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To Win The Peace

The document discusses the challenges facing Sri Lanka in the post-war period and transitioning to peace. It notes that while the new government has made some political arrests of former officials, it has not addressed the difficult issue of resolving tensions with the Tamil population. The military remains large with over 300,000 personnel and entrenched in the north, maintaining divisions and militarizing civilian life. For Sri Lanka to build a sustainable peace, it must reduce the military's size and presence in the north, scale back militarization across the country, and pursue a political resolution to the Tamil question. Demobilizing soldiers could help but presents economic challenges that will require assistance from countries like India.

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Thavam Ratna
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207 views4 pages

To Win The Peace

The document discusses the challenges facing Sri Lanka in the post-war period and transitioning to peace. It notes that while the new government has made some political arrests of former officials, it has not addressed the difficult issue of resolving tensions with the Tamil population. The military remains large with over 300,000 personnel and entrenched in the north, maintaining divisions and militarizing civilian life. For Sri Lanka to build a sustainable peace, it must reduce the military's size and presence in the north, scale back militarization across the country, and pursue a political resolution to the Tamil question. Demobilizing soldiers could help but presents economic challenges that will require assistance from countries like India.

Uploaded by

Thavam Ratna
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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To win the peace

Written by Nirupama Subramanian | Published on:April 25, 2015 12:37 am


President Maithripala Sirisenas self-imposed 100-day deadline to prove that his
government is indeed the promised clean break from the Rajapaksa regime
ended on April 23. A day earlier, the Sri Lankan police made the high-profile
arrest of Basil Rajapaksa, former economic development minister and brother
of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, on corruption charges.
Nearly a month ago, there was another round of arrests but chances are you did
not hear about it. Policemen burst into a dubbing studio in Colombo with a
search warrant and arrested eight people present five Tamils and three
Sinhalese, including studio employees and voice artistes. The alleged crime: the
studio was dubbing a film being made by a Sri Lankan Tamil. Set in the final
days of the Sri Lankan war, the film tells the story of four real-life people as the
LTTE comes apart on the battlefield. It is not a documentary. Actors play the four
characters. The film was shot and produced in Tamil Nadu.
The filmmaker had sent to the Colombo studio seven minutes of footage, with

army scenes, to be dubbed in Sinhalese. The police said the film was
defamatory of the Sri Lankan army, containing scenes that projected it as
immoral, inhumane and atrocious. The eight people have since been released
on police bail, meaning the police have let them go until investigations are
completed. A travel ban has been imposed on them.
Much has changed in Sri Lanka since January, yet little has changed because the
new government has not yet applied itself to the most difficult issue facing the
country. None of the promises in the 100-day package relate to Sri Lankas Tamil
question. In fact, some, such as the electoral reforms presently under discussion,
may even complicate it.
Granted, a 60-year-old question cannot be settled in 100 days. But it cannot be
put off forever either. The longer it is postponed, the sharper post-conflict
divisions are likely to get, not least because of a militarisation that has become
so entrenched that certain arms of the Sri Lankan state, as last months arrests
show, still see shadows of the long-gone LTTE everywhere and believe the war
unfinished. Reversing this is easier said than done. In their eagerness to milk
the victory over the LTTE for political ends, the Rajapaksas built up the military
as an instrument of day-to-day governance, deeming this necessary to combat
the threat that the Tigers were still said to be posing.
This has given Sri Lanka a huge Sinahlese-only military with no war to fight and
no enemies in sight, but much self-importance and the constant need to justify
its size and existence. It means that Tamils remain suspect, with incidents like
the one at the Colombo studio sharpening the divisions.
Sirisena did not dissolve parliament and call for fresh elections on the 100th day
of his government as he had promised, but he is expected to do this soon. If Sri
Lanka is serious about post-war nation-building, a challenge for this
government and the one that comes in after the parliamentary elections, is to
tackle this militarisation as it works towards a political resolution of the Tamil
question.

It would have to start with the size of the military. After the first shots fired by
Tamil militants in Jaffna in the 1970s, the Sri Lankan military grew from a
ceremonial force of 30,000 to an estimated 3,00,000 men in all three services
plus the police force by the end of the war. Present force strengths of the army,
navy and air force are guesstimates based on the contradictory numbers
provided by figures in the defence establishment. Though no notable hardware
acquisitions have been made since the end of the war, the defence budget has
increased since 2009, mostly to pay out the salaries and pensions of soldiers.
Shepherded by Gotabaya Rajapaksa, defence secretary during brother
Mahindas presidency, it was not long after the war that this large and idle force
entered public life and the economy at various levels: in urban development
projects, especially Colombos much admired beautification; in education,
giving military training that was made compulsory for university entrants; the
retail trade; agriculture; civil aviation; tourism, with several military-run hotels
and resorts, including one at the site of the LTTEs last stand in Mullaitivu, called
Lagoons Edge. In the Tamil north, where its influence extends across all sectors
of civilian life, the first non-military governor was appointed only after the new
government took charge. But calls to reduce the militarys presence in the
region have not been met.
Of the armys 19 divisions, 16 are garrisoned in northern and eastern Sri Lanka,
an estimated 80,000 troops. The military took thousands of acres of land
(separate from the land acquired in the early 1990s, some of which was recently
returned) to build these camps. In addition, a plainclothes Civilian Defence
Force acts as an intelligence arm for the military. It has been suggested that
there is no option: southern Sri Lanka just does not have the space for these
garrisons. But Tamils fear that this entirely Sinhalese force will become a
permanent part of the norths demography, altering its ethnic composition to
their disadvantage.

Colombo can scale down the armys presence in the north, the militarisation
across the country, and the persisting Sinhala triumphalism of the 2009
battlefield victory, only by first reducing troop strength. Demobilisation, if ever
considered, did not top Rajapaksa post-war priorities. But unless the word
enters the debate, Sri Lanka will find itself with an army that needs to grow in
size and influence just to keep its economic and other interests going and as
in Pakistan, the interests expanding as its influence grows, all in the name of an
enemy.
The Rajapaksas had sent out a strong signal with the arrest of Sarath Fonseka,
the chief who led the army against the LTTE, that the military would function
purely under their leadership and there was no place for rivals from the
defence forces. The present government alleged the former first family tried to
use the army to mount a coup when it became clear they had been voted out,
and that the country was saved because the army chief refused. True or not, a
large, well-trained standing army with little in its own sphere to keep it busy
will remain a temptation for Sri Lankas political and military adventurers.
Locating alternate livelihoods for demobbed soldiers is a challenge even for
countries with big economies. India and other countries that want Sri Lanka to
win the peace must help. The Modi government, which is trying to revive a
comprehensive economic partnership, can make this deal more attractive by
offering ex-soldiers training and education scholarships in India, and by
persuading Indian companies with a presence in Sri Lanka to offer job
opportunities to them. Ultimately, demilitarisation is key to addressing the issue
of alleged war crimes in a less charged atmosphere. It will hasten post-war
reconciliation and ensure the countrys political stability.
Postscript: The eight people who were arrested and provisionally let off are still
awaiting their fate.
nirupama.subramanian@expressindia.com
Posted by Thavam at

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