1.

MINARD HALL FACADE COLLAPSE (2009)

Introduction:
Minard Hall, originally named Science Hall, is located on the campus of North Dakota State
University (NDSU). Minard Hall was constructed in three stages.

Figure 1: Layout of Minard Hall, including the excavation zone, location of

piles, and point of failure.

The third stage was built in 1929 and was meant to mirror the construction of the first
building. When the three stages were completed (see Figure 1), the building was 80 feet deep and
224 feet long, making it one of the most artistic buildings on campus. Subsequent additions have
been added to Minard Hall. In 2003, a wing connecting the historic Minard Hall and Music
Education building was completed. In 2009, another renovation to Minard Hall was started. The
project included building additions to the north and west side of the 1918 and 1929 sections, as
well as, rebuilding the roof of the 1918 facility, a new main building entrance, and site
improvements.
In the early morning hours of December 27, 2009 the northwest wall of Minard Hall, the largest
building on NDSU's campus, collapsed (see Figure 2). Rescue crews reported to the scene at
3:17 am.
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Figure 2: Collapse of Minard Hall along the northwest wall of the

building.

The failure occurred in the portion of the building where the renovation was taking place. The
excavation extended 25 feet into the ground along the northwest corner of the building, leaving
the foundation exposed. Near the excavation site, piles were being driven into the ground to
protect a steam tunnel and stair tower at the building's north entrance. The collapse resulted in a
gaping hole in the building and cracks in the concrete foundation walls and brick facade. After
the collapse, steps were taken to shore up the floors and roof to prevent any further collapse.
Cause of Failure:
The most recent phase of renovation on Minard Hall required excavating along the north wall
and northwest corner of the building. Meinicke-Johnson Construction was performing the
excavation work. The excavation went down about 25 feet into the ground, and remained open
for several weeks before the collapse occurred. Even though the buildings foundation was
exposed, a number of sources, including Heyer Engineering, the structural engineering firm on
the project, concluded that the building was stable. In addition to the adjacent excavation, pilings
were being driven into the ground nearby to protect a steam tunnel and the stair tower at the
buildings north entrance. As a result of the piling driving, Minard Hall was subjected to
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vibrations in the ground. The combination of the adjacent deep excavation and the soil vibrations
caused one of the exposed structural pillars to fail, thus leading to the facade collapse along the
northwest wall of Minard Hall.
Reconstruction
After the collapse of the northwest wall of Minard Hall, a shoring system was designed and
installed to prevent any further collapse of the building. Once the building was stabilized, the
collapsed portion could be demolished, and testing and evaluations took place. While removing
the collapsed section, asbestos contaminated soils were discovered in the area, which needed to
be contained and removed. During the redesign of the collapsed section, concerns arose about
continuing with the basement plan for the addition. Based on soil conditions, the basement
mechanical space would be moved to a fifth floor or penthouse area, and a crawl space would be
used instead. While the new plans were being approved, the priority was to remove the loose
sandy fill from the area and replace it with compacted engineered fill. After this was completed,
work could begin on the collapsed area and footings for the north addition. The north addition
footings and foundation wall were completed in October 2011 and the steel frame installations
for the collapsed portions and addition are currently underway.
Conclusion
The Minard Hall facade collapse that occurred in 2009, is another example highlighting the
potentially disastrous effects adjacent excavations can have on existing structures. The soil
strength that nearby foundations rely on becomes compromised, so vertical and lateral movement
of the soil and footings can occur.

2. GERRARDS CROSS TUNNEL

INTRODUCTION:
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Gerrards Cross Tunnel is a railway tunnel in Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire, on the Chiltern
Main Line. The purpose of the tunnel was to enable a new Tesco supermarket to be built over the
railway line. Plans were initially met with anger by local residents, and the council refused
planning permission but this decision was overturned by John Prescott.

Figure 3: During the collapse, the crown of the tunnel caved in on itself, bringing the tonnes
of soil piled on top down onto the railway tracks, which are visible in the foreground.
During construction of the tunnel, it partially collapsed on 30 June 2005. No-one was injured in
the accident, although a train heading towards the tunnel when it collapsed had to perform an
emergency stop. Early reports suspected the cause was the backfilling operation but the Health
and Safety Executive are yet to release their findings.
Despite the incident, the construction continued in 2007 with different contractors building the
tunnel. The store opened in November 2010, fourteen years after the project was commissioned.

Figure 4 (a)

Figure 4 (b)

Figure 4 (c)

Figures 5(a), (b), (c): Pictures showing the backfill.

Failure:
At 7.34pm on 30 June 2005, 30 meters of the 320 meters tunnel collapsed. At the time, there
were no trains passing through the tunnel, although one train, heading west towards High
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Wycombe, had to make an emergency stop. The train had passed through Denham Golf Club
station, the last stop before Gerrards Cross, before the driver was warned by radio. He reversed
the train to Denham Golf Club, where all passengers were let off. Additionally, a London-bound
train was standing at the eastbound platform at Gerrards Cross waiting to depart. The driver of
this train had just set the train in motion when he saw the collapse, stopped his train using the
emergency brake, and informed the railway signalers by radio; they in turn stopped other trains.
There were no casualties as a result of the incident. One witness told a news channel that he was
parking his car when he heard "what sounded like a clap of thunder - I thought it was an
earthquake. I saw the tunnel falling on to the rail track."
Cause of failure:
The initial investigations into the cause of collapse focused on the backfilling operation. The
tunnel segments allowed for substantial vertical settlement during construction, and it was vital
that the material was built up evenly on both sides and over the crown of the arch. Units have
failed by creating a hinge in the concrete section. The hinge has rotated downwards, which is
consistent with the crown of the arch moving downwards under excessive load and/or the sides
of the arch moving outwards under too little lateral restraint. This problem would have been
made worse if there was a significant difference in the level of the fill on the two sides. At the
section that is still standing the central hinge has bent down indicating an imbalance between the
vertical and horizontal loads and a failure by outward spreading of the arch. The heavy rainfall,
which had hit Gerrards Cross several days before the collapse, may have made the problem
worse. It is possible that rainfall increased the vertical load on the tunnel. At the same time, if the
fill at the sides is not completely free draining, it could have led to a reduction in the passive
pressure available from the fill on the side.

3. FARGO GRAIN ELEVATOR (1955)

Introduction:

The Fargo Grain Elevator was constructed during the summer and autumn of 1954, two miles
west of Fargo, North Dakota. That autumn and winter there was only a small amount of grain
stored in the elevator. In April of 1955 the majority of the filling began. The collapse and utter
destruction of the elevator occurred on the morning of June 12, 1955.
The Fargo Grain Elevator consists of 20 circular bins and 26 smaller interstitial bins, all
reinforced concrete. At one end a combined head-house, bin-house, and work-house is located.
The circular bins, with an inside diameter of 19 ft., are arranged in two rows of 10 bins. The bins
have a height above ground of 122 ft. and are capped with a 6 in. thick roof slab (See Figures 1
and 2). The foundation is a 2-4 thick reinforced concrete raft, the bottom of this raft is 6-0
below grade.
Causes of the Failure:
On June 12, 1955 the grain elevator collapsed northwards, early in the morning. Filling the
elevator began in early May and steadily continued until the collapse at a rate of roughly 1 ksf in
ten days. Prior to the collapse, the elevator suffered from significant settlement, readings were
taken of seven elevation benchmarks and are shown in Table 1. There was also a 6 foot ground
heave on the south side of the elevator. The average net pressure on the foundation at the time of
the collapse was 4.75 ksf. Despite the extraordinarily high settlement reading no one took a
closer look at the load and settlement data. If a plot of load versus settlement had been analyzed
the imminent collapse would have been blatantly obvious and unloading the elevator would have
prevented its collapse (Nordlund and Deere, 1970).
Table 1: Settlement Readings Prior to Collapse
Date of Observation

Settlement, in inches
BM 1 BM BM BM BM BM BM 7
2
3
4
5
6

May 10

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

May 18

0.60 0.12 0.72 0.96 1.20 1.56 1.44

May 25

1.92 1.08 2.04 2.28 2.88 3.49 3.00

June 1

4.92 4.68 5.40 5.52 5.89 6.00 5.89

June 8

9.48 8.75 10.42 10.92 11.52 12.13 11.30

The Fargo area soil consists of glacial lake silts, sands, and clays to a depth of 150 feet. The soil
is stratified which means it consists of layers of differing soil textures. The failure here is
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unmistakably a full-scale bearing capacity failure and more specifically a local shear failure,
Figure 3 depicts a local shear failure. The soil could only support a maximum of 4.11 ksf based
on unconfined compression tests while the foundation pressed down with a force of 4.75 ksf.
With a minimum acceptable factor of safety of 1.5 the maximum allowable working pressure
would have been 2.74 ksf. Based on the compression tests the grain elevators weight was well
beyond what could safely be supported by the soil. Errors in soil strength calculations as well as
incorrect assumptions about soil characteristics might have been the reason the computed
compression strength of the soil was so much larger than the allowable working pressure. If
borings would have been taken prior to construction the collapse could have been averted. This
collapse also could have been prevented if the elevation benchmark readings were plotted against
the loading.

Figure 5: Local Shear Failure (Based on Figure from Day, 2005).

Conclusion
It is unclear what caused the engineer to calculate an allowable stress so much higher than the
maximum determined from laboratory tests. Potential causes of this failure include calculation
errors, absence of boring prior to construction, absence of a geotechnical study, and a general
lack of awareness.