Kayla Manning

Law and the Legal System

Case Brief # 1:
The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee v. Jenna M. Christopherson, Appellant. Supreme
Court of Illinois. No. 105928 899 N.E.2d 257. (Nov. 20, 2008).
Facts: This case involves the defendant, Christopherson, being charged with the unlawful
delivery of alcohol to a minor. The minor, Smith, then died in a one car accident after
consumption of the delivered alcohol. This moved to a court of appeal because the defendant
claimed that the statute subpart which she was charged by was not implied to be for minors.
Issue 1: May minors be charged with delivery of alcoholic liquor to a minor?
Answer: Yes
Analysis: The issue concerned the use and format of a statute, thus being a question of the law. It
was reviewed to figure out the legislative intent of the statute. The language had to be defined
and as it was clear and unambiguous, it was not held to any other means of interpretation. In the
statute it is read as forbidding any person from giving, selling or delivering alcoholic liquor to a
person under the age of 21, this saying person and not specifying if the person delivering it has
to be a minor or of legal age. Thus through legislative intent, it was left unspecific to any
persons. In fact of this case, the point is to deem that the danger could occur whether it comes
out of the hands of a minor or an adult. Another section of the law also applies to those under the
legal drinking age and how they are prohibited of use of fake identification, regulating both those
under 18 and those over the age of 18 but younger than the legal drinking age.
Conclusion: The case was concluded that the statute applies to both minors and those over the
age of 18, all persons. Therefore the appellate court reversed the case stating that it did not matter
that the defendant was under the age of 21.

Case Brief # 2:
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Charles Demore Jewell, Defendant- Appellant.
U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit. 532 F.2d 697. (1976)
Facts: The defendant was found to have knowingly transported marijuana from Mexico to the US
in a secret compartment in the back seat of the car. Jewell insisted to not be aware of the

substance in his car, however this was up to the judgment of the jury. If he was guilty it could be
deemed a result of deliberate ignorance.
Issue 1: Does ignorance constitute knowledge in terms of transporting drugs.
Answer: Yes
Analysis: Jewell appealed in the grounds that criminal intent was needed to be charged. However
the court of appeal upheld the trial court because deliberate ignorance is culpable as positive
knowledge and make it a defense. Deliberate ignorance reflects conscious avoidance. However,
in order to form a conscious purpose to avoid knowledge of something, one has to have a high
belief that the presence of a drug must possibly be there. Instruction was also not given that
Jewell count not be convicted if he actually believed there was not a controlled substance in the
car. Lastly the jury instruction states that Jewell could be convicted if he was found not aware
that the car contained it. The statute may only be used if there is a knowledge.
Conclusion: Willful ignorance is deemed the same as having knowledge.

Case Brief # 3:
The People of the state of New York v. Melvin Dlugash. Court of Appeals of New York. 41
N.Y.2d 750,363 N.E.2d 1155, 395 N.Y.S. 2d 419. (1977)
Facts: Dlugash, Bush, and Geller were drinking until 3 am. During these Geller demanded that
bush pay rent moneyas he had moved in there. Bush continually threatened to shoot Geller if he
did not stop and finally bush fired 3 shots at Geller. One of these shots went through the heart of
Geller. Minutes later, Dlugash fired several shots into Gellers head. When asked why, he first
said he didnt know but eventually he claimed it was because he was afraid of Bush. At trial,
medical examiners testified that without prompt medical attention, Geller would have died.
However Dlugash was tried with murder, though it was not clear if Geller was alive when he
shot him. At appeal the state claimed that it was not proved that he was alive or not and held him
not guilty.
Issue: Can one be liable for attempting to murder a person who was already dead?
Answer: No, attempt of the crime, but not the criminal offense itself.
Analysis: The issue at hand with this case is that it must be aimed at a malicious or criminal
purpose. This is involving the penal law which in 1967, it states that if a person engages in an
action that is considered attempted of a crime, it is no defense to prosecute for something that
was legally impossible of commission to be attempted. With this being said, one can be
convicted for attempt if the criminal intent was there and the person was believed to be alive by
the defendant.
Conclusion: Since it was no necessarily murder but an attempt of the crime, the defendant was
charged with the lesser offense.

Case Brief # 4:
State v. Guffey et al. Springfield court of Appeals, Missouri. 262 S.W.2d 152. (1953)
Facts: Missouri Conservation agents set up a stuffed deer on the side of a road in a field for
citizens who may come shoot it before deer season. The defendant drove by, saw the deer and
there was a gun shot, however they claimed that they were out frog hunting. They were then
convicted with the misdemeanor of pursuit and taking of wildlife against rules and regulations.
Issue: Can citizens be convicted of the misdemeanor of pursuit and taking of wildlife against
rules and regulations if they shoot at a dummy deer, instead of a real one.
Answer: No
Analysis: With this case in mind, many words had to be defined to identify a crime being
committed. The first being of a question of if they pursued the deer, when there in fact was not
deer of question in the first place. Because the dummy could not run or escape, it was not wild
and had no life; it was not wildlife. The word pursued however was defined as intention of
overtaking which they did, however again it was not a deer. For example, you cannot murder a
corpse because it was already dead, you cannot be charged for a crime that cannot be committed
Conclusion: You cannot commit a crime if there is nothing constituted a crime in this case. With
this being said, the trail court should be reversed and the appellants discharged.

Case Brief # 5:
State of Iowa Appellee v. Rodney Neil Heemstra, Appellate. Supreme Court of Iowa. No. 040058 721 N.W.2d 549. (Aug. 25, 2006)
Fact: Heemstra and Lyon were farmers in Iowa. Since 1998, Lyons had rented the same land
belonging to the Rodgers family, however in 2003 Heemstra became in possession of it. On
January of 2003, both were travelling in the same direction on the road, when Lyon stopped and
blocked the road. He threated that he needed to end up with the land. Heemstra ended up feeling
threatened and lyon sustained one gunshot to the head. The next day Heemstra died it and finally
he said he shot a defenseless man. At trial he claimed self-defense. Issue on if Lyon had mental
issues also arose
Issue: Is the idea that it could cause willful injury enough to consider it willful and thus a felony
murder?
Answer: Yes
Analysis: The court had to decipher between first degree murder (willful, deliberate, and
premeditated). Pointed a gun at another presented the concept of willful murder however, it does
not fit the statutory definition. On appeal, the jury found it to be willful injury, however another

thing to consider is if a harmful intent was there. Such that if they found that he pointed the gun
with the intent to harm, then it would be felony murder.
Conclusion: It was held that if the act causes willful injury it is the same as predicted felony
murder.