Case Digest of Tanada vs.

Tuvera
TANADA V. TUVERA [136 S 27] - F: Invoking the people's right to be informed
on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well
as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations,
EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents
contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non
requirement
for
the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication
in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored
on
Art.
2
of
NCC.
HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled
that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day
following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date
when
it
goes
into
effect.
Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the
light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the
publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents.
G.R.
VIRGILIO

No.

170338
O.

December
GARCILLANO,

23,

2008
petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY,
and
SUFFRAGE
AND
ELECTORAL
REFORMS,
respondents.
x
x
G.R.
No.
179275
December
23,
2008
SANTIAGO
JAVIER
RANADA
and
OSWALDO
D.
AGCAOILI,
petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT
THE
HONORABLE
MANUEL
VILLAR,
respondents.
x
x
MAJ.
LINDSAY
REX
SAGGE,
petitioner-in-intervention
x
x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M.
LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondentsintervenors
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the
conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director,
regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such
conversation was recorded and was played during the house of representative investigation. Because of such
turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized
communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays
that the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that
there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the
unlawfully
seized
documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed
with
their
investigation?
Held:

No,

the

Supreme

Court

mentioned

the

following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published
rules
of
procedure,
in
clear
derogation
of
the
constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette,
or
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation
in
the
Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules
have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone
for
free,
and
accessible
to
the
public
at
the
Senates
internet
web
page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs,
without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have

undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any
custom,
practice
or
tradition
followed
by
the
Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not
make
the
internet
a
medium
for
publishing
laws,
rules
and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution,
use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries
in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the
rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such
inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at
stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such
rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed
by the court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry in
aid of legislation.
Gregorio Honasan II petitioner vs.
The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
Of the Department of Justice
G.R.No. 159747 April 13,2004
Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of the Ombudsman (consti),
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)
Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code
Facts:

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:

o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood and
Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a house
located in San Juan, Metro Manila
o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying
Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to
the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to
risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe
is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the
NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision
of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood compact
and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said Kung kaya
nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain
Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press
conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands
and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound.

August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification
questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his
public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the Office
of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ
Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo,
attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of
September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence
on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
Issues:
Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman

1.

should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was

2.

not published
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because the

3.

petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.
Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit
1.

No.

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1)
those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are
filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may
be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial
or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors.

circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement
between the Ombudsman and the DOJ

The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the
Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All
recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct
preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and employees.

The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the

preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the
principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the
Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the
Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to
delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do
so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of
the investigation.
2.

No.

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.

In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:

o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules
on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the
office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ
and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not
regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

3.

No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present
petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E.

Facts:

On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a

verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent
to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On May 12,
1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing
of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law
disqualifying

him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens
to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and
shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance
at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat,
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the
right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the
Family

Code.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration.

They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or

orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as
childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E.

Facts:

On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a

verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent
to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On May 12,
1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing
of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law
disqualifying

him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens
to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and
shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance
at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat,
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the
right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the
Family

Code.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration.

They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or

orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as
childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.