December 24, 1927

G.R. No. 27531

In re estate of the deceased Victoriana Saavedra. MACARIO
MACROHON ONG HAM, administrator-appellant,
vs.
JUAN SAAVEDRA, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
Frank H. Young and Pablo Lorenzo for appellant.
No appearance for appellees.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and executor of the joint last will and
testament of Victoriana Saavedra and himself, presented said will for
probate, which was ordered by the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in
its decree of February 21, 1924.
This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the
property in accordance with the terms of the joint will, to which Juan
Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined insisting upon
the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of Juan Saavedra
and others be overruled.
On March 25, 1926, the parties submitted a statement of facts, which reads
as follows:
1. That Victoriana Saavedra died in the municipality and Province of
Zamboanga, P. I., without descendants or ascendants, being at that time
married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of them having executed a joint
will, which joint will has been duly admitted to probate in this court.
2. That the only near relations of the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right
to inherit her estate are her brothers Juan and Segundo Saavedra; her

nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana

Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion
Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana Saavedra died
intestate, or did not dispose of her property in said will.
3. That aside from the estate mentioned in the said last will and testament,
duly probated by this Honorable Court, there exist another parcel of land,
acquired by Ong Ham the year 1920, by purchase from Ong Tah, and
adjudicated to the said Ong Ham in Expediente No. 6 (Cadastral).
Lot No. 3057, with the improvements thereon in favor of the persons named
below in the following proportions: Ong Ham, aged 65 years, married to
Victoriana Saavedra, 19/20 parts; Crispulo Macoto Cruz, of legal age, 1/40
part; and Juan Mocoto, 1/40 part.
4. That the interest parties in this proceeding herewith submit to this
Honorable Court the rights of the respective parties in this estate, in
accordance with the terms of this joint last will and testament of the
spouses, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and of Victoriana Saavedra, deceased.
5. That the parties representing Macario Macrohon Ong Ham admit that he
sold lots Nos. 34 and 35, of Expediente No. 8196, for the sum of P1,900,
believing in good faith that he could sell the same for his personal uses.
6. That the party representing Juan Saavedra, and the other relations
heretofore named hereby withdraw their opposition which they have
presented to the final account of the surviving spouse, Macario Macrohon
Ong Ham, and conform to the same, and ask that the Court approve the said
final account.
The will referred to in the statement of facts above quoted reads as follows:
That we, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham Victoriana Saavedra, both residing at
San Roque, municipality and Province of Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, and
both of about 70 years of age, realizing that we have but a few more years to

live, and each of us being in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties
and not acting by virtue of threats, force or undue influence, individually and
conjointly do hereby make public, declare, and execute this, our last will and
testament, in the following terms:
We hereby declare that we are husband and wife; that we have had no issue,
nor have we adopted children.
We hereby likewise declare that Macario Macrohon Ong Ham is a native of
China, having resided in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands for over 40 years,
and that Victoriana Saavedra is a native of the Philippine Islands.
We furthermore declare that Macario Macrohon Ong Ham has two nephews
at present residing in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, whom he has always
treated as his own sons, following the custom of Amoy, China, whose names
and ages respectively as follows:
Ong Ka Chiew, residing at San Roque, Zambaoanga, P. I., about 20 years of
age, single, and Ong Ka Jian, also residing at San Roque, Zamboanga, P.I.,
about 18 years of age, single.
We also declare that there are actually registered in our names, as conjugal
property, the following parcels of land located in Zamboanga, P. I., to wit:
Lot No. 838 A, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1257
Lot No. 825, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1783
Lot No. 832, proceeding 7880, same certificate
Lot No. 330, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 4027
Lot No. 1, proceeding 7880, same certificate
Lot No. 199, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 736
Lot No. 329, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 858
Lot No. 838 C, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1259
Lot No. 831 B, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1256
Lot No. 817, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1247

Lot No. 768, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1105

Lot No. 35, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 1257
Lot No. 65 A, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 3688
Lot No. 834, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 4025
Lot No. 96, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 4025
Lot No. 57 A, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 4871
Lot No. 222, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 861
Lot No. 34, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 4858
Lot No. 137 C, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 2223
We do hereby agree jointly and individually, that our properties above
described by disposed of in the following manner:
In case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana
Saavedra, we hereby order that the properties hereinafter described be
jointly given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian , and should either of the two
die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order that all the said properties
be given to the survivor, which properties are described as follows:
Lot No. 838 C, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1259
Lot No. 831 B, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1256
Lot No. 825, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1783
Lot No. 832, proceeding 7880, same certificate
Lot No. 330, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 4027
Lot No. 1, proceeding 7880, same certificate
Lot No. 199, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 736
Lot No. 329, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 858
Lot No. 35, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 1257
Lot No. 65 A, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 3688
Lot No. 834, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 4025
Lot No. 96, proceeding 8196, same certificate
Lot No. 57 A, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 4871
Lot No. 222, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 861

Lot No. 34, proceeding 8196, certificate 4858

Lot No. 137 C, proceeding 8196, certificate No. 2223
In case that Victoriana Saavedra should survive Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,
the lands and properties described below shall belong exclusively to
Victoriana Saavedra, to wit:
Lot No. 838 A, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1257
Lot No. 817, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1247
Lot No. 768, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1105
Should Victoriana Saavedra die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order
that lot No. 817-A, proceeding No. 7880, certificate No. 1247, be adjudicated
to Segunda Saavedra, widow, sister of Victoriana Saavedra, free of all liens
and encumbrances.
We further order that all our debts and just obligations, including the
expenses of our last illness and funerals, be paid by Ong Ka Chiew and Ong
Ka Jian.
If any of the legatees named herein should question or in any way attempt to
alter the disposition of any of our several properties, such legatee is to lose
and shall no longer receive the benefits and rights herein specified.
We individually and cojointly declare that the contents of this document have
been read aloud to us in our dialect and that we understand said contents,
this document having been read in the presence of each of us and in the
presence of the witnesses whose names are mentioned further on and who
have signed the present instrument together with ourselves.
In witness whereof, we sign this our last will and testament at Zamboanga,
Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on this second (2) day of January, 1923.
We, Ong Peh, Ong Chua, and T. Arquiza, do hereby certify that the foregoing
document consisting of five (5) sheets including the present, was on the date

above-mentioned, signed by the testators Macario Macrohon Ong Ham and

Victoriana Saavedra on all its sheets, in our presence at their request, in their
presence, and in the presence of each other we have signed our names as
witnesses on all the sheets of said will.
The lower court solving the question raised by the parties in their agreement
of facts, held that the one-half of the property described in the will, all of lot
No. 3057, cadastral case No. 6; one-half of the cash balance of the final
account to be rendered by the executor, and half of the proceeds of the sale
of lots No. 34 and 35 of Proceeding No. 8196, belong to Macario Macrohon
Ong Ham; and as it appears from the will quoted, as well as from the
agreement dated March 25, 1926, that Victoriana Saavedra left no legitimate
ascendants or descendants at the time of her death Macario Macrohon Ong
Ham, her widower, is, according to the provisions of articles 837 of the Civil
Code, entitled to the usufruct of one-half of the estate of the said Victoriana
Saavedra, consisting of one-half of the property described in the will,
excluding lots No. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda
Saavedra with the consent of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; of one-half of the
cash balance of the executor's final account, and of half of the proceeds of
the sale of lots Nos. 34 and 35 in proceeding No. 8196, and said estate is
adjudicated as follows: one-half of the same belongs in usufruct to the
widower Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and the naked ownership of this half
as well as the full ownership of the other half is adjudicated to Victoriana
Saavedra's heirs, named in the said agreement dated March 25, 1926, in the
following manner: sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in
usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, to Juan Saavedra;
sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct ands sixteenths
of the other half in full ownership, to Segunda Saavedra; and, sixteenths of
the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other
half in full ownership to Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana
Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra and Josefa Saavedra, children
of Mateo Saavedra, deceased brother of Victoriana Saavedra, in equal parts;
and to Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, daughters of Petrona Saavedra,

deceased sister of Victoriana Saavedra, sixteenths of the naked ownership of

the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, in
equal parts.
As regards lots Nos. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda
Saavedra, the court adjudicates the same to the said Segunda Saavedra, in
accordance with the clauses on lines 99-111 of the will.
Finally, the court orders that the executor, after paying the inheritance tax,
distribute among Victoriana Saavedra's heirs named in the agreement of
March 25, 1926, the part belonging to each of them as hereinabove stated,
and after this delivery is made and the inheritance tax, if any, is paid, this
proceeding is to be considered closed ipso facto.
Counsel for the executor appealed from this decision and assigns in his brief
the following alleged errors as committed by the lower court:
I. In holding in its auto, of November 26, 1926, that the deceased, Victoriana
Saavedra, died partially intestate, and did not dispose of all her property by
the joint last will and testament executed by herself and her husband,
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and in not finding that under the terms of the
aforesaid joint will the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, named
therein, were entitled to receive her estate and participation in the sixteen
parcels of land devised under the said joint will, by the said spouses.
II. In holding that the brother and the sister of Victoriana Saavedra, by name,
Juan Saavedra and Segundo Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, by name,
Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra,
Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, her
next of kin were entitled to receive any part of her estate and participation in
the said sixteen parcels of land, devised to the above named legatees, Ong
Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint last will and
testament.

The parts of the will pertinent to the questions raised by the appellant are:
We do agree jointly and individually that our properties above described be
disposed of in the following manner:
In case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana
Saavedra, we hereby order that the properties hereinafter described given to
Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian jointly, and should either of the two die before
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order that all the said properties be given to
the survivor, which properties are described as follows:
(Here follows a description of 16 of the 19 lots that are also described in the
will as conjugal property of the testator and testatrix.)
In case that Victoriana Saavedra should survive Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,
the lands and properties described below shall belong exclusively to
Victoriana Saavedra, to wit:
Lot No. 838 A, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1257
Lot No. 817, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1247
Lot No. 768, proceeding 7880, certificate No. 1105
Should Victoriana Saavedra die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order
that lot No. 817 A, proceeding No. 7880, certificate No. 1247, be
adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra, widow, sister of Victoriana Saavedra, free
of all liens and encumbrances.
We also order that lot No. 768, proceeding No. 7880, certificate No. 1105, be
adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra and her heirs, on condition that she devote
the products of the same to having masses said for the repose of the soul of
Victoriana Saavedra.
In case of the death of either of us, we order that the surviving spouse be
appointed executor of this our last will and testament.

Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in holding that Victoriana
Saavedra died partly intestate. Article 658 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 658. Succession is effected either by the will of man expressed by the
testament or, in the absence of a testament, by operation of law.
The first is called testamentary, the second legal succession.
It may also be effected partly by the will of man and partly by operation of
law.
According to this, there are three ways in which succession may be effected:
by the will of man, by the law, or by both at the same time. In the first case
the succession is called testamentary, because it is based on the last will and
testament, which is the orderly manifestation of the testator's will; in the
second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by operation of the law; and
the third is called mixed, because it partakes of the character of both
testamentary and legal succession.
Commenting on the third mode of effecting succession, Mr. Manresa says:
"The rule of indivisibility and incompatibility was transferred to our laws from
pure Romanism, and it remained in them until the XV Century, when the law
of the Ordenamientopreviously cited repealed the maxim nemo pro parte
testatus pro parte intestatus decedere protest. This same repeal is confirmed
in paragraph 3 of the article under consideration (658), which prescribes that
it may also be effected partly by the will of man and partly by operation of
law, and in articles 764 and 912 above cited which call the legal heirs to the
enjoyment of the part of the inheritance not disposed of by the testator in his
will." (Vol. 5, 1921 ed., pp. 326, 327.)
This is a refutation of the appellant's argument that no one who has
executed a will can die partly intestate. That the rule of indivisibility of the
testator's will invoked by the appellant does not hold good in this jurisdiction,
is shown, moreover, by articles 764 and 912 of the Civil Code. According to

the first of these articles, a will is valid even though it does not contain any
institution of an heir, or if such institution does not include the entire estate,
and even though the person instituted does not accept the inheritance or is
disqualified to inherit; according to the second, one of the ways in which
legal succession may take place is when the will does not institute an heir to
all or part of the property, or does not dispose of all that belongs to the
testator, in which case legal succession shall take place only with respect to
the property which the testator has not disposed of.
Assuming that the joint will in question is valid, it follows that the deceased
Victoriana Saavedra specified therein that parcels 187 and 768 in proceeding
No. 7880 be delivered as a legacy to her sister Segunda Saavedra, the first
parcel free of all liens and encumbrances, and the second on the condition
that the legatee devote the products of the same to having masses said for
the repose to the testatrix's soul. As to the remaining sixteen parcels, the
testatrix disposed of her part in them conditionally, that is to say, in case her
husband Macario Macrohon Ong Ham died before she died, said parcels were
to be awarded to her husband's nephews, or to either of them in case one
should have died before the said Macario Macrohon Ong Ham. The condition
imposed in the will as precedent to the vesting in the alleged legatees Ong
Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of the right to the legacy, not having been
complied with, the trial court found that the part of said property belonging
to the testatriz should be partitioned among the persons called on to
succeed her under the law. We are of the opinion that this finding is in
accordance with the law, since, under article 791 of the Civil Code,
conditions imposed upon heirs and legatees shall be governed by the rules
established for conditional obligations in all matters not provided for by this
section (articles 790 to 805). And, in accordance with article 1114 of the
Code, in conditional obligations the acquisition of rights, as well as the
extinction or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the
occurrence of the event constituting the condition.

Another error assigned by the appellant consist in the trial court not having
found that, under the terms of the joint will, the legatees Ong Ka Chiew and
Ong Ka Jian were entitled to receive the testatrix's share in the sixteen
parcels of land mentioned in said will.
The part of the will invoked by the appellant, states:
In case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana
Saavedra, we hereby order that the properties hereinafter described given to
Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian jointly, and should either of the two die before
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order that all the said properties be given to
the survivor.
The trial court, in interpreting this paragraph of the will in regard to legatees
Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, reached the right conclusion, and rightly, in
our opinion, that it provides for the substitution of legatees in case either of
them should die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; and that the acquisition
by these legatees of any right to the property described in the will depended
on the condition that Macario Macrohon Ong Ham died before Victoriana
Saavedra.
The appellant also assigns as error the holding of the trial court that the
opponents, the brother, sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were
entitled to receive her share in the said sixteen parcels of land, given to the
legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint
will. Such a contention is untenable. As we have said, the acquisition of right
by the alleged legatees depends on the occurrence of the event constituting
the condition, that is, the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham prior to that
of his wife; and this condition not having been complied with, the said Ong
Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian have not acquired any right, and therefore the
testatrix's estate is to be divided among her heirs in accordance with the law.
To the sixteen parcels of land to which reference is her made, that is, those
given to the nephews of the testator, should be added lot No. 838--A,

proceeding No. 7880, certificate 1257, which the testatrix had reserved to
herself (together with lots 817 and 768), in case she survived her husband
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham.
One-half of these seventeen parcels of land belong to the widower, Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham, and the trial court shall order the division of the other
half, that is, the estate of the deceased Victoriana Saavedra, being one-half
of the conjugal property, between the widower and the opponents, as
provided for in articles 945, 948 and 953 of the Civil Code. With this
modification, the order appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. So
ordered.
CONDE v. ABAYAGR No.L-4275,March 23, 1909 13PHIL 249FACTS:Casiano Abaya died
unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiffappellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir ofher children, sued for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano alongwith the acknowledgment of the
two as natural children of the deceased. Thetrial court, with the opposition of the
defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment
bestowing the estate of Casianoto Conde as legitimate heir of the decedent's
natural children.ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action
forthe acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order toappear in
his behalf to receive the inheritance from the deceased naturalfather.HELD: The right
of action that devolves upon the child to claim hislegitimacy lasts during his whole life,
while the right to claim theacknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life
of his
presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may,
as anexception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in twocases:
first, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of thechild, and
second, upon the discovery of some instrument of expressacknowledgment of the
child, executed by the father or mother, the existenceof which was unknown during
the life of the latter. But such action for theacknowledgment of a natural child can
only be exercised by him. It cannot betransmitted to his descendants, or his
ascendants.

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and
ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised
is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her
mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident
of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2)
children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix
of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective
share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she
is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court
denied her plea. Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial court
which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said
widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right,
and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either
by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of
representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from
her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the
Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the
deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving
spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the
Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving
spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597
(not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the
Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person

represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of
his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented)
who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an
inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may,
said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox
Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his
deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon
the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate
heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 559

MANUEL BARRIOS Y BARREDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARIA PASCUALA DOLOR, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Simplicio del Rosario, for appellant.
Maria Pascuala Dolor, appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of the
late Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate and the stock thereon,
which he claims to have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In
support of his contention as to the law of the case he attached to the complaint a
public instrument which appears to have been executed by himself and

Demonteverde, February 3, 1883, in which, according to the plaintiff, a stipulation is

made for a contract of partnership for the operation of the said estate, and,
furthermore, a community, of ownership is established with respect to the estate in
favor of the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this instrument has
been recorded in the registry of property.
Service of the complaint having been had on the defendants, Doa Maria Pascuala
Dolor raised an incidental issue as a previous question, praying that the instrument
referred to be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had not been recorded in the
registry of property, and that it be returned to the plaintiff without leaving in the
record any transcript or copy thereof or extract therefrom, resting this contention upon
article 389 of the Mortgage Law. This motion was granted by the judge by order of the
24th of March, 1898, against which the plaintiff appeals.
The article cited is literally as follows: "From the time this law goes into operation the
ordinary and special courts and the Government offices will not admit any document
or instrument by which rights subject to inscription according to this law are
constituted, transmitted, acknowledged, modified, or extinguished, unless recorded in
the register, if the object of the presentation of such document is to
enforce, to the prejudice of a third person, a right which should have
been recorded."
In view of the latter part of this article, the question has been raised in this incidental
issue whether the defendants, as heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and should
be regarded as third persons for the purposes of the Mortgage Law, with respect to the
contract executed by Demonteverde and evidenced by the instrument above
mentioned.
The Mortgaged Law itself, in article 27, gives the definition of a third person, which
is, "he who has not taken part in the act or contract recorded."
According to this parties to a contract are not third persons; consequently,
Demonteverde was not a third person with respect to the contract entered into by him
and evidenced by the instrument in question. He not being such a third person, neither

can his heirs be so regarded, nor should they be so regarded with respect to the same
contract, because they are only the judicial continuation of his personality, they having
been subrogated, by virtue of the right of succession, to all his rights and obligations,
in accordance with provisions of article 661 of the Civil Code.
This doctrine, which is a mere consequence of the general principles of law, has
received express sanction, in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain. In its
judgment of the 27th of January, 1881, the latter held that acts, both in court and out,
consented to by the person who lawfully took part therein, are effective with respect to
the heirs or successors of such parties, who are not be regarded as third persons for
this purpose; and in its judgment of the 28th of January, 1892, it was decided by the
same court that heirs are nothing more than the continuation of the legal personality of
their decedent and can not be considered in any degree as third persons within the
meaning of article 27 of the Mortgage Law.
The defendants, therefore, are not third persons with respect to the contract entered
into by their decedent, Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, in the instrument of February 3,
1883, and they therefore can not avail themselves of the prohibition contained in
article 389 of the Mortgage Law for the purpose of opposing the admission of this
instrument as evidence in the case, because not recorded in the registry of property.
This prohibition was established solely and exclusively in favor of those who, within
the meaning of that law, are third persons. Were it otherwise, the position of the
defendants would be superior to that of the person whom they derived their rights,
because he, not being a third person, could not set up such an exception. This would
certainly be most illogical from a legal point of view, in view of the fact that the heir
is, as above stated, a mere continuation of the civil personality of his decedent.
The defendants not being third persons, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether the
instrument referred to is or is not subject to inscription in accordance with article 2 of
the Mortgage Law, because, at all events, and however this may be, the mere failure to
record the instrument in the registry of property can not be a bar to its admission as
evidence in this case, as the action is not brought against a third person in the sense of
this word as used in the law referred to.

Consequently we reverse and annul the order of the court below, overruling the
motion made on behalf of Doa Maria Pascuala Dolor, without special condemnation
as to the costs of either instance. So ordered.