Indigenous rate in
Victoria; 8.0 times the rate in New South Wales; 7.9 times the rate in Western
Australia; and 6.5 times the rate in South Australia.

101 ibid, p18, Table 2.9.

102 ibid, p18.

Social Justice Report 2003

Table 19: Rate of children on care and protection orders: By Indigenous status and
state/territory, 2001-02103
State/Territory

Indigenous
(rate per 1,000)

Non- Indigenous
(rate per 1,000)

Indigenous to
non-Indigenous ratio

31.9
40.6
15.1
15.7
20.3
5.2
2.8
18.1
20.5

4.0
3.9
3.3
2.0
3.1
1.9
4.0
2.9
3.5

8.0
10.4
4.6
7.9
6.5
2.7
0.7
6.2
5.9

NSW
Vic
Qld
WA
SA
NT
Tas
A.C.T
Nationally

c) Children in out of home care

At 30 June 2002, there were 4,199 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children
in out-of-home care, an increase of 126 on the previous year. The rate of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in out-of-home care was 20.1 per
1,000 (compared with 3.2 per 1,000 for other children). In all states and territories
except Tasmania the rate of Indigenous children in out-of-home care was higher
than for other children.104 Table 20 shows the rates per 1,000 for Indigenous
and non-Indigenous children and the ratio of Indigenous to non-Indigenous
children in out-of-home care. The ratio for Indigenous to non-Indigenous children
was highest in Victoria, NSW, WA and SA.

103 ibid, p34, Table 3.10.

104 ibid, p44.

Appendix 1

225

226

Table 20: Rate of children in out-of-home care: by Indigenous status and state/
territory, 2001-02105
State/Territory

Indigenous
(rate per 1,000)

Non- Indigenous
(rate per 1,000)

Indigenous to
non-Indigenous Ratio

33.5
39.0
12.2
17.1
20.2
4.4
3.6
15.3
20.1

3.8
3.0
2.9
2.2
2.8
1.6
4.6
2.5
3.2

8.8
13.0
4.2
7.8
7.2
2.8
0.8
6.1
6.3

NSW
Vic
Qld
WA
SA
NT
Tas
A.C.T
Nationally

At 30 June 2002, 79% of Indigenous children placed in out-of-home care across

Australia were placed in accordance with the Aboriginal Child Placement
Principle. This Principle outlines a preference for placing Indigenous children
with an Indigenous family. It places a preference for placements first with their
extended families, second with their Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
community and third with Indigenous people before placing the child with a
non-Indigenous family.106

105 ibid, p44, Table 4.8.

106 ibid, pp44-45, Table 4.9.

Social Justice Report 2003

227

Appendix 2

The Council of Australian Governments wholeof-government community trials initiative

This appendix provides a summary of the Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) whole-of-government community trials initiative and its implementation
in each state and territory.1

1. Background
In its communiqu of November 2000, COAG agreed on a reconciliation
framework through which governments would work in partnership to advance
reconciliation. The communiqu recognises that all levels of government have
a responsibility to progress reconciliation and to improve the economic and
social wellbeing of Indigenous peoples.
The Reconciliation Framework establishes three priority areas for government
action:
Investing in community leadership initiatives;
Reviewing and re-engineering programmes and services to ensure
they deliver practical measures that support families, children and
young people. In particular, governments agreed to look at measures
for tackling family violence, drug and alcohol dependency and other
symptoms of community dysfunction; and
Forging greater links between the business sector and indigenous
communities to help promote economic independence.2
At its April 2002 meeting, COAG reaffirmed its November 2000 commitment to
advance reconciliation and agreed to trial a whole-of-government cooperative
approach in up to ten communities or regions across Australia:

1
2

For further details, see the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce website:
www.icc.gov.au.
Council of Australian Governments, Communiqu, 3 November 2000, <www.dpmc.gov.au/
docs/coag031100.cfm>, (4 December 2003).

Appendix 2

228

The aim of these trials will be to improve the way governments interact
with each other and with communities to deliver more effective responses
to the needs of indigenous Australians. The lessons learnt from these
cooperative approaches will be able to be applied more broadly. This
approach will be flexible in order to reflect the needs of specific
communities, build on existing work and improve the compatibility of
different State, Territory and Commonwealth approaches to achieve better
outcomes.3

It was subsequently agreed that there would be eight trial sites. The sites, and
the Australian Government department that is leading each trial, are listed below:
1. Murdi Paaki Region (New South Wales):
Department of Education, Science and Training;
2. Wadeye (Northern Territory):
Department of Family and Community Services;
3. Shepparton (Victoria):
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations;
4. Cape York (Queensland):
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations;
5. Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (South Australia):
Department of Health & Ageing;
6. East Kimberley region (Western Australia):
Department of Transport and Regional Services;
7. Northern Tasmania:
Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs; and
8. The Australian Capital Territory:
Department of Environment and Heritage.
Within State and Territory jurisdictions, leadership of the trials rests with Premier
and Cabinet (or Chief Ministers) departments and the portfolios with
responsibility for Indigenous affairs except in NSW where the Department of
Education and Training has head agency responsibility.
ATSIC is strongly supportive of the trials, and states that:
they provide a significant opportunity to identify more responsive and
flexible ways in which governments can respond to the needs of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. and [an] opportunity to examine the
development of effective governance structures and processes, and to
support and develop local leadership and build community capacity.4

3
4

Council of Australian Governments, Comminque,5 April 2002, <www.pmc.gov.au/docs/

coag050402.cfm>, (12 December 2003).
Quartermaine, L, Correspondence from ATSIC with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice Commissioner, January 2004, p1.

Social Justice Report 2003

2. Government coordination mechanisms for the trials

Overall coordination of the trials is done through the COAG Senior Officials
Meeting (which consists of CEOs of Premiers and Chief Ministers Departments,
and is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet).
There are regular progress reports to this body.
At the federal level, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs has overall responsibility for the trials. Federal government progress in
the trials is advanced through four main government processes:
First, meetings of Australian Government Ministers with program and
policy responsibilities for Indigenous affairs;
Second, meetings of Australian Government departmental secretaries
(the Secretaries Group);
Third, the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce (ICCT)
which implements the directives of the Secretaries Group; and
Fourth, lead agencies, where Secretaries and their agencies
champion individual trial sites.
The Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Immigration Affairs chairs the
meeting of Australian Government Ministers. This group leads the whole-ofgovernment process. The Secretaries Group meets once a month to oversee
progress in the trial sites. The group promotes greater whole-of-government
coordination across Australian government agencies and develops linkages
with the State and Territory governments to improve service delivery to Indigenous
communities.5
The Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs chairs this
group. It includes membership from the following Australian Government
agencies:

Department of Education, Science and Training;

Department of Health and Ageing;
Department of Family and Community Services;
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations;
Department of Transport and Regional Services;
Department of Environment and Heritage;
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet; and
ATSIC.6

Reports are provided to the Prime Minister on the progress in the trials, in addition
to reports to the Ministers.7
The Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce (ICCT) has been
established to support the Secretaries Group and federal government agencies
involved in the eight trials. The ICCT is located within the Department of

5
6
7

Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Who We Are, Online at <www.icc.gov.au/

who_we_are > (10 December 2003).
ICCT, Shared Responsibility, Shared future, DIMIA, Canberra 2003, Attachment 1.
ibid, p5.

Appendix 2

229

230

Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and is staffed by officers

seconded from the various Commonwealth agencies involved in the initiative.
The ICCT administers a Flexible Funding Pool (FFP) with a budget of $6 million
over two years (from the 2003-04 Federal Budget) to facilitate projects within
the trial sites. In supporting the Secretaries Group, the ICCT are involved in
implementing the COAG initiative within Australian government agencies,
working with State and Territory governments, monitoring performance , and
providing feedback to and from Indigenous communities on the implementation
of the initiative.8
For each trial site, a lead Australian government agency has also been selected.
The lead agency has day-to-day accountability for progress in each of the trial
sites. ATSIS does not have lead agency status in any of the eight regions.
Instead it is designated partner agency status and plays a vital role in guiding
and supporting activity in all of the trial sites.9 The ICCT has noted that:
The ATSIC Regional Councils should be a really important part of these
trials. In some areas they are at the centre; in others, they are more of a
support mechanism; but everywhere they are keen to be involved and to
get more involved.10

The ICCT states that the commitment of government bureaucracies to the COAG
initiative also differs from previous attempts to deliver more effective responses
to Indigenous people given the governments high-level visibility and increased
accountability to Indigenous people:
What is different at the bureaucratic level this time is the commitment
across the board in a large number of key agencies of people at the top.
There is a continuing and really strong commitment. People see that,
because it is very visible. Secretaries have sort of put themselves on the
line, I suppose, with communities in terms of being the person identified
as their champion.11

ATSICs approach has been to promote the Regional Councils as the preeminent source of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander advice in all trial sites.
This is easier in regions where Regional Councils are the main source of
leadership but has proved difficult where other organisations compete for the
role, or where the trial site boundary differs from the Regional Council boundary.
ATSIC has stated that one the roles it has fulfilled is providing introductions
between communities and government partners, and supporting these
relationships. In some regions, it has set the framework from within which the
trial has proceeded as a critical insider (for example, Murdi Paaki and Cape
York). ATSICs role is made easier by the fact that in general the trials are being
rolled out in an environment where there are already a number of agreement
frameworks between ATSIC and state or territory governments.12
8
9
10
11
12

ibid, p2.
Richardson, G, Hansard, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 13 October 2003, p1304.
Hawgood, D, Hansard, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 13 October 2003, p1305.
ibid, p1300.
Quartermaine, L, op.cit, p2.

Social Justice Report 2003

Within State and Territory bureaucracies, a variety of mechanisms have been

established to support the trials. Some are similar to the Australian Government
arrangements, for example:
In Queensland, the Premier established a CEOs Steering Committee
to progress the reform process in Cape York through the Queensland
Governments Meeting Challenges, Making Choices initiative which
the COAG trial has built on. The CEOs Steering Committee also
comprised senior Indigenous leadership from Cape York and, once
the COAG trial started, the Australian Government. CEOs of
Queensland government departments also act as champions for
individual communities within Cape York.
In Western Australia, an Indigenous Affairs Advisory Committee (IAAC)
had been established to better coordinate Indigenous business across
the State with membership from WA Government department CEOs
and Chairs of ATSIC Regional Councils. After agreement on a COAG
trial site, the Australian Government was also invited to be a member
of the Committee.
In the Northern Territory, the Chief Ministers Department coordinates
across Territory agencies through regular meetings at the senior level.
A tripartite steering committee of Australian Government and NT
Government officials and representatives of the Thamarrurr Council
from the Wadeye trial site has also been established to oversee
progress in the trial site.

3. Improving government coordination and the

Shared Responsibility approach
The COAG Communiqu of April 2002 recognised that outcomes and
management processes in Indigenous policy and service delivery need to be
improved. The COAG initiative is intended to trial a different approach as current
and past approaches have not always achieved the desired outcomes. A twofold
method is proposed under the COAG initiative:
governments must work together better at all levels and across all
departments and agencies; and
Indigenous communities and governments must work in partnership
and share responsibility for achieving outcomes and building the
capacity of people in communities to manage their own affairs.13
As stated by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs:
Put simply, COAG instructed the bureaucrats to get their act together
and coordinate their efforts. In return, the Indigenous people were given
more of a say and more responsibility for what happens in their
communities.14

13
14

ICCT, Shared Responsibility, Shared future, op.cit, p2.

Vanstone, A, (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), Very
Encouraging Signs From Indigenous Pilots, Media Release, 8 October 2003.

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231

232

The trials recognise the need for a different type of engagement and relationship
to be developed between government and Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait
Islanders, with partnerships based on community-determined priorities. As stated
by the ICCT the whole-of-government initiative supports:
Different engagement between government and community; and
Redefining the relationship between government and Indigenous
communities based on what communities are saying.15
The objectives of the COAG trials set out a number of practical areas for
government to reform its current operations. The objectives of the COAG trial
are to:
tailor government action to identified community needs and
aspirations;
coordinate government programmes and services where this will
improve service delivery outcomes;
encourage innovative approaches traversing new territory;
cut through blockages and red tape to resolve issues quickly;
work with Indigenous communities to build the capacity of people in
those communities to negotiate as genuine partners with government;
negotiate agreed outcomes, benchmarks for measuring progress and
management of responsibilities for achieving those outcomes with
the relevant people in Indigenous communities; and
build the capacity of government employees to be able to meet the
challenges of working in this new way with Indigenous communities.16
It is anticipated that the trials will encourage governments to modify the way
they conduct their program and service delivery responsibilities, including by
encouraging the pooling of funding, breaking down internal administrative
barriers and improving the way government manage and award contracts.17
The Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations has stated that:
The whole-of-government initiative, which flows from an agreement at
COAG last year, is designed to tackle this problem of the fragmentation
of service delivery. In areas where the whole-of-government initiative is
operating, one federal portfolio is coordinating the delivery of all federal
services to Indigenous peoples in that area and it is working in close
partnership with one state portfolio which is similarly coordinating the
delivery of all state services to Indigenous people.18

The ICCT have noted that there is a lot of work to be done to improve coordination
between the federal, state and territory governments in order to make them

15

16
17
18

Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Imagine What Could Happen If We Worked

Together: Shared Responsibility and a Whole of Governments Approach, Conference paper
The Native Title Conference, Alice Springs, 3 June 2003, <www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/
conf2003/papers/hawgood.pdf>, (24 December 2003).
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Trial Objectives, online at: www.icc.gov.au/
communities/objectives/, (29 October 2003).
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Imagine What Could Happen if we Worked
Together: Shared Responsibility and a Whole of Governments Approach, op.cit.
Abbott, T, Hansard, House of Representatives, 8 September 2003, p18892.

Social Justice Report 2003

flexible and effective to community-identified needs.19 The COAG whole-ofgovernment approach is still in its early stages. It should not be assumed that
existing Australian and State/Territory government funding parameters and
restrictions have already been addressed under the COAG initiative.
The initial stage of the COAG initiative has been dedicated in part to developing,
building or re-establishing effective networks and relationships between
Indigenous people and government. The ICCT describes this stage as critical
and building relationships of trust between governments and Indigenous
communities are essential to developing sustainable structures to support the
initiatives.20
COAGs policy framework that underpins the trials is based on shared
responsibility and partnership. The ICCT has stated that the Shared
Responsibility approach will involve communities negotiating as equal parties
with government21 and asserts that the wellbeing of Indigenous communities
is shared by individuals, families, communities and government. All parties
must work together and build their capacity to support a different approach for
the economic, social and cultural development of Indigenous peoples.
One mechanism for formalising the partnership approach is through the
negotiation of a Shared Responsibility Agreement (SRA) between government
and Indigenous peoples. The purpose of the agreement is threefold. It:
Sets out priorities identified with communities and agreed outcomes
and benchmarks;
Establishes partnership arrangements and describe each partys
responsibilities; and
Supports local governance and decision-making.22
A template of an SRA has been developed which could potentially be adapted
to the circumstances of the Indigenous people in each trial site. The agreement
outlines the parties to the agreement, objectives, local outcomes and priorities,
agreed performance measurement and evaluation framework (including agreed
benchmarks), access to data, dispute settling arrangements, processes for
reviewing progress and the duration and variation provisions to the agreement.23
Three Shared Responsibility Agreements were finalised in 2003, with negotiations
ongoing in relation to the remaining five trial sites. The current status of these
agreements in each trial site is discussed later in this appendix.

19
20
21
22
23

Hawgood, D, Hansard, Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, 4 November 2003,

p10.
Hawgood, D, Hansard, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 13 October 2003, p1294.
ibid.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Imagine What Could Happen if we Worked
Together: Shared Responsibility and a Whole of Governments Approach, op.cit.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Shared Responsibility Agreements, online
at: <www.icc.gov.au/communities/agreements>, (4 December 2003).

Appendix 2

233

234

4. Performance Monitoring Framework for the trials

Australian Government and State and Territory officials have worked together to
develop a broad framework for monitoring performance in the COAG trials. The
framework, entitled National Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
Framework, was finalised in November 2003. It is intended to capture information
at the community/regional level, national level and within government
bureaucracies. The information to be collected at each level includes the
following.
Community and/or Regional Level Monitoring
Performance data collected at the community and/or regional level
will be negotiated between government and Indigenous peoples and
collected against agreed priorities, outcomes and benchmarks. An
integral element of data collection at this level involves two-way
communication between government and Indigenous people and the
development of specific site indicators will be dependent on the
negotiation and implementation of the Shared Responsibility
Agreement in each of COAG trial sites.
National Level Monitoring
The local-level information will be aggregated to feed into the national
level analysis, and if possible, will be aligned to the COAG Framework
for Reporting on Indigenous Disadvantage. In addition to reporting
under the headline and strategic change indicators developed by the
Steering Committee for the Provision of Government Services, the
monitoring framework will attempt to compare data against existing
portfolio budget statements and other cross-government frameworks
at the national level.
Government Level Monitoring
By monitoring the performance within the government bureaucracies,
the initiative will identify whether the necessary structural changes
are occurring to support greater flexibility and better coordination
across and between the different levels of government. Agreed
benchmarks will be established for the Commonwealth agencies
involved in the trials to measure performance and the costeffectiveness of operational and structural reform between the different
levels of government.
In addition, the Australian Government intends to evaluate its own performance
in the trials at 2 and 5 years. In a number of trial sites, plans are developing for
site evaluation involving the Australian, State and Territory governments and
community representatives.
Evaluation of the trials will be used to assess whether the COAG trials have
lead to improved social and economic circumstances for Indigenous peoples
and will inform decisions as to the potential of the approach being adopted
more widely.24 The ICCT is also developing a data tracking system, with a
24

ICCT, Shared Responsibility, Shared future, op.cit, p3.

Social Justice Report 2003

baseline data set and protocols. This Indigenous Communities Coordination

Taskforce Database will contain local-level performance and monitoring
information across the eight trial sites.

5. Progress in each COAG whole-of-government

community trial site
To date, the following seven trial sites have been publicly announced:

Murdi Paaki region in New South Wales;

Wadeye (Port Keats) in the Northern Territory;
Shepparton in Victoria;
Cape York in Queensland;
Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) Lands in South Australia;
East Kimberley in Western Australia; and
Northern Tasmania.

There is one final trial site, to cover the entire Australian Capital Territory, which
has yet to be publicly announced. The details of this site are expected to be
made public in early 2004.
Initial Shared Responsibility Agreements have been negotiated and finalized in
Murdi Paaki (New South Wales) and Wadeye (Northern Territory) during 2003.
In Victoria, an agreement, called a Compact has been negotiated to underpin
the trial in Shepparton. The next stage for these sites involves developing action
plans, performance measures and benchmarks to implement the agreement.
Negotiations on Shared Responsibility Agreements are continuing in the
remaining five COAG sites.
There are significant variations between each of the COAG trial sites. They vary
geographically across urban, regional and remote areas of Australia; and through
the method of participation of Indigenous communities in the trials. The
differences between sites are also reflected in different structures and processes
for each trial site (with unique design, delivery and monitoring measures
developed for each of the eight regions).
A summary of the progress in each of the eight COAG trial sites is provided
below (commencing with the three trial sites which have signed agreements or
compacts).

a) Murdi Paaki region (New South Wales)

The COAG trial site in NSW is the region comprising the ATSIC Murdi Paaki
Regional Council. This is an area of 300 000 square km, covering one-third of
NSW. It includes the communities of Bourke, Brewarrina, Broken Hill, Cobar,
Collarenebri, Coonamble, Dareton, Enngonia, Goodooga, Gulargambone,
Ivanhoe, Lightning Ridge, Menindee, Quambone, Tibooburra, Walgett,
Weilmoringle and Wilcannia.25

25

Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Murdi Paaki trial site (NSW), online at <http:/
/www.icc.gov.au/communities/locations/murdi_paaki> 10 December 2003.

Appendix 2

235

236

A Shared Responsibility Agreement was signed by the ATSIC Murdi Paaki

Regional Council, the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of New
South Wales in August 2003.
The Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) is the lead agency
for the Australian government, and a dedicated officer is located in Dubbo to
work closely with regional staff and have greater access to the region. DEST
reports that the early planning and negotiation stages of the COAG whole-ofgovernment initiative has resulted in the capacity development of government
and Indigenous peoples in the region. 26 The lead agency for the NSW
government is the Department of Education and Training. Although structural
policy and procedural changes have not occurred at this stage, the NSW
government expects the community planning process to identify better ways of
providing services which will be implemented under the COAG initiative as it
develops.27
Under the agreement, the ATSIC Murdi Paaki Regional Council and the
Community Working Parties (CWPs) it has established are recognised as the
primary contact points for Indigenous peoples in the region. The Community
Working Parties are the primary governance structure in the communities, with
each comprised of a broad cross section of the local Indigenous community.
To ensure these working parties are as representative as possible, the Murdi
Paaki Regional Council is currently facilitating refresher elections.28
All parties to the Shared Responsibility Agreement have committed to four key
regional priorities. These are:

Improving the health and wellbeing of children and young people;

Improving educational attainment and school retention;
Helping families to raise healthy children; and
Strengthening community and regional governance structures.29

The establishment of effective local governance structures is seen as essential

to the sustainability of any initiatives under the COAG trial. The Shared
Responsibility Agreement details how the ATSIC Regional Council, Australian
and New South Wales (NSW) governments will support the sixteen Community
Working Parties (CWPs). The Agreement details the benchmarks, reporting
arrangements and short and long term outcomes to provide secretariat and
administrative support to the CWPs. This includes assistance from the Australian
and state government to provide additional funding and training support to
Community Development Employment Program (CDEP) workers to provide
Secretariat services to each of the CWPs participating in the COAG trial.

26
27
28
29

Minister for Education, Science and Training (Cth), Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, November 2003.
Director General, New South Wales Department of Education and Training, Correspondence
with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 28 October 2003.
Minister for Education, Science and Training (Cth), op.cit.
Shared Responsibility Agreement Between the Murdi Paaki Regional Council, the
Commonwealth of Australia (through the Department of Education, Science and Training) and
the State of New South Wales (through the Department of Education and Training),August
2003, p2, available online at www.icc.gov.au/communities/locations/murdi_paaki, accessed
10 December 2003.

Social Justice Report 2003

In addition to building governance structures, supporting children at schools

has been identified as the critical priority in the region. Discussions are currently
underway to identify one to three schools to be involved in a joint approach
between the community, Australian government and NSW government to work
together to focus on strengthening families, school retention and providing family
support to children.30
The Shared Responsibility Agreement is a regional agreement. It is anticipated
that individual shared responsibility agreements will be negotiated with each of
the 16 Community Working Parties and the Government. A staged approach
has been adopted to negotiating these agreements to account for the different
capacities of each of the working parties. Six communities (Enngonia,
Collarenebri, Goodooga, Ivanhoe, Weilmoringle and Wilcannia) have been
selected to develop local agreements in the first instance.31
A number of structures have been established to facilitate the whole-ofgovernment trial. A steering committee has been established with members
from the ATSIC Murdi Paaki Regional Council, DEST, the ICCT, and NSW
Government Cabinet Office, and the Department of Employment and Training.
The Steering Committee is responsible for progressing regional priorities,
addressing barriers and improving the delivery of services.32 The Steering
Committee is supported by a group of field officers who work across all levels
of government and negotiate directly with the Community Working Parties. An
Evaluation Framework Committee has also been established to facilitate the
collection of baseline data and discus how the trial will be evaluated.33

b) Wadeye (Northern Territory)

The Wadeye whole-of-government trial site was announced in November 2002.
Wadeye is the sixth largest town in the Northern Territory, approximately 420
kms south-west of Darwin, and is one of the largest Aboriginal communities in
the Territory.34 The Shared Responsibility Agreement (SRA) for the trial was signed
on 21 March 2003 between the Commonwealth of Australia, the Northern Territory
Government and the Thamarrurr Regional Council.
The Thamarrurr Regional Council was endorsed under the Local Government
Act of the Northern Territory in early 2003 by the Northern Territory Parliament,
and is the result of over six years of work by the land-owning groups to develop
the unique governance structure of Thamarrurr.35 The Thamarrurr region covers
approximately 5000 kilometres and 20 land-owning groups are included within
30
31
32
33
34
35

Hawgood, D, Hansard, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 13 October 2003, p1298.
Minister for Education, Science and Training (Cth), op.cit.; Director General, New South Wales
Department of Education and Training, op.cit.
Minister for Education, Science and Training (Cth), op.cit.
ibid.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Wadeye Trial site (NT),online at: <http://
www.icc.gov.au/communities/locations/wadeye>, (10 December 2003).
Minister for Family and Community Services (Cth), Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, December 2003. Since approximately 1996 the
Northern Territory government and Wadeye community leaders have working towards the
establishment of Thamarrurr as the regional governance authority for the Wadeye region.

Appendix 2

237

238

the area, including Rak Diminin (referred to as Kardu Diminin) who are the
traditional landowners of the Wadeye township.36
The Department of Family and Community Services is the lead agency for the
Australian Government and the Office of Indigenous Policy (within the
Department of the Chief Minister) leading the trial on behalf of the Northern
Territory government. At this stage, the COAG trial has highlighted the need for
stronger collaborative efforts between governments by encouraging funds
pooling based on needs-based planning models and administrative reforms
for alternative models of service delivery to reduce bureaucratic processes.37
The Northern Territory government has identified governance as the critical
starting point in the whole-of-government initiative. They see the major challenge
facing Indigenous communities in North Australia as how to bring together
contemporary governance arrangements with culturally based systems of
authority and decision-making.38
As stated by the Northern Territory Government:
Previous [government] policies have resulted in largely imposed localized
structures that have been designed for governing for dependence.
Without effective governing institutions, leaders who have cultural
legitimacy and the ability for Indigenous institutions to exercise real
decision making powers, the aims of [the COAG trial] will simply not
be sustainable or of any long term social or economic benefit.39

In the trial, the Thamarrurr Regional Council has a government to government

relationship with the Australian and Northern Territory governments. All three
parties are given equal standing in the SRA, the key principles of which are
based on cultural respect and the beliefs of the Thamarrurr.40 Notwithstanding
the mutual responsibilities of all governments (Australian, Northern Territory and
Thamarrurr), Indigenous peoples have insisted that it wants the Australian and
Northern Territory governments to take responsibility for its responsibilities.41
The Northern Territory government has stated that:
Community leaders tell us that Governments often arbitrarily shove
problems off onto community people to solve. They have made it clear
they want Government field staff to offer options that involve practical
solutions not just more problems.42

The Shared Responsibility Agreement outlines the three key regional priorities
for the region. These are women and families; youth; and housing and

36
37

38
39
40

41
42

ibid.
Office of Indigenous Policy, Department of the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory,
Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 14
November 2003, (Herein: Office of Indigenous Policy (NT), Correspondence) .
ibid.
ibid.
Shared Responsibility Agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia through the
Department of Family and Community Services, the Northern Territory Government through the
Department of Chief Minister Indigenous Policy Unit and the Thamarrurr Regional Council, 21
March 2003, p2.
Office of Indigenous Policy (NT), Correspondence, op.cit.
ibid.

Social Justice Report 2003

construction. As stated in the agreement, education, training and enterprise

development are intrinsically linked to advancing the three regional priorities,
and these needs will be central to any strategies developed in pursuit of the
regional priorities. The importance of tackling issues in manageable components
has been identified by all partners in Wadeye.
As stated by the Northern Territory government:
The partners recognise up front the pressure to spread effort too thinly.
The decision to focus on a common community chosen theme Give
every kid a chance, tackle issues in biteable chunks and avoid trying to
fix everything has proven to be the correct strategy.43

As advised by the ICCT, a number of local projects have been initiated under
the three regional priorities, including the family program activities conducted
by the Womens Centre, the employment and training of local people in the
region44 and the Economic Education Project. The Local Jobs for Local People
Plan strategy forms the blueprint for all future training and employment activity
at Wadeye and the Economic Education Project provides information and
resources on a range of issues to assist the Thamarrurr understand economic
and money matters that impact on their daily lives.45
The governance structure to oversight and manage the COAG initiative
comprises a Tri-partite Steering Committee. This committee was involved in the
negotiations of the Shared Responsibility Agreement and will develop an
appropriate evaluation methodology. Representatives from the three tiers of
government are members on the Tripartite Steering Committee and Priority
Working Groups have been established under the committee to concentrate
on the three regional priority issues. As stated by the ICCT, the Priority Working
Groups are developing action plans for the identified priorities outlined in the
Shared Responsibility Agreement and the community members are using these
groups to drive reforms and seek innovative ways to deal with community
issues.46
The Priority Working Group action plans will specify the responsibilities of all
level of governments, agreed performance indicators and benchmarks, and
establish specific feedback and monitoring mechanisms. The action plans will
be attached as schedules to the Shared Responsibility Agreement and endorsed
by the Tripartite Steering Committee.

43

44
45

46

Westbury, N, The Indigenous Community Coordination Pilot Trial: The Leadership Challenge
for Governments in supporting Indigenous Governance, Conference paper: Building Effective
Indigenous Governance Conference, Jabiru, November 2003, p6, online at <www.nt.gov.au/
cdsca/indigenous_conference/web/html/papers.html>, (5 December 2003).
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Council of Australian Governments
Indigenous Whole of Governments Initiative, Report September 2003, op.cit, p2.
Hunter, S, The COAG Trial: The Leadership Challenge for Governments in Supporting Indigenous
Governance, Conference paper: Building Effective Indigenous Governance Conference, Jabiru,
November 2003, p6, online at <www.nt.gov.au/cdsca/indigenous_conference/web/html/
papers.html>, (4 December 2003).
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Council of Australian Governments
Indigenous Whole of Governments Initiative, Report September 2003, op.cit, p2.

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240

The Northern Territory governments approach to the trial is based on their

Stronger Regions Stronger Futures Strategy which was released in 2003.47
This outlines strategies for a focused collaborative approach between Indigenous
peoples and government for the development of sustainable regional
economies. A key component of the strategy is the Northern Territory
governments commitment to the negotiation of Partnership Agreements and
the establishment of Regional Authorities where existing community councils
agree to amalgamate. Under this strategy, and aligning with the COAG wholeof-government initiative, the Northern Territory government has recognised the
need to expand its skill base to support regional social and economic
development. To achieve this, Northern Territory government officers will
undertake training and development in community development skills and their
future recruitment strategy will reflect this requirement.48
The Australian Department of Family and Community Services shares this view
and believes that capacity building skills are needed within government:
The pilot has also revealed a need for a deliberate approach to the
fostering of community development, and community capacity building
skills across government agencies. FaCS is attempting to get this issue
on the national agenda.49

c) Shepparton (Victoria)
The Greater Shepparton region of Victoria was announced as a COAG trial site
in July 2003. The region covers approximately 2,422 square kilometres of the
Goulbourn Valley in mid-north Victoria. It is the fourth largest provincial centre in
Victoria.50
A Compact was signed in September 2003 between the Aboriginal Community
Facilitation Group (on behalf of the Aboriginal community of greater Shepparton),
the Australian and Victorian governments, the Greater Shepparton City Council
and the ATSIC Binjirru Council.51 The Department of Employment and Workplace
Relations (DEWR) is the lead Australian government agency for Shepparton,
and a dedicated on-the-ground DEWR position has been appointed to lead its
involvement in the initiative.52

47
48
49
50
51

52

Department of Community Development, Sport and Cultural Affairs, Building Stronger Regions
Stronger Futures, Northern Territory Government, Darwin 2003.
Office of Indigenous Policy (NT), Correspondence, op.cit.
Hunter, S, The COAG Trial: The Leadership Challenge for Governments in Supporting Indigenous
Governance, op.cit, p4.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Shepparton trial site (VIC), online at
<www.icc.gov.au/communities/locations/shepparton>, 10 December 2003.
Compact Outlining a New Collaboration Between the Aboriginal Community Facilitation Group
on behalf of the Aboriginal Community of Greater Shepparton, The Federal government through
the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, The Victorian Government, The Greater
Shepparton City Council and the ATSIC Binjirru Council, 4 September 2003, online at <
www.icc.gov.au/_data/page/13/Shepparton_Compact_-_final.pdf> (Herein, Shepparton
Compact).
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister
for the Public Service (Cth), Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice Commissioner, November 2003.

Social Justice Report 2003

The Department of Victorian Communities is the lead agency for the Victorian
government and believes the trials align closely with the Victorian Governments
broad agenda to strengthen communities and deliver better services to all
Victorians. 53 The Victorian government describes the COAG whole-ofgovernment initiative as an evolutionary model and structures and processes
will change as understanding develops about what constitutes an effective
working relationship between Indigenous peoples and governments.54
The objectives and guiding principles of the Compact are based on developing
an equal partnership between Indigenous peoples and government, which
recognises the need for innovative changes and capacity development within
all levels of government and community to support sustainable and long-term
improvements in government and community practice.55 This involves changes
to the current planning, service delivery and monitoring approaches afforded
to Indigenous peoples in the past by government agencies.
As stated by the Victorian Premier:
Were committed to working closely with the Koori community so that
Government services fit around their needs and their priorities. This is a
radical change from the community having to organize itself around
Government programs.56

Extensive community consultation occurred in Shepparton to identify the

following community priorities and strategic areas for action in the Compact:

Strengthening families;
Governance;
Strategic planning;
Leadership strategy;
Pride, image, social connectedness and respect strategy;
Cultural enhancement;
Education and Training strategy;
Job strategy;
Economic development strategy;
Justice strategy;
Community health strategy; and
Housing strategy.57

The first priority strengthening families is central to all strategic areas. The
next stage for the whole-of-government initiative in Shepparton involves
developing action plans for each of these eleven priority action areas.58 The
53
54
55
56

57
58

Secretary, Department for Victorian Communities, Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, November 2003.
ibid.
Shepparton Compact, op.cit, p1.
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations (Cth), Premier of Victoria, Minister for
Aboriginal Affairs (Vic) and Shepparton Indigenous Community Facilitation Group, Sheppartons
Indigenous Community Joins COAG Trial, Joint Media Release, July 2003.
Shepparton Compact, op.cit, p7.
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister
for the Public Service, Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, November 2003.

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242

action plans will form part of the Compact and will include performance
measures, benchmarks and an evaluation framework for each of the priority
areas.
These will be jointly developed by all partners to the Compact. Additional
performance measures and benchmarks will be developed to measure and
monitor community-government collaboration; improvements in community and
government capacity to identify and respond to local issues; and improvements
in Aboriginal communitys social, economic and cultural sustainability.59
A number of community and government structures have been established to
support the COAG whole-of-government initiative. These include the Aboriginal
Community Facilitation Group and the Steering Group. The Aboriginal
Community Facilitation Group represents the Indigenous people of Shepparton
and is consulting with the wider community about the initiative and is developing
a community plan and longer-term community structures for greater
representation and involvement.60 A community facilitator has been employed
to assist in establishing the partnership, and works directly to the Aboriginal
Community Facilitation Group. It is proposed that the position will be supported
by a project team with seconded officers from the Victorian government, DEWR
and the Aboriginal Community Facilitation Group. The Victorian government
has financially committed to support the communitys participation in the Whole
of government Shared Responsibility Agreement (SRA) with $500 000 over three
years to support the communitys participation in the project.
The Steering Group consists of representatives from the Aboriginal Community
Facilitation Group, the ATSIC Binjirru Chair and the Victorian, federal and local
government (with government representation at Secretary/CEO level). The
Steering Group will meet regularly to negotiate and implement policy, program
and service delivery in response to the community-identified priorities and
monitor progress.
Three broad (and overlapping) stages have been identified in the Compact for
the trial to be achieved over a three year timeframe.61 These stages are:
Phase 1: Development. Focused on developing the communitygovernment partnership and processes to manage the trial, and has
included ways to ensure wide community participation and community
engagement.
Phase 2: Initiation. Focused on establishing new approaches and
reshaping existing services in the context of the communitys strategies
and priorities.
Phase 3: Consolidation. Focused on ensuring ongoing communitygovernment collaboration for identifying and responding to Indigenous
needs, aspirations and interests.62

59
60
61
62

Shepparton Compact, op.cit, p5.

Secretary, Department for Victorian Communities, op.cit.
Shepparton Compact, op.cit, p8.
Secretary, Department for Victorian Communities, op.cit.

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243

d) Cape York region (Queensland)

The Cape York region was the first COAG trial site to be announced, in September
2002. A Shared Responsibility Agreement is still being negotiated for the trial.
The trial area covers approximately 150,000 square kilometres in Far North
Queensland and includes the communities of Aurukun, Lockhart River, Mapoon
(Old Mapoon Marpuna), New Mapoon, Wujal Wujal, Coen, Hope Vale, Injinoo,
Kowanyama, Laura, Napranum, Pormpuraaw and Umagico.63
The lead Commonwealth agency for the trial is the Department of Employment
and Workplace Relations (DEWR) which has two dedicated DEWR officers have
been located in Cairns to work with the Queensland government and Indigenous
leaders, organisations and communities in the Cape. The DEWR positions have
a brokerage role across Federal government agencies and will coordinate and
facilitate appropriate programs and services to meet agreed community and
regional priorities.
The lead Queensland government agency is the Department of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Policy (DATSIP). The trial is being closely aligned with the
implementation of the Queensland Governments Meeting Challenges Making
Choices (Herein Meeting Challenges).64 Meeting Challenges was released in
April 2002 and is the Queensland Governments response to the Cape York
Justice Study.65 Meeting Challenges has eight key priority areas: alcohol and
substance abuse and rehabilitation; governance; crime and justice; children,
youth and families; health; education and training; economic development;
and land and sustainable resources.
Under Meeting Challenges, the Queensland government is supporting a number
of community-owned mechanisms to inform government policy and service
delivery. The first of these was the development of Alcohol Management Plans
and associated intervention measures by Community Justice Groups to reduce
the instances of alcohol abuse and violence.66 Alcohol management plans are
currently in place in Aurukun, Bamaga, and Napranum and are being
implemented in Lockhart River and Wujual Wujal.67
The Queensland strategy is supported by a number of high-level government
structures, with the government champions concept a central component.

63
64

65

66

67

Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Cape York trial site (Qld), online at <http://
www.icc.gov.au/communities/locations/cape_york>, accessed 10 December 2003
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister
for the Public Service, Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, November 2003 (Herein Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations,
Correspondence).
The Cape York Justice Study was commissioned by the Queensland Government and released
in November 2001. The CYJS recommends a number of strategies to address factors
contributing to breaches of the law in Cape York communities, with a particular focus on
strategies that target alcohol and substance abuse.
In the 2003-2004 Queensland Government budget $2.9 million was allocated for 34 community
justice groups (CJGs) to established across Queensland. These CJGs will be located in Deed
of Grant in Trust (DOGIT) communities and other non-DOGIT regions.
Director-General, Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy (Qld),
Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner,
November 2003.

Appendix 2

244

Each region under Meeting Challenges has been assigned a government

champion (a Chief Executive Officer of a Queensland government department)
and their role is to manage negotiations at the highest executive level, streamline
agency initiatives and formally support negotiation table participants.68
In addition to the government champions concept, the Cape York CEO Steering
Committee was established in November 2001 to coordinate public sector policy
and program reform in response to the Cape York Justice Study.69 DEWR, ATSIS
and the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce (ICCT) represented
the federal government at the Cape York CEO Steering Committee. This has
since been replaced with the Meeting Challenges, Making Choices CEO Steering
Committee.70
These State-level structures are mirrored at the regional level and the Queensland
Governments Cape York Strategy Unit (CYSU) in Cairns is staffed by various
Queensland Government agencies and its aim is to better align resources and
efforts across Queensland government agencies and work directly with
Indigenous communities in the Peninsula.71 The Queensland government
describes the CYSU structure as unique in forging partnerships with agencies,
regional bodies, government and community leaders in a new context of
reciprocity and cooperation.72 A strong relationship has developed between
the DEWR, ATSIS and the CYSU (with DEWR having located a senior staff
member within the CYSU)73 and a number of whole-of-government forums have
been established to support collaborative arrangements between the federal
and Queensland governments.
Through the COAG trial, governments are working both with Indigenous leaders
at the regional level and with individual communities.
Discussions are continuing about the COAG whole-of-government regional
priorities and a number of key issues have been identified. These include health
and wellbeing (with a focus on substance abuse and family violence); education
and economic development; home and community environment and; linking
education, training and employment outcomes.74 DEWR advises that progress
is being made in developing a common understanding of what shared
responsibility means in practical terms, improving governance arrangements
in communities, identifying community priorities and implementing local-level
strategies to address issues such as employment, education, economic
development, health and money management.75

68
69

70
71
72
73
74
75

ibid.
The Steering Committee is chaired by The Hon Steve Bredhauer , Queensland Minister for
Transport and Minister for Main Roads and is attended by the Chief Executive Officers of
Queensland Government agencies. The Steering Committee provides a forum for collaboration
between agencies and information exchange on the progress of Meeting Challenges initiatives.
Discussions with Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, 20 January 2004.
Director-General, Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy, op.cit.
ibid.
Discussions with Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, 20 January 2004.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Council of Australian Governments
Indigenous Whole of Governments Initiative, Report September 2003.
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Correspondence, op.cit.

Social Justice Report 2003

Aside from discussions about regional priorities it is likely that community-level

Shared Responsibility Agreements will be developed through the Queensland
governments negotiation table process.76 The negotiation table concept is
a key policy platform of the Queensland Governments Meeting Challenges
strategy, and involves a process of negotiation between Indigenous communities
and government to identify community priorities and establish agreed strategies
to respond to these issues. The negotiation table process commenced in late
2003 and the federal government participated on these community-government
processes.
In addition to the Meeting Challenges strategy, there are a number of significant
Australian Government and Queensland Government initiatives in the Cape
York region which are compatible with the identified priorities of the COAG trial.
These include the Primary Health Care Access Program (PHCAP) being run
through Apunipima Cape York Health Council and the Cape York Partnerships
Institute for Policy and Leadership (an academic centre developed between
Cape York Indigenous organisations and Griffith University, and jointly funded
by the Australian and Queensland Governments).77

e) Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (South Australia)

The Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (the AP Lands) were announced as the South
Australian trial site in May 2003. The AP Lands cover approximately 103,000
square kilometres in the far north-west of South Australia and are protected
under the Pitjantjatjara Lands Rights Act 1981(SA). The AP Lands are part of a
larger cross-border region which covers some 350,000 square kilometres of
South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, and which is the
traditional lands of the Ngaanyatjara, Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara (NPY)
peoples.78
The Department of Health and Ageing is the lead Australian Goverment agency
for the initiative. The Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation is the
agency for the South Australian government.
Community consultations have occurred to determine the priorities for a regional
Shared Responsibility Agreement.79 The identified priorities include health and
wellbeing with focus on substance misuse and the supply of healthy food,
education, training and employment opportunities; better access to services
such as banking and Centrelink, essential services and housing; and
strengthening community governance.
To provide the overall direction to the AP Lands trial a joint COAG Steering
Committee was established in early 2003. Its membership comprises
representatives from the community, Australian and State governments and
ATSIS. This Committee oversees the COAG agenda, and works in close

76
77
78
79

ibid.
ibid.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) Lands (SA), online
at <http://www.icc.gov.au/communities/locations/ap_lands> accessed 12 December 2003.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Council of Australian Governments
Indigenous Whole of Governments Initiative, Report September 2003.

Appendix 2

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246

cooperation with the Tier One group where common priorities are being
addressed.
The draft SRA has been endorsed by the COAG Steering Committee and
circulated for signing. Two projects addressing identified priorities have been
agreed the implementation of Mai Wiru, the regional stores policy, which seeks
to address issues of pricing, nutrition and stores management training and the
establishment of rural transaction centres.
The AP Lands Inter-government Inter-agency Collaboration Committee (APLIICC)
between the Commonwealth, South Australian government, ATSIS and Anangu
Pitjantjatjara Council is known as the Tier One group and was established in
1999 to better coordinate the delivery of services to the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
Yankunytjatjara (APY) communities.80 The committee was supported by a second
tier of working groups composed of senior policy and project officers (the Tier
Two working groups) and has recently been replaced with a number of task
forces. These taskforces implement the directives of the APLIICC and focus on
a range of issues, including community health and wellbeing; arts and culture;
economic and resources; community cohesion and safety; education and
training; income support and infrastructure. Tier One now focuses on
coordinating State government activities and links in with the COAG Steering
Committee work. An Allocation Committee has been established and the fifteenmember committee has membership from Community Councils, Homelands
Groups, Nganampa Health and the APY Womens Council. The group assists
in the disbursement of new SA government funding for AP Lands and its
establishment ensures all stakeholders have a clear understanding of funding
available for the AP Lands and are involved in its distribution.
Further information about the AP Lands COAG trial is contained in Chapter 4 of
this report on the responsive of governments to issues of petrol sniffing on the
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands.

f) East Kimberley region (Western Australia)

The Western Australian COAG trial (formerly known as the Tjurabalan trial site)
was announced in July 2003. It is situated in the east Kimberley region and
encompasses the communities of Balgo, Bililuna, Mulan, Ringers Soak and
Yagga Yagga.81 The lead Australian government agency is the Department of
Transport and Regional Services (DoTARS). Other partners in the trial include
the Tjurabalan Native Title Land Aboriginal Corporation, ATSIC Wunan Regional
Council, the local government Shire of Halls Creek and the communities of
Billiluna, Yakka Yakka, Balgo, Kundat Djaru and Mulan. The Department of
Indigenous Affairs is the lead agency for the WA government and a partner in
the trial. The Halls Creek Shire Council is also a key partner and the local
government involved in the trial.

80

81

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation, Minister for Correctional Services and Minister
Assisting the Minister for Environment and Conservation (SA), Correspondence with Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, November 2003.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, WA COAG trial site, online at <http://www.icc.
gov.au/communities/locations/wa_coag_site> accessed 11 December 2003.

Social Justice Report 2003

The initial focus of the trial has been on establishing governance structures
through which the parties can interact and to identify community consulting
agents to help engage local communities. The Munjurla Reference Group was
established to drive the trial, with support provided by an on-the-ground
Secretariat. The reference group consists of two representatives from each
community, traditional owners the ATSIC Wunan Regional Council and
representatives from Australian, State and local governments at Secretary or
CEO level.
The group has agreed on its roles and responsibilities, the establishment of a
basic administration centre in the region, and series of activities for the Justice
Participation Project.82
A working group has been established under the Munjurla Reference Group to
progress decisions, and the first task has been to ensure effective
communication channels are established and maintained between the Munjurla
Reference Group and existing Community Councils.83 The working group
secretariat is comprised of a Community Initiatives Coordinator (jointly funded
between DoTARS and the Department of Family and Community Services), an
ATSIS-funded COAG officer and a WA state government officer.
A scoping study has also commenced (the Munjurla Scoping Study) to gather
baseline data to provide a road map for negotiating an agreement with the
communities. It has been commissioned by ATSIS. A joint fund has been
established under the auspice of the Halls Creek Shire Council to support
consultations about the scoping study. In addition to the scoping study, this
fund supports broader community engagement with government and reference
group meetings with contributions made by the federal and Western Federal
governments, and provides a vehicle for private sector contributions.84
A draft Shared Responsibility Agreement has been provided by the two lead
agencies the Department of Transport and Regional Services and the WA
Department of Indigenous Affairs to all partners through the Munjurla Reference
Group in December 2003. Further consultations will be held with local
communities and partners to the trial to finalise an SRA. Some issues have
already been identified for negotiation under the SRA, including the need for
activities for children and young people; better education options; improved
health services; improved policing; improved housing and transport
infrastructure and amelioration of substance abuse.85 Alcohol, substance abuse
and community safety have been raised consistently as major areas for concern
within communities.86 Other issues in the region include the development of

82
83
84
85
86

Secretary, Department of Transport and Regional Services, Correspondence with Aboriginal

and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 25 November 2003.
ibid.
ibid.
Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce, Council of Australian Governments
Indigenous Whole of Governments Initiative, Report September 2003.
Secretary, Department of Transport and Regional Services, op.cit.

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248

economic opportunities in mining, land care and tourism that have arisen from
the native title consent determination in August 2001.87
The need to change existing government processes and service delivery
arrangements has been recognised by DoTARS:
A new level of bureaucratic awareness is also necessary a way of
looking beyond the boundaries of the existing envelope of government
processes and seizing opportunities to make a difference for Indigenous
communities in innovative ways.88

DoTARS states that while it is difficult to describe success in terms of real

changes to the social and economic wellbeing of communities, there are
anumber of early successes from the COAG trial. These successes focus on
the relationship between Indigenous people and government. As stated by the
Department:
The successes to date have been about engaging the communities and
governments to try things differently. This has meant building new
relationships and developing a shared understanding of what it means
to work together.89

The key lessons DoTARS have identified from the trial have focused on the
need to build effective relationships with Indigenous peoples and ensure
communities are supported in developing their capacities:
Successful engagement with remote Indigenous communities requires
a realistic and long-term approach, and for activities to occur at a pace
the communities are comfortable with. Introducing change in severely
disadvantaged communities requires that we first assist the communities
to develop their capacity to engage. Time for this process needs to be
factored into any planning.90

g) Northern Region of Tasmania

The Northern region of Tasmania was announced as the Tasmanian site for the
COAG trial in August 2003. The region is a mix of urban and rural areas and
covers Launceston, the Furneaux Islands group and the northern midlands
covering Deloraine to the far west and Bicheno in the south. The Tasmanian
Governments Aboriginal Family Violence Working Group has agreed in principle
to the northern geographical region and the initiative is in the early stages of
development.91

87

88
89
90
91

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services (Cth), President Halls
Creek Shire Council, Minister for Indigenous Affairs (WA), Chair of the Tjurabalan Native Title
Land Aboriginal Corporation and Chair ATSIC Wunan Regional Council, Tjurabalan and Region
Indigenous Communities Join COAG Trial, Joint Media release, July 2003.
Secretary, Department of Transport and Regional Services, op.cit.
ibid.
ibid.
Secretary, Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tas), Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, November 2003.

Social Justice Report 2003

The Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA)

is the lead Australian government agency and a dedicated full-time officer was
appointed to manage the initiative in June 2003.92 The Department of Premier
and Cabinet is the lead agency for the Tasmanian government, and an interim
Commonwealth/State Steering Committee has been formed to improve
coordination between the different levels of government and scope existing
government funded services in the trial area to identify resources and areas of
need.93 Both levels of government are exploring ways agencies can coordinate
their efforts to better meet the needs and interests of Indigenous peoples, and
due to being in the early stages of the trial, no legislative or administrative
amendments have been identified for implementation by the Tasmanian
government.94
There were a number of reasons for the selection of the Northern region as the
whole-of-government trial site. These included:
Based on available data it has one of the highest incidences/reporting
rates of domestic violence in the State (of all cultural groups);
Currently no government funded Aboriginal specific family violence
services exist in the region;
The region has a supportive and well-connected Aboriginal and nonAboriginal community organisation network; and
There is a good geographical mix of urban and rural areas.95
Family violence and safety issues have been identified as themes for the trial
and discussions are continuing between Indigenous people and the Australian
and Tasmanian government about a shared responsibility agreement.
Early discussions indicate the COAG whole-of-government initiative will build
on the initiatives of the Tasmanian government report on family violence ya
pulingina kani Good to See You Talk and the criminal justice options paper on
family violence, Safe at Home.96
Under the shared responsibility concept a partnership model will be developed
between government and Indigenous people, and the current consultation
process in the Northern region in Tasmania will determine the model of
Indigenous governance that will lead the community component of the trial.

92

93
94
95
96

Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs. Department of Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Cth), Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Justice Commissioner, November 2003.
Secretary, Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tas), op.cit.
ibid.
ibid.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Cth) and Premier of Tasmania,
Aboriginal People in Northern Region of Tasmania to join COAG Trials, Joint Media Release, 28
August 2003.

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h) Australian Capital Territory

The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has not yet been announced publicly as a
COAG trial site. It is expected that it will be formally announced in early 2004.
The Department of Environment and Heritage is the lead Australian government
agency for the initiative. The trial will be implemented across the entire region of
the ACT. The Chief Ministers Department is the lead agency for the ACT
government.
Indigenous community consultations and negotiations have been undertaken
for the trial, which culminated in a two day workshop held in September 2003.
Forty Indigenous leaders and representatives from Indigenous community
organisations attended.
The September 2003 meeting obtained Indigenous community endorsement
for the trial and the themes to be progressed under the shared responsibility
approach.97 The initial proposed focus of the trial on youth issues and education
have evolved through the consultation process to an holistic approach being
pursued under the concept of The Living Web Keeping the Web Alive. This
framework is multifaceted and encompasses justice, employment, youth, culture,
education, housing, health and aged care. Three overarching themes have
emerged from these discussions: social and emotional well being; culture and
learning; and capacity building for all.98
It was agreed at the September 2003 workshop that a federation of Indigenous
community organisations would constitute the community governance model
in the ACT. An Indigenous working group has been established as an executive
group to the community federation model and will represent the community
interests in negotiating the Shared Responsibility Agreement.99
A shared responsibility agreement is expected to be finalised during 2004 and
will outline the agreed responsibilities between the Indigenous Working Group,
Australian and ACT government and ATSIC. The Minister for Environment and
Heritage states that close working relationships have been developed between
the two tiers of government and both Governments have established closer
relationships with the Indigenous communities in the ACT.100
A monitoring and evaluation framework for the trial is currently being drafted,
and will align with the national reporting measures set by the Ministerial Council
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (MCATSIA) and the Productivity
Commission.101

97

Chief Executive, Chief Ministers Department (ACT), Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, October 2003.
98 ibid.
99 Minister for the Environment and Heritage (Cth), Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, November 2003.
100 Minister for the Environment and Heritage (Cth), op.cit.
101 ibid.

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Appendix 3

Extract from findings of Coronial inquests

on petrol sniffing on the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara Lands
This appendix contains an extract from the findings of Coroner Chivell in the
inquests of the South Australian Coroners Court into the deaths of three Anangu
on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands between 1999-2001.1 The full findings of the
Coroner can be accessed online at the following address: http://
w w w. c o u r t s . s a . g o v. a u / c o u r t s / c o r o n e r / f i n d i n g s / f i n d i n g s _ 2 0 0 2 /
kunmanara_ken.finding.htm

1.

Executive Summary

1.
This inquest concerns the deaths of three people, Kunmanara Ken who
died on 3 August 1999, Kunmanara Hunt who died on 27 January 2001 and
Kunmanara Thompson who died on 26 June 2001.
2.
All three deceased died as a result of inhalation of petrol fumes. The
mechanism of death was strikingly similar in each case, namely that the
deceased took a can containing petrol to bed with them, and continued to sniff
until they died from respiratory depression with a possible additional component
of asphyxia.
3.
Each person had marks on his or her face indicating that the head was
resting on the tin, which had been shaped to fit the contours of the face and
achieve a seal.
4.
Each of them was of mature age (27, 25, 29 years) and each had been
sniffing petrol for more than ten years, thereby justifying the description chronic
sniffers. Each had led lives characterised by illness, hopelessness, violence
and alienation from their families and community. Each had parents and family
who did their best to stop them sniffing, and who have endured much suffering
and grief as a result of their inability to do so, and the consequent death of a
loved family member.
1

Chivell, W, Findings of the South Australian State Coronial Inquest into the Deaths of Kunmanara
Ken, Kunmanara Hunt and Kunmanara Thompson, 6 September 2002.

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5.
Petrol sniffing is endemic on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands. It has caused
and continues to cause devastating harm to the community, including
approximately 35 deaths in the last 20 years in a population of between 2,000
and 2,500. Serious disability, crime, cultural breakdown and general grief and
misery are also consequences.
6.
The phenomenon is still not well-understood, and although considerable
research has been undertaken, Governments still do not have a clear idea how
many people are involved, and the extent to which they have already suffered
serious harm.
7.
The extent of the problem diminished somewhat in the mid 1990s, and it
is apparent that there was a reduction in effort towards tackling the problem. It
has been apparent since at least 1998 that the problem was returning, and that
the prognosis was bad, but little has been achieved to restore the effort to pre1995 levels, let alone take it further.
8.
Clearly, socio-economic factors play a part in the general aetiology of
petrol sniffing. Poverty, hunger, illness, low education levels, almost total
unemployment, boredom and general feelings of hopelessness form the
environment in which such self-destructive behaviour takes place.
9.
That such conditions should exist among a group of people defined by
race in the 21st century in a developed nation like Australia is a disgrace and
should shame us all.
10. Many attempts over the years to combat petrol sniffing have been
unsuccessful. Anangu continue to try and care for sniffers even when they
continue to sniff, and even after they are violent and disruptive to their families
and the community. Some Anangu are concerned that if they try and stop sniffers
they will harm them, or that the sniffers may harm themselves. They look to the
broader community to help them deal with a problem which has no precedent
in traditional culture.
11. The South Australian Government established the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
Lands Inter-Governmental Inter-Agency Collaboration Committee (APLIICC)
to tackle the wider issues and the Petrol Sniffing Task Force (PSTF) to specifically
tackle petrol sniffing. The terms of reference of APLIICC were established in
September 2001. It has held several meetings, as have its sub-committees, but
the big meeting with Anangu on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands is yet to occur.
12. The Commonwealth Government took over responsibility for aboriginal
health from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in
1995. It has conducted a review and established the Central Australian Cross
Border Reference Group on Volatile Substances Use. That Group has also met
several times but is yet to develop a framework for action.
13. The establishment of these bodies met with a generally favourable
response, although there have been criticisms about failure to consult, and
delay. Both bodies have taken far too long to act. Their meetings are too far
apart, and still seem stuck in the information gathering phase. There is no
need for further information gathering, and there is a vast untapped pool of
professional expertise to be utilised. What is missing is prompt, forthright,
properly planned, properly funded action.

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14. Many of the people in the field complained of the remoteness of

bureaucracies, and their incessant demands for written reports on performance
outcomes and so forth. It would be better if the bureaucracies appointed trusted
representatives who could monitor and evaluate projects and programmes for
themselves, rather than insisting that dedicated professionals in the field continue
to spend valuable time and resources preparing reports in order to ensure
continued funding. It would also be preferable, for a variety of reasons, if
programmes are funded on a triennial basis, as recommended by the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.
15. A variety of intervention strategies to combat petrol sniffing were analysed
at this inquest. Clearly a successful strategy must have broad community
support.
16. Strategies at three different levels are called for:
Primary interventions to reduce recruitment into substance
abuse;
Secondary interventions seeking to achieve abstinence and
rehabilitation;
Tertiary intervention providing services to the permanently
disabled.
17. Strategies include:
Youth activities through provision of youth workers;
Neuropsychological testing;
Outstations / Homelands;
Avgas;
Legal sanctions;
Night patrols;
Programmes for Children At Risk;
Disability services;
Secure care facilities;
Policing;
Crime Prevention strategies.
18. The implementation of any one of those strategies by itself is likely to fail,
but introduction in combination with a variety of others will give a better chance
of success.
19. All these strategies must be accompanied by strategies to address socioeconomic issues such as poverty, hunger, health, education and employment.
20. The implementation of these strategies will doubtless involve difficult
problems such as recruitment and retention of suitable staff. Creative solutions
will need to be found. Anangu cannot be expected to find all of the human and
other resources to tackle these problems. They need the assistance and input
of non-Anangu professional people to tackle these problems directly, and to
give them the power and skills to take up the task in due course.
21. Anangu who gave evidence at the inquest were not consistent in their
views about the role they felt police should take, although I detected a general
feeling that they wanted more protection and security from the South Australia

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Police Department (SAPOL), particularly during the acute phase of incidents

involving petrol sniffers.
22. The evidence of non-Anangu witnesses was unanimous that a much
greater, permanent SAPOL presence on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands is called
for. This was accepted in principle by SAPOL following a review in 1998, although
the recommendations of the review have still not been implemented.
23. The Community Constable Scheme is a worthwhile initiative, and could
be improved with further training of community constables. However the scheme
has significant limitations because of cultural constraints, and the fact that the
Community Constables are members of very small communities. Their strengths
lie in diffusing acute situations, and acting as liaison and intelligence officers.
24. Ongoing training, support and supervision of community constables by
sworn police officers is needed, and this will require a permanent SAPOL
presence on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands. The decision to station two police
officers at Umuwa on a rotation basis is supported, but a review to assess the
adequacy of this measure is necessary in due course.
25. The presence of SAPOL officers in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands could
fulfil a valuable community development role in addition to policing issues.
26. The establishment of SAPOL officers at Marla is significantly understrength, and more needs to be done to attract officers to the area.
27. Police are considerably inhibited from dealing in a more effective way
with offending in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands at present by the lack of
appropriate detention facilities, lack of personnel, the distances involved, and
the lack of sentencing options available to the courts.
28. Operation Pitulu Wantima conducted in January and February 2000
demonstrated that police can be effective in interdiction and suppression of
petrol sniffing, and of crime generally, if they have a more sustained presence
on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands

12. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody

(RCIADIC)
12.1 A comparison of the issues which have arisen at this inquest with the
findings of the RCIADIC published in 1991 reveals that the recommendations
of that inquiry have still not been fully implemented. An exhaustive analysis of
those recommendations (339 in all) is beyond my capacity in the context of this
inquest, but an examination of some specific recommendations is instructive:
Recommendation 88: That Police Services in their ongoing review
of the allocation of resources should closely examine, in
collaboration with Aboriginal organisations, whether there is a
sufficient emphasis on community policing. In the course of the
review, they should, in negotiation with appropriate Aboriginal
organisations and people, consider whether:
a) There is over-policing or inappropriate policing of Aboriginal
people in any city or regional centre or country town;

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b) The policing provided to more remote communities is adequate

and appropriate to meet the needs of those communities and,
in particular, to meet the needs of women in those communities;
and
c) There is sufficient emphasis on crime prevention and liaison
work and training directed to such work (page 51).
Recommendation 113: That where non-custodial sentencing
orders provide for a community work or development program as
a condition of the order the authorities responsible for the program
should ensure that the local Aboriginal community participates, if
its members so choose, in the planning and implementation of
the program. Further, that Aboriginal community organisations be
encouraged to become participating agencies in such programs
(page 55).
Recommendation 195: That, subject to appropriate provision to
ensure accountability to government for funds received, payments
by government to Aboriginal organisations and communities be
made on the basis of triennial rather than annual or quarterly
funding (page 74).
Recommendation 238: That once programs and strategies for
youth have been devised and agreed, after negotiation between
government and appropriate Aboriginal organisations and
communities, governments should provide resources for the
employment and training of appropriate persons to ensure that
the programs and strategies are successfully implemented at a
local level. In making appointment of trainers preferences should
be given to Aboriginal people with a proven record of being able
to relate to, and influence, young people even though such
candidates may not have academic qualifications (page 84).
Recommendation 265: That as an immediate step towards
overcoming the poorly developed level of mental health services
for Aboriginal people priority should be given to complementing
the training of psychiatrists and other non-Aboriginal mental health
professionals with the development of a cadre of Aboriginal health
workers with appropriate mental health training, as well as their
general health worker training. The integration of the two groups,
both in their training and in mental health service delivery, should
receive close attention. In addition, resources should be allocated
for the training and employment of Aboriginal mental health workers
by Aboriginal health services (page 91).
Recommendation 286: That the Commonwealth Government, in
conjunction with the States and Territories Governments and nongovernment agencies, act to co-ordinate more effectively the
policies, resources and programs in the area of petrol sniffing (page
94).

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12.2 It can be seen that simply by analysing the facts and circumstances of
these three deaths, and the circumstances which still exist on the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara Lands at the moment, those recommendations of the RCIADIC
have not been complied with, either by Commonwealth or State Governments.
12.3 This is a great tragedy which I have no doubt will, if it is not addressed,
lead to severe disability and further deaths, not to mention continuing social
dislocation, crime, loss of culture and general community degradation and loss.

13. Recommendations
13.1 I am empowered by section 25(2) of the Coroners Act, 1975, to make
recommendations following an inquest if, in my opinion, to do so may prevent,
or reduce the likelihood of, a recurrence of an event similar to the event that
was the subject of the inquest.
13.2 Having considered the evidence in this matter and the detailed and very
helpful submission of counsel, I consider that it is appropriate to make the
following recommendations:
1. That Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments
recognise that petrol sniffing poses an urgent threat to the very
substance of the Anangu communities on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara
Lands. It threatens not only death and serious and permanent
disability, but also the peace, order and security of communities,
cultural and family structures, education, health and community
development.
2. Socio-economic factors such as poverty, hunger, illness, lack
of education, unemployment, boredom, and general feelings of
hopelessness must be addressed, as they provide the environment
in which substance abuse will be resorted to, and any rehabilitation
measures will be ineffective if the person returns to live in such
conditions after treatment.
3. The fact that the wider Australian community has a
responsibility to assist Anangu to address the problem of petrol
sniffing, which has no precedent in traditional culture, is clear.
Governments should not approach the task on the basis that the
solutions must come from Anangu communities alone.
4. The Commonwealth Government, though the Central
Australian Cross Border Reference Group, and the South Australian
Government through the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands InterGovernmental Inter-Agency Collaboration Committee, should
accelerate their efforts to find solutions to these issues and get
beyond the information gathering phase forthwith. They should
use the extensive knowledge, published material and professional
expertise that is already available.
5. It is particularly important that Inter-Governmental coordination
of approach be a high priority in order to avoid the fragmentation

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8.

of effort and confusion and alienation of service-providers which

are features of current service delivery to Anangu communities.
6. Commonwealth and State Governments should establish a
presence in the region, if not on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands
then at least in Alice Springs, of senior, trusted officials, in order to
develop local knowledge, personal relationships with service
providers and receivers, and some expertise and experience in
cross-cultural issues, rather than relying on infrequent meetings
with ever-changing officials in order to communicate with Anangu.
Such officials should be invested with sufficient authority to manage
and assess programmes on an ongoing basis, so that service
providers can have a line of communication with the funding body,
and some certainty as to future arrangements.
7. Many of the strategies for combating petrol sniffing which
have been tried in the past should not be discarded simply because
they failed to achieve permanent improvements. Some of them
might be regarded as having been successful for as long as they
were extant. For any strategy to be successful will require broad
Anangu support. Most strategies will fail unless they are supported
by others as part of a multi-faceted approach. Strategies should
be aimed at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, as I have
outlined in these findings.
In particular:
8.1 The proposal before the Tier 1 Committee of APLIICC to
appoint four youth workers and a coordinator for the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara Lands should be implemented forthwith. Practical
issues such as employment conditions, housing conditions and
the like must be dealt with. The situation should be monitored to
ensure that this number is sufficient to meet the needs of all
communities;
8.2 A programme of further research and evaluation of people
who have been sniffing petrol, on a neurological and
neuropsychological basis, should be instituted so that
assessments can be made about the suitability of candidates for
rehabilitation, and the level of need for disability services on the
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands can be evaluated;
8.3 The establishment of a culturally appropriate Homelands/
Outstation programme should be undertaken to provide a venue
for community respite, recreation, skills training, education and
the like in the context of abstinence from petrol sniffing. Such
establishments should not be considered as rehabilitation facilities
for chronic petrol sniffers;
8.4 The Commonwealth Government should continue to resource
the Avgas initiative through the Comgas scheme, as it represents
a successful interdiction strategy without which petrol would be
much more widely available;

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8.5 The range of sentencing options available to courts sitting in

the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands must be increased. The SA
Department for Correctional Services must provide supervisors
so that bonds, undertakings and community service obligations
can be enforced. The establishment of Outstations/Homelands,
and a secure care facility would also provide options to courts;
8.6 The Public Intoxication Act should be amended so that it
applies on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands. There should be a
declaration that petrol or hydrocarbons, or the vapours thereof,
are a drug for the purposes of the Act. A secure care facility would
provide a sobering up facility to which detainees could be taken
pursuant to the Act;
8.7 Although night patrols have not received support on the
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands to date, the possibility of encouraging
and supporting Anangu to establish them as part of an overall
crime prevention strategy in consultation with SAPOL should be
explored;
8.8 APLIICC should consider the future role of FAYS in relation to
children at risk on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands, and in particular
whether their role needs to be expanded into a much more
proactive community development role;
8.9 The level of services for disabled victims of petrol sniffing
should be urgently upgraded. The recommendations of Mr
Tregenzas review should receive urgent consideration (it has been
in the hands of the SA Government for six months or more) and
implemented where practicable;
8.10 Planning for the establishment of secure care facilities on
the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands should commence immediately.
These facilities must be reasonably accessible from all
communities on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands, and have a multifunctional role to provide facilities for detention, detoxification,
treatment and rehabilitation as outlined in these findings;
8.11 A much more energetic, concerted and creative approach to
recruitment of suitably qualified experienced and appropriate staff
will need to be undertaken in order to attract people to employment
in the implementation of these strategies;
8.12 The implementation of the recommendations of the SAPOL
review into the Community Constable Scheme, in particular
concerning establishment of a permanent, sworn SAPOL presence
on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands, should be undertaken forthwith.
The proposal to station two officers at Umuwa is a start, but the
abandonment of the proposal to establish another base in the
Western area, at Murpatja, should be reconsidered in order to
provide an appropriate degree of training, support, and supervision
of Community Constables;

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8.13 Further measures need to be taken by SAPOL to ensure that

the staff establishment at Marla is at full strength. Although efforts
made to address this issue to date are recognised, the station
remains under-strength, and is unable to provide an effective
policing service on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands, at present,
resulting in under-reporting of crime and a general disenchantment
with the level of police service among Anangu;
8.14 The interventions described above must be implemented as
part of an overall multi-faceted strategy, and not piecemeal, as
they are interdependent and stand a high chance of failure if they
are introduced separately;
8.15 The recommendations of the Royal Commission into
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody should be re-examined by both
Commonwealth and State Governments as a check to assess the
degree to which those recommendations have still not been
implemented.

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