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Mapa V Arroyo

This document is a summary of a Supreme Court of the Philippines case from July 5, 1989. The case involved a dispute over contracts to sell four lots of land between petitioner Jose Antonio Mapa and respondent Labrador Development Corporation. Mapa claimed that Labrador failed to fulfill its obligations to provide proper infrastructure like water, lighting and roads to the subdivision within the time period required by Presidential Decree No. 957. Labrador argued that it properly cancelled the contracts after Mapa defaulted on payments for over 5 years. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the administrative agencies that ruled in favor of Labrador, noting there was no clear abuse of discretion in their factual findings and interpretation of the relevant laws.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
251 views4 pages

Mapa V Arroyo

This document is a summary of a Supreme Court of the Philippines case from July 5, 1989. The case involved a dispute over contracts to sell four lots of land between petitioner Jose Antonio Mapa and respondent Labrador Development Corporation. Mapa claimed that Labrador failed to fulfill its obligations to provide proper infrastructure like water, lighting and roads to the subdivision within the time period required by Presidential Decree No. 957. Labrador argued that it properly cancelled the contracts after Mapa defaulted on payments for over 5 years. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the administrative agencies that ruled in favor of Labrador, noting there was no clear abuse of discretion in their factual findings and interpretation of the relevant laws.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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7/25/2015

G.R.No.78585

TodayisSaturday,July25,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.78585July5,1989
JOSEANTONIOMAPA,petitioner,
vs.
HON.JOKERARROYO,inhisCapacityasExecutiveSecretary,andLABRADORDEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,respondents.
FranciscoT.Mamaugforpetitioner.
EmilianoS.Samsonforprivaterespondent.

REGALADO,J.:
Wearecalledupononceagain,inthisspecialcivilactionforcertiorari,forapronouncementastowhetherornot
therehasbeengraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartoftheexecutive
branch of Government, particularly in the adjudication of a controversy originally commenced in one of its
regulatoryagencies.
Petitioner herein seeks the reversal of the decision of the Office of the President, rendered by the Deputy
Executive Secretary on April 24,1987, 1 which dismissed his appeal from the resolution of the Commission Proper,
HumanSettlementsRegulatoryCommission(HSRC,forshort),promulgatedonJanuary10,1986andaffirmingthedecision
of July 3, 1985 of the Office of Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA, for brevity) of HSRC. Petitioner avers that public
respondent"gravelytranscendedthesphereofhisdiscretion"infindingthatPresidentialDecreeNo.957isinapplicableto
thecontractstosellinvolvedinthiscaseandinconsequentlydismissingthesame.2

Theestablishedfactsonwhichtheassaileddecisionisbasedaresetoutthereinasfollows:
Recordsdisclosethat,onSeptember18,1975,appellantJoseAntonioMapaandappelleeLabrador
DevelopmentCorporation(Labrador,forshort),owner/developeroftheBarangayHillsSubdivisionin
Antipolo,Rizal,enteredintotwocontractstoselloverlots12and13ofsaidsubdivision.Ondifferent
months in 1976, they again entered into two similar contracts involving lots 15 and 16 in the same
subdivision.Undersaidcontracts,MapaundertooktomakeatotalmonthlyinstallmentofP2,137.54
overaperiodoften(10)years.Mapa,however,defaultedinthepaymentthereofstartingDecember
1976,promptingLabradortosendtotheformerademandletter,datedMay5,1977,givinghimuntil
May18,1977,withinwhichtosettlehisunpaidinstallmentsforthe4lotsamountingtoP15,411.66,
with a warning that nonpayment thereof will result in the cancellation of the four (4) contracts.
Despite receipt of said letter on May 6,1977, Mapa failed to take any action thereon. Labrador
subsequentlywroteMapaanotherletter,datedJune15,1982,whichthelatterreceivedonJune21,
1982,remindinghimofhistotalarrearsamountingtoP180,065.27anddemandingpaymentwithin5
days from receipt thereof, but which letter Mapa likewise ignored. Thus, on August 16, 1982,
LabradorsentMapaanotarialcancellationofthefour(4)contractstosell,whichMapareceivedon
August 20, 1982. On September 10, 1982, however, Mapa's counsel sent Labrador a letter calling
Labrador'sattentionto,anddemandingitscompliancewith,Clause20ofthefour(4)contractstosell
whichrelatestoLabrador'sobligationtoprovide,amongothers,lighting/waterfacilitiestosubdivision
lotbuyers.
On September 10, 1982, Labrador issued a certification holding the implementation of the letter
datedAugust16,1982(renotarialcancellation)pendingthecompletedevelopmentofroadlotculde
sac within the properties of Mapa at Barangay Hills Subdivision.' Thereafter on October 25,1982,
LabradorsentMapaaletterinforminghim'thattheconstructionofroad,sidewalk,curbsandgutters
adjacenttoBlock11BarangayHillsSubdivisionarealreadycompleted'andfurtherrequestingMapa
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to'cometoourofficewithinfive(5)daysuponreceiptofthislettertosettleyouraccount.'
OnDecember10,1982,MapatenderedpaymentbymeansofacheckintheamountofP2,137.54,
butLabradorrefusedtoacceptpaymentforthereasonthatitwasagreed'thatafterthedevelopment
oftheculdesac,he(complainant)willpayinfullthetotalamountdue,'whichLabradorcomputedat
P 260,138.61. On December 14, 1982, Mapa wrote Labrador claiming that 'you have not complied
with the requirements for water and light facilities in lots 12, 13, 15 & 16 Block 2 of Barangay Hills
Subdivision.'Thefollowingday,MapafiledacomplaintagainstLabradorforthelatter'sneglecttoput
1)awatersystemthatmeetstheminimumstandardasspecifiedbyHSRC,and2)electricalpower
supply. By way of relief, Mapa requested the HSRC to direct Labrador to provide the facilities
aforementioned, and to issue a cease and desist order enjoining Labrador from cancelling the
contractstosell.
After due hearing/investigation, which included an onsite inspection of the subdivision, OAALA,
issued its decision of July 3, 1985, dismissing the complaint and declaring that after the lapse of 5
years from complainant's default respondent had every right to rescind the contract pursuant to
Clause7thereof...
PeritsresolutionofJanuary10,1986,theCommissionProper,HSRC,affirmedtheaforesaidOAALA
decision.3
It was petitioner's adamant submission in the administrative proceedings that the provisions of Presidential
DecreeNo.957 4andimplementingrulesformpartofthecontractstosellexecutedbyhimandrespondentcorporation,
hence the obligations imposed therein had to be complied with by Labrador within the period provided. Since, according to
petitioner,Labradorfailedtoperformtheaforementionedobligations,itisprecludedfromrescindingthesubjectcontractsto
sellsincepetitionerconsequentlydidnotincurindelayonhispart.

Suchintransigentpositionofpetitionerhasnotchangedinthepetitionatbarandunyieldingrelianceisplacedon
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 and its implementing rules. The specific provisions of the Decree
whicharepersistentlyrelieduponread:
SEC.20.TimeofCompletion.Everyownerordevelopershallconstructandprovidethefacilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting
facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans,
brochures,prospectus,printedmatterslettersorinanyformofadvertisements,withinoneyearfrom
the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other
periodoftimeasmaybefixedbytheAuthority.
SEC.21.SalesPriortoDecree.Incasesofsubdivisionlotsorcondominiumunitssoldordisposed
of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the
subdivisionorcondominiumprojecttocompletecompliancewithhisoritsobligationsasprovidedin
theprecedingsectionwithintwoyearsfromthedateofthisDecreeunlessotherwiseextendedbythe
AuthorityorunlessanadequateperformancebondisfiledinaccordancewithSection6hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding
provisionsshallconstituteaviolationpunishableunderSections38and39ofthisDecree.
RuleVoftheimplementingrules,ontheotherhand,requirestwo(2)sourcesofelectricpower,two(2)deepwell
and pump sets with a specified capacity and two standard fire hose flows with a capacity of 175 gallons per
minute.5
Theprovision,insaidcontractstosellwhich,accordingtopetitioner,includesandincorporatestheaforequoted
statutoryprovisions,isClause20ofsaidcontractswhichprovides:
Clause20.SUBDIVISIONDEVELOPMENTToinsurethephysicaldevelopmentofthesubdivision,
theSELLERherebyobligesitselftoprovidetheindividuallotbuyerwiththefollowing:
a)PAVEDROADS
b)UNDERGROUNDDRAINAGE
c)CONCRETECURBSANDGUTTERS
d)WATERSYSTEM
e)PARKANDOPENSPACE

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These improvements shall apply only to the portions of the subdivision which are for sale or have
been sold. All improvements except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the
governmentshallbecompletedwithinaperiodofthree(3)yearsfromdateofthiscontract.Failure
bytheSELLERtoreasonablycomplywiththeabovescheduleshallpermittheBUYER/Stosuspend
his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time that these
improvementsshallhavebeenmadeasscheduled.6
As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion
amountingtowantofjurisdiction,thefindingsoftheadministrativeagencyonmattersfallingwithinitscompetence
will not be disturbed by the courts. 7 Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not
finality,becauseofthespecialknowledgeandexpertisegainedbythesetribunalsfromhandlingthespecificmattersfalling
under their jurisdiction. Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not supported by evidence where the
findingsarevitiatedbyfraud,impositionorcollusionwheretheprocedurewhichledtothefactualfindingsisirregularwhen
palpableerrorsarecommittedorwhengraveabuseofdiscretion,arbitrarinessorcapriciousnessismanifest."8

Acarefulscrutinyoftherecordsoftheinstantcaserevealsthatthecircumstancesthereofdonotfagunderthe
aforesaidexceptedcases,withthefindingsdulysupportedbytheevidence.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 957 must be rejected. Said decree was
issued on July 12, 1976 long after the execution of the contracts involved. Obviously and necessarily, what
subsequently were statutorily provided therein as obligations of the owner or developer could not have been
intended by the parties to be a part of their contracts. No intention to give restrospective application to the
provisionsofsaiddecreecanbegatheredfromthelanguagethereof.Section20,inrelationtoSection21,ofthe
decreemerelyrequirestheownerordevelopertoconstructthefacilities,improvements,infrastructuresandother
forms of development but only such as are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium
plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisements. Other than what are
providedinClause20ofthecontract,nofurtherwrittencommitmentwasmadebythedeveloperinthisrespect.
To read into the contract the matters desired by petitioner would have the law impose additional obligations on
thepartiestoacontractexecutedbeforethatverylawexistedorwascontemplated.
Wefurtherrejectpetitioner'sstrainedandtenuousapplicationofthesocalleddoctrineoflastantecedentinthe
interpretationofSection20and,correlatively,ofSection21.Hewouldtherebyhavetheenumerationof"facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development" interpreted to mean that the demonstrative
phrase "which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of
development" and not to "facilities, improvements and infrastructures." While this subserves his purpose, such
bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and
erroneous.Thecompleteandapplicableruleisadproximumantecedensfiatrelationisiimpediatursentencia. 9
Relativewordsrefertothenearestantecedent,unlessitbepreventedbythecontext.Inthepresentcase,theemployment
oftheword"and"between"facilities,improvements,infrastructures"and"otherformsofdevelopment,"farfromsupporting
petitioner'stheory,enervatesitinsteadsinceitisbasicinlegalhermeneuticsthat"and"isnotmeanttoseparatewordsbut
isaconjunctionusedtodenoteajoinderorunion.

Thus,ifeverthereisanyvalidgroundtosuspendthemonthlyinstallmentsduefrompetitioner,itwouldonlybe
basedonnonperformanceoftheobligationsprovidedinClause20ofthecontract,particularlytheallegednon
constructionoftheculdesac.But,eventhisisunavailingandisobviouslybeingusedonlytojustifypetitioner's
default.TheonsiteinspectionofthesubdivisionconductedbytheOAALAanditssubsequentreportrevealthat
Labradorsubstantiallycompliedwithitsobligation.10
Furthermore, the initial nonconstruction of the culdesac, as private respondent Labrador explained, was
because petitioner Mapa requested the suspension of its construction since his intention was to purchase the
adjoininglotsandthereafterenclosethesame. 11Ifthesewerenottrue,petitionerwouldhaveinvokedthatsupposed
default in the first instance. As the OAALA noted, petitioner "stopped payments of his monthly obligations as early as
December,1976,whichisamerefivemonthsaftertheeffectivityofP.D.No.957oraboutayearaftertheexecutionofthe
contracts.Thismeansthatrespondentstillhas1and1/2yearstocomplywithitslegalobligationtodevelopthesubdivision
under said P.D. and two years to do so under the agreement, hence, it was improper for complainant to have suspended
payments in December, 1976 on the ground of nondevelopment since the period allowed for respondent's obligation to
undertakesuchdevelopmenthasnotyetexpired."12

ONTHEFOREGOINGCONSIDERATIONS,thepetitionshouldbe,asitisherebyDISMISSED.
SOORDERED.
MelencioHerrera(Chairperson),Paras,PadillaandSarmiento,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
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1AnnexK.PetitionRollo,3540.
2Rollo,1617.
3Ibid.,3536.
4TheSubdivisionandCondominiumBuyers'ProtectiveDecree,effectiveJuly12,1976.
5Rollo,208.
6AnnexA,PetitionRollo,18.
7Sagun,etal.vs.People'sHomesiteandHousingCorporation,G.R.No.44738,June22,1988.
8Alcuaz,etal.vs.PhilippineSchoolofBusinessAdministration,etc.etal.,161SCRA7(1988),citing
AteneodeManilaUniversityvs.CourtofAppeals,145SCRA106(1986).
9SeeBlack'sLawDictionary,4thEd.,57,citingBrownvs.Brown,Del.,3Terry157,29A.2d
149,153.
10Rollo,83.
11Ibid.,256TSN,Jan.24,1984,7TSN,Feb.6,1984,1819.
12Ibid.,8485.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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