Rule 62: Interpleader

Respondent: Leonora Tirona

Section 1. When interpleader proper.

Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves.

G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005

Carpio, J.

Sec. 2. Order.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the conflicting
claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court
may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.
Sec. 3. Summons.
Summons shall be served upon the conflicting claimants, together with a copy of the
complaint and order.
Sec. 4. Motion to dismiss.
Within the time for filing an answer, each claimant may file a motion to dismiss on the
ground of impropriety of the interpleader action or on other appropriate grounds
specified in Rule 16. The period to file the answer shall be tolled and if the motion is
denied, the movant may file his answer within the remaining period, but which shall not
be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Sec. 5. Answer and other pleadings.
Each claimant shall file his answer setting forth his claim within fifteen (15) days from
service of the summons upon him, serving a copy thereof upon each of the other
conflicting claimants who may file their reply thereto as provided by these Rules. If any
claimant fails to plead within the time herein fixed, the court may, on motion, declare
him in default and thereafter render judgment barring him from any claim in respect to
the subject matter.
The parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party
complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules.
Sec. 6. Determination.
After the pleadings of the conflicting claimants have been filed, and pre-trial has been
conducted in accordance with the Rules, the court shall proceed to determine their
respective rights and adjudicate their several claims.
Sec. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens.
The docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this
Rule, as well as the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge
upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise.

1. Ocampo v. Tirona
Petitioner: Leonardo R. Ocampo

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

SUMMARY:
Ocampo purchased from Rosauro Breton a parcel of land located in Alvarez St. Pasay
City with an approximate area of 500sqm. Upon acquisition of the property, Ocampo
sent a formal written notice of ownership to the lessee Tirona, who paid rentals to
Ocampo in recognition of his ownership. On one occasion, Ocampo received a letter
from Callejo Law Office which stated that Tirona will temporarily stop payment because
the property was declared by the NHA as area for priority development. Ocampo
demanded for payment but was unheeded. Hence he filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages in the MTC of Pasay. MTC of Pasay ruled for Ocampo and
ordered Tirona to pay and vacate the premises. Pending Tironas appeal to the RTC,
one Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola filed a motion with leave to file intervention before
the RTC, claiming to be the owner of the land. Tirona subsequently filed a
memorandum disclosing for the first time that Maria Lourdes was her real lessor. RTC
denied Maria Lourdes claim, and affirmed MTC. CA reversed and set aside the
previous rulings and held that Ocampo, being the buyer of the subject land which is not
yet partitioned among the heirs, cannot validly evict Tirona. SC held that (1) Ocampo
has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. (2) As a stakeholder, Tirona should
have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court by filing a
bill of interpleader.
FACTS:

Ocampos claims:
o He is the owner of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 500
square meters, located at Alvarez Street, Pasay City.
o Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the
subject lands registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz.
o Possession and administration of the subject land are claimed to be
already in Ocampos management even though the TCT is not yet in
his name.
o Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of the
subject land.

Facts established in the MTC:

o According to Ocampo, upon acquisition of ownership of the subject
premises, a formal written notice was given to Tirona.
o Tirona paid some monthly rentals due in recognition of Ocampos
right of ownership over the subject premises.
o However, on July 5, 1995, Ocampo received a letter from Callejo
Law Office stating among others, that, in view of the fact that the
subject premises was declared under area for priority development,
Tirona is invoking her right of first refusal and in connection thereto,
Tirona will temporarily stop paying her monthly rentals until and
unless the National Housing Authority (NHA) have processed the
pertinent papers as regards the amount due to Ocampo by reason of
the implementation of the above law.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Ocampo replied to Callejo Law Office and Tirona was also furnished
a copy (content not discussed).
o On 7 August 1995, Ocampo wrote a letter to Tirona demanding
payment for rentals in arrears for the months of April, May, June,
July and August at the rate of P1,200 a month and to vacate the
premises.
o Tirona failed and refused to heed [Ocampos] demands.
Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona
before the MTC.
Tironas answer:
o The land is actually owned by one Doa Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza,
represented by Assignor Edison A. Hindap (her General Overseer
and Attorney-in-Fact).
o The Title of Ocampo overlapped with the Original Land Title of the
Assignor.
o The Assignor recognized Tirona as co-owner by possession and
thereby ceded, transfered and assigned the said parcel of land in
Tironas favor.
o Tirona denied and discontinued all obligations imposed by Ocampo
because the property in question is not owned by Ocampo, but
rather owned by the Assignor, who issued a Certification for
Occupancy and Assignment in favor of Tirona.
o The certificate of title to the subject land is not even registered under
Ocampos name.
o Tirona also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale
of the land, pursuant to PD Nos. 1517, 1893 and 1968.
o Tirona asked for attorneys fees and moral and exemplary damages.
MTC --- Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of rents until
after PD No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. 1893 and 1968, is implemented in
her favor. Tironas non-payment of rents rendered her occupation of the
subject land illegal. As owner of the subject land, Ocampo is entitled to its
use and enjoyment, as well as to recover its possession from any person
unlawfully withholding it. Tirona was ordered to vacate the property, surrender
its possession and pay rentals, attorneys fees and cost of suit. Tirona
appealed to the RTC.
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola filed a motion with leave to file intervention
before the RTC, claiming to be the owner of the land.
o Tirona filed a memorandum, disclosing for the first time that she is
actually the tenant of one Alipio Breton. When Alipio Died, Rosauro
and Maria Lourdes inherited the land. Rosauro waived and
conveyed the land to Maria Lourdes, and could not have sold his
portion to Ocampo.
RTC --- affirmed in toto the MTC ruling.
o The RTC denied Breton-Mendiolas motion with leave to file
intervention because it would violate the 1964 Rules of Court and
jurisprudence.
o Tirona appealed to the CA, claiming a better right of possession to
the land.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

CA --- considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to

Ocampos action.
o The principal issue for its resolution is whether Ocampo, being the
buyer of the subject land which is not yet partitioned among the
heirs, can validly evict Tirona.
o Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the RTC in the pending
partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by
metes and bounds, Ocampo cannot rightfully claim that what he
bought is part of the property occupied by Tirona.

ISSUES:
Ocampo argues that the CA ERRED in:
1. Entertaining and not dismissing the petition for review (with prayer for its
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and immediate issuance of tro),
the same having been filed beyond the reglamentary period. --- YES
2. Considering and resolving an issue raised in the petition for review for
the first time on appeal. --- YES
3. Declaring that Leonardo R. Ocampo has no right to eject Leonora
Tirona, nor demand payment of rentals from her for the use and
occupancy of the lot involved in the present case. --- YES
HELD:

The petition has merit.

Instant petition for review GRANTED.
RTC decision affirming MTC decision is REINSTATED.
Decision of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration is SET ASIDE.

RATIO:
1. SC agrees with Ocampos observation that Tirona changes her theory of the
case each time she appeals.

The evidence on record reveals that the CA did not contradict the
findings of facts of the MTC and RTC.

There is no reason to deviate from their findings of facts.

2. Unlawful detainer

The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases

are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms.

Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the
elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are
present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land
from Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation of the subject
land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampos terms. However,
Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the
lease.

Mirasol v. Magsuci, et al. --- The sale of a leased property places the
vendee into the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee
bound himself to pay. The vendee acquires the right to evict the
lessee from the premises and to recover the unpaid rentals after the
vendee had notified the lessee that he had bought the leased

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

3.

4.

property and that the rentals on it should be paid to him, and the
lessee refused to comply with the demand.
Ownership of the subject lot

Unlawful detainer being a summary proceeding, it was error for the

CA to include the issue of ownership.

Had the CA limited its ruling to the elements to be proved in a case

of unlawful detainer, Ocampo need not even prove his ownership.

The issue of ownership opens a virtual Pandoras Box for Tirona and
her supposed intervenor, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.
Interpleader

As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in

hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before
filing a bill of interpleader.

An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know
the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the
property.

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has

property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation
to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or
claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to
demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the
other thing.

The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double

liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one
liability.

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves,
there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled
interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the
action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a crosscomplaint.

2. ALVAREZ VS COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES

(SORRY LONG DIGEST! )
G.R. No. L-45315 | February 25, 1938
Plaintiffs-appellants: PRAXEDES ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Defendants-appellees: THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, Provincial
Government of Laguna, the municipality of San Pedro, the Colegio de San Jose, and
Carlos Young
Interpleader-appellant: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA
Summary: Plaintiffs claim they are the owners of the improvements, which are their
houses, found within Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan and recognize the obligation of

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

paying the reasonable rent but asks the court that the defendants or interpleaders
litigate among themselves over the ownership or dominion of the hacienda to
determine by judgment who is the rightful owner of the hacienda. Plaintiff maintains
that the Commonwealth of the Philippines has become the owner of the Hacienda and
likewise Colegio de San Jose. Municipality of San Pedro Laguna filed its complaint of
interpleader stating that it has right to the hacienda for the exclusive benefit of its
inhabitants. Carlos Young and Colegio de San Jose interposed demurrer to complaint
on the ground of lack of cause of action. Lower court dismissed plaintiffs complaint
which was appealed. The Court affirmed appealed resolution stating that the pleadings
were complaints, that the applicant for interpleading is equivalent to a complaint in an
ordinary action which may be demurred to. And, with the exclusion of the
Commonwealth of, because of its unwillingness to litigate or engage with anyone in a
suit, it becomes evident that the action of interpleader is indefensible from any
standpoint for lack of the basis of reason relied upon by the plaintiffs. The complaint of
interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro is premature inasmuch as there has been
no order yet by the court that the defendants litigate among themselves.
FACTS:

In the complaint by which the case was commenced, the plaintiffs allege: that
they appear and bring the action for themselves and in the name of other five
thousand persons; all of them and their predecessors-in-interest from time
immemorial, are in possession for many years of many lots, where they now
have their houses, any many agricultural lands which they have continuously
cultivated lots which are found within the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,
situated in the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna
o They only claim to be the owners of the improvements, consisting of
houses and that they are entitled to occupy the lands and
agricultural lands
o They recognize in favor of someone their obligation to pay
reasonable rent or canon for their occupation of the lots and
agricultural lands which they are willing to pay
o The Commonwealth of the Philippines is the true owner of the entire
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of escheat.
o The Provincial Government of Laguna may have an interest in the
hacienda, for the benefit of the plaintiffs and the residents of the
municipality of San Pedro; that this municipality, will claim the
ownership of the hacienda also by the right of escheat
o The Colegio de San Jose, without any right, also claims to be the
owner; and that Carlos Young, without any known right, claims to
have an interest in the same hacienda.
o Plaintiffs ask that the court order the defendants or interpleaders to
litigate among themselves over the ownership or dominion of the
hacienda and thereafter determine by judgment who is the rightful
owner thereof entitled to collect the rental from them.

The municipality of San Pedro filed its complaint of interpleader wherein it is

stated: that according to the history of the Philippines, so alleges, the
Hacienda De San Pedro Tunasan originally belonged to one, Don Esteban
Rodriguez de Figueroa, who held the office of Governor and Captain General
of the Island of Mindanao and who executed a will transferring in trust and for

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

administration the entire hacienda aforesaid to a charitable institution of

learning which was subsequently called the Colegio de San Jose, governed
by the Jesuit Fathers
o Rodriguez de Figueroa died leaving as heirs his two minors
daughters, who also died without leaving any heirs;
o Since then the Colegio de San Jose, through the Jesuit Fathers, had
held and administered the hacienda and through the practice called
"sustitucion pupilar" by the claimant, the Jesuit Fathers succeeded in
appropriating the same, considering it from then on as their property
and as part of the temporal properties of the church;
o By virtue of the treaty of Paris, the Organic Law of the United States
Congress of July 1, 1902, the Jones Law, and finally the TydingsMcDuffie Independence Law, the aforesaid passed to the ownership
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the latter is at present
the owner thereof, which should be administered and conserved for
the benefit of the inhabitants of the Philippines, particularly those of
the municipality of San Pedro;
o By the right of escheat the Commonwealth has likewise become the
owner of the hacienda because of the death of the daughters of
Rodriguez de Figueroa without leaving any heirs and because there
is no one who is legally entitled thereto;
o The municipality of San Pedro has a right to a hacienda for the
exclusive benefit of its inhabitants;
o Colegio de San Jose should render an accounting of the rentals
which it has been collecting from the hacienda, which should not be
less than P60,000.
Carlos Young appeared and interposed a demurrer to the complaint of the
plaintiffs on the grounds that it does not state facts constituting a cause of
action and that is allegations are vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible; and
urged that said complaint be finally dismissed. He also filed MTD of complaint
of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro, on the ground that the latter
entity has no standing to bring the action, that the complaint of interpleader is
premature because the court has not yet ordered the parties therein to litigate
among themselves.
The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., interposed a demurrer to the plaintiff's
complaint, upon the same grounds advanced by Carlos Young in his
demurrer. It filed it answer to the complaint of interpleader of the municipality
of San Pedro, wherein it denied the material allegation thereof and put up the
defense that the Hacienda de an Pedro Tunasan is it exclusive property and
that its title has been recognized by the government and the courts.
The lower court entered the appealed resolution dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint, holding further that the complaint of interpleader of the municipality
of San Pedro is premature, overruling all the motion filed by the latter and
ordering the striking out from the record of the pleadings filed by appellants
counsel

ISSUES (assignment of errors by appellants):

1. W/N judge acted impartial in the case NO

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

2. W/N applicant for interpleading is equivalent to a complaint in an ordinary action

which may be demurred to, and consequently, assuming the demurrers of Carlos
Young and of the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. YES
3. W/N applicant (not complaint) of interpleading is sufficient NO
4. W/N special appearance of Solicitor-Genral should be sustained YES
5. W/N complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro is premature and,
consequently, W/N Colegio de San Jose and Carlos young should have been declared
in default YES & NO
6. W/N proceedings of this case should be suspended until decision of the escheat
case NO
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE: JUDGE DID NOT ACT PARTIALLY

Appellant question the integrity and impartiality of the judge who entered the
appealed resolution and contend that he should have abstained from taking
cognizance of the case.

The appellants concede that they have not duly questioned at any time, the
judge who decided this case. The facts of record do not furnish any evidence
in support of the appellants' contention. The circumstances pointed out by the
appellants that one of their attorney filed a complaint and administrative
charge against the judge, and that this naturally created an enmity between
them, is not a sufficient ground for concluding that the judge acted partially.
SECOND ISSUE: COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING THE DEMURRERS

The plaintiff commenced the case under the provisions of section 120 of the
Code of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 120. Interpleading. Whenever conflicting claims are or may be made
upon a person for or relation personal property, or the performance of an
obligation or any portion thereof, so that he may be made subject to several
actions by different person, unless the court intervenes, such person may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants, disclaiming personal interest
in the controversy, to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves, and the court may order the conflicting claimants
to interplead with one another and thereupon proceed to determine the right
of the several parties to the interpleading to the personal property or the
performance of the obligation in controversy and shall determine the right of
all in interest.

Pursuant to this section, the remedy provided for may be availed of by

bringing an "action", for no other meaning may de deduced from the phrase
"such person may bring an action against the conflicting claimants" used to
indicate the procedure to be followed by one would avail himself of its
provisions.

The word "action" means the ordinary action defined in section 1 of the same
Code and should be commenced by complaint which may be demurrer to as
provided in section 91 and upon the grounds therein stated. The pleading
which commences an ordinary action cannot be correctly called an
application or petition because these, generally, are the pleadings used only
to commence special proceedings

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The action of interpleader, under section 120, is a remedy whereby a person

who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly
or partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that
the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves
entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate
among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the
other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there
arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in
such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of
interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

THIRD ERROR: ACTION OF INTERPLEADER IS INDEFENSIBLE

The lower court sustained the demurrers on the ground that the complaint of
the municipality of San Pedro does not allege sufficient facts to constitute a
right or cause of action. As to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, because
it cannot be compelled to litigate without its consent, and as to the Colegio de
San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young, because according to the very allegations
of the complaint there is no person or entity, outside of the Colegio de San
Jose, Inc., who has conflicting or incompatible claims in connection with the
obligation to pay rent or canon which plaintiffs admit devolves upon them.

Speaking of the intervention of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, there is

little to be said. It is a fundamental principle that the Government of the
Philippines, now the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as the supreme
authority which represents in this country the existing sovereignty, cannot be
sued without its consent. The prohibition holds true both in case where it is
joined as a defendant as well as in that where, as in the present, it is being
compelled to litigate against other persons without its consent. There is no
substantial difference between making it defend itself against it will in a case
where it is a defendant and compelling it, without its consent, to interplead in
an action commenced by another person.

With the exclusion of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, because of its

unwillingness to litigate or engage with anyone in a suit over an hacienda the
ownership of which is clearly defined and recognized, it becomes evident that
the action of interpleader is indefensible from any standpoint for lack of the
basis of reason relied upon by the plaintiffs in their complaint, namely, that
there are two entities, the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the Colegio
de San Jose, contending over the hacienda and claiming to be entitled to
collect the rent or canon coming therefrom.

We do not include Carlos Young, because according to his own admission,

he is a mere lessee of the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and does not claim any
right of ownership adverse to the latter.

In reaching this conclusion we have not lost sight of the fact that the
municipality of San Pedro has already filed its complaint of interpleader
wherein it alleges a certain interest in the hacienda and in its rents; but apart
from the fact that in resolving the demurrers only the allegation of the
plaintiffs' complaint should be taken into account, because the former are

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

directed only against it, it appears from the allegations said complaint of
interpleader that the municipality of San Pedro also admits that the
Commonwealth of the Philippines is the owner of the hacienda by transfer
and right of escheat.
Another question raised by the appellants has to do with the holding of the
court that the complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro is
premature inasmuch as there has been no order yet that the defendant
litigate among themselves.
In the opinion of the court it is necessary that there be a declaration to this
effect before the defendant may litigate among themselves and file a
complaint of interpleader. Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure in truth
requires such and good practice demands that the defendants be not
permitted to file claims or complaint of interpleader until after the court has
ordered that they should litigate among themselves. This procedure will do
way with groundless suits, and will save the parties time, inconvenience, and
unnecessary expenses.
Finally, it remains to be whether, the demurrers having been sustained, the
plaintiff are entitled to amend their complaint, or whether the case should be
1
dismissed. Section 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the
procedure to be followed in cases where a demurrer has been interposed
Under this section the amendments of a pleading, after a demurrer is
sustained, is not an absolute right of the pleader; and the amendment rest
rather in the sound discretion of the court. When it is evident that the court
has no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, that the pleading is
so fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment or that to permit
such amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of the action
then the court may refuse the amendment of the defective pleading and the
order the dismissal of the case.
In the present case the plaintiffs' complaint is fatally defective because its
allegations are insufficient to constitute a cause of action, and to permit the
amendment thereof the plaintiffs would have to charge their theory as well as
the nature of the action which they have commenced. For this reason the
court did not commit the error assigned in not permitting the amendment and
in finally dismissing the case.

FOURTH ISSUE:
SPECIAL APPEARANCE AND DISMISSAL OF CASE OF
COMMONWEALTH UPHELD
1

SEC. 101. Proceedings on Demurrer. When a demurrer to any pleading is sustained, the party whose
pleading is thus adjudge defective may amend his pleading within a time to be fixed by the court, with or
without terms, as to be the court shall seem just; but if the party fails to amend his pleading within the time
limited or elect not to amend the court shall render such judgment upon the subject matter involved in the
pleading and demurrer as the law and the facts of the case as set forth in the pleadings warrant. If the
demurrer is overruled, the court shall proceed, if no answer is filed, to render such judgment as the law and
the facts duly pleaded warrant. But after the overruling of a demurrer to a complaint, the defendant may
answer within a time to be fixed by general rules of court; and after the overruling of a demurrer to an answer
the plaintiff may amend his complaint, if necessary, to meet new facts or counterclaims set forth in the answer.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Commonwealth of the Philippines cannot, without its consent, be compelled

to litigate in this action of interpleader. This being so, the conclusion is
inevitable that the court did not err in sustaining the special appearance of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and in ordering the dismissal of the
complaint with respect to this party.

FIFTH ISSUE: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDROS COMPLAINT OF INTERPLEADER

PREMATURE, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE AND YOUNG NOT IN DEFAULT

In resolving the third assignment of error we already expressed the opinion

that the court should order that the defendant litigate among themselves
before any of them may file a complaint of interpleader. Applying this rule, it is
evident that the first part of the assignment of error is without merit.

With respect to the default of the Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young, it
suffices to state that the first and El Colegio de San Jose, Inc., are the same
entity and it, as well as Young, interposed demurrers within the legal period.
SIXTH ISSUE: SUSPENSION OF PROCEEDINGS NOT NECESSARY

Before rendering the appealed resolution, the municipality of San Pedro

asked for the suspension of the proceedings in the case for the purpose of
first obtaining final judgment in the other escheat case (Special Proceedings
No. 3052) commenced by the same municipality. There was no good reason
to suspend the proceedings and to put off the resolution or decision, when at
any rate the same result would be reached.

At all events, the appellants do not cite the violation of any law, and the
suspension of the proceedings rest entirely in a sound judicial discretion, a
discretion which the court exercised adversely to the municipality of San
Pedro.
HELD: For all the reasons stated herein, the appealed resolution is affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against all the appellants. So ordered.

3. Wack-Wack Golf v. Won

G.R. No. L-23851 | March 26, 1976
Petitioner: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc.
Respondent: Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee & Bienvenido A. Tan
Ponente: C. J. Castro
Summary:
Won claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at Wack Wack Golf & Country
Club. By virtue of a civil case, he was issued such certificate. But a certain Tan also
claims ownership over such certificate pursuant to an assignment made by the alleged
true owner of the same certificate. Thus, Wack Wack filed a complaint to interplead
Won and Tan to litigate their conflicting claims. Trial court dismissed the complaint on
the ground of res judicata by reason of the previous civil case that issued Won the right
to the certificate. ISSUE is WON Wack Wack is barred to file an interpleader suit.
YES.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

As to the subject matter (Membership fee certificate), there is no question that such is
proper for an interpleader suit. However, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper
because Wack Wack had already been made independently liable in the previous civil
case wherein Won had established his rights to the certificate and, therefore, its
present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final
judgment in the civil case. Since Won had already established his rights to
membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case, it follows then that this
interpleader suit, if granted, would compel Won to establish his rights anew, and
thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an
interpleader. And because Wack Wack allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in
the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is
barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
FACTS:

Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. (a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Philippines with principal office in
Mandaluyong, Rizal) filed an interpleader suit. In its complaint, the corporation
alleged 2 causes of action.
st

1 cause of action:
o Won claims ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the
decision rendered in civil case 26044 of Manila CFI (entitled "Won v. Wack
Wack Golf & Country Club" and also by virtue of membership fee certificate
201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court pursuant to the order
in the said case.
o Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of the same
membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201serial no. 1199 issued to him pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by
"Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of membership
fee certificate 201.
o Wack Wack Golf has no means of determining who of the two defendants is
the lawful owner.
nd

2 cause of action:
o The membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk
of court of Manila CFI is null and void because it was issued in violation of the
corporations by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the
outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to
the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary.
o This is aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case
26044 is not binding upon Tan, because he was only made a party to the
case so that complete relief may be accorded therein.

The Corporation prayed that

o an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their
conflicting claims;
o judgment be rendered, declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of
membership fee certificate 201; and
o ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Won & Tan moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata,
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.
Trial Court:

Dismissed the complaint due to res judicata.

Wack Wack Golfs Argument:

Trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, instead of compelling the appellees
to interplead because there actually are conflicting claims with respect to the
ownership of membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is not identity of
parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action, between civil case 26044 of the
CFI of Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have been
dismissed upon the ground of res judicata.

WACK W ACK

DID NOT ACT WITH DILIGENCE, SUCH THAT IT

INTERPLEADER

ISSUE: WON Wack Wacks interpleader suit can prosper. NO.

RATIO:

Interpleader under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a remedy

whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to
render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and
asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to
litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or
the one thing.
o The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but
against double vexation in respect of one liability.

The subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the
propriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and
circumstances obtaining.
WHEN TO APPLY FOR AN INTERPLEADER

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to

court.
o He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before
filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a
reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by
either of the contending claimants.
o Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts
with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the
remedy is not barred.

A stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment

has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants,
especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the
adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered.
o If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and
allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on
have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

CANNOT

EVOKE THE REMEDY OF

The corporation was aware of the conflicting claims of Won & Tan with respect to
the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit.
o It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner.
o It was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate.
Yet it did not interplead Tan.
o It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself
therein. In fact, a final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment
has already been executed.
The Corporation has NOT shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an
application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel Won & Tan to
litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership.
o It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against the corporation
that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it.
o By then it was too late.

Because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show

that he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants.

Since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final

judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and
unavailing.
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful
establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate
201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the
purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose
the benefits of the favorable judgment.
o This cannot be done.
o Having elected to take its chances of success in civil case 26044, the
Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.
Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated
adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew
against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the judgment.

DECISION: ACCORDINGLY, the order dismissing the complaint, is affirmed, at

appellant's cost.

4. Ramos v. Ramos
G.R. No. 144294 | March 11, 2003 | Panganiban, J.
Petitioners: Soledad Ramos, Francisco Chanliongco, Adelberto Chanliongco,
Armando Chanliongco, and Florencio Chanliongco
Respondents: Teresita Ramos, Sps. Teresita and Edmundo Muyot, Sps. Vedasta and
Florencio Dato, Loreto Muyot, Sps. TEresita and Elmer Solis, Liceria Torres, SPs.
Corazon and Vicente Macatungal, Sps. Precilla and Cirsostomo Muyot, and Sps.
Caridad and Salvador Pingol

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

SUMMARY:
Petitioners are children of the late Paulino. Paulino was the co-owner of a land in
Tondo together with his siblings Narcisa, Mario and Antonio. A SPA was executed by
the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, by virtue of which her daughter Adoracion was able
to sell the lot to the respondents. Conflict arose among the heirs of the co-owners as to
the validity of the sale. Hence, respondents filed an interpleader to resolve the various
ownership claims. RTC upheld the sale insofar as Narcisas share was concerned, but
held that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other co-owners because
the SPA was executed in favor only of Narcisa, her mother. CA modified the ruling,
and held that while there was no SPA in favor of Adoracion, the sale was nonetheless
valid, because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latters subagent.
This CA decision was not appealed, became final and was entered in favor of the
respondents. ISSUE: WN CA erred in denying petitioners motion and allowing its
decision to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners. NO, CA WAS CORRECT. Petition
denied. As a GR, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. Exceptions are clerical errors, nun pro tunc entries and void judgments.
Whether the CA Decision was void depends on the nature of the action and the
propriety of the summons. The Complaint filed by the respondents called for an
interpleader. It forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the
dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the property. It was
therefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession of real property.
Petitioners, as heirs, only had an inchoate right over the property; hence, they had no
standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because an
executor or administrator represented the latter. There was no need to implead them
as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners
had already been made parties. Futher, under the old Rules, which was in effect at
the time that the Complaint was filed, an executor or administrator may sue or be sued
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended. In the
present case, it was the estate of petitioners father, Paulino Chanliongco, as
represented by Sebrio Tan Quiming and Associates, that was included as
defendant and served summons. As it was, there was no need to include
petitioners as defendants. Not being parties, they were not entitled to be served
summons. Petitioner Florencio was impleaded, but was not served summons.
However, the service of summons upon the estate of his deceased father was
sufficient to include him.
FACTS

Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari under R45 of the Rules of Ct., seeing
to set aside the 7/31/2000 Resolution of the CA which denied petitioners
Motion to Set Aside the CA decision dated 9/28/1995

Petitioners are children of the late Paulino Chanliongco, Jr. (Paulino), a coowner of land known as Lot No. 2-G of Subdivision Plan SWO No. 7308
o Co-owners: siblings Paulino, Narcisa, Mario and Antonio

By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by the coowners

in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza (Adoracion)
had sold the lot to herein respondents on different days in September
1986.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the

validity of the sale, respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for
interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims.
RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Narcisa was concerned.
o Held: Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other
co-owners, because the SPA had been executed in favor only of her
mother, Narcisa.
CA modified RTCs ruling
o Held: While there was no SPA in favor of Adoracion, the sale was
nonetheless valid, because she had been authorized by her mother
to be the latters subagent.

There was thus no need to execute another SPA in her

favor as sub-agent.

This CA Decision was not appealed, became final and

was entered in favor of respondents on August 8, 1996

ISSUE: WN the CA erred in denying petitioners Motion and allowing its Decision dated
9/25/1995 to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and passing petitioners property in
favor of respondents, hence without due process of law. No, CA was correct.
HELD: Petition unmeritorious.
RATIO:

GR: A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.
A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law; and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in
the land.

EXC: The only exceptions to this rule are the:

o Correction of clerical errors,
o
Nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and
o Void judgments.

To determine whether the CA Decision of 9/25/1995 is void, the failure to

implead and to serve summons upon petitioners will now be addressed.
o To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determine
whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The
rules on the service of summons differ depending on the nature
of the action.

An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability;

o An action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person;
o An action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object
is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding
lien or obligation

The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader
to determine the ownership of the real property in question.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

It forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the

dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the
property.
o It sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed
against the personal liability of any particular person. It was
therefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession
of real property.
o As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased
registered co-owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and Antonio
Chanliongco, as represented by their respective estates.
Petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented
merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino.
o They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a
property of the estate, because an executor or administrator
represented the latter.
o Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the
case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had
already been made parties.
Further, at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of Court
(Old Rules) were still in effect.
2
o Under the old Rules, specifically 3 of Rule 3, an executor or
administrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is prosecuted or defended.
3
o The present rule, however, requires the joinder of the beneficiary or
the party for whose benefit the action is brought.
o Under the old Rules, an executor or administrator is allowed to either
sue or be sued alone in that capacity.
o In the present case, it was the estate of petitioners father,
Paulino Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio Tan Quiming
and Associates, that was included as defendant and served
summons.
o As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as
defendants. Not being parties, they were not entitled to be
served summons.
Petitioner Florencio D. Chanliongco (Florencio), on the other hand, was
impleaded in the Complaint, but not served summons.

SEC. 3. Representative Parties. A trustee of an express trust, a guardian, executor or administrator, or a

party authorized by statute, may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
presented or defended; but the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order such beneficiary to be made
a party. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
3

SEC. 3. Representatives as parties.

Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a
party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to
the principal.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

However, the service of summons upon the estate of his

deceased father was sufficient, as the estate appeared for and
on behalf of all the beneficiaries and the heirs of Paulino
Chanliongco, including Florencio.
We also note that the counsel of petitioners, Atty. Felino V. Quiming Jr., is
a partner of the law firm that represented the estate of the deceased
father.
o Hence, it can reasonably be expected that the service upon the
law firm was sufficient notice to all the beneficiaries of the
estate, including Petitioner Florencio.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners

5. Beltran v. Peoples Homesite

G.R. No. L-25138 | August 28, 1969
Plaintiffs-appellants: JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL.
Defendants-appellees: PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Summary
Interpleader suit was filed by plaintiffs praying that the two defendant-government
corporations be compelled to litigate and interplead between themselves their alleged
conflicting claims involving said Project 4. PHHC announced to the tenants that the
management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred by the
PHHC to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in payment of PHHC
debts to the GSIS. Subsequently, however, PHHC through its new Chairman-General
Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements and undertakings
previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to enforce the
said agreements and was upheld in its contention by both the Government Corporate
Counsel and the Secretary of Justice. W/N the complaint for interpleader should be
dismissed. YES. While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting
claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and
ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they
involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any
corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their leasepurchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the
rentals or amortization payments. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and
had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and
amortizations should be made directly to the PHHC alone. There were no conflicting
claims by defendant corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may properly
be compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate among themselves.
CASE: Appeal on purely questions of law from an order of dismissal of the complaint
for interpleader, on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, as certified to
this Court by the Court of Appeals. We affirm the dismissal on the ground that where
the defendants sought to be interpleaded as conflicting claimants have no conflicting

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

claims against plaintiff, as correctly found by the trial court, the special civil action of
interpleader will not lie.

receive in trust the payments from the plaintiffs on their monthly amortizations on
PHHC lots and to be released only upon proper authority of the Court."

FACTS:

This interpleader suit was filed on August 21, 1962, by plaintiffs in their own behalf
and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that the two
defendant-government corporations be compelled to litigate and interplead
between themselves their alleged conflicting claims involving said Project 4.
Plaintiffs' principal allegations in their complaint were as follows:

Since they first occupied in 1953 their respective housing units at Project 4, under
lease from the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and paying
monthly rentals therefor, they were assured by competent authority that after five
years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase said units.

PHHC announced to the tenants that the management, administration and

ownership of Project 4 would be transferred by the PHHC to the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) in payment of PHHC debts to the GSIS.

In the same announcement, the PHHC also asked the tenants to signify their
conformity to buy the housing units at the selling price indicated on the back
thereof, agreeing to credit the tenants, as down payment on the selling price, thirty
(30%) percent of what had been paid by them as rentals.

The tenants accepted the PHHC offer, and the PHHC announced in another
circular that all payments made by the tenants after March 31, 1961 would be
considered as amortizations or installment payments.

The PHHC furthermore instructed the Project Housing Manager in a memorandum

to accept as installments on the selling price the payments made after March 31,
1961 by tenants who were up-to-date in their accounts as of said date.

Pursuant to the PHHC-GSIS arrangement, collections from tenants on rentals

and/or installment payments were delivered by the PHHC to the GSIS.

The agreement of turnover of administration and ownership of PHHC properties,

including Project 4 was executed by PHHC in favor of GSIS, pursuant to the
release of mortgage and amicable settlement of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings instituted in May, 1960 by GSIS against PHHC.

(Conflict) Subsequently, however, PHHC through its new Chairman-General

Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements and
undertakings previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its
legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contention
by both the Government Corporate Counsel and the Secretary of Justice.
Complaint

Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between the defendantscorporations caused them great inconvenience and incalculable moral and
material damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay the monthly
amortizations or payments.

They further alleged that as the majority of them were GSIS policy holders, they
preferred to have the implementation of the outright sale in their favor effected by
the GSIS, since the GSIS was "legally entitled to the management, administration
and ownership of the PHHC properties in question."

Upon urgent ex parte motion of plaintiffs, the trial Court issued its August 23,
1962 Order designating the People's First Savings Bank at Quezon City "to

Motion to Dismiss filed by PHHC and GSIS

The two defendant corporations represented by the Government Corporate

Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action as well as to lift the Court's order designating the People's First Savings
Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.

The trial Court heard the motion on in the presence of all the parties, and
thereafter issued its Order dismissing the Complaint:
o During the hearing of the said motion and opposition thereto, the counsel for the
defendants ratified the allegations in his motion and made of record that the
defendant Government Service Insurance System has no objection that
payments on the monthly amortizations from the residents of Project 4 be made
directly to the defendant People's Homesite and Housing Corporation.
o From what appears in said motion and the statement made in open court by the
counsel for defendants that there is no dispute as to whom the residents of
Project 4 should make their monthly amortizations payments, there is, therefore,
no cause of action for interpleading and that the order of August 23, 1962 is not
warranted by the circumstances surrounding the case.
o In so far as payments are concerned, defendant GSIS has expressed its
conformity that they be made directly to defendant PHHC.

10

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

MR

Plaintiffs subsequently filed their motion for reconsideration and the trial court,
"with a view to thresh out the matter once and for all," called the Managers of the
two defendants-corporations and the counsels for the parties to appear before it
for a conference on October 24, 1962.

"During the conference," the trial court related in its Order, denying plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration, "Manager Diaz of the GSIS made of record that he
has no objection that payments be made to the PHHC.

On the other hand, Manager Eco of the PHHC made of record that at present
there is a standing arrangement between the GSIS and the PHHC that as long as
there is showing that the PHHC has remitted 100% of the total purchase price of a
given lot to the GSIS, the latter corporation shall authorize the issuance of title to
the corresponding lot.

It was also brought out in said conference that there is a new arrangement being
negotiated between the two corporations that only 50% of the purchase price be
remitted to the GSIS by the PHHC, instead of the 100%.

At any rate the two Managers have assured counsel for the plaintiffs that upon
payment of the whole purchase price of a given lot, the title corresponding to said
lot will be issued."
Appeal

On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing their suit,
contending the allegations in their complaint "raise questions of fact that can be
established only by answer and trial on the merits and not by a motion to dismiss
heard by mere oral manifestations in open court," and that they "do not know who,

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

as between the GSIS and the PHHC, is the right and lawful party to receive their
monthly amortizations as would eventually entitle them to a clear title to their
dwelling units."

ISSUE:
W/N the complaint for interpleader should be dismissed. - YES

RATIO:

Rule 63, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14) requires as an
indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants."

While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between
themselves with regard to the management, administration and ownership of
Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve
or affect the plaintiffs.

No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC
which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on
them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments.

The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability, and
recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement of
December 27, 1961 between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their
action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between
the two corporations and not against plaintiffs.

Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as pointed

out by the trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made
directly to the PHHC alone.

The record rejects plaintiffs' claim that the trial courts order was based on "mere
oral manifestations in court." The Reply to Opposition of September 11, 1962 filed
by the Government Corporate Counsel expressly "reiterates his manifestation in
open court that no possible injustice or prejudice would result in plaintiffs by
continuing to make payments of such rentals or amortizations to defendant PHHC
because any such payments will be recognized as long as they are proper, legal
and in due course by anybody who might take over the property.

Specifically, any such payments will be recognized by the GSIS in the event that
whatever conflict there might be (and this is only on the hypothetical assumption
that such conflict exists) between the PHHC and the GSIS should finally be
resolved in favor of the GSIS".

The assurances and undertakings to the same affect given by the Managers of the
defendants-corporations at the conference held by the trial Court are expressly
embodied in the Court's Order of November 20, 1962 quoted above.

The GSIS' undertaking to recognize and respect the previous commitments of

PHHC towards its tenants is expressly set forth in Par. III, section M of the
turnover agreement, Annex "F" of plaintiffs' complaint, wherein it is provided that
"GSIS shall recognize and respect all awards, contracts of sale, lease agreements
and transfer of rights to lots and housing units made and approved by PHHC,
subsisting as of the signing of this agreement, and PHHC commitment to sell its

11

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

housing projects 4, 6 and 8-A at the selling prices less rental credits fixed by
PHHC and as finally approved by the OEC.
In fine, the record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by defendant
corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may properly be compelled in
an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate among themselves.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property in his
possession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any
right in both, comes to court and asks that the defendants who have made upon
him conflicting claims upon the same property or who consider themselves entitled
to demand compliance with the obligation be required to litigate among
themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or payment of the
obligation.
"The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability
but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability."
Thus, in another case, where the occupants of two different parcels of land
adjoining each other belonging to two separate plaintiffs, but on which the
occupants had constructed a building encroaching upon both parcels of land,
faced two ejectment suits from the plaintiffs, each plaintiff claiming the right of
possession and recovery over his respective portion of the lands encroached
upon, this Court held that the occupants could not properly file an interpleader
suit, against the plaintiffs, to litigate their alleged conflicting claims; for evidently,
the two plaintiff did not have any conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
against the occupants, but were enforcing separate and distinct claims on their
respective properties.
Plaintiffs' other contention is that they had raised other issues that were not
resolved and would require rendition of judgment after trial on the merits, such as
"the issue of the right of ownership over the houses and lots in Project 4 (and) the
issue of the status of the commitment agreements and undertakings made by the
previous PHHC Administration, particularly those of the then PHHC General
Manager Bernardo Torres."
This contention is without merit, for no conflicting claims have been made with
regard to such issues upon plaintiffs by defendant corporations, who both bound
themselves to recognize and respect the rights of plaintiffs-tenants. The resolution
of such issues affecting the defendant corporations exclusively may not properly
be sought through the special civil action of interpleader.
Should there be a breach of the PHHC undertakings towards plaintiffs, plaintiffs'
recourse would be an ordinary action of specific performance or other appropriate
suit against either the PHHC or GSIS or both, as the circumstances warrant.
We find no error, therefore, in the trial court's order of dismissal of the complaint
for interpleader and the lifting, as a consequence, of its other order designating
the People's First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on the
PHHC lots.

ACCORDINGLY, the trial Court's order of dismissal is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

6. Sy-Quia v. Sheriff of Ilocos Sur (MB)

Petitioner: Gregorio R. Sy-Quia
Respondents: The Sheriff of Ilocos Sur and Filadelfo De Leon
46 Phil. 400, October 10, 1924
Ostrand, J.
SUMMARY:
[Short case] Cheng-Laco and ChengKiango executed a chattel mortgage in favor of
petitioner Sy-Quia on their mercantile establishment including merchandise contained
therein as security for a debt of P6,000. A second mortgage on the same property was
executed in favor of respondent De Leon as security for the sum of P4,900. Sy-Quia
requested the Sheriff to take possession of the property and sell it under Sec. 14 of the
Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508). The Sheriff seized the property and scheduled
the date of the sale. Meanwhile, De Leon filed an adverse claim on the property
alleging that the goods covered by Sy-Quias chattel mortgage were already sold,
st
hence the 1 chattel mortgage was of no effect. Sheriff suspended the foreclosure
proceedings and brought an action requiring the 2 claimants to interplead. Sy-Quia
filed the present petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff
to proceed with the foreclosure sale. SC denied the petition ruling that the Sheriffs
action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of interpleader
seems justified. The Sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he sold
the goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not
appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in such an event.
FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff of the Province
of Ilocos Sur to proceed with a chattel mortgage foreclosure sale.

Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes ChengKiango executed a

chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their
mercantile establishment, with all the merchandise therein contained, as
security for a debt of P6,000.
o From its terms it may be inferred that it was the intention of the
parties that the mortgagors were to be permitted to sell the
merchandise replenishing their stock from time to time and that the
new stock brought in should also be subject to the mortgage.

Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco executed a 2nd chattel mortgage on the same

establishment and all its contents in favor of the respondent Filadelfo de Leon
as security for the sum of P4,900.

Sy-Quia requested the Sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged property

and to sell it at public auction under the provisions of section 14 of the Chattel
Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508).

The Sheriff seized the establishment in question as well as its contents and
fixed the date of the sale at June 2, 1924.
o In the meantime Filadelfo de Leon presented an adverse claim to the
property by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging that all the goods
on which the chattel mortgage of Gregorio R. Sy-Quia was given had

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been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon was
executed, hence, the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect.
The Sheriff being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims,
suspended the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action requiring the
two claimants to interplead.
The present proceeding in mandamus was instituted. Sy-Quia alleged that the
duty of the Sheriff to proceed with the sale was a ministerial one and praying
that the Sheriff be commanded to proceed.

ISSUE:
[Not stated] W/N the writ of mandamus should be issued. --- NO
HELD:

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied with the costs against the
petitioner.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

RATIO:

Though it would have been better practice for the Sheriff to sell the property
and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action of
interpleader, the SC is of the opinion that the facts shown do not justify our
interference by mandamus.

The Sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he sold the
goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not
appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in such
an event.

In these circumstances, his action in suspending the sale pending the

determination of the action of interpleader seems justified.

Also, the petition for mandamus should be addressed to the CFI rather than
the SC.

7. DE JESUS vs LA SOCIEDAD ARRENDATARIA

G.R. No. L-7313 | August 29, 1912
Plaintiff-appellant: PRUDENCIO DE JESUS
Defendants-appellants: LA SOCIEDAD ARRENDATARIA DE GALLERAS DE PASAY,
ET AL.
Summary: A partnership owned a cockpit which was rented to defendant company.
Plaintiff became absolute owner of two-fifths interest in the property on February 15,
1909 when Lucio Cruz sold his interest and failed to exercise right of repurchase.
Plaintiff also purchased another two-fifths share while one of the defendants hold onefifth share in the partnership. Plaintiff now seeks monthly rental from defendant
company which he claims to be due on February 15, 1909. The Court ruled in his
favor. If the defendant company had any sufficient ground to be in doubt as to which of
the claimants was entitled to the rent, it could have protected itself from the danger of
making payment to the wrong person by requiring the contesting claimants to

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

interplead, thus leaving the determination of the doubt to the courts. A lessee who is in
doubt as to the person to whom he should pay the rent because the property leased is
claimed by several persons may properly bring an action for interpleader against such
persons (words from another case).
FACTS:

A partnership composed of Isidoro Aragon, Lucio Cuneta Cruz and Modesto

de la Cruz, owned a cockpit which it rented to the defendant company. On the
14th of December, 1908, Lucio Cuneta Cruz sold his interest in the
partnership (two-fifths share) to the plaintiff, reserving the right to repurchase
under certain conditions.

Plaintiff claims that the vendor having failed to exercise the right became
absolute owner on the 15th day of February, 1909, and that since that date he
has been the sole owner of this two-fifths interest in the partnership.

It appears also that plaintiff purchased the interest of Isidoro Aragon in the
partnership (also a two-fifths share), and that Modesto de la Cruz, one of the
defendants in this action, continues to hold his original interest in the
partnership (a one-fifth share).
ISSUES:
1) W/N plaintiff may recover from defendant company the amount of the monthly rental
which plaintiff claims to be due to him as the owner of Lucio Cuneta Cruz' interest
since the 15th day of February, 1909 YES
2) W/N plaintiff may terminate the rental contract NO
RATIO:

We think that the evidence of record fully establishes the claim of the plaintiff
as to his purchase of the interest of Lucio Cuneta Cruz in the partnership
which entered into the rental contract the defendant company obligated itself
to pay to the owner of that interest the sum of P280 per month so long as the
contract continued in force up to the date of the entry of judgment in the court
below; and that the plaintiff became the absolute owner of Cuneta Cruz'
interest on February 15, 1909.
PLAINTIFF ENTITILED TO RECOVER AMOUND OF RENTAL FROM DATE WHEN
PURCHASE PERFECTED

The trial judge recognized the right of the plaintiff to recover this monthly
rental from the defendant company from the date of the judgment entered by
him, but declined to give judgment for the monthly rental from the date when
the purchase of Cuneta Cruz' interest was perfected (February 15,1909) to
the date of the judgment.
o Since there had been no formal adjudication of plaintiff's ownership
of Cuneta Cruz' interest prior to the date of the judgment, the
defendant company was not obligated to pay the plaintiff the monthly
rental, since, to have done so might have exposed it to the risk of
having the contract terminated by Cuneta Cruz for failure to pay to
him the stipulated rental, in the event that it should later be judicially

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

determined that Cuneta Cruz and not the plaintiff was the true
owner.
In this we hold that the trial judge erred. The defendant company had due and
sufficient notice of the sale at the time when the plaintiff perfected his
purchase of Cuneta Cruz' interest. Demand was formally and promptly made
upon it for the payment of the rent to which the plaintiff was thereafter entitled.
Under its contract it was the defendant company's duty to pay the stipulated
rent to the owner of the interest originally held by Cuneta. If with due notice of
the purchase of this interest by plaintiff, it paid any other person than the true
owner, such payment in no wise relieved it of its obligations under the
contract to pay the true owner.
Judgment for the rent in question from the 15th day of February, 1909, to the
date of the judgment should have been rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
together with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum upon the
amount of the rent for each month from the date when it fell due to the date of
payment.

ACTION FOR INTERPLEADER PROPER WHEN IN DOUBT AS TO WHOM TO PAY

RENT (MAIN)

We do not recognize the force of the contention that merely because the right
of ownership was in dispute the defendant company lawfully refused to pay
the rent to the plaintiff, on the ground that it could not be required to take the
risk of paying the wrong person and suffering the consequences. Section 120
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for just such a case. If the defendant
company had any sufficient ground to be in doubt as to which of the claimants
was entitled to the rent, it could have protected itself from the danger of
making payment to the wrong person by requiring the contesting claimants to
interplead, thus leaving the determination of the doubt to the courts.

The defendant company not having exercised this right, it voluntarily assumed
the risk of payment to the wrong person, and of course payment to the wrong
person, under such circumstances (even if it were actually made, which does
not affirmatively appear from the record in the case), would not relieve it of
ability to the person lawfully entitled to received payment under the rental
contract.
RENTRAL CONTRACT CANNOT BE TERMINATED

Plaintiff's prayer that the rental contract with the defendant company be
terminated cannot be granted in this action. Plaintiffs appears to rest his
demand for the termination of the contract on the ground that as the owner of
two of the three interests which originally constituted the partnership (a
"sociedad colectiva" as defined in article 2 of title 1 of the Code of Commerce)
that entered into the rental contract with the defendant company, these two
interests constituting a four-fifths share in that partnership, he is entitled to
control the operations of the partnership.

Even if it be admitted that plaintiff's purchase of two of the three original

interests representing a four-fifths share in the partnership gave him the right
to control the operations of the partnership, it does not necessarily follow that
he can arbitrarily repudiate the rental contract.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The right to terminate the contractual relations between the parties, and the
conditions upon which one or other of the contracting parties may exercise
this right necessarily depends on the contract itself. It does not definitely
appear from the record whether the contract was or was not reduced to
writing; and while there does not seem to have been any question in the court
below as to some of its terms, the contract itself is not before us.
Plaintiffs having failed to establish satisfactorily the terms and conditions of
the rental contract, it is impossible for us to determine the conditions, if any,
upon which he, acting for the partnership, may exercise his alleged right to
terminate it; or to hold that under the contract, the society or partnership in
which plaintiff holds a controlling interest has a right to have the contract
rescinded.
So far therefore as the judgment of the court below denies the right of the
plaintiff to have the rental contract in question terminated in this action it
should be affirmed, reserving to the plaintiff, however, the right to institute a
new action or to take such steps as he may deem proper, hereafter, with a
view to the exercise of any right he may have, under the contract, to rescind
or terminate the same.

HELD: Ten days hereafter let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court
below without costs in this instance, and twenty days thereafter let the record be
returned to the court wherein it originated, which will enter final judgment, in
accordance with the principles herein laid down. So ordered.

8. Mesina v. IAC
G.R. No. 70145 | November 13, 1986
Petitioner: Marcelo A. Mesina
Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, in his capacity
as Judge of Manila RTC (Branch VIII), Jose Go, & Albert Uy
Ponente: J. Paras
Summary:
Jose Go purchased from Associated Bank a cashier's check for P800,000 which he left
on top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the bank. The bank manager
entrusted the check for safekeeping to Albert Uy. While Uy went to the men's room,
the check was stolen by his visitor, Alexander Lim. Upon discovering that the check
was lost, Go accomplished an Affidavit of Loss and a "STOP PAYMENT" order. Two
days later, Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing from Prudential Bank.
After dishonoring the same check twice, Associated Bank received summons and copy
of a complaint for damages of Marcelo Mesina who was in possession of the lost
check and is demanding payment. Unsure of what to do, Associated Bank filed an
action for Interpleader. Mesina, instead of filing his answer to the complaint filed a
Motion to Dismiss which the RTC denied. Thereafter, he was declared in default. The
RTC then rendered a decision ordering Associate Bank to replace Cashier's Check No.
011302 in favor of Go or its cash equivalent. Main ISSUE is WON the interpleader suit
was proper (my own words ). YES.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

The SC held that Associated Bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a
mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. The
interpleader suit was filed because Mesina and Jose Go were both claiming on the
cashiers check. Contrary to Mesinas claim, Associated Bank filed the interpleader suit
NOT because Mesina sued it for damages. This is supported by the fact that (1)
Associated Bank was willing to issue a certificate of time deposit of P800,000
representing the cashier's check in the name of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be
awarded to whoever will be found by the court as validly entitled to it, and (2) on the
day that the bank instituted the interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages
filed as the interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank v. Jose Go and John
Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe when his name became
known to the bank.
FACTS: [Sori mahaba talaga yung facts, saka mejo iniba ko yung ordering nung facts
para mas madaling intindihin]

Jose Go purchased from Associated Bank a cashier's check for P800,000.00.

Unfortunately, he left the check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when
he left the bank. The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to Albert
Uy, a bank official, who had then a visitor (Alexander Lim). Uy had to answer a
phone call on a nearby telephone after which he proceeded to the men's room.
When he returned to his desk, Lim was already gone.

When Go inquired for his cashier's check from Uy, the check was not in his folder
and nowhere to be found. He then advised Go to accomplish a "STOP
PAYMENT" order, which was immediately put into action. Go also executed an
affidavit of loss.

Afterwards, Uy went to the police to report the loss of the check, pointing to
Alexander Lim as the one who could shed light on it.

Records of the police show that Associated Bank received the lost check for
clearing, coming from Prudential Bank, Escolta Branch. The check was
immediately dishonored by Associated Bank by sending it back to Prudential
Bank, with the words "Payment Stopped" stamped on it.
o However, the same was again returned to Associated Bank and for the
second time it was dishonored.

Several days later, Associated Bank received a letter from a certain Atty. Lorenzo
Navarro demanding payment on the cashier's check which was being held by his
client.
o He however refused to reveal the name of his client and threatened to sue if
payment is not made.
o Associated Bank replied saying the check belonged to Go who lost it in the
bank and is laying claim to it.
Filing of Cases
st

1 case: Unsure of what to do, Associated Bank filed an action for Interpleader
naming as respondent, Jose Go and one John Doe, Atty. Navarro's then unnamed
client.
nd

2 case: Thereafter Associated Bank received summons and copy of the

complaint for damages of a certain Marcelo Mesina from the Caloocan City RTC.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Associated Bank moved to amend its complaint, having been notified for the first
time of the name of Atty. Navarro's client and substituted Marcelo Mesina for John
Doe. Simultaneously it informed the Western Police District that the lost check of
Go is in the possession of Mesina.
o When asked how he came to possess the check, he said it was paid to him
by Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate further.
rd
3 case: An information for theft was then instituted against Alexander Lim and
the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued which up to the date of the
filing of this instant petition remains unserved because of Lim's successful evation.

st

1 case: Interpleader Suit

Go filed his answer.

Uy filed a motion of intervention and answer in the complaint for Interpleader.

Mesina, instead of filing his answer to the complaint filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abudante Cautela alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the absence of
an order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and lack of personality to sue.
o RTC DENIED.
o MR also denied.
o RTC afterwards issued an order declaring Mesina in default since his period
to answer has already expired and set the ex-parte presentation of
Associated Bank's evidence.

Mesina then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with IAC to set
aside 1) order of RTC denying his omnibus Motion to Dismiss and 2) the order of
default against him.
o IAC dismissed.
o MR also denied.

RTC rendered a decision in the Interpleader case ordering Associate Bank to

replace Cashier's Check No. 011302 in favor of Go or its cash equivalent.
2

nd

case: Complaint for Damages.

Go moved to participate as intervenor.
Associated Bank moved to dismiss suit in view of the existence of the Interpleader
case.
RTC issued an order dismissing the case since the main issue in both cases (the
Interpleader Suit & Complaint for Damages) are the same (ISSUE who
between Mesina and Go is entitled to payment of Associated Bank's Cashier's
Check No. CC-011302).
o Said issue having been resolved already, the complaint for damages is
already moot and academic.

ISSUES:
1. WON IAC erred in ruling that a cashier's check can be countermanded even in the
hands of a holder in due course. NO. In the first place, Mesina is NOT a
holder in due course.
2. WON IAC erred in countenancing the filing and maintenance of an interpleader
suit by a party who had earlier been sued on the same claim. NO. [main]
3. WON IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring Mesina in default
when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader complaint.

15

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

4.

NO. [important also because it discusses the process involved in an interpleader

suit]
WON IAC went beyond the scope of its certiorari jurisdiction by making findings of
facts in advance of trial. NO.

RATIO:
MESINA IS NOT A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE [nego issue]

Mesina failed to substantiate his claim that he is a holder in due course and
for consideration or value.
o He became the holder of the cashier's check as endorsed by Alexander Lim
who stole the check, and he refused to say how and why it was passed to
him.
o He had therefore notice of the defect of his title over the check from the start.
o The holder of a cashier's check who is not a holder in due course
cannot enforce such check against the issuing bank which dishonors
the same.

If a payee of a cashier's check obtained it from the issuing bank by fraud,

or if there is some other reason why the payee is not entitled to collect
the check, the issuing bank would, of course, have the right to refuse
payment of the check when presented by the payee, since it was aware
of the facts surrounding the loss of the check.

Moreover, Associated Bank did not issue the cashier's check in payment of
its obligation.
o Jose Go bought the cashiers check from the said bank for purposes of
transferring his funds from Associated Bank to another bank near his
establishment realizing that carrying money in this form is safer than if it were
in cash.
o The check was Jose Go's property when it was misplaced or stolen, hence he
stopped its payment.
o Jose Go owns the money the cashiers check represents and he is therefore
the drawer and the drawee in the same manner as if he has a current account
and he issued a check against it; and from the moment said cashier's check
was lost and/or stolen no one outside of Jose Go can be termed a holder in
due course because Jose Go had not indorsed it in due course.
o The check in question suffers from the infirmity of not having been properly
negotiated and for value by Jose Go.
AN INTERPLEADER SUIT IS PROPER [MAIN]
Mesinas Argument: There is no showing of conflicting claims and interpleader is out of
the question.
SC: There is enough evidence to establish the contrary.

Associated Bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a

mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper
remedy.
o The interpleader suit was filed because Mesina and Jose Go were both laying
their claims on the check, Mesina asking payment thereon and Jose Go as
the purchaser or owner.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Mesinas allegation that Associated Bank had effectively relieved itself of its
primary liability under the check by simply filing a complaint for interpleader is
belied by the willingness of the bank to issue a certificate of time deposit of
P800,000 representing the cashier's check in the name of the Clerk of Court of
Manila to be awarded to whoever will be found by the court as validly entitled to it.
Associated Bank filed the interpleader suit NOT because Mesina sued it but
because he is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming.
o In fact on the very day that the bank instituted the case in interpleader, it was
not aware of any suit for damages filed by Mesina against it as supported by
the fact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose
Go and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe
when his name became known to the bank.

MESINA WAS ALREADY IN DEFAULT WHEN HE FAILED TO FILE HIS ANSWER

Mesinas Argument: IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner in
default when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader case.
SC: Such contention is untenable.

The Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is to all
intents and purposes an order to interplead, substantially and essentially and
therefore in compliance with the provisions of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
IACS FINDING OF FACTS WAS NECESSARY IN THE CASE AT BAR

Before Associated Bank resorted to Interpleader, it took precautionary and

necessary measures to bring out the truth.

On the other hand, Mesina concealed the circumstances known to him and now
that the bank brought these circumstances out in court (which eventually rendered
its decision in the light of these facts), Mesina charges it with "gratuitous
excursions into these non-issues."

IAC cannot rule on whether RTC committed an abuse of discretion or not,

without being apprised of the facts and reasons why Associated Bank
instituted the Interpleader case. Therefore, IAC did not act therefore beyond the
scope of the remedy sought in the petition.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, finding that the instant petition is merely dilatory, the same
is hereby denied and the assailed orders of the respondent court are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

9. Vda. De Camilo v. Hon. Arcamo

GR No. L-15653 | Sept. 29, 1961 | Paredes, J.
Petitioners-appellees: Petra Carpio Vda. De Camilo, et al. (PETRA)
Respondents-appellants: Hon. Justice of the Peace (JP) Arcamo, Ong Peng Kee
(PENG), Adelia Ong (ADELIA)
SUMMARY

16

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Petra, Estrada and the Franciscos owned parcels of land in Zamboanga del Sur, all of
which had buildings erected on them. Fire razed the buildings. Afterwards, the Ongs
erected their own building on the pretense that the Municipality of Malangas leased the
land to them. The new building, however, encroached upon the petitioners land.
Petitioners filed 2 separate forcible entry cases against the Ongs. The Ongs,
meanwhile, filed a complaint for interpleader. Petitioners filed the present proceedings
for mandamus and certiorari claiming that the justice of the peace (JP) had no
jurisdiction over the interpleader case. CFI ruled in favor of petitioners. The Ongs
appealed. Issue: WN the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the interpleader case. No. The petitioners claimed the possession of the
respective portion of the lands belonging to them on which the respondents had
erected their house. This being the case, the contention of petitioners-appellants
that the complaint to interplead lacked cause of action, is correct. Petitioners did
not have conflicting claims against the respondents. Petra, Estrada and the
Franciscos claimed possession of two different parcels of land of different
areas, adjoining each other. Further, it is not true that the Ongs did not have any
interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their
occupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon by them. It is,
therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not
exist. CFI decision affirmed.
FACTS

This appeal stemmed from a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by
Petra and others, against Samuel A. Arcamo, Justice of the Peace of
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur, Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong.

Petra had been by herself and predecessor in interest in peaceful, open and
adverse possession of a parcel of public foreshore land, situated in Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur, containing an area of about 400 square meters.
o A commercial building was erected on the property which was
declared under Tax Dec. No. 5286 and assessed at P7,400.00.

Peng was a lessee of one of the apartments of said commercial building since
June 1, 1957.

8/1/1957 Arthur Evert Bannister (Bannister) filed an unlawful detainer case

against both Petra and Peng with the JP of Malangas.
o For failure of Bannister and/or counsel to appear at the trial, they
were declared in default and P100.00 was awarded to Petra on her
counterclaim.
o The MR presented by Bannister was denied.

The other petitioners (Other Petitioners; Severino Estrada, Felisa, Susana,

Antonio and the minors Isabelo, Rene and Ruben, all surnamed Francisco,
the said minors represented by their mother Susana) had also been in
possession (in common), peaceful, open and adverse, since 1937, of a
parcel of public foreshore land, about 185 square meters which is
adjoining that land occupied by Petra.
o On this parcel, a commercial building assessed at P1,000.00 was
erected by the Franciscos, and had the same declared under Tax
Dec. No. 4911.

9/1/1957 the 2 commercial buildings were burned down.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Two weeks after, Peng and Adelia constructed a building of their

own, occupying about 120 sqm.
o However, the building encroached upon portions of the lands
previously occupied by Petra and the Franciscos.
12/3/1957 Petra filed a civil case for Forcible Entry against Peng and Adelia
(Ongs) with the JP of Malangas.
8/8/1958 Estrada and the Franciscos filed a similar case.
Ongs answer: land where they constructed their building was leased to them
by the Municipality of Malangas.
Pending trial of the 2 cases, the Ongs filed a complaint for Interpleader
against Petra, Estrada, the Franciscos, Arthur Evert Bannister, the Mayor
and Treasurer of Malangas, alleging that the filing of the three cases of
forcible entry indicated that the defendants (in the Interpleader, i.e.,
Petra, etc.) had conflicting interests, since they all claimed to be entitled to
the possession of the lot in question and they (Ongs) could not determine
without hazard to themselves who among the defendants was entitled to the
possession.
o Interpleader plaintiffs (Ongs) further alleged that they had no interest
in the property other than as mere lessees.
And motion to dismiss the complaint for interpleader was presented by the
defendants therein (now petitioners), contending that the JP had no
jurisdiction to try and hear the case; that there were other pending actions
between the parties for the same cause; and that the complaint for
interpleader did not state a cause of action.
o The Ongs opposed the motion.
o Respondent JP denied the MTD and ordered the petitioners to
interplead.
o The 2 forcible entry cases dismissed.
The petitioners instituted the present proceedings, for certiorari and
mandamus before the CFI of Zamboanga, claiming that the JP acted
without jurisdiction in denying the MTD, gravely abused his discretion for
having given due course to the complaint for Interpleader, and unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which was specifically enjoined by law,
and for which there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
CFI JP was without jurisdiction (in favor of the petitioners); Order denying
the motion to dismiss the interpleader complaint was set aside. Respondents
appealed.

ISSUE: WN the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
interpleader case. No.
HELD: Decision appealed from is affirmed.
RATIO:

The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective portion of the lands
belonging to them on which the respondents had erected their house after the
fire, which destroyed petitioners' buildings.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

This being the case, the contention of petitioners-appellants that

the complaint to interplead lacked cause of action, is correct.
1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court (old):
o Interpleader when proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who
claims no interest whatever in the subject-matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
Petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents.
o Their respective claim was separate and distinct from the other.
o Petra only wanted the respondents to vacate that portion of her
property, which was encroached upon by them when they
erected their building.
o The same is true with Estrada and the Franciscos.
o They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of
different areas, adjoining each other.
o Furthermore, it is not true that the Ongs did not have any interest
in the subject matter.

Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy

or possession of the portions encroached upon by
them.

It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a

complaint of Interpleader do not exist.
Even in the supposition that the complaint presented a cause of action for
Interpleader, still SC holds that the JP had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance thereof.
o The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead practically
took the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP court, because
the action would then necessarily "involve the title to or
possession of real property or any interest therein" over which
the CFI has original jurisdiction.
o Then also, the subject matter of the complaint (interpleader)
would come under the original jurisdiction of the CFI (not the JP
court), because it would not be capable of pecuniary estimation,
there having been no showing that rentals were asked by the
petitioners from respondents.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find that the decision appealed from
is in conformity with the law, and the same should be, as it is hereby affirmed,
with costs against respondents-appellants Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong.

10. Makati Devt Corp v. Tanjuatco

G.R. No. L-26443
March 25, 1969
Plaintiff-appellant:
MAKATI
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Defendants-appellees: PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES,
INC.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Summary
Plaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the latter
bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and
pump house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the
materials necessary therefor.
Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired
from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills therefor of
Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them. In response to this
inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing
the cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. Plaintiff instituted
the action, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to
compel them to interplead their conflicting claims. W/N the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction
over the complaint for interpleader? It does not have jurisdiction. There is no
question in this case that plaintiff may compel the defendants to interplead among
themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who
among the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action,
which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of fact, on May 25,
1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil Case No. 149173 of the Municipal Court of
Manila, for the recovery of said amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein will
settle the question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by plaintiff herein.
Case: Appeal by plaintiff Makati Development Corporation from an order of dismissal
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), predicated upon lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:

February 21, 1963, said plaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a
contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete
covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park,
Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the materials necessary therefor.

Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff
inquired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills
therefor of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them.

In response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. hereinafter referred to as

the Supplier made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost of
transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco.

With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to
him and, in view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the
Supplier, on September 16, 1955, plaintiff instituted the present action, in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to
compel them "to interplead their conflicting claims."

October 4, 1965 - Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation, the amount
involved therein being less than P10,000.00.

Finding this motion "to be well-taken", the lower court granted the same, over
plaintiffs opposition thereto, and, accordingly, issued an order, dated November
16, 1965, dismissing the case, without costs.

18

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

ISSUE:
W/N the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction over the complaint for interpleader? It
does not have jurisdiction.
RATIO:

Plaintiff maintains that the subject-matter of this litigation is not the

aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to
litigate among themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a double
vexation in respect to one liability."

We find no merit in this contention. There is no question in this case that plaintiff
may compel the defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning the
aforementioned sum of P5,198.75.

The only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is
the object of the action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court.

As a matter of fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil Case
No. 149173 of the Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of
P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the question as to who has a right to
the sum withheld by plaintiff herein.

The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the
procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of
Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of the Old Rules, omits the Rules on
Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does not
warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein.

To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable
controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to
which municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in
controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos."

Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.

Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to
make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies
that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of
interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to
ordinary civil action in said courts.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against plaintiff Makati Development Corporation. It is so ordered.

11. RCBC v. Metro Container Corp. (MB)

Petitioner: Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
Respondent: Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN)
G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Kapunan, J.
SUMMARY:
LEYCON loaned P30,000,000 from RCBC which was secured by a real estate
mortgage over a property located in Barrio Ugong, Valenzuela City. The property was
leased out to METROCAN. When LEYCON failed to pay RCBC, the latter
extrajudicially foreclosed the property and purchased it as the highest bidder. LEYCON
on the other had filed an action for Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and
Damages against RCBC. RCBC on the other hand consolidated ownership over the
property, and by virtue of such title demanded rental payments from METROCAN.
st
LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer (1 case) against METROCAN.
nd
Subsequently, METROCAN filed a complaint for Interpleader (2 case) to compel
LEYCON and RCBC to litigate their claims in order to determine which among them
nd
should rightfully receive rental payments. During the pre-trial of the 2 case, LEYCON
and METROCAN was able to reach an amicable settlement where METROCAN was
st
to pay rentals to LEYCON. Thereafter the 1 case was resolved in favor of LEYCON
and METROCAN was ordered likewise to pay LEYCON. In effect, both LEYCON and
nd
METROCAN moved to dismiss the Interpleader case (2 case) which motions the
nd
RTC dismissed. On appeal, the CA granted the motions to set aside the 2 case.
RCBC questions the dismissal of the Interpleader case. SC held that (1) The reason
for the Interpleader action ceased when the MeTC rendered judgment in Unlawful
Detainer case whereby the court directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON. (2) While
RCBC could not compel METROCAN to pursue the Interpleader case, it is not bereft of
other legal remedies such as proving its claim in the action for Nullification of
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by LEYCON.
FACTS:

Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) contracted a loan from RCBC in the

amount of P30,000,000.
o The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a property,
located in Barrio Ugong, Valenzuela, Metro Manila (now Valenzuela
City).
o LEYCON failed to settle its obligations prompting RCBC to institute
an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding.
o When LEYCONs legal attempts to forestall the action of RBCB
failed, the property was foreclosed with RCBC as the highest bidder.
o LEYCON promptly filed an action for Nullification of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Sale and Damages against RCBC in the RTC of
Valenzuela, Branch 72.
o Meanwhile, RCBC consolidated its ownership over the property due
to LEYCONs failure to redeem it within the 12-month redemption
period and a TCT was issued if favor of the bank.
o By virtue thereof, RCBC demanded rental payments from Metro
Container Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the property
from LEYCON.
st

1 case (Unlawful Detainer) --- LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer
against METROCAN before the MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 82.
nd

2 case (Interpleader) --- METROCAN filed a complaint for Interpleader

before the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 75 against LEYCON and

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully receive the
payment of monthly rentals on the subject property.
o During the pre-trial conference, the trial court ordered the dismissal
of the case insofar as METROCAN and LEYCON were concerned in
view of an amicable settlement where METROCAN paid back
rentals to LEYCON.
st
Judgment was rendered in the 1 case which among other things, ordered
METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject
premises. The MeTC decision became final and executory.
nd
METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the 2 case for having become moot
and academic due to the amicable settlement and because of the decision in
st
the 1 case. LEYCON did the same.
o The two motions were dismissed for lack of merit.
o MRs filed by METROCAN and LEYCON were also denied.
o METROCAN sought relief from the CA via a petition forcertiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
o LEYCON also sought for the nullification of the RTC orders.
CA --- granted the petition and set aside the orders of the RTC and ordered
nd
the dismissal of the 2 case (Interpleader)
RCBCs MR was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUES:
RCBC alleges that:
st
1. The decision in the 1 case (Unlawful Detainer) between METROCAN
and LEYCON does not and cannot render the Interpleader action moot
and academic.
2. While a party who initiates an Interpleader action may not be compelled
to litigate if he is no longer interested to pursue such cause of action,
said party may not unilaterally cause the dismissal of the case after the
answer have been filed. Further, the defendants in an Interpleader suit
should be given full opportunity to litigate their respective claims.

HELD:

Petition for review is DENIED.

The Decision of the CA as well as its Resolution are AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. When Interpleader is proper

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Interpleader when proper. - Whenever conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part
is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several

claims among themselves.
2. Application to the case at hand
nd

It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the Interpleader action (2 case)

because it was unsure which between LEYCON and RCBC was entitled to
receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON was
claiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC was
making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in
its name.

It is also undisputed that LEYCON, as lessor of the subject property filed an

st
action for Unlawful Detainer (1 case) against its lessee METROCAN.
o The issue in the Unlawful Detainer case is limited to the question of
physical or material possession of the premises.
o The issue of ownership is immaterial and the outcome of the case
could not in any way affect conflicting claims of ownership, in this
case between RCBC and LEYCON.
o This was made clear when the trial court, in denying RCBC's "Motion
for Inclusion x x x as an Indispensable Party" declared that "the final
determination of the issue of physical possession over the subject
premises between the plaintiff and the defendant shall not in any
way affect RCBC's claims of ownership over the said premises,
since RCBC is neither a co-lessor or co-lessee of the same, hence
he has no legal personality to join the parties with respect to the
issue of physical possession.

Hence, the reason for the Interpleader action ceased when the MeTC
rendered judgment in Unlawful Detainer case whereby the court directed
METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises
x x x.

While RCBC, not being a party to Unlawful Detainer case, could not be bound
by the judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision.

Precisely because there was already a judicial fiat to METROCAN, there was
no more reason to continue with Interpleader case. Thus, METROCAN
moved for the dismissal of the Interpleader action not because it is no longer
interested but because there is no more need for it to pursue such cause of
action.
3. Other comments on Interpleader

An action of Interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double

liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.

It requires, as an indespensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the

same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-Interpleader
who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.
o The decision in Unlawful Detainer case resolved the conflicting
claims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned.
4. RCBC may prove its claim through other legal remedies.

RCBC is correct in saying that it is not bound by the decision in Unlawful

Detainer case because it is not a party thereto.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

However, RCBC could not compel METROCAN to pursue the Interpleader

case.
RCBC has other avenues to prove its claim.
The issue of ownership can very well be threshed out in the case for
Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by LEYCON
against RCBC.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Rule 63: Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

Section 1. Who may file petition.

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code,
may be brought under this Rule.
Sec. 2. Parties.
All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration
shall be made parties; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these
Rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action.
Sec. 3. Notice on Solicitor General.
In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or
any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party
assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.
Sec. 4. Local government ordinances.
In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding
prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified
and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the
Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.
Sec. 5. Court action discretionary.
Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the
court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights
and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the
declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances.
Sec. 6. Conversion into ordinary action.
If before the final termination of the case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action, and
the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper.
1. MIRANDO V. WELLINGTON
G.R. No. L-44062 | February 16, 1978
Petitioners-appellants: PABLO L. MIRANDO, MANUEL V. SERRANILLA,
MAGDALEMO LEMOS, JESUS MILLA, IGNACIO ANGUE, JUAN BOLO, RUFINO
FLORES, TEODORO CASTILLO, PETRA ALACAR, AURELIA LAVADIA, EUGENIO

AMOR, RAYMUNDO ABELLA, CONSTANTINO DODIE, ANTONINO V.

SERRANILLA, DAVID IMPANG and CELESTINO LACERNA
Respondents-appellees: WELLINGTON TY & BROS., INC. and THE PHILIPPINE
BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS,.
Summary: After liberation from the Japanese, petitioners occupied and lived in the
premises of Arellano University in Manila, from 1945 to 1950. To solve the problem
posed by the squatters to public health and sanitation, Mayor of Manila relocated the
squatters in QC. The Phil. Board of Liquidators took possession of these lots from a
Japanese enemy alien. During their occupancy of the lots, petitioners constructed their
houses and were charged nominal rentals. They also filed their respective applications
for the sale of the lots to them. Phil. Board bartered two parcels of land with another
land owned by Planas. Estate of Planas sold lots in question to Wellington Ty to which
a TCT was issued. Petitioners filed petitioned entitled Declaratory Relief for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reconveyance with Preliminary Injunction when they were
demanded to vacate and surrender premises. SC ruled that complaint must fail for lack
of sufficient cause of action. An action for declaratory relief may be entertained,
provided the following are present: (1) there must be a justifiable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. All these requisite facts are not
present. Petitioners who claimed to have interest on the disputed land by paying rents
in favor of the government (in contrast to respondents claim by virtue of contract of
sale with the government) failed to prove that they were entitled to the same.
FACTS:

Shortly after the liberation of Manila from the Japanese Imperial Army,
petitioners occupied and lived in the premises of Arellano University at
Legarda St., Manila, from 1945 to 1950. To solve the problem posed by the
squatters to public health and sanitation in general and to meet the needs of
the University for its premises in particular, Mayor de la Fuente of Manila
secured the approval of Mayor Diaz of QC to relocate the squatters in Lots 1
and 2, Block No. 3, adjoining Broadway St., QC.

These lots were formerly owned by a Japanese named Arata Tuitsue.

4
Because he was an enemy alien, the Phil. Board of Liquidators took
possession of these lots. During their occupancy of the lots in question,
petitioners constructed their houses thereon and were charged nominal
rentals by the respondent Phil. Board of Liquidators. They also filed their
respective applications with the Board through the Office of the President for
the sale of the lots to them.

Sometime in 1953 the Phil. Board of Liquidators with the approval of the
President of the Philippines, bartered the two parcels of land in dispute with
4

21

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

successor of Phil. Alien Property Custodian

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

another piece of land owned by the late Carmen Planas. In 1964, the
administrator of the estate of Planas sold the lots in question to private
respondents, Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. A TCT was issued to the latter.
Soon thereafter, the private respondents made demands upon the petitioners
to vacate and surrender the possession of the premises. Petitioners refused,
claiming that they had preferential rights to the property. Private respondents
reacted by filing an ejectment proceeding QC.
In 1969, Petitioners-appellants filed a petition entitled Declaratory Relief for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reconveyance with Preliminary Injunction before
the CFI of Rizal, claiming inter alia,
o (a) that they are the bona fide occupants of the lots in question,
having, constructed thereon their respective resident substantial
houses with assessed values as follows: (case listed for each
petitioner ranging from 2k to 8k) and
o (b) that through the fraud and misrepresentation of the respondentappellee Wellington Ty & Bros, Inc., in collusion with the Phil. Board
of Liquidators, they were deprived of their preferential right to
purchase said lots from the latter.
The petition sought the cancellation of the title of Wellington, the
reconveyance of the disputed lots in their favor and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against further proceedings in the ejectment case.
After their MTD was denied, respondent appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc.
filed its Answer, claiming the indefensibility of their title under the Land
Registration Act, being purchasers for value and in good faith. Further, they
reiterated the grounds of their motion to dismiss:
o (a) the present action is not the proper remedy;
o (b) the petition does not state a sufficient justifiable cause of action
as required by law;
o (c) there is a pending action in Court between the same parties
wherein the issue raised herein is involved.
Likewise, respondent Phil. Board of Liquidators filed its Answer with following
defenses:
o (a) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the respondent Board of
Liquidators;
o (b) That petitioners have no cause of action against respondent
Board of Liquidators;
o (c) That the respondent Board of Liquidators is not the real party in
interest in this case;
o (d) That the cause of action, if any, has already prescribed.
CFI Rizal decision: petitioners had no right over the property
CA decision: Court feels that the, issues raised involve purely questions of
law, the review of which is vested within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to the declaratory relief prayed for NO
RATIO:
THE ACQUISITION OF LAND WAS VALID

22

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Petitioners-appellants contend that their alleged preferential right to buy the

land is by authority of R.A. 3348 which provides:
Section 1. Section 1 of RA 477, as amended by RA 1970, is further amended
to read as follows:
Section 1. All lands which have been or may hereafter be transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the Philippine Property Act of
1946 and RA 8 and all the public lands
and
improvements
thereon
transferred from the Bureau of Lands to the National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation under the provisions of EO 29 (1946), and of EO 99 (1947), shall
be subdivided into convenient-sized lots, except such portion thereof as the
President of the Philippines may reserve or transfer title thereto for the use of
the National or local governments, or for the use of the corporations or
entities owned or controlled by the Government. ; Provided that any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Department of General
Services shall determine the minimum size of said urban homesite or
residential lots and shall allot to the actual occupants thereof at the time of the
approval of this Act.

Petitioners-appellants' contention is without merit, the said law having come

into effect only on August 8 1963, or almost 10 years after the lots in question
passed into the private estate of the late Carmen Planas who acquired the
same from the national government in 1953.

We do not see any irregularity in the acquisition by Carmen Planas of the said
parcels of land. The exchange of properties between the national government
and the late Carmen Planas was validly effected in accordance with the
provisions of the then existing laws.

Thus, under EO 372 (1950), the Philippine Board of Liquidators, with the
approval of the President of the Philippines, was empowered to sell lease,
transfer, assign, or otherwise dispose of, the properties transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines under the Philippine Property Act of 1946

And, under RA 926, the "President of the Philippines, in payment of

compensation for landed estates acquired by the Government, whether thru
voluntary agreement or expropriation proceedings, may convey in behalf of
the Republic, with the written consent of the owner of the land, in total partial
payment of such compensation, such public land as is disposable by sale or
lease to private individuals in accordance with law, and such other similarly
disposable property pertaining to the Republic of the Philippines."

In the absence of proof of defect in the acquisition by Carmen Planas of, or

proof of infirmity in her title to, the lots occupied by petitioners-appellants, We
cannot question the validity of the contract of sale executed between the
administrator of her estate and Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc.
NO PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO BUY LOTS

If We pursue farther the contention of the petitioners- appellants that they had
the preferential right to buy the lots they occupied, We must look into the
provisions of the law then in effect, RA 477, effective 1950, and not RA 3348.
Thus,

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Sec. 1. (same provision as above but the ff text was emphasized)

except such portions thereof as the President of the Philippines may
reserve for the use of the National or local governments, or for the
use of corporations or entities owned or controlled by the
Government. ...
The fact that the applications of the petitioners-appellants to buy these
parcels of land from the national government, thru the Board of Liquidators,
had not been given due course by the latter no doubt shows that, as
authorized under the above provision of law, the national government
reserved these lots for its own use with no intention to subdivide them into
convenient-sized lots to be awarded to bona fide occupants.
That petitioners-appellants paid nominal fees for the use of the lots is of little
consequence, in the absence of positive proof that the fees were in
consideration of any claim of priority rights. In fact, unrebutted testimony was
presented appellants were considered squatters. Their use and occupation of
the land was merely tolerated by the national government, and could not have
vested in them any claim, right, or adverse interest in such government
property.

CONDITIONS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF NOT PRESENT

Under the Rules of Court, declaratory relief is an action which any person
interested under a deed will, contract, or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance,
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

Petitioners-appellants brought this action with a claim that they were deprived
of their preferential right to buy the disputed lots by virtue of a contract of sale.
But it is evident from the records that from the date of their relocation to the
disputed lots in 1950 to the date of the filing of this petition for declaratory
relief, at no time did the petitioners-appellants acquire any interest
whatsoever in the parcels of land subject of the aforementioned contract of
sale.

They enjoyed no rights which were violated, or at the least, affected by the
exchange of properties between the national government and the late
Carmen Planas, and eventually, by the above contract of sale between the
administrator of the estate of Carmen Planas and the respondent-appellee
Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc.

The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for declaratory
relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite
facts or conditions:
o (1) there must be a justifiable controversy;
o (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse;
o (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy; and
o (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

23

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

All these requisite facts are not present; the complaint must, therefore, fail for
lack of sufficient cause of action.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners-appellants.
2. DELUMEN V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-5552 | January 28, 1954
Doctrine: An action for declaratory judgment cannot be invoked solely to determine or
try issues or to determine a moot, abstract or theoretical question, or decide claims
which are uncertain or hypothetical.
Petitioners: Antonio Delumen, et al
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
Ponente: C. J. Paras
FACTS: [No summary since short case]

Antonio, Juan and Julito, all surnamed Delumen, filed a petition in the CFI of
Samar, alleging that they are legitimate children of Pacencia Pua, a Filipino
woman, and Mariano Delumen who was declared a Filipino citizen by the same
court.
o They prayed to said court to determine whether they are Filipino citizens and
to declare their corresponding rights and duties.
o They alleged that they have continuously resided in the Philippines since their
birth, have considered themselves as Filipinos, had exercised the right to vote
in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered voters for the
elections in 1951.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an answer
alleging that the petition states no cause of action.
o There is no adverse party against whom the petitioners have an actual or
justiciable controversy.

CFI: Declared petitioners to be Filipinos by blood.

Solicitor Generals contention:

No justiciable controversy no specific person was mentioned in the petition as

having or claiming an adverse interest in the matter and with whom the appellees
have an actual controversy.
Petitioners contention:

By virtue of the answer filed by the Solicitor General opposing the petition for
declaratory relief, a justiciable controversy thereby arose.
ISSUE: WON the petition for declaratory relief is proper. NO.
RATIO:
Requisites for a petition for declaratory relief:
1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse;

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

3)
4)

the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy;
and
the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.

Petitioners contention is incorrect. [See above]

Justiciable controversy is one involving " an active antagonistic assertion of

a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real,
and not a mere theoretical question or issue.
o There is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the alleged status of
the pettiioners as Filipino citizens had in any instance been questioned or
denied by any specific person or authority.
o As they have alleged, they have considered themselves and were considered
by their friends and neighbors as Filipino citizens, voted in the general
elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered voters for the elections of
1951, and it is not pretended that on any of said occasions their citizenship
was controverted.

It is wrong to say that an actual controversy arose after the filing by the Solicitor
General of an opposition to the petition, because the cause of action must be
made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition, without the aid of the
answer.

In essence, the petitioners merely wanted to remove all doubts in their

minds as to their citizenship, but an action for declaratory judgment cannot
be invoked solely to determine or try issues or to determine a moot, abstract
or theoretical question, or decide claims which are uncertain or
hypothetical.
o And the fact that their desires are thwarted by their "own doubts, or by fears
of others . . . does not confer a cause of action."
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and the petition
dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
3. TOLENTINO V. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY
GR No L-3062| 09/28/1951 | Bautista Angelo, J.
Plaintiff-appellant: Hilarion Tolentino (Tolentino)
Defendants-appellees: Board of Accountancy (BOA), Robert Orr Ferguson
(Ferguson), Hans Hausamann (Hausamann)
SUMMARY
Tolentino assailed the constitutionality of CA No. 342 on the ground that it is a class
legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in other callings or
professions from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the
practice of such callings or professions. The lower court dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff-appellant appealed. W/N plaintiff had sufficient cause of action NO. Tolentino
sought declaratory relief for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions
or callings, who are not parties to this case. This case, therefore, does not
properly come under rule 66 of the Rules of Court which authorizes the

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

institution of an action for declaratory relief. Further, the requisites for an action of
declaratory relief were lacking (see below). W/N Act is unconstitutional NO. While
said Act does not mention other professions, occupations or calling, it does not mean
that they are precluded from using a trade name as this privilege is likewise given to
them in other similar laws.
FACTS

Action for declaratory relief filed by plaintiff in the CFI-Manila

o Purpose: test the constitutionality of 16-A of Comm. Act (CA) No.
3105 (Phil. Accountancy Law), as amended by (a.a.b.) CA No. 342.
o Ground for unconstitutionality: it is a class legislation since by its
terms it excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions
from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with
the practice of such callings or professions
o BOA did not answer complaint, nor has the Solicitor General
intervened.
o Only Ferguson and Hausamann appeared and answered through
counsel.
o Atty. Claro M. Reco was allowed to intervene as amicus curiae in
favor of contitutionality
o Lower court dismissed complaint disputed law is not
unconstitutional. Plaintiff-appellant appealed to SC.

Facts as found by the lower court:

o Tolentino is a CPA duly admitted to the practice of accountancy as
per a certificate issued on March 15, 1948.
o BOA is an administrative body created by law and vested with the
power and authority to regulate and supervise the practice of the
profession of accountancy in the Philippines
o Ferguson (British) & Hausamann (Swiss) both admitted to the
practice of accountancy in the Phils.

Practiced profession as CPAs under the trade name

Fleming & Williamson
o Tolentino submitted that 16-A, CA No. 3105, a.a.b. CA No. 342
unconstitutional on the ground that it excludes persons engaged in
other callings and professions from adopting or acquiring or using a
trade name.
o Answer of defendants-appellees practically admitted the foregoing
allegations

16-A, CA No. 3105, a.a.b. CA No. 342 not a class

legislation, nor does it violate the provision of the
Constitution with respect to equal protection of the laws;
that the plaintiff has no right or interest adversely affected
by said law and that he is entitled to the benefits thereof
and may use a trade or name firm name in the practice of
his profession as accountant.

Fleming ^ Williamson old trade name of accountants ,

used originally in 1952 by Messrs. Fleming & Williamson;

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

the right to use the same was sold to various parties until
acquired by Ferguson & Hausamann in 1946.

June 10, 1946 defendants formed a co-partnership

under the trade name

Registered with the SEC

June 13, 1946 trade name registered with the B. of

Commerce

Sept. 17, 1948 partnership of defendants renewed

registration of the trade name
BOA did not appear or answer

ISSUE
1. WN plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question constitutionality of CA
No. 342 - NO
2. WN said Act is constitutional - YES
HELD: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs against the
appellants.
RATIO

TOLENTINO HAS NO SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION

o Tolentions main objection centers on the exclusive character of the
law which extends its benefits only to those engaged in the
profession of accountancy.
o SC: Tolentiono seeks the declaratory relief not for his own
personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an
accountant, or as an individual, are adversely affected, but rather for
the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or
callings, who are not parties to this case.
o He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him
or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the
disputed name by the defendants.
o His complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of
said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading and is
liable to defraud the public.
o Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable controversy against the
defendants which may give him the right to secure relief by asserting
the unconstitutionality of the law in question.
o This case, therefore, does not properly come under rule 66 of
the Rules of Court which authorizes the institution of an action
for declaratory relief.
o Requisites for an action of declaratory relief:

There must be a justiciable controversy

Controversy must be between persons whose interests

are adverse

The party seeking declaratory relief have a legal

interest in the controversy

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

The issue involved must be ripe for judicial

determination
o These requisites are wanting; thus, complaint must fail for lack of
sufficient cause of action.
CA NO. 342 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
o Granting for the sake of argument that plaintiff has established the
requisite facts to entitle him to claim for declaratory relief, we are,
however, of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 342 does not offend
against the equal protection clause of our Constitution on the ground of
class legislation, for the reason that said Act applies alike to all persons
pursuing the same calling or profession under the same conditions or
requirements.

Said Acts gives the right or affords the same privileges to

all accountants without distinction or discrimination. This
benefit is extended to the defendants as well as to the
plaintiff.

The only requirement is that they should comply with the

provisions of Act No. 3883 as to the procedure to be followed
relative to the use of the chosen trade name

So long as the law applies to all alike, the requirements of equal

protection are met.

The discriminations which are open to objections are those in

which persons engaged in the same business are subjected to
different privileges under the same conditions.

12 Am. Jur., 187: It is a general rule that legislation which

affects alike all persons pursuing the same business under the
same conditions is not such class legislation as is prohibited by
constitutional provisions. The discrimination which are open to
objection are those in which persons engaged in the same
business are subjected to different restrictions or are held
entitled to different privileges under the same conditions.

12 Am. Jur., 143: The general rule is well settled that legislation
which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its
application, if within the sphere of its operation its affects all
persons similarly situated, is not within the prohibition of the
14th Amendment. The mere fact that legislation is based on a
classification and is made to apply only to a certain limited
group of persons, and not to others, does not affect its validity, if
it is so made that all persons subject to its terms are treats alike
under similar circumstances and conditions.

16 CJS, 966: The legislature may classify professions,

occupations, and business, according to natural and reasonable
lines of distinction, and if a statute affects like all persons of the
same class it is not invalid as class legislation;
o It is not true that CA No. 342 precludes practitioners of other
professions, occupations or calling from using a trade name in
connection with the practice of their professions, occupation or
calling.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

o
o

While said Act does not mention other professions, occupations or

calling, it does not mean that they are precluded from using a trade
name as this privilege is likewise given to them in other similar
laws.
We may mention CA No. 294 for mechanical engineers, RANo. 318 for
chemical engineers, and even the corporation law as regards corporate
names.
Assuming that CA No. 342 grants accountants a privilege not accorded
to member s of other professions or calling, that alone would not render
the Act discriminatory or violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, for tat clause only means that no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.
And the Legislature may classify professions, occupations, and business
according to natural and reasonable lines of distinction, and if a statute
affects like all persons of the same class it is not invalid as a class
legislation
The claim that CA No. 342 is discriminatory because it was approved
only to protect foreign accountants has no basis in law or in fact, for there
is nothing that bears it out. Said Act applies to all accountants in
general without distinction.
The claim that said Act contravenes the principle of separation of powers
is likewise untenable. The Act does not encroach upon the powers of the
Executive Department as represented by the Board of Accountancy
simply because it attempts to regulate the profession of accountants. If
our legislature can create the Board of Accountancy, it can certainly
amend the law that gave life to it without in any way encrouching on the
prerogatives of the Executive Department of our government

4. EDADES V. EDADES
[No. L-8964. July 31, 1956]
Plaintiff and appellant: JUAN EDADES
Defendants and appellees SEVERINO EDADES, ET AL.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Bonto, J.
SUMMARY
Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan seeking a
declaratory judgment on his hereditary rights in the property of his alleged father and
incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades. The
court sustained the MTD holding that "An action for declaratory relief just for the
purpose of clearing away doubt, uncertainty, or insecurity to the plaintiff's status or
rights would seem to be improper and outside the purview of a declaratory relief.
Neither can it be availed of for the purpose of compelling recognition of such rights, if
disputed or objected to." W/N an action for declaratory relief is proper? YES. The
present action, though captioned as one for declaratory relief, is not merely aimed at

26

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

determining the hereditary right of the plaintiff to eventually preserve his right to the
property of his alleged father, but rather to establish his status as illegitimate child in
order that, should his father die, his right to inherit may, not be disputed, as at present,
by the other defendants who are the legitimate children of his father. Considering that
an illegitimate child other than natural is now given successional rights and there is
need to establish his status before such rights can be asserted and enforced. The
rules of procedure shall be liberally construed to promote their object and avoid an
expensive litigation (section 2, Rule 1), we hold that the present action may be
maintained in the light of the view herein expressed.
FACTS:

Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
seeking a declaratory judgment on his hereditary rights in the property of his
alleged father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son of
Emigdio Edades.
Plaintiffs allegations

He is an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades with Maria de Venecia, having been

born when said Emigdio Edades was legally married to Maxima Edades with
whom Emigdio had eight legitimate children;

He had always enjoyed the continuous and uninterrupted possession of the status
of illegitimate child by direct and positive acts of his father and of the legitimate
children of the latter;

As such illegitimate child he is entitled to share in the inheritance of his father

under the law;

And that as the legitimate children of his father will deny, as in fact they have
denied his right to inherit, and such denial may ripen into a costly litigation, he
brought the present action for the determination of his hereditary rights.
MTD

Motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.

The court sustained the motion holding that "An action for declaratory relief just
for the purpose of clearing away doubt, uncertainty, or insecurity to the
plaintiff's status or rights would seem to be improper and outside the
purview of a declaratory relief. Neither can it be availed of for the purpose of
compelling recognition of such rights, if disputed or objected to."

Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint, without costs. From the order of
dismissal, plaintiff has appealed and the case was certified to this court because
only questions of law are involved in the appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N an action for declaratory relief is proper? YES
RATIO:

Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is
interested "under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute or ordinance" in order to determine any question of

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute, or to declare his

rights or duties thereunder (section 1, Rule 66).
Moreover, the action should be predicated on the following conditions:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial determination. (Tolentino w.
Board of Accountancy)
The present case does not come within the purview of the law authorizing an
action for declaratory relief for it neither concerns a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or
validity of which is involved.
Nor is it predicated on any justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights
of inheritance which plaintiff desires to assert against the defendants as basis of
the relief he is seeking for have not yet accrued f or the simple reason that his
alleged father Emigdio Edades has not yet died.
In fact, he is one of the herein defendants. And the law is clear that "the rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent"
(Article 777, new Civil Code).
Up to that moment, the right to succession is merely speculative for, in the
meantime, the law may change, the will of the testator may vary, or the
circumstances may be modified to such an extent that he who expects to receive
property may be deprived of it.
Indeed, the moment of death is the determining point when an heir acquires a
definite right to the inheritance. This action therefore cannot be maintained if
considered strictly as one for declaratory relief.
But the present action, though captioned as one for declaratory relief, is not
merely aimed at determining the hereditary right of the plaintiff to eventually
preserve his right to the property of his alleged father, but rather to establish
his status as illegitimate child in order that, should his father die, his right to
inherit may, not be disputed, as at present, by the other defendants who are
the legitimate children of his father.
In fact, in paragraph 2 of complainant's prayer he asks that defendants be ordered
to recognize his status as illegitimate child with right to inherit. It is true that there
is no express provision in the new Civil Code which prescribe the step that may be
taken to establish such status as in case of a natural child who can bring an action
for recognition (Article 285), but this silence notwithstanding, we declare that a
similar action may be brought under similar circumstances considering that an
illegitimate child other than natural is now given successional rights and there is
need to establish his status before such rights can be asserted and enforced.
This right is impliedly recognized by Article 289 which permits the investigation of
the paternity or maternity of an illegitimate child in the same manner as in the case
of a natural child. Considering that the rules of procedure shall be liberally
construed to promote their object and avoid an expensive litigation (section
2, Rule 1), we hold that the present action may be maintained in the light of
the view herein expressed.

27

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Wherefore, the order appealed from is revoked. Thc case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings in connection with the determination of the alleged status of the
plaintiff as an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades, without pronouncements as to costs.
5. TANDA V. ALDAYA
Nos. L-932223| January 30, 1956 | Bautista Angelo, J.
Plaintiff-Appellant: Teodoro Tanda
Defendant-Appelle: Narciso Aldaya
SUMMARY:
Tanda instituted as action for the annulment of a certain contract of sale with pacto de
retro. Trial court ruled for Aldaya and upheld the validity of the contract. SC affirmed
the trial court. Tanda filed a case for declaratory relief because according to him (1)
The case comes under its purview because its purpose is to obtain a clarification of the
decision of the SC affirming the Trial court in the annulment case which in the opinion
of appellant, is vague and susceptible of double interpretation, and (2) The words
other written instrument should be interpreted as including a court decision
regardless of whether it is final in character or otherwise. The SC denied Tandas
petition ruling that a court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview
of the words other written instrument.
FACTS:
Annulment of Contract of Sale

Tanda instituted in the CFI of Cavite an action for the annulment of a certain
contract of sale with pacto de retro.

Trial court rendered a decision declaring the contract valid and absolving
Aldaya of the complaint.
o Motion to set aside judgment and a motion for new trial filed by
Tanda were denied by the trial court, so he appealed to the SC.

SC affirmed the decision appealed from particularly with regard to the

validity of the contract.
o Tandas 2 MRs were denied and the decision became final and
executory.
Declaratory Relief

Subsequently, Tanda initiated the present case for declaratory relief.

o Side comment from the SC --- Considering that this action is
purposeless because, while outwardly its aim is to seek a
declaratory relief on certain matters but in effect its purpose is to
nullify the judgment rendered in the annulment case which was
affirmed by the SC.

In the meantime, appellee moved to withdraw the original of Title No. 114 in
order that his ownership may be consolidated and a new title issued in his
name.

Trial court granted Aldayas motion to dismiss and allowed him to withdraw
the original title of the subject property in the annulment case.

CA certified the case to SC on purely questions of law.

Tandas arguments:

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

1.

2.

This case comes under its purview because its purpose is to obtain
a clarification of the decision of the SC affirming the Trial court in the
annulment case which in the opinion of appellant, is vague and
susceptible of double interpretation.
The words other written instrument should be interpreted as
including a court decision regardless of whether it is final in
character or otherwise.

ISSUE:
[None stated] W/N an action for declaratory relief is proper --- NO.

HELD:

Petition has NO MERIT.

Order appealed from AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. A court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the
words other written instrument

The Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or
doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the
expedient prescribed by Rule 66.

If a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact,

he may file with the trial court a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in
order that the defect may be corrected (Section 1, Rule 37).

The same remedy may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision of the
Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54, section 1, Rule
55, in connection with section 1, Rule 58).

A party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of
that remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1, Rule 38.

In the present case, the fundamental reason why the decision cannot be the
subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the principle of res judicata
which stamps the mark of finality on a case which has been fully and
definitely litigated in court.

Apparently, appellant has already availed of some of these legal remedies but
that he was denied relief because his claim was found unmeritorious.
2. Res judicata applies.

It avoids multiplicity of actions. It commands that once a case is definitely

litigated it should not be reopened.

The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once;
that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties, and those in privity with them in law or estate.
3. No contradiction or inconsistency in the courts pronouncement that the contract of
sale was valid.

28

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

It was licit for the parties to agree that the vendor should pay the purchaser
only P2,000 instead of P20,000 as price of repurchase regardless of the
currency received by the vendor. In this case the plaintiff, who is a fullpledged
lawyer and appeared below in his own behalf and filed the brief in this
instance, drew the deed of sale himself, according to the lower courts finding,
and the fixing of the ratio of ten to one between the Japanese war notes and
the Commonwealth money must have been his own idea and certainly was
for his own benefit. If the devaluation of the Japanese money bothered the
plaintiffs conscience, there was no law to prevent him from redeeming the
land for P20,000, or P15,000 which he admitted having received.
Where the judgment has become final and executory and no further step
need be taken affecting the equities of the parties, the evidence presented
therein may be withdrawn.

6. DE BORJA V. VILLADOLID
G.R. No. L-1897 | November 28, 1949
Plaintiff-appellant: JOSE DE BORJA
Defendant-appellee: DEOGRACIAS V. VILLADOLID, Director of Fisheries
Summary: This is a complaint for declaratory relief filed with the CFI of Manila
whereby plaintiff prayed the court to issue a declaratory judgment "declaring that the
plaintiff is not required by law to secure a commercial fishing boat license," for the
operation of his motor boats engaged in the transportation of fish. The defendant
required the plaintiff, as such fish peddler to procure a commercial fishing boat license.
Plaintiff refused on the ground that he is not so required by Act No. 4003 for the reason
that he "is not operating his motor boats for the purpose of catching fish." Court ruled
against plaintiff. It appears that plaintiff, upon learning of the defendants turning over
the case to the Fiscal, countered by filing this complaint for declaratory relief, but this
attitude of the plaintiff will only result in multiplicity of actions. The Rules of Court
provide that the action for declaratory relief must be brought "before there has been a
breach" of a contract or statute the construction of which is sought. There is nothing
left for the courts to adjudicate or construe regarding the legal rights, suites and status
of appellant in the premises. The law also does not require that there shall be an actual
pending case (like criminal case against plaintiff). It is sufficient that there is a breach
of the law, an actionable violation to bar a complaint for declaratory judgment.
FACTS:

This is a complaint for declaratory relief filed with the CFI of Manila whereby
plaintiff prayed the court to issue a declaratory judgment "declaring that the
plaintiff is not required by law to secure a commercial fishing boat license," for
the operation of his motor boats engaged in the transportation of fish.

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he "is a license fee fish peddler, having
paid the required license fee" to the office of Manila City Treasurer; that " as
such fish peddler" he "is the owner of two motor boats, with coastwise license
issued by the Bureau of Customs renewable every year; " that "said motor

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

boats are used by him solely and exclusively in connection with his business
of buying fish somewhere in Busuanga and other islands adjacent to the
coast of Palawan and in Lubang, Batangas, for the purpose of selling said fish
in Manila and that plaintiff has no intervention in the catching of fish, nor does
he participate, as partner or in any other capacity, in the catch of the
fishermen actually engaged in the catching of fish."
The defendant required the plaintiff, as such fish peddler, to procure a
commercial fishing boat license as owner and operator of said motor boats.
Plaintiff refused to secure such license as demanded by the defendant, on the
ground that he is not so required by section 18 of Act No. 4003, as amended
by CA No. 471, for the reason that he "is not operating his motor boats for the
purpose of catching fish."
A MTD the complaint was granted and MR having been denied, case was
brought here on appeal.

ISSUE: W/N complaint for declaratory relief filed by plaintiff should be given due
course in this Court NO
RATIO:

Court cited Sections 17 & 18 of Act No. 4003:

SEC. 17. License tax on operation of boat. Unless provided with a
license issued in accordance with this Act, no person, association
or corporation shall operate any vessel of more than three tons
gross for the purpose of catching fish in the territorial waters of the
Philippine Islands.
SEC. 18. Annual fee on operation of boat. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce is hereby empowered to issue to the
proper parties licenses for fishing operation of powered vessels of
more than three tons gross and sailing or rowed vessels of more
than three tons gross towed or operated in connection with power propelled vessels : Provided That failure of a licensee to secure a
renewal or extension of his license and pay the annual fee shall
subject him to a surcharge of 100% based on the amount of the
original fee, without prejudice to criminal proceedings against the
delinquent licensee under the penal provisions of this Act: Provided,
further, That all vessels less than three tons gross shall be licensed
: And provided, also, That the catching of fish under the license
issued shall be subject to the limitations, restrictions, and penalties
imposed by this Act.

The issue presented for our determination is whether or not the plaintiff, by
operating his motor boats for the purpose of transporting fish caught by other
persons in the places mentioned in the complaint, and of bringing them to
Manila for sale in the local market, is obliged to procure a commercial fishing
boat license as owner and operator of his motor boats engaged for said
purpose.

29

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

The Solicitor General relies on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of

Justice, that vessels engaged in the transportation of fish, although not
actually employed in the catching thereof, are, pursuant to Act No. 4003,
required to pay the commercial fishing boat license. We deem it unnecessary
to delve now on the applicability of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice
to the case at bar.
It appears that the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries demanded that plaintiff
pay the license provided in that Act and in view of the insistent refusal of
plaintiff to comply with such demand, he finally turned over the case to the
Office of the Fiscal of the City of Manila for appropriate action.
However, plaintiff, upon learning of the step taken by the director of the
Bureau of Fisheries, countered by filing this complaint for declaratory relief,
but this attitude of the plaintiff will only result in multiplicity of actions which
should always be invoked and the Rules of Court obviously seeks to prevent
when, in section 2 of Rule 66, it provides that the action for declaratory relief
must be brought "before there has been a breach" of a contract or statute the
construction of which is sought.
The facts in this case are so clear and unambiguous, that in the light of said
section 2 or Rule 66, there is nothing left for the courts to adjudicate or
construe regarding the legal rights, suites and status of appellant in the
premises. The general purpose of declaratory judgment act is to provide for
adjudication of the legal rights, duties, or status of the respective parties."
It is quite clear that if appellant is prosecuted and found criminally liable, then
the punishment prescribed by section 78 of the law, will be imposed upon
him; otherwise the charge will be dismissed. In either case, the action is, as
stated by the Solicitor General, terminated with finality.
It might be argued that no criminal action has as yet been presented. But the
law does not require that there shall be an actual pending case. It is sufficient
that there is a breach of the law, an actionable violation to bar a complaint for
declaratory judgment.
Evidently, appellant would have the courts to prejudice the impending criminal
action against him, without necessarily terminating the same.

HELD: The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila which dismissed the
complaint herein is hereby affirmed
7. ARANETA V. GATMAITAN
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191 | April 30, 1957
st
[1 case]
Petitioner: SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL.
Respondent: THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC., ET AL.
nd

[2 case]
Petitioner: EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL.
Respondent: SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL.
Ponente: J. Felix

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Summary: The President issued E.O 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel
Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general
clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that
the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects
of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and
void. CFI of Manila ruled in favor of the trawl operators. Now the Secretary is
contending that the Rules of Court does not empower a court of law to pass upon the
validity of an executive order in a declaratory relief proceeding.

More processes

The complainants filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of injunction
which was opposed by the Solicitor General (who acted as the representative of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries)
o Court issued an order denying Sol Gens motion to set aside judgment and
ordering them to file a bond of P30,000, as a condition for the non-issuance of
the injunction prayed for by complainants pending appeal.

And so the Sol Gen brought the matter to this SC in a petition for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction.
o On the same day it filed a notice to appeal from the order of the CFI.

The SC held that the court is allowed. There was already a case before, Hilado vs. De
la Costa, et al., which involves the constitutionality of another executive order
presented in an action for declaratory relief, on which the decision of the lower court
was also affirmed by the SC.

Sol Gens contention:

Case 1: Petition for prohibition and certiorari [dito ung part na important for SCA]

The Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries
contended among other things
o That the order of the judge requiring them to post a bond had been issued
without jurisdiction or with GADALEJ
o that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not empower a court of law to pass
upon the validity of an executive order in a declaratory relief proceeding
o that the Judge did not have the power to grant the injunction as Section 4 of
Rule 39 does not apply to declaratory relief proceedings but only to injunction,
receivership and patent accounting proceedings
Case 2: Appeal from CFIs decision

The lower court erred in ruling that the President has no authority to EOs 22, 66
and 80 banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay.

FACTS:

San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and
Camarines Sur is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side
of the Bicol region.

In 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this
region most for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay.

It was believed that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the
marine resources of that area. Thus, there arose a general clamor among the
majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in
San Miguel Bay.

A resolution were passed by the Municipal Mayors' League condemning the

operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie. In
another resolution the same League of Municipal Mayor, prayed the President to
protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of
trawls.

In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, EO 22

prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
o was amended by EO 66 allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon
season only.
o EO 80 revived EO 22. (EO 66 was superseded)

And so, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the CFI of Manila, praying that:
o a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from
enforcing said EO
o to declare the same null and void
o and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
CFI

Granted.
o Until, the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned
from San Miguel bay by executive proclamation.
o EOs 22 & 66 are void.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

ISSUES:
1. WON the constitutionality of an executive order can be ventilated in a declaratory
relief proceeding. YES. [main for SCA]
2. WON the EOs were valid, for the issuance was not in the exercise of legislative
powers unduly delegated to the Pres. YES.
RATIO:
#1 Declaratory Relief is proper

The SC had already taken cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the lower
court in the case of Hilado vs. De la Costa, et al., which involves the
constitutionality of another executive order presented in an action for declaratory
relief, which in effect accepted the propriety of such action.
#2 The EOs are valid

Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that:

o it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Philippines
o therefore there is a need to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devises
like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete the countrys supply of
seafood; and
o to that end authorized the Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide
regulations/ restrictions as he may deem necessary for this purpose.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its
legislative intent
As the Secretary is subject to the general supervision and control of the President,
he can exercise the same power and authority through EOs, regulations, decrees,
and proclamations, upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned.

8. MEJIA V. GABAYAN
Petitioner: Arturo Mejia (Mejia)
Respondents: Filomena Gabayan, Albin Rueme (Rueme), Ernesto Mejia (Ernesto),
Carlos Ramos (Ramos), Josefina Lacadin (Lacadin), Pedro Gavino (Gavino)
(collectively respondents)
*The facts of this case are convoluted, so please take note of the DAR Secretary Order
and RTC Orders. Read the summary for guidance.
SUMMARY
The gist of the factual milieu of the case points to Mejias relentless pursuit to drive the
respondents away from the subject property. Mejia hinges his rights to own the
property on an OCT. Respondents based their rights on Certs. of Land Transfer issued
by DAR. Mejia filed a petition with the DAR, but was denied. He appealed this
administrative case with the DAR. Instead of pursuing this appeal, he then filed a case
with the RTC for declaratory relief, praying that the property be exempt from PD 27,
pursuant to the Alita ruling promulgated by the SC. On 1/25/1995, RTC granted a
summary judgment in favor of Mejia. (The admin. Case went through various
departments within the DAR, but I will cut the path and go straight to the DAR
Secretary because that is important.) Meanwhile, DAR Secretary issued an Oder on
12/27/1996 (take note!), holding that only that portion of the property that petitioner is
personally cultivating shall be exempt from PD 27, and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over Mejias action. Mejia assailed this DAR Order in the SC, which
denied the same. In the civil case, RTC made an about-face, declaring that the
12/27/1996 DAR Sec. Order was valid. WN RTC can modify/alter its decision that has
become final and executory YES. As a GR, it is the trial courts ministerial duty to
order the execution of its orders. However, the Rules of Court provides an exception
that the RTC may amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice. Based on case law, an action for declaratory relief is
proper only if adequate relief is not available through other existing forms of
actions or proceedings. A petition for a declaratory relief cannot be made a
substitute for all existing remedies and should be used with caution. Relief is sui
generis, not designed to supplant existing remedies, and purely statutory in nature
and origin. A declaratory judgment does not create or change substantial rights
or modify any relationship or alter the character of controversies. Worse, the
RTC rendered judgment ordering the respondents to vacate the property and
restore possession thereof to the Mejia, notwithstanding case law that the

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

petitioner is not entitled to any award other than a declaration of all his rights
under PD No. 27, as amended, in light of the ruling of the Court in Alita. Case
dismissed.
FACTS

Mejia registered owner of a parcel of land in Sinamar, San Mateo, Isabela

(10.400 hectares; TCT No. 75164 issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) of
Isabela on 7/3/1974)
o Lot is a portion of a large tract of land covered by a homestead
patent granted by the President of the Philippines to Dalmacio Mejia
(Dalmacio) in 1936, on the basis of which OCT No. T-4184 was
issued by the RD of Isabela.

8/13/1978 Phil. President, through the Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary,

issued Certs. Of Land Transfer (CLT) over portions of the property covered by
TCT 75164 to the respondents.

Certificates were filed with the RD. Upon learning of the certificate issuances,
Mejia filed a petition with the DAR in 1983 for their cancellation. But no
action was taken on said petition.

Meantime: case Altia v. CA (Alta) was promulgated, wherein it was held that
properties covered by homestead patents were not covered by Pres. Decree
No. 27

5/10/1993 Mejia filed a petition with DAR for the exclusion of the property
from PD 27 (docketed as Admin. Case No. A-0204-0001)

8/26/1993 Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order

recommending denial of the petition. Mejia appealed this to the DAR Regional
Director

6/20/1994 Instead of pursuing his appeal in Admin. Case A-0204-0001,

Mejia took advantage of the ruling in Alita and filed a complaint on June 20,
1994 in the RTC-Isabela against respondents for declaratory relief and for
recovery of the lot covered by TCT 75164 with damages and plea for
injunctive relief. (docket: Civil Case No. 768)

Complaint allegations:
o Lot originally owned by Mejias father, Dalmacio, to whome a
homestead patent was granted by the Phil. President; based on the
patent, OCT T-4148 was issued by the RD; respondents were
agricultural tenants on the property; the land was not covered by
PD 27 based on Alita; and demands to vacate the lot were made on
respondents, who refused to do so, claiming security of tenure as
agricultural tenants therein.
o Prayer: that the trial court declare the property as not covered by PD
27 and other related law; that he be declared entitled to possession
thereof; and the respondents be evicted therefrom;
o His plea for injunctive relief was denied by the trial court

Answer to complaint respondents averred:

o That there was a pending petition with the DAR filed by Mejia for the
xclusion of the property from the coverage of PD 27; that the action
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court because the dispute

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

between the parties is agrarian and, as such, within the original

exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR and Adjudication Board (DARAB);
and that, as evidenced by the CLTs issued in their favor, they were
beneficiaries of the land reform laws.
Prayer: dismissal of complaint. They appended to their answer a
copy of the petition for exclusion filed by Mejia with the DAR and the
CLTS issued by DAR in their favor

Pre-trial:
o Respondents alleged that they had acquired all the rights and
privileges enjoyed under PD 27 and could not be deprived thereof by
RA 6657 (Comp. Agrarian Reform Law of 1998); Mejias action was
barred by his pending petition with DAR; the court had no jurisdiction
over the action; and Mejia was guilty of forum shopping
1/25/1995 RTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of Mejia that it had
jurisdiction over his action for declaratory relief and that the lot was not
covered by PD 27 in light of the Alita ruling. Respondents appealed to the CA
5/23/1995 meantime, DAR Regional Director issued an Order granted
Mejias petition exempting his property from the CARProgram, but ordered
him to allow the respondent-tenants to remain in possession of the lot and to
execute Leasehold Contracts in their favor in accordance with RA 3844
(Agricultural Land Reform Code)
o Mejia appealed this Oder to the DAR Secretary
5/17/1996 CA Resolution: dismissed respondents appeal for failure to file
their appellants brief within the period required. Entry of judgment: 7/10/1996.
Thereafter, CA remanded the records to the RTC for execution of its decision
12/27/1996 DAR Secretarys Order: affirmed the DAR Reg. Dir.s
Resolution with modifications:
o (inter alia) only that portion of the property that petitioner is
personally cultivating shall be exempt from PD 27 and RA 6658
o Cancelled CLTs by the previous Order shall be re-issued (this time
as CLOAs since subject landholding is not covered by PD 27),
except those within the landowners area which shall be under the
leasehold system
o DAR Secretary ruled: RTC had no jurisdiction over Mejias action
o Mejia filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, assailing the
12/27/1996 Order of the DAR Secretary SC dismissed petition
on 3/17/1997; appropriate remedy was a petition for review with the
CA; this became final and executory on 4/24/1997
Despite the 12/27/1996 DAR Secretary Oder becoming final and
th
executory, Mejia filed a motion (in Civil Case 768; 7 bullet above) for
the issuance of a writ of execution.
o RTC issued writ of execution; Sheriff, with policemen, placed
bamboo poles with red flags on the 4 corners of the lot
o Ambot Rueme, on of respondent Rueme removed the poles; Sheriff
placed ples anew; Mejia, however, failed to take possession of the
lot

Chief of the DAR Legal Division issued a status quo order because of the
conflicting RTC and DAR Secretary rulings; requested the PNP to implement
it
Mejia filed a petition for contempt against Ambot Rueme which the RTC
granted. Majia was placed in actual possession of the property
But, respondents counsel ordered them to reenter property, claiming that
RTC decision was null and void.
o Mejia filed a petition for contempt against respondents and counsel
RTC issued TRO, ordering them not to harvest palay from the
property
o 3/2/1998 respondents file petition against Mejia with the DAR to
enjoin him from entering the lot, and for DAR to implement the
12/27/1996 DAR Order.
o 6/2/1998 Meantime, RTC found respondents and counsel in
contempt of court. They sought reconsideration and filed a petition
with the CA for nullification of the RTC decision in Civil Case 768, on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the action, the dispute
being an agrarian one.
o 8/25/1998 CA dismissed this because their appeal from the RTC
decision in Civil Case No. 768 has previously been dismissed due to
their failure to file their briefs

Respondents MR of the Resolution was likewise denied by

the CA. The failed to appeal the resolutions of the Court;
entry of judgment made on 12/4/1998
o Meantime, sheriff again placed poles; but respondents drove Mejia
away; contempt case filed again (Hay. Kapagod.)
10/22/1998 Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
decision in DARAB Case dismissing petition for the implementation of
the 12/27/1996 DAR Sec. Order. PARAD: that Order was null and void.
12/15/1998 filed an Omnibus Motion with the RTC (reiterating what he wants)
Parallel development: Director of the DAR Legal Assistance Office Order of
Finality of DAR Order dated 12/27/1996
3/31/1999 Mejia filed an Urgent Motion to Implement Writ of Execution and
All Orders of the Court; prayed to be placed in possession of the property;
and that the Order citing respondents in contempt be enforced
6/30/1999 Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer invited Mejia to attend a field
investigation to implement the 12/27/1996 DAR Secretary Order, giving him
an opportunity to choose his retained area.
3/6/2001 RTC made a complete about-face. Assailed RTC Order:
holding in abeyance the resolution of Mejias pending motions. (the
resolution of the Motion to Execute the order of this Court dated June 2, 1998
and the Omnibus Motion of the plaintiff are held in abeyance)
o Ruled that the 12/27/1996 DAR Sec. Order was valid, and that its
Decision vis--vis the same Order could not be fully
implemented.
o MR was denied. Mejia assailed these Orders. Progress!!!

ISSUE

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

1.
2.

3.

WN RTC can motu proprio amend/modify its 1/25/1995 Decision after the
same had already been duly executed? YES
WN RTC can hold in abeyance the execution of tis 6/2/1998 Order holding
contemners in contempt of court, which has long become final and executor?
st
YES (issues 1 &2 explained under 1 ratio)
WN RTC can hold in abeyance the accounting by respondents (defendants)
of the palay they harvested on the property in litigation? NO, RTC has no
jurisdiction.

HELD: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO

RTC can amend/modify its Decision

o GR: it is the ministerial duty of the court to order the execution of its
final judgment
o EXC: Rule 135, Section 5(g) of the Rules of Court provides that the
trial court may amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice. It has the inherent power
to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
offices, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto
o It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.
o The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the enforcement
of its decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its
rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the
record.
o In another case, the Court held that an execution would ordinarily be
stayed pending the termination of the proceedings connected with
the principal case.
o Here, the RTC ruled that it did not amend its decision but
merely harmonized it with the December 27, 1996 Order of the
DAR Secretary and suspended its enforcement until after the
said order shall have been implemented.
o Assailed Orders of the RTC in accord with case law.

SC agrees with the RTC finding that Mejia deliberatele

concealed his petition, then pending with the DAR, for the
exclusion of the property from PD 27. RTC became aware
of the pending petition during the RTC proceedings.

In fact, RTC new of the pending DAR case as early as

1983, but RTC turned a blind eye to the respondents
pleadings. RTC should have dismissed petitioners
complaint. Petitioner should have exhausted all admin.
remedies before coming to court.
o Based on case law, an action for declaratory relief is proper only
if adequate relief is not available through other existing forms
of actions or proceedings.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

A petition for a declaratory relief cannot be made a

substitute for all existing remedies and should be used
with caution.

Relief by declaratory judgment is sui generis and not

strictly legal or equitable yet its historical affinity is
equitable.

The remedy is not designed to supplant existing remedies.

The remedy is purely statutory in nature and origin.

A declaratory judgment does not create or change

substantial rights or modify any relationship or alter
the character of controversies.

Worse, the RTC rendered judgment ordering the

respondents to vacate the property and restore
possession thereof to the petitioner, notwithstanding
case law that the petitioner is not entitled to any award
other than a declaration of all his rights under PD No.
27, as amended, in light of the ruling of the Court in Alita.

1996 DAR Sec. Order had become final and executor

whent this Court denied due course to the petition filed by
Mejia assailing said Order on the ground that the correct
remedy was to file a petition for review in the CA.

Tshe RTC cannot enforce its decision and ignore the 1996
Order of the DAR Secretary, especially so in light of the
ruling of this Court in Paris v. Alfeche

Held: Right to retain an area of 7 hectares (has.) is

not absolute. It is premised on the condition that
the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be
retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity
of the law.

From the pleadings of the parties, the respondents had

been in actual possession of the property and
cultivated the same as agricultural tenants long before
the Mejia filed his complaint in the RTC.

SC ruled in Paris v. Alfeche] that, under the circumstances,

the only right of the petitioner is to retain 5 has. of the
subject property, in accordance with 6 RA No. 6657
Petitioners cannot be evicted from property.
o Mejia cannot find solace in the PARAD decision dated 10/22/1998,
which held that the 1996 DAR Sec. Order was null and void
o FIRST. Mejia himself acknowledged DRAs jurisdiction over his
petition for exemption of the property from PD 27. The petitioner
cannot invoke the authority of the DAR to grant him relief and at the
same time disavow the same authority without running afoul of the
doctrine of estoppel.
o SECOND. The petition for exemption was filed by Mejia in 1993
before the aforequoted Rule of the DARAB was promulgated.

Under PD No. 946, Section 12, as amended by RA No.

6657, matters involving administrative implementation of
the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under PD 27

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

o
o

and amendatory decrees, orders, rules and regulations,

shall be exclusively cognizable by the DAR Secretary, and
that the decision of DAR Secretary may be appealed to the
Philippine President.

I his complaint before the RTC, Mejia sought the

declaration of his right in light of the ruling of the Alita ruling
inclusive of his right of retention and of the right of the
respondents to a home lot, as well as the consequent
issuance, recall and cancellation of CLTs except in cases
where the tenant-farmer failed to pay the amortization for
the landholding. The matters raised by Mejia and the
reliefs prayed for by him were within the authority of
the DAR Secretary to delve into and resolve.
In fine, RTC had no jurisdiction over Mejias complaint for the
declaration of his rights under RA No. 6657 and its precursors,
inclusive of the issue of whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a
retention area and, if so, how big an area is he entitled to.
Such matters are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary to delve into and resolve.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction on the action of the
petitioner, its decision and the writs of execution issued by it
are null and void.

9. CUTARAN V. DENR
G.R. No. 134958
January 31, 2001
PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL, petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein
represented by SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and GUILLERMO S.
FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community Special Task Force on Ancestral
Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio City, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

SUMMARY
In 1990 the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special
Order no. 3 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification,
evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative
Region".
The relatives of herein petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral
land claim (CALC) over the land they, respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay
Reservation. Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet
been issued by the DENR in favor of the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength
of certain documents issued by the DENR, tried to acquire possession of the land they
applied for, including the portion occupied by herein petitioners. Hence, this petition
for prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals to enjoin the respondent
DENR from implementing the assailed administrative issuances and from processing
the application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of
Carantes on the ground that the said administrative issuances are void for lack of legal

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

basis. W/N the DENR Special Order no. 25, series of 1993 and its implementing rules
DAO no. 02 are valid? YES, no justiciable controversy yet. From a reading of the
records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely filed. Under the undisputed
facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition
should have been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground. As the undisputed
facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between the petitioners and the
respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners'
asserted right to possess the land by reason by the implementation of the
questioned administrative issuances.

Case: Petition for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on March
25, 1998 and the order dated August 5, 1998, a petition for prohibition originally filed
with the appellate court to enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing DENR
Special Order Nos. 31, as amended by 31-A and 31-B, series of 1990, Special Order
No. 25, series of 1993 and all other administrative issuances relative thereto, for
having been issued without prior legislative authority.

FACTS:

In 1990 the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special
Order no. 3 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance,
identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera
Administrative Region".

The special task force created thereunder was authorized to accept and evaluate
and delineate ancestral and claims within the said area, and after due evaluation
of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles (Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim)
in accordance with existing laws.

On January 15, 1993 the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no.
25 entitled "Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community
environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and
recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide" and Department Administrative
Order no. 02 containing the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order
no. 25.

In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein
petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC)
over the land they, respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation.

In 1996, the applications were denied by the DENR Community Special Task
Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to
which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of Baguio City.

Also pursuant to the assailed administrative issuances the Heirs of Apeng

Carantes filed an application for certification of ancestral land claim over a parcel
of land also within Camp John Hay and overlapping some portions of the land
occupied by the petitioners.
Petitioners allegations:

Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet been
issued by the DENR in favor of the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength of

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

certain documents issued by the DENR, tried to acquire possession of the land
they applied for, including the portion occupied by herein petitioners.
Petitioners also allege that the heirs of Carantes removed some of the
improvements they introduced within the area they actually occupy and if not for
the petitioner's timely resistance to such intrusions, the petitioners would have
been totally evicted therefrom.
Hence, this petition for prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals to
enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing the assailed administrative
issuances and from processing the application for certificate of ancestral land
claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes on the ground that the said
administrative issuances are void for lack of legal basis.
The Court of Appeals held that the assailed DENR Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A,
31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the National
Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and
effect "for pre-empting legislative prerogative" but sustained the validity of DENR
Special Order No. 25, and its implementing rules (DAO No. 02, series of 1993) by
the appellate court on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers
5
delegated to the DENR under section 13 of RA 7586.

Present case

The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review of the appellate court's
decision on the ground that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of
Special Order No. 25 and its implementing rules.

The petitioners seek to enjoin the respondent DENR from processing the
application for certificate of ancestral land claim filed by the Heirs of Carantes.
Petitioners contend that in addition to the failure of the DENR to publish the
assailed administrative issuances in a newspaper of general circulation prior to its
implementation, RA 7586, which provides for the creation of a National Integrated
Protected Areas System, does not contain the slightest implication of a grant of
authority to the DENR to adjudicate or confer title over lands occupied by
indigenous communities.

It is contended that the said law only grants DENR administrative and managerial
powers over designated national and natural parks called "protected areas"
wherein rare and endangered species of plants and animals inhabit.
ISSUE:
W/N the DENR Special Order no. 25, series of 1993 and its implementing rules DAO
no. 02 are valid? YES, no justiciable controversy yet.

"Section 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights over Them. Ancestral lands and customary rights and interest
arising therefrom shall be accorded due recognition. The DENR shall prescribe rules and regulations to govern
ancestral lands within protected areas: Provided, that the DENR shall have no power to evict indigenous
communities from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their consent: Provided,
however, that all rules and regulations, whether adversely affecting said communities or not, shall be subjected
to notice and hearing to be participated in by members of concerned indigenous community."

35

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

RATIO:

The petitioners' main contention is that the assailed administrative orders were
issued beyond the jurisdiction or power of the DENR secretary under the NIPAS
Act of 1992. They seek to enjoin the respondents from processing the application
for ancestral land claim filed by the heirs of Carantes because if approved, the
petitioners may be evicted from the portion of the land they occupy which overlaps
the land applied for by the Carantes heirs.

From a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely
filed. Under the undisputed facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the
court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate
court on this ground.

We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioners'
memorandum that the alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim
(CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed DENR special orders has
not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued.

The DENR is still processing the application of the heirs of Carantes for a
certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or may not grant.

It is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing
claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to possess a common
portion of a piece of land.

As the undisputed facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between the

petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation
of the petitioners' asserted right to possess the land by reason by the
implementation of the questioned administrative issuances.

A justiciable controversy has been defined as, "a definite and concrete dispute
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest" which may
be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.

Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as
a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases,
advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot.

Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving
the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or
performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person
contesting its validity.

This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners' speculation that the DENR will
approve the application of the heirs of Carantes.

There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently
cause injury to the alleged right of the petitioner to possess the land before the
jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked.

There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the
heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.

The petitioners' allegation that certain documents from the DENR were shown to
them by the heirs of Carantes to justify eviction is vague, and it would appear that
the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent DENR or its officers
authorized the attempted eviction.

Suffice it to say that by the petitioners own admission that the respondents are still
processing and have not approved the application of the heirs of Carantes, the

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent
danger of being violated, as the DENR may or may not approve Carantes'
application.
Until such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted
from the premises at some future time.
If indeed the heirs of Carantes are trying to enter the land and disturbing the
petitioners possession thereof even without prior approval by the DENR of the
claim of the heirs of Carantes, the case is simply one for forcible entry.
10. SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK

G.R. No. 94723| August 21, 1997 | Torres, Jr., J.

Petitioners: Karen E. Salvacion, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and
Natural Guardian, and Spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion
Respondents: Central Bank of the Philippines, China Banking Corporation and Greg
Bartelli y Northcott
SUMMARY:
Karen Salvacion was detained for four days and raped by Greg Bartelli (American
tourist) once for the first day, and 3 times each in the next succeeding three days.
Policemen rescued Karen and Bartelli was arrested and charged with Serious Illegal
Detention and 4 counts of Rape. On the day assigned for hearing of Bartellis bail, he
escaped from prison. Karens parents filed an action for damages. RTC rules for the
petitioners. However, respondents Central Bank and Chinabank prevented them from
recovering their claims due the enforcement of RA 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Depostis
Law) and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar
deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body, whatsoever. Hence, petitioners filed this petition for declaratory
relief to restrain respondents from enforcing the said laws. SC held that (1) Petitioner
deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for
declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to
require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution. (2) In case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.
FACTS:

Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner

Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment.
o She was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza
Fair, an American approached her. He sat beside her when he
talked to her. He then invited her to go with him to his house where
she could teach Pilipino to his niece in his house at Kalayaan
Ave. He even gave her a stuffed toy.
o Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door, got
a piece of cotton cord and tied Karens hands with it, and then he
undressed her. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed
posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could
come out because there were tapes on her mouth.
o She was raped 3 times each day for the next 3 days.
Policemen and people living nearby rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was
arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail.
Greg Bartelli was charged with Serious Illegal Detention and four (4)
counts of Rape.
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Makati a claim for damages with
preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli.
The day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartellis petition for bail, he
escaped from jail. A Warrant of Arrest and a Hold Departure Order was
issued.
RTC (action for damages case) ruled for petitioners and issued a writ
of preliminary attachment.
The Deputy Sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking
Corporation.
o China Banking Corporation invoked RA 1405 (Secrecy of Bank
Depostis Law) and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg
Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.
Counsel for petitioners inquired from the Central Bank if there are any
exceptions to Section 113 or if it has been repealed.
o Central Bank replied saying the laws are in absolute force and
there are no exceptions the reason being that the purpose of the
law is to encourage dollar accounts within the countrys banking
system which would help in the development of the economy.
The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law.
Meanwhile, RTC (action for damages) ruled for petitioners because
Greg Bartelli was in default for his failure to answer the complaint.
o Bartelli was orders to pay P500,000.00 as moral
damages; P150,000.00 each for Karens parents; exemplary
damages of P100,000.00; attorneys fees, litigation costs.
Hence this petition for declaratory relief praying for the following reliefs:
1. Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued
restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;
2. After hearing, judgment be rendered:
a. Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners
and respondents;
b. Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 as contrary to the provision of the Constitution,
hence void; because its provision that Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order to process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

i. has taken away the right of petitioners to have

the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y
Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment
rendered in petitioners favor in violation of
substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution;
ii. has given foreign currency depositors an
undue favor or a class privilege in violation of
the equal protection clause of the
Constitution;
iii. has provided a safe haven for criminals like
the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott since criminals could escape civil
liability for their wrongful acts by merely
converting their money to a foreign currency
and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit
account with an authorized bank.
ISSUES:
1. May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original
jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? --- YES
2. Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A.
6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient? --- NO
HELD:

Petition is PARTLY MERITORIOUS.

The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to
be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.

Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution

and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli
y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
RATIO:
1. Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief.

Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But
this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a
petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the
writ of execution

This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized.

Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions
that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.
2. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was
indoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which
could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could
make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once
when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano
University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because
the school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened
to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case.
The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli.
This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience.

11. ALLIED BROADCASTING V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 91500 | October 18, 1990
Petitioner: ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC.
Respondents:
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
TRANSPORTATION
AND
COMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

DEPARTMENT
OF
and
NATIONAL

SUMMARY: This is a petition for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of PD No.

576-A with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction. In January 1960, RA 3001 was passed granting ABC to operate
its broadcasting stations. ABC subsequently established 10 radio stations. In
November 1974, PD 576-A was passed delineating and restricting radio station
ownership. It basically regulated ABCs ownership of some of its stations. One of the
laws provisions is that a broadcasting station should only own one radio station per
municipality or city. This made ABC lose 7 of its radio stations. ABC complained
alleging that the law is arbitrary. SC dismissed the petition. The petition seeks a
declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of PD No. 576-A. As such, it must be
treated as one seeking declaratory relief which action should be brought before the
RTC and not before the Supreme Court. A petition for declaratory relief is not among
the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions
of law are involved. Also, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law
sought to be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under the law.
Petitioner does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a
violation. There is, likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been
confiscated or shut down. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in
the context of a specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his
rights.
FACTS:

This is a petition for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 576-A

with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction.

On January 1960, RA No. 3001 was passed granting petitioner the permit or
franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the
Philippines which the petitioner was able to do, operating 10 radio
6
broadcasting stations all over the country. Through said broadcasting
stations, petitioner was able to provide adequate public service which enabled
the government to reach the population on important public issues, and assist
the government in programs relating to public information and education.

Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001, petitioner's franchise or permit

"shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of the
Philippines when the public interest so requires . ..."

On November 1974, PD No. 576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The

Ownership And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations And For Other
Purposes" was issued. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide:
Sec. 3. No person or corporation may own, operate, or manage more than
one radio or television station in one municipality or city; nor more than five
AM and FM radio stations; nor more than five television channels in the
entire country, and no radio or television station shall be utilized by any
single-interest group to disseminate information or otherwise influence the
public or the government to serve or support the ends of such group.
Sec. 4. Any person or corporation which owns more than the number of
radio or television stations authorized in the preceding section shall divest
itself of the excess stations or channels. Any excess station shall be sold
through the Board of Communications.
Sec. 5. Failure to divest as provided in the foregoing section shall, in addition
to the penalties provided in Section 6, subject the person or corporation
guilty of such failure to cancellation of the franchise of every excess station
and to confiscation of the station and its facilities without compensation.
Sec. 6. All franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates or other forms
of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting systems shall
Its radio stations have never been used for the broadcasting of obscene or indecent language or
speech, or for the disseminati on of misleading information or willful misrepresentation, or to the
detriment of the public health, or to incite, encourage or assist in subversion or treasonable acts.
6

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

terminate on December 31, 1981. Thereafter, irrespective of any franchise,

grant, license, permit, certificate or other forms of authority to operate
granted by any office, agency or person, no radio or television station shall
be authorized to operate without the authority of the Board of
Communications and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications or
their successors who have the right and authority to assign to qualified
parties frequencies, channels or other means of Identifying broadcast
systems; Provided, however, that any conflict over, or disagreement with, a
decision of the aforementioned authorities may be appealed finally to the
Office of the President .
Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all franchises, grants, licenses,
permits, certificates, or other forms of authority to operate radio or television
broadcasting systems/stations, including the franchise or permit of petitioner
under Republic Act No. 3001, have been deemed terminated or revoked
effective December 31, 1981.
Thus, petitioner is left with only 3 radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod
City and Roxas City.
Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it great and irreparable
damage, because (a) it divested petitioner of its franchise without due
process of law and forced it to divest itself of some of its radio stations; (b) it
deprived petitioner of its right to further construct, maintain and operate radio
broadcasting stations in other cities or municipalities of the country; 2 (c) it
deprived petitioner of its right to avail of loan facilities or renew its existing
loan availments from any bank or financial institution in order to expand and
continue the operation of its radio broadcasting business; and (d) petitioner
suffered loss of income.

ISSUE: W/N PD No. 576-A is unconstitutional and null and void ab initio NO
RATIO:

The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of PD

No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one seeking declaratory relief under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be brought before the
RTC and not before the Supreme Court. A petition for declaratory relief is not
among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even
if only questions of law are involved. Thus, present petition should be
dismissed on this score.

Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to

be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized
number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the
restrictions under the law. Petitioner does not also allege that it had been
penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is,
likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been
confiscated or shut down.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a

specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All
that petitioner seeks is the nullification of PD No. 576-A and the reinstatement
of its rights under RA No. 3001.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to
determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." The power
of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide case or
controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.
Petitioner alleges that it used to maintain and operate at least ten (10) radio
broadcasting stations but pursuant to the cited sections of the law it divested
itself of the "excess stations" thus leaving it with three (3) radio stations.
Petitioner did not allege that it challenged the constitutionality of the decree at
any time since it took effect. It does not appear that petitioner's compliance
was made under protest.
In view of its acquiescence with PD No. 576-A, the petitioner is now estopped
from challenging the same under the principle of estoppel that "one who
sleeps on his rights shall not be heard to complain."
The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be treated as a petition for
prohibition does not place petitioner in any better position. The petition cannot
be considered as one for prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit further
proceedings being conducted by any tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising judicial or ministerial functions.
In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to prohibit any proceeding
being conducted by public respondent which adversely affects its interest.
Petitioner does not claim that it has a pending application for a broadcast
license which is about to be denied. Apparently, what petitioner seeks to
prohibit is the possible denial of an application it may make to operate radio
or television stations on the basis of the restrictions imposed. Obviously, the
petition is premature.
Petitioner prays for reinstatement of its rights under its original franchise.
Reinstatement is an affirmative remedy and cannot be secured through a writ
of prohibition which is essentially a preventive and not a corrective remedy. It
cannot correct an act that is a fait accompli.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

RULE 64: Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the

Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders
or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. (n)
Section 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as
hereinafter provided. (n; Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
Section 3. Time to file petition. The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if
allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial. (n)
Section 4. Docket and other lawful fees. Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner
shall pay to the clerk of court the docket and other lawful fees and deposit the amount
of P500.00 for costs. (n)
Section 5. Form and contents of petition. The petition shall be verified and filed in
eighteen (18) legible copies. The petition shall name the aggrieved party as petitioner
and shall join as respondents the Commission concerned and the person or persons
interested in sustaining the judgment, final order or resolution a quo. The petition shall
state the facts with certainty, present clearly the issues involved, set forth the grounds
and brief arguments relied upon for review, and pray for judgment annulling or
modifying the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. Findings of fact of the
Commission supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-reviewable.
The petition shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true
copy of the judgment, final order or resolution subject thereof, together with certified
true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other
documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The requisite number of copies of the
petition shall contain plain copies of all documents attached to the original copy of said
petition.
The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the
period fixed herein, and shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

Section 6. Order to comment. If the Supreme Court finds the petition sufficient in
form and substance, it shall order the respondents to file their comments on the
petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof; otherwise, the Court may dismiss the
petition outright. The Court may also dismiss the petition if it was filed manifestly for
delay or the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings. (n)
Section 7. Comments of respondents. The comments of the respondents shall be
filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. The original shall be accompanied by certified true
copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein together with
other supporting papers. The requisite number of copies of the comments shall contain
plain copies of all documents attached to the original and a copy thereof shall be
served on the petitioner.
No other pleading may be filed by any party unless required or allowed by the Court.
(n)
Section 8. Effect of filing. The filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the
execution of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, unless the
Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. (n)
Section 9. Submission for decision. Unless the Court sets the case for oral
argument, or requires the parties to submit memoranda, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision upon the filing of the comments on the petition, or of such other
pleadings or papers as may be required or allowed, or the expiration of the period to
do so. (n)
1. Aratuc v. Comelec (JM)
G.R. Nos. L-49705-09 and L-49717-21 | February 8, 1979
st

[1 case]
Petitioners: TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED
TAMULA, MANGONTAWAR GURO and BONIFACIO LEGASPI
Respondents: COMELEC, REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII
(Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH DIMAPORO, JESUS AMPARO, ANACLETO
BADOY, et al.
nd

[2 case]
Petitioner: LINANG MANDANGAN
Respondents: COMELEC, REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII
(Central Mindanao), & ERNESTO ROLDAN
Ponente: J. Barredo

The petition shall further be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof on the
Commission concerned and on the adverse party, and of the timely payment of docket
and other lawful fees.
The failure of petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (n)

40

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Summary: [Sori guys, magulo talaga yung case. Eto lang ang naintindihan ko.]
Aratuc et al, and Mandangan filed a separate Petition for certiorari with restraining
order and preliminary injunction against the decision of Comelec resolving their appeal
from the Regional Board of Canvasses for Region XII regarding the canvass of the
results of the election in said region for representatives to the Interim Batasang

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Pambansa held on April 7, 1978. Aratuc et al questioned the alleged dubious canvass
being undertaken by the Board in Cotabato city, which according to them did not
observe the issued guidelines by the SC in an earlier order. Mandangan, on the other
hand, is a candidate for representative in the same election in that region, who also
filed a petition to review the decision of the Comelec declaring Ernesto Roldan as
entitled to be proclaimed as one of the 8 winners in said election.
The SC held that the petition for certiorari is not proper. It differentiated review and
certiorari. A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment
while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist
even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies an indifferent
disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent
considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effects of
an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, there are matters that
by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain
officers or entities, reserving it to the SC to insure the faithful observance of due
process only in cases of patent arbitrariness. Therefore, the certiorari jurisdiction of the
SC over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and
should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process. In the case at bar, Comelec did not act wantonly and
arbitrarily or without any rational basis. If there are errors in any of those conclusions,
they are errors of judgment which are not reviewable in certiorari.
FACTS:
st
1 case

Tomatic Aratuc, et al. (6 independent candidates for representatives to the Interim

Batasang Pambansa who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya
ng Bayan which was not registered as a political party or group) sought the
suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board Of
Canvassers for Region XII (BOARD) in Cotabato city.

A supervening panel headed by Comelec Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted

of their complaints of the alleged irregularities in the election records in all the
voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the whole City of Marawi, 8
towns of Lanao del Norte, 7 towns in Maguindanao, 10 towns in North Cotabato,
and 11 towns in Sultan Kudarat by reason for which, they ask that the returns from
said voting centers be excluded from the canvass.

Before hearing, the canvass was suspended but thereafter, Comelec lifted its
order of suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in
Manila. The said order was appealed to the SC, and after hearing the parties, the
SC allowed the resumption of the canvass but issued guidelines to be observed,
which was subsequently modified.

The Board proceeded with the canvass, with Aratuc, et. al. presenting objections.
Notwithstanding, Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the
voting.

Aratuc et al brought the resolution of the Board to the Comelec. Hearing was held
after which the case was declared submitted for decision. However the Comelec
issued a resolution stating that in order to enable the Commission to decide the
appeal properly:

41

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

it will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and
registration records, and in the case of voting centers whose voting and
registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to
decide to open the ballot boxes; and
o to interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested
persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place, as well
as those of the military authorities in the areas affected.

After requiring the parties to file their respective comments, the Comelec rendered
its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the
canvass.
nd
2 case

Linang Mandangan, on the other hand, is a candidate for representative in the

same election in that region, who also filed a petition for certiorari with
restraining order and preliminary injunction regarding the decision of the
Comelec declaring Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed as one of the 8
winners in said election.
Aratuc et als contentions:

Comelec committed GADALEJ because of the ff:

1. In not pursuing the examination of the registration records and voting records
from the other voting centers after it found proof of massive substitute voting
in all of the voting records and registration records examined by Comelec and
NBI experts;
2. In including in the canvass returns from the voting centers whose book of
voters and voting records could not be recovered by the Commission in spite
of its repeated efforts to retrieve said records;
3. In not excluding from the canvass returns from voting centers showing a very
high percentage of voting and in not considering that high percentage of
voting, coupled with massive substitution of voters is proof of manufacturing
of election returns;
4. In denying petitioners' petition for the opening of the ballot boxes from voting
centers whose records are not available for examination to determine whether
or not there had been voting in said voting centers;
5. In not identifying the ballot boxes that had no padlocks and especially those
that were found to be empty while they were shipped to Manila pursuant to
the directive of the Commission in compliance with the guidelines of the SC;
6. In not excluding from the canvass returns where the results of examination of
the voting records and registration records show that the thumbprints of the
voters did not correspond to those of the registered voters;
7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of chairmen and members of the
voting centers, municipal treasurers and other election officials in the voting
centers where irregularities had been committed and not giving credence to
the affidavits of watchers of petitioners;
8. In not including among those questioned before the Board those included
among the returns questioned by them in their Memorandum filed with the
Commission which the Supreme Court said in its Guidelines should be
considered by the Board in the course of the canvass.
Mandangans contentions:

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Comelec erred in applying Diaz vs. Comelec instead of that of Bashier vs.
Comelec
Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied Mandangan due process

ISSUES:
3. WON the petition for certiorari is proper. NO. [main for SCA]
4. WON the contentions of the petitioners are with merit. NO.
RATIO:
#1 What is the nature and extent of the SCs power of review [MAIN]

The Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on the ground that Comelec committed
GADALEJ in 8 specifications. The Mandangan petition raises pure questions of
law and jurisdiction.
o Both petitions invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate
authority of review.

While under the 1935 Constitution, "the decisions, orders and rulings of Comelec
shall be subject to review by the SC" and pursuant to the Rules of Court, the
petition for "certiorari or review" shall be on the ground that Comelec "has decided
a question of substance not determined by the SC, or has decided it in a way not
in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the SC", the 1973 Constitution
provides somewhat differently.
o "Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari, even if Comelec shall "be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of
the National Assembly and elective provincial and city official.

Correspondingly, the Election Code of 1978, which is the first legislative

construction of the pertinent constitutional provisions, makes Comelec also the
"sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies" and further provides that "any of
its decisions, orders or rulings (in such contoversies) shall be final and executory",
just as in election contests, "the decision of the Commission shall be final, and
executory and inappealable."

It is evident that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of
the Comelec as the independent constitutional body charged with the
safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections.
o The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite
knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the SC".

Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the modified pertinent

constitutional provision is to the effect that the actuations of the Commission are
final, executory and even inappealable. While such construction does not exclude
the general certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it correspondingly
narrows down the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to
undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from
review.
o A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment.

While certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which

may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous.

42

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice,

an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without
rational deliberation.

While the effects of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an
indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that by their nature
ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain
officers or entities, reserving it to the SC to insure the faithful observance
of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.
Therefore, the certiorari jurisdiction of the SC over orders, and decisions of
the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial
denial of due process. It is in this light that the SC oppose the contentions
of the parties in this cases.

#2 The contentions are without merit [not important. siguro pag nagtanong n lang si
sir]
Aratuc case

In summary, Comelec did not act wantonly and arbitrarily or without any rational
basis, in drawing its conclusions adverse to petitioners' position. If there are errors
in any of those conclusions, they are errors of judgment which are not reviewable
in certiorari, so long as they are founded on substantial evidence.
Mandangan case
1. The Diaz and Bashier rulings are not mutually exclusive of each other. Whether
they will be applied together or separately depends on the situation on hand. In
the factual milieu of the instant case as found by the Comelec, the SC sees no
cogent reason, and Mandangan has not shown any, why returns in voting centers
showing that the votes of the candidate obtaining highest number of votes of the
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes exceeds the highest possible
number of valid votes cast therein should not be deemed as spurious and
manufactured just because the total number of excess votes in said voting centers
were not more than 40 %.
2. In regard to the jurisdictional and due process issue raised, it should be noted that
under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Comelec shall have
direct control and supervision on over the board of canvassers. The authority of
Comelec in reviewing does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by
any specific provision of law, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provision of Section 168. And in
administrative law, a superior body or office having supervision and control over
another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.

DECISION: Petition dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

2. Dario v. Mison (RS)
176 SCRA 84 (1989) | Sarmiento, J.
G.R. No.s 81954, 81967, 82023, 83737, 85310, 85335, 86241

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

*7 petitions; there are numerous parties; Sorry if the digest is long; please read the
summary for guidance
SUMMARY
Pursuant to EOs issued by Pres. Corazon Aquino and the new Constitution, BOC
Commissioner Mison sent notices of separation to various BOC officials and
employees. These officials/employees sought recourse with the Civil Service
Commission, which ruled for their reinstatement. BOC Commissioner sought a
reconsideration of this Resolution, which was denied. He then went to the SC on
certiorari to question the CSC decisions. Meanwhile, BOC employee-petitioners
question before the SC Misons authority to dismiss them. SC rules in favor of the BOC
officials/employees in regard to their reinstatement. With respect to whether
Commissioner Mison could validly file a certiorari case with the SC to question CSCs
decisions, the SC says that judgment of the Commission (CSC) may be brought to
the SC through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules. The SC affirms the
Aratuc ruling, which held that [i]t is once evident from these constitutional and
statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate
the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body
charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The
framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge
of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission
"subject to review by the Supreme Court'. SC observes that there is no
fundamental difference between the CSC and Commission on Elections (the latter is
relevant to Rule 64).
FACTS

3/25/1986 Pres. Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3

(Adoption of a Provisional Constitution; basically provided for a reorganization
of the government)

Various Eos and directives that Aquino enacted:

o EO 17 (5/28/1986) set forth grounds for separation replacement of
personnel
o EO 127 (1/30/1987) reorganized the Finance Ministry, including
the Bureau of Customs
o New Constitution (2/2/1987)

1/6/1988 incumbent Comm. Of Customs (COC) Salvador Mison issued a

Memorandum, providing for guidelines on the implementation of Eos,
specifically the procedure in personnel placement
o He also sent notices to several Customs officials, informing them of
their termination; 310 people were listed as recipients of this notice
(see original; Dario was one of the numerous recipients/parties in
this case)

Records reveal that 394 officials/employees of the BOCustoms (BOC) were

given notices of separation; a number of them sought reinstatement with the
Reorganization Appeals Boards while the others went to the CSC; the first 31
in the 310 listed in the case came directly to the SC.

6/30/1988 CSC Resolution ordered reinstatement of 279 employees in GR

85310

43

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

7/15/1988 Commissioner Mison, represented by the OSG, filed an

MR, which was denied by the CSC

10/20/88 Mison filed a certiorari case with the SC (GR 85310)

11/16/88 CSC Resolution CSC further reinstated 5 more employees

o 1/6/1989 Mison challenged this in the SC (GR 86241)

6/10/88 RA 6656 (act to protect the security of tenure of civil service

officers/employees in the implementation of govt reorganization) - 7 states
that illegally separated employees shall be reinstated/reappointed without
loss of seniority rights and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of
separation.

6/23/1988 Amasa and Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by Mison

petitioned the SC to contest the validity of the statute (GR 83737)

10/21/1988 35 more Customs officials ordered reinstated by the CSC filed

their own petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to comply with
CSC order (GR 85335)

A summary of the petitions follows:

GR 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335

Dario (GR 81954) was 1 of the Deputy Commissioners of the BOC until his
dismissal from service by Mison. He contends that Mison could not have
7
legally invoked 59 of EO 127 to dismiss him.
o Avers that he could not have been legally deemed to be an
"incumbent whose position is not included therein or who is not
reappointed" to justify his separation from the service.

Like Dario, Feria (GR 81967) was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau until
his separation directed by Commissioner Mison. Like Dario, he claims that he
has acquired security of tenure and that he is not covered by 59 of EO 127,
having been appointed during the effectivity of the Provisional Constitution.
o

SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and
employees of the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective
duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the
meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17
(1986) or Article III of the Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be approved and
prescribed by the Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this
Executive Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose
positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated
from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to
which they may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be
paid the equivalent of one month basic salary for every year of service, or the equivalent
nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received but in no
case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order to enjoin the separation/replacement of any officer or employee effected under this
Executive Order

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Petitioners in GR 82023, collectors and examiners in venous ports of the

Philippines, say, on the other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to
end corruption at the BOC and that since there is no finding that they are
guilty of corruption, they cannot be validly dismissed from the service.
GR 85310 AND 86241

Commissioners twin petitions are direct challenges to 3 rulings of the CSC:

o 6/30/1988 Resolution reinstating 265 customs employees
o 9/20/1988 Resolution denying reconsideration
o 11/16/1988 Resolution reinstating 5 employees
CSC RULING

Reorganizations occur where there has been a reduction in personnel or

redundancy of functions; there is no showing that the reorganization in
question has been carried out for either purpose on the contrary, the
dismissals now disputed were carried out by mere service of notices

The current Customs reorganization has not been made according to

Malacaang guidelines; information on file with the Commission shows that
Commissioner Mison has been appointing unqualified personnel
8

Jose v. Arroyo, relied upon by Mison in validating Executive Order No. 127,
did not countenance illegal removals; RA 6656 protects security of tenure in
the course of reorganizations
ISSUE
What is the nature and extent of this government reorganization?
HELD

CSC Resolutions dated 6/30/1988, 9/20/1988 and 11/16/1988 involved in

GR Nos. 85310, 85335 and 86241, and 5/8/1989 involved in GR 85310 are
affirmed
Petitions in GR Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023 and 85335 (BOC employeepetitioners) are granted.
Petitions in GR Nos. 83737, 85310 and 86241 (Amasa, Dionisio and
Commissioner Misons petitions) are dismissed.
Commissioner of Customs is ordered to reinstate the employees separated
as a result of his notices dated 1/26/1988
Employees whom Mison may have appointed as replacements are ordered to
vacate their posts

Jose v. Arroyo: The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of the
provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service employees security of
tenure overlooks the provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which
explicitly authorize the removal of career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result
of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution." By virtue of said provision, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even
after the ratification of the Constitution, and career civil service employees may be separated
from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization.

44

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

RATIO
JUDGMENT OF THE COMMISSION MAY BE BROUGHT TO THE SC BY CERTIORARI ALONE

The urgings in GR 85335 and 85310 that the 6/30/1988 CSC Resolution had
attained a character of finality for failure of Mison to seasonably apply for
judicial review or ask for reconsideration under PD 807, or under RA 6656, or
under the Constitution are likewise rejected.
o Records show that BOC had until 7/15/1988 to ask for
reconsideration or come to this Court pursuant to 39 of PD 807.
o SolGen also filed an MR on 7/15/1988.
o The CSC issued its Resolution denying reconsideration on
9/20/1988; a copy of this Resolution was received by the Bureau on
9/23/1988
o Hence, the Bureau had until 10/23/1988 to elevate the matter on
certiorari to this Court.
o Since the Bureaus petition was filed on 10/20/1988, it was filed on
time.

(Note: This, I think, is the only important part of the case vis--vis Rule
64)
o Contentions that the Bureaus petition (in GR 85310) raises no
jurisdictional questions, and is thus bereft of basis as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are rejected.
o Questions raised in Misons petition (in GR 85310) are proper for
certiorari if, by jurisdictional questions, the SC means questions
having to do with an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness
and caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a
decision arrived at without rational deliberation, as distinguished
from questions that required digging into the merits and unearthing
errors od judgment which is the office, on the other hand, of review
under Rule 45 of the said Rules.
o CSCs act of reinstating Customs employees has implications not
only on the entire reorganization process decreed no less than by
the Provisional Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in
general; these implications are of such magnitude that it cannot be
said that the CSC committed a plain error of judgment that Aratuc
says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or
ay special civil action.
o SC affirms the teaching of Aratuc as regards recourse to this Court
with respect to rulings of the CSC which is that judgment of the
Commission (CSC) may be brought to the SC through certiorari
alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules.
o Aratuc: It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory
modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and
invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the
independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding
of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new
Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of
what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court'. And

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the

Commission's actuations be instead 'brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change
the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope
of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.
o SC: No fundamental difference between the Commission on
Elections and the Civil Service Commission (or the Commission
on Audit for that matter) in terms of the constitutional intent to
leave the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws
relative to elections, with respect to the former, and the civil
service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of government
accounts, with respect to the Commission on Audit).

It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973
Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari," which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically
connotes something less than saying that the same 'shall be subject to review
by the Supreme Court, which in turn suggests an appeal by petition for
review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from
the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.

While RA 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are "final and
executory" and hence, unappealable, under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in
the absence of an appeal.

Accordingly, SC accepted Misons petition (G.R. No. 85310), which clearly

charges the CSC with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari,
although it may not have so stated in explicit terms.

SC reiterates that it has been filed seasonably. SolGen had 30 days from
9/23/1988 (the date the CSC Resolution of 9/20/1988, denying
reconsideration,
was
received)
to
commence
the
instant certiorari proceedings.
o Under the Constitution, an aggrieved party has 30 days within which
to challenge "any decision, order, or ruling" of the Commission. To
say that the period should be counted from the Solicitor's receipt of
the main Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should
not have asked for reconsideration But to say that is to deny him the
right to contest (by a motion for reconsideration) any ruling, other
than the main decision, when, precisely, the Constitution gives him
such a right. Hence, we must reckon the thirty-day period from
receipt of the order of denial
SCS RULING ON THE SEPARATION OF BOC EMPLOYEES

Fundamental Principles of Reorganization

o Removals versus separations arising from abolition of office (not by
virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by
reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions.

Separations: Govt is obliged to prove good faith

Removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit

constitutional mandates: Govt is not hard put to prove

45

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution

allows it.
9
o Question is whether or not 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Govt to remove career
public officials it could have validly done under an automatic
vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.

Since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by

provisions of automatic vacancies. SC takes the silence
of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint
upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a
moment's notice.
Nature, Extent and Limitations of Reorganization under the 1987
Constitution; Jose v. Arroyo clarified
o Did Arroyo extend the effects of reorganization under the
revolutionary Charter to the era of the new (1987) Constitution?
o The opinion expressed therein that "by virtue of said provision the
reorganization of the BOC under EO 127 may continue even after
the ratification of this constitution and career civil service employees
may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such
reorganization" is in the nature of an obiter dictum.
o Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma-Fernandez (which held
that after February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have
acquired security of tenure) is a full-blown decision. While a
resolution of the Court is no less forceful than a decision, the latter
has a special weight.
o Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose v.
Arroyo was promulgated on August 11, 1987 while PalmaFernandez was decided on August 31, 1987.) A later judgment
supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency.
o Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-Fernandez (or
Esguerra)
o Based on the foregoing, reorganization under the aegis of the
1987 Constitution is not as stern as reorganization under the
prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's

Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but
as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be
entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing
to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation.
In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation,
tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.
Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

46

subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same

cannot be said of the reorganization inferred under the new
Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks to usher
in a democratic regime
o While the former Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the
present Constitution requires that removals "not for cause"
must be as a result of reorganization. The 1987 Constitution
does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass
the test of good faith a test not obviously required under the
revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but a test wellestablished in democratic societies and in this government
under a democratic Charter.
o Therefore, when Arroyo permitted a reorganization under EO
127
after
the
ratification
of
the
1987
Constitution, Arroyo permitted a reorganization provided that it
is done in good faith.
o GR: a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that
event, no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist.
o Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a
constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case.
Lack of good faith in the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs
o There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have
been made or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that
matter at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed
office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire
employees.
o There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the
sense of reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a
revamp of personnel pure and simple.
o SC did not strike down EO 127 for repugnancy to the Constitution.
While the act is valid, the means with which it was implemented is
not.
Specific case of EO 127
o With respect to EO 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under
59 thereof, "those incumbents whose positions are not included
therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from
the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel
have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated.
o The Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of
EO 39, under which the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint
all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President."
o Thus, with respect to Dario and Feria, Commissioner Mison
could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential
appointees.
o Also, 59 has been rendered inoperative according to our holding
inPalma-Fernandez.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Summary of SC statements:
o The President could have validly removed government employees,
elected or appointed, without cause but only before the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987; in this connection, 59
(on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127
cannot be a basis for termination;
o In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and
retirement benefits or upon their option be given reemployment
opportunities
o From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to
reorganize the Government resulting in the separation of career civil
service employees, provided, that such a reorganization is made in
good faith.

3. Garces v. CA (RT)
G.R. No. 114795 July 17, 1996
Petitioner: LUCITA Q. GARCES
Respondents: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR EMPEYNADO
and CLAUDIO CONCEPCION
SUMMARY
Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del
Norte. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion who, in
turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Concepcion, however, refused to
transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces, on the other hand, was directed by
the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she
was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial
Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in
Gutalac as the same is not vacant. Garces was directed by the same Office of
Assistant Director to defer her assumption of the Gutalac post. Meanwhile, since
respondent Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en
banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy. Garces filed before the RTC a petition
for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages
against Empeynado and Concepcion, among others. Meantime, the COMELEC en
banc through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988, resolved to recognize respondent
Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac, and ordered that the appointments of
Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled. I: 1. Is petitioner's action
for mandamus proper? NO. 2. Is this case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme
Court? RTC. 1. Mandamus will not lie as this remedy applies only where petitioner's
right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. It will not issue to give him
something to which he is not clearly and conclusively entitled. Considering that
Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position and exercises the
corresponding functions therefor, the proper remedy should have been quo
warranto and not mandamus. 2. Cognizable by the RTC. The settled rule is that
"decision, rulings, order" of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving "elective regional, provincial, and city

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

officials." The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can
this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga
del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar
Claudio Concepcion who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Correspondingly approved by the Civil Service Commission, both appointments
were to take effect upon assumption of office.
Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it.
Garces, on the other hand, was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for
Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a
Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador
Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as the same is not
vacant.
On February 24, 1987, Garces was directed by the same Office of Assistant Director
to defer her assumption of the Gutalac post.
On April 15, 1987, she received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service
Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of
polling booths.
It was addressed "Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte"
which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order.
Meanwhile, since respondent Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office,
the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
On February 26, 1988, Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against
Empeynado and Concepcion, among others.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988,
resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of
Gutalac, and ordered that the appointments of Garces to Gutalac and of
Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled.
In view thereof, respondent Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition
for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic by the said
COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under
Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
The RTC, thereafter, dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1)
that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the "cases" or "matters" referred
under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
On appeal, respondent CA affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the case. Hence, this
petition
ISSUES:
1. Is petitioner's action for mandamus proper? NO.
2. Is this case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme Court? RTC.

On the first issue, Garces claims that she has a clear legal right to the Gutalac post
which was deemed vacated at the time of her appointment and qualification. Garces
insists that the vacancy was created by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution.
On the contrary, Concepcion posits that he did not vacate his Gutalac post as he did
not accept the transfer to Liloy.
10
Article III Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution did not require any cause for
removal of an appointive official under the 1973 Constitution.
The transition period from the old to the new Constitution envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy; hence the government is not hard put to prove anything plainly and simply
because the Constitution allows it.
Mere appointment and qualification of the successor removes an incumbent from his
post.
Nevertheless, the government in an act of auto-limitation and to prevent
indiscriminate dismissal of government personnel issued on May 28, 1986,
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17.
This executive order, which applies in this case as it was passed prior to the
issuance of Concepcion's transfer order, enumerates five grounds for separation or
replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized under Article III, Section 2
of the Provisional Constitution, to wit:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil
Service Law;
2. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the
service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by petitioner when
respondent Concepcion was transferred from Gutalac to Liloy.
More, Concepcion was transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior
appointment.
If the transfer was made without the consent of the official concerned, it is
tantamount to removal without valid cause contrary to the fundamental guarantee on
non-removal except for cause.
Concepcion's transfer thus becomes legally infirm and without effect for he was not
validly terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete
because he did not accept it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, it is indispensable
to complete an appointment.
Corollarily, Concepcion's post in Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic precept
in the law of public officers that "no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is
for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant.

10

RATIO:
1. Mandamus is NOT proper.

47

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in the office
until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. (Emphasis
supplied).

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

 There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be

legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated before one could be validly
installed to succeed him.
Further, Garces' appointment was ordered to be deferred by the COMELEC. The
deferment order, we note, was not unequivocably lifted. Worse, her appointment to
Gutalac was even cancelled by the COMELEC en banc.
These factors negate Garces' claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right to the
Gutalac post. On the contrary, her right to the said office is manifestly doubtful and
highly questionable.
As correctly ruled by respondent court, mandamus, which petitioner filed below,
will not lie as this remedy applies only where petitioner's right is founded
clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.
It will not issue to give him something to which he is not clearly and conclusively
entitled.
Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position and
exercises the corresponding functions therefor, the proper remedy should have
been quo warranto and not mandamus.
Quo warranto tests the title to one's office claimed by another and has as its object
the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to enforce clear
legal duties and not to try disputed titles.
2. Cognizable by the RTC.
The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent Empeynado contending
that this is a "case" or "matter" cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution.
The COMELEC resolution cancelling the appointment of Garces as Election
Registrar of Gutalac, he argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the
Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of
11
an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
The contention is without merit. This provision is inapplicable as there was no
case or matter filed before the COMELEC.
On the contrary, it was the COMELEC's resolution that triggered this controversy.
The "case" or "matter" referred to by the constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute.
The settled rule is that "decision, rulings, order" of the COMELEC that may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that
relate
to
the
COMELEC's
exercise
of
itsadjudicatory or quasijudicial powers involving "elective regional, provincial, and city officials."
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC's choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational
set-up of an agency.
11

Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the supreme court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this
matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions
that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power
to exercise original jurisdiction over "all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
over of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial orquasi-judicial
functions."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED without
prejudice to the filing of the proper action with the appropriate body.

4. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC (MB)

Petitioner: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
Respondent: Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000
Panganiban, J.
SUMMARY:
ABS-CBN filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
a Comelec en banc Resolution which issued a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or
any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys for the
May 1998 elections. The SC issued a TRO prayed for by ABS-CBN and ordered
Comelec to cease and desist from the implementation of the Resolution. ABS-CBN
now raises the issue that Comelec acted with GADALEJ in the issuance of the prior
Resolution. SolGen argues that the issue is moot and that the case is premature
because ABS-CBN failed to file an MR. SC held that:
(1) The procedural requirement that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed
before resorting to the special civil action of certiorari may be glossed over to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social
justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is
the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
(2) Where not only is time of the essence but transcendental constitutional issues are
involved, direct resort to the Supreme Court through a special civil action for
certiorari is justified.
(3) [Non-SCA issue] The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results
through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of
the press. Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean,
honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls -- properly
conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of electionfixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the
Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of
exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our
people.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

FACTS:

This case is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing a Comelec en banc Resolution which issued a restraining order to
stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting exit surveys.

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon information from a
reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR
groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit
survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcast
immediately.

The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

On May 9, 1998, SC issued a TRO prayed for by ABS-CBN.

o Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued
pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUES:
ABS-CBN posits the issue:
Whether or not the Comelec acted with GADALEJ when it approved the
issuance of a restraining order enjoining ABS-CBN or any other group, its
agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the May 11
elections.
SolGen argues:
1. Mootness
2. [SCA issue] Prematurity, because of petitioner's failure to exhaust available
remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
HELD:

Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the

Court on May 9, 1998 is made PERMANENT.

Assailed Minute Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc is hereby

NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
1.

Procedural Issues: Mootness and Prematurity

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred
specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's
fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding
of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its
very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of
the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future
elections.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

2.

The procedural requirement that a motion for reconsideration must first be

filed before resorting to the special civil action of certiorari may be glossed
over:
(1) to prevent a miscarriage of justice
(2) when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of
labor
(3) when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or
(4) when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.
Where not only is time of the essence but transcendental constitutional issues
are involved, direct resort to the Supreme Court through a special civil action
for certiorari is justified.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on
April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the
petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the
circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a
reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998
elections.

Validity of Conducting Exit Polls:

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals

or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of
an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have
voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results
of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to
give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or
organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not
been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls.
A. Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press:
o The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our
democratic government. It is a preferred right and, therefore,
stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties.
o Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.
o Gonzales v. Comelec --- at the very least, free speech and a free
press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without prior restraint.
B. Limitations:
o The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an
absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. They
are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its police
power.
o Cabansag v. Fernandez --- two theoretical tests in determining the
validity of restrictions to such freedoms:

Clear and present danger rule --- that the evil consequence
of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high' before the

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

C.

D.

50

utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded

against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented.

Dangerous tendency rule --- if the words uttered create a

dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that
some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons
to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if
the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance
be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent.
Justification for a Restriction:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Comelec Ban on Exit Polling:
o In the case at bar, the Comelecs arguments are purely speculative
and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the
interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the
results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the
general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second,
the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group
as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on
the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake
here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are
exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The
holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the
latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
o The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be
justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of
communication to gather the type of information obtained through
exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable
ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or
minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit
surveys.
o For its part, Petitioner ABS-CBN explains its survey methodology as
follows: (1) communities are randomly selected in each province; (2)
residences to be polled in such communities are also chosen at
random; (3) only individuals who have already voted, as shown by
the indelible ink on their fingers, are interviewed; (4) the interviewers
use no cameras of any sort; (5) the poll results are released to the
[49]
public only on the day after the elections. These precautions,

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

E.

together with the possible measures earlier stated, may be

undertaken to abate the Comelec's fear, without consequently and
unjustifiably stilling the people's voice.
Violation of Ballot Secrecy:
o In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually
exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted
for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to
reveal their identities.

5. Repol v. COMELEC (LL)

G.R. No. 161418 | April 28, 2004
Petitioner: NOEL Y. REPOL
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VIOLETO CERACAS
Summary: Repol and Ceracas were candidates for Municipal Mayor in Pagsanghan,
Samar. Ceracas was proclaimed mayor but Repol filed an election protest claiming
that fraud and other irregularities marred the elections. COMELEC directed RTC to
conduct revision of ballots after reversing RTC order of dismissing the election protest
case. New trial ensued and Repol was proclaimed as mayor to which a writ of
execution was issued. During the pendency of Ceracass appeal with the COMELEC
and without waiting for the RTC to resolve his omnibus motion, Ceracas filed with the
COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari. COMELEC division issued assailed Order directing
the parties to maintain the status quo ante in the interest of justice and so as not to
render the issues moot and academic. SC ruled that COMELEC is not empowered to
issue a status quo ante which in effect overturned the effective enforcement of the writ
of execution issued by trial court and suspending indefinitely, without prior notice and
hearing, the implementation of such writ. Since the COMELEC First Division issued the
interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC First Division should resolve Repols MR of
the Order. The circumstances however justify the propriety of assailing the order
through certiorari. The Order, which actually took the form of a TRO, violated rule that
such will only had lifespan of 20 days. Also, the grant of execution pending appeal was
well within the discretionary powers of the trial court.
FACTS:

Repol and private respondent Violeto Ceracas ("Ceracas") were candidates

for Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar in the 14 May 2001 elections.
Ceracas was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor with 66 votes more than
Repol.

Repol filed an election protest (Election Case No. T-001) before the RTC of
Tarangnan, Samar claiming that fraud and other irregularities marred the
elections in three precincts. Repol prayed for revision of the ballots in these
precincts. Judge Francisco Mazo dismissed the election protest.

On certiorari, the COMELEC First Division reversed the dismissal order of

Judge Mazo in a Resolution "for being issued with GAD tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction" and directed the trial court "to reinstate the subject election

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

protest and conduct the revision of ballots from the protested precincts." This
was affirmed by COMELEC en banc.
This time around, trial and revision of the ballots ensued with Judge Navidad
presiding. The trial court declared proclaimed Repol the duly elected mayor.
Thus:
o After a very careful study and meticulous and painstaking appraisal
of the contested ballots, cheating and commission of various
frauds and irregularities in three contested precincts was massive
o .. Use of some ballots as shuttles [lanzadera], by which device, the
ballots of the voters who are not skilled in the act of writing or whose
fidelity to party is in doubt is illegally written out for them by others.
o Sisters in law of the Protestee were illegally at the table of the BEI
Chairman controlling the voting process and demanding that some
voters be allowed to vote as illiterates
o Handwriting of one person in some of the ballots in one precinct are
also found in the other two precincts. Also, ballots had unnecessary
decorations serving to easily identify his vote.
Trial court granted Repols motion and issued a writ of execution. Meanwhile,
Ceracas appealed the trial courts judgment to the COMELEC.
Repol took his oath of office as the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan,
Samar. On the same date, Ceracas filed before the trial court an omnibus
motion to reconsider, set aside and quash the writ of execution.
During the pendency of Ceracass appeal with the COMELEC and without
waiting for the trial court to resolve his motion, Ceracas filed with the
COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari (with prayer for temporary restraining
order, writ of preliminary injunction and/or status quo ante) assailing the writ
of execution (SPR No. 1-2004)
On January 12, 2004, COMELEC First Division issued the assailed Order
(Order) directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante. The Order
reads in part:
o In the interest of justice and so as not to render the issues moot and
academic, the Comelec (First Division) hereby directs the parties to
maintain the STATUS QUO ANTE, which is the condition prevailing
before the issuance and implementation of the questioned Order (for
writ of execution)
o Accordingly, effective immediately, private respondent Noel Repol, is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from assuming the duties and
functions of Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Western Samar until
further orders from this Commission. In the meantime, petitioner
Violeto Ceracas shall assume the post of Municipal Mayor of
Pagsanghan, Western Samar.
Repol filed this Petition for Certiorari in SC alleging that COMELEC First
Division committed GAD in issuing the Order.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMELEC IS EMPOWERED UNDER ANY STATUTE,

RULE, OR JURISPRUDENCE TO ISSUE A STATUS QUO ANTE IN EFFECT
OVERTURNING THE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION

51

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND SUSPENDING INDEFINITELY, WITHOUT

PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH WRIT NO
RATIO:

Repol argues that the COMELEC First Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the status quo ante Order which indefinitely suspended
and effectively nullified the trial courts writ of execution.

Repol contends that the COMELEC First Division has no authority to issue
the Order after the trial court found the election in the protested precincts
marred by fraud and after the trial court considered meritorious the grounds
cited by Repol in his motion for execution pending appeal. The law, rule and
jurisprudence limit the COMELECs power to issue temporary restraining
orders to a non-extendible period of 20 days from the date of issuance.

Ceracas agrees with Repol that the rules do not expressly grant to the
COMELEC the power to issue status quo ante orders. However, Ceracas
argues that the COMELECs power to issue TROs and preliminary injunctions
necessarily includes the power to issue status quo ante orders.

OSG prays that the Court dismiss the instant petition. The OSG asserts that
Repol cannot challenge before this Court by way of a petition for certiorari an
interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division without first filing a motion
for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc.
Remedy to Assail Interlocutory Orders of the COMELEC in Division

Where the COMELEC in division allegedly committed grave abuse of

discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an
interlocutory order, the applicable rule is Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993
12
COMELEC Rules of Procedure

The 12 January 2004 Order did not dispose of the case completely as there is
something more to be done. Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental
issue and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave
something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits.

Since the COMELEC First Division issued the interlocutory Order of 12

January 2004, the same COMELEC First Division should resolve Repols
motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party is
neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC
en banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under COMELEC rules, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for
reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be
elevated to the COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is that an order is
final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case. But if there is
something more to be done in the case after its issuance, that order is
interlocutory.

Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved
by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which shall be
resolved by the division which issued the order.
12

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the
COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be
decided by the COMELEC en banc
Clearly, the assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory, should first be
resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the
13
instances over which the COMELEC en banc can take cognizance of the
case asprovided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither is this
case one where a division is not authorized to act nor a case where the
members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the issue to the
COMELEC en banc. Thus, the COMELEC en banc is not even the proper
forum where Repol may bring the assailed interlocutory Order for resolution.
Repol went directly to the SC from an interlocutory order of the COMELEC
First Division. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the
power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, which
mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to
abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition. BUT this is not an ironclad rule.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC: Procedural requirement
[of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or
the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside
is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available. An exception was warranted
under the peculiar circumstances of the case since there was hardly enough
opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in
time for the 11 May 1998 elections.
The same can be said in Repols case. We rule that direct resort to this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari is justified under the circumstances
obtaining in the present case.

Validity of the Status Quo Ante Order

The main issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the COMELEC First
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the status quo ante Order which effectively overturned
the trial courts grant of execution pending appeal in Repols favor.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: The Commission shall sit
en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a
majority of the members of the Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not
authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the Members of a Division, an
interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred
to the Commission en banc.
13

52

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

This issue is not mooted even if the next elections are just a few weeks away.
The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic
government. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a
task that could well crop up again in future elections.
First. Rule 30 of the 1993 COMELEC Rule of Procedure provides for the
metes and bounds on the COMELECs power to issue injunctive relief (too
long, I will only include Section emphasized by SC)
o SECTION 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
issuance of restraining order. - No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without notice to the adverse party. If it shall appear from the
facts shown by affidavits or the verified petition that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice, the Commission or any Division to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty days from
date of its issuance. .
A cursory reading of the Order dated 12 January 2004 or the so-called status
quo ante Order reveals that it was actually TRO. It ordered Repol to cease
and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan,
Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime.
The status quo ante Order had a life span of more than 20 days since the
directive was qualified by the phrase "until further orders from this
Commission." This violates the rule that a TRO has an effective period of only
20 days and automatically expires upon the COMELECs denial of the
preliminary injunction. Thus, the status quo ante Order automatically ceased
to have any effect after 1 February 2004 since the COMELEC First Division
did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction.
While the hearing on Ceracass application for a writ of preliminary injunction
was held on 29 January 2004, the COMELEC First Division failed to resolve
the application. Instead, it issued an Order directing the parties to file their
memoranda until 3 February 2004 on their respective positions "on the life
span of status quo ante orders and whether a writ of preliminary injunction
should be granted in the case." Clearly, the COMELEC First Divisions
indecision on the matter not only worked injustice to Repol but also failed to
dispel the uncertainty beclouding the real choice of the electorate for
municipal mayor.
Second. The decision of the trial court in Election Case No. T-001 was
rendered on 30 December 2003, or after almost one year of trial and revision
of the questioned ballots. It found Repol as the candidate with the plurality of
votes. The grant of execution pending appeal was well within the
discretionary powers of the trial court.
Santos v. COMELEC Panulaya: Between the determination by the trial court
of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of
Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the courts decision that should
prevail.
The rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases is "to give as
much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is
initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers."

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Thus: Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as

basis of the right to assume office, subject to future contingencies attendant
to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed, when it is
considered that the board of canvassers is composed of persons who are
less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots,
apart from their being more apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that
the board must act summarily, practically racing against time, while, on the
other hand, the judge has the benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer
and of admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart from his
being allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation
before rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing
the immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the
protestees, notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals
therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the court, good
reasons therefor.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal
would bring back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest"
techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their
efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a
consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.
Applying Santos to this petition, we hold that the COMELEC First Division
committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the trial courts order
granting execution pending appeal.

Ceracas was Guilty of Forum Shopping

At the time Ceracas instituted SPR Case No. 1-2004 with the COMELEC, he
had a pending omnibus motion to reconsider, set aside and quash the writ of
execution with the trial court. In addition, Ceracass appeal of the trial courts
adverse decision was also pending before the COMELEC.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 12 January
2004 of the COMELEC First Division in SPR Case No. 1-2004 is ANNULLED and said
case is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of forum-shopping. The Order dated 5
January 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40, granting
the execution pending appeal of its decision in Election Case No. T-001, and the Writ
of Execution issued pursuant thereto, are REINSTATED. The full enforcement of the
said Writ must forthwith be made.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

RULE 65: CERTIORARI

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
XXX
1.

MERALCO V. CBAA (JM)

G.R. No. L-46245

May 31, 1982
Nature of the Case: In this special civil action of certiorari, Meralco assails the
decision of the CBAA (composed of the Sec. of Finance as chairman and the Secs. of
Justice and Local Government and Community Development as members) dated May
6, 1976, holding that Meralcos oil pipeline is subject to realty tax.
Petitioner: Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation
Respondents: Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Board Of Assessment Appeals
Of Laguna & Provincial Assessor Of Laguna
Ponente: J. Aquino
Summary:
Meralco installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical
steel pipes joined together and buried not less than 1 meter below the surface along
the shoulder of the public highway. The portion passing through Laguna is about 30
kilometers long. Pursuant to the Assessment Law, the provincial assessor of Laguna
treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations. The Board of
Assessment Appeals of Laguna and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
affirmed. Hence this petition for certiorari.
The SC held that in this case, certiorari was properly availed of. The rule is that as to
administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial power there is an underlying power in
the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by the statute. Judicial review of the decision of
an official or administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial functions is proper in
cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion

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or in case the administrative decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious. However, in the

case at bar, the CBAA did not act with grave abuse of discretion, did not commit any
error of law and acted within its jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the provincial
assessor and the LBAA that Meralco Securities' pipeline system in Laguna is subject to
realty tax.
FACTS:

Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949 (RA
387), Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system
consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than 1
meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway.
o The portion passing through Laguna is about 30 kilometers long.

The pipes are embedded in the soil and are firmly and solidly welded together so
as to preclude breakage or damage thereto and prevent leakage or seepage of
the oil. The valves are welded to the pipes so as to make the pipeline system one
single piece of property from end to end. In order to repair, replace, remove or
transfer segments of the pipeline, the pipes have to be cold-cut by means of a
rotary hard-metal pipe-cutter after digging or excavating them out of the ground
where they are buried. In points where the pipeline traversed rivers or creeks, the
pipes were laid beneath the bed thereof.
o Hence, the pipes are permanently attached to the land.

According to Meralco:
o Segments of the pipeline can be moved from one place to another as shown
in the permit issued by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
which permit provides that the government reserves the right to require the
removal or transfer of the pipes by and at the concessionaire's expense
should they be affected by any road repair or improvement.

Provincial Assessor: Pursuant to the Assessment Law (Commonwealth Act

470), the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and
issued Tax Declarations.

LBAA: Meralco Securities appealed the assessments to the Board of Assessment

Appeals of Laguna composed of the register of deeds as chairman and the
provincial auditor as member, but it upheld the assessments.

Central Board of Assessment Appeals: Ruled that the pipeline is subject to

realty tax. The MR was also denied.

Hence, this special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petition for certiorari is proper. YES. [main for SCA]
2. WON the pipeline system is subject to realty tax. YES.
RATIO:
#1 CERTIORARI WAS PROPERLY AVAILED OF [main]
Solicitor General: Certiorari is not proper because the Board acted within its jurisdiction
and did not gravely abuse its discretion.
Meralco Securities: Because the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review the
decision of the CBAA and because no judicial review of the Board's decision is

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provided for in the Real Property Tax Code, the recourse is to file a petition for
certiorari.
SC:

Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions whereby the record of a particular
case is ordered to be elevated for review and correction in matters of law.

The rule is that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial power there

is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by the
statute.
o Judicial review is a part of the system of checks and balances which is a
limitation on the separation of powers and which forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.

Judicial review of the decision of an official or administrative agency

exercising quasi-judicial functions is proper in cases of lack of jurisdiction,
error of law, grave abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion or in case the
administrative decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious.
#2 PIPELINE SUBJECT TO REALTY TAX
CBAA: The pipes
1. Are machinery or improvements as contemplated in the Assessment Law and the
Real Property Tax Code;
2. They do not fall within the category of property exempt from realty tax under those
laws;
3. Articles 415 & 416 of the Civil Code, defining real and personal property, have no
application to this case;
4. Even under article 415, the steel pipes can be regarded as realty because they
are constructions adhered to the soil and things attached to the land in a fixed
manner; and
5. Meralco Securities is not exempt from realty tax under the Petroleum Law.
Meralco Securities: Its pipeline is not subject to realty tax because:
1. It is not real property within the meaning of article 415.
2. The Petroleum Law exempts the company from the payment of realty taxes,
because the provisions of that law exempts Meralco Securities from local taxes
and makes it liable for taxes of general application.
SC:

Pipeline means a line of pipe connected to pumps, valves and control devices for
conveying liquids, gases or finely divided solids. It is a line of pipe running upon or
in the earth, carrying with it the right to the use of the soil in which it is placed.

Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real
property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements" not
specifically exempted in section 3 thereof. This provision is reproduced with
some modification in the Real Property Tax Code.
o The pipeline of Meralco Securities does not fall within any of the classes of
exempt real property enumerated in section 3 of the Assessment Law and
section 40 of the Real Property Tax Code.

Article 415[l] and [3] provides that real property may consist of constructions of all
kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached to an immovable in a fixed

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manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object.
o The pipeline system is indubitably a construction adhering to the soil. It is
attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without dismantling the steel pipes which were welded to form the
pipeline.
o Note that what are being characterized as real property are not the steel
pipes but the pipeline system as a whole.
Insofar as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the
flow of oil, it is in a sense machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax
Code.
Lastly, the realty tax is a tax of general application.
o It is enforced throughout the Philippines and not merely in a particular
municipality or city but the proceeds of the tax accrue to the province, city,
municipality and barrio where the realty taxed is situated.
o In contrast, a local tax is imposed by the municipal or city council by virtue of
the Local Tax Code (PD 231).

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution are affirmed. The
petition is dismissed. No costs.
2. NUNAL V. COA (RS)
G.R. No. 78648 | 1/24/1989 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | RESOLUTION
Petitioner: Rafael Nunal (Nunal)
Respondents: Comm. On Audit, Mun. of Isabela, Basilan (Municipality)
SUMMARY
Nunal was appointed as Muncipial Administrator (MunAdmin) of Isabela, Basilan. He
was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for dishonesty,
misconduct and for lack of confidence. On appeal to the Merit Systems Board, he was
exonerated and reinstated to his position. He was later on dismissed again for lack of
confidence by Mayor Dans. Nunal filed 2 cases seeking reinstatement, payment of
backwages, other emoluments, and separation pay. Nunal and the Municipality
entered into a Compromise Agreement (CompAgr) entitling the former to the amounts
he sought. The CompAgr was approved by the CFI. He then filed a claim for
separation pay with the Mun. Treasurer, who forwarded the request to the Provincial
Auditor who, in turn, granted such claim. The Regional Director of the COA, however,
denied it. The COA Central Office in QC denied the claim for separation pay, as well
as the backwages and other emoluments. Nunal raised the case to the SC on
certiorari. SC denied the petition for certiorari in its Minute Resolution of 5/11/1988
(assailed resolution). On this MR, Nunal claims that the assailed resolution does not
clearly express the facts and the law on which it is based. SCs "Resolution" of 11 May
1988 was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This
mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due
course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the
case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course
to a Petition for Certiorari. The assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the
dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision. It may be

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added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a
prerogative Writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in
the exercise of judicial discretion."
FACTS

Case: For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute

Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the Petition
for certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the COA had
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding, among others, that the
compromise agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the
Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been impleaded as an
indispensable party in the case.

Nunal contends in the present motion:

o Decision does not clearly express the facts and the law on which it is
based
o The Municipality is bound by the compromise agreement; and
o COA gravely abused its discretion in denying the lawful claim for
separation pay by Nunal

2/24/1986 Nunal was appointed as Mun. Administrator of Isabela, Basilan.

1/1/1980 (6 years back; I dont know if this is correct) he was

administratively charged and dismissed from the service for dishonesty,
misconduct and for lack of confidence.

5/8/1980 On appeal, the Merit Systems Board exonerated Nunal and

reinstated him to his position as Municipal Administrator.

1/29/1981 Nunal was again dismissed for lack of confidence by then

Municipal Mayor Alvin Dans under Administrative Order No. 54, Series of
1981

Upon denial of his MR, Nunal filed Case No. 43, a suit for mandamus and
Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the Municipal Mayor, the
Municipal Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan, before the then CFIBasilan Branch 1, praying for reinstatement "with full backwages and other
rights inherent in the position."

He also filed Case No. 45 with the same Court seeking that he and his wife
be paid their back salaries from 1 February 1980 to 31 May 1980 pursuant to
the Decision of the Merit Systems Board on 16 February 1981.

2/20/1984 during the pendency of the said case, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Isabela, Basilan, abolished the subject position in its Resolution No. 902,
Series of 1984, and Ordinance No. 336, pursuant to the provisions of the
Local Government Code (LGC)

12/5/1984 On the one hand, Nunal and his wife, and on the other, Mayor
Dans in his capacity both as Municipal Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Bayan, the Municipal Treasurer and the Provincial, entered into
a Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others, that:
o The respondents shall pay petitioner Nunal all back salaries and
other emoluments due him by reason of his employment as
Municipal Administrator covering the period from January 1, 1980 to
August 15, 1984, together with accumulated vacation/sick leaves,

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mid-year and Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation

pay under the LGC, which are reflected in the computation
o Nunal was also considered as "retired" upon receipt of the monetary
considerations mentioned therein.
12/12/1984 CFI approved the Compromise Agreement.
4/1/1985 Nunal collected his retirement benefits although, concededly, no
provision for the same had been included in the Compromise Agreement
9/17/1985 Nunal filed his claim for separation pay in the amount of
P54,092.50 to which he is allegedly entitled due to the abolition of the position
of Municipal Administrator, which separation pay is provided for by the LGC
1/6/1986 Municipal Treasurer forwarded Nunals claim to the Provincial
Auditor of Basilan.
o 1/1/1986 in a First Indorsement, the Provincial Auditor opined that
the claim was legal and proper but its payment was made subject to
availability of funds and the ruling of the Regional Office of the COA,
Region IX, Zamboanga City.
o 2/12/1986 in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional Director of the COA,
Region IX, Zamboanga City, reversed the Provincial Auditor of
Basilan and denied Nunals claim for separation pay.
o Nunals MR was forwarded to the COA Central Office, Quezon City.
10/13/1986 COA Central Office, in its Decision No. 388, not only denied
Nunals claim for separation pay but also disallowed the other payments
made to him
First petition to the SC: denied, held in favor of COA and the Municipality
Thus, this MR by Nunal alleging grave abuse of discretion by COA,
which Petition we had previously dismissed in our Resolution of 11 May
1988.

ISSUE: WN the COA committed GAD?

HELD
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby
PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by COA of the amounts
ordered paid by the CFI-Basilan, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984, is hereby
SET ASIDE, but its disallowance of Nunals claim for separation pay of P54,092.50, is
hereby SUSTAINED.
RATIO

It appearing, however, that the Compromise agreement was duly signed by

Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, by the Municipal Treasurer, and by the Provincial Fiscal as their; that
the case was one for reinstatement and backwages; and following the ruling
of this Court in Gementiza vs. Court of Appeal (1982), the Municipality should
be deemed as impleaded in this case, it being apparent that the officials
concerned had been sued in their official capacity.

It should be noted that before the CFI, respondents sued petitioner Mayor
alone.

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57

However, respondents, too, prayed for a Writ of mandamus to

compel petitioner Mayor to reinstate them with back salaries and
damages (***this part is unclear)
o Respondents, therefore, actually intended to sue petitioner in his
official capacity.
o Failure to implead the Municipality and other municipal authorities
should not deter this Court, in the interests of justice and equity, from
including them herein as respondents.
o The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding
on the Municipality of Isabela, which was not, in any way, deprived
of its day in
o Thus, the payments to Nunal of the sums of P68,389.25 as back
salaries, P21,387.71 as total accumulated vacation/sick leaves,
P772.75 as Christmas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs.
Nanie B. Nunal in the sum of P3,096.00, have to be upheld.
o It likewise appears that retirement benefits bad also been collected
by Nunal on 1 April 1985.
In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by Nunal, we uphold the
ruling of the COA:
o Anent the second issue, this Commission believes and so holds that
the instant claim for separation pay in addition to the retirement
benefits earlier received by claimant is bereft of any legal basis.
o Culled from the records is the fact that Nunal was dismissed from
the service on January 29, 1981 and has not been reinstated to the
service until his position of Municipal Administrator of Isabela was
abolished.
o In other words, he was no longer in, or had already been separated
from, the service when the said position was abolished.
o Evidently then, his separation from the service was not attributable
to the abolition of the position but was due to his dismissal and,
therefore, Section 76 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 cannot be
validly invoked as legal basis for the claim for separation pay, viz

Section 76.-Abolition of Position. When the position of an

official or employee under the civil service is abolished by
law or ordinance, the official or employee so affected shall
be reinstated in another vacant position without diminution
of salary. Should such position not be available, the official
or employee affected shall be granted a separation pay
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service
over and above the monetary privileges granted to officials
and employees under existing law.
o Moreover, Nunal has already been paid his retirement benefits under
the existing retirement law.
o His entitlement, thus, to separation pay under BP 337 is offensive to
the general policy of the government prohibiting payment of double
retirement benefits to an employee.
o To grant double gratuity is unwarranted
o It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in the
Compromise Agreement. Nonetheless, it could not be granted

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

outright but still had to be claimed and passed in audit, and has
been aptly denied by COA.
o And although Nunal did file suit against the Municipality for
reinstatement, it does not follow that he was not effectively
dismissed such that he could still be considered an incumbent
whose position had been abolished.
o A dismissed employee can be considered as not having left his
office only upon reinstatement and should be given a comparable
position and compensation at the time of reinstatement
MOST IMPORTANT: On Nunals contention that the Resolution of this Court
under date of 11 May 1988 is not in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides No decision shall be rendered
by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
o No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the Court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor.
o SCs "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the
meaning of the Constitutional requirement.

This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for

decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of
Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the
case may be.

It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing

due course to a Petition for Certiorari.
o The assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal
of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision.
o It may be added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is a prerogative Writ, never demandable as a
matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion."

3. TUASON V. RD-CALOOCAN (RT)

G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988
Petitioners: ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact
Trinidad S. Viado
Respondents: REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
and the NATIONAL TREASURER,
SUMMARY
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965,
with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel
Farms, Inc. (Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the
latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. On September 14, 1973-a year
almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then
president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree
No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons'
vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had
subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being

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among the buyers). Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel
had failed to complete payment of the price.
W/N the petition for certiorari is proper? YES
It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial
or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts
either judicial or ministerial. The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an
obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to
those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These
acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an
officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that
the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as
everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may
be established by law the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances
indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his
office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative
power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6,
1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from
Carmel Farms, Inc. (Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters,
in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City.
In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled
and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took
possession of their property.
Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one
morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the
land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the
other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the
members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona
fide occupants thereof."
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law
Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency
powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect.
The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had
earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into
several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers).
The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar
Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as
amended.
Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to
complete payment of the price. It adjudged that
o ... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original
purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all
installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by the
Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of
said Association stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the

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Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has
never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any
and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said
property of the Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab
initio as against the law and public policy.
Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all
those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the
lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and sale
... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended."
It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree contained
contradictory declarations.
o While acknowledging on the one hand that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were
occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he
states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners
Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots.
o The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both
a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of physics that two objects
cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
o And the absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in
possession of land, who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be
deemed "occupants" thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants.
But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos
disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they.
On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following:
MEMORANDUM. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate of title
is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against
the Government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition
and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.
The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which
deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not
only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but
also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of
Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the
derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that
they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.

SOLGEN
Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the
petition, he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by
the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued
as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition for certiorari is proper? YES

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

RATIO:
It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify
only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed
against acts either judicial or ministerial.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to
"any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the
same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the
petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful
exercise of judicial power.
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He
made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the
legal rights of the parties were in the premises.
These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction
which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause.
He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their
subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase
money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on
which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand."
And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said
land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the
members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the
Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and
purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and
void ab initio as against the law and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because
done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function,
if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion.
Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone
knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances
indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his
office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative
power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e. determined the relevant facts
and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were
accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination
of the facts material to the controversy.
He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands."
Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and
reliability of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable
that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never
confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness
and present countervailing evidence.
This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly
violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in

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virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto
himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had
in addition exercised it unconstitutionally.
In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for
prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the
latter. Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted
without jurisdiction exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution
or the laws and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional
rights of the parties thereby affected.
The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises
even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the
permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic
averments of the parties' pleadings.
There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was
actually issued to it by the Government. This of course gives rise to the strong
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, that official duty being in
this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of the
fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e., the payment in
full of the price, together with all accrued interest.
Against this presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be accorded full sway
in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it
became "effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of
the Land Registration Act."
It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price of
the land purchased by it from the Government pursuant to the provisions of Act
1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact, the
Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest,
invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and
enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the
manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of
mortgages.
This it can do despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. Prescription does
not lie against the Government. But until and unless such a suit is brought and
results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel
and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors from it of
portions of the land covered by its original title must be respected.
At any rate, the eventuation of that contingency will not and cannot in any manner
affect this Court's conclusion, herein affirmed, of the unconstitutionality and invalidity
of Presidential Decree No. 293, and the absolute lack of any right to the land or any
portion thereof on the part of the members of the so-called "Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc."
The decree was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice
principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem
deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard of
the rights of others. It was in reality a taking of private property without due process
and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of
their titles in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and

void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the
inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the
memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein
respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore
the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from
implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No
pronouncement as to costs.

4. INPORT V. IAC (MB)

Petitioner: Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. (INPORT)
Respondents: The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, Atty. Florentino G.
Dumlao, Jr.
G.R. No. 71771-73 March 31, 1989
Melencio-Herrera, J.
SUMMARY:
Atty. Florentino G. Dumlao was a retained counsel for INPORT. He asked for an
increase in his retainership fee, but INPORT refused. Castro filed before the 3 cases
handled by him for INPORT for payment of attorneys fees which the trial court
granted. INPORT challenged said orders through Petitions for Certiorari in the IAC and
not through appeals. IAC denied the petitions and ruled for Castro. Hence the present
Petition for Certiorari. SC affirmed the IAC stating:
(1) Appeal, not certiorari, was the proper remedy in assailing a final order.
(2) INPORT failed to take into account that a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted
either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered or in an
independent action.
(3) Certiorari will neither lie because INPORT has failed to show that the Orders
complained of are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, meaning such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Atty. Florentino G. Dumlao, Jr., was a retained counsel for INPORT, an

arrastre and stevedoring operator since 1976 when it was established up to 1
June 1984.
o As retained counsel, he was given a monthly fee of P 1,000.00,
representation allowance of P 500.00 and 100 liters per month as
gasoline allowance.

Castro asked for an increase in retainership fee. Instead of giving the same,
INPORT discarded the previous arrangement and proposed that Castro
specify, instead, the legal fee for every legal case to be handled by him.

In 3 pending cases handled by Castro for INPORT before the lower Courts,
Castro filed Manifestations/Motions for the payment of attorney's fees based
on quantum meruit (a reasonable sum of money to be paid for services

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rendered or work done when the amount due is not stipulated in a legally
enforceable contract) which were granted by the respective Trial Courts.
Challenging the aforesaid Orders, INPORT resorted to Petitions for Certiorari,
not appeals, before the IAC.
IAC decided against INPORT.
o What INPORT should have done was to appeal on time the
questioned orders.
o This, it failed to do, and at the very least if these petitions had only
been interposed seasonably they could have been considered the
appeals.
o Even if we were for the moment to ignore the fatal procedural error
of INPORT of not appealing, and were We to treat the petitions for
certiorari as such, still no comfort and relief could be extended to
INPORT, because grave abuses of discretion on the part of
respondent judges had not been shown to exist.
o INPORT's MR of said judgment was denied.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
In its Memorandum INPORT defines the issues, thus:
1. What should have been the proper legal remedy taken by INPORT in bringing
the 3 questioned orders from the RTC to the IAC, appeal or certiorari? --APPEAL
2. Is Atty. Florentino G. Dumlao, Jr. legally entitled to recover alleged attorney's
fees in the 3 cases, now the subject of this appeal by certiorari? --- YES
HELD:

The judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against INPORT.

RATIO:
1. Appeal, not certiorari, was the proper remedy.

For an appeal to lie, Orders or Resolutions of any Court must be final.

The test in determining whether or not a judgment or order is final is whether

or not something remains to be done by the Court.

A final judgment, order or decree is one that finally disposes of, adjudicates or
determines the rights or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire
controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which
concludes them until it is reversed or set aside.

In this case, the Orders of the Trial Courts are, indeed, final in character
because they finally disposed of the matter of attorney's fees, and nothing
more remained for the respective lower Courts to do. No further questions
can come on the issue before the Trial Courts except the execution of said
Orders.

Since no timely appeals were interposed, the questioned Orders have

become final and the issue of Castro's entitlement to those fees deemed to
have been laid at rest.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

2. INPORT failed to take into account that a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted
either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered or in an
independent action.

INPORT contends that under the circumstances, appeal is not possible

because the main cases are still being litigated in the lower Courts based on
Section 39 of BP Blg. 129.

In the cases at bar, although Castro sought to enforce his claim for attorney's
fees in the principal case, that issue remained separate and distinct from the
main litigation and resolution of the former will in no way affect or disturb the
latter as, in fact, the cases below still pend, as INPORT itself admits. And on
appeal, only the pleadings and documents pertinent to the issue of attomey's
fees need be presented to the Appellate Court.
3. Certiorari will neither lie.

Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous

conclusions of law or fact.

As long as a Court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, will amount to nothing more than errors of
judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil
action of certiorari.

Tolentino vs. Escalona --- having failed to interpose a timely appeal from the
impugned Orders, petitioners may not avail of the Writ of certiorari to offset
the adverse effects of their omission.

Even if certiorari were the proper remedy, INPORT has failed to show that the
Orders complained of are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, meaning
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

Abuse of discretion alone is not sufficient. Rather, it must be grave as where

the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.

That the Courts below were lawfully vested with jurisdiction to hear and act on
the Motions to fix attomey's fees is beyond question. Any alleged mistakes
committed in the exercise thereof would be errors of judgment not reviewable
by a special civil action of Certiorari.

While INPORT claims that the Orders were issued ex-parte, its filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was orally argued and subsequently
supported by a memorandum and documents, had cured that defect.

5. ST. PETER MEMORIAL V. CAMPOS JR (LL)

G.R. No. L-38280 | March 21, 1975
Petitioner: ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK, INC.
Respondents: HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. and/or COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF RIZAL (Quezon City, REGINO CLEOFAS, and LUCIA DE LA CRUZ

Petitioner: BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner,

Respondents: HON. JOSE CAMPOS, REGINO CLEOFAS, and LUCIA DE LA CRUZ
Summary: Spouses Cleofas filed suit against St. Peter Memorial Park praying that
they be declared rightful owners of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate. Lower court
rendered a decision in favor of the spouses. Memorial Park filed MNT which was
denied which prompted it to file before SC a petition for certiorari against trial judge
and spouses, seeking annulment of courts order denying new trial as it was issued in
GAD. SC ruled that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion for new trial, having disregarded in a capricious and arbitrary manner, the
newly discovered evidence. The general rule is that the extraordinary writ of certiorari
is not proper when ordinary appeal is available. However, it has been granted in cases
where it is shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not
promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained of. The
grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, justify the giving
of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for ordinary appeal will not be
adequate. As many memorial lot buyers are affected, and the very integrity of the
torrens system is at stake, public interest is involved.
FACTS:

In CFI of Rizal, the spouses Regino Cleofas and Lucia de la Cruz filed suit
14
against St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. (Memorial Park) et al (Civil Case No.
Q-15001)
o The spouses prayed that they be declared the rightful owners of Lot
No. 719 of the Piedad Estate, that the Torrens Title to said lot be
reconstituted, the title thereto of their deceased predecessor,
Antonio Cleofas, having been burned in a fire in 1933; that the
certificates of title over said lot in the name of the Memorial Park,
and that in the name of Wijangco del Rosario, and all the certificates
of title from which these certificates were derived be declared null
and void; that the mortgages over said, lot constituted in favor of
Banco Filipino and the NIDC be declared null and void; and that the
Memorial Park be ordered to pay plaintiffs damages.

May 2, 1973 decision: Lower court rendered a decision in favor of the

spouses. Memorial Park and Banco Filipino filed MR and/or joint MNT which
was opposed by spouses who moved for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and restoration of receivership.

February 5, 1974 order: Trial court denied new trial, which was appealed.

The Memorial Park filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction (L-38280) against the trial judge and the
plaintiff spouses, seeking annulment of the court's order denying new trial, on
the ground that the same was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

This Court issued a restraining order: that effective immediately and until
further orders from this Court, You (respondent Judge), your agents
representatives and/or any person or persons acting upon your orders or in
Araceli Wijangco del Rosario, National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino), the RD of Rizal, RD & Sheriff of QC
14

G.R. No. L-39905 | March 21, 1975

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

your place or stead are hereby RESTRAINED from enforcing your decision
and your order all issued in Civil Case No. Q-15001, and from stopping the
business operations of petitioner herein."
In compliance, the lower court, issued an order holding "in abeyance until
further orders from the Appellate Court," action on the petition for appointment
of a receiver and for execution of judgment pending appeal, and likewise
upon motion of spouses Cleofas and De la Cruz, deferred the approval of the
Joint Record on Appeal "until the Supreme Court has ruled on the petition for
certiorari filed by the defendants."
July 8, 1974 order: However the court, again upon motion of said spouses,
dismissed the appeal filed by both the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino, on
the ground that the same was abandoned when Memorial Park filed the
present petition for certiorari the dismissal order having been brought to the
attention of this Court in the manifestation of the Memorial Park.
Banco Filipino, for its part, filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary injunction (L-38843), against the trial judge and
the spouses Cleofas and Dela Cruz, to annul the trial court's order dismissing
its own appeal.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the joint appeal of the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino in its order of July
8, 1974
2) For Case No. L-38280: whether or not the respondent Judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied in its order the motion for new trial of the Memorial
Park in its order of February 5, 1974
RATIO:
1. JUDGE COMMITTED GAD IN DISMISSING APPEAL

In moving for dismissal of the appeal in the trial court, respondents spouses
averred that "the filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the
Supreme Court by the principal defendant, in effect, is abandonment of the
unperfected appeal;"
o that "the defendants could not pursue both remedies, appeal to the
Court of Appeals and appeal by special action to the Supreme Court
of one and the same case;" and
o that "the dismissal of the appeal is not covered by the restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid petition filed by
one of the defendants in this case."

It must be noted that the petitioner in L-38280 is only St. Peter Memorial Park.
Banco Filipino is not a party in that first proceeding before this Court. Thus,
whatever may be the effect of the filing of a petition for certiorari, on the
pending appeal, cannot affect the appeal of Banco Filipino.

And the respondent Judge clearly committed a clear error and a grave abuse
of discretion when it dismissed the appeal of Banco Filipino due to the filing
by the Memorial Park of its petition in L-38280. Moreover, as will now be
explained, the dismissal of the appeal violated the restraining order issued by
this Court.

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Even with respect to the Memorial Park, we cannot say there was
abandonment of the appeal. There would have been abandonment if there is
incompatibility between the two remedies sought by the Memorial Park, that
is, between said appeal and the petition for certiorari. The appeal is from the
decision of May 2, 1973; the certiorari petition is directed against the order
dated February 5, 1974.
Under American Law, a motion for new trial does not work as a waiver of the
appeal, unless there is a rule to the contrary. Thus, both the motion for new
trial and the appeal may be pursued at the same time. Here, the certiorari
petition in L-38280 is in pursuance of the motion for new trial. Memorial Park
can pursue this remedy as well as that of the appeal from the main decision.
More important, it must be remembered that in L-38280 this Court issued a
restraining order enjoining respondent Judge "from enforcing your decision
dated May 2, 1973." This restraining order was intended to retain the status
quo insofar as said decision and other circumstances surrounding it are
concerned. Any court action or order that would change any circumstance of
the decision is necessarily included in the scope of the restraining order.
At the time that restraining order was issued, the trial court's decision was a
decision on appeal. The order dismissing the appeal tended to change the
status quo since by reason of the dismissal, the enjoined decision became
final. For the reasons we have expounded we find said dismissal order to
have been issued in grave abuse of discretion.

2. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GAD IN DENYING MNT, HAVING

DISREGARDED NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

The questions presented in L-38280 are : (1) Is certiorari the proper remedy,
ordinary appeal being available to petitioner St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. (2)
Did respondent Judge commit grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of
jurisdiction when he denied the motion for new trial?
Facts from Trial Court Decision

From the decision of the trial court it appears that the parties do not dispute
that Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate forms part of the land covered by an
OCT in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands. The Director of
Lands, as administrator of the Piedad Estate, executed a contract in favor of
Antonio Cleofas.

According to the decision, private respondents' evidence indicated that

Antonio Cleofas, their predecessor, took possession of the lot and occupied
the same until his death sometime in 1945. However, Antonio's title was
burned in a fire sometime in 1933. Private respondents did not take any step
to reconstruct said title until the real estate boom. But when they filed a
petition for reconstruction, they discovered that the lot was already covered
by TCT in the name of Trino Narciso and Aniceto Martin, predecessors of the
Memorial Park.

On the other hand, the decision states, that the Memorial Park and Banco
Filipino presented evidence to the following effect (too many transactions
involved. Basta in the end Memorial Park purchased it from Roques).

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

OCT was however torn. The MNT was based on newly discovered evidence.
It alleges:
o A certificate of title of the Piedad Estate could not have been issued
in favor of Cleofas because all rights thereto had been assigned to
Martin predecessor-in-interest of defendant St. Peter pursuant to
which Deed of Conveyance from bureau of Lands to Martin and TCT
were issued, also all in favor of Martin.
o St. Peter started on the premise now that the entry in favor of
Antonio Cleofas, et als. on Sheet 15 of OCT No. 614 (the major
portion of which appear to have been torn off and lost) must refer to
another lot of the Piedad Estate
o St. Peter examined the incomplete entry on the torn part of the OCT
and also the records of the Notary Public and concluded that entry
on sheet or page 15 of OCT no. 614 refers to another lot and
another title of the Piedad Estate

Certiorari may be granted if remedy of appeal is inadequate

As contended by herein respondents, the general rule is that the

extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when ordinary appeal is available.
However, we have granted the writ in cases where it is shown that appeal
would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve petitioner
from the injurious effects of the order complained of. In fact, in Alfonso vs.
Yatco, to avoid future litigations, we passed upon a petition for certiorari
though the proper remedy was appeal.

Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, pointed out the evils attending split jurisdictions,
saying: "To draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in...
litigations. A piece meal resort to one Court and another gives rise to
multiplicity of suits... The time to be lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented,
additional expense incurred...these are considerations which weigh heavily
against split jurisdiction. Indeed, it is more in keeping with orderly
administration of justice that all the causes of action here be cognizable and
heard by only one court ... ."

The grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari,
justify the giving of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for ordinary
appeal will not be adequate. As many memorial lot buyers are affected, and
the very integrity of the torrens system is at stake, public interest is involved.

Judge committed grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of jurisdiction when he

denied petitioner's motion for new trial, based on the evidence attached to the said
motion

The rule for the granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of
procedure, should be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a
just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for
the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both
parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to
find out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate
grievances should not be barred by technicalities.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Gauged by these standards, we find the evidence proposed to be presented

by petitioner in a new trial are newly discovered evidence within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court. The said evidence could not have been
produced during the trial because the subject-matter of the trial was Lot No.
719. Petitioner correctly searched, discovered and presented during that trial,
all documents pertaining to Lot No. 719 only.
The evidence sought to be presented in a new trial by petitioner became
pertinent and important only after trial, when judgment was rendered by
respondent Judge that private respondents have a valid and subsisting title to
Lot No. 719 on the basis of sheet 15 of OCT which on its fact does not
mention Lot No. 719.
Based on the incomplete data appearing on such, petitioner conducted a new
search and discovered the evidence it now seeks to present in a new trial,
indubitably showing that sheet 15 of OCT refers to a title to Lot No. 640, and
not to Lot No. 719 in the name of petitioner. If admitted in a new trial, these
newly discovered evidence will probably alter the judgment of the trial court.
In making the foregoing conclusions, we do not by any means intend to
prejudge the effect of such evidence on the outcome of the case. We are
confining ourselves to the conclusion that the evidence intended to be
submitted, "would probably alter the result."
We hold that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion for new trial, having disregarded in a capricious and
arbitrary manner, the newly discovered evidence. We rule, therefore, in favor
of new trial. The grant of new trial necessarily vacates the judgment subject of
the appeal which, consequently, becomes moot.

HELD: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions in L-38280 and L39905 are granted, the orders of February 5, 1974 and July 8, 1974 are hereby
declared null and void and set aside, and both cases are remanded to the trial court for
new trial pursuant to the motion to that effect of both Banco Filipino and Memorial
Park, dated June 30, 1973, which is hereby granted. Costs against private
respondents.
6. Valencia v. CA (JM)
G.R. No. 89431 | April 25, 1990
Petitioner: ERIBERTO G. VALENCIA
Respondents: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CARLOS C. OFILADA, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch XL, Third Judicial Region, Deputy Sheriff
PABLO R. GLORIOSO, MIGUEL BUNYE and RICARDO BAGTAS
Ponente: J. Regalado
Summary:
Valencia filed with the Bulacan RTC for the rescission of a lease contract over a 24
hectare fishpond in Paombong, Bulacan against BUNYE & BAGTAS. During the
pendency of the case, the lease contract expired and Bunye & Bagtas peacefully
surrendered the fishpond to Valencia. As a result, the case became moot and
academic and RTC just ordered Valencia to pay moral & exemplary damages and

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

attorneys fees. Pending appeal by Valencia to the CA, Bunye & Bagtas filed a motion
for execution pending appeal under Rule 39 Sec 2 which provides that a writ of
execution may be issued to enforce a judgment before the expiration of the period to
appeal upon showing good reasons by filing a bond. Notwithstanding the opposition
filed by Valencia, RTC granted the motion. In view of Valencias failure to file a
counterbond, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued by the RTC. Thus, this
Petition for Certiorari by Valencia contending that mere filing of a bond does not
suffice, absent of a showing of superior circumstances demanding urgency which will
outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the
judgment.
The SC held that the issuance of Writ of Execution Pending Appeal by RTC is
IMPROPER. The requisites for such issuance are the ff: (a) There must be a motion by
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) There must be a good reason
for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) The good reason must be stated in a special
order. The rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is
NOT a good reason for ordering execution pending appeal. Absent any such good
reason, the special order of execution must be struck down for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. It follows then also, that certiorari lies against an order
granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons.
It is the inadequacy not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of
certiorari.
FACTS:

Valencia filed with the RTC of Bulacan for the rescission of a lease contract over a
24 hectare fishpond in Paombong, Bulacan, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against BUNYE & BAGTAS.

During the pendency of the case, the lease contract expired and Bunye & Bagtas
peacefully surrendered the fishpond to Valencia.

RTC: declared that the Valencias prayer for rescission of contract had become
moot and academic and the only remaining issue for adjudication was the matter
of damages claimed by the defendants.
o It then awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages to each defendant and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, aside from
the costs of suit.

Valencia claims that Bagtas acknowledged in writing his receipt of a copy of said
decision on January 3, 1989. On the other hand, Valencia received a copy of the
decision on January 10, 1989, and filed a notice of appeal on January 16, 1989.
While on appeal

On the same day, RTC judge Ofilasa issued an order that said notice of appeal be
"given due course" and directing that the records of the case be forwarded to CA.

Bunye & Bagtas then filed a motion for execution pending appeal, alleging that
under ROC Rule 39 Section 2 a writ of execution may be issued to enforce a
judgment before the expiration of the period to appeal upon showing good
reasons. The filing of the bond by the successful party is a good reason for
ordering execution.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Notwithstanding the opposition filed by Valencia, RTC judge Ofilasa granted

the motion for execution pending appeal, Bunye & Bagtas having filed a bond
of P330,000 posted by the Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines.
o It also granted a period up to April 27, 1989 within which Valencia may "file a
counterbond to stay the implementation of the Writ of Execution to be issued."
Valencias MR was also denied on the ground that "an offer of a bond for
immediate execution of judgment is a good ground for execution pending appeal"
and "execution pending appeal may be granted as long as movant files a good
and sufficient surety.
Consequently, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued by the trial court.

Petition for Certiorari

Valencia then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA
on the following grounds:
a) Upon the perfection of the appeal from the decision rendered on November
29, 1988, a copy thereof having been received by Bunye & Bagtas on
January 3, 1989, RTC Bulacan lost jurisdiction over the case, and accordingly
no longer had any jurisdiction to entertain bunye's and bagtas' motion for
execution pending appeal, let alone to issue a writ of execution.
b) Mere filing of a bond does not suffice absent of (sic) a showing of superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.
c) A trial court exceeds the limits of its jurisdiction where it orders advance of
(sic) execution of consequential damages, exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.

CA: Dismissed.

SC: Issued a TRO.

ISSUES:
3. WON the trial court had already lost jurisdiction by reason of the perfection of
appeal in Nov. 29, 1988. NO.
4. WON the trial court was correct in issuing a writ of execution pending appeal.
NO. [main for SCA]
RATIO:
#1 THERE WAS NO PERFECTION OF APPEAL YET

An appeal is perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any
party. It is not perfected on the date the notice of appeal was filed.

In the present case, Bunye & Bagtas had up to January 18, 1989 within which to
appeal and Valencia had up to January 25, 1989. The motion for execution was
filed by Bunye & Bagtas on January 17, 1989, before the expiration of the last day
to appeal by any of the parties.

The fact that plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on January 16, 1989 did not result in
the perfection of the appeal.

Despite Valencias having filed his notice of appeal, Bunye & Bagtas could still
have availed of the right, up to their last day to appeal which was January 18,
1989, to also file their notice of appeal or to file a motion for new trial or to move

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

for execution as in fact they did, since Valencias appeal had not yet been
perfected.
#2 ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL BY RTC IS IMPROPER [main]

In order that there may be a discretionary issuance of a writ of execution pending

appeal the following requisites must be satisfied, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court: (a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to
the adverse party; (b) There must be a good reason for issuing the writ of
execution; and (c) The good reason must be stated in a special order.

In the case at bar, the ground relied upon by the trial court in allowing the
immediate execution is the filing of a bond by Bunye & Bagtas.
o The rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful
party is NOT a good reason for ordering execution pending appeal.

Roxas v. CA: Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons must

exist to justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and
justice, it may well become a tool of oppression and inequity. But to
consider the mere posting of a bond a "good reason" would precisely
make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the
rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be executed
immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that the
prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to answer for the
damages that might result therefrom

The exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, the existence of good
reasons is principally what confers such discretionary power. Absent any such
good reason, the special order of execution must be struck down for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
o The courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which
has not acquired a final character. Section 2 of Rule 39 which authorizes the
discretionary execution of judgments, being an exception to the general rule,
must be restrictively construed.

Likewise, awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be the subject of
execution pending appeal.
o Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) vs. Lantin: The
existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal
relation to the petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of the
assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all,
while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary
damages.
Anent the issue of the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari to assail an order
for execution pending appeal [SCA part]

Jaca et al. vs. Davao Lumber Company: Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked
when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
(ordinary) course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the
ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a
party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and

sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually
determines the propriety of certiorari.
o Thus, in the case at bar, certiorari lies against an order granting execution
pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons.
o Also, the fact that the losing party had appealed from the judgment does not
bar the certiorari action filed in CA as the appeal could not be an adequate
remedy from such premature execution.
o Moreover, the filing of supersedeas bond to prevent execution pending
appeal does not entitle Valencia to the suspension of execution as a matter of
right. It cannot, therefore, be categorically considered as a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed resolutions of CA
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution issued by the trial court
is hereby ANNULLED. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued against the
said order and writ is hereby made permanent.

7. National Electrification Administration v. CA (RS)

GR L-32490 | 12/29/1983 | Melencio-Herrera, J.
Petitioners: Natl Elec. Admin. (NEA), rep. by Administrator Lopez (Now Dumol)
Respondents: CA, Hon. Bello (Judge, CFI-Lingayen, Pangasinan), Rural Power
Corporation (RPC), Sps. Eusebio and Lourdes Ferrer (Sps. Ferrer), Eduardo Ferrer
(Eduardo)
SUMMARY
Rural Power executed 3 real estate mortgages (REMs) in favor of NEA in the sum of
P985K. Due to alleged violations of the conditions in the mortgage deed, NEA
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Rural Power then instituted a civil suit
against NEA. Hon. Bello issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as regards the public
auction of the properties related to the REMs. NEA filed a notice of appeal and a
Records of Appeal, which was disapproved by Hon. Bello. Thereafter, NEA filed an
Amended Records of Appeal pursuant to Hon. Bellos Order disapproving the first
Records of Appeal. NEA did not file an MR of this later Order, but instead filed a
Petition for certiorari with the CA, which, however, denied the petition. WN the CA
gravely abused their discretion in holding that NEAs omission to move for
reconsideration before the Trial Court prior to filing a petition for certiorari and
mandamus was fatal to the petition. YES. Whatever defects the original Record on
Appeal may have contained had been cured in the Amended Record on Appeal by
NEAs prayer that all the documentary and oral evidence be elevated to the CA as
expressly provided for by 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the eyes of
the law, the two disputed Orders were patent nullities, thus excepting the instant
case from the general rule that before certiorari or mandamus may be availed of
petitioner must first file a Motion for Reconsideration. Further, public interest
being involved, a Motion for Read consideration need not be availed of.
Furthermore, a Motion for Reconsideration is no longer a prerequisite where

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

there is urgent necessity and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government.
FACTS

Petition for certiorari under RA 5440 (as amended by a.a.b. RA 6038) in

relation to Rule 45 (R45) of the Rules of Court, to review the CA Decision
dated August 17, 1970, which denied the petition in said case, and dissolving
the Writ of Preliminary injunction issued in connection therewith on June 3,
1970.

6/14/1965 RPC, Sps. Ferrer and Eduardo (hereinafter referred to as Rural

Power) executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) in favor of NEA in the sum
of P985K for the purpose of improving the formers services to the public.
o Rural Power was required to execute 2 other REMs to secure 2
other loans for the amounts of P98K and P81K, but said amounts
were never released.
o Of the 3 deeds of mortgages, only the first in the amount of P985K
has been the object of implementation
o
The mortgage deed provided for a "program of world divided into
Phases A, B and C and pursuant thereto P68,000.00 was released
on July 8, 1965, P247,000.00 on September 19, 1965, and
(P125,000.00 on January 16, 1966, with deductions for expenses,
interests, and insurance. Among the conditions of the mortgage
were that the amount to be released to Rural Power would be
utilized for the "purposes therein specified subject to availability of
funds", and "that the respondents shall adhere strictly with the
program of work and specifications attached to the deed."

5/11/1969 Due to alleged violations of the conditions above, NEA instituted

extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the deed of REM for the
amount of P985K
o Sheriff of Alaminos set the sale of the properties for public auction .

4/24/1969 Rural Power initiated a civil case before the CFI-Pangasinan for
injunction, release of sum of money, cancellation of mortages, and damages.
o Respondent Hon. Bello issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
stopping the auction sale and subsequently decided in favor of Rural
Power after trial on the mertis.

12/23/1969 NEA filed notice of appeal and appeal bond

1/3/1970 NEA filed Record of Appeal, which was disapproved by Hon. Bello
in an Order dated 1/14/1970 for alleged non-compliance with 6, Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court and directed NEA to comply therewith and file an
Amended Record on Appeal.

2/13/1970 NEA filed an Amended Record on Appeal supplying the

deficiencies with the prayer that "all oral and documentary evidence
presented in the instant case be elevated together with all the records to the
Court of Appeals".
o Again, Hon. Bello disapproved the Amended Record on Appeal for
alleged non-compliance with Section 6 of Rule 41 of the Revised
Rules of Court in an Order, dated 3/4/1970
o NEA did not file an MR of this Order

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

5/27/1970 NEA filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with Prelim.
Injunction before the CA.
o However, the CA ruled that the failure of NEA to ask Hon. Bello to
reconsider his Order of 3/4/1970 before resorting to the remedies of
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction was "fatal" to
petitioner's position

ISSUE:

WN CA gravely abused its discretion in holding that NEAs omission to move

for reconsideration before the Trial Court prior to filing a petition for certiorari
and mandamus was fatal to the petition. - YES

This issue would, in turn, hinge on the question of WN Hon. Bello committed
grave abuse of discretion in disapproving NEAs Record on Appeal and the
subsequent Amended Record on Appeal. - YES
HELD
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of respondent Appellate Court
(former Special 8th Division), dated August 17, 1970, is hereby annulled and the
Regional Trial Court corresponding to the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Lingayen Branch) is hereby directed to transmit the entire original record of the case
to the Intermediate Appellate Court (the Record on Appeal having been eliminated by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).
RATIO
1. First of all, Hon. Bellos Order of January 14, 1970 as well as that of March 4,
1970 disapproving NEAs original and amended Record on Appeal,
respectively, for alleged non- compliance with 6 of Rule 41 were both vague
because they did not specify the requirements not complied with nor the
errors or additions that had to be corrected or added.
a. As the CA had observed "it is possible that the respondent Judge
was referring to deficiencies other than that specified in (the) order of
January 14, 1970". Hence, petitioner cannot be faulted if its
Amended Record on Appeal did not meet the standards set by the
Trial Judge as there weren't any.
2. Secondly, whatever defects the original Record on Appeal may have
contained had been cured in the Amended Record on Appeal by NEAs
prayer that all the documentary and oral evidence be elevated to the CA as
expressly provided for by 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
a. Therefore, Hon. Bellos disputed Order of March 4, 1970 again
disapproving the Amended Record on Appeal on the same ground of
alleged non- compliance with 6, Rule 41 was arbitrary and
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
b. In the eyes of the law, the two disputed Orders were patent
nullities, thus excepting the instant case from the general rule
that before certiorari or mandamus may be availed of petitioner
must first file a Motion for Reconsideration.
c. In other words, Hon. Bello, in effect, deprived NEA of its right to
Appeal and other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

3.

4.

5.

ordinarily course of law, hence, making NEAs resort to the instant

petition a virtual necessity.
d. People v. Palacio a Motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with if under the circumstances, such as in the case
at bar, it would have been lifeless.
Third, NEA is a government corporation performing governmental functions
pursuant to Republic Act, No. 2717, as amended. Public interest being
involved, a Motion for Read consideration need not be availed of.
Fourth, NEA averred that time was of the essence because respondents were
in the process of executing the assailed judgment of the Trial Court with
precipitate haste, the enforcement of which would have impaired petitioner
corporation's operations and funds.
a. Vivo vs. Cloribel and Bache and Co. (Phil). Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Ruiz
this Court held that a Motion for Reconsideration is no longer
a prerequisite where there is urgent necessity and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.
Finally, to sustain Rural Power's stand would be to put a premium on
procedural technicality, which should not be made to prevail over NEAs
substantive right to appeal.
a. Considering the fact that the two Records on Appeal were totally
unopposed by Rural Power and that giving the appeal due course
would not have prejudiced its rights nor substantially affected the
merits of the case, the spirit of liberality which animates the Rules
rather than strict technicality would be more in keeping with the ends
of justice. As this Court, speaking through Justice Moreland, in the
case of Alonzo vs. Villamor, said:
i. The error in toes case is purely technical, To take
advantage of it rather than to cure it, does not appeal to a
fair sense of justice. Its present. ration as fatal to the
plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is
not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a
contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays
before the court the facts in issue, and then brushing aside
as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels are not to be won by the
rapier's thrust. Technicality when it deserts its proper office
as an aid to justice becomes its great hindrance and
enemy, and deserves scant consideration from the courts.
There are no vested rights in technicalities.

8. Uy Kiao v. Lee (RT)

G.R. No. 176831| January 15, 2010
Petitioner: UY KIAO ENG
Respondent: NIXON LEE
SUMMARY

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic
will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent
Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that
probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. W/N the petition for
mandamus is the proper remedy? NO.
The Rules of Court does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the
allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. There being a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the
subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that
respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition.
FACTS:
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a
holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother,
respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to
produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted.
Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the
patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but
petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner posited that the same be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance
with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in
custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She,
moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his
siblings.
As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the
will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further
contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably
settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had
in her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces
of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial
and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove
that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the
writ of mandamus.
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. In its February 4, 2005
Order, however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on
September 20, 2005. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006,
the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus
would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and
sufficient to afford redress.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

 Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father,
respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or
probate of the holographic will.
The CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed
to present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original
copy of the will. 1avvphi1
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August
23, 2006 Amended Decision, granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued
the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It
ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his
mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007
Resolution.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy? NO.
RATIO:
The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the
writ is directed or from operation of law.
This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes
the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of
duties in which the public has no interest.
The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to
compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs,
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law.
Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to
which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical
question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.
As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.

68

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used
to enforce contractual obligations.
o Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will
not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or
quasi-public duty is imposed.
o The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ
of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice
would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and
to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.
o To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.
o In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified
as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is
generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of
mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
Case at bar
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the
production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however,
does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the
15
will whether the same is in his possession or not.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the
16
production of the original holographic will.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.
15

Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
16

SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the
testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.A person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows
of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death
of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within
such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding
sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects without
reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until
he delivers the will.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil
Case No. 01100939 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED.
9. Romys Freight Service v. Castro (MB)
Petitioner: Romys Freight Service, represented by Roman G. Cruz
st
Respondent: Jesus C. Castro, Dominador Veloria and 1 Division of the Court of
Appeals

G.R. No. 141637. June 8, 2006

Corona, J.
SUMMARY:
Private respondents Castro (supervisor) and Veloria (senior mechanic) filed a petition
for illegal dismissal against Romys Freight Service owned by Cruz. They alleged that
they were constructively dismissed for failure to report to work due to health-related
absences. LA ruled for Castro and Veloria. NLRC reversed the LA ruling. Castro and
Veloria filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA ascribing GADALEJ on
the NLRC. CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari filed by Romys Freight Service which claims that (1) the CAs taking
cognizance of the private respondents petition for certiorari was improper and that (2)
the monetary awards granted the employees were improper. The SC ruled for private
respondents stating:
(1) Private respondents petition for certiorari to the CA is proper even if no
motion for reconsideration had been filed by them with the NLRC because the
issue was impressed with public interest.
(2) Romys Freight Services present petition for certiorari must fail because:
a. An inquiry into factual matters (such as whether private respondents
were illegally dismissed or abandoned their work and whether they
were entitled to backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and
attorneys fees) cannot be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari.
b. Petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving just cause for
terminating the employment of private respondents.
FACTS:

This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed jointly by
private respondents Jesus C. Castro and Dominador Veloria against Romys
Freight Service, represented by Roman G. Cruz (owner/sole proprietor) with
the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Baguio City.

Castro was hired by Romys Freight Service as a mechanic.

o He was promoted to supervisor.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

He suffered a stroke. On his doctors advice, he took a leave of

absence from work. Pending recovery, he extended his leave
several times.
o While on leave, however, petitioner Roman G. Cruz sent him several
letters first urging him to return to work. The succeeding ones
assumed the nature of show cause letters requiring him to explain
why he should not be disciplined for his prolonged absence. Cruz
also filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft against him.
o Because of these, Castro was constrained to file a case for illegal
dismissal against petitioner on the ground that Cruzs acts
constituted constructive dismissal.
Veloria was hired by petitioner in 1977 as a carpenter.
o After several years, he was promoted to mechanic and senior
mechanic.
o He figured in an accident. The overheated water coming from the
radiator of a car he was repairing spurted onto his face, burning it.
He was forced to absent himself from work to undergo recuperation.
o During his absence, he received several letters from Cruz. One letter
required him to explain the loss of several tools, another ordered him
to pay his loan and still another required him to explain his
absences. He was later charged for qualified theft of the missing
tools.
o Because of petitioners acts against him, Veloria joined Castro in
filing a case for illegal constructive dismissal against petitioner.
Cruz denied that private respondents were dismissed from their employment,
asserting that private respondents abandoned their work.
Executive labor arbiter Jesselito Latoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of
illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents the total amount
of P352,944.90, representing 13th month pay, backwages, separation pay,
premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and attorneys
fees.
o He amended the decision and increased the award to P985,529.20
to include backwages.
o Cruz appealed to the NLRC.
NLRC reversed and set aside the LAs ruling.
o It found private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and
dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.
o Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the CA. They ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC
for not finding that they were constructively dismissed by petitioner.
CA reversed and set aside the NLRC.
o Cruz failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of just
cause for dismissing private respondents, hence, it was guilty of
illegal dismissal.
o It held that their failure to report for work was for justifiable reasons
and that they had no intention to sever their employment.
o Cruz MR denied.
o

Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus,
the Court grants the demurrer.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the petition for certiorari of private respondents should have been
dismissed outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the
NLRC before filing the petition for certiorari with the CA. --- NO
2. W/N the CA erred when it adopted the findings of the labor arbiter that private
respondents were constructively dismissed, instead of the contrary finding of
the NLRC. --- NO
3. W/N the CA erred when it awarded 13th month pay, backwages, separation
pay and attorneys fees to Castro and 13th month pay, backwages, premium
pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and attorneys fees to
Veloria. --- NO
HELD:

Petition is DISMISSED.

CA decision is AFFIRMED.
B.
RATIO:
1. Private respondents certiorari to the CA is proper even if no motion for
reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.

As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 can be resorted to.

Private respondents petition for certiorari before the CA was covered by the
exceptions.

The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e.,
whether private respondents were constructively dismissed without just
cause, was also the very same issue raised before the NLRC and resolved by
it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
private respondents was impressed with public interest.
2. Petitioners present petition for certiorari fails because:
A. An inquiry into factual matters cannot be a proper subject of a petition
for certiorari.
o The other issues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether private respondents
were illegally dismissed or abandoned their work and whether they were
entitled to backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorneys
fees, are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. They involve an
inquiry into factual matters.
o The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of
law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion.
o The phrase grave abuse of discretion has a precise meaning in law,
denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal

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hostility." It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a

mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties respective evidence
or the evaluation of their relative weight.
o The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
parties and analyze, assess and weigh them all over again to ascertain if
the trial court or quasi-judicial agency and the appellate court were
correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of
one party or the other.
o The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of
public respondents evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings
based thereon.
o Therefore, the present petition for certiorari fails insofar as it questions
the affirmation by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that
private respondents were illegally dismissed, entitling them to an award
of backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorneys fees.
Petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving just cause for terminating
the employment of private respondents.

10. DBP vs PINGOL (LL)

G.R. No. 145908 | January 22, 2004
Petitioner: Development BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: PINGOL LAND TRANSPORT SYSTEM COMPANY, INC., REMEDIOS
D. PINGOL (Chairman of the Board of PLTSCI), JESUSITO L. PINGOL (President)
and JOSEPHINE PINGOL-SILO (Treasurer)
Summary: PLTSCI executed a chattel mortgage over certain air-conditioned buses in
favor of DBP to secure payment for its loans. After PLTSCI defaulted in payment, DBP
applied for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. PLTSCI filed with
the Makati RTC a complaint for damages with injunction seeking the annulment of the
foreclosure and seizure of its buses. PLTSCI filed another complaint for annulment of
foreclosure and/or auction sale, replevin and damages before the RTC Naga. Naga
RTC issued the assailed Order annulling the writ of replevin and denied the motion to
dismiss of petitioner ratiocinating that no pending case exists at the time PLTSCI filed
the complaint with the Naga court considering that the prior motion to withdraw the
complaint filed by Jesusito Pingol terminated all the proceedings before the Makati
court. CA dismissed petition for certiorari filed by DBP, ruling that assuming that the
Naga court committed an error in not granting the motion to dismiss, said error is an
error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari. SC found
PLTSCI guilty of forum shopping. What highlights the error of the CA in not dismissing
the complaint before the Naga court is the fact that PLTSCI withdrew its appeal from
the decision of the Makati RTC. Said withdrawal had the effect of rendering final and
executory the decision of the Makati court. This is obviously a species of res judicata,
specifically, bar by former judgment. The judgment on the merits rendered by the
Makati court constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent action before the Naga court.
The remedy of certiorari is therefore proper to assail the patently null order of the Naga

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Where the questioned order is a
patent nullity, or where it was issued in excess or without jurisdiction, resort to
certiorari may be allowed. Here, the violation of the rule on forum shopping is obvious.
Disregarding such fact constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is CA decision which

dismissed the petition for certiorari questioning the Order of the RTC Naga
denying petitioners motion to dismiss.

Respondent Pingol Land Transport System Company, Inc. (PLTSCI), a

domestic corporation, obtained loans from petitioner Development Bank of
the Philippines in the total amount of P20 Million. To secure the payment
thereof, PLTSCI executed, among others, a chattel mortgage over certain airconditioned buses in favor of petitioner.

After PLTSCI defaulted in the payment of its loans, petitioner applied for the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties

PLTSCI filed with the RTC Makati a complaint for damages with injunction
against petitioner seeking the annulment of the foreclosure and seizure of its
buses and the issuance of a restraining order and/or injunction to prevent
their sale at public auction. Meanwhile foreclosure sale proceeded with
petitioner being declared as highest bidder.

Jesusito filed "Motion to Withdraw Complaint but failed to show authorization

to do so upon court order.

PLTSCI filed another complaint against petitioner for annulment of foreclosure

and/or auction sale, replevin and damages before the RTC Naga. The
complaint was based on the same facts alleged case pending before the
Makati RTC, except that in the latter complaint, PLTSCI prayed for the
issuance of a writ of replevin to recover the buses foreclosed by petitioner.

RTC Naga issued the assailed Order annulling a writ of replevin which was
previously issued, directing sheriff to repossess the subject 19 vehicles and
deliver such to DBP. Judge ruled that the replevin bond posted by PLTSCI
was inefficacious because the officer of Utility Assurance Corporation who
signed the replevin bond had no authority to do so.
o Nevertheless, RTC Naga denied the motion to dismiss prayed for by
petitioners ratiocinating that no pending case exists at the time
PLTSCI filed the complaint with the Naga court considering that the
prior motion to withdraw the complaint filed by Jesusito Pingol
terminated all the proceedings before the Makati court. Judge
Malaya held that said complaint can be withdrawn as a matter of
right because the same was filed before the petitioner filed its
answer.

Petitioner elevated case to CA via petition for certiorari when its MR was
denied contending, among others, that Judge Malaya gravely abused his
discretion in not dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum shopping.

In the meantime, the Makati RTC denied motion to withdraw the complaint for
failure to submit a Board Resolution authorizing him to withdraw the same
Makati RTC rendered a decision ordering PLTSCI to pay petitioner the

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outstanding balance of its loan. The said decision was assailed on certiorari
by PLTSCI to the CA.
Both cases elevated to CA were consolidated. CA issued a Resolution
granting PLTSCIs motion to withdraw. It also dismissed the petition for
certiorari, ruling that assuming that the Naga court committed an error in not
granting the motion to dismiss, said error is an error of judgment and not an
error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.
Hence, petitioner DBP filed the instant petition.

ISSUES: (1) W/N CA erred in sustaining the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss
YES
(2) if in the affirmative, W/N such an error is correctible by certiorari YES
RATIO:
CA ERRED IN SUSTAINING RTCS DENIAL OF MTD

Forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment.

In the case at bar, the principal parties in the two complaints filed before the
Makati and Naga courts were the same, i.e., PLTSCI and petitioner DBP as
well as their officers. Both cases arose from the same loan and mortgage
contracts; and both complaints filed by PLTSCI seek to annul the foreclosure
and sale at public auction of the foreclosed buses, except that in the
complaint before the Naga court, PLTSCI included an additional prayer for the
issuance of a writ of replevin. Evidently, this is a clear case of forum shopping
as the judgment in the Makati RTC would constitute a bar to the suit before
the Naga court.

What highlights the error of the Court of Appeals in not dismissing the
complaint before the Naga court is the fact that PLTSCI withdrew its appeal
from the decision of the Makati RTC. Said withdrawal had the effect of
rendering final and executory the decision of the Makati court which (1)
dismissed PLTSCIs complaint to recover damages and to annul the
foreclosure and sale of its buses; and (2) ordered PLTSCI to pay the balance
of the loan plus damages for filing a clearly baseless and unfounded suit.

This is obviously a species of res judicata, specifically, "bar by former

judgment," which exists when, between the first case where the judgment was
rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The judgment on the
merits rendered by the Makati court constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent action before the Naga court.

Rules of Civil Procedure which allows the dismissal of the complaint by the
plaintiff as a matter of right at any time before service of the answer, is not
applicable in the instant case because Jesusito Pingol who signed the motion
to withdraw the complaint failed to present a Board Resolution authorizing
him to withdraw the complaint filed by PLTSCI. Being a corporation, the latter
has a personality separate and distinct from Jesusito Pingol.

Petitioners claim for damages, caused by PLTSCIs filing of a baseless suit,

cannot be decided without going through the merits of the complaint filed by

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PLTSCI. Moreover, petitioners counterclaim cannot stand independently from

PLTSCIs complaint as petitioners claim is dependent on the validity of sale
and foreclosure which PLTSCI branded as illegal. This justified the Makati
courts denial of the motion to withdraw the complaint.
PETITIONER CORRECTLY RESORTED TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Basic is the doctrine that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being
interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari; it cannot be the subject of
appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered. But this rule is not absolute.

Even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, the Supreme Court
has allowed a writ of certiorari (1) where the appeal does not constitute a
speedy and adequate remedy, as where 33 appeals were involved from
orders issued in a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a
proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin; (2) where the orders were
also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction; (3) for certain special
considerations, as public welfare or public policy (Jose vs. Zulueta); (4) where
in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as,
in case of acquittal there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent
nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future
litigations.

Indeed, where the questioned order is a patent nullity, or where it was issued
in excess or without jurisdiction, resort to certiorari may be allowed. Here, the
violation of the rule on forum shopping is obvious. Disregarding such fact
constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The remedy of certiorari is therefore proper to
assail the patently null order of the Naga court which denied petitioners
motion to dismiss.
HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint before RTC Naga is
DISMISSED.

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

RULE 65: PROHIBITION

Section 2. Petition for prohibition.
When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
XXX
11. Matuguina Integrated Wood Products v. CA (JM)
G.R. No. 98310
October 24, 1996
Petitioner: MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC
Respondents: The HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DAVAO ENTERPRISES
CORPORATION, The HON. MINISTER, (NOW SECRETARY) of NATURAL
RESOURCES AND PHILLIP CO
Ponente: J. Torres Jr.
Summary:
A timber license was issued to Milagros to operate logging businesses under her sole
proprietorship venture MLE. Thereafter, MIWPI was established with 7 stockholders,
Milagros becoming the majority stockholder later on. Milagros then petitioned to have
the timber license be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLEs petition,
DAVENCOR filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester alleging that
Milagros/MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs timber
concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had
recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case
to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares
from MIWPI. Later, Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to
the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI
to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The
Minister then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for
prohibition before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered
to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed
and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. Now MIWPI is contending that it is not a
party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued a separate entity). That the
issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not only without or in

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excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without any factual or
legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs constitutional rights under the due
process clause.
The sc ruled that failure to afford MIPWI the opportunity to be heard in the
administrative level could not have been cured by the institution of the action for
prohibition in the trial court because said court had no jurisdiction to determine whether
MIPWI was guilty of encroachment on Davencors timber concession. Prohibition is a
remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. In a
certiorari or prohibition case, only issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board
and offices involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts. In the instant
case, the issue of whether MIPWI is an alter ego of Milagros/MLE is one of fact, and
which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and not in the
prohibition proceedings of the trial court.
FACTS:

Acting Director of the Bureau of Forest Development issued Provisional Timber

License (PTL) No. 30, covering an area of 5,400 hectares to Milagros Matuguina
who was then doing business under the name of MLE, a sole proprietorship
venture.
o A portion of the said area was located within the territorial boundary of Gov.
Generoso in Mati, Davao Oriental, and adjoined the timber concession of
Davao Enterprises Corporation (DAVENCOR).

Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI) was incorporated, having an

authorized capital stock of Ten Million Pesos.
o Milagros became the majority stockholder of MIWPI when Henry Wees
1Million shares were transferred to her, thus giving her 70% stock ownership.

Milagros then requested the Director of Forest Development (DFD) for a change
of name and transfer of management of PTL No. 30, from a single proprietorship
under her name, to that of MIWPI.

In the meantime, Milagros executed a Deed of Transfer transferring all of her

rights, interests, ownership and participation in PTL No. 30 to MIPWI in
consideration of 148,000 shares of stocks in MIWPI.
o A copy of said deed was submitted to the DFD, and MIWPI had since been
acting as holder and licensee of PTL No. 30.

District Forester: Pending approval of the request to transfer the PTL to MIWPI,
DAVENCOR complained to the District Forester at Mati, Davao Oriental that
Milagros/MLE had encroached into and was conducting logging operations in
DAVENCORs timber concession.
o After the Investigating Committee submitted its report to the Director, the DFD
issued an Order finding and declaring MLE to have encroached upon and
conducted illegal logging operations within the licensed or concession area of
DAVENCOR.

Ministry of Natural Resources: MLE appealed the Order to the Ministry of

Natural Resources. During the pendency of the appealed case with the Minister,
Milagros disposed of her shares in MIWPI, thereby ceasing to be a stockholder.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda rendered his

Decision, affirming the order of the DFD.

Matuguina is ordered to pay DAVENCOR the equivalent value in pesos

of 2,352.04 cubic meters of timber based on the market price obtaining.
She is directed to comply with this Order within 90 days from receipt, and
after the lapse, MLEs logging operations shall ipso facto become
automatically suspended until she shall have complied as directed. (Note
that Matuguina is the one directed in the Decision)
o When the Decision of the Minister became final and executory, Philip Co and
DAVENCOR requested the Minister to issue immediately a writ of execution
against MLE and/or MIWPI. The Order of Execution was issued which
directed the issuance of a writ of execution, not only against MLE, but
likewise against MIWPI.
o Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued in favor of DAVENCOR.
RTC: And so, MIWPI filed a complaint for prohibition, damages and injunction,
with prayer for restraining order in the RTC Davao City.
o MIWPIs Contentions: (among others)

MIWPI which has a distinct and separate personality of its own under the
law, and was never a party to the case between DAVENCOR and MLE,
suddenly became a party to the case after the decision became final and
executory.

Minister is doing, threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering

to be done, some act which definitely is in violation of the MIWPIs rights
respecting the subject matter of the action, and unless said act or acts
are restrained or prohibited at least during the pendency of this case,
said act or acts would probably work not only injustice to MIWPI but
would tend to render the judgment of the RTC ineffectual.
o Trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining DAVENCOR and
the Secretary of Natural Resources from enforcing, implementing and/or
carrying into effect, the decision of as well as the order of execution.
o DAVENCOR filed a Motion to Dismiss but this was denied. And so, it filed an
Answer, stating the following special and affirmative defenses: (among
others)

Neither Milagros nor MIWPI advised Davencor of the change of name,

and transfer of management of PTL No. 30. from Milagros to MIWPI
during the pendency of MNR Case No. 6540 before the Bureau of Forest
Develoment and the Ministry of Natural Resources, notwithstanding that
the lawyer of MIWPI who was also a stockholder thereof, had appeared
for Milagros in said administrative case.

That MIWPI has acted in bad faith and is now in estoppel from
questioning the Writ of Execution issued against Milagros (now MIWPI)
to satisfy the judgment in MNR Case No. 6540.

The RTC has no jurisdiction because MIWPI has not exhausted

administrative remedies available to it before initiating this action.
o Meanwhile, the trial court issued an order granting MIWPIs prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
o RTC rendered its Decision in favor of MIWPI.

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The order of execution issued by the Minister of Natural Resources included

MIWPI despite its non-inclusion in the decision of the then Minister of Natural
Resources. Said order or execution is hereby declared null and void.
CA: Reversed.
o The Order of Execution issued by the Minister of Natural Resources is
affirmed.
o MIWPIs MR was denied.
Hence this Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUES:
5. WON MIWPI was denied due process when it was adjudged liable with MLE for
encroaching upon the timber concession of DAVENCOR in the Minister's Order of
Execution. YES. [main for SCA]
6. WON MIWPI is a transferee of MLE's interest, as to make it liable for the latters
illegal logging operations in DAVENCORs timber concession. NO.
RATIO:
#1 MIWPI WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS [main]

Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any

proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound
by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, an execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.
o Lorenzo vs. Cayetano: only real parties in interest in an action are bound by
judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant
thereto.

A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. A decision of a
court will not operate to divest the rights of a person who has not and has never
been a party to a litigation, either as plaintiff or as defendant. Execution of a
judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not
against one who, not being a party in the action has not yet had his day in court.

The writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be

executed, as it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.
Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment which sought to be
executed.
o Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life
and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to
ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property
without due process of law.

The writ of execution issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources clearly varies
the term of his Decision, inasmuch as the Writ includes the MIWPI as party liable
whereas the Decision only mentions Milagros/MLE.
o There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against MIWPI.
The same was issued without giving it an opportunity to defend itself
and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of
execution against it.
o In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of
DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Honorable
Secretarys decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

order of execution by Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI

are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs letter
requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. This
action of the Secretary disregards the most basic tenets of due process and
elementary fairness.

The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative

proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of
fact before hearing all the parties concerned. The right to notice and hearing is
essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the
administrative proceedings.
o Appellant [DAVENCOR] should have filed a Motion with the Minister with
Notice to the appellee [MIWPI] to include the latter as party liable for the
judgment in order to afford the appellee an opportunity to be heard on its
liability for the judgment rendered against Milagros doing business under the
name Matuguina Logging Enterprises.
[SCA part]

HOWEVER, the failure to comply with the procedure in order to satisfy the
requirements of due process was NOT cured by the present action for prohibition
where the liability of MIWPI has been ventilated.

Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons

from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
vested by law.
o Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople: in a certiorari or prohibition case, only
issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board and offices involved may
be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.

The issue of whether or not MAWPI is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is

one of fact, and which should have been threshed out in the administrative
proceedings, and not in the prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is
precisely the failure of the Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated
by law in the execution of its order which is under scrutiny.
#2 THERE IS NO NEED TO PIERCE THE VEIL OF MIWPIS CORPORATE EXISTENCE. IT IS NOT A
MERE CONDUIT OR SUCCESSOR OF MLE.

Assuming that prohibition is the proper remedy for determining the propriety of
piercing the separate personality of MIWPI with its stockholders, the evidence
presented at said trial does not warrant such action.

It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct

from that of persons composing it. But when the juridical personality of the
corporation is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend crime, the corporation shall be considered as a mere association of
persons and its responsible officers and/or stockholders shall be individually liable.
o For the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the
wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.

In the case at bar, there is insufficient basis for the appellate courts ruling that
MIWPI is the same as Milagros/MLE. DAVENCORs arguments do not at all
indicate that such a legal fiction was granted.

In the first place the alleged control of Milagros was not evident in any of
MPWIs particular corporate acts, wherein Milagros/MLE using MIPWI,
executed acts or powers directly involving the corporation.
o Neither was there any evidence that Milagros, using the facilities and
resources of MIPWI, involved itself in transaction using both MLE and MIPWI
in such particular line of business undertakings.

There is no evidence presented that during the subject decision of Hon.

Secretary of Natural Resources and corresponding writ of execution,
Milagros was a stockholder of MIPWI in such amount or was she an
officer of MIPWI in whatever capacity.
o Yet, granting that in 1974 or in 1975, Milagros became the controlling
stockholder, this circumstance, does not of itself prove that MIPWI was the
alter ego of Milagros.

Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all

or nearly all of the capital stocks of the corporation, is not itself a
sufficient warrant for disregarding the fiction of separate personality.
It is likewise improper to state that the MIWPI is the privy or the successor-ininterest of MLE, as the liability for the encroachment over DAVENCORs timber
concession is concerned, by reason of the transfer of interest in PTL No. 30 from
MLE to MIWPI.
o First at all, it does not appear indubitable that the said transfer ever became
effective, since PTL No. 30 remained in the name of Milagros/MLE until it
expired.
o More importantly, even if it is deemed that there was a valid change of name
and transfer of interest in the PTL No. 30, this only signifies a transfer of
authority, from MLE to MIWPI, to conduct logging operations in the area
covered by PTL No. 30. It does not show indubitable proof that MIWPI was a
mere conduit or successor of Milagros/MLE, as far the latters liability for the
encroachment upon DAVENCORs concession is concerned. This is the only
conclusion which we can discern from the language of Section 61 of P.D.
705, and the letters of the Acting Minister of Natural Resources to
Milagros/MLE and to MIWPI.

Even if it is mandated in Section 61 of P.D. 705 that the transferee shall

assume all the obligations of the transferor this does not mean that all
obligations are assumed, indiscriminately.

The term obligations as used in the final clause of the second

paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those
obligations incurred by the transferor in the ordinary course of business.
It cannot be construed to mean those obligations or liabilities incurred by
the transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are
personal obligations of the transferor, and could not have been included
in the term obligations absent any modifying provision to that effect.

Accordingly, the letter's language implies that the obligations which

MIWPI are to assume as transferee of Milagros /MLE are those
obligations in favor of the government only, and not to any other entity.
Thus this would include Forestry Charges, Taxes, Fees, and similar
accountabilities.

Conclusion:

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

1.

2.

The Honorable Minister of Natural Resources gravely abuse its discretion when it
issued its Order of Execution, including therein as one of the parties liable MIPWI
which was never a party to the assailed proceeding resulting in the issuance of
such Order and, without affording the same an opportunity to be heard before it
was adjudged liable.
MIPWI is a corporate entity separate and distinct from Milagros/MLE, there being
no clear basis for considering it as a mere conduit or alter ego of Milagros/MLE,
and therefore, cannot be made liable for the obligations of the same for
encroachment over the timber concession of DAVENCOR.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed resolutions of CA

are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution issued by the trial court
is hereby ANNULLED. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued against the
said order and writ is hereby made permanent.
12. MORFE V. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF CALOOCAN (RS)
GR L-46604|April 29, 1939|Villa-real, J.
Petitioners: Francisco Morfe, Catalino Bolos
Respondents: Justice of the Peace (JOP) of Caloocan, Rizal, and Albino Celestino,
Ricardo Celestino
SUMMARY
Cases for estafa was filed against Morfe. Cases for less serious physical injuries were
filed against Morfe and Bolos for allegedly inflicting harm on Albino and Ricardo, both
surnamed Celestino (Respondents). Also, a case for less serious physical injuries was
filed against Respondents for allegedly harming Morfe. All accused pleaded not guilty.
Criminal cases for less serious physical injuries against Morfe and Bolos were not
called for trial immediately because the respondents were confined at PGH. Cases
against the Petitioners and the Respondents were not called for trial because of
postponements sought by Atty. Valencia. Respondents announced their intention to file
complaints for frustrated murder against the Petitioners, and by agreement of the
parties the trial of case for less serious physical injuries was postponed. Complaints for
frustrated murder were filed with the JOP in place of those for less serious physical
injuries. Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction and competency of said JOP to receive
said complaints. WN the facts alleged in the petition for prohibition and mandamus are
sufficient to justify the granting of the remedies prayed for. NO. The remedy of
prohibition has for its object that of preventing an inferior tribunal in the proper
case, as a JOP court, from executing or continuing to execute an act in excess
of its jurisdiction, when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. The respondent JOP had and has the power to
dismiss the complaints for less serious physical injuries either on petition of the
complainants or upon his own for the reason that the cognizance and decision
of the crime of less serious physical injuries complained of are within his
jurisdiction. He also has authority to receive and docket the new complaints for
frustrated murder in place of the former ones, which were filed by the same
respondents against the petitioners, and to conduct only the summary and preliminary
investigation inasmuch as it is not within his jurisdiction to take cognizance of
complaints or informations for the crime of frustrated murder or decide the same, but
within that of the proper CFI.

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FACTS

To prevent the respondent JOP of Caloocan, Rizal, from receiving and

docketing or continuing to take cognizance of the complaints for frustrated
murder filed by the respondents against the petitioners after the complaints
for less serious physical injuries against the same petitioners had been
dismissed; and to compel said respondent JOP to hear and decide on its
merits and without further delay criminal case No. 10476 entitled
"People vs. Albino Celestino et al.," for less serious physical injuries, the
aforesaid petitioners Morfe and Bolos have filed the present combined
petition for prohibition and mandamus.

9/29/1938 complaint for estafa against Morfe, was filed in the JOP Court of
Coloocan, Rizal.

10/15/1938 accused was temporarily released upon filing a bond.

10/18/1938 as a result of a quarrel between Morfe and the respondents, a

complaint for less serious physical injuries was filed against the former, who
is alleged to have inflicted the same upon the persons of Albino and Ricardo
(criminal case No. 10477).
o Same day as a result of the same quarrel, a complaint also for less
serious physical injuries, was filed against the other petitioner, Bolos,
who is alleged to have inflicted the same upon the same
respondents (criminal case no. 10478).
o Same day complaint for less serious physical injuries was filed
against Albino, Felipe and Ricardo, all surnamed Celestino, who
allegedly inflicted said injuries upon the persons of Morfe (criminal
case No. 10476).

10/19/1938 The accused, having been arraigned by the reading of the

respective complaints against of them, pleaded not guilty, each giving a bond
for his temporary release.

1/19/1939 Morfe appeared in criminal case No. 10473 for estafa and asked
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the facts alleged are not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the JOP court of Coloocan, Rizal, or to
constitute the crime of estafa with which he charged. Up to the filing of the
present petition, Morfe has not been notified of any resolution on his motion
for dismissal

Criminal cases Nos. 10477 and 10478 against Morfe and Bolos, respectively,
for less serious physical injuries, were not called for trial immediately, until
December 16, 1938, for the reason that Albino and Ricardo, were then
confined in the Philippines General Hospital as a result of the injuries they
had received.
o The trial was not, however, held because Atty. Felix Valencia asked
for postponement.

1/23/1939 on motion of the offended parties Albino and Ricardo, the JOP
dismissed the criminal cases Nos. 19477 and 10478.

Criminal case No. 10476, in which Albino and Ricardo are accused, was
called for hearing on December 16, 1938; but was postponed on motion of
Atty. Felix Valencia, who appeared as private prosecutor.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The case having been again (sic) for trial on January 19, 1939, Albino and
Ricardo announced their intention to file complaints for frustrated murder
against the Petitioners, and by agreement of the parties the trial of said case
was postponed.
As one of the attorneys for the petitioners asked the provincial fiscal of Rizal
to examine the records of the criminal cases for frustrated murder, the
hearing of the case was suspended until the records were returned on March
2, 1939.
1/24/1939 complaints for frustrated murder in criminal cases Nos. 10576
and 10577 were filed with the JOP in place of those for less serious physical
injuries.
Before the JOP could issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, one of the
attorneys for the Petitioners asked the provincial fiscal to examine all the
records of the criminal cases for frustrated murder.
2/10/1939 Petitioners filed with the JOP a special appearance in which they
challenged the jurisdiction and competency of said JOP to receive said
complaints.
Up to the filing of the present petition, the said JOP has not resolved the
foregoing objection, nor has he issued any warrant of arrest in said criminal
cases for frustrated murder.

ISSUE: WN the facts alleged in the petition for prohibition and mandamus are sufficient
to justify the granting of the remedies prayed for. NO.
HELD: Wherefore, there being no merit whatever in the combined petition for
prohibition and mandamus before us, we hereby dismiss the same with costs against
the petitioners.
RATIO:

The remedy of mandamus has for its object to compel an inferior tribunal in
the proper case, as a JOP court, to comply with a function which the law
specially prescribes as a duty resulting from its office when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy (sec. 222, Code of Civil Procedure); and
that of prohibition has for its object that of preventing an inferior
tribunal in the proper case, as a JOP court, from executing or
continuing to execute an act in excess of its jurisdiction, when there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law (section 226, Code of Civil Procedure).

As to the petition for mandamus, the causes of the delay in the hearing of
criminal case No. 10476 entitled "People vs. Albino Celestino et al.," for less
serious physical injuries, against the herein Petitioners, were the
postponement prayed for by Atty. Felix Valencia, who appeared as private
prosecutor; the agreement entered into by all the parties to suspend the
hearing by reason of the announced intention of the Respondents to file a
complaint for frustrated murder against the Petitioners, and the fact that one
of the attorneys for the Petitioners asked the provincial fiscal of Rizal to
examine the records of the criminal cases for frustrated murder, agreeing to
wait for the result of the investigation.

As to that prohibition, the respondent JOP had and has the power to
dismiss the complaints for less serious physical injuries either on

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petition of the complainants or upon his own for the reason that the
cognizance and decision of the crime of less serious physical injuries
complained of are within his jurisdiction.
o He also has authority to receive and docket the new complaints for
frustrated murder in place of the former ones, which were filed by the
same respondents against the petitioners, and to conduct only the
summary and preliminary investigation inasmuch as it is not within
his jurisdiction to take cognizance of complaints or informations for
the crime of frustrated murder or decide the same, but within that of
the proper CFI.
SC thus finds that in so far as the petition for mandamus is concerned, it not
appearing that the respondent JOP has abused his discretion in not hearing
and immediately deciding criminal case No. 10476, the petition referred to is
without basis.
On the petition for prohibition, the respondent JOP having jurisdiction to
receive and docket the complaints for frustrated murder filed by the
respondents against the petitioners and to conduct the summary as well as
the preliminary investigation thereof, said petition does not likewise lie.

13. Vergara v. Rugue (RT)

G.R. No. L-32984 August 26, 1977
Petitioner: ALFONSO VERGARA
Respondents: ABRAHAM RUGUE, JUDGE JOSE S. DELA CRUZ, CFI, Manila,
Branch XIX, THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MANILA
SUMMARY
Vergara v. Rugue
G.R. No. L-32984 August 26, 1977
Petitioner: ALFONSO VERGARA
Respondents: ABRAHAM RUGUE, JUDGE JOSE S. DELA CRUZ, CFI, Manila,
Branch XIX, THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MANILA
FACTS:
The Kapisanan "Ang Buhay, Inc." executed a contract of sale on Lot No. 9, Block No.
12, in favor of the plaintiff Abraham Rugue.
Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff bound himself to pay and religiously and
regularly paid the installments that become due and payable thereon. Having thus
completed the payments constituting the purchase price of the said lot, the Land
Tenure Administration became bound to execute the corresponding document of sale
to transfer the ownership of the said lot to the plaintiff. However, before the same could
be done, one Alfonso Vergara intervened and claim preferential right over the said
property over Rugue herein. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing
the complaint for the annulment of the sale but ordering the Land Tenure
Administration to refund to Abraham Rugue all the payments that he has made on the

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

property, as well as to reimburse him for whatever improvement he has made on the
property. Vergara filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for relief from judgment; he
also filed with the lower court the corresponding motion to stay execution of judgment.
SC denied the petition for review by certiorari.
W/N the the decision of the CA is null and void and its execution can be
restrained by the extraordinary writ of prohibition.
It is petitioner's view that when the Court of Appeals in effect set aside the effects of
the decision of Executive Secretary Pajo which according to him had long become final
and executory, it exceeded or transcended its appellate jurisdiction. The thrust of his
argument is that the Court of Appeals was precluded from reviewing the decision of
Executive Secretary Pajo on the ground of res judicata.It is rather too late in the day for
petitioner to question now the lack or excess of jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in
rendering the said decision on the alleged ground that said Court is precluded from
reversing the award of the lot on the ground of res judicata. It should be obvious to
petitioner that the defense of res judicata when not interposed either in a motion to
dismiss or in an answer is deemed waived. The office of the extraordinary remedy
of prohibition is not to correct errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain
usurpation by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of
their jurisdictions. It is a preventive remedy. Its function is to restrain the doing of
some act to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished.
FACTS:

The Kapisanan "Ang Buhay, Inc." which was duly authorized by the Tuason
Estate in Sta. Mesa, Manila executed a contract of sale on a portion of the
said estate described as Lot No. 9, Block No. 12, in favor of the plaintiff
Abraham Rugue.

Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff bound himself to pay and
religiously and regularly paid the installments that become due and payable
thereon.

Having thus completed the payments constituting the purchase price of the
said lot, the Land Tenure Administration became bound to execute the
corresponding document of sale to transfer the ownership of the said lot to
the plaintiff.

However, before the same could be done, one Alfonso Vergara intervened
and claim preferential right over the said property over Rugue herein.

An investigation was conducted by the Land Tenure Administration as a result

of which the Land Tenure Administration awarded the contract in favor of the
Rugue.

An appeal from the decision of the Land Tenure Administration was taken by
defendant Alfonso Vergara to the Office of the President, which Office
reversed the decision of the Land Tenure Administration thru former
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, and awarded the contract of the said property
to the said defendant Alfonso Vergara, reserving, however, the right of
reimbursement to the plaintiff for the payments that he had made on the said
lot by virtue of the contract that was executed between him and the
representative of the government.

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After trial, the lower court ordered the Land Tenure Administration to refund to
Abraham Rugue all the payments that he has made on the property, as well
as to reimburse him for whatever improvement he has made on the property.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court.
The records of the case were remanded by the Court of Appeals to the lower
court, and Rugue filed with the lower court a motion for execution of said
decision which was granted by the trial court on. Consequently, the
corresponding order of execution was issued.
Vergara filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for relief from judgment; he
also filed with the lower court the corresponding motion to stay execution of
judgment. Per Resolution dated June 5, 1970, the Court of Appeals denied
Vergara's petition for relief from judgment.
He moved for reconsideration of said Resolution on June 24, 1970, but the
motion was likewise denied.
Forthwith, Vergara filed with this Court a petition for review by certiorari of the
decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals, with preliminary injunction.
Denied.
Vergara moved for reconsideration of the Resolution, contending that Rugue
was disqualified to purchase the lot, and that the subsequent award to him
was valid, he being qualified to acquire the property. Denied.
Undaunted, he filed a second motion for reconsideration. Denied.
This notwithstanding, Vergara filed a third motion for reconsideration.
DENIED!

THIS CASE

Apprehensive that the lower court, upon receipt of the foregoing

Resolution, would lift its order staying execution of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31186-R, petitioner filed the present
petition, contending that said decision of the Court of Appeals "was rendered
through a patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction or
excess of jurisdiction" and, consequently, the decision is null and void
and its execution can be restrained by the extraordinary writ of
prohibition.
ISSUE:
W/N the decision of the CA is null and void and its execution can be restrained by the
extraordinary writ of prohibition. NO
RATIO:

The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise

of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of
justice.

It is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for prohibition, it must

first be demonstrated that the lower court has exercised its power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual

refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
On the other hand, the term "excess of jurisdiction" signifies that the court,
board, or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended the same or
acted without any authority.
It is petitioner's view that when the Court of Appeals in effect set aside the
effects of the decision of Executive Secretary Pajo, dated June 12, 1958,
which according to him had long become final and executory, it exceeded or
transcended its appellate jurisdiction.
The thrust of his argument is that the Court of Appeals was precluded from
reviewing the decision of Executive Secretary Pajo on the ground of res
judicata a principle also applicable to judicial acts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards.
We do not think that this ingenious argument is legally tenable. It ignores the
circumstance that res judicata was never raised as a defense by the petitioner
in the afore-mentioned Civil Case No. 45780, the decision of which was
reversed by the Appellate Court, in CA-G. R. No. 31186-R.
Neither has Vergara invoked res judicata in his brief when the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 31186-R, although
extensive discussion was made thereon regarding the power of the Executive
Secretary to reverse the decision of the Chairman of the Land Tenure
Administration and the correctness and validity of the former's decision
reversing that of the latter.
Nor has he questioned, in his petition for certiorari with this Court on July 30,
1970 in G R. No. L-32309, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in reversing
the trial court's judgment.
Thus, he emphasized therein not the lack of authority of the respondent Court
of Appeals to cancel and declare null and of no effect the sale of Lot No. 9,
Block No. 12, of the Tuason Estate in Sta. Mesa, Manila, executed by the
Land Tenure Administration in favor of Alfonso Vergara, as well as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 59274 issued in Vergara's name, but the fact that the
Appellate Court "has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings".
It is rather too late in the day for petitioner to question now the lack or excess
of jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in rendering the said decision on the
alleged ground that said Court is precluded from reversing the award of the
lot on the ground of res judicata.
It should be obvious to petitioner that the defense of res judicata when not
interposed either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed waived.
Furthermore, the decision of Executive Secretary Pajo was presented as
evidence by petitioner Vergara himself Considering such circumstance and
the fact that petitioner Vergara had not invoked the defense of res judicata, it
was properly within the appellate authority of the Court of Appeals to pass
upon said decision of the Executive Secretary to ascertain whether or not the
same was supported by substantial evidence, or that said administrative
officer acted with gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

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The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions

which were in issue and adjudicated in a former action is commonly applied to
all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions "necessarily involved in an issue, and
necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although
no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although
such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually
or formally presented.
Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could
not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the
parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are
as conclusive as the judgment itself.
It is urged by petitioner that the facts of the case as stated in the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals are "mis-restated" in that there are some
portions thereof which do not reflect the true facts.
Again, it is rather too late for the petitioner to raise this point. In fact, having
adopted the very same facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals in its decision,
in his petition for certiorari with this Court in G. R. No. L-32309, he is now
estopped from raising such question. In any event, no excess or want of
jurisdiction is herein involved which would justify the availment of the
extraordinary legal remedy of prohibition.
The same conclusion is reached with regard to petitioner's contention that the
Court of Appeals erred when it honored the sale of the questioned lot in favor
of Abraham Rugue.
This is a matter that has to do with the merits of the case which
petitioner is now precluded from relitigating in view of the principle
of res judicata. Certainly, such question is not a proper subject of a
petition for prohibition.
The office of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct
errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation by inferior
tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their
jurisdictions.
It is a preventive remedy. Its function is to restrain the doing of some act to be
done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
This remedy will lie only to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation, or
improper assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or tribunal,
or to prevent some great outrage upon the settled principles of law and
procedure; but, if the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the person
and subject-matter of the controversy.
The writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to
prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment,
or even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or
the improper assumption or jurisdiction, where an adequate and applicable
remedy by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of
review are available.
It may be safely asserted as a settled law, that "unless the court sought to be
prohibited is wanting in jurisdiction over the class of cases to which the

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

pending case belongs or is attempting to act in excess of its jurisdiction in a

case of which it rightfully has cognizance, the writ will be denied."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for prohibition should be, and
it is hereby, DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
14. NACIONALISTA PARTY V. BAUTISTA (MB)
Petitioner: The Nacionalista Party
Respondent: Felix Angelo Bautista (Solicitor General of the Philippines)

G.R. No. L-3452 December 7, 1949

Padilla, J.
SUMMARY:
Felix Angelo Bautista, Solicitor General of the Philippines, was appointed by President
Quirino as acting member of the Comelec. Nacionalista Party challenges the
constitutionality of this appointment by praying for a writ of prohibition. The SC held
that:
1. Bautista's designation to act temporarily a member of the Comelec is unlawful
because it offends against the provision of the Constitution creating the Comelec.
2. No legal basis for the allegation of bad faith.
3. Nacionalista Party failed to establish that it is a real party in interest.
4. Prohibition is not the proper remedy. However, peculiar and extraordinary
circumstances are obtaining in this case. The authorities and decisions of courts
are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de
facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a
subordinate court. As no one is entitled to the office, there is no party who in his name
may institute quo warranto proceedings. Bautista, the only other party who may
institute the proceedings in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, would not
proceed against himself. Were it not for this anomalous situation where there would be
no remedy to redress a constitutional transgression, we would adhere strictly to the
time-honored rule that to test the right to an office quo warranto proceedings is the
proper remedy.
FACTS:

On 9 November 1949, while Bautista held, as he still holds, the office of

Solicitor General of the Philippines, the President designated him as acting
member of the Comelec.

On that same date Bautista took the oath of office and assumed office.

Nacionalista Party contends:

o Such designation is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because
there was no vacancy in the Comelec, for the acceptance, approval,
or granting of the application for retirement filed by Commissioner
Francisco Enage on such date constitutes or amounts to abuse of
discretion and was done in bad faith by the President and therefore
null and void.
o The allegation of bad faith is predicated upon the allegation that the
Commissioner "had voted to suspend the elections in Negros

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Occidental and Lanao and the Liberal Party fears he might vote to
annul said elections."
o Even if there was a vacancy in the Comelec, still Bautista's
designation is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because
membership in the Commission is a permanent constitutional office
with a fixed tenure, and therefore, no designation of a person or
officer in an acting capacity could and can be made.
Bautistas answer:
o His designation is lawful and valid, not only because the power to
appoint vested in the President includes the power to designate, but
also because it is expressly so provided in Commonwealth Act No.
588.
o The offices held by him, one permanent and the note temporary, are
not incompatible.
The Nacionalista Party prays that a writ of prohibition be issued commanding
Bautista Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting member of
the Comelec under the designation rendered to him by President Quirino
unless he is legally appointed as regular member of the said Comelec.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the designation of Bautista as Acting Member of the Commissions
on Elections, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General, pending the
appointment of a permanent of Commissioner Francisco Enage, is unlawful
and unconstitutional. --- YES.
2. [MAIN] Whether or not prohibition is the proper remedy. --- NO, but peculiar
and extraordinary circumstances are obtaining in this case.
HELD:

Nacionalista Party is granted 5 days within which to amend its petition so as

to substitute the real parties in interest for it, or to show that it is a juridical
person entitled to institute these proceedings.

Otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing

referred to shall have been made, the writ prayed for will issue, without costs.
RATIO:
1. Bautista's designation to act temporarily a member of the Comelec is unlawful
because it offends against the provision of the Constitution creating the Comelec.

Francisco Enage vacated his office in the Comelec when he retired. In cases
of vacancy (when a member or members die, resign, retire, as in the case, or
be removed by impeachment or disqualified, or become physically or mentally
incapable, to perform the duties and functions of the office), the President
may appoint the Commissioner for the unexpired term.

However, by the very nature of their functions, the members of the Comelec
must be independent. It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose
and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent
Commissioner than to designated, tested by the nature and character of the
functions he has to perform in both offices, but in the broad sense there is an

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

incompatibility, because his duties and functions as Solicitor General require

that all his time be devoted to their efficient performance. Nothing short of that
is required and expected of him.
2. No legal basis for the allegation of bad faith.

There is no legal basis for the allegation of bad faith, because the Comelec
can only recommend to the President the suspension of an election "when for
any serious cause the holding of an election should become impossible in any
political division or subdivision," pursuant to section 8 of Republic Act No.
180, and because the Commission on Election cannot "vote to annul said
elections" for it has no power to annul the election.
3. Nacionalista Party failed to establish that it is a real party in interest.

It does not aver that it is incorporated to entitle it to bring this action.

It may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the Comelec

for the purposes of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180 ), but for
the purpose of bringing an action in the courts of justice such organization
and registration are not sufficient.

But this technical defect may be cured by allowing the substitution of the real
parties in interest for the Nacionalista Party.
4. Prohibition is not the proper remedy. However, peculiar and extraordinary
circumstances are obtaining in this case.

As no one is entitled to the office, there is no party who in his name may
institute quo warranto proceedings. Bautista, the only other party who may
institute the proceedings in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, would
not proceed against himself. Were it not for this anomalous situation where
there would be no remedy to redress a constitutional transgression, we would
adhere strictly to the time-honored rule that to test the right to an office quo
warranto proceedings is the proper remedy.

This special civil action as our Rule call it, or this extraordinary legal remedy
following the classical or chancery nomenclature, may only be instituted by
the party who claims to be entitled to the office (sec. 6, Rule 680 or by the
Solicitor General (sec. 3,4, Rule 68).

The authorities and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition
will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only
function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court.

However, in the case at bar, since Bautista's designation is unconstitutional,

the dismissal of the petition would deny and deprive the parties that are
affected by such designation of a remedy and relief, because no one is
entitled now to the office and a party who is not entitled to the office may not
institute quo warrant proceedings.

Bautista as Solicitor General, the only other party who may institute the
proceedings, would not proceed against himself. In these circumstances, it is
incumbent upon and the duty of this Court to grant a remedy.

There are cases involving a situation similar to the one under the
consideration wherein it was ruled that the remedy of prohibition may lie.

High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd edition on this point enumerates:

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1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

When the legislature have, by an unconstitutional statute, referred to

a body of judges the determination of the validity of a statute
concerning the liability of the state upon bonds issued in aid of
railways, prohibition will lie to prevent such body from acting upon
the matters thus submitted. So when an act of legislature delegates
to a judge powers partly judicial and partly of a legislative character,
as regards the determination of petitions for the incorporation of
villages, the act being held unconstitutional because assuming to
delegate legislative powers to a court or judicial body, prohibition will
lie to prevent the exercise of the powers thus conferred.
Prohibition will not be granted as a substitute for quo warranto for
the purpose of trying title to a judicial office by restraining an intruder
or de facto officer from acting, on the ground that he is an intruder or
a de facto officer. However, in Chambers vs. Jennings, it was
doubted whether there was or could be any such court, but said a
prohibition would lie to a pretend court.
If a court against which a writ of prohibition is sought is one of
established jurisdiction, a plea that the subject matter of a particular
suit lies without its jurisdiction, or that the party is not amenable to its
cognizance, will ordinarily afford full relief; "but when the question
involves the legal existence and construction of a court, a denial
of all jurisdiction and not of the particular jurisdiction proposed to be
exercised, a prohibition is the only adequate remedy.
Where a statute was plainly unconstitutional in so far as it provided
for the creation of a tribunal of justices to hear and consider
accusations of corrupt practices in elections, made no provision for
exemptions, and denied the right of appeal, except as to questions
of the eligibility of candidates to public office (so that in particular
case there was no means of review except through certiorari or writ
of error, neither of which would lie until after the unconstitutional
tribunal should have completed its hearings and made futile findings
which it had no jurisdiction to make, and both of which were
otherwise so defective under the circumstances as to be remedies in
form rather than in substance,) it was held proper to determine an
issue as to the constitutionality of the statute in a prohibition
proceeding. [Curtis vs. Cornish (1912)]
Where a writ of prohibition may issue against certain persons to
prevent their acting as supreme court commissioners by
appointment made under an unconstitutional statute, the somewhat
lengthy opinion contains no suggestion of doubt as to the propriety
of the remedy in view of the conclusion that statute in its entirety was
utterly void. The statute purported to create the offices of
commissioners of the supreme court as well as to provide for the
appointment of commissioners. [Hovey vs. Noble (1889)]

15. ENRIQUEZ v. MACADAEG (LL)

G.R. No. L-2422 | September 30, 1949 (short case, no summary)

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Petitioner: MARCELO ENRIQUEZ

Respondents: HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, Judge of CFI of Cebu, MELITON YBURAN,
and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be treated as one for
prohibition by waiving strict adherence to technicalities in the interest of a
speedy administration of justice.

FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to

dismiss a civil action pending in his court.

The civil action in question is for the recovery of a piece of real property
situated in Negros Oriental, the complaint alleging that the said property had
been bought by Meliton Yburan at an execution sale but that, notwithstanding
the sale, the judgment debtor, as supposed owner of said property,
subsequently mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank and
refused to surrender possession thereof to Yburan, whereupon, the latter
brought suit (Meliton Yburan vs. Marcelo Enriquez and PNB) to have himself
declared owner of said property and placed in possession thereof.

Before filing their answer, the defendants in that case moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground, among others, that, as the action concerned
title to and possession of real estate situated in Negros Oriental, venue was
improperly laid in the CFI of Cebu. The motion having been denied, the
defendants filed the present petition for mandamus to compel the respondent
judge to dismiss the action.

Answering the petition, the respondent judge puts up the defense that the act
sought to be ordered involves the exercise of judicial discretion and that
petitioner has another adequate remedy, which is by appeal.

HELD: Wherefore, let a writ of prohibition issue, enjoining the respondent judge or his
successor from taking cognizance of this case unless it be to dismiss the same in
accordance with the Rules. Without costs. So ordered.

ISSUE: W/N mandamus proper remedy for correcting error of CFI judge NO

The SC held that (1) a CFI does not exceed its probate jurisdiction in authorizing one
claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a decedent to intervene in the probate
of the alleged will of said decedent, upon presentation of prima facie evidence of such
civil status, (2) although a CFI does exceed its jurisdiction in ordering the payment
from the funds under administration of the expenses incurred by a presumptive for his
appearance and that of this witnesses with a view to opposing the probate of an
alleged will of his predecessor, because such expenses are not necessary to the
management of the estate, or its productivity, yet said decree being of a final character
and appealable, and there existing a plain, speedy and adequate remedy such as an
appeal, the writ of prohibition cannot be issued.

RATIO:

Rules of Court require that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession

of real property be commenced and tried in the province where the property
lies. Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion to dismiss the
action when "venue is improperly laid."

As the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and the recovery of

possession of real property situated in Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the
action was improperly brought in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
motion to dismiss was therefore proper and should have been granted.

But, while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the
motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this
is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or
"unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right."

It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of

Court by refusing to dismiss an action which would not be maintained in his
court. The remedy in such case is prohibition, and that remedy is available in
the present case because the order complained of, being merely of an
interlocutory nature, is not appealable.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

16. ASINAS v. CFI & ASINAS (JM)

G.R. No. L-29038
March 10, 1928
Petitioner: CATALINA ASINAS, assisted by her husband Francisco Medina
Respondents: THE COURT OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF ROMBLON and FELISA
ASINAS
Ponente: J. Villa-Real
Summary:
Catalina filed an application for the probate of the will of Mauricio. This was opposed
by Felisa who claimed to be the acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased. After
consideration, court authorized Felisa to intervene in the probate proceeding and the
administration of the estate, and also granted her P200 travelling expenses for herself
and her witnesses chargeable to the funds of the estate.

FACTS:

An application for the probate of what purports to be the will of the deceased
Mauricio Asinas, a resident of Looc, Romblon was filed by Catalina Asinas (hindi
sinabi kung ano siya ni Mauricio) in the office of the clerk of the CFI of Romblon.

Opposition was entered to said application by Felisa Asinas, alleging that she is
an acknowledged natural daughter of Mauricio, and by Justo Asinas, brother of
the deceased.

In view of the fact that Catalina denied Felisas right to intervene in the proceeding
for the probate of said alleged will, the court proceeded to determine whether
Felisa is really an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased.

After hearing the parties, and upon consideration of the evidence adduced, the
court, in spite of Catalinas objection authorized Felisa to intervene in said probate

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proceeding as well as in the administration of the said deceased's estate, and

granted her P200 travelling expenses for herself and her witnesses, chargeable to
the funds under administration.
Catalina moved for reconsideration but this was denied.
Hence this Petition for Prohibition.

ISSUE: WON court exceeded its jurisdiction in:

7. authorizing Felisa to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of the alleged will
of the deceased Mauricio and the administration of his estate. NO.
8. ordering that the expenses incurred by Felisas appearance in court and that of
her witnesses, amounting of P200, be charged to the funds under administration.
YES.
RATIO:
#1 IT WAS PROPER FOR THE PROBATE COURT TO PERMIT FELISA TO INTERVENE

Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in requiring the publication in a

newspaper of general circulation in the province for 3 consecutive weeks of the
date fixed by the competent court for the probate of a will, in order to afford all
those interested an opportunity to appear and oppose said probate, does not
specify who are the interested parties who may appear nor what proof they must
submit to show such interest.

A person alleging an interest in opposing the probate of a will as an acknowledged

natural daughter need not conclusively prove the existence of such a civil status,
or that such status has been judicially declared; it is sufficient that there be prima
facie evidence to that effect.
o This is not only because the law does not require it, but because section 753
of the same Code provides for the determination of the persons entitled to
receive the rest of the property in the said administration proceeding after the
debts, funeral and administration expenses have been paid.

Felisas right to intervene in the appointment of an administrator and in the estate

is nothing more than a logical consequence of her right to oppose the
probate of the will.
o It was only proper to permit Felisa, upon producing prima facie evidence of
her condition as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Mauricio,
to oppose the probate of the said deceased's will and to intervene in the
appointment of an administrator of the property left by him.
#2 CFI EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, BUT PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE

Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada: The expenses of administration should be those

necessary for the management of the property, for protecting it against destruction
or deterioration, and possibly for the production of fruits; but the sum expended by
an administrator of an extensive administration of the estates of the decedent
cannot be considered "expenses of administration.

The expenses incurred by Felisa for her appearance and that of her witnesses,
with a view to establishing her right to oppose the probate of Mauricio Asinas' will,
cannot be considered as administration expenses, inasmuch as they are not
necessary either for the management of the property or its protection from
destruction of deterioration, or for the production of fruits.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Although a CFI has jurisdiction to authorize a judicial administrator of a

decedent's estate to make certain expenses for the benefit of said estate, or
to approve those already made, such jurisdiction is confined to expenses
strictly necessary for the good management thereof.
o In ordering then that the P200 expenses incurred for the appearance of Felisa
and her witnesses be paid out of the funds under administration, the court
exceeded its jurisdiction.
HOWEVER, note that the court's resolution ordering the payment of said
expenses to be charged to the funds under administration, is final in character,
since by it a claim of Felisa is granted, without the administrator or Catalina having
had a day in court, and notwithstanding their subsequent opposition, thus giving
an end to the controversy; and as such it is appealable, without the necessity of
waiting for the termination of the administration.
o As there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of justice, namely, an appeal, prohibition cannot lie.

DECISION: By virtue whereof, the remedy applied for is denied, and the application is
dismissed, with the costs against the petitioner.
17. HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. V. DEFENSOR (RS)
GR 163980|Aug. 3, 2006|Tinga, J.
Petitioners: HSHA, Inc. (HSHAI), Nestorio Apolinario, in his personaly capacity as
President of HSHAI
Respondents: Sec. Michael Defensor (Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban
Devt Coordinating Council HUDCC), etc.
*Long case, but really easy to understand. Included all issues just in case sir asks. Go
straight to the procedural matters if youre in a hurry.
SUMMARY
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, seeking to prevent respondents from
enforcing the IRR of RA 9207. For the government, the OSG contends that, as to
procedure, prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not
lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. The respondents also allege that
petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with
this Court and not with the CA, which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for
prohibition. SC said that they are correct. Case ruled in favor of respondents. In
questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasilegislative power. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a
rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its
quasi-legislative function, the regular courts (RTCs) have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or

persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions,
but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. The assailed IRR was
issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized
by R.A. No. 9207. Hence, the petition is mortal.
FACTS

The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9207, otherwise known as the National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.

HSHAI is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC,

represented by its president, Apolinario.

Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government

Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant
petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor,
Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National
Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential
Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon
City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the DENR and Secretary Florante Soriquez of
the DPWH.

Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances

authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the
National Government Center (NGC).

3/5/1972 former President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826,

reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little
over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC.

8/11/1987 then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding

150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the
excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.

In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by

Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 (kaloka) on September 7,
1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to
maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of
the governments socialized housing program.
17

5/14/2003 President GMA signed into law R.A. No. 9207.

18

In accordance with 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee formulated the IRR
of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant
petition.

ISSUES:

WN 3.1(A.4), 3.2(A.1) and 3.2(C.1) of the IRR should be declared null and
void for being inconsistent with RA 9207. NO

WN 3.1(A.4), 3.2(A.1) and 3.2(C.1) should be declared null and void for
being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical. NO
HELD
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED
RATIO
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

As to locus standi:
o OSG contends that:

coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of
Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents
therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall be
based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona
fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and
occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal
agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken,
consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.
SEC. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local
Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and Religious
Purposes. Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or
community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are
hereby reserved for
disposition for
such
purposes:Provided, That only
those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those
occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the provisions this
Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor
of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis
therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of
such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them
shall be based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

17

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land
tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be
utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.
SEC. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide
Residents. Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from the

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

18

SEC. 5. National Government Center Administration Committee. There is hereby created a

National Government Center Administration Committee to administer, formulate guidelines
and policies, and implement the land disposition of the areas covered by this Act. xxx

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85

HSHAI cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1

(b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any right
over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the
maximum lot area that may be awarded to a residentbeneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1)
imposes a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified
beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the
prescribed period.

Also, since HSHAI is not the duly recognized peoples

organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as
beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of
disposition of lots in the NGC.
o Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
o HSHAI has the legal standing to institute the instant petition, whether
or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the
NGC. There is no dispute that the individual members of HSHAI are
residents of the NGC. As such, they are covered and stand to be
either benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly
as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to
qualified beneficiaries. Thus, HSHAI may assail those provisions in
the IRR, which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its
members.
o We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus
standi. The petition does not merit dismissal on that ground.
As to prohibition:
o OSG contends:

Prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of

prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Since in issuing the questioned IRR of
R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a
petition for prohibition under 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be
dismissed outright.

For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City and

respondent NHA contend that petitioners violated the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition
with this Court and not with the CA, which has concurrent
jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.
o These cited breaches necessitate the dismissal of the instant
petition.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

o
o

o
o

o
o

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial

powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This
principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to
its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207.
Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a
rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its
quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must
follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom
of choice of court forum
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance
of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature
and importance of the issues raised, so warrant.
A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition.
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor SC will not entertain direct resort
to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as
cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

Here, perusal of the petition for prohibition shows no

compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the
Courts taking cognizance of the petition in the first
instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that
precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of
the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution, the Courts power to evaluate
the validity of an IRR is generally appellate in nature. Thus,
following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant
petition should have been initially filed with the Regional
Trial Court.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail

an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against

any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings are without
or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or
are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law

Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions,

but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions.

Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a

lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order
to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
channels.

Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against

usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained.

Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an

IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are

performing or threatening to perform functions without or in
excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined
by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary
restraining order.

SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS

Petitioners allege that the provisions of the IRR (see ISSUES) are
constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with
the object and purpose of RA 9207
o They allege that the limitation on the areas to be awarded to
qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not
in harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates
that the lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the
area actually used or occupied by bona fide residents without
limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless.
o SC: While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso
mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area
actually used or occupied at the time of the laws effectivity, this
proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

local government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and

religious institutions which do not have specific lot allocations, and
not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no proviso which
even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to
the lot area actually occupied by him.
Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a
lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price. They
add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to
sell within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision plan by
imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A.
No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A.
No. 9207 and should be nullified. The argument deserves scant
consideration.
o Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or
contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity
with the standards prescribed by the law
o In 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to
administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the
disposition of the areas covered by the law
o The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be
likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of
a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
o Here, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots is
unreasonable.
Petitioners also suggest:
o That the adoption of the IRR suffers from a procedural flaw.
o Also, that the IRR was adopted and concurred in by several
representatives of peoples organizations contrary to the express
mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives from duly
recognized peoples organizations must compose the NGCAC which
promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner
association is not a duly recognized peoples organization.
o In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or
regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process
requirement is deemed complied with. That there is observance of
more than the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption
of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.

18. Verzosa v. CA
G.R. No. 119511 November 24, 1998

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Petitioners: WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ

respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON
USON
SUMMARY
Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan. She mortgaged
the land to Wilfredo Verzosa. Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa,
prompting the latter to have the mortgage foreclosed. To prevent the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Fe Uson filed a complaint
against Wilfredo Verzosa for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was
not personally verified by plaintiff Fe Uson. She then filed her amended complaint
which bears the proper verification. The foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff.
The property was sold to Verzosa being the highest bidder. The trial court issued an
order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson. Verzosa filed for certiorari. He
alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint was issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
The court dismissed the petition, thus sustaining the validity of respondent court's
order admitting Fe Uson's amended complaint.Upon Uson's application for preliminary
injunction respondent court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist
from entering, making constructions and performing any act of possession or
ownership over the land in question Respondent judge, acting on Verzosa's motion for
clarification, issued an order to the effect that the status quo being maintained is the
possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land and that such status quo does not refer to
defendant Pilar Martinez being the registered owner of T.C.T. No. 11107.
ISSUES:
1. Is private respondent entitled to an injunctive writ? YES.
2. What is the status quo ante that the said writ seeks to preserve? the status quo was
the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original Complaint.
1. Issuance of the Injunctive Writ
An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established:
1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial;
2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
The foregoing requisites are present in this case. The undisputed owner of the
property which was mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa was private respondent who,
upon learning of the scheduled foreclosure, immediately filed a Complaint to annul the
mortgage, praying that a restraining order be issued to restrain such foreclosure.
Private respondent insisted that she had paid her P25,000 debt, except for the
remaining unpaid balance of P915.75 which she was willing to consign to the court. In
other words, she had title to and possession of the property and she claimed to have
paid her obligation, except for the nominal unpaid balance which she was willing to
consign judicially.
2. Status Quo Ante
The "status quo" is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ. In the instant case,
the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action or
demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

and thereafter to implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from
Verzosa.
FACTS:
Records reveal that Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of
19,955 square meters located at Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan. She mortgaged the
land to Wilfredo Verzosa.
Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have
the mortgage foreclosed. The Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan set the foreclosure
sale on August 17, 1988 at 10:00 A.M.
To prevent the Office of the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure
sale, Fe Uson, on August 12, 1988, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial
Sheriff, docketed as Civil Case No. 16590, for annulment of mortgage with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.The complaint was
dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by plaintiff Fe Uson.
Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the court. She filed
her amended complaint which bears the proper verification.
Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure of
mortgage.
Whereupon, Fe Uson, through counsel, wrote the Provincial Sheriff requesting him
to discontinue the foreclosure sale in deference to "the said pending case and to the
action to be taken by the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Court.
The foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property was sold to Verzosa
being the highest bidder. Thereafter, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was approved
by Executive Judge Antonio Belen and issued to Verzosa.
The trial court issued an order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson.
At this point, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 18898
for certiorari. He alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint was
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Alaminos,
Pangasinan.
After the expiration of the redemption period of one year, the defendant Sheriff
issued the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale. Thus, the title in Fe Uson's name was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, title was issued in the name of Wilfredo Verzosa.
Verzosa sold the land to Pilar Martinez. As a result, Verzosa's T.C.T. was cancelled
and T.C.T. was issued to Martinez.
Meantime, after one year from the filing of Verzosa's petition for certiorariwith the
Court of Appeals, the said court dismissed the petition, thus sustaining the
validity of respondent court's order dated September 5, 1989 admitting Fe
Uson's amended complaint.
Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional defendants
the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Pilar Martinez and praying,
among others, the annulment of the latter's title T.C.T. No. 11107.
Upon Uson's application for preliminary injunction embodied in her Second
Amended Complaint (which was opposed by Verzosa and Martinez), respondent
court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist from entering, making

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

constructions and performing any act of possession or ownership over the land in
question, upon posting by plaintiff Uson of a bond of P10,000.00.
Defendant Martinez filed a motion for consideration which was denied on September
18, 1991.
After hearing and upon posting of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00 by Uson,
respondent Judge issued an order directing defendants Verzosa and Martinez
and/or any and other persons acting under their command to desist and cease
from entering, intruding and making constructions on the land covered by
O.C.T. No. 12783.
Respondent judge, acting on Verzosa's motion for clarification of the order dated
September 18, 1991, issued an order to the effect that the status quo being
maintained is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land and that such status
quo does not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being the registered owner.
It should be noted that the Complaint alleged that Private Respondent Uson
mortgaged the property to Verzosa for P25,000, and that the remaining, unpaid
balance was P915.75, an amount she was willing to consign to the trial court.
Petitioners challenged by certiorari the two orders of the trial court. Because the CA
dismissed their petition, petitioners availed themselves of the present recourse.

ISSUES:
1. Is private respondent entitled to an injunctive writ? YES.
2. What is the status quo ante that the said writ seeks to preserve? The status quo was
the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original Complaint.
RATIO:
1. Issuance of the Injunctive Writ
Petitioners primarily allege that the injunctive writ was wrongfully issued in favor of
private respondent, as the latter had a doubtful, unclear and unadjudicated right for
recovery of the property which had been mortgaged, foreclosed and sold to a third
party. We disagree.
An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established:
4. The invasion of the right is material and substantial;
5. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
6. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
The foregoing requisites are present in this case.
The undisputed owner of the property which was mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa
was private respondent who, upon learning of the scheduled foreclosure,
immediately filed a Complaint to annul the mortgage, praying that a restraining order
be issued to restrain such foreclosure.
Private respondent insisted that she had paid her P25,000 debt, except for the
remaining unpaid balance of P915.75 which she was willing to consign to the court.
In other words, she had title to and possession of the property and she claimed to
have paid her obligation, except for the nominal unpaid balance which she was
willing to consign judicially.
Hence, she had a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title to and possession
of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.

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Given the above factual allegations, it is clear that private respondent was entitled to
the injunctive writ.
2. Status Quo Ante
The "status quo" is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.
Petitioners insist that the status quo refers to the point when Pilar Martinez was
already the owner of the property, having purchased it from Verzosa.
We cannot sustain the petitioners, for Martinez' claim to the property is precisely the
bone of contention.
Private respondent, the origin owner of the property, filed a Complaint against
Wilfredo Verzosa and the provincial sheriff for the annulment of mortgage and the
issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent the foreclosure of the property and the
subsequent transfer of ownership. Although the Complaint was subsequently
amended, the controversy began when the first Complaint was filed.
Nevertheless, Petitioner Verzosa and the sheriff proceeded with the foreclosure
before the filing of the Amended Complaint. Worse, Verzosa sold the property to
Martinez one week later.
Now, Verzosa and Martinez claim that thestatus quo to be preserved refers to the
time before the filing of the second Complaint and after Martinez had acquired the
property from Verzosa.
Petitioners contend that the controversy started only when the Amended Complaint
was filed, because the previous Complaints were expunged from the records.
Jurisprudence says that when the amended complaint does not introduce new
issues, causes of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the
date the original complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended
complaint.
In other words, for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is
deemed to have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint.
In short, for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original,
complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if
the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand.
Hence, it has been held that "an amendment which merely supplements and
amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the date of the commencement
of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations, the period of which
expires after service of the original complaint but before service of amendment." It is
the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of the
amended pleading.
In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different
cause of action or demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the
lack of verification and thereafter to implead Martinez, who had purchased the
contested property from Verzosa.
Similarly unavailing is petitioners' contention that the injunctive writ was applied
retroactively and, hence, violative of Ruymann and other subsequent cases. To
repeat, Ruymann was wrongly applied by petitioners.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

 There being no new issues introduced in the Amended Complaint herein, the
present suit is deemed to have commenced on the date of the filing of the original
Complaint.
Hence, the CA was correct in upholding the trial court that the status quo was the
situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original Complaint.
Finally, petitioners assert that Respondent Court violated the well-entrenched
doctrine that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction.
As earlier noted, despite the fact that Pilar Martinez already had title to and
possession of the disputed property, the CA affirmed the order of the trial court
enjoining her from "entering, intruding and making construction and/or performing
any act of ownership or possession and any activity over the
land . . .; "
Where the acts have been performed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, the
general rule is that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction.
However, "where the acts are performed after the injunction suit is brought, a
defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed to perform the acts sought to be
restrained and then be heard to assert in the suit that the injunction will not lie
because he has performed these acts before final hearing has been had, but after
the beginning of the action. A defendant thus acts at his peril."
It has been held that the general rule of law is that, where a defendant completes,
after the beginning of an action, the act thereby sought to be restrained, and before
the issue of any final order or decree, the court has the power to, and may, compel,
by a mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former condition of things and
thereby prevent the giving of an advantage by reason of the wrongful act.
And where a defendant does an act thus sought to be restrained, he proceeds at his
peril, and the court in which the action is pending may compel a restoration of the
former status or grant to the plaintiff such relief as may be proper.
In this case, an action was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with
the mortgage sale, yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still pending.
Such conduct is reprehensible.
Hence, in proceeding with the mortgage sale and subsequently selling the property
to Pilar Martinez, Petitioner Verzosa was acting at his peril.
Clearly, the Respondent Court did not err in sustaining the Decision of the lower
court that the status quo to be maintained was the situation when title to and
possession of the property were still with Private Respondent Uson.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

MANDAMUS
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (3a)
Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the
proceedings therein. (5a)
Section 6. Order to comment. If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to
justify such process, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent or
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy
thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the court
may direct together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto.
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the
provisions of section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto,
the court may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to
dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply and such
other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper. (6a)
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition
is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
(7a)
Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. After the comment or other
pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired,
the court may hear the case or require the parties to submit memoranda. If after such
hearing or submission of memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing
thereof the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998;
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC)

The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without
merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. (8a)

Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates
to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents
with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private
respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the
public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded
in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents
only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.

Section 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. A certified copy of the

judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon
the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be
punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in
accordance with section 1 of Rule 39. (9a)

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the
public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or
any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public
respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise

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1. Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman (MB)

Petitioner: Casiano A. Angchangco, Jr.
Respondents: The Honorable Ombudsman, Zaldy Tamayo, Gilda Navarra, Odelia
Legaspi, Salvador Tamayo, Gaspar Aborque, Roel Abas, Remedios Olita, et al.,
Teodoro Torreon, et al., Jimmy Martin, Menrado Allawan, Margarito Escorial, Norberto
Ocat and Alejandro Erna.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

G.R. No. 122728. February 13, 1997

Melo, J.
SUMMARY:
Angchangco was the Sheriff IV in the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. The
DOLE rendered a decision ordering NIASSI to pay its workers. Angchangco garnished
on NIASSIs clients to satisfy the writ of execution. Atty. Calo (NIASSI President) filed a
civil case (prohibition and damages) in the RTC and criminal complaints (graft,
estafa/malversation and misconduct) in the office of the Ombudsman against
Angchangco. Several workers of NIASSI filed letters-complaints with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao charging Angchangco with illegal deductions from their salary.
RTC dismissed the civil case. The criminal complaints remained unresolved for more
than 6 years. Angchangcos motion to dismiss also remained unacted upon. Hence
this petition for mandamus filed by Angchangco to compel the Ombudsman dismiss
the cases against him and to issue a clearance.
The SC held that the petition for mandamus was proper because the Office of the
Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against Angchangco for
more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of Angchangco to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the
Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise
available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion,
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
FACTS:

Angchangco served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the RTC of

Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.

The DOLE rendered a decision ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services Inc. (NIASSI) to pay its workers the sum of
P1,281,065.505.

Angchangco, as the assigned sheriff and pursuant to the writ of execution

issued, caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily
collections from its various clients.

Atty. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. (NIASSI President), filed a complaint for

prohibition and damages against Angchangco.

RTC initially issued a TRO but later dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Atty. Calo likewise filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint
against Angchangco for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to
the enforcement of the writ of execution.

Ombudsman recommended dismissal for lack of merit.

Several workers of NIASSI filed letters-complaints with the Office of the

Ombudsman-Mindanao alleging that Angchangco illegally deducted an
amount equivalent to 25% from their differential pay

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Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed to the Court the administrative aspect of

the complaints. The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated November 25,
1993 dismissed the case for lack of interest on the part of complainants to
pursue their case.
When Angchangco retired the criminal complaints still remained unresolved,
as a consequence of which Angchangco's request for clearance in order that
he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was denied.
With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years,
Angchangco filed a motion to dismiss, invoking Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan.
However, even this motion to dismiss, has not been acted upon.
Hence, the instant petition for mandamus seeking to compel the Ombudsman
to dismiss the cases and to direct the Ombudsman to issue a clearance in
favor of Angchangco.
Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion saying it
agreed with the views of Angchangco.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus is proper. --- YES.
HELD:

The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit.

The Court RESOLVED to give DUE COURSE to the petition and to GRANT
the same.

Ombudsman Cases are ordered DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman

is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of
Angchangco.
RATIO:
1. The inordinate delay of more than six years violates Angchangcos right to
due process and speedy disposition of cases.

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to

do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
(Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints against Angchangco to be violative of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases.

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan --- The long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative
of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Not only under the
broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases, the inordinate delay is violative of

the petitioners constitutional rights. A delay of close to three years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in
the case at bar.
2. The Ombudsman failed to discharge its duty to promptly act on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials and employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof.

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a

ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either (Rules of Court in the Philippines,
Volume III by Martin, 4th Edition, page 233).

It is correct that in the performance of an official duty or act involving

discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to
act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of
exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG,
156 SCRA 222, 232 [1987]).

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal
charges against Angchangco for more than six years, has transgressed on
the constitutional right of Angchangco to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own
constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it.

For all these past 6 years, Angchangco has remained under a cloud, and
since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of
his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of
the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too
late for Angchangco to receive his retirement benefits, not to speak of
clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance
of the writ prayed for.
2. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA VS MANILA RAILROAD
G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979
Petitioner-appellant: KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC.
Respondent-appellee: MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
Summary: In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa seeks a reversal of the decision relying on what it considered to be a
right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023. Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa contends that the mandatory character of RA 2023 is only to compel the
employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and
turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not
convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. Such an interpretation found
favor with the Manila Railroad Company, which pointed out that there is nothing in said

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provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the
nature of that payable to Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa, and that, therefore, Manila
Railroad Company, in issuing the documents did not violate RA 2023. SC ruled that
this petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear
on its face, it would appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. The
very law on which the action is based fails to supply any basis for this petition.
Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part
of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty
or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is
entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and
certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain,
the petition must be dismissed
FACTS:

In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant

would seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it considered to be a
right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically
the first two paragraphs thereof:
o "... (1) A member of a cooperative may execute an agreement in
favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the
salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as
may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so
deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other
demand owing from the member to the co-operative.
o (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so
required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as
such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make
the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the cooperative."

Petitioner contends that the loans granted by credit union to its members
enjoy first priority in the payroll collection. There is nothing in RA 2023 which
provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions
shall enjoy first priority.
o The only effect of RA 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from
the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees'
cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to
pay the same to the credit union.
o If RA 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled
to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the
employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a
member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first
priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law
which does not appear.
o The mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the
employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the
latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but
this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit
into a first priority credit.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

If the legislative intent were to give first priority in the matter of

payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit
unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared.
Respondent-appellee pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from
which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of
that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing
the documents which establish the order of priority of payment out of the
salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the abovequoted Section 62 of RA 2023. In issuing such documents, it was only
implementing the law.

ISSUE: W/N mandamus lie in this case NO

RATIO:

This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon
being clear on its face, it would appear that no favorable action can be taken
on this appeal.

The applicable provision of RA 2023 speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity.

Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the
courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its
operation, must be obeyed.

Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on
which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A
more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a suit of this
character.

Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect
on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the
law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and
enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled.

Only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and
certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and
certain, the petition must be dismissed.

It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by

mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear,
and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful."

The writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes
duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.

It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the
act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to
costs.
3. Carbungco v. Amparo
G.R. No. L-2245
May 20, 1949

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Petitioner: Ambrosio Carbungco

Respondents: Rafael Amparo, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
Ponente: J. Montemayor
FACTS: [No summary since short case]

Ambrosio Carbungco filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against
Vicenta Foz, in the municipal court of Manila, claming that the regular tenant Jose
Santos who previously occupied Nos. 1775 and 1777 of Andalucia Street,
Sampaloc, Manila owned by Carbungco, had already vacated and delivered the
premises to him, upon his demand.
o Foz claiming to have received as sublease said premises, from the lessee,
particularly the second story of house No. 1775, refused to vacate the same.

Foz failed to either appear in the municipal court or answer the complaint.
o Municipal court: Judgment was rendered against her, ordering her to vacate
the premises, restore possession to Carbungco, and to pay P100 as monthly
rental from February 16, 1947, until she shall have left the premises, with
costs.

Foz appealed to CFI Manila. Pending appeal, and because of her failure to
deposit the rental corresponding to the month of April 1948, Carbungco filed a
motion in CFI Manila for execution of the judgment.
o It was only after this when Foz made the deposit of the rentals corresponding
to the month of April 1948.

Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding branch V of CFI Manila, in the absence of Judge
Buenaventura Ocampo who was on vacation, issued an order denying the motion
for execution on the ground that the deposit had already been made.

MR denied.

Hence this petition for mandamus praying that Judge Rafael Amparo be
commanded to issue an order of execution against Foz.
ISSUE: WON mandamus lies. YES. (no issue given; in my own words )
RATIO:

Contrary to the provisions of law (ROC rule 72 section 8) Rules of Court, Foz
failed to deposit in court within the first 10 days of the succeeding month (May
1948) the rental corresponding to the previous month (April 1948).
o The deposit was actually made 3 days after the end of the 10-day period.

This legal provision is mandatory. Upon violation by Foz, Carbungco has the
right to ask for execution pending appeal; and that the court is left no discretion to
extend the period of deposit prescribed by law, postpone the making of said
deposit, or otherwise relieve Foz of the consequences of her on his failure to
make the deposit within the period prescribed by law.

Also, the fact that the actual deposit was made shortly after the expiration of the
first 10 days of the succeeding month cannot make any difference.
o The law has prescribed a period, and this requirement should be complied
with strictly. Its observance and compliance should be enjoined and enforced
by the courts, not only for the protection of parties in whose favor the law

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

happens to have been made and promulgated, but also for the information
and guidance of those otherwise affected thereby.
o Otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding as to whether or
not an appellant in a forcible entry and detainer case could avoid execution if
he shall have made the monthly deposit, say, on the 11th, 12th, 13th or 14th
day etc. of the succeeding month, just as long as the delay is not too long.

Pending appeal, failure to make the deposit of rentals within the

period fixed by law, however short the delay, gives Carbungco the
right to execution of the judgment, which the court is bound to
grant and enforce.
In 2 cases previously decided by the SC (Thomas v. Garcia, Santos vs. Alvarez),
it was held that under Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by RA 66, a
tenant cannot be ejected for non-payment of rents unless such nonpayment be
deliberate and intentional.
o In the present case however, there is every reason to believe that Fozs
failure to deposit within the period fixed by law was deliberate and intentional.
No explanation was given for the delay in making the deposit.
o Moreover, there is reason to doubt that Foz does not possess the status of a
regular tenant. According to the uncontradicted claims of Carbungco, Foz was
a mere intruder or squatter, having had no previous contract or understanding
with him about the occupancy of the premises in question.

DECISION: In view of the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is hereby granted and
the respondent judge, or anyone presiding over Branch V of CFI Manila, or any other
branch of said court taking cognizance of civil case No. 2886 is hereby commanded to
order the execution of the appealed judgment rendered by the Municipal Court of
Manila requiring Foz to vacate the premises in question.
4. University of San Carlos v. CA (RS)
GR 79237|10/18/1988|Gancayco, J.
Petitioner: Univ. of San Carlos (USC), Victoria Satorre (Satorre) collectively
Petitioners
Respondents: CA, Jennifer Lee (Lee)
SUMMARY
Lee enrolled in the College of Architecture, USC. She obtained 2 failing grades and 1
incomplete (IC) in 3 of her subjects. She subsequently transferred to the College of
Commerce. She graduated with a degree in Accounting, without honors. She asked
Dean Satorre to confer to her the recognition of graduating cum laude, which the
former refused. Lee then filed a Petition for mandamus to compel USC and Dean
Satorre to confer to her the recognition being sought. The main question is WN
mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a degree with honors.
NO. Schools of teaming are given ample discretion to formulate rules and
guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of
academic freedom. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed
much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in
its exercise. Besides, USC issued rules and policies to be followed by students in
regard to scholastic responsibility and transfer of courses. Lee failed to follow these
rules. More, she employed undue and improper pressure on the MECS

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authorities to approve the change of her grades to remove all obstacles to her
graduation with honors. Lee not having demonstrated that she has a clear legal right
to the honors sought, her claim for damages must necessarily fail.
FACTS
st

Lee enrolled in the College of Architecture, USC during the 1 semester of

nd
school year (SY) 1978-79. At the end of the 2 sem of that SY, she obtained
a grade of IC (incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of 5s (failures) in
Architecture 122 and 123.

The following SY, she shifted to the College of Commerce of USC.

o Some of the units she earned in Architecture were carried over and
credited in her new course.
o As a commerce student, she obtained good grades. However, she
was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture
and that the same would be taken into consideration in the
evaluation of her overall academic performance to determine if she
could graduate with honors.

12/10/1981 Lee wrote the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her
grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the
computation of her grade average.
o She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS) in Region VII and this letter was referred to the
President of the USC for comment and return to the MECS.
rd

3 Indorsement dated Feb. 4, 1982 USC President informed the MECS that
the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any
course would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that policy
would mean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not
allowed to graduate with honors; that the bad grades given to her were
justified and could not be deleted or removed because her subjects were not
"dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade
which became a failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade
within one year; and that while her three failures did not affect her graduation
from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused her disqualification
from graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said indorsement
but she did not ask for reconsideration.

3/17/1982 USC President was out of town; Lee wrote the USC Registrar
requesting that her failing grades be changed.
o USC Registrar referred her letter to the MECS and the request for
change of grades was approved in a 4th indorsement of March 22,
1982
o Grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor
Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and
Architecture 123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn)

3/24/1982 Mr. Bacalso of MECS Hinger Education Division discovered that

the change of the grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did not have
the supporting class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr.
Ortiz requesting the submission of the class record.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

3/28/1982 USC held its graduation exercises, and Lee graduated with the
degree of BS in Commerce, major in Accounting, without honors.
3/31/1982 Lee, assisted by counsel, demanded from Dean Satorre that she
be allowed to graduate, cum laude.
o Dean Satorre explained that the matter was held in abeyance
pending compliance with certain requirements of the MECS through
the memo of Mr. Bacalso.
5/24/1982 Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class
records, reported he could not produce the same.
o 5/27/1982 Dean Satorre wrote to the MECS Regional Director
Aurelio Tiro asking for the revocation of the change of grades of
Lee. Request was denied as there was no positive proof of fraud.
Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against USC and Satorre in
the RTC of Cebu, asking that Petitioners be compelled to confer upon her the
degree of BS in Commerce, major in Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to
March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials
evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
RTC in favor of Lee
CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. MR was denied

ISSUE

WN mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a

degree with honors. NO.

Incidentally, WN the refusal of that university to confer honors would

constitute bad faith so as to make it liable for damages. NO.
HELD
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the subject decision of the respondent
court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO

It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample

discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors
for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the
parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and
colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the
graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be
disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave
abuse of discretion in its exercise.

Here, the Petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other
interested parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment
and academic achievements.
o A student may not officially withdraw from subjects in the curriculum
if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian.
o For an incomplete grade, there must be an application for
completion or removal within the period announced by the school

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calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically
becomes final.
o A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5"
disqualifies a student from receiving honors.
o A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18 units per
semester but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A
failure in any subject disqualifies a student from honors.
o Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as important
criteria for honors as academic achievements.
Lee should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is
bound to comply therewith.
It is precisely because she knew of these rules that she exerted all efforts to
have her final grades of "5's" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 be
disregarded in the computation of honors.
o When her request was denied by the university, she did not ask for a
reconsideration thereof. Instead, when the USC President was out of
town, she wrote another letter to the USC registrar asking her failing
grades be changed as above related. The matter was referred to the
MECS and the request was approved on March 22,1982.
o However, when it was discovered that the change of Lees grades
from "IC" to "1.9" was not supported by the corresponding class
records and its production was required, the same could not be
produced.
o There is thus no justification for said change of grade.
o More, the request for the change of the grade of incomplete was not
made by Lee within 1 year so that it became final according to the
rules.
By the same token, the change of the grades of private respondent from "5"
to "W" (Withdrawn) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 was without the
written permission of her parents or guardian.
o Indeed, it is unusual that a student who got a "5" in a subject, as in
this case, should still be allowed to withdraw from such subject.
Withdrawal from subjects is not ordinarily allowed after mid-term
examination much less after a failing grade in the subject has been
received.
Lee employed undue and improper pressure on the MECS authorities to
approve the change of her grades to remove all obstacles to her
graduation with honors.
o Petitioners' claim that the change of grades was attended with fraud
is not entirely misplaced.
o Petitioners cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors
demanded of them by Lee.
o
One failure would have been sufficient to disqualify her but she had
one incomplete and two failures. Her only change was to reverse her
failing grades. This she accomplished thru the back door.
Nevertheless, even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was
still within the sound discretion of the petitioners to determine whether
private respondent was entitled to graduate with honors

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the honors
sought by Lee under the circumstances.
o The change of grades did not automatically entitle her to the award
of honors
o Lee not having demonstrated that she has a clear legal right to the
honors sought, her claim for damages must necessarily fail.

5. Madrigal v. Lecaroz
G.R. No. L-46218 October 23, 1990
Petitioner-appellant: JOVENTINO MADRIGAL
Respondents-appellees: PROV. GOV. ARISTEO M. LECAROZ, VICE-GOVERNOR
CELSO ZOLETA, JR., PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS DOMINGO RIEGO AND
MARCIAL PRINCIPE; PROV. ENGR. ENRIQUE M. ISIDRO, ABRAHAM T. TADURAN
AND THE PROVINCE OF MARINDUQUE
Summary
November 25, 1971 - public respondents Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor
Celso Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board of Marinduque members Domingo Riego and
Marcial Principe abolished petitioner-appellat Joventino Madrigal's position as a
permanent construction capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer from the
annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 by virtue of Resolution
No. 204. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province
and it appearing that his position was not essential. Madrigal appealed to the Civil
Service Commission. He transmitted a follow-up letter to the Commission regarding his
appela. December 15, 1975 - Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Marinduque against public respondents Governor Aristeo
M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board Members Domingo
Riego and Marcial Principe, Provincial Engineer Enrique M. Isidro, Abraham I. Taduran
and the Province of Marinduque for mandamus and damages seeking
1) W/N the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus and damages on
the ground of laches. NO, CA was correct.
The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo
warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1)
year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. There must be stability in
the service so that public business may not be unduly retarded; delays in the
statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. It is not proper
that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the
peoples interest require that such right should be determined as speedily as
practicable. The fatal drawback of Madrigal's cause is that he came to court out of
time. As aforestated, it was only after four (4) years and twenty (20) days from the
abolition of his position that he file the petition for mandamusand damages. This single
circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor. And this one (1)
year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy.
FACTS:
November 25, 1971 - public respondents Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, ViceGovernor Celso Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board of Marinduque members Domingo

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Riego and Marcial Principe abolished petitioner-appellat Joventino Madrigal's

position as a permanent construction capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer
from the annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 by virtue of
Resolution No. 204. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of
the province and it appearing that his position was not essential.
Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission. He transmitted a follow-up letter
to the Commission regarding his appela. On January 7, 1974, the Commission in its
1st Indorsement declared the removal of Madrigal from the service illegal.
Public respondent Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz moved for a reconsideration of said
resolution. The Commission denied the motion for reconsideration.
Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial Board requesting implementation of the
resolution of the Commission and consequently, reinstatement to his former
posistion.
The Provincial Board, through Resolution No. 93, denied Madrigal's request for
reinstatement because his former posistion no longer exists. In the same resolution,
it ordered the appropriation of the amount of P4,200.00 as his back salaries covering
the preiod December 1, 1971 up to June 30, 1973.
December 15, 1975 - Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Marinduque against public respondents Governor
Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board
Members Domingo Riego and Marcial Principe, Provincial Engineer Enrique M.
Isidro, Abraham I. Taduran and the Province of Marinduque for mandamus and
damages seeking, inter alia, (1) restoration of his abolished position in the Roads
and Bridges Fund Budget of the Province; (2) reinstatement to such position; and (3)
payment of his back salaries plus damages.
March 16, 1976, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition on the
ground that Madrigal's cause of action was barred by laches. The trial court
rationalized its judgment as follows:
o It is beyond question that herein petitioner was separated from the service
on November 25, 1971, and it was only on December 15, 1975, or FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWENTY (20) DAYS after, that he filed this case for "Mandamus and
Damages" with the principal aim of causing his reinstatement to the public position
from where his service was terminated.
o Much as the petitioner might have had a good cause of action, it is unfortunate
that the same is now barred by laches.
o A person claiming right to a position in the civil service should file his action for
reinstatement within one year from his illegal removal from office, otherwise he is
considered as having abandoned the same.
The rationale for the aforecited doctrine on time limitation of a cause of action in a
judicial tribunal by one seeking reinstatement in the civil service is that the suitor
thereby is guilty of LACHES (National Shipyards and Steel Corporation vs. CIR, L21675, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 134).
The ruling is no doubt inspired by the provision of Section 16, Rule 66 of the Revised
Rules of Court on "Quo Warranto", pertinent portion of which reads:
o Sec. 16. Limitations. Nothing contained in this rule shall be construed to
authorize an action ... against a public officer or employee for his ouster from
office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such
ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold such office or position, arose ....

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

o and to the established jurisprudence interpreting the aforequoted rule to the effect
that the period of one year fixed therein is a condition precedent to the existence
of the cause of action for quo warranto.
That the instant case is one for MANDAMUS, and not QUO WARRANTO, is not of
any significance, for the same principle applies as held in these cases:
o An action for reinstatement, by a public official, whether it be quo warranto
or mandamus, should be filed in court within one year from removal or separation,
otherwise the action will be barred.
MR was denied.
ISSUES:
1) W/N the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus and damages on
the ground of laches. NO, CA was correct.
2) Assuming arguendo that his claim for reinstatement was not filed seasonably, the
trial court erred in not proceeding with the trial of the case on the merits to determine
the claim for back salaries and damages. NO. CA still correct.
RATIO:
1. Madrigals petition was filed out of time.
The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo
warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1)
year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position
The reason behind this being was expounded in the case of Unabia v. City Mayor,
etc., 99 Phil. 253 where We said:
o ..... [W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action
must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the
island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190).
o We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that
persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed
should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so
within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right
thereto by abandonment.
o There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil
service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may not be
unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service
must be discouraged.
o Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the
officer for one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation
which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position
anytime he pleases.
o And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title
to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples
interest require that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable.
o Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person
claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another
actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament
of having to pay the salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office,

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although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although
entitled to do so.
o We hold that in view of the policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period
of one year within which action for quo warranto may be instituted, any person
claiming right to position in the civil service should also be required to file his
petition for reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise he is thereby
considered as having abandoned his office.
Case at bar
The fatal drawback of Madrigal's cause is that he came to court out of time. As
aforestated, it was only after four (4) years and twenty (20) days from the abolition of
his position that he file the petition for mandamusand damages. This single
circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor. And this one
(1) year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy.
Actually, the recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is
fundamental that in a case where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be
resolved with finality by the administrative officer.
Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions of law would be an
exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot decide such issues with
finality.
In the present case, only a legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not
the abolition of Madrigal's position was in accordance with law.
2. Madrigal is not entitled to back wages and damages. Madrigal loses sight of the fact
that the claim for back salaries and damages cannot stand by itself. The principal
action having failed, perforce, the incidental action must likewise fail. Needless to
state, the claim for back salaries and damages is also subject to the prescriptive period
of one (1) year.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The orders of the Court of First
Instance of Marinduque dated March 16, 1976 and April 27, 1976 are AFFIRMED.
6. University of the East v. City of Manila (MB)
Petitioner-appellee: University of the East
Respondents-appellants: City of Manila and Alejo Aquino, etc.
G.R. No. L-7481 December 23, 1954
Jugo, J.:
SUMMARY:
The University of the East filed with the City Engineer of Manila an application for a
permit to construct a four-storey high school building on its lot on Gastambide Street,
Sampaloc, Manila. It submitted plans and specifications but not in conformity with the
requirements of the Zoning Regulations adopted and promulgated by the National
Planning Commission. For failure of the University of the East to comply, the City
Engineer refused to issue the permit. The University of the East brought an action for

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

mandamus to compel the City Engineer to issue the permit. The CFI granted. The City
of Manila and the City Engineer appealed to the SC. The SC affirmed the CFI ruling
that the respondent-appellants should issue the corresponding permit because the
Zoning Regulations adopted and promulgated by the National Planning Commission
are null and void.
FACTS:

The University of the East filed with the City Engineer of Manila an application
for a permit to construct a four-storey high school building on its lot on
Gastambide Street, Sampaloc, Manila.

It submitted the plans and specifications prepared by its architect, in

conformity with the provisions of Zonification Ordinance No. 2830, as
amended by Ordinance No. 2906 of the City of Manila, but not in conformity
with the requirements of the Zoning Regulations adopted and promulgated by
the National Planning Commission.
o Section 43, paragraph (c) of said Zoning Regulations --- That there
shall be a minimum depth of 6 meters for the front yard, 5 meters
wide for side yards, and a minimum depth of 6 meters for the rear
yard.

The City Engineer notified the University of the East to prepare plans and
specifications in conformity with the Zoning Regulations.

As the University of the East failed to amend its plans and specifications as
required, the City Engineer refused to issue the permit.

The University of the East brought an action for mandamus in the CFI of
Manila to compel him to do so.

Honorable Judge Rafael Amparo declared the Zonification Regulations of

the National Planning Board null and void, and ordered the City Engineer to
issue the permit.

The City of Manila and the City Engineer appealed to the SC arguing:
1. According to the lower court, "there can be no question that Executive
Order No. 98 series of 1946, was promulgated in accordance with the
emergency powers of the President."
2. When then President Quirino issued Executive Order No. 367, he acted
under the authority of Republic Act No. 442 and in consolidating the
National Urban Planning Commission and the National Planning
Commission he thereby transferred the powers conferred on the former
Commission by Executive Order No. 98 to the latter.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the lower court erred in declaring that the Zoning Regulations adopted and
promulgated by the National Planning Commission are null and void. --- NO
2. W/N the lower court erred in ordering the respondent-appellants to issue the
corresponding permit for the construction of a high school building on Gastambide
Street in accordance with the plans and specifications submitted by the petitionerappellee which are not in conformity with the said Zoning Regulations. --- NO
HELD:

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

When the President merged into one single body the National Urban Planning
Commission, the Capital City Planning Commission, and the Real Property
Board, he was limited to consolidating the powers, duties and functions of
said bodies for purposes of economy.
The Municipal Board of Manila is the local legislative body of said City.
However, not only have said "Zoning Regulations for the City of Manila" not
been adopted as a city ordinance by the Municipal Board but said Municipal
Board of the City of Manila even protested against said zoning regulations, as
promulgated by the National Planning Commission, and recommended that,
considering the far-reaching effects of said regulations on property owners
and other persons engaged in construction, public hearing should first be
conducted whereat the public and persons interested might express their
views on the matter, before final action thereon would be taken by said
Municipal Board;
Consequently, the above-mentioned zoning regulations having been rejected
by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila are of no force and effect as one
of the essential requisites prescribed by Executive Orders Nos. 98 and 367
has not been complied with:
o Section 7 of Executive Order No. 98 --- Legal Status of Zoning
Regulations. Resolutions of the Commission shall be filed with the
President of the legislative body. Unless said legislative body shall
disapprove such resolution by a three-fourths vote within 30 days it
shall take effect and shall supersede any similar regulations.
o Section 4, Executive Order No. 367 --- Building Code. The
Building Code, or any proposed amendment thereof, shall be
submitted to the local legislative bodies concerned for adoption in
the form of ordinances, and shall take effect in the same as zoning
or subdivision regulations.
Moreover, the issuance of such zoning regulations which affect very important
and valuable property rights throughout the whole country, cannot be
delegated to an administrative commission without specific standards and
limitations to guide the commission in the exercise of the wide discretion
granted to it.
o People vs. Vera --- The presence or absence of a standard or rule of
action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, is to aid the
delegate in exercising the granted discretion. As a rule, an act of the
legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it.

07 HENARES vs LTFRB
G.R. No. 158290 | October 23, 2006
Petitioners: ILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L.
HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA
BELO HENARES

RATIO: [no discussion about mandamus in particular]

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Respondents: LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY

BOARD (LTFRB)
and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC)
Summary: Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility
vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Citing
studies made by various agencies, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for
judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioner presented statistics showing the dire situation of the air pollution of the major
cities in the Philippines. Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the
bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to
use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16 Article II of the 1987 Constitution,
ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 14 of Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. SC
ruled that regrettably, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by
petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to
use CNG, is unavailing. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The writ neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. Also, mandamus is available only to compel the doing of
an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.
FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding

LTFRB and the DOTC to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Various studies and statistics referred by petitioners

Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation
Study of 1996, the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of NCR, a
study of the Asian Development Bank, the Manila Observatory and the DENR
on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines,
including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles
and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present
a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and
related environmental hazards.

Particulate matters (PM) (like dust, dirt, smoke) emitted into the air from
various engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners
particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion
when these react to other pollutants. (di ko na nilagay, puro chemicals na
nagcreate ng smog, acid rain, etc)

With the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport
sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions.
Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002,
stating that in four of the country's major cities the exposure to PM10, a finer
PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems,

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leading people to die prematurely and others to suffer from chronic bronchitis
and other respiratory symptoms days.
Petitioners likewise cite the UP studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that
vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of
chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis
is highest among jeepney drivers. The studies also revealed that the children
in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than their
rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions
of PUVs.

Petitioners proposal of use of CNG

To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs,

petitioners propose the use of CNG. CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly
of methane which although containing small amounts of propane and
butane,is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel
because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces
up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx
emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60
percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use
CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 414 of RA 8749
or Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.
Solicitor Generals comment (for respondents)

Writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only
to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is
required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is

one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of an act done.

Nothing in RA 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and
diesel by owners of motor vehicles. RA 8749 does not even mention the
existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is
amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents
cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.

It is DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB
nor the DOTC. It is the Department of Energy (DOE) that is required to set the
specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel
compositions for improved efficiency and reduced emissions. DOTC is limited

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein
respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards.
ISSUES: 1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
YES
2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel? NO
RATIO:
I. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this
Court. Even respondents do not question their standing.

This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right
to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court
is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's
discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised.

We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the

transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand
that they be settled promptly.

Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount

importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also
impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive
and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of
motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners..
II. Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by
petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to
use CNG, is unavailing.
1. What is writ of mandamus

Mandamus lies under any of the following cases:

o (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty;
o (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station; and
o (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a

ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone
to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to
control or review the exercise of discretion.

On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of

mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and
it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It
never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be
absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear.

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The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty
to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which
he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties.
It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.

Reiteration of petitioners contentions and causes of action

In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced
hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in
operational terms, e.g. in RA 8749. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act
specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of
implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC.

There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked
to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an
action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the
DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles
prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor
vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

In Oposa we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We also said, it
is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the
said right.

Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in
their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents
to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general
mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel,
particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order (EO No. 290)
implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. A thorough
reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner
environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had
been mooted by the issuance of EO No. 290.
Writ of mandamus is unavailing because of absence of a law

BUT mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically

enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use
CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii),
Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results
of the DOTC surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.
The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot
be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is
procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch
dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to
address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a

balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa, where we upheld the
right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we
recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to
clean air.
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the
premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the
landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution,
with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal
as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring
resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles,
we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that
imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of
the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles.
It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by
herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is

DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation
of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without
being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (1a)
Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. The
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must
commence such action. (3a)
Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with
permission of court. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the
permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at
the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer
bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an
amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request
and upon whose relation the same is brought. (4a)
Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action.
Upon application for permission to commence such action in accordance with the next
preceding section, the court shall direct that notice be given to the respondent so that
he may be heard in opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court shall
issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all interested parties,
and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a)
Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. A person claiming to
be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action therefor in his own name. (6)
Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. When the action is
against a person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set
forth the name of the person who claim to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment
of his right to the same and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All
persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made
parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise
determined, in the same action. (7a)
Section 7. Venue. An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents
resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in a
Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme
Court. (8a)
Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given
precedence. The court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing
pleadings and for all other proceedings in the action in order to secure the most
expeditious determination of the matters involved therein consistent with the rights of

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the parties. Such action may be given precedence over any other civil matter pending
in the court. (9a)
Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found. When the respondent is found guilty
of usurping into, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office,
position or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be,
recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective
rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as
justice requires. (10a)
Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and
papers; damages. If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the
complaint to be entitled to the public office he may, after taking the oath of office and
executing any official bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the
office, and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and
papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to which the
judgment relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper
pursuant to such demand, he may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a
lawful order of the court. The person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring
action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by such person by
reason of the usurpation. (15a)
Section 11. Limitations. Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or
the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose, nor to authorize an
action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment
establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (16a)
Section 12. Judgment for costs. In an action brought in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, the court may render judgment for costs against either the
petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a
corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires. (17a)
1.

POTOT V. BAGNO (JM)

G.R. No. L-2456

January 25, 1949
Petitioner: Nicolas B. Potot
Respondents: Juan L. Bagano, the Secretary of Justice & the Judge Of CFI Cebu
Ponente: J. Tuason
FACTS: [No summary since very short case]

This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by a prewar justice of the peace

whose position was filled by the appointment and confirmation of the respondent
after liberation.

Potot was appointed justice of the peace for the municipality of Pilar, Cebu, in
1933. He had held that office until 1944 when he ceased to act for reasons not
disclosed in the record.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

In1945, the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of San Francisco, Poro and
Tudela (which is currently held by) Vicente de Roda was extended to comprise the
municipality of Pilar. De Roda was later succeeded by Felixberto R. Sosmea,
who was justice of the peace until April 1946. Thereafter, the office was vacant. It
was only in September 1946 that respondent entered upon the performance of his
duties in that office.
Potot on the other hand joined the police force of Cebu city as lieutenant from
June 11, 1947, to January 15, 1948. From January 16 April 24, 1948 year, he
was Assistant Provincial Warden.

ISSUE: WON the instant petition for quo warranto would prosper. NO. (no issue
given; in my own words )
RATIO:

Potots acceptance of other public offices incompatible with judicial

function operates as an abandonment of the position to which he seeks
reinstatement.
o That he was forced to seek or accept jobs in order to live would not alter the
case even if is to be assumed, for the sake of argument, that economic
necessity was a valid plea.

The government was not the only source of gainful employment that could have
tide him over while waiting, as he says, for reappointment to his old position.

The truth is that for almost 2 years after liberation, before he accepted other
government positions, his previous position was without any permanent
incumbent. But even so, he did not enter public service, and he did not raise a
finger to claim his judicial post. It would seem that he lost all interest in the same
until he changed his mind.
DECISION: The petition is dismissed with costs.
2. ABAYA V. ALVEAR (RS)
82 Phil. 103|11/9/1948|Montemayor, J.
Petitioner: Jose Abaya
Respondent: Alejandrino Alvear
SUMMARY
Abaya was appointed to the post of justice of the peace of the towns of Cervantes,
Angaki, Concepcion and San Emilio, all Provinces of Ilocos Sur. When the Japanese
occupied the Philippines, he was forced to abandon his post. After liberation, he was
again appointed to the post, but the Commission of Appointments did not approve this
appointment. Presumably because of this non-approval by the COA, Alvear was
appointed in Abayas stead. Abaya instituted quo warranto proceedings. The SC rules
in Abayas favor, citing the case of Teves, recently decided by the SC and on point
with Abayas case. The SC held, as in Teves, that Abaya did not intend to abandon his
post. Because of the abnormal conditions obtaining in Ilocos Sur, particularly the towns
of Cervantes and Angaki during the war, there is reason to believe that the changing of
the original circuit occupied by Abaya, eliminating therefrom the town of Angaki, was a
mere temporary expedient to meet the exigencies of the administration of justice in that

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area, under abnormal conditions, and that his acceptance of the new post did not
involve or entail abandonment of his old position. The important thing is that he
never intended to abandon his old post. His appointment, though unconfirmed by
the COA, was unnecessary and did not and could not add anything to or diminish
his right to the office conferred by his original appointment, but that said
appointments may be regarded as a mere restitution of the office which
belonged to him but which he failed to hold because of, and during the war.
FACTS

Abaya 61 y/o, member of the Bar

o 10/9/1920 - appointed to the post of justice of the peace of the towns
of Cervantes, Angaki, Concepcion and San Emilio, Province of
Ilocos Sur and he qualified for the position and discharged the duties
thereof
o 1923 - municipalities of Concepcion and San Emilio were excluded
from his territorial jurisdiction and he continued to discharge his
judicial functions as JOP of Cervantes and Angaki up to December
31, 1941, a few days before the Japanese occupation forces arrived
in the town of Cervantes
o 4/17/1943 Abaya was given an appointment as JOP of Cervantes
only, by Jorge B. Vargas (Vargas), chairman of the Philippine
Executive Commission.
o 5/1/1944 Jose P. Laurel as President of the Republic of the
Philippines extended to him another appointment as JOP of the
same town of Cervantes, Ilocos Sur.
o He evidently accepted these appointments made during the
Japanese occupation and continued to discharge his judicial function
of the peace but only for the town of Cervantes, until the month of
November, 1944 when, because of the threat of military clashes
between Japanese forces and Filipino guerrillas, he left his post and
fled to the mountains for safety.
o After liberation and upon establishment of a military government in
Ilocos Sur, Abaya was appointed by the military governor as JOP of
the municipalities of Cervantes and Angaki, Ilocos Sur.
o 8/1/1945 Mauro Versoza, acting as delegate of the Department of
the Interior, designated Abaya as temporary JOP of Cervantes and
Angaki, the appointment to "terminate as soon as your successor is
appointed by the central office."
o 2/8/1946 Upon the restoration of peace and order and upon
normal functioning of the Commonwealth government, Abaya was
given an ad interim appointment by President Sergio Osmea to the
post of JOP for the towns of Cervantes and Angaki.
o But when this appointment was submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA), it was turned down.
o 12/5/1946 Abaya was given another appointment as JOP by
President Manuel Roxas for the municipalities of Cervantes and
Angaki but said appointment was left without being acted upon by
the Commission on Appointments.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

6/13/1947 presumably because of the failure of the COA to approve

Abayas appointment, President Manuel Roxas extended an ad
interim appointment to the post of JOP of Cervantes and Angaki in favor of
Alvear Alejandrino A. Alvear
o 7/5/1947 Alvear accepted and assumed appointment
o Alvear's appointment was later confirmed by the COA.
o Alvears Answer: claims that when he assumed office, Abaya was
nowhere to be found because he had gone to the town of Candon,
Ilocos Sur to reside. He also states that Abaya has already asked
the Secretary of Justice to have his application for retirement
approved.
Abaya claims that shortly after Alvear had assumed office as JOP of
Cervantes and Angaki, he, Abaya, wrote a letter to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines protesting against his being deprived of his old
post although, no copy of said letter could be found in the office of the
Assistant Executive Secretary of Malacaan
o He further claims that when he failed to receive any answer to his
letter to the President, he conferred with VP Elpidio Quirino, and
Senator Prospero Sanidad regarding his being restored to the
position for JOP of Cervantes and Angaki
o 11/14/1947 Failing to receive immediate relief, he commenced
these quo warranto proceedings in this Court for the purpose of
having him declared the legal and lawful JOP for the towns
already referred to and have Alvear ousted therefrom.

ISSUE: WN quo warranto is proper. YES

HELD: In view of the foregoing, we hold and decide that the Abaya Jose Abaya never
abandoned his office of JOP of Cervantes and Angaki, Province of Ilocos Sur, and that
he is entitled to the same by virtue of his pre-war appointment; and Alvear Alejandrino
A. Alvear is hereby ordered to deliver said office and all the records appertaining
thereto to said Abaya. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
RATIO

Alvears theories: Abaya had lost his right, title or valid claim to the position of
JOP of Cervantes and Angaki by reason of abandonment, consisting in his
acceptance of the position of JOP of Cervantes only, during the Japanese
occupation, said position being different and distinct from the circuit of
Cervantes and Angaki held by him before the war; his acceptance of the
position of temporary JOP of Cervantes and Angaki under an appointment
extended by a Special Delegate of the Department of the Interior; his
departure from his circuit of Cervantes and Angaki, and his residence in
Candon, Ilocos Sur; lastly, his insistence on the approval of his retirement
and, his inaction for several months from June 30, 1947 to November 30,
1947, evidencing his intention to abandon his office.

Teves vs. Sindiong (10/21/1948) facts, as quoted below, are similar to case
at bar [including the summary of the case cause its important to understand
how its applied to Abayas case]:
o On December 19, 1914, Pablo Teves was appointed JOP of
Luzurriaga, Negros Oriental. He assumed office on January 14,

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o
o
o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

1915, and had since discharged the duties of said office up to the
outbreak of the Pacific war in December, 1941.
Negros Oriental, or part thereof, was subsequently occupied by
then Japanese army.
Teves followed and stayed with the guerrillas in the free area and
continued to discharge his duties as JOP of that part of Luzurriaga
not occupied by the invaders.
However, sometime in October 1943, Teves was arrested by a
Japanese patrol and was later taken down to Dumaguete, capital of
Negros Oriental, and there kept a virtual prisoner.
Because of Teves absence from the free area of Luzurriaga where
a free government had been organized and maintained by the
guerrilla forces, the Deputy Governor of said government appointed
Atty. Mauro Edrial as JOP of said municipality of Luzurriaga
Edrial qualified for the position and performed the duties thereof
from July 8, 1944 to January 4, 1945.
In October, 1944, Teves managed to escape from his confinement
in Dumaguete, went to the free area of Luzurriaga, and asked the
Deputy Governor under the guerrilla Government to restore to him
his post of JOP of Luzurriaga
He was advised that before he could be reinstated, he should
secure a clearance certificate from the guerrilla military authorities to
prove his loyalty to the Filipino cause.
Teves secured the necessary clearance, and, on January 4, 1945,
he was appointed JOP of the municipalities of Luzurriaga and
Bacong, 6th Administrative District, by Deputy Governor Margarito
Teves, which appointment was approved by Alfredo Montelibano,
Governor of the Islands of Negros and Siquijor.
Teves resumed, or rather qualified for said office and discharged
the duties thereof.
On May 1, 1945, Teves was again appointed acting JOP of
Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, by special agent Jose M. Aldeguer of
the Department of the Interior, by virtue of the authority vested in
that Department by the President of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, said appointment bearing the approval of the
Commanding Officer of PCAU 24. On the same day, the plaintiff
qualified for and assumed said office.
Then, on December 26, 1945, Teves was again appointed by
President of the Philippines Sergio Osmena, as ad interim JOP of
Luzurriaga, Negros Oriental. Teves again qualified for and assumed
said office.
However, when his appointment was submitted to the Commission
on Appointments, it was not confirmed. Despite this nonconfirmation, plaintiff Teves continued in office.
[M]eantime, and presumably because of his non-confirmation of
Teves' appointment, the President of the Philippines nominated the
defendant Perpetuo A. Sindiong JOP of Luzurriaga and said
nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on
September 3, 1946.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Sindiong took the corresponding oath on September 14, 1946, and

then advised the plaintiff of his appointment and demanded of him
the surrender of the office. Plaintiff refused to comply with this
demand, insisting that he was the legitimate JOP of Luzurriaga.
o On being apprised of the situation, the Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental issued a summary order dated
September 23, 1946, directing Teves to make delivery within ten
days of the office of JOP of Luzurriaga, together with the documents
and records pertaining thereto to Sindiong, under penalty of
contempt.
o To avoid unpleasant consequences, Teves surrendered the office
and its records to Sindiong on October 7, 1946, and a week later, or
on October 14, he commenced the present action in the Court
below.
o HELD in Teves: [B]ecause of the abnormal conditions obtaining
in Negros Oriental by reason of the war the formation of new
judicial circuits including Luzurriaga first, the grouping of
Luzurriaga and Bacong, and later the merger of the three towns of
Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, into a circuit was a makeshift
arrangement, a mere temporary expedient, far from being
permanent in nature, but merely designed to meet and solve the
exigencies of the administration of justice in those areas in the
manner possible under said abnormal conditions; that the law and
doctrines governing abandonment of an office may not and
should not be strictly applied to cases occurring during the
war, specially in those areas occupied partly or by the enemy;
and that considering the surrounding circumstances, we ruled
that in accepting the post of JOP of Luzurriaga and Bacong and later
of the office of JOP of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, Teves did not
abandon his post JOP of Luzurriaga.

Acceptance by Teves of the ad interim appointment in

December, 1945, of his old post of JOP of Luzurriaga
was not a waiver of his right and title to the old post;
that he had the right to hold the same, not under the
new ad interim appointment in December, 1945, but by
virtue of his original appointment in 1914, for the
reason that one cannot be properly appointed to the
same post; that (note: pretty sure the last semicolon
shouldnt be there) he is already holding under a valid
appointment.

A subsequent appointment to the post of JOP extended

to one who already had a right to it because of a
previous pre-war appointment under which he had
qualified and discharged his duties, may be regarded
as a mere restitution or restoration of the position
which belonged to him; and that the new appointment
can add nothing to or diminish his right to the office
conferred by his original appointment.
Teves as applied to Abayas case:
o

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Because of the abnormal conditions obtaining in Ilocos Sur,

particularly the towns of Cervantes and Angaki during the war, there
is reason to believe that the changing of the original circuit occupied
by Abaya, eliminating therefrom the town of Angaki, was a mere
temporary expedient to meet the exigencies of the administration of
justice in that area, under abnormal conditions, and that his
acceptance of the new post did not involve or entail abandonment of
his old position.
Proof of the temporary nature of the change in the circuit: the
that when conditions returned to normal, the old circuit comprising
the towns of Cervantes and Angaki was restored. When said old
circuit was restored, Abaya was likewise restored to his old post by
appointments extended by two administrations, that of President
Osmena and the administration of President Roxas.
In those days Abaya could not very well dictate his terms of
acceptance of the positions extended to him.

He had to take them as they came, accepting the position

of JOP of Cervantes alone during the occupation and
accepting a new appointment to his old circuit during the
days following the liberation.

He had no freedom of choice. The important thing is that

he never intended to abandon his old post and all
along during the Japanese occupation and even after
liberation he continued in the judicial service and
exercised and discharged the functions of the office of
JOP in the same place and area which he did before the
war.

His appointment by President Osmena and later by

President Roxas, to his old post of JOP of Cervantes and
Angaki, though not confirmed by the COA, was
unnecessary; that it did not and could not add anything
to or diminish his right to the office conferred by his
original appointment, but that said appointments may
be regarded as a mere restitution of the office which
belonged to him but which he failed to hold because of,
and during the war.
We find no merit in the other grounds advanced by the Alvear.

When Alvear assumed the office of JOP of Cervantes and

Angaki, there was no reason nor obligation on the part of
the Abaya to continue residing in Cervantes. He was
prompted to reside in Candon perhaps because it was his
native town.

Furthermore, his asking the government to act upon his

application for retirement may not be regarded as evidence
of intent to abandon his office.

Such applications for retirement had, years ago, been filed

by many government officials in order to secure the benefits
of the retirement law.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

And his urging the government to act upon such application

was perhaps a mere precaution for purposes of security in
case that he lost his office against his will.
His very letter to the Secretary of Justice in this regard
(Exhibit 7) states that his successor to the post of JOP of
Cervantes and Angaki was appointed without his
knowledge.
And to further demonstrate that he did not intend to lose
said office without effort or fight, he filed these proceedings
not long after he was deprived thereof.

3. TEVES V. SINDIONG (RT)

[G.R. No. L-2050. October 21, 1948.]
Plaintiff-Appellant: PABLO TEVES
Defendant-Appellee: PERPETUO A. SINDIONG
SUMMARY
Pablo Teves was appointed justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Negros Oriental. He
qualified for and assumed said office on January 14, 1915, and had since discharged
the duties of said office up to the outbreak of the Pacific war in December 1941. The
plaintiff followed and stayed with the guerrillas in the free area and continued to
discharge his duties as justice of the peace of that part of Luzurriaga not occupied by
the invaders. However, sometime in October 1943, the plaintiff was arrested by a
Japanese patrol and was later taken down to Dumaguete, capital of Negros Oriental,
and there kept a virtual prisoner. Pablo Teves managed to escape from his
confinement in Dumaguete, went to the free area of Luzurriaga, and asked the Deputy
Governor under the guerrilla Government to restore him to his post of justice of the
nd
peace of Luzurriaga. 2 Appointment- May 1, 1945, Teves was again appointed
acting justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin. However, when his
appointment was submitted to the Commission on Appointments, it was not confirmed.
Despite this non-confirmation, plaintiff Teves continued in office. In the meantime, and
presumably because of this non-confirmation of Teves appointment, the President of
the Philippines nominated the defendant Perpetuo A. Sindiong justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga and said nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Trial Court decision:Teves had abandoned his old office of justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga alone.
Who is entitled to the said office of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga? Teves.
The appellant herein is still below the age of seventy, and none of the other factors or
elements justifying loss of, or separation from, his office as justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga, exists with the possible exception of that of abandonment. The conditions
obtaining at the time were far from normal. It seems that the town proper of Luzurriaga
was occupied by the Japanese forces. Instead of rendering service to, or cooperating
with, these military occupants and continuing to serve as justice of the peace of the
town proper under them, Teves joined the guerrillas in the mountains and continued to
exercise his judicial functions and administer justice in the free area of Luzurriaga
under the aegis of the government maintained by the Filipino forces, until he was
arrested by the Japanese soldiers and confined in Dumaguete. The law and the
doctrines governing abandonment of an office may not and should not be too strictly

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applied to cases occurring during war, especially in those areas occupied party or
entirely by the enemy. Considering all the circumstances surrounding this case, we
believe and hold that in accepting the post of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and
Bacong and later the office of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin,
the appellant herein did not abandon his post of Justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga. One cannot properly be appointed to the same post that he is already
holding under a valid appointment. Incidentally, it may even possibly be maintained,
and not without reason, that the last appointment for the post of justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga in December 1945, was invalid for the additional reason that the President
could not extend an appointment to one who, under a new appointment, is not duly
qualified.
CASE: Pablo Teves, for the purpose of having himself declared legally entitled to
the office of justice of the peace of the municipality of Luzurriaga (now Valencia),
Negros Oriental, and placed in possession thereof, and at the same time of having the
defendant Perpetuo A. Sindiong, the incumbent, declared not entitled to the said office,
and so ousted therefrom, instituted the present quo warranto proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros. After due hearing, the trial court found and
held that the plaintiff, Pablo Teves, was not entitled to the said office of justice of the
peace of Luzurriaga, and that he had no cause of action against the defendant
Perpetuo A. Sindiong, and so it dismissed the case, with costs against the plaintiff.
Teves has now brought the case here on appeal.
FACTS
st
1 Appointment
December 19, 1914, Pablo Teves was appointed justice of the peace of Luzurriaga,
Negros Oriental. He qualified for and assumed said office on January 14, 1915, and
had since discharged the duties of said office up to the outbreak of the Pacific war in
December 1941.
Negros Oriental, or part thereof, was subsequently occupied by the Japanese army.
The plaintiff followed and stayed with the guerrillas in the free area and continued to
discharge his duties as justice of the peace of that part of Luzurriaga not occupied
by the invaders.
However, sometime in October 1943, the plaintiff was arrested by a Japanese patrol
and was later taken down to Dumaguete, capital of Negros Oriental, and there kept
a virtual prisoner.
Because of plaintiffs absence from the free area of Luzurriaga where a free
government had been organized and maintained by the guerrilla forces, the Deputy
Governor of said government appointed Atty. Mauro Edrial as justice of the peace of
said municipality of Luzurriaga. Edrial qualified for the position and performed the
duties thereof from July 8, 1944 to January 4, 1945.
Pablo Teves managed to escape from his confinement in Dumaguete, went to the
free area of Luzurriaga, and asked the Deputy Governor under the guerrilla
Government to restore him to his post of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga.
He was advised that before he could be reinstated he should secure a clearance
certificate from the guerrilla military authorities to prove his loyalty to the Filipino
cause.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

 Plaintiff secured the necessary clearance, and, he was appointed justice of the
peace of the municipalities of Luzurriaga and Bacong, 6th Administrative District, by
Deputy Governor Margarito Teves, which appointment was approved by Alfredo
Montelibano, Governor of the Islands of Negros and Siquijor. Plaintiff Teves
resumed, or rather qualified for said office and discharged the duties thereof.

nd

2 Appointment
May 1, 1945, Teves was again appointed acting justice of the peace of Luzurriaga,
Bacong and Dauin, by special agent Jose M. Aldeguer of the Department of the
Interior, by virtue of the authority vested in that Department by the President of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, said appointment bearing the approval of the
Commanding Officer of PCAU 24.
On the same day, the plaintiff qualified for and assumed said office. Then, on
December 26, 1945, Teves was again appointed by President of the Philippines
Sergio Osmea, as ad interim justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Negros Oriental.
Teves again qualified for and assumed said office. However, when his appointment
was submitted to the Commission on Appointments, it was not confirmed. Despite
this non-confirmation, plaintiff Teves continued in office.
Entry of Sindiong
In the meantime, and presumably because of this non-confirmation of Teves
appointment, the President of the Philippines nominated the defendant Perpetuo A.
Sindiong justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and said nomination was confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments on September 3, 1946.
Sindiong took the corresponding oath on September 14, 1946, and then advised the
plaintiff of his appointment and demanded of him the surrender of the office. Plaintiff
refused to comply with this demand, insisting that he was the legitimate justice of the
peace of Luzurriaga.
On being apprised of the situation, the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental issued a summary order dated September 23, 1946, directing plaintiff Pablo
Teves to make delivery within ten days of the office of justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga, together with the documents and records pertaining thereto to the
defendant Perpetuo A. Sindiong, under penalty of contempt.
To avoid unpleasant consequences, Teves surrendered the office and its records to
Sindiong on October 7, 1946, and a week later, or on October 14, he commenced
the present action in the court below.
Trial Court decision: According to the lower court, in accepting first the position of
justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong, and afterwards, the position of justice
of the peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, the plaintiff had abandoned his old
office
of
justice
of
the
peace
of
Luzurriaga
alone.
ISSUE
Who is entitled to the said office of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga? Teves.
RATIO
Considering the circumstances under which the appellant herein accepted the two
positions, first as justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong and later as

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justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, we disagree with the view
or conclusion of the trial court.
There is no question that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Tavora v.
Gavina Et. Al., supra, by virtue of Article VIII, section 9, of the Philippine
Constitution, which provides that "members of the Supreme Court and all Judges
of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of
seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office," a
justice of the peace appointed and qualified before the war, but who ceased to
discharge his duties as such at the outbreak thereof, may, after liberation or after the
war, resume and continue in his office until he either reaches the age limit, becomes
incapacitated, resigns from office, is properly removed therefrom, or abandons the
same.
The appellant herein is still below the age of seventy, and none of the other factors
or elements justifying loss of, or separation from, his office as justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga, exists with the possible exception of that of abandonment.
If the acts of acceptance in this case, particularly plaintiffs acceptance of the two
new appointments to the position first as justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and
Bacong and then of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, had taken place during normal
conditions, there might be force and reason in the position maintained by the lower
court regarding abandonment.
If, during normal times, as a result of a judicial reorganization pursuant to a provision
of law, the position of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga had been abolished, and in
its place the office of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong had been
established, and again under another legal reorganization the second position was
again abolished and in its place a new district or circuit had been established
comprising the municipalities of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, and that the plaintiff,
without pressure or necessity, or considerations of Government expediency due to
war, had successively accepted said two new positions or districts, we might agree
that he had lost right and title to the old post of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga by
abandonment.
However, the conditions obtaining at the time were far from normal. It seems that the
town proper of Luzurriaga was occupied by the Japanese forces. Instead of
rendering service to, or cooperating with, these military occupants and continuing to
serve as justice of the peace of the town proper under them, Teves joined the
guerrillas in the mountains and continued to exercise his judicial functions and
administer justice in the free area of Luzurriaga under the aegis of the government
maintained by the Filipino forces, until he was arrested by the Japanese soldiers and
confined in Dumaguete.
He escaped from confinement and again joined the guerrillas. Later, for some
reason not known to us, at least not appearing in the record, but possibly because of
the limited area occupied by the guerrillas and for purposes of expediency, the
municipalities of Luzurriaga and Bacong were joined so as to comprise one single
judicial district or circuit; and this district was given to Teves due to his desire and
willingness to continue serving the guerrilla Government in his judicial capacity.
But it is extremely doubtful whether, in accepting this post, Teves acted with
complete freedom of choice. Normally, one would prefer to serve as Justice of the
peace of only one town like Luzurriaga, if under complete peace and order in the
poblacion, rather than for two towns with perhaps a bit more pay and a little wider

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

territorial jurisdiction, but in the mountains, under abnormal conditions and subject to
be continually harassed or even captured and summarily punished by the superior
Japanese occupation forces.
Said fear was not imaginary or fanciful, as proven by the fact that, while serving as
justice of the peace in this area, Teves had previously been captured by the
Japanese forces and confined in Dumaguete. Abandonment of an office by reason
of the acceptance of another, in order to be effective and binding, should spring from
and be accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice, either to keep the old
office or renounce it for another.
Teves, and for it he could not well be blamed, did not wish to continue staying
with, and performing his judicial duties under the Japanese Government and
administration. He preferred to be with the resistance movement; but, in continuing
to serve his people in a judicial capacity, in the free area, he could not well dictate
his terms or his wishes to the guerrilla authorities, such as insisting that his judicial
district comprising only one municipality, that of Luzurriaga, be preserved.
Conditions and reasons of expediency, possibly military, perhaps called for the
merging of the towns of Luzurriaga and Bacong into a new judicial circuit or district.
This district, Teves accepted, because he felt he could not keep his old office under
the Japanese.
The second appointment extended to him on May 1, 1945.
The record shows that the conditions in Negros Oriental at the time were not yet
normal. True, some areas, and perhaps the greater portion of Negros Oriental, were
already occupied by the American liberation forces. But there was still fighting
between said forces and Japanese troops entrenched in the mountains.
For purposes of debt moratorium, Proclamation No. 9 of President Osmea declared
Negros Oriental free from enemy occupation as of May 30, 1945. The lower court in
its decision said that when Negros Oriental was liberated, plaintiff Teves was
discharging his duties of justice of the peace of the three municipalities of
Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin.
This goes to show that when the plaintiff accepted his second appointment on May
1, 1945, Negros Oriental where these three municipalities were located had not yet
been liberated. And to further show that at that time normalcy had not yet returned,
the appointment extended to plaintiff as justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong
and Dauin, was made not by the President of the Philippines but by an agent of the
Department of the Interior and under the approval of the PCAU (Philippine Civil
Affairs Unit), a body which was administering civil affairs for the Army. And it was not
a permanent appointment either, but merely as acting justice of the peace.
And it is significant that these two appointments, the first by the guerrilla
Government, and the second, by the Department of the Interior, were not ad
interim appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
as regular appointments should have been.
All these circumstances and considerations forcibly bring out the fact that the
formation of a judicial circuit including Luzurriaga, first, the grouping of the
municipalities of Luzurriaga and Bacong, and later the merger of the three towns of
Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, into a circuit, was a makeshift arrangement, a
mere temporary expedient, far from being permanent in nature, but merely designed

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to meet and solve the exigencies of the administration of justice in those areas in the
best manner possible under said abnormal conditions.
And the best proof that all that arrangement and setup was temporary in nature, is
the fact that in December 1945, when conditions were much better, and were fast
becoming normal, the old judicial arrangement or setup was restored, namely, the
office of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga alone.
And it is significant to note that the person who was appointed to this post was none
other than the original pre-war incumbent, the plaintiff herein.
No abandonment of office
The law and the doctrines governing abandonment of an office may not and should
not be too strictly applied to cases occurring during war, especially in those areas
occupied party or entirely by the enemy.
How many public officials, upon the outbreak of or during the war, left their offices in
the cities, particularly Manila, and returned to their native towns, but who were not
held as having abandoned said offices, and were recalled to them after liberation?
Tavora v. Gavina Et. Al.:
o Tavora who had been appointed justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union,
and had been discharging his judicial functions as such, ceased to perform his
duties at the outbreak of the war.
o True, he was later appointed to the same post by the Chairman of the Philippine
Executive Commission and he served under said appointment, but, in July 1944
he ceased to act in said office and did not resume his duties until April 1945.
o Under normal conditions, such act or conduct may clearly be regarded as an
abandonment and vacation of his office, a voluntary relinquishment thru nonuser.
And yet, it was not even insinuated that Tavora had abandoned his office for
failure and for ceasing to discharge his functions and for nonuser.
Considering all the circumstances surrounding this case, we believe and hold that in
accepting the post of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong and later the
office of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, the appellant herein
did not abandon his post of Justice of the peace of Luzurriaga.
One cannot properly be appointed to the same post that he is already holding under
a valid appointment. Incidentally, it may even possibly be maintained, and not
without reason, that the last appointment for the post of justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga in December 1945, was invalid for the additional reason that the
President could not extend an appointment to one who, under a new appointment, is
not duly qualified.
Plaintiff herein is not a member of the Bar, although, having been appointed before
the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines and of Commonwealth Act No.
101 which lastly amended section 207 of the Revised Administrative Code on
October 28, 1936, which require membership in the Bar as a qualification for the
position of justice of the peace, he was not bound by this legal requisite as far as his
appointments in 1914 is concerned.
However, a new appointment like that appointment extended to him in December
1945 for the post of justice of the peace would come under this requirement, that
is to say, that no person who is not a lawyer may be appointed to the office of justice
of the peace after the approval of the Philippine Constitution and of Commonwealth
Act No. 101 amending section 207 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

 Garces v. Bello Et. Al. and Singson v. Quintillan: An appointment to the post of
justice of the peace extended to one who had a right to it because of a previous prewar appointment under which he had qualified and discharged his duties, may be
regarded as a mere restitution or restoration of the position which belonged to him;
and that the new appointment can add nothing to or diminish his right to the office
conferred by his original appointment. It may well be said that the appointment
extended to the plaintiff in December 1945 was a mere restitution of the office which
belonged to him but which he failed to hold because of, and during the war.
In conclusion, we find and hold that the appellant here had not abandoned his post
of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Negros Oriental, because of his acceptance
and discharge of the position first of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong,
and later, of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, under abnormal
conditions due to the last war, which new positions successively occupied were
temporary in nature and intended as a mere temporary expedient; and that his last
appointment in December 1945, to his original office of justice of the peace of
Luzurriaga, was unnecessary if not invalid, and his acceptance of the same would
not in any way affect his right to hold said office under his original appointment in
1914.
Reserving the decision appealed from, the plaintiff-appellant Pablo Teves is hereby
declared to be legally entitled to the office of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga (now
Valencia), Negros Oriental, and the defendant-appellee Perpetuo A. Sindiong is
hereby ordered to deliver said office and all the records appertaining thereto to said
plaintiff-appellant. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
4. SERAFIN V. CRUZ (MB)
Petitioner: Simplicio Serafin
Respondent: Justo C. Cruz
G.R. No. L-39224 October 24, 1933
Villa-Real, J.:
SUMMARY:
Serafin was dismissed from his office as chief of police of the municipality of Quigua,
Bulacan for negligence in the performance of his duties. Municipal president Anselmo
D. Garcia appointed Cruz to replace Serafin. Serafin appealed to the provincial board,
and he was reinstated. Cruz now appeals from a judgment of the CFI of Bulacan which
reinstated Serafin. The SC reversed the CFI ruling and held that the extraordinary legal
remedy of quo warranto does not lie against a duly and legally appointed chief of
municipal police who has duly qualified for and has entered upon the performance of
his duties, in order to reinstate another who has been legally dismissed from the office
in question.
FACTS:

Father Victorino Lopez (Parish Priest of Quigua, Bulacan) filed with the
provincial board of Bulacan, administrative charges against Simplicio Serafin

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(chief of police of the municipality of Quigua, Bulacan), for negligence in the

performance of his duties.
Municipal council exonerated Serafin.
o Father Victorino Lopez, appealed to the provincial board.
Provincial board Ordered Serafins dismissal. Serafin should be separated
from the service, particularly during this time when there are so many
eligibles, and government institutions are entitled to select the officials who
have a keen sense of responsibility.
Anselmo D. Garcia (municipal president of Quigua) issued executive order
No. 1 dismissing Serafin and appointed the herein respondent-appellant,
Justo C. Cruz, permanent chief of police.
The term of the provincial board which dismissed Serafin expired.
Serafin filed with the new provincial board a motion for reconsideration of the
decision ordering his dismissal rendered by the former provincial board.
New provincial board granted the motion for reconsideration, exonerating
the plaintiff-Serafin of the charge of "negligence in the performance of his
duties", and by an executive order the immediate reinstatement of the said
Serafin in the office of chief of police.
This is an appeal taken by the respondent Justo C. Cruz from the judgment
rendered by the CFI of Bulacan [no mention how the case reached the CFI of
Bulacan but it may be inferred that Serafin filed a quo warranto against Cruz
in the CFI of Bulacan] which ruled in favor of plaintiff Simplicio Serafin,
declaring that he is reinstated to hold the office of chief of police of the
municipality of Quigua.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a duly appointed and qualified chief of municipal police who has
entered upon the performance of his duties as such, may be dismissed therefrom in
order to reinstate another who had been dismissed from such office pursuant to a
legal, valid and conclusive decision.
HELD:

The judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED.

The quo warranto proceedings DISMISSED, with the costs against Serafin.
So ordered.
RATIO:

In the case at bar, the herein defendant-appellant, Justo C. Cruz, was

permanently appointed chief of police of Quigua by the president of the said
municipality, to fill the vacancy created by the dismissal from said office of
Serafin, as ordered by the provincial board of Bulacan after the necessary
proceedings provided by law.

Cruz has acquired a vested right in the office and cannot be removed nor
dismissed therefrom except for any of the causes designated and in
accordance with the proceedings established by law.

Section 2272 of the Administrative Code --- Members of the municipal police
shall not be removed and, except in cases of resignation, shall not be
discharged from the service, except for misconduct or incompetency,

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

dishonesty, disloyalty to the United States or Philippine Government, serious

irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law or duty.
The reinstatement of the dismissed official is not one of the causes
designated by the law for the removal therefrom of one who has been
permanently appointed to substitute the former.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the extraordinary legal remedy of quo
warranto does not lie against a duly and legally appointed chief of municipal
police who has duly qualified for and has entered upon the performance of his
duties, in order to reinstate another who has been legally dismissed from the
office in question.

5. LACSON V. ROMERO ET AL. (LL)

G.R. No. L-3081 | October 14, 1949
Petitioner: ANTONIO LACSON
Respondents: HONORIO ROMERO, ET AL.

provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Romero. Both nominations

were simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of
Tarlac. But respondent Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal of
Negros Oriental) in Manila, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and
thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of
Negros Oriental, he notified Lacson of his intention to take over the office the
following day, but Lacson objected.
Romero appeared in a criminal case and also special proceedings case which
was objected by Lacson. Judges Narvasa& Ocampo (respondents in the
case) denied the petitions of Lacson and recognized respondent Romero as
the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.
When petitioner Lacson requested payment of his salary as provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental, Angel Paguia, Provincial Auditor Provincial Treasurer (also
respondents in the case) turned down his claim and instead paid respondent
Romero the salary.

Summary: Involved in these quo warranto proceedings is the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Negros Oriental, and the right to said position as between petitioner Lacson
and respondent Romero. Petitioner Lacson was appointed by the President of the
Philippines to provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. Upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice, the President nominated Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of
Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the position of provincial fiscal
of Negros Oriental respondent Romero. Both nominations were simultaneously
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. But Lacson neither accepted the
appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac and objected to Romeros
intention of taking over the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental. SC ruled that Lacson had
the right to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. Defendant Romeros
appointment to the post was invalid. The complete appointment to a post like that of a
provincial fiscal, the disputed position in this case, involves several steps. First is the
nomination by the President. Second, for it to be valid and permanent, the Commission
on Appointments must confirm the said nomination. Finally, the appointee should
accept his post by assuming it. The first two steps constitute a mere offer of a post.
Acceptance then completes and gives effect the appointment, which rests solely with
the appointee himself. It has neither been shown that petitioner Lacson has accepted
the new position given to him nor that he has been charged with any violation of the
law or civil service regulation. Pertinently, the Administrative Code provides that a
provincial fiscal enjoys security
of tenurethat is, until he reaches the age of 65, unless sooner removed for cause.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner has right to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental
YES

FACTS:

Involved in these quo warranto proceedings filed directly with this Court is the
Office of Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, and the right to said position as
between the petitioner Antonio Lacson and the respondent Honorio Romero.

Petitioner Lacson was appointed by the President of the Philippines to

provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice, the President nominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial
fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the position of

(1) Did the Commission on Appointments alone, without his acceptance nomination of
Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the thereof create a vacancy in the post of
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental so that Romero could be lawfully appointed to said
vacancy?

The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be

complete involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the
President. Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the
Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said

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RATIO:
Background in the case

Negros Oriental was a second class province with a salary of P5,100 per
annum for the post of provincial fiscal, while Tarlac was first class simple with
a higher salary of P5,700.

There is reason to believe that the nomination of Lacson to Tarlac or rather

his attempted transfer from Negros Oriental to Tarlac was intended and
considered as a promotion. At least, there is nothing in the record to show
that he was being deliberately eased out of or removed from his post in
Negros Oriental.

But the category of province of Negros Oriental was raised and after filing the
present petition, Tarlac was also raised to higher category making the salary
for both the same.

This might be one of the reasons why petitioner to the Province of Tarlac
prefer to remain at his old post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.
The determination as to who is entitled to the position of provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental, depends upon the correct answers to several queries.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his
assumption of office.
The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a
post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of the
Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment complete
and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not
accept the appointment or nomination. There is no Power in this country
which can compel a man to accept an office.
Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as
provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he
continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office
was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of
Negros Oriental.

(2) Does the nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments serve as and is equivalent to a removal of Lacson as fiscal of Negros
Oriental? If in the affirmative, was that removal and lawful?

The intended transfer of Lacson to Tarlac on the basis of his nomination

thereto, if carried out, would be equivalent to a removal from his office in
Negros Oriental. To appoint and transfer him from one province to another
would mean his removal or separation from the first province.

The reason is that a fiscal is appointed for each province, and Lacson could
not well and legally hold and occupy the two posts of fiscal of Tarlac and
Negros Oriental simultaneously. To be fiscal for Tarlac must mean his
removal from Negros Oriental.

In one case, it was decided that a transfer of a Justice of the Peace outside of
the municipality of which he is appointed is in legal effect a combined removal
and appointment." When the transfer is consented to and accepted by the
transferees, then there would be no question; but where as in the present
case, the transfer is involuntary and objected to, then it is necessary to decide
whether the removal is lawful.

The office of provincial fiscal is included in the Civil Service. The law
regarding appointment to the post of provincial fiscal is contained in section
66 of the Administrative Code which provides that "the Governor-General
(now the President) shall appoint among other officials, Secretaries to
Departments, Provincial Treasurers, Provincial Fiscals, Register of Deeds,
etc."

And, Article VII, section 10(3) of the Constitution provides that the President
shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
shall appoint among other officials, "all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for" which clearly
includes the office of provincial fiscal.

It is therefore clear that a provincial fiscal who is nominated and appointed by

the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as was
petitioner Lacson, is, under section 671 (b) of Administrative Code, included
in the unclassified service of the Civil Service.

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(3) Could the President who appointed Lacson as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental
remove him at will and without cause, or did the post of provincial fiscal in general
have attached to it a tenure of office during which the incumbent may not be removed
except for cause?

Article XII, section 4 of Constitution provides that "no officer or employee in

the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law." This constitutional provision is reproduced in Rev. Adm. Code.

The Committee on Civil Service of the Constitutional Convention which

drafted the Constitution in its report and in advocating the merit system in
connection with a civil service system among other things stated the
following:
o The adoption of the "merit system" in government service has
secured efficiency and social justice. It eliminates the political factor
in the selection of civil employees which is the first essential to an
efficient personnel system. It insures equality of opportunity to all
deserving applicants desirous of a career in the public service. It
advocates a new concept of the public office as a career open to all
and not the exclusive patrimony of any party or faction to be doled
out as a reward for party service.
o Necessity for Constitutional Provisions. The inclusion in the
constitution of provisions regarding the "merit system" is a necessity
of modern times. As its establishment secures good government, the
citizens have a right to expect its guarantee as a permanent
institution. . . . .
o Separations, Suspensions, Demotion, and Transfers. The "merit
system" will be ineffective if no safeguards are placed around the
separation and removal of public employees. The Committee's
report requires that removals shall be made only for "causes and in
the manner provided by law." This means that there should be bona
fide reasons and action may be taken only after the employee shall
have been given a fair hearing. This affords to public employees
reasonable security of tenure.

It is contended on of the respondent that the power of removal is inherent in

the power to appoint. Ordinarily, where there is no constitutional limitation the
contention of the respondent would be tenable; but where as in the
Philippines and as already stated the Constitution forbids the removal of a
civil service official or employee like the petitioner except for cause as
provided by law, said right of the Chief Executive is qualified and limited. That
constitutional prohibition is a limitation to the inherent power of the Executive
to remove those civil service officials whom he appoints.

Again, it is contended that the provincial fiscal is not appointed for a fixed
term and that there is no tenure of office attached to the post. This contention
is without merit. As we have already stated, a provincial fiscal as a civil
service official may not be removed from office even by the President who
appointed him, and even with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, except for cause.

Considering this security and protection accorded a provincial fiscal from

arbitrary and illegal removal from office, and considering the provisions of

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

section 1673 of the Administrative Code which among other things provides,
that "after December 31, 1932 any city fiscal or assistant city fiscal of Manila,
provincial fiscal or deputy provincial fiscal over 65 years of age shall vacate
his office, the logical inference is that a provincial fiscal duly appointed, until
he reaches the age of 65 has the right to continue in office unless sooner
removed for cause. In other words, he enjoys tenure of office, which is duly
protected by statute and by the Constitution.
The last part of the report of the Committee on Civil Service of the
Constitutional Convention which we have reproduced mentions this tenure of
office in its last sentence, "This affords public employees reasonable
security or tenure."
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines, which has no counterpart
in the Constitution of the United States, makes the tenure of officers and
employees in the Civil Service secure even against the President's power of
removal and even if the officers should hold purely executive offices.
It is also contended by the respondent that neither the Constitution nor the
laws passed by the Legislature mention or enumerate the cause or causes for
which a civil service official may be removed from office. We find this claim
untenable. The law and civil service rules clearly provide the causes or some
of the causes for removal of civil service officials.
o Section 686 of the Revised Administrative Code, section 18 provides
that falsification by a civil service official of his daily time record shall
render him liable to summary removal and subject him to
prosecution as provided by law.
o Section 687 of the same Code section 19 deals with political activity
and contribution to political fund by civil service employees.
o Rule XIII, section 6 of the Civil Service Rules also provides certain
misconducts
From sections 64 and 694 of the Admin Code, it is inevitable that before a
civil service official or employee can be removed, there must first be an
investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to
defend himself.
In the case of petitioner Lacson, the record fails to show, neither is there any
claim that he has been charged with any violation of law or civil service
regulation, much leas investigated and thereafter found guilty so as to
authorize or warrant removal from office.

CONCLUSION: The transfer of Lacson to Tarlac by his nomination to the post of

provincial fiscal of that province was equivalent to and meant his removal as provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental; that said removal was illegal and unlawful for lack of valid
cause as provided by law and the Constitution; that the confirmation of the nomination
by the Commission on Appointments did not and could not validate the removal, since
the Constitution is equally binding on the Legislature; that a provincial fiscal is a civil
service official or employee whose tenure of office is protected by the Constitution; and
that Antonio Lacson could not be compelled to accept his appointment as provincial
fiscal of Tarlac; that having declined said appointment, he continued as provincial fiscal
of Negros Oriental; that inasmuch as he neither left, abandoned nor resigned from his
post as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, there was no vacancy in said post to which

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the respondent could be legally appointed; and that consequently, the appointment of
the respondent was invalid.
Final dramatic words from SC

There are hundreds, yea, thousands of young, ambitious people who enter
the Civil Service not temporarily or as a makeshift, but to make a career out of
it. They give the best years of their lives to the service in the hope and
expectation that with faithful service, loyalty and some talent, they may
eventually attain the upper reaches and levels of official hierarchy.

To permit circumvention of the constitutional prohibition in question by

allowing removal from office without lawful cause, in the form or guise of
transfers from one office to another, or from one province to another, without
the consent of the transferee, would blast the hopes of these young civil
service officials and career men and women, destroy their security and tenure
of office and make for a subservient, discontented and inefficient civil service
force that sways with every political wind that blows and plays up to whatever
political party is in the saddle.

Incidentally, it happens that the petitioner is one of those we had in mind as

making a career of the Government service. He claims and it is not denied by
the respondent, that twenty years ago he entered the service of the
Government as register of deeds of Negros Oriental, then was promoted to
the post of fiscal, first of the Province of Palawan, then of Surigao, later of
Antique and lastly of Negros Oriental in 1946. He does not want to accept the
transfer to the Province of Tarlac. His only alternative would be to resign,
sacrifice his twenty years of continuous, faithful service and his career, and
perchance his hope that some day, he might yet be promoted to the judiciary.
Not a very bright prospect or picture, not only to him but to other civil service
officials in like circumstance.

But in justice to the President and the Commission on Appointments, let it be

stated once again that it would seem that the transfer of the petitioner to
Tarlac was not meant and intended as a punishment, a disciplinary measure
or demotion. It was really a promotion, at least at the time the appointment
was made.

Only, that later, due to a change in the category of Oriental Negros as a

province, the transfer was no longer a promotion in salary. And yet the
respondent and the Solicitor General insisted in the transfer despite the
refusal of the petitioner to accept his new appointment.
HELD: In conclusion, we find and declare the petitioner to be the provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental, and the respondent not being entitled to said post, is hereby ordered
to surrender to the petitioner all the records or papers appertaining to said office that
may have come into his possession. The respondent provincial auditor and provincial
treasurer, are hereby ordered to pay to the herein petitioner his salary from June 16,
1949, and as long as said petitioner continues to be the legal incumbent to the office in
question. Considering that the respondent appears to have acted in good faith and
relied upon his nomination by the President and the confirmation thereof by the
Commission on Appointments, as well as the position taken by the Solicitor-General,
who sustained his appointment, we make no pronouncement as to costs.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

o
6. ACOSTA V. FLOR (JM)
G.R. No. 2122
September 13, 1905
Petitioner: Pedro Acosta
Respondent: David Flor
Ponente: J. Mapa
Summary:
Acosta filed a case in the lower court alleging that as a result of the December 1903
municipal elections in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, he was elected by a majority of 100 votes.
Notwithstanding this, Flor (another candidate) has usurped the office. He therefore
prays to be declared to be entitled to the office and be given possession thereof. In the
trial, it was not proven that Acosta was entitled in any way of the office of municipal
president. Hence, the court granted Flors Demurrer of Evidence, and acquitted Flor on
the ground that Acostas petition had no cause of action for failing to establish his right
to the exercise of the office.
SC held that under Sec. 201 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, it can be inferred that
the individual who does not claim to have such right cannot bring an action for the
usurpation of public office. This is supported by Sec. 202 which states that when an
action is against a person for usurping an office, the complaint shall set forth the name
of the person who claims to be entitled, with an averment of his right to the same.
Therefore, at any stage of the proceedings if it be shown that such individual has no
right, the action may be dismissed because there is no legal ground upon which it may
proceed.
FACTS:

Acosta filed a case in the lower court (hnd sinabi kung saan) a complaint alleging:
o At the municipal elections held in Dec. 1, 1903 in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, Acosta
and Flor were candidates for the office of municipal president;
o that as a result of the election Acosta was elected to by a majority of 100
votes, and that notwithstanding this Flor has usurped the office and unlawfully
held the same ;
o sets out other acts in regard to illigalities alleged to have been committed
during the election.
o Prayer: that judgment be entered against Flor, excluding him from the
exercise of such office and that Acosta be declared to be entitled to the same
and that he be given possession thereof.

In the trial, not a single witness by Acosta confirmed that he had obtained a
majority of 100 votes at the election, nor can it be inferred from the evidence
introduced by him that he, as a result of the said election or for any other reason,
was entitled to the office of municipal president of Laoag.

In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by Acosta, and before Flor had
presented his, the court, on the latters motion, acquitted Flor (Demurrer to
evidence?) on 2 grounds:

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No cause of action because Acosta had failed to establish his alleged right to
the exercise of the office; and
o There was no necessity to inquire into the right of Flor to hold the office
because this question had already been determined by the provincial board
after a consideration of the various protests presented to it in regard to
irregularities committed during the election held at Laoag and for the further
reason that the presumption is that a person holding a public office was duly
appointed or elected thereto.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON a plaintiff can maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the
defendant from the exercise of an office on account of illegalities alleged to have been
committed in the elections notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff has failed to show that
he had any right to the office of municipal president of Laoag. NO. (no issue given)
RATIO:

If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to maintain an
action for usurpation of public office, he would have plainly said so in order to
avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance.
19
20

On the contrary especially and specifically provided in sections 199 , 200 , and
21
201 of the Code of Civil Procedure who must and who may bring such actions.
And it is very clear that it was its intention to give such right to those expressly
mentioned and to no other, following the well-known rule of law "inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius."
o The 3 sections only mention the Attorney-General, the provincial fiscal,
and the individual claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully held
and exercised by another.
o It is to be inferred from this last provision that the individual who does not
claim to have such a right cannot bring an action for usurpation of public
office.

This inference is supported by the provisions of section 202 which says

that when the action is against a person for usurping an office, the
complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled
thereto, with an averment of his right to the same.

As a consequence of what has been said, no individual can bring a civil action
relating to the usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a
right to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown that
19

"the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the fiscal of any province, when directed by the Chief
Executive of the Islands, must commence any such action; and when upon complaint or otherwise he
has good reason to believe that any case specified in the two preceding sections can be established by
proof, he must commence such action."
20
"the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a province, may, at his own instance, bring such
an action, or he may, on leave of the court in which the action is to be commenced, or a judge thereof in
vacation, bring the action upon the relation of and at the request of another person; but, if the action is
brought at the request of and upon the relation of another person, the officer bringing it may require an
indemnity for expenses and costs of the action, to be given to him by the party at whose request and
upon whose relation the same is brought, before commencing it."
21
"A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may
bring an action therefor."

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

such individual has no such right, the action may be dismissed because
there is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental
basis of such action is destroyed as is the case here.
This is what actually happened in this case. After all of the evidence presented by
Acosta had been introduced, it was found, and he himself so admitted that he had
failed to establish in any way that he had any right to the office of municipal
president of Laoag as he had alleged in his complaint without foundation for such
allegation.
o Consequently the judge very properly acquitted Flor.
Acostas Contention: The question of the right of the plaintiff to the said office
does not arise until it has been determined that the defendant is not entitled to the
exercise of such office. In other words, the court should have first passed upon the
right of the defendant and afterwards upon the right of the plaintiff.
SC: This should be done at the same time and in the same judgment. It is
immaterial what method the court may follow in the determination of the questions
in the rendition of his judgment because even though the court may pass upon the
right of the plaintiff first, and the right of the defendant afterwards, or vice versa,
this procedure would not vitiate the judgment, provided the court does not fail to
state therein what the rights of the contending parties to the office are.
o BUT all of this presupposes that the action has been properly brought
and duly prosecuted to a judgment. It is impossible to prosecute a suit
without a cause of action.
o Therefore, whenever before judgment it is conclusively proven that the
plaintiff has no right to maintain the action since he has not the essential
conditions required by law in order to bring and maintain such action, his
complaint should be dismissed and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the
right of the defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed possession
of his office, unless the action is brought by a person having a right to
maintain the same under the law.
o The only exception to the rule that there be a person claiming to be entitled to
the office alleged to have been usurped, only refers to cases where the action
is brought by the Attorney-General or the provincial fiscal.

DECISION: The order of the court below appealed from, is hereby affirmed.
7. GARCIA V. PEREZ (RS)
22
No. L-28184|99 SCRA 628 |9/11/1980|De Castro, J.
Petitioner-appellant: Purificacion Garcia
Respondent-appellee: Angelo Perez
SUMMARY
Garcia questioned the appointment of Perez to the position of Senior Clerk in the
Fiscal Management and Budget Division, Court of Appeals, which receives a higher
salary than what Garcia does. Garcia filed a protest with the CSC against Perez
22

Syllabus says 99 SCRA 328, but that case, if there is one with that
citation, does not turn up in my search.
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appointment on the ground that she was next in rank, better qualified and entitled to
preferential appointment to the position. CSC denied this. MR denied. Garcia filed quo
warranto case, which was also denied by the court a quo. MR denied. Before the SC,
the issue was WN Garcia has the right to bring a quo warranto proceeding questioning
the legality of the appointment of Perez. NO. Quo warranto petition dismissed. A
petitioner, in a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public office, must be
able to show that he is entitled to said office. Absent such an element, the
petition must be dismissed. In Cuyegkeng, the SC held that one who does not
claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another, but who "merely asserts a right to be appointed" thereto,
cannot question the latter's title to the same by quo warranto. In other words, one
whose claim is predicated solely upon a more or less remoted possibility, that
he may be the recipient of the appointment, has no cause of action against the
office holder.
FACTS

Purificacion V. Garcia appeals on pure questions of law, from a decision

dated 29 June 1967 of the CFI of Manila, which dismissed the petition for quo
warranto instituted by petitioner-appellant questioning the authority of
respondent-appellee to occupy and discharge the duties of the position of
Senior Clerk in the Fiscal Management and Budget Division, Court of Appeals
(CA).

9/1964 position of Senior Clerk in the Fiscal Management and Budget

Division of the CA (Senior Clerk or the position for brevity) with an
authorized salary of P4,800 per annum, became vacant

Petitioner Garcia, who was then occupying another position of Senior Clerk in
the same division but with compensation at the rate of P3,400 per annum,
filed with the Presiding Justice of the CA a written application for the vacant
position stating therein her qualifications.

9/12/1964 upon recommendation of the Clerk of CA, the Presiding Justice

of said Court, appointed respondent Angelo Perez to the vacant position, with
compensation at the rate of P4,200 per annum, effective 2 days hence. At
that time, Perez was holding the position of Cash and Payroll Clerk in the
same division, with compensation at the rate of P3,960 per annum.

9/21/1964 Garcia filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), a protest
against the appointment of Perez on the ground that she was next in rank,
better qualified and entitled to preferential appointment to the position.
o The Commissioner of CSC indorsed Garcia's protest to the CA for
comment.
o In a second endorsement, the Presiding Justice of the CA,
recommended approval of the appointment of Perez.
o In a separate communication to the Commissioner of CSC, the Chief
of the Fiscal Management and Budget Division of the CA stated that
the recommendation for the approval of the appointment of Perez
was made "after carefully studying the records and efficiency ratings
of the ranking employees in said division where the vacancy exists"
and that while Garcia occupies an item in his division, she never

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

worked therein and "has no knowledge or experience about the

nature or kind of work being performed" in said division.
o The first Deputy Clerk of Court and Administrative Officer of the CA
also informed the Commissioner of CSC that the position of Cash
and Payroll Clerk, was considered next in rank to the position of
Senior Clerk to which Perez was appointed and this ranking was
based in the "hierarchical organization of the Fiscal Department and
Budget Division to which the two above-mentioned positions belong,
the degree of relationship between these two positions and the
similarity in the nature of the duties inherent in them."
8/8/1966 Commissioner of CSC approved Perez appointment as Senior
Clerk with compensation at the rate of P4,200 per annum.
Garcia filed a MR of the decision of the Commissioner of CSC denying her
protest.
10/7/1966 MR was denied by the Commissioner of CSC.
To the position of Cash and Payroll Clerk vacated by Perez, the Presiding
Justice of the CA appointed Virginia Soriano thereto.
11/23/1966 - Garcia sent to the Commissioner of CSC her protest against
said appointment on the ground that it violated the CSC Rules on Promotion,
with the statement that the formal protest would be sent later.
11/25/1966 - Garcia commenced the present action but three days later she
sent her formal protest against the appointment of Mrs. Soriano, with a prayer
that it be disapproved and to cause the appointment of Garcia to said
position.
Court a quo dismissed the complaint: "A careful reading of Garcias complaint
and the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties disclose that Garcia does
not claim to be entitled to the position but she merely asserted a preferential
right' to be appointed thereto. Considering that she has not been appointed to
the position in question, she cannot, therefore, be placed and made to occupy
it. Under the situation, Garcia has no cause of action against Perez."
o Further note: "Another circumstance which militates against the
present action is that it was commenced beyond the period of one
year from the time the alleged right of Garcia to hold the office in
question arose. Perez was appointed Senior Clerk effective
September 14, 1964, and since then, he immediately discharged the
duties of the position. Considering that Garcia contends that the
appointment, of Perez to said position and his exercise of its
functions was unlawful and prejudicial to petitioner's rights, she
should have commenced her action (assuming that she has the right
to do so) within a period of one year from said appointment, as she
was in effect deprived of a right to occupy the position, The
complaint in this case was filed only on November 25, 1966 and
accordingly, it is already barred."
Hence, this appeal wherein Garcia has assigned four (4) errors of the court a
5
quo, thus:

ISSUE: WN Garcia has the right to bring a quo warranto proceeding questioning the
legality of the appointment of Perez. NO

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HELD: Instant petition for quo warranto is dismissed.

RATIO

Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner, in a quo warranto

proceeding to try title to a public office, must be able to show that he is
entitled to said office.
o Absent such an element, the petition must be dismissed.
o This is a principle that goes back to Acosta v. Flor, a 1905 decisionDOCTRINE: "No individual can bring a civil action relating to
usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a right
to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown
that such individual has no right, the action may be dismissed
because there is no legal ground upon which it may proceed
when the fundamental basis of such action is destroyed.
o This has been the exacting rule, since then, followed with stricter
firmness in Cuyegkeng v. Cruz HELD: one who does not claim
to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held
or exercised by another, but who "merely asserts a right to be
appointed" thereto, cannot question the latter's title to the same
by quo warranto. In other words, one whose claim is predicated
solely upon a more or less remoted possibility, that he may be
the recipient of the appointment, has no cause of action against
the office holder.

This is precisely the situation in the case at hand, and there is no cogent
reason to change the rule. Perforce, the instant appeal may be dismissed,
even on this ground alone.

Should greater liberality be accorded to Garcia by considering her action as

one for mandamus whereby she would seek the appointing power to be
compelled to withdraw the appointment of Perez and issue in its place one for
Garcia herself, a procedural obstacle stands on the way, the appointing
power, the Presiding Justice of the CA, not having been impleaded as a party.
This on the assumption that appellant has a clear legal right to the contested
position, which she has not.
o The observation just made finds relevance to the issue raised in
appellant's second assignment of error, relative to the fatal
consequence of her failure to institute the present quo warranto
proceedings within the reglementary period of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court).
o In said assignment of error, Garcia maintains that the lower court
erred in holding that this action should have been commenced within
one (1) year from the Perez appointment and argues that her cause
of action arose only after notice of the denial of her MR of the
decision of the Commissioner of CSC on her protest against the
appointment of Perez.
o Moreover, she insists that the pendency of the protest in the CSC
suspended the running of the one-year period, citing the Supreme
Court's ruling on the finality of appointment in the case of Grospe v.
Sec. of Public Works and Communication, the dissenting opinion of

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116

Justice Perfecto in the case of Tumulak v. Egay concerning the oneyear period, and the ruling in the case of Agcaoile v. Saguitan.
o The authorities relied upon by appellant are, however, not in point
and do not apply in this case.

The first case is one of mandamus and the case at bar

cannot be considered as one, as already shown asking
for the reinstatement of an employee who was ordered
dismissed for cause by the Commission on CSC.

The second is a dissenting opinion which is not binding, as

it is a mere expression of the individual view of the
dissenting justice from the conclusion held by the majority
of the court.

The last was expressly abandoned in Torres v. Quintos in

the following tenor: ... We denied said supplemental action
in a minute resolution, the effect of which is of course to
reject the theory that the pendency of an administrative
remedy suspends the period within which a petition for quo
warranto should be filed. The reason is obvious. While it
may be desirable that administrative remedies be first
resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as
said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the
institution of quo warranto proceedings: it follows that he
who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly
usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the
courts, should file the proper judicial action within the
reglementary period. Public interest requires that the right
of public office should be determined as speedily as
practicable... This ruling has been reiterated with
consistent strictness in a long line of cases.
As applied to the instant case: admitted facts show that the appointment in
controversy was made on 12 September 1964, effective 14 September 1964;
respondent-appellee assumed office on the strength thereof, and received the
salary corresponding to said position. The petition herein was filed only on
25 November 1966, clearly more than one year after the pretended right
of Garcia to hold the office in question arose. This circumstance has
close the door for any judicial remedy in her favor.
This makes it unnecessary to take up in detail the other assignment of errors
advanced by Garcia. Suffice it to state that Garcia has not overcome the
presumption of regularity and legality in official actions anent the extension of
the appointment in question by the Presiding Justice of the CA and the
approval thereof, by the Commissioner of CSC.
o Even if viewed only as a matter of equity, we cannot disregard, as if
they were totally irrelevant, the facts that Perez was at the time of
the issuance of the disputed appointment, receiving a higher salary
than Garcia; and that he, as cash and payroll clerk, had always
worked in the division to which the contested position pertains, while
Garcia has never worked therein, although her item is that of a
senior clerk of the same division, thereby giving Perez higher

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

o
o

potentiality for, if not actually greater, competence for the duties and
responsibilities of the position in question.
Likewise, three days after filing the instant petition, Garcia protested
with the Commissioner of CSC the appointment of Mrs. Soriano to
the position of cash and payroll clerk, the position vacated by Perez,
praying that she (Garcia) be appointed to said position.
This theory of abandonment, as advanced by Perez and raised his
Motion to Dismiss was not refuted by Garcia, as she could have
done by filing a reply brief which she did not.
Undeniably, there is obvious validity in this contention, at least
insofar as it tends to show Garcias own conviction in the weakness
of her claim to be entitled to the position in dispute, which constitutes
the real and actual foundation of the action of quo warranto which
she has instituted.

8. CRUZ V. RAMOS (RT)

G.R. No. L-3059
August 2, 1949
Petitioners: VICENTE G. CRUZ, AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, JOSEFINA R. PHODACA,
SALVADOR MARINO, ISAURO M. SANTIAGO, and SEGUNDO AGUSTIN
Respondents: PLACIDO RAMOS, FERNANDO MONLEON, and LUIS VILLACERAN
SUMMARY
The six petitioners allege that they are members of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, they having been elected in the general elections of 1947 for a term of four
years expiring on December 31, 1951. As such elected members they have the
absolute and exclusive right to exercise the prerogatives and privileges of the office of
members of said board. Only one vacancy in the board was created by the
appointment of Eustaquio Balagtas as Director of Prisons. The President of the
Philippines appointed the respondents Placido Ramos, Fernando Monleon and Luis
Villaceran members of the municipal board to fill the vacancy caused by the
appointment of Eustaquio Balagtas as Director of Prisons and two new additional
positions created by Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila.
Petitioners allege that Republic Act No. 409, which increases the congressional
districts of the City of Manila from two to four and the membership of the municipal
board from ten to twelve, is unconstitutional because section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution authorizes the Congress to apportion legislative districts throughout the
Philippines by a general law and not by piecemeal legislation.
W/N quo warranto is proper? NO.
The exercise of the prerogative writ of Quo Warranto is governed by Rule 68 of the
Rules of Court. Section 6 provides that "a person claiming to be entitled to a public
office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor
in his own name." The present petition is not authorized by section 6 to because the
petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the public office alleged to be unlawfully held
or exercised by the respondents. As a matter of fact the petitioners allege that they are
elected members of the municipal board and that their term of office will not expire until
December 31, 1951. They do not and cannot claim that the respondents have

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

supplanted them. Their contention that they and the other elected members of the
board who are not parties in this case "have the absolute and exclusive right to
exercise the prerogatives and privileges and discharge the duties of the office of
members of said board." does not bring their case within the purview of section 6. The
mere fact that the membership of the board was increased from ten to twelve and the
quorum from six to seven does not in any way diminish the rights and prerogatives of
the individual petitioners as members of the board. Such increase does not result in
the diminution of the emolument or in the curtailment of the participation in the
deliberations and of the vote of each of the petitioners as a member of the board.

CASE: An original petition of Quo Warranto (1) to declare "that the respondents are
illegally usurping, intruding into, and/or exercising or holding the office of Members of
the Manila Municipal Board," and (2) oust them from that office.
FACTS
Petitioners Allegations
The six petitioners allege that they are members of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, they having been elected in the general elections of 1947 together with
Gregorio Garcia, Andres Santamaria, Pedro Arenas, and Eustaquio Balagtas (who
are not parties in this case) to compose the ten members of the Board, for a term of
four years expiring on December 31, 1951.
As such elected members they have the absolute and exclusive right to exercise the
prerogatives and privileges of the office of members of said board.
Only one vacancy in the board was created by the appointment of Eustaquio
Balagtas in March, 1949, as Director of Prisons.
On June 22, 1949, the President of the Philippines appointed the respondents
Placido Ramos, Fernando Monleon and Luis Villaceran members of the municipal
board to fill the vacancy caused by the appointment of Eustaquio Balagtas as
Director of Prisons and two new additional positions created by Republic Act No.
409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
Petitioners allege that Republic Act No. 409, which increases the congressional
districts of the City of Manila from two to four and the membership of the municipal
board from ten to twelve, is unconstitutional because section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution authorizes the Congress to apportion legislative districts throughout the
Philippines by a general law and not by piecemeal legislation.
At least any two of the respondents are illegally usurping, intruding into, and/or
holding or exercising the rights and privileges and discharging the duties exclusively
pertaining to the petitioners and other members of the municipal board elected in the
general elections of 1947 because the creation of the office and the appointment of
at least any two of the respondents are contrary to section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution.
The unconstitutional appointment and qualification of at least any two of the
respondents increases the number of a majority to constitute a quorum to do
business in the deliberation of the municipal board, thereby depriving any six of the
elective members of the board to do business, inasmuch as the minimum number to
constitute a quorum of a 12-member board under Republic Act No. 409 is seven,
instead of six.

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Respondents contentions
The petitioners have no legal capacity to bring the present action for usurpation of
public office, inasmuch as the petitioners do not claim to be entitled to occupy the
office now held by the respondents, and that an action for usurpation of office may
be brought only by the Solicitor General or by a fiscal in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
The respondents are lawfully holding the office in question, they having been duly
appointed thereto by the President of the Philippines.
Republic Act No. 409 is constitutional.
ISSUE
W/N quo warranto is proper? NO.
RATIO
The exercise of the prerogative writ of Quo Warranto is governed by Rule 68 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 1 of said rule provides that an action for the usurpation of office may be
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against any person who
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.
And section 6 provides that "a person claiming to be entitled to a public office
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in
his own name."
The present petition is not authorized by section 6 to because the petitioners do not
claim to be entitled to the public office alleged to be unlawfully held or exercised by
the respondents. As a matter of fact the petitioners allege that they are elected
members of the municipal board and that their term of office will not expire until
December 31, 1951.
They do not and cannot claim that the respondents have supplanted them. Their
contention that they and the other elected members of the board who are not parties
in this case "have the absolute and exclusive right to exercise the prerogatives and
privileges and discharge the duties of the office of members of said board." does not
bring their case within the purview of section 6.
Moreover, such contention is untenable because if the elected councilors had "the
absolute and exclusive right" to the membership of the board, then no other person
could become a member of the board even if vacancies should be created therein by
law or by the death or resignation of an elected member during the four-year term of
office of the petitioner; and that is untenable because the councilors are elected
individually, each to fill one seat in the board, and not collectively as a body to
constitute the board.
And if the petitioners should admit as they must that vacancies may be filled by other
persons, because an elected councilor cannot fill more than one seat in the board,
they must necessarily admit also that their right to membership therein is not
exclusive.
The mere fact that the membership of the board was increased from ten to twelve
and the quorum from six to seven does not in any way diminish the rights and
prerogatives of the individual petitioners as members of the board.

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 Such increase does not result in the diminution of the emolument or in the
curtailment of the participation in the deliberations and of the vote of each of the
petitioners as a member of the board. The petitioners are bringing this action as
individuals and not as a group or judicial entity recognized by law as having a
corporate or collective right to assert.
As members of the municipal board the six petitioners are not bound to vote solidly
to a man on any measure or motion that may come up before the board. Indeed,
they are supposed to express their individual opinions and cast their individual votes.
Therefore, the increase of the membership of the board and of the invasion of
petitioners' right which would entitle them to bring this action.
If, as petitioners contend, Republic Act No. 409 increasing the membership of the
board is unconstitutionala question which we cannot inquire into unless a proper
action is brought before usthe remedy available to them as well as to any other
citizen is that provided for in section 4 of Rule 68; namely, to relate the matter to the
Solicitor General and request him to bring the action in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
The reason of the law is that a public office or a franchise is created or granted by
law, and its usurpation or unlawful exercise is the concern primarily of the
Government. Hence the latter as a rule is the party called upon to bring the action for
such usurpation or unlawful exercise of an office or franchise.
The only exception in which the law permits an individual to bring the action in his
own name is when he claims to be entitled to the public office alleged to be usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another. That, however, is not the present case,
as we have hereinabove demonstrated.
It resulting from the foregoing that the petitioners have no cause of action, it is
neither necessary nor proper for the Court to pass upon the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 409.
The petition is dismissed, with costs.
9.

CALLEJA V. PANDAY (MB)

Petitioners: Ma. Lutgarda P. Calleja, Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., Jadelson Peter P.

Calleja, Ma. Jessica T. Flores, Mercie C. Tipones and Perfecto Nixon C. Tabora
Respondents: Jose Pierre A. Panday, Augusto R. Panday and Ma. Thelna P. Mallari
G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006
Austria-Martinez, J.:
SUMMARY:
Respondents Jose Panday et al. filed a petition with the RTC-Br. 58 of Camarines Sur
for quo warranto and other remedies against Ma. Lutgarda Calleja et al. for allegedly
usurping the powers which supposedly belonged to Panday et al. as members of the
board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated. RTC-Br. 58 Camsur
transferred the case to RTC-Naga City, but RTC-Naga City refused to receive the case
for improper venue. RTC-Br. 58 Camsur proceeded with the case. Petitioners Tabora
and others answer moved to dismiss the quo warranto case invoking improper venue,
lack of jurisdiction and wrong remedy of quo warranto. RTC-Br. 58 Camsur dismissed

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this motion to dismiss. Hence this petition for review on certiorari assailing the said
order. The SC granted the petition ruling:
(1) Calleja et al. chose the wrong remedy. However, it appears that the longer
this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for more violence
between the parties to erupt so the SC resolved to rule on the merits.
(2) Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo
warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation.
(3) It is The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo
warranto filed by Panday et al.
(4) It is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in
Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition
FACTS:

Respondents Jose Panday et al. filed a petition with the RTC of San Jose,
Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order against Ma. Lutgarda Calleja et al.

Panday et al. alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial
court, they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St.
John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, Calleja et al., who
are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation,
forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly
belonged to Panday et al.

RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC in Naga City.
o Since the verified petition showed Panday et al. to be residents of
Naga City, then the action for quo warranto should be brought in the
RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where Panday et
al. or any of the respondents resides.

However, the Executive Judge of RTC of Naga City refused to receive the
case, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo
warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.

The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons.

o Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer raising the ff. affirmative defenses:
(1) improper venue
(2) lack of jurisdiction, and
(3) wrong remedy of quo warranto.
o Other respondents also filed their Answer raising the same
affirmative defenses.

RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order:

o Denying the Motion to Dismiss because it is a prohibited pleading
o Remanding the case to the RTC of Naga City which has been
designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate
controversies under R.A. 8799.
o The issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better
left to the court of competent jurisdiction to rule upon.

Calleja et al. elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

In their Comment, Panday et al. argue that:

1. An appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate because the Order is
merely interlocutory and not a final order as contemplated under
Rule 45.
2. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the wrong remedy
because all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the
Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies shall be
appealable to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43.
3. The petition was intended merely to delay the proceedings.
Subsequently, Calleja et al. also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo
Ante, alleging that respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed
men, assaulted the premises of St. John Hospital in Naga City, taking away
the daily hospital collections estimated at P400,000.00.

ISSUES:
1. Whether a branch of the RTC which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a
case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal court in order to
cure the defects on venue and jurisdiction. --- NO
2. Whether or not Administrative Circular No. 8-01 dated January 23, 2001
which took effect on March 1, 2001 may be applied in the present case which
was filed on May 16, 2005. --- YES
HELD:

The petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED.

The Order of the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur is SET ASIDE for
being NULL and VOID.

The petition for quo warranto entitled "Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. Sps.
Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al." is ordered DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. Calleja et al. chose the wrong remedy. However, it appears that the longer this case
remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for more violence between the parties
to erupt.

It is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

governs appeals from judgments or final orders.

The order was merely interlocutory as it does not dispose of the case
completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits. Such being
the case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a petition
under Rule 45.

In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases
previously cognizable by the SEC under Section 5, P.D. No. 902-A, and the
propensity of the parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to look
beyond petitioners technical lapse of filing a petition for review
on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
proper court.

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Thus, the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.

2. History: Transfer of jurisdiction from SEC to regular courts

It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain
persons usurped the offices, powers and functions of duly elected members
of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate
controversy.

Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their
office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally
incorporated, while actions of quo warranto against corporations, or against
persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed stating that the SECs jurisdiction over
all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is
hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
RTC: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases.

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a

corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the SEC, have been
transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction.
3. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an
office in a private corporation.

Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads ---- Section 1. Action by Government

against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office, position or franchise;

Unilongo case --- Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer
contains the phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law"
which was found in the old Rules.
o Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo
warranto against:

persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise;

public officers who forfeit their office; and

associations which act as corporations without being legally

incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799.

Therefore, it is The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate

Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules) which applies to the
petition for quo warranto filed by Panday et al. before the trial court since
what is being questioned is the authority of Calleja et al. to assume the office
and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The Interim Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in civil cases
involving the following among others:
o Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or
association relations, between and among stockholders, members,
or associates, and between, any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members,
or associates, respectively;
o Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees,
officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;
Venue --- All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in
the RTC which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation,
partnership, or association concerned.

4. It is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in

Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo
warranto filed by Panday et al.

Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (effective December 15,

2000) --- designating certain branches of the RTCs to try and decide cases
formerly cognizable by the SEC. For the Fifth Judicial Region, this Court
designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit:
Camarines Sur (Naga City) --- Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo,
Jr.
Albay (Legaspi City) --Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta
Sorsogon (Sorsogon) --Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor

Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC (effective July 1,

2003) --- which provides that the RTCs designated as SEC courts shall be
called Special Commercial Courts to try and decide cases involving violations
of Intellectual Property Rights in addition to SEC cases.

It is undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at

Goa, Camarines Sur.

RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over Panday

et al.s petition for quo warranto because based on the allegations in the
petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute.
o RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court;
hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously
cognizable by the SEC.
o RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the
transfer of the case to another branch of the RTC.
o The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Note, further, that Panday et al. petition for quo warranto was filed as late as
2005. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was
clearly provided that such petitions shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court.
o Since the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court
for Camarines Sur is the RTC in Naga City, Panday et al. should
have filed their petition with said court.

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Rule 67: EXPROPRIATION

Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the
filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and
join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part
thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each
defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty
specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the
complaint. (1a)
Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government
depositary. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due
notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall
be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of
deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to
the authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the
amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit
a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. (2a)
Section 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to
the action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance
and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in
which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he
shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or
any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within
the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the
property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the
interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his
property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or
allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the
interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten
(10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation
whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present

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evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may
share in the distribution of the award. (n)
Section 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the
right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears
to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from
determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and
equitable. (4a)
Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the rendition of the order of
expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall
designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the
commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the
court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of
any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service,
and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have
received copies of the objections. (5a)
Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. Before entering upon the performance
of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will
faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with
the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before
the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them,
and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due
notice to the parties, to attend, view and examine the property sought to be
expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party
may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the
consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or
purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no
case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages
assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (6a)

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Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. The court may order
the commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have
been passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and
direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the
property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such
property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all
their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall
have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their
recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report
shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of
their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the
filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested
parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to
the findings of the report, if they so desire. (7a)
Section 8. Action upon commissioners' report. Upon the expiration of the period of
ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such
period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their
statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and
render judgment in accordance therewith, or, for cause shown, it may recommit the
same to the commissioners for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and
appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part and
it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the
property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property so taken. (8a)

ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant
of the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant
sustained and may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)

Section 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property

taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may
order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the
court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to
either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. (9a)

1. BRGY SAN ROQUE vs PASTOR (LL)

G.R. No. 138896 | June 20, 2000

Section 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. Upon payment by the
plaintiff to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest
thereon from the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to him of the
amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter
upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose
defined in the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession
thereof under the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel
absent themselves from the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered, the same
shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the same effect
as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person ultimately adjudged entitled
thereto. (10a)
Section 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. The right of the plaintiff
to enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or
purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court
determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered

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Section 12. Costs, by whom paid. The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as
a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants
litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the
owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the
appeal shall be paid by the owner. (12a)
Section 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. The judgment entered in
expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an adequate description, the
particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or
purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy
of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the
property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real
estate so described for such public use or purpose. (13a)
Section 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. The guardian or guardian ad
litem of a minor or of a person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the
approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or
thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of property belonging to
such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or
person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of
age or competent. (14a)

Petitioner: BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU

Respondents: Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR, namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO,
TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE
SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO
JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within
the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject
property.
Facts:

Petitioner Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu filed before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of the
respondents heirs of Francisco Pastor. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain is an
exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of
just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal
cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action
also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain
is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
and not with this Court."

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that the
action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action
affecting title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value
of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court. Section
3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, provides that all civil actions
involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value of
less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts. The Tax Declaration shows that the assessed value of
the land involved is only P1,740.00. Hence, it is the MTC which has
jurisdiction.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction in expropriation cases? - RTC

Ratio:
Test to determine whether a suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A review of the

jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought.

If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered

capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim.

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for
support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts
of first instance (now RTC).
Expropriation proceedings involve two phases
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit.

It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation

declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon
the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint.

An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,

since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by
the Court on the merits.

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Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought
to be taken.

This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too.

It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing
more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money.

Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right
to take private property for public use.

The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government

or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of
private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government
entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process.
In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise
of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary

terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it.
This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that
amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government

may expropriate private property under the given set of circumstances. The
government does not dispute respondents title to or possession of the same.
Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the
government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely
asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual
property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare
may demand."
2.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs.

2. NAPOCOR V. JOCSON (JM)

G.R. Nos. 94193-99
February 25, 1992
[Sorry guys mahaba ung case at puro tungkol sa expropriation, saka baka gusto ito ni
Sir kasi puro mali yung ginawa nung judge]
Petitioner: National Power Corporation
Respondents: HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 47, Bacolod City) AND
Jesus, Fernando, Maria Cristina And Michael, All Surnamed Gonzaga; Luis,
Dionisio, Roberto, Gabriel, Benjamin, Ana, Alexander, Carla, Sofia And
Daniel, all Surnamed gonzaga; Rosario P. Mendoza; Celsoy Agro-Ind. Corp.;

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Emmanuel, Lydia, Harry, Noli, Clifford And Christian Dale, all surnamed Ao;
Mayo L. Lacson; And Lucia Gosienfiao [collectively known as DEFENDANTS]
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.
Summary:
Napocor filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over
7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for
its Negros-Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bacolod-Tomonton
Transmission Line. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just
compensation thereby prompting Napocor to bring the eminent domain case.
Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation and
thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas
based on the tax declaration of the properties. Napocor, in compliance to the order,
deposited a corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands with the PNB.
However, the defendants as land owners filed a MR asserting that the assessed value
is way too low. Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the
provisional value to that stated in the MR and ordered Napocor to deposit the
differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in abeyance the
writ of possession order pending compliance to said order. Napocor complied.
Thereafter, respondent judge again ordered Napocor to pay in full amount the
defendants for their expropriated property. Unable to accept the above Order, Napocor
filed this petition alleging that respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction, in
violation of laws and in dereliction of the duty to afford respondents due process when
he issued said Orders.
Respondent Judge committed GADALEJ, and is otherwise either unmindful or ignorant
of the law: when (1) he fixed the provisional values of the properties in disregard of
P.D. No. 42; (2) in amending such determination of provisional values without hearing;
(3) in directing the defendants to manifest within 24 hours whether or not they are
accepting and withdrawing the amounts, representing the provisional values, deposited
by Napocor as "final and full satisfaction of the value of their respective property; (4) in
declaring the provisional values as the final values and directing the release of the
amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof; and (5) in suspending the issuance of
the writ of possession until after the amounts shall have been released to and received
by defendants.
FACTS:

Napocor filed a special civil action for certiorari to annul 4 orders issued by
respondent judge for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, in
violation of law and in deprivation of petitioner's right to due process

Napocor filed 7 eminent domain cases before the RTC of Bacolod City for the
acquisition of a right-of-way easement over portions of the parcels of land
described in the complaints for its Negros-Panay Interconnection Project,
particularly the Bacolod-Tomonton Transmission Line.
o It was alleged therein that the lands were urgently needed, compatible with
the greatest good, and at the same time causing the least private injury for
the lands will not be impaired as it will only acquire a right-of-way-easement
thereon. It had negotiated with and offered to pay defendants for the portions

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affected but the parties failed to reach an agreement despite long and
repeated negotiations.
st
1 order: Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the
expropriation, the long range benefit of the project involved, substantial
compliance with the rules concerning efforts for negotiation and, taking into
consideration the market value of the subject areas and the daily opportunity profit
that the petitioner allegedly admitted in open court, and thereby issued an order
determining the provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax
declaration of the properties, as found in the assessment by the Assessor.
Napocor, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited a
corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the amount of
P23,180,828 with the Philippine National Bank.
The defendant land owners filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that the
assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated
as P29,970,000.
nd
2
order: Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the
provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration and ordered
Napocor to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order
while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said
order which Napocor immediately complied.
rd
3 order: Thereafter, respondent judge ordered Napocor to pay in full amount the
defendants for their expropriated property, and ordering that the writ of possession
be issued after the defendants "have duly received the amounts."
Napocor assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge, hence this petition.

Napocors Contentions: The respondent judge acted with GAD in

1) fixing the provisional values of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated by
Napocor in amounts far exceeding their market values;
2) increasing the provisional values of the parcels of land without hearing, and
holding in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of Napocor
until deposit of the additional amount;
o This is in violation of:
o Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court upon the filing of the complaint or
at any time thereafter, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon
the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with the
National or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionally and promptly
ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings
o P.D. No. 42 upon filing in the proper court of the complaint in eminent
domain proceedings or at anytime thereafter, and after due notice to the
defendant, plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of
the real property involved if he deposits with the PNB, an amount equivalent
to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, to be held by
said bank subject to the orders and final disposition of the court.
3) requiring the defendants, to state in writing within 24 hours whether or not they are
amenable to accepting and withdrawing the amount deposited by Napocor as
provisional values in full and final satisfaction of their respective properties, and

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

4)

directing that the writ of possession be issued only until after the defendants shall
have so manifested in writing their acceptance and receipt of said amounts;
o Impliedly, this act surrenders the judicial prerogative to fix the provisional
value in favor of the defendants considering that respondent Judge's
valuation may still be overruled by the latter.
o Moreover, it preempts and deprives Napocor of the right to dispute and
contest the value of the property. The respondent Judge took a short-cut,
violating in the process the procedure laid down in Sections 3 to 8 of Rule 67
of the Rules of Court.
directing Napocor to release and pay within 24 hours, through the Court and in
favor of the defendants, the amount of P43,016,960.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge committed GADALEJ. YES.

RATIO:
Review There are two 2 stages in an action of expropriation:
a) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit.
o It ends with either (1) an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, or
(2) an order of dismissal. Both are final orders.
b) the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to
be taken.
o This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too.
Reasons why there was GADALEJ:
#1 Judge deliberately disregarded P.D. No. 42 or was totally unaware of its existence
and the cases applying the same.

Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has the
right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved upon
compliance with PD 42.
o PD 42 requires the petitioner, after due notice to the defendant, to deposit
with the PNB in its main office or any of its branches or agencies an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, as
indicated in the tax declaration.

PD 42 repealed the provision in the RoC on the assessment of the property

value under Rule 67 Sec. 2.
o Under the RoC then, the court has the discretion to determine the provisional
value. Notice to the parties is not indispensable.
o Now, under PD 42, what is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the
assessed value for taxation purposes. No hearing is required for that purpose.
All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to be
condemned. PD 42 effectively removes the discretion of the court in
determining the provisional value.

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In the case at bar, Napocor deposited the provisional value fixed by the court. As
a matter of right, it was entitled to be placed in possession of the property involved
in the complaints at once, pursuant to both Section 2 of Rule 67 and P.D. 42.
Respondent Court had the corresponding duty to order the sheriff or any other
proper officer to forthwith place the petitioner in such possession. Instead of
complying with the clear mandate of the law, respondent Judge chose to ignore
and overlook it.

#2 The Orders were issued in violation of the proceedings and formalities required
under the Rules of Court.

No hearing was held on the motions of the defendants.

As a matter of fact, the MR of the defendants did not even contain a notice of
hearing. It is then a mere scrap of paper.]
#3 Upon having fixed the provisional values, though erroneous, and Napocor having
deposited the amount, respondent judge lost plenary control over the order fixing the
amount of the deposit.

He has no longer the power to annul, amend, or modify it in matters of substance

pending the course of the condemnation proceedings.

The reason for this is that a contrary ruling would defeat the very purpose of the
law which is to provide a speedy and summary procedure whereby the peaceable
possession of the property subject of the expropriation proceedings may be
secured without the delays incident to prolonged and vexatious litigation touching
the ownership and value of such lands, which should not be permitted to delay the
progress of the work.
#4 There was a clear abdication of judicial prerogative.

The Order unjustly, oppressively and capriciously compels Napocor to accept the
respondent Judge's determination of the provisional value as the just
compensation after the defendants shall have manifested their conformity thereto.
o He thus subordinated his own judgment to that of the defendants' because he
made the latter the final authority to determine such just compensation.

The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial

function.
o Accordingly, the Order is unconstitutional and void, for being, inter alia,
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives which tends to render
the Court inutile in a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to it for
final determination.
#5 There is a complete disregard of the provisions of Rule 67 as to the procedure to be
followed after a plaintiff has deposited the provisional value of the property. The
following were not done by Respondent Judge.

3 sets of defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67;

Section 4 provides that the court must rule on them and in the event that it
overrules the motions or, when any party fails to present a defense as required in
Section 3, it should enter an order of condemnation declaring that the petitioner
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

From the 1st Order, the respondent Judge found that Napocor has the right to
expropriate for there will be a paramount public interest to be served.
o Accordingly, considering that the parties submitted neither a compromise
agreement as to the just compensation nor a stipulation to dispense with the
appointment of commissioners and to leave the determination of just
compensation to the court on the basis of certain criteria, respondent Judge
was duty bound to set in motion Section 5 of Rule 67.
o The court should have appointed not more than 3 competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to it regarding
the just compensation.
o Such commissioners shall perform their duties in the manner provided for in
Section 6.
o Sec: 7 Upon the filing of their report, the court shall grant 10 days to the
parties in order that the latter may file their objections to such report, and after
hearing pursuant to Section 8, accept and render judgment in accordance
therewith or, for cause shown, recommit the same to the commissioners for
further report of facts.
o The court may also set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it
may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order
or render such judgment as shall secure to the petitioner the property
essential to the exercise of its right of condemnation, and to the defendant
just compensation for the property so taken.

#6 Not satisfied with the foregoing violations of law and insisting upon his own
procedure, respondent Judge declared in the 3rd Order that the provisional amounts
be the fixed values.

By such Order, the case was in fact terminated and the writ of execution then
became a mere incident of an execution of a judgment.

The right of Napocor to take possession of the property upon the filing of the
complaint granted by Section 2 of Rule 67 and P.D. No. 42 was totally negated
despite compliance with the deposit requirement under the latter law.
Conclusion: [drama part]

Nothing can justify the acts of respondent Judge. Either by design or sheer
ignorance, he made a mockery of the procedural law on eminent domain by
concocting a procedure which he believes to be correct. Judges must apply the
law; they are not at liberty to legislate.

Canon 18 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics Ours is a government of law and not
of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if
he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular
case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him.

The demands of fair, impartial, and wise administration of justice call for a faithful
adherence to legal precepts on procedure which ensure to litigants the opportunity
to present their evidence and secure a ruling on all the issues presented in their
respective pleadings. "Short-cuts" in judicial processes are to be avoided where
they impede rather than promote a judicious disposition of justice.

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DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Orders of

respondent Judge are hereby SET ASIDE and the TRO issued by this Court directing
respondent Judge to cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Orders is hereby
made permanent.
The respondent Judge is hereby directed to fix the provisional values of the parcels of
land in Civil Cases Nos. 5938, 5939, 5940, 5941, 5942, 5943, and 5944 in accordance
with P.D. No. 42; thereafter, the petitioner may retain in Savings Account No. 249505865-7 with the Philippine National Bank, NAPOCOR Branch, Diliman, Quezon City,
a sum equivalent to the provisional value as thus fixed, which the Bank shall hold
subject to the orders and final disposition of the court a quo, and withdraw the balance.
The respondent Judge is further directed to proceed with the above eminent domain
cases without unnecessary delay pursuant to the procedure laid down in Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.
3. CITY OF MANILA VS THE ARELLANO LAW COLLEGES INC. (RS)
GR NO L-2929 | 2/28/1950 | Tuason, J.
Plaintiff-appellant: City of Manila
Defendant-appellee: Arellano Law Colleges, Inc.
SUMMARY
Manila City wanted to expropriate lands owned by Arellano Law Colleges. CFI-Manila
dismissed the action, which sought to condemn said lands for the purpose of
subdivision and resale. WN City was entitled to expropriate? NO. The word
"expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only meaning. But this
power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions noted in
the cases of Guido and Borja. The national Government may not confer upon its
instrumentalities authority which it itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run higher
than its source. To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee
of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for
the proposed uses and purposes. Necessity within the rule that the particular
property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to
the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party
and property owner consistent with such benefit. Any good that would accrue to
the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in
comparison with the preparation of young men and women for useful citizenship
and for service to the government and the community, a task which the
government alone is not a position to undertake.
FACTS

1 of RA 267 provides: "Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract

loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Philippine National
Bank, and/or any other entity or person at a rate of interest not exceeding
eight per cent per annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating
homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at
cost to residents of the said cities and municipalities."

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CFI of Manila this provision empowers cities to purchase but not to

expropriate lands for the purpose of subdivision and resale, and so
dismissed the present action, which seeks to condemn, for the purpose just
stated, several parcels of land having a combined area of 7,270 square
meters and situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila.
Guido v. Rural Progress Administration and Commonwealth v. De Borja
SC discussed at great length the extent of the Philippine Governments power
to condemn private property for resale [take note of the LIMITS to the power
to expropriate public interest, public purpose, public use, etc.]
o [T]he assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take
the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full
compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is
claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just
principle and fundamental maxim of a free government.
o In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity,
and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or
city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land
expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of
social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes
the expropriation with public interest and public use
o Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied
in determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the
direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is
synonymous with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage,
and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to
promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interests
involved are of considerable magnitude
o In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by
condemnation. The highest court of New York State has ruled that
slum clearance and erection of houses for low-income families were
public purposes for which New York City Housing authorities could
exercise the power of condemnation. And this decision was followed
by similar ones in other states.

The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the

destruction of congested areas and insanitary dwellings
diminishes the potentialities of epidemics, crime and waste,
prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected
areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the
surrounding communities, and promotes the safety and
welfare of the public in general.
o But it will be noted that in all these cases and others of similar nature
extensive areas were involved and numerous people and the
general
public
benefited
by
the
action
taken.
o

127

"The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50

persons and their families does not insure to the benefit of the public
to a degree sufficient to give the use public character.

The expropriation proceedings at bar [2 cases cited] have

been instituted for the economic relief of a few families

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

devoid of any consideration of public health, public peace

and order, or other public advantage.
"No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public
use and what is not can be made; each case has to be judged
according to its peculiar circumstances.

ISSUE: WN Manila City is empowered to expropriate the subject lands for homesties.
NO.
HELD: Order CFI of Manila affirmed.
RATIO

SC is inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as

well as to purchase lands for homesites.
o The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible
of only one meaning.
o But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the
limitations and conditions noted in the decisions above cited.
o The National Government may not confer upon its
instrumentalities authority which it itself may not exercise. A
stream cannot run higher than its source.
o The case at bar is weaker for the condemnor [City].

FIRST, the land that is the subject of the present

expropriation is only one-third of the land sought to be
taken in the Guido case, and about two-thirds of that
involved in the Borja condemnation proceeding.

SECOND, the Arellano Colleges land is situated in a highly

commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons
who are not bona fide tenants.

THIRD, this land was bought by the defendant for a

university site to take the place of rented buildings that are
unsuitable for schools of higher learning.
o To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a
grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist
for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes.
o City of Manila v. Manila Chinese Community SC, citing American
decisions, laid down this rule: "The very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of
the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the
taking of the land

Passage in Blackstones Commentaries on the English Law

is cited in this decision: "So great is the regard of the law for
private property that it will not authorize the least violation
of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very
great necessity thereof."

Perhaps modern decisions are not so exigent. Necessity within the rule that
the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not
mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property
owner consistent with such benefit.
But measured even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the
private character of the intended use, necessity for the condemnation
has not been shown.
o The land in question has cost the owner [Arellano] P140,000.
o The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken
are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, unless they
intend to borrow the money with a view to disposing of the property
later for a profit.
o Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and
more suited to the occupants needs and means, if really they only
want to own their own homes, are aplenty elsewhere.
o On the other hand, Arellano not only has invested a considerable
amount for its property but had the plans for construction ready and
would have completed the project a long time ago had it not been
stopped by the city authorities.
o And again, while a handful of people stand to profit by the
expropriation, the development of a university that has a present
enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed. Any good that
would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families
fades into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of young
men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to the
government and the community, a task which the government alone
is not in a position to undertake.
o As the Rural Progress Administration, the national agency created
by the Government to purchase or expropriate lands for resale as
homesites, and to which the petition to purchase the land in question
on behalf of the occupants was referred by the President, turning
down the occupants request after proper investigation, commented
that "the necessity of the Arellano Law College to acquire a
permanent site of its own is imperative not only because denial
of the same would hamper the objectives of that educational
institution, but it would likewise be taking a property intended
already for public benefit.
o
The Mayor of the City of Manila himself confessed that he believes
the plaintiff is entitled to keep this land.

4. VISAYAN REFINING V. CAMUS, G.R. NO. L-15870 (RT)

(http://philippinelaw.info/case-digests/visayan-refining-v-camus-g-r-no-l-15870.html)
1.EMINENT DOMAIN; PUBLIC USE; MILITARY AND AVIATION PURPOSES.The
use of land by the Government for military and aviation purposes is a public use within
the meaning of the provisions of law authorizing the Government of the Philippine
Islands to acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain.

128

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

2.ID. ; JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; AUTHORITY OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO

DIRECT INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS.Judicial proceedings for the
condemnation of land for public use can be maintained in the name of the Government
of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the directions of the Governor-General, without
any other special legislative authority than that expressed in subsection (h) of section
64 of the Administrative Code, in relation with section 3 of the Jones Act.
3.ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATION.The existence of a legislative
appropriation especially destined to pay for land to be acquired by the Government
through the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not an essential prerequisite to
the institution and maintenance of judicial proceedings for the expropriation of such
land. All that can be required of the Government is that it should comply with the
conditions laid down by law as and when those conditions arise.
4.ID. ; RIGHT TO EXERCISE POWER; INHERENT IN SOVEREIGNTY.The power
of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty, being essential to the existence of
the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. No law,
therefore, is ever necessary to confer this right upon sovereignty or upon any
Government exercising sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers.
5.ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; JUST COMPENSATION.The power of eminent
domain, with respect to the conditions under which the property is taken, must be
exercised in subjection to the restraints imposed by constitutional or organic law, and
in these Islands especially with reference to section 3 of the Jones Act which declares
that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of property without due
process of law and that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
6.ID. ; ID. ; METHOD OF EXPROPRIATION.If the Legislature prescribes a method
of expropriation which provides for the payment of just compensation and such method
is so conceived and adapted as to fulfill the constitutional requisite of due process of
law, any expropriation accomplished in conformity with that method is valid.
7.ID. ; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION.There is no organic or
constitutional provision in force in these Islands requiring that compensation shall
actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION AS PREREQUISITE TO
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY.The system of expropriation prescribed by laws in
force in these Islands affords absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally
and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. In this
connection our courts are directed to make such final order and judgment as shall
secure just compensation for the land taken, and the right of the expropriator is finally
made absolutely dependent upon the payment of compensation by him.
9.ID. ; ID. ; GIVING OF PROVISIONAL POSSESSION TO GOVERNMENT ; OFFICE
OF PRELIMINARY DEPOSIT.Where provisional possession is given to the
Government in an expropriation proceeding, upon the making of the deposit required
by Act No. 2826 of the Philippine Legislature, the owner of the land is fully protected

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

from any loss that might result from the temporary occupation of the land by the
Government in the event that the Legislature should finally f ail to appropriate any
additional amount necessary to satisfy the award of the court; for such preliminary
deposit serves the double purpose of prepayment upon the value of the property, if
finally expropriated, and as an indemnity against damage in the eventuality that the
proceeding should fail of consummation.
FACTS:
Upon the direction of the Governor-General, the Attorney-General filed a complaint
with the CFI (Rizal) in the name of the Government of the Philippines for the
condemnation of a certain tract of land in Paranaque for military and aviation purposes.
The petitioners herein are among the defendants named. Likewise, it was prayed that
the court will give the Government the possession of the land to be expropriated after
the necessary deposit (provisional) of P600, 000.00 as the total value of the property.
Through the order of the public respondent, Judge Camus, the prayer was granted.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners raised a demurrer questioning
the validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no law authorizing the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Likewise, they moved for the revocation of
the order on the same ground stated and with additional allegation that the deposit had
been made without authority of law since the money was taken from the unexpended
balance of the funds appropriated by previous statutes for the use of the Militia
Commission and the authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain could
not be found in those statutes. The demurrer and motion were overruled and denied
respectively by Camus. This prompted the petitioners to file this instant petition to stop
the proceedings in the CFI.
ISSUE: Can the Philippine Government initiate expropriation proceedings in the
absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain?
RULING: Yes, it can. The Philippine Government has the general authority to exercise
the power of eminent domain as expressly conferred by Section 63 of the Philippine
Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902). It says that the Philippine Government is
authorized "to acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and personal
property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right to
eminent domain." The same is subject to the limitation of due process of law. In
consonance with this, Section 64 of the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands
(Act No. 2711) expressly confers on the Government General the power "to determine
when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf
of the Government of the Philippine Island; and to direct the Attorney-General, where
such at is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in
the court having proper jurisdiction." There is no question as to the Governor General's
authority to exercise this power.
However, this authority is not absolute. It is subject to two limitations, namely, that the
taking shall be for public purpose and there must be just compensation.

129

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Apparently, the reason behind the taking of the subject land was for military and
aviation purposes. This considered a public purpose given the importance of the
military and aviation in the operation of the State.
As to the second requirement, it must be remembered that at that time there was no
law requiring that compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of
condemnation. The deposit was made, despite the absence of said law, to afford
absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an
unwilling owner until compensation is paid. This is in conformity with the just
compensation requirement.
Given these reasons, the proceedings were made in accordance with law.
DISPOSITION
Petition is denied. Proceedings of the lower court were in all respects regular and
within the jurisdiction of the court.
NOTE: The Supreme Court did not elaborate the reason in upholding the legality of the
transfer funds used for the deposit. It only said that "the Insular Auditor was acting
within his authority when he let this money out of the Insular Treasury."

5. Municipality of Bian v. Garcia (MB)

Petitioner: Municipality of Bian
Respondents: Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Bian,
Laguna (BRANCH XXXIV, Region IV), and Erlinda Francisco
FACTS:

The expropriation suit was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of

Bian, Laguna filed in the RTC. The complaint named as defendants the
owners of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Bian The land sought to be
expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a modern public market
and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
One of the defendants, Francisco filed a MTD. Her motion was filed pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 67. Her "motion to dismiss" was thus actually a pleading,
taking the place of an answer in an ordinary civil action; it was not an ordinary
motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the
contemplation of Rule 16. Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in
favor of the plaintiff Municipality.

Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial. She alleged she had the special
defense of "a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing
approved Locational Clearance from the H.S.R.C. The Court granted the
motion. It directed that a separate trial be held for Francisco regarding her
special defenses.

Judge issued order dismissing the complaint "as against defendant

FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ of Possessions as to "exclude
therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant .. and her property ..."

The Municipality filed a MR. Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution
and/or Finality of Order," contending that the Order had become "final and

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

executory for failure of the Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration

and/or appeal within the reglementary period," i.e "fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order .. appealed from.
The Municipality contended that "multiple appeals are allowed by law" in
actions of eminent domain, and hence the period of appeal is thirty (30), not
fifteen (15) days;the special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule
69.

HELD:

The challenged Order issued by His Honor is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE

The case is remanded to the Trial Court for the reception of the evidence of
the plaintiff Municipality of Bian as against defendant Erlinda Francisco, and
for subsequent proceedings and judgment in accordance with the Rules of
Court and the law.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. Whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court is a case "wherein multiple appeals are allowed, 1 as regards which 'the
period of appeal shall be thirty [30] days, instead of fifteen (15) days.

The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for
partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for
appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from notice
of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions
in general.

The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was
therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law
therefor; and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to
have declared that the order sought to be considered had become final and
executory.

In the case at bar, where a single complaint was filed against several
defendants having individual, separate interests, and a separate trial was held
relative to one of said defendants after which a final order or judgment was
rendered on the merits of the plaintiff s claim against that particular
defendant, it is obvious that in the event of an appeal from that separate
judgment, the original record cannot and should not be sent up to the
appellate tribunal. The record will have to stay with the trial court because it
will still try the case as regards the other defendants. As the rule above
quoted settles, "In an action against several defendants, the court may, when
a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them,
leaving the action to proceed against the others. " In lieu of the original
record, a record on appeal will perforce have to be prepared and transmitted
to the appellate court. More than one appeal being permitted in this case,
therefore, "the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal
being required as provided by the Implementing Rules in relation to Section
39 of B.P. Blg. 129, supra.

130

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

2. Whether or not the Trial Court may treat the motion to dismiss" filed by one of
the defendants in the action of eminent domain as a "motion to dismiss" under
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, reverse the sequence of trial in order and hear and
determine said motion to dismiss, and thereafter dismiss the expropriation suit
as against the movant.

One of the defendants was Erlinda Francisco. She filed a "Motion to Dismiss."
Now, her motion to dismiss" was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court:
o Sec. 3. Defenses and objections within the time specified in the
summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a
single motion to dismiss or for other apppropriate relief, all of his
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his
property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such
objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the
motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed
with the court with the proof of service.

Her "motion to dismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of an
answer in an ordinary civil action; it was not an ordinary motion governed by
Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the contemplation of Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court.
3. And the third is whether or not a "locational clearance issued by the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission relative to use of land is a bar to an
expropriation suit involving that land.

Turning now to the locational clearance issued by the HSRC in Francisco's

favor on May 4, 1983, it seems evident that said clearance did become a
"worthless sheet of paper," as averred by the Municipality, upon the lapse of
one (1) year from said date in light of the explicit condition in the clearance
that it shall be considered automatically revoked if not used within a period of
one (1) year from date of issue," and the unrebutted fact that Francisco had
not really made use of it within that period. The failure of the Court to consider
these facts, despite its attention having been drawn to them, is yet another
error which must be corrected.

6. PROVINCIAL GOVT OF RIZAL vs ARAULLO (LL)

G.R. No. L-36096 | August 16, 1933
Plaintiff-appellant: THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF RIZAL, PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
Defendants-appellees: FILOMENA CARO DE ARAULLO, ET AL.
Defendants-appellants: AMALIA ARCEGA DE BASA and RAMON AGTARAP
Facts:

This is an appeal by the provincial government of Rizal from the decision of

the Court of First Instance of that province, fixing the damages to be paid by
the plaintiff for the property expropriated for the extension of Taft Avenue from
the limits of the City of Manila, through the municipality of Pasay, to its

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

intersection with the Manila South Road. Fifty-two lots and the improvements
on ten lots are involved in the appeal
The original complaint was filed on May 31, 1928. Defendants appeared and
admitted plaintiff's right to expropriate the property in question, and the court
appointed four commissions respectively, to hear the parties and view the
premises, and assess the damages to be paid for the condemnation, and to
report their proceedings to the court. The only question involved in the case
was the determination of the damages to which the defendants were entitled.
In the case of most of the lots the evidence consists of the owner's estimate
of the value of his land at the time of the hearing in 1929 or 1930, and for the
plaintiff the testimony of Colin M. Hoskins. Hoskins is a real estate broker and
appraiser of real property, and at the time of the hearing had been engaged in
that business for seven years, and had participated in real estate transactions
in the municipality of Pasay and in the land taken for the extension of Taft
Avenue. He had examined the property to be condemned, and was in a
position to express a reliable opinion as to its market value.
We have not overlooked the fact that he was being paid for his services by
the plaintiff. He testified as to the value of the property in question in 1927
before the extension of Taft Avenue was laid out, and as to its increase value
at the time of the hearing.
There were 13 errors attributed to lower courts decision. Issue included here
is the first issue. Other errors were related to each of the lots value during
appraisal.

Issue:
Are the damages to be based upon the value of the property when the district engineer
of Rizal Province entered upon the land and laid out the extension of Taft Avenue in
1927, or the value on May 31, 1928 when the condemnation proceedings were filed, or
on the value of the property at the time of the hearings before the commissioners in
1929 and 1930? 1927

Ratio:

131

In their report of October 25, 1930, commissioners state that in appraising the
land expropriated they gave great weight to Hoskin's valuation of the land for
1927, which they increased slightly. An examination of the record as to the
individual lots shows, however, that in most cases the commissioners
disregarded the evidence and substituted their opinion as to the value of the
property, based on the inspection made by them. This they were not
authorized to do.
After referring to the case of the Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, the trial
judge said that the present expropriation was begun June 1, 1928. It may be
inferred from this statement that he was under the erroneous impression that
the province did not lay out the street or take possession of the property
before the filing of these proceedings.
o The trial judge also held that there was a natural increase in the
value of the property from 1927 to 1928; that in the ordinary course
of events land increases in value from time to time, and the appraisal
in this case is based almost entirely on the prices fixed by Hoskins

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

for the year 1927, plus an extra prince in accordance with the
petition of counsel for some of the defendants, this extra price
appearing to be the natural increase in value of the properties in
question from 1927 to the date of the expropriation.
The record does not sustain these findings of the trial court.
Manila Railroad Company vs. Caligsihan: It is a rule of general application
that the value of the property taken by eminent domain should be fixed as of
the date of the proceedings, and with reference to the loss the owner
sustains, considering the property in its condition and situation at the time it is
taken, and not as enhanced by the purpose for which it is taken. Our law says
that the compensation shall be "just" and, "to be exactly just, the
compensation should be estimated as of the time of the taking."
The rule just quoted contemplates a case where the taking of the property by
eminent domain coincides with the filing of the proceedings, but in the case at
bar the plaintiff through its agents entered upon the property, with the consent
of the owners, and laid out the street in 1927, and entrusted to the Director of
Public Works and other officials the negotiations as to the price to be paid
therefor.
A few public spirited citizens offered to donate their land; others agreed to
accept what the authorities deemed a reasonable price, but in most cases no
amicable agreement could be reached as to the value of the property taken,
and in order to settle the matter plaintiff filed these condemnation proceedings
on May 31, 1928. The improvements existing on the land when it was taken
had been removed or destroyed in most cases before the filing of these
proceedings.
It is contended for one appellant that the value of the said two lots ought to be
P3.50 per square meter which was the price in 1927 and not P5 per square
meter which was the value fixed by the commissioners and approved by the
trial judge corresponding to the year 1928 when the expropriation
proceedings were actually commenced in the CFI of Rizal."
As clearly appears from the evidence of record, the value of the property in
question was greatly enhanced between the time when the extension of the
street was laid out and the date when the condemnation proceedings were
filed, because of the fact that one of the widest and most important streets in
the City of Manila was to be extended through the municipality of Pasay,
thereby making the land affected practically a part of the City of Manila and
giving it a frontage on one of the city's principal boulevards. The property had
further increased in value when the commissioners held hearings a year and
a half after these proceedings were filed.
In other words, the value of the property was enhanced by the purpose for
which it was taken. In our opinion the owners of the land have no right to
recover damages for this unearned increment resulting from the construction
of the public improvement for which the land was taken. To permit them to do
so would be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the
time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public
improvements.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The property is to be considered in its condition and situation at the

time it is taken, and not as enhanced by the purpose for which it is
taken.
The fundamental doctrine that private property cannot be taken for public use
without just compensation requires that the owner shall receive the market
value of his property at the time of the taking, unaffected by any subsequent
change in the condition of the property.
The valuation of the property taken should be made as of the time of the filing
of the condemnation proceedings. That is a fixed and convenient date, and it
usually precedes or coincides with the taking of the property; but in the case
at bar the plaintiff appropriated the property with the consent of the
landowners, and without the filing of any expropriation proceedings, in the
expectation that the parties would be able to reach an agreement out of court
as to the value of the property taken, and the condemnation proceedings
were not filed until it was found much later than no such agreement could be
reached as to part of the property. Under those circumstances the value of
the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date
of the filing of the proceedings.
Wier vs. St. Louis: "The general current of authorities is that in all such cases
compensation should be ascertained and assessed as of the time when the
property was taken. Where the possession is taken by consent of the owner,
followed by the location and construction of the road, the time of going into
such actual possession is clearly the time of taking, rather than the period of
condemnation proceedings, which, for some reason, may have been
postponed. The damages will be measured as of the time when the company
first takes possession of the land, and occupies it as a right of way.
The conclusion of the trial court to the effect that there is a steady increase in
the value of land is not well founded. Land like other property increases or
decreases in value according to the general economic conditions prevailing,
and for special reasons, but that is a matter of proof.

Held: The decision appealed from is modified as hereinabove stated; in all other
respects it is affirmed. The plaintiff will pay the costs of the proceedings in the trial
court. No costs will be allowed in this court.

7. REPUBLIC V. VDA DE CASTELLVI (JM)

G.R. No. L-20620
August 15, 1974
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: Carmen M. Vda. De Castellvi, Et Al.
Ponente: J. Zaldivar
Doctrine: What constitutes taking for purposes of eminent domain.
Summary:

132

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

After Vda de Castellvi, the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied
by the AFP in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the Republic of the Philippines
commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. The trial court rendered a decision
finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per
square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just compensation. Republic
contended that the P10.00 was unconscionable in view of the fact that the fair market
value of the was not more than P.20/sqm when AFP first had the taking of the said
property by virtue of the special lease agreement. Vda de Castellvi and ToledoGonzon on the other hand contends that their lands, being residential lands have a fair
market value of not less than P15/sqm.
The SC ruled that the just compensation is to be determined at the time of the taking
of the property. The property was deemed taken only when the expropriation
proceedings commenced in 1959. The essential elements of the taking are: (1)
expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3)
and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) to substantially to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at bar,
elements #2 & #5 were not present when the government entered and occupied the
property under the contract of lease in 1947. As a consequence, the P0.20/sqm was
wrong. Yet, the SC also stated that the P10.00/sqm, as suggested by the
commissioners is too high. The SC then fixed the price at P5.00/sqm.
FACTS:

Castellvi and Toledo-Gonzon own neighboring land near an AFP Base in San
Jose, Floridablanca,Pampanga.

1 July 1947 - Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) occupied
the land situated in Floridablanca, Pampanga of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the
judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi by virtue of a
contract of lease on a year-to-year basis with option to renew. Since then the AFP
have built an airstrip and a number of military installations on the leased land.

30 June 1956 - Before the expiration of the contract of lease, the Republic sought
to renew the same but Castellvi refused, because the family was subdividing it
and going to sell it to subdivision developers.

26 June 1959 In view of the difficulty for the army to vacate the premises due to
permanent installations and other facilities, AFP filed expropriation proceedings
against Castellvi and Toledo-Gonzon, and was placed in possession of the lands
on 10 August 1959.

In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market
value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for
the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare (P.20/sqm), or
a total market value of P259,669.10 when AFP first had the taking of the said
property by virtue of the special lease agreement. Respondents allege that their
lands are residential with a fair market value of not less than P15/sqm.

The trial court rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation
of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the
action is fair and just compensation.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

ISSUES:
1. When did the taking happen? 1959
2. WON the P10/sqm is fair and just compensation NO.
RATIO:
ISSUE 1: TAKING OF THE PROPERTY
REPUBLIC: 1947, when it got the lease with option to buy and it started building stuff
on it.
CASTELLVI & TOLEDO-GOZUN: 1959, when the expropriation case started
SC: 1959 (filing of expropriation complaint)

Taking under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as

entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the
warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be

present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain:
(Elements/Requisites)
1) Expropriator must enter a private property.
2) Entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
3) Entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
4) Property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected.
5) Utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

The "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain CANNOT be

considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee.
o Elements #1, #3 & #4 were met.

1st element By virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through

the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi. Thus, there was
entering of a private property.

3rd element This circumstance in the "taking" was under warrant or

color of legal authority because the Republic entered the Castellvi
property as lessee.

4th element It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property

being devoted to public use is present because the property was used by
the air force of the AFP.
o HOWEVER, Elements #2 & #5 were not present when Republic entered the
properties in 1947.
nd

2 element The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one

year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the
lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic,
through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature
does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or
intended to last a year. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to
occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of
permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the
clear and express terms of the lease contract.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

5th element Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously

recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the
lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease
contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived
of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was
bound to pay, and had been paying Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals
until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26,
1959.

ISSUE 2: JUST COMPENSATION

REPUBLIC: the value of the expropriated lands is to be determined as of June 26,
1959, the price of P10.00 per square meter fixed by the lower court "is not only
exhorbitant but also unconscionable. It should be P0.20 per square meter.
CASTELLVI & TOLEDO-GOZUN: lands are residential lands with a fair market value
of not less than P15.00 per square meter.
SC: P5.00 per square meter

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just compensation is to be

determined as of the date of the taking, that is, as explained above from the filing
of the expropriation complaint.

This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings,
or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the
just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of
the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959.

The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid should not be paid based on 1947 fair market value
amount.

Basic guidelines in determining the value of the land to be expropriated:

1) Same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between
private parties.
2) Estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having
regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be
reasonably expected in the immediate future.

In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its
value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market.

We have arrived at the conclusion that the price of P10/sqm is quite high. The
price of P5/sqm would be a fair valuation and would constitute a just
compensation. We considered the resolution of the Provincial Committee on
Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, that in the year 1959 the lands
could be sold for from P2.50- P4/sqm, and the Court arrived at a happy medium
between the price as recommended by the commissioners and approved by the
court, and the price advocated by the Republic.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

a)

b)
c)

d)

e)

the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves ToledoGozun, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for public
use;
the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square
meter;
the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00 as just
compensation for her one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299 square
meters, minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the amount
that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land, with interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is
made or deposited in court;
the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as
the just compensation for her two parcels of land that have a total area of
539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00 that she withdrew out
of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of her
lands, with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until the
day full payment is made or deposited in court; (e) the attorney's lien of Atty.
Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and
the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines, as provided
in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13, Rule 141, of the Rules of Court.

8. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. DULAY (RS)

G.R. No. L-59603| April 29, 1987|GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Petitioner: EPZA,
Respondents: HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
SUMMARY
During the martial law regime, the President issued Proclamation No. 1811 reserving
parcels of land of the public domain in Cebu for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner. Seeing that some of the lands are privately owned,
EPZA sought to buy the property from San Antonio Devt Corp. Negotiations failed.
EPZA filed a complaint for expropriation. At the pre-trial, they agreed that the issue
would be limited to just compensation. A commission was delegated the task of
determining the just compensation and, indeed, they came up with an amount, which
EPZA decried. WN there is still a need to appoint commissioners even after the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1533 which already provided for a mode in determining just
compensation. YES. he Court declares the provision of the P.D. 1533 on just
compensation unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just
compensation under the said decree constitutes impermissible encroachment
on judicial prerogatives. The trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the
decree
may
only
serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the
earlier well-established doctrine [Regalado said there is a return to the rules outlined

134

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

in
Rule
67]
is
more
in
keeping
with
the
principle
that
the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not
denigrating
constitutional rights.
FACTS:

On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued

Proclamation
No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in
the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an
export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA).

Not all the reserved area, however, was public land.

The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of owned and
registered in the name of the San Antonio Development Corporation.

EPZA, therefore, offered to

purchase the parcels of land in accordance with the valuation set forth in
Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended.

The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.

EPZA then filed with the CFI a complaint for expropriation, through which, a
writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of
the premises was issued.

At the pre-trial conference, parties have agreed that the only issue to be
resolved is the just compensation for the properties. Hearing on the merits
was then set.

CFI declared EPZA as having the lawful right to take the properties sought
to be condemned upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as
of
the
filing
of
the
complaint
and
appointing commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.

The consolidated report of the three commissioners recommended the

amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just
compensation for the properties.

EPZA filed an Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D.

No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on
the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.

CFI denied the motion, as a result of which, the petitioner flied this present
petition enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order and from further
proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
ISSUE:
WN there is still a need to appoint commissioners even after the effectivity of P.D. No.
1533 which already provided for a mode in determining just compensation. - YES
HELD:

The Court declares the provision of the P.D. 1533 on just compensation
unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just
compensation under the said decree constitutes impermissible

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

135

encroachment on judicial prerogatives. [Doctrine in the syllabus and as

highlighted by Regalado]
It tends to render the Court inutile on a matter, which, under the
Constitution, is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding, the court technically would still
have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following
the applicable decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower
value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor.
The strict application of the decree during proceedings would be nothing short
of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two.
The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what
is just or fair.
The trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only
serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
A return to the earlier well-established doctrine [Regalado said there is a
return to the rules outlined in Rule 67] is more in keeping with the principle
that
the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not
denigrating constitutional rights.
The basic unfairness of the decree is readily apparent.
o Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking.
o It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.
o In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by EPZA as
basis for just compensation were made by the city assessor long
before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but when
assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only
a fraction of their true market value.
o The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at
the time.
o To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents, which are
out
of
date,
and
at
prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrar
y and confiscatory.
o To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations
made
by
assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory
o The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what
is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or
municipal clerks for them.
o They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements.
o It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to
prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

The executive department or the legislature may make the initial

determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the court's findings.
In view of the foregoing, P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion
to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, was
therefore held unconstitutional and void.

9. CITY OF MANILA V. CORRALES (RT)

G.R. No. L-10076
October 28, 1915
Plaintiff-appellant:
THE
CITY
OF
Defendants-appellants: FERNANDA FELISA CORRALES, ET AL.

MANILA

1.EMINENT DOMAIN; MEASURE AND AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION.In taking

private property for public use, under the power of eminent domain, the person whose
property is thus taken should be paid the reasonable market price for the same. The
owners of property should not take advantage of the necessity of the public for the
purpose of requiring the Government to pay more than their property is worth; neither
should the Government be permitted to take the property of private persons at a less
price than it is reasonably worth at the time of the expropriation, When we speak of the
market value of property taken under the power of eminent domain, we mean the value
which purchasers generally would pay for it. We do not mean what a purchaser would
pay who had no particular object in view in purchasing and no definite plan as to the
use to which to put it. The owner has a right to its value for the use for which it would
bring the most in the market.
2.In.; ID.; OWNER OF LAND EXPROPRIATED SHOULD NOT BE CHARGED WITH
EXPENSES OF IMPROVEMENT.The commissioners reduced the value of the land,
expropriated for street purposes, by an amount sufficient to improve the land so taken.
Held: That the owner was entitled to recover the value of the land at the time it was
expropriated. He should not be charged with the expense necessary to put the
property so taken in the condition in which the public desires to use it.
3.ID.; ID.; METHOD OF ASCERTAINING VALUEIn expropriation proceedings, the
question of the value of the property is always a difficult one to decide. Men vary so
much concerning their opinion of the real value of property. The best the courts can do
is to hear all the witnesses which the respective parties desire to present, and then, by
carefully weighing such testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable.
The value of property cannot always be fixed by its actual rental value. There is a
difference between the actual value of property and the price for which it is rented at
any particular time. What property will rent for is a variable quantity. The amount paid
for the use of property is not always a constant quantity. The amount which tenants will
pay depends upon their particular necessities at the time. The value of property cannot
always be capitalized on its rental value. Neither can the value of property for
expropriation purposes be based upon its actual cost of construction. In determining
the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are to be

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

regarded as in the sale of property between private parties. The inquiry must always
beWhat is the property worth on the market, viewed, not merely as to the use to
which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the use to which it is plainly
adapted; that is to say, what is it worth, from its availability for a valuable purpose?
FACTS:

The present action was commenced on the 22nd of May, 1913, in the Court
of First Instance of the City of Manila.

It was brought for the purpose of condemning certain property under the
power of eminent domain.

The complaint alleged that the property in question was necessary for
the purpose of opening or building a street running from Calle Marques
de Comillas to Calle Nozaleda, crossing Calle San Marcelino and Taft
Avenue.

The plaintiff was able to purchase much of the land necessary for said
construction.

The question of the necessity for said condemnation was submitted to the
court. After hearing the respective parties it was agreed that the opening or
construction of said proposed street was necessary.

Whereupon, by agreement of all the parties, Mauro Prieto, Alfonso Tiaoqui,

and Denis J. Mahoney were appointed as commissioners to view and
appraise the property involved in the present action and to report their
findings and conclusions to the court. said commissioners were duly sworn
and entered upon the performance of their duty.

Upon a consideration of the report of said commissioners, the Honorable A.S.

Crossfield, judge, accepted their findings of fact and conclusions and
rendered a judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff in
accordance with their recommendations.

From that judgment, both the plaintiff and the defendants appealed to this
court and each made several assignments of error.
ISSUES
For the purpose of convenience in discussing the questions presented by the
respective appellants, their assignments of error are hereby presented in parallel
columns:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS.

BY

First. The trial court erred in not

awarding the defendants at least
P13,617.63, as the value of the land
expropriated.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

ASSIGNEMENTS OF ERROR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

P433, the amount arbitrarily deducted

by the commissioners from the cost of
filing, as established by the defendants.

Second. The trial court erred in

accepting the commissioners' valuation
of the tienda (building No. 2 on plan)
and in not fixing its valuation at at least
P5,265.

Fourth. In accepting the sum of P2,000

assessed by the commissioners as the
value of the structure known as building
No. 2, and it not reducing said valuation
to the sum of P1,680.

Third. The trial court erred in not

awarding the defendants at least
P5,048.40, as damages on building No.
1 on plan.

Second. In accepting the sum of P8,105

as assessed by the commissioners as
the value of the protion to be taken from
the structure described as "No. 1 main
building," in Exhibit A, and for cost of
work of reconstruction and damages to
remainder of building, and in not finding
that the owners are only entitled to
receive for this item the sum of
P5,444.50, and no more.

Fourth. The trial court erred in not

awarding the defendants at least
P16,362, as the value of the lithograph
building No. 3 on plan.

Fifth. In allowing the sum of 2,000

assessed by the commisioners as
damages to the defendants, and in
overruling plaintiff's motion to reject said
assessment.

Fifth. The trial court erred in not

awarding the defendants at least
P849.36 for the camarin or stable, No. 4
on plan.

Third. In accepting the sum of P376

assessed by the commissioners as the
value of the structure described as
"building No. 4" and in not finding that
the total compensation which the
owners are entitled to receive for said
structure is the sum of P200 and no
more.

BY

First. The trial court erred in accepting

the valuation of P9,284.15, assessed by
the commissioners, as the present net
market value of the land sought to be
condemned, and in overruling plaintiff's
motion to reduce said valuation by

Sixth. The trial court erred in not

awarding defendants at least P1,000 for
trees, plants and tennis-court.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Seventh. The trial court erred in not

allowing the consequential damages to
the land not taken.

Sixth. In not finding that the sum of

P5,566.44, which is the consequential
gain in value which the remainder of the
property of defendants will obtain
through the construction of the public
improvement referred to in these
proceedings, should be deducted from
the compensation to be paid to the
owners.

RATIO:

In taking private property for public use under the power of eminent domain,
the persons whose property is thus taken, should be paid the reasonable
market price of their property.

The owners of property should not take advantage of the necessity of the
public for the purpose of requiring the Government to pay more than their
property is worth, neither should the Government be permitted to take the
property of private persons at a less price than it is reasonably worth at the
time of the expropriation.

When we speak of the market value of property taken under the power of
eminent domain, we mean the value which purchasers generally would pay
for it.

We do not mean what a purchaser would pay who had no particular object in
view in purchasing, and no definite plan as to the use to which to put it. The
owner has a right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in
the market.

With this principle in mind we shall proceed to examine into the report of the
commission for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not their conclusions
conform therewith.
The first assignment of error by each of the appellants relates to the amount
allowed for all of the land belonging to the defendants, appropriated for the
opening or construction of the street.

It is admitted by both parties that the amount of land appropriated is 1,837.20

square meters. The commissioners allowed as the reasonable value of said
land the sum of P9,284.15, said sum being, in their judgment, the reasonable
and just market value of said land.

The commissioners, for the purpose of ascertaining the value of said parcel
No. 2, divided it into two parts, the first consisting of 483.76 square meters at
P8 per meter, and the second consisting of 1,353.44 square meters at P5 per
meter.

On that basis, the value of the land (1,837.20 square meters) amounted to
P10,637.28. The commissioners, however, reduced said total amount by
the sum of P1,353.13, which was the necessary cost, in their estimation,
to properly grade the street. Deducting from the total value of the land
(P10,637.28) the cost of grading the street (1,353.13), we have what the

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

commissioners regarded as the value of the land, or the sum of

P9,284.15.
The defendant-appellants insist that they should have been allowed the sum
of P13,617.63. In support of their claim they cite the declaration of several of
the witnesses who testified during the trial of the cause with reference to the
value of the land in question.
By reference to the report of the commissioners, it will be seen that they
reduced the total value of the land, P10,637.28, by the sum of P1,353.13, the
amount which was necessary to grade the street when opened.
The commissioners found that it would cost P1.25 per cubic meter to properly
grade the street. The plaintiff-appellant complains that they should have
reduced the total amount by the sum of P1,353.13 plus P433 or the sum of
P1,786.13.
The only expert evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, which stands
uncontradicted and undisputed, was the testimony of Latimer who stated that
it would cost P1.65 per cubic meter to properly fill the street. Sellner testified
that while the total value of the land was P10,637.28, that amount should be
reduced by whatever it would cost to fill and grade the street. He does not
state, however, the amount which it would cost to properly grade the street.
The plaintiff-appellant argues that the commissioners arbitrarily, without any
proof whatever, reduced the cost of filling the street and grading the land from
P1.65 to P1.25 per square meter.
It will be remembered that none of the witnesses, except Sellner, in
estimating the value of the land in question, made any reduction whatever for
the cost of grading the street when opened.
It is difficult to understand upon what theory the plaintiff could insist
upon having the actual value of the land at the time of expropriation
reduced by what it would cost to grade the street after the land had
been turned over to it. The plaintiff was attempting to expropriate the
land in the condition under which it was found. The commissioners
were appointed for the purpose of ascertaining its value in that
condition.
The question was as to the value then, not its value after it was appropriated
for public street purposes. It is difficult to understand upon what theory the
plaintiff could require the defendants to bear the cost of the construction of
the proposed street.
In fact, a condition might be imagined where the street might be so graded as
to result in actual damage to the rest of the property of the defendants. For
example, if the city should establish a grade much higher than the property
belonging to the defendants, actual damages might result to the defendants
by virtue of the grading of the street.
We do not believe that the cost of grading the proposed street should
be charged to the defendants. We are of the opinion, therefore, and so
hold, that the value of the property, P10,637.28, should not have been
reduced by the sum of P1,353.13, or by any other sum, for the purpose
of paying for the grading of the proposed street.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The second assignment of error of the defendant-appellants and the fourth of

the plaintiff-appellant relates to the amount which the commissioners allowed
for the tienda located on the land in question which is marked building No. 2 on
the plan.

The defendant-appellants assert that the commissioners did not allow

sufficient for said tienda. The plaintiff-appellant contends that the
commissioners allowed too much as the value of the tienda.

The defendant-appellants alleged that the commissioners should have

allowed the sum of P5,265. The plaintiff-appellant attempts to show that the
tienda was not worth more than P1,680. The commissioners allowed P2,000.

By reference to the plan above, it will be seen that the tienda at the point
marked No. 2 is located wholly upon the land in question. The opening of the
street made it necessary to completely remove said tienda. The defendantappellants show that they were receiving a monthly rent for said building in
the sum of P50. That proof is not denied.

The plaintiff-appellant insists, and presented proof in support of the

contention, that the tienda could be reconstructed for the sum of P1,680.

The plaintiff insists that the defendants should not receive more for the tienda
than the cost of its construction, while the defendants insist that they should
be allowed a sum which would produce P50 per month, at the current rate of
interest.

In other words, the defendant-appellants insist that if 6 per cent is the current
rate of interest, for example, they should be allowed a sum for said tienda
sufficient to produce P50 per month. Using this example as the basis of the
defendants' contention, they should be allowed the sum of P10,000.
Changing the basis of our calculations, and assuming that the current rate of
interest is 10 per cent, then, upon that basis, under the theory of the
defendants, they should receive the sum of 6,000 for said tienda.

The defendant-appellants claim that they should receive an amount for said
tienda which, at 11 per cent, would produce an income of P50 per month, or
the sum of P5,454.

The question of the value of property in expropriation proceedings is always a

difficult one to settle. The opinions of men vary so much concerning the real
value of property that the best the courts can do is to hear all of the witnesses
which the respective parties desire to present, and then, by carefully weighing
that testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable.

We do not believe that the contention of the defendant-appellants is tenable.

There may be cases where the value of property can be fixed upon its actual
rental value. For example, where the property has been rented for a number
of years at a fixed rate, then such rate ought to be used as the basis of the
actual value of the property.

It must not be overlooked that there is a difference between the actual rental
value of the property and the price for which it is rented at any particular time.

What property will rent for is a variable quantity. The amount paid for the use
of property is not always a constant quantity. The amount which the tenant
will pay may depend upon his particular necessities at the time.

The theory of the defendants would fix the rent for all time as a constant
quantity. The constant changing of centers of population and of business, as

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

well as the fluctuation of business, depending upon good or so-called hard

times, affect that value of property for rental purposes.
Neither can the rental value be determined upon a consideration of the
cost of the construction of the property.
For example, a building in the principal part of the city might be worth much
more than one on the outskirts, which cost twice as much. A building on the
Escolta, in the city of Manila, which cost P50,000 might rent for twice as much
as a building on the outskirts of the city which cost P100,000. Thus it is clear
that the cost of construction cannot be used as a basis for determining the
value of property.

In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same
considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private
parties. The inquiry, in such cases, must be what is the property worth in the
market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time
applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted, that is to
say, What is it worth from its availability for valuable uses?

So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in

determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is
practically impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all
cases.

Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as
a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner is to be
estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having
regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be
reasonably expected in the immediate future.

The tienda in question (building No. 2), according to the proof, is a very cheap
structure, and might be reconstructed for the sum of P1,680. Its value, as
insisted upon by the defendant-appellants, does not include the land. It does
not seem reasonable to believe that such a structure, even granting that it
rents for P50 a month, has a market value such as is contended for by the
defendants, under normal conditions, where the owner desires to sell, without
necessity, and to a person who desires to buy for some specified purpose.
With reference to the other assignments of error, relating to the various items which
the commissioners allowed, and considering the evidence adduced during the hearing,
and in view of what has been said above, and without a further discussion of the
evidence relating to said assignments of error, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
with the modification above indicated, relating to the cost of grading the street, the
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs.
It is therefore hereby ordered and decreed that a judgment be entered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff in the sum of P33,138.28, with costs. So ordered.
The property involved in the present action is represented by the following plan:

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

2.
3.

10. Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. Republic (MB)

G.R. No. 71412
August 15, 1986
Petitioner: BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., (now Benguet Corporation)
Respondents: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUMMARY:
Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines filed for the expropriation of land belonging to 10
defendants, one of which was Benguet Consolidated Inc, for the purpose of
establishing and maintaining a permanent site for the Philippine Military Academy.
Benguet opposed the expropriation. Trial court denied and declared the the RP had
lawful right to take the property. A board of commissioners were formed to assess the
value of the property. Trial court rejected the values and prescribed its own amount.
Intermediate Appellate Court ordered the property condemned and for plaintiff RP to
pay defendants. Hence, Benguet files this appeal, contesting (1) the expropriation and
(2) the determination of just compensation. SC held denied and held that:
1. The filing of expropriation proceedings recognizes the fact that Benguet's
property is no longer part of the public domain.

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Benguet is estopped from questioning the proceedings of condemnation

followed by the court.
Benguet has not advanced any reason to reject such findings of the
Commissioners Report.

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines filed with the then CFI of Benguet and Baguio
a complaint for expropriation against 10 defendants, among them Benguet
Consolidated, Inc.
o Republic stated that it needed the property for the purpose of
establishing and maintaining a permanent site for the Philippine
Military Academy, a training institution for officers in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
o It also averred that it had occupied the area covered by the mining
claims of the defendants and had already installed permanent
buildings and other valuable improvements with no less than
P3,000,000.00 in the belief that the area was unoccupied portions of
the public domain
o According to the Appraisal Committee the reasonable and fair
market value of the rights and interests affected by these eminent
domain proceedings cannot exceed the total sum of P532,371.40.

The Benguet filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic did not
need and has not occupied the areas covered by the above-mentioned
mining claims and neither have improvements been made on the said areas
and that the area covers ground which is rugged in terrain for which the
Philippine Military Academy could have no use.
o By way of separate and special grounds for dismissal, Benguet
alleged that the authority given by the President of the Philippines for
the expropriation proceedings refers to privately owned lands is in
violation of law.

Trial court --- declared the Republic to have lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use described in the complaint, upon
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint.

A Board of Commissioners to assess and establish the reasonable amount of

compensation was formed.
o Submitted their report recommending the payment of P43,703.37 to
the ten (10) defendants as just compensation for their expropriated
properties.
o Parties filed their objections to the Commissioners' report.

Trial Court --- rejected the Commissioners' Report and made its own findings
and conclusions.
o Issued an order fixing the just compensation of the surface area of
the four (4) claims of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. in the amount of
P128,051.82 with interest at 6% per annum from May 6, 1950 until
fully paid, plus attorney's fees in an amount equal to 5 % of the sum
fixed by this Court.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

o Benguet appealed.
IAC --- set aside the trial court's decision. It (1) condemned the mineral claims
described in the complaint belonging to the defendants for the public use; and
(2) ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants.

Benguets arguments (opposing (1) the expropriation and (2) the just
compensation):
a. Its mineral claims were located since 1933 at the latest. It argues
that by such location and perfection, the land is segregated from the
public domain even as against the government.
i. Gold Greek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, et al --- when
the location of a mining claim is perfected, this has the
effect of a grant of exclusive possession with right to the
enjoyment of the surface ground as well as of all the
minerals within the lines of the claim and that this right may
not be infringed.
b. Nieto v. Ysip --- in expropriation proceedings an order of
condemnation may NOT be entered by the court before a motion to
dismiss is denied
c. It assails the appellate court's approval of the Commissioners'
Report which fixed the amount of P7,532.46 as just compensation
for the mineral claims. The amount is by any standard ridiculously
low and cannot be considered just and that in fact the
commissioners' report was rejected by the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the condemnation of Benguet's mineral claim is contrary to law and
applicable jurisprudence. --- NO
2. W/N in expropriation proceedings an order of condemnation may be entered
by the court before a motion to dismiss is denied. --- YES
3. W/N just compensation was adequately given. --- YES

HELD:

The Benguet's arguments have no merit.

The decision of the IAC is MODIFIED in that the government is directed to

pay the Benguet the amount of Php 7,532 and 46/100 (P7,532.46) plus 6%
interest from May 6, 1950 to July 29, 1974 and 12% thereafter until fully paid

AFFIRMED in all other respects.

RATIO:
1. The filing of expropriation proceedings recognizes the fact that Benguet's
property is no longer part of the public domain.

The power of eminent domain refers to the power of government to

take private property for public use. If the mineral claims are public, there
would be no need to expropriate them.

The mineral claims of the Benguet are not being transferred to another mining
company or to a public entity interested in the claims as such. The land where

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the mineral claims were located is needed for the Philippine Military
Academy, a public use completely unrelated to mining.

The fact that the location of a mining claim has been perfected does not bar
the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain.

The right of eminent domain covers all forms of private property, tangible or
intangible, and includes rights which are attached to land.

After party whose mineral land is being expropriated has shifted its position to
the issue only of just compensation, it cannot later claim that its motion to
dismiss (which operates as an answer in expropriation cases) should have
been resolved first before entry of condemnation order.
2. Benguet is estopped from questioning the proceedings of condemnation
followed by the court.

It is very clear from the statements of Benguet that it had already abandoned
its earlier stand on the propriety of expropriation and that its intent shifted to
the just compensation to be paid by the plaintiff for its condemned properties.

In the instant case the ruling on the motion to dismiss was deferred by the
trial court in view of a possible amicable settlement.

In its original decision, the lower court overlooked an award of just

compensation for Benguet. This triggered off the filing of the following motions
by Benguet several motions for clarification and a motion to re-open the case.

The lower court denied the motion to re-open the case, but this was not
challenged by Benguet.
3. Benguet has not advanced any reason to reject such findings of the
Commissioners Report.

While it is true that a court may reject a Commissioners' Report on the ground
that the amount allowed is palpably inadequate (Republic v. Vda. de
Castellvi) it is to be noted that the petitioner herein has not supported its
stand that the P7,532.46 just compensation for its mining claims is by any
standard ridiculously low and cannot be considered just.

The conclusion of the Commissioners are the result of documentary evidence

presented by the parties, testimonies of several mining experts and
executives of mining companies including Mr. Ralph W. Crosby, the then
vice-president of Benguet, and ocular inspections of the mining claims
involved in this case.

The petitioner's mining claims were classified as non-producing unpatented

claims. It was established that the area of the mineral claims belonging to the
petitioner and included in the Philippine Military Reservation was 25.1082
hectares. Hence, the commissioners arrived at the total amount of P7,532.46
(25.1082 x P300.00) as just compensation to be paid to the petitioner for its
mining claims.
4. Other notes:

Atty. Melo --- Here we see the two-step procedure of expropriation. Benguet
first opposed governments right to expropriate. Then in second stage, it did
not present evidence what JC is proper. Maybe counsel wary that by
presenting evidence for JC, it is deemed abandonment of MTD. But given
nature of ED/Expropriation, shouldve presented evidence.

Interest --- A judgment in expropriation proceedings should provide for the

payment of legal interest as a matter of law from the time the government

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

takes over the land until it pays the owner thereof. If the compensation is not
paid when the property is taken, but is postponed to a later date, the interest
awarded is actually part of the just compensation which takes into account
such delay.

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Rule 68: Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

Section 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure. In an action for the foreclosure of a
mortgage or other encumbrance upon real estate, the complaint shall set forth the date
and due execution of the mortgage; its assignments, if any; the names and residences
of the mortgagor and the mortgagee; a description of the mortgaged property; a
statement of the date of the note or other documentary evidence of the obligation
secured by the mortgage, the amount claimed to be unpaid thereon; and the names
and residences of all persons having or claiming an interest in the property subordinate
in right to that of the holder of the mortgage, all of whom shall be made defendants in
the action. (1a)
Section 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. If upon the trial in such
action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall
ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation,
including interest and other charges as approved by the court, and costs, and shall
render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to the court
or to the judgment obligee within a period of not less than ninety (90) days nor more
than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of judgment, and that in default of
such payment the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment. (2a)
Section 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect. When the defendant, after being
directed to do so as provided in the next preceding section, fails to pay the amount of
the judgment within the period specified therein, the court, upon motion, shall order the
property to be sold in the manner and under the provisions of Rule 39 and other
regulations governing sales of real estate under execution. Such sale shall not affect
the rights of persons holding prior encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof,
and when confirmed by an order of the court, also upon motion, it shall operate to
divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in
the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.
Upon the finality of the order of confirmation or upon the expiration of the period of
redemption when allowed by law, the purchaser at the auction sale or last
redemptioner, if any, shall be entitled to the possession of the property unless a third
party is actually holding the same adversely to the judgment obligor. The said
purchaser or last redemptioner may secure a writ of possession, upon motion, from the
court which ordered the foreclosure. (3a)
Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. The amount realized from the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale,
be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance
or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior
encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there
be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them,
then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it. (4a)
Section 5. How sale to proceed in case the debt is not all due. If the debt for which
the mortgage or encumbrance was held is not all due as provided in the judgment as
soon as a sufficient portion of the property has been sold to pay the total amount and
the costs due, the sale shall terminate; and afterwards as often as more becomes due

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for principal or interest and other valid charges, the court may, on motion, order more
to be sold. But if the property cannot be sold in portions without prejudice to the
parties, the whole shall be ordered to be sold in the first instance, and the entire debt
and costs shall be paid, if the proceeds of the sale be sufficient therefor, there being a
rebate of interest where such rebate is proper. (5a)
Section 6. Deficiency judgment. If upon the sale of any real property as provided in
the next preceding section there be a balance due to the plaintiff after applying the
proceeds of the sale, the court, upon motion, shall render judgment against the
defendant for any such balance for which, by the record of the case, he may be
personally liable to the plaintiff, upon which execution may issue immediately if the
balance is all due at the time of the rendition of the judgment; otherwise; the plaintiff
shall be entitled to execution at such time as the balance remaining becomes due
under the terms of the original contract, which time shall be stated in the judgment.
(6a)
Section 7. Registration. A certified copy of the final order of the court confirming the
sale shall be registered in the registry of deeds. If no right of redemption exists, the
certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall be cancelled, and a new one
issued in the name of the purchaser.
Where a right of redemption exists, the certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor
shall not be cancelled, but the certificate of sale and the order confirming the sale shall
be registered and a brief memorandum thereof made by the registrar of deeds upon
the certificate of title. In the event the property is redeemed, the deed of redemption
shall be registered with the registry of deeds, and a brief memorandum thereof shall be
made by the registrar of deeds on said certificate of title.
If the property is not redeemed, the final deed of sale executed by the sheriff in favor of
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale shall be registered with the registry of deeds;
whereupon the certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall be cancelled and a
new one issued in the name of the purchaser. (n)
Section 8. Applicability of other provisions. The provisions of sections 31, 32 and
34 of Rule 39 shall be applicable to the judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages
under this Rule insofar as the former are not inconsistent with or may serve to
supplement the provisions of the latter. (8a)
1. SENO vs PESTOLANTE (LL)
G.R. No. L-11755 | April 23, 1958
Plaintiff-appellant: FLORENCIO SENO
Defendants-appellees: FAUSTO PESTOLANTE and TELESFORO BARIMBAO
FACTS:

Plaintiff brought this action before the CFI of Cebu to recover from defendant
Fausto Pestolante the sum of P600, plus interest, and the sum of P250 as
attorneys' fees and, in default of payment thereof, to order the foreclosure of
the chattel mortgage executed by said defendant covering personal
properties valued at P2,500.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

One Telesforo Barimbao was made party defendant for the reason that he is
presently in possession of the mortgage property and has refused to
surrender the same to the plaintiff.
o He refused to surrender possession because he has purchased it
from his co-defendant as evidenced by a deed of sale executed
before a notary public.
Defendant Pestolante filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, it appearing that the action
is only to collect a balance of P600 which comes under the original jurisdiction
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental.
The court sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint stating:
o Nature of this case is but a collection of the balance of P600 which
defendants owe the plaintiff out of the original debt of P1,900,.
o Later on, P950 was paid by defendant Fausto Pestolante of said
obligation leaving an unpaid balance of P600. The chattel mortgage
was executed in the municipality of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental
on February 17, 1954.

ISSUE: W/N CFI has jurisdiction over the case YES

RATIO:

While it is true that the purpose of the action is to recover the sum of P600,
plus interest, which comes within the original jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court, it is as well true that the action involves the foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage executed by defendant Fausto Pestolante to secure the
payment of his obligation, which mortgage covers personal properties valued
at more than P2,000.

A chattel mortgage may be foreclosed judicially. When the mortgagor refuses

to surrender possession of the mortgaged chattel an action of judicial
foreclosure necessarily arises, or one of replevin to secure possession as a
preliminary step to the sale contemplated in Section 14 of Act No. 1508 (sale
of property at public action).

Where the debtor refuses to yield up the property, the creditor must institute
an action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure
possession as a preliminary to the sale above quoted

Plaintiff had to institute the present action because, as alleged in the

complaint, one Telesforo Barimbao has refused to surrender the possession
of the mortgaged chattel because he claims to have bought it from the
mortgagor free from encumbrance by virtue of a document executed before a
notary public. And the action has to be instituted before the court of first
instance because the chattel is worth more than P2,000.
HELD: Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, with costs against appellee Fausto
Pestolante.

2. THE GOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP V. TUTAAN (JM)

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

G.R. No. L-41641 | September 30, 1976

Petitioner: The Good Development Corporation
Respondents: Hon. Eduardo C. Tutaan, Guillermo V. De Los Reyes & Marcelina
Marcelo
Ponente: J. Concepcion Jr.
Topic: Jurisdiction
FACTS: [no summary since short case]

The corporation filed a complaint in CFI Rizal to recover from Guillermo De los
Reyes and Marcelina Marcelo (Respondents) P1,520.00 plus interest, and the
sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due as attorney's fees and, in default of
payment thereof, to order the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage executed by
them covering personal properties valued at P15,340.00, located at Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
o Gregorio Emperado and Leonarda de la Cruz were made party defendants as
the co-makers of the promissory note executed by the respondents to
evidence the loan.

Gregorio Emperado was declared in default while the case against Leonarda de la
Cruz was dismissed without prejudice.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

o The complaint prays for a sum of money amounting to P1,520.00 which
comes under the original jurisdiction of the municipal court (being less than
P10,000), and that in view of the alternative prayer for foreclosure of
mortgage, the complaint should have been filed in the proper court of Bulacan
where the chattels are located and where the deed of chattel mortgage is
registered.

CFI granted MTD and dismissed the complaint without prejudice to its refiling in
the proper form and in the proper court. MR denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the city court of Bulacan has jurisdiction. NO. It is w/in the
competence of the CFI Rizal.
RATIO:

Seno vs. Pastolante, et al. Although the purpose of an action is to recover an

amount plus interest which comes within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of
the Peace Court, yet when said action involves the foreclosure of a chattel
mortgage covering personal properties valued at more than P2,000, (now
P10,000.00) the action should be instituted before the CFI.

In the instant case, the action is to recover the amount of P1,520.00 plus interest
and costs, and involves the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage of personal
properties valued at P15,340.00, so that it is clearly within the competence of the
respondent court to try and resolve.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of the respondent
court are hereby set aside and the respondent court directed to resume further
proceedings in the said civil case.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

3. LIMPIN V. IAC (RS)

GR no. 70987 | 9/29/1988 | Narvasa
Petitioners: Gregorio Limpin, Rogelio Sarmiento
Respondents: IAC, Guillermo Ponce
SUMMARY
A 1987 SC Decision, denied petitioners petition. They come to Court again, this time
for a determination of [ISSUE] whether or not the equity of redemption recognized in
favor of petitioner Sarmiento in this Court's 1987 Decision, still subsists and may be
exercised, more than a year after that judgment had become final and executory.
NO. Right of redemption is compared with equity of redemption. The right of
redemption is available if there has been an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of property,
whereas where the foreclosure is judicially effected, no equivalent right of redemption
exists. No such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. There
exists only what is known as the EQUITY OF REDEMPTION, which is simply the right
of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the
property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior
to its confirmation. It is this same equity of redemption that is conferred by law on
the mortgagor's successors-in-interest, or third persons acquiring rights over
the mortgaged property subsequent, and therefore subordinate, to the
mortgagee's lien. If these subsequent or junior lienholders are not joined in the
foreclosure action, the judgment in the mortgagor's favor is ineffective as to them, of
course In this case, they retain what is known as the "unforeclosed equity of
redemption," and a separate foreclosure proceeding should be brought to require
them to redeem from the first mortgagee, or the party acquiring title to the mortgaged
property at the foreclosure sale, within 90 days, under penalty of losing that
prerogative to redeem. In the case at bar, however, there is no occasion to speak
of any "unforeclosed equity of redemption' in Sarmiento's favor since he was
properly impleaded in the judicial proceeding where his and Ponce's rights over
the mortgaged property were ventilated and specifically adjudicated. The
rejection by this Court of Sarmiento's and Limpin's appeal in its own 1987 Decision,
which imported nothing less than a total affirmance of the IAC Decision, should
therefore have sufficiently alerted Sarmiento that confirmation could come at any time
after this Court's Decision became final, with or without any action from Ponce. He
cannot, in the circumstances, claim unfair surprise. He should, upon being notified of
this Court's Decision, have taken steps to redeem the properties in question or, at the
very least, served the RTC and Ponce with notice of his intention to exercise his equity
of redemption
FACTS

The petitioners came to the Court in 1987, but their petition then was denied
[1987 Decision]. They come to Court again, this time for a determination of
whether or not the equity of redemption recognized in favor of petitioner
Sarmiento in this Court's judgment promulgated on January 30, 1987, still

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subsists and may be exercised, more than a year after that judgment had
become final and executory.
Subject: 2 lots covered by TCT Nos. 92836 and 92837 together with 2
others [parcels of land], were originally mortgaged in 1973 to Ponce by their
former owners, the Spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino.
o These 2 lots were afterwards sold in 1978 by the Aquino Spouses to
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation.
o Against this corporation, Limpin obtained a money judgment in 1979;
to satisfy the judgment, the two lots were levied on and sold at public
auction in 1980, Limpin being the highest bidder.
o Limpin later sold the lots to Sarmiento.
A day before levy was made on the 2 lots in execution of the judgment
against Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation Ponce initiated judicial
proceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage over said 2 lots [together with
the 2 others mortgaged to him]
o Judgment was rendered in his favor and became final; and at the
ensuing foreclosure sale, the lots were acquired by Ponce himself as
highest bidder.
o Ponce then moved for confirmation of the foreclosure sale, but the
Court confirmed the sale of only 2 lots, refusing to do so as regards
the 2, which had been subject of the execution sale in Limpin's favor
[i.e., those covered TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837].
Ponce instituted a SCAction in the IAC, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento as
indispensable respondents.
o IAC ruled in Ponce's favor; Limpin and Sarmiento appealed; this
Court denied their appeal.
1987 Decision dismissed Sarmiento's and Limpin's petition for review on
certiorari of the IACs decision; in effect, it affirmed the IACs decision which
inter alia ordered the RTC "to confirm the sale (of the lots formerly covered by
TCT Nos. 92836 and 92837) and issue a writ of possession to ... [Ponce] with
respect to the aforesaid lots, subject to the equity of redemption of Sarmiento.
o Applying the doctrine laid down in Santiago v. Dionisio, a 1953
decision of this Court, the IACs decision declared that "the sale to
Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the two lots in
question should have been confirmed, subject to Limpin's (and now
Sarmiento's) equity of redemption."
This Court's aforesaid judgment also clearly and categorically sustained the
exercise by the IAC of jurisdiction over the persons of Sarmiento and Limpin.
o There can thus be no question that the petitioners herein were
affected and are bound by the decision of the IAC, and that of this
Court affirming it.
Sarmiento particularly, was aware that the RTC had the ministerial duty to
execute the IACs decision, i.e., to confirm the sale and issue a writ of
possession as regards the aforesaid lots, subject to the equity of redemption
explicitly recognized in his favor in the decisions mentioned.
o He knew that he had the prerogative to exercise his equity of
redemption, if not from the moment that the judgment of this Court
became final and executory, at least until the Court a quo, presided

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

145

over by Hon. Solano, subsequently confirmed the sale and issued a

writ of possession in favor of Ponce in June, 1987.
o He did not try to exercise that right before, at or about the time of the
confirmation of the foreclosure sale by Judge Solano.

Instead, he instituted no less than 2 actions in the same

RTC, which actions were assigned to another branch,
presided over by Hon. Teodoro Beltran attempting to
relitigate precisely the same issues which this Court and
the IAC had already passed upon and resolved adversely
to him.

For doing so for trifling with and abusing the processes of

the courts, and thus unwarrantedly delaying execution of
the final and executory judgment against him he and his
counsel were both found guilty of contempt and
correspondingly punished by this Court in May 1988.

Complaints in both cases and the nullification and setting

aside of the restraining or injunctive orders of Judge Beltran
dismissed.
March 11, 1988 9 months or so after entry of the judgment recognizing his
equity of redemption as successor-in-interest of the original mortgagors that
Sarmiento finally bestirred himself to attempt to exercise his unforeclosed
equity of redemption.
o On that day he filed a motion with the Court presided over by Judge
Solano, manifesting that he would exercise the right and asked the
Court to fix the redemption price.
o The Court opined that "this should be the subject of the agreement
between Ponce and Sarmiento.
Sarmiento then wrote to Ponce offering "P 2.6 million as redemption price for
the two lots originally covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, now 307100
and 307124.
o Ponce rejected the offer said averred "that the period within which
Sarmiento could have exercised such right had lapsed.
o Sarmiento reacted by filing a motion with the Solano Court, asking it
to "fix the redemption price and that the implementation of the writ of
possession be provisionally deferred.
o
An opposition was promptly filed by Ponce in which he argued that
"Sarmiento's right to exercise his equity of redemption over those
lots had long expired," the opportunity to exercise it having
presented itself but not availed of "(i) after default in the performance
of the conditions of the mortgage and (ii) before the Sheriffs sale of
the property and the judicial confirmation thereof."
o Added Ponce: "from October 17, 1982, (when) Sarmiento's
predecessors-in-interest defaulted in their obligations over the
mortgaged properties, up to June 17, 1987, when this Trial Court
confirmed the auction sale of those properties, Sarmiento could (and
should) have exercised his 'equity of redemption.'"
o Judge Solano did not share this view, and ruled accordingly.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

ISSUE: WN the equity of redemption, recognized in favor of Sarmiento in this Court's

judgment promulgated on January 30, 1987, still subsists and may be exercised more
than a year after that judgment had become final and executory. NO.
HELD
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that the equity of redemption claimed and
invoked by Rogelio M. Sarmiento over the properties originally covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 92836 and 92837 (now by TCTs Numbered 307100 and
307124), Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, subject of this case, lapsed and ceased to
exist without having been properly exercised, on June 17, 1987, with the issuance by
the Trial Court of the Order confirming the sheriffs sale (on judicial foreclosure) of said
properties in favor of Guillermo Ponce.
RATIO
PONCE: the term equity of redemption means "the right of the mortgagor to redeem
the mortgaged property after his default in the performance of the conditions of the
mortgage but before the sale of the property or the judicial confirmation of the
(Sheriffs) sale," or "the right to redeem mortgaged property by paying the amount
ordered by the court within a period of ninety days, or, even thereafter but before the
confirmation of the sale.

On this premise, he postulates that "from October 17, 1982, the date
Sarmiento's predecessors-in-interest defaulted in their obligations over the
mortgaged properties, up to June 17, 1987, when the lower court confirmed
the auction sale of those properties, Sarmiento could have exercised his
'equity of redemption."'

Not having done so within that time, his equity of redemption had been
extinguished; indeed, by opting to file "new suits against Ponce seeking to
annul Ponce's titles over those properties" instead of redeeming the same, he
had "waived his equity of redemption (assuming such right existed at the time
the suits were commenced)."
SARMIENTO: the "17 June 1987 confirmation of the sale of the two lots could not
have cut off his equity of redemption;" in fact, "Ponce himself, in his 'Urgent
Motion,' precisely prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession 'subject to the
equity of redemption of Sarmiento' thereby recognizing Sarmiento's equity of
redemption beyond confirmation date.

He also argues that he had not been informed of the time when his right of
redemption would be cut-off, because he "never received a copy of any
Motion for Confirmation, much less notice of hearing thereon in violation of his
right to due process;" that to hold otherwise would "render nugatory the
decision of the Court of Appeals and this ... Court on the issue;" and that he is
entitled to a reasonable time, e.g., a year, for the exercise of his equity of
redemption.
THE

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION IS DIFFERENT FROM AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.

The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage [understood in the sense

of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the
foreclosure sale] exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

146

No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only

where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or
banking institution.
o Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to
the mortgagor the right of redemption within 1 year from the
registration of the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of
redemption exists.
o The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by
an order of the court, shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject
to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.
o Such rights exceptionally "allowed by law" (i.e., even after
confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the:

Charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and

2938), and

General Banking Act (R.A. 337).

o These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors-in-interest or
any judgment creditor of the mortgagor the right to redeem the
property sold on foreclosure [after confirmation by the court of the
foreclosure sale] which right may be exercised within a period of 1
year, counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in
the Registry of Property.
o But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of
judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the
PNB or a bank or banking institution.
o In such a case, the foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an order of
the court shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the purchaser."
o There then exists only what is known as the EQUITY OF
REDEMPTION simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to
extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
o Section 2, Rule 68 provides that ... If upon the trial ... the court
shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall
ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or
obligation, including interest and costs, and shall render judgment for
the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court within
a period of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service
of such order, and that in default of such payment the property be
sold to realize the mortgage debt and Costs. [cf. the current Rule,
which says not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days from the
entry of judgment]
o This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of redemption which,
as above stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the
90-day period "from the date of service of the order,' and even

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order

of confirmation of the sale.
o After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected
any longer.
o It is this same equity of redemption that is conferred by law on
the mortgagor's successors-in-interest, or third persons
acquiring rights over the mortgaged property subsequent, and
therefore subordinate, to the mortgagee's lien.
o If these subsequent or junior lienholders are not joined in the
foreclosure action, the judgment in the mortgagor's favor is
ineffective as to them, of course In this case, they retain what is
known as the "unforeclosed equity of redemption," and a
separate foreclosure proceeding should be brought to require them
to redeem from the first mortgagee, or the party acquiring title to the
mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale, within 90 days, under
penalty of losing that prerogative to redeem.
o In the case at bar, however, there is no occasion to speak of
any "unforeclosed equity of redemption' in Sarmiento's favor
since he was properly impleaded in the judicial proceeding
where his and Ponce's rights over the mortgaged property were
ventilated and specifically adjudicated.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the plain intention of the IAC
was to give to Sarmiento, not the unforeclosed equity of redemption
pertaining to a stranger to the foreclosure suit, but the same equity of
redemption possessed by the mortgagor himself.
The judgment cannot be construed as contemplating or requiring the
institution of a separate suit by Ponce to compel Sarmiento to exercise his
unforeclosed equity of redemption, or as granting Sarmiento the option to
redeem at any time that he pleases, subject only to prescription.
o This would give rise to that multiplicity of proceedings, which the law
eschews.
o The judgment plainly intended that Sarmiento exercise his option to
redeem, as successor of the mortgagor.
Upon the facts on record, Sarmiento cannot be heard to complain of denial of
due process for alleged lack of notice of any motion or hearing for
confirmation of sale.
o The Decision of the IAC which he and his predecessor, Limpin, had
appealed to this Court, specifically ordered the RTC to confirm the
judicial foreclosure sale in favor of Ponce over the two lots, in these
terms: WHEREFORE, the orders dated October 16,1983 and
December 19,1983 of the respondent court, so far as they deny the
confirmation of the sale of the lots formerly covered by TCT Nos.
92836 and 92837, are SET ASIDE, and the respondent court is
hereby ORDERED to confirm the sale and issue a writ of possession
to the petitioner with respect to the aforesaid lots, subject to the
equity of redemption of the respondent Rogelio V. Sarmiento.
Without costs.
Given the fact that said appealed orders of the Trial Court had been issued
upon motion for confirmation earlier made by Ponce [which was duly served

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

and heard] the aforecited IAC Decision can be construed in no wise than as a
peremptory command to the RTC to confirm the sale as directed, motu
proprio, and without the need of any further motion or other action on the part
of Ponce.
The rejection by this Court of Sarmiento's and Limpin's appeal in its own 1987
Decision, which imported nothing less than a total affirmance of the IAC
Decision, should therefore have sufficiently alerted Sarmiento that
confirmation could come at any time after this Court's Decision became final,
with or without any action from Ponce.
He cannot, in the circumstances, claim unfair surprise.
He should, upon being notified of this Court's Decision, have taken steps to
redeem the properties in question or, at the very least, served the RTC and
Ponce with notice of his intention to exercise his equity of redemption.
There was certainly time enough to do this the order confirming the
foreclosure sale issuing only on June 17, 1987had he not occupied himself
with the fruitless maneuverings to re-litigate the issues already recounted.
Indeed, had he made an attempt to redeem, even belatedly but within a
reasonable period of time after learning of the order of confirmation [the
record shows he did learn of it within 3 days after its issuance], he might
perhaps have given the Court some reason to consider his bid on equitable
grounds. He did not.
He let 9 months pass in carrying out improper [and contumacious] stratagems
to negate the judgments against him, before making any such move.
Neither can Sarmiento acceptably claim that Ponce, by moving for a writ of
possession subject to his (Sarmiento's) equity of redemption, recognized the
existence and enforceability of that prerogative beyond the prescribed cut-off
date of confirmation of the sale.
o Such an interpretation of the motion is totally unwarranted, given the
fact that said motion was made at a time (June 1, 1987) when there
was as yet no order confirming the sale and, since Sarmiento's
equity of redemption then still unquestionably existed, there was
hardly occasion or for that matter, any reason as far as Ponce was
concerned, to provide against its lapsing. Moreover, assuming for
the sake of argument that a resolutory period fixed by law may be
extended by act of the party in whose favor its expiration would
operate, that act must bespeak a clear and unequivocal intent to
grant such an extension. No such clear grant can be inferred from
the terms of Ponce's motion, which can, and in fact should be, read
as a mere affirmation that there existed at the time an equity of
redemption in Sarmiento's favor.

4. QUIMSON vs. PNB (RT)

G.R. No. L-24920 | November 24, 1970
Plaintiffs-appellants: ROSA QUIMSON, SONIA QUIMSON and FRANCISCO
QUIMSON,
Heirs
of
the
late
Dr.
Francisco
Quimson

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Defendants-appellees: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, thru its SPECIAL ASSETS

DEPARTMENT and RICARDO MENDOZA
SUMMARY
Francisco Quimson during his lifetime mortgaged several properties with the Philippine
National Bank. Because of the failure of said Francisco Quimson to pay the mortgage
loans, the Philippine National Bank filed foreclosure proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija. The property was sold to the Philippine National Bank, it
being the highest bidder. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a certificate of sale in
favor of the Philippine National Bank which certificate of sale was given judicial
confirmation on September 27, 1957. The certificate of sale dated January 10, 1957
as well as the judicial confirmation of the court was registered only with the Register of
Deeds of Rizal on September 19, 1963. Plaintiffs who are the heirs of the late
Francisco Quimson want to redeem the property from the Philippine National Bank.
Defendant Philippine National Bank, however, refused alleging that the period of
redemption which is to be counted from the date of judicial confirmation has already
expired and that the property has already been sold to Ricardo S. Mendoza.
W/N THE 1-year period of redemption should be counted from September 27, 1957,
the date of the judicial confirmation of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated January
10, 1957, instead of from September 19, 1963, the date when the Certificate of Sale
and the Decree of Confirmation of the same were registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds? September 19, 1963.
The property therein involved is registered land. While, indeed, sales on foreclosure of
properties mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank may partake of being sui generis,
they need not depart from the sound principles governing registration of transactions
concerning lands coming under the Land Registration Act or the Torrens system. As
already stated, this Court has uniformly ruled that redemption from execution sales
under ordinary judgments pursuant to Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court should
be made within twelve (12) months from the registration of the same and We have as
uniformly applied the same rule to sales upon extrajudicial foreclosure of registered
lands. We see no valid reason why the rule in foreclosure of mortgages of registered
real estate where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank should not be the
same. It is thus clear that it is preferable that even in foreclosure of mortgage of
registered real property by the Philippine National Bank by virtue of its charter, the
period of redemption should start from the registration of the deed of sale
conducted by the sheriff and not from the date of confirmation thereof, and We
so hold.
FACTS:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV,
dismissing its Civil Case No. 8300 after trial on the merits, holding that under
the charter of the Philippine National Bank the right to redeem property sold in
a judicial foreclosure sale of real estate mortgage to said Bank can be
exercised only within one year from the date of the judicial confirmation
thereof and not from the date of its registration, without passing on the
question raised in the pleadings before it as to whether in an instance where
the property sought to be repurchased is only one of several properties
separately mortgaged by the same mortgagor to the said Bank at different
times but sold in a single foreclosure proceeding together with the others

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

because the separate deeds of mortgage commonly provide that each shall
be security for all obligations of the mortgagor to the Bank, as in this case,
should be the amount of the particular loan for which the property being
redeemed was mortgaged or the total of all the loans covered by all the
mortgages involved in the said foreclosure.
Francisco Quimson during his lifetime mortgaged several properties with the
Philippine National Bank among which was a parcel of land situated in San
Juan, Rizal, having an area of 465 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 47769 of the Land Records of Rizal. The property was
mortgaged for P2,500.00.
Because of the failure of said Francisco Quimson to pay the mortgage loans,
the Philippine National Bank filed foreclosure proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija.
On December 1, 1956, a Writ of Execution was issued by the said Court of
First Instance and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal was directed by the said
Court to sell at public auction the property in question covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 47769. The property was sold to the Philippine National
Bank, it being the highest bidder.
On January 10, 1957, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a certificate of sale
in favor of the Philippine National Bank which certificate of sale was given
judicial confirmation on September 27, 1957.
On April 24, 1959, the Branch Manager of the Philippine National Bank wrote
a letter to plaintiff's son, Francisco Quimson, Jr. who is occupying the
property, informing him that the property in question was sold by the bank to
Ricardo S. Mendoza for the sum of P7,763.36.
The certificate of sale dated January 10, 1957 as well as the judicial
confirmation of the court was registered only with the Register of Deeds of
Rizal on September 19, 1963.
Plaintiffs who are the heirs of the late Francisco Quimson want to redeem the
property from the Philippine National Bank. Defendant Philippine National
Bank, however, refused alleging that the period of redemption which is to be
counted from the date of judicial confirmation has already expired and that the
property has already been sold to Ricardo S. Mendoza.
Plaintiffs argued that the period of redemption should be counted from the
date that the sale and the judicial confirmation were registered on September
19, 1963. In support of their argument, plaintiffs cited the case of Ernesto
Salazar, et al. vs. Flor de Lis Meneses, et al., G.R. No. 15378, which was
decided and promulgated by the Supreme Court on July 31, 1963.
The court cannot sustain the argument of the plaintiffs. The above cited case,
"Ernesto Salazar, et al. vs. Flor de Lis Meneses, et al." refers to an extrajudicial foreclosure and does not apply to the case at bar. The rule in judicial
foreclosure is different in that the period of redemption is counted from the
time of judicial confirmation. This is a well settled rule enunciated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Ernesto Gonzales vs. Philippine National Bank,
48 Phil. 824 as well as in the very case cited by the plaintiffs.

ISSUES:

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1. W/N THE 1-year period of redemption granted by Sec. 20 RA 1300 should be

counted from September 27, 1957, the date of the judicial confirmation of the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale dated January 10, 1957, instead of from September 19, 1963, the
date when the Certificate of Sale and the Decree of Confirmation of the same were
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds? September 19, 1963.
2. W/N the sale made by defendant-appellee PNB in favour of Ricardo Mendoza on
April 16, 1959 is null and void?
RATIO:
Contention: Appellants rely on the firm and uniform rulings of this Court that the period
of redemption of real property with Torrens title and sold in an execution sale under
Sections 24 and 30 of Rule 39 must be computed from the date of registration.

Cited by them is this Court's holding in Agbulos v. Alberto:

o The property involved in the present case is registered land. It is the law
in this jurisdiction that when property brought under the operation of the
Land Registration Act is sold, the operative act is the registration of the
deed of conveyance.
o The deed of sale does not "take effect as a conveyance, or bind the land"
until it is registered. Undoubtedly, to be in consonance with this well
settled rule, Section 24, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides that a
duplicate of the certificate of sale given by the sheriff who made the
auction sale to the purchaser must be filed (registered) in the office of the
register of deeds of the province where the property is situated.

It is true that this case of Agbulos v. Alberto involved a sale on an ordinary

execution and not a foreclosure sale, but it must be borne in mind that exactly one
year after Agbulos, in Salazar v. Meneses:
o The above ruling is squarely applicable to the present case which
involves also registered land, inspite of the fact that the sale in question
is not an execution sale but a foreclosure sale.

Appellees insist that the said ruling cannot apply to this case because, according
to them, what is here involved is a sale resulting from judicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage and not, as in those cases, one by virtue of an extrajudicial
foreclosure under Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118.

It is pointed out that in judicial foreclosures under Rule 68 (formerly 70) of the
Rules of Court, a mortgage debtor has no right of redemption after the judicial
confirmation of the sale of the mortgaged property, all that he has being the equity
of redemption which must be exercised within ninety days from the finality of the
judgment, and that it is only by virtue of the Charter of the Philippine National
Bank that such a right of redemption after the foreclosure sale is recognized
as regards properties mortgaged to the said Bank.

In this connection, appellees cite the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales
v. Philippine National Bank, 48 Phil. 824:
o The sales of real property by the Philippine National Bank under
foreclosure proceedings are more or less sui generis. Strange as it may
seem, the question of redemption in such cases is separate and distinct
from, and unlike, that of any other foreclosure proceeding.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Giving it a liberal construction, it is apparent that in this class of cases,

the words "within one year after the sale of real estate, etc." should be
construed to mean within one year after the confirmation of the sale.
o It is the confirmation only which consummates the sale. Prior to that, the
purchaser's bid is nothing more than an executory contract, which may or
may not be executed depending upon the confirmation of the sale. That
is the spirit and intent of the law in question.
They argue that this is the ruling that should control in the case at bar, hence the
period of redemption of appellants should be considered as having started on
September 27, 1957 when the public auction sale in question to the appellee Bank
was confirmed.

SC does not agree. The property therein involved is registered land. While, indeed,
sales on foreclosure of properties mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank may
partake of being sui generis, they need not depart from the sound principles governing
registration of transactions concerning lands coming under the Land Registration Act
or the Torrens system.

As already stated, this Court has uniformly ruled that redemption from execution
sales under ordinary judgments pursuant to Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court should be made within twelve (12) months from the registration of the same
and We have as uniformly applied the same rule to sales upon extrajudicial
foreclosure of registered lands.

We see no valid reason why the rule in foreclosure of mortgages of registered real
estate where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank should not be the
same.

Section 32 of Act 2938 (now Section 20 of Republic Act 1300), the Bank's charter,
provides:
SEC. 20. Right of Redemption of property foreclosed.-The mortgagor shall have
the right, within the year after the sale of real estate as a result of the foreclosure
of a mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in
the order of execution, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage,
and all the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the bank by reason of the
execution and for the custody of said property.

This is practically the same language as that of Section 6 of Act 3135 governing
redemption in extrajudicial foreclosures and Section 30 of Rule 39 governing
redemption from sales on execution of ordinary judgments.

It is to be noted that nowhere in the Gonzales case does it appear that what was
involved therein was registered land. Of course, it is understandable that with
regard to unregistered land, the most natural date from which the period of
redemption should be company computed should be that of the judicial
confirmation of the sale as it is only then that, in the language of Section 3 of Rule
68, the sale "operates to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest
their rights in the purchaser."

Withal, the qualification contained in the same Section 3 of Rule 68 to the effect
that the vesting of the rights of all the parties to the foreclosure in the purchaser is
"subject to such rights of redemption as may be authorized by law" verily implies
that the applicable rules of redemption, particularly as to the period thereof, must
be premised on the character of finality imparted by the judicial confirmation upon

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the sale but it need not be computed from the date thereof but, rather, according
to what the particular applicable law providing for the right of redemption may
ordain or specify.
It is thus clear that it is preferable that even in foreclosure of mortgage of
registered real property by the Philippine National Bank by virtue of its charter, the
period of redemption should start from the registration of the deed of sale
conducted by the sheriff and not from the date of confirmation thereof, and
We so hold.

Contention: Incidentally, appellee Mendoza contends that if the above rule of

registration is to be followed, and not the Gonzales ruling regarding the date of
confirmation, this Court should also apply as to him the familiar rule, with respect to
registered land, that actual knowledge is equivalent to registration, and since it
appears that appellants were notified by the appellee Bank on April 24, 1959 that the
property in question had been sold to him on April 16, 1959 yet, he maintains that
appellants' period of redemption should be computed from the date of said notice, April
24, 1959.
SC does not agree. The contention is not correct. When it comes to the period of
redemption of registered real estate sold on execution, whether in foreclosure
proceedings or in ordinary cases, actual notice of the sale by the judgment debtor or
redemptioner is immaterial, the period must always be computed from the date of
registration of the corresponding auction sale.

Accordingly, We hold that appellants' first assignment of error is well taken

and, therefore, appellants' period of redemption should be computed from
September 19, 1963.

It may be stated, however, that since the record is not very clear as to what
concrete steps have been taken by appellants towards the actual redemption
in controversy, outside of the letter they have written to appellee Bank on
June 17, 1964 "requesting information as to proper steps to be taken in order
to repurchase the (subject) property,"

We are not in a position to hold now whether or not appellants' right to make
the said redemption may be considered as still subsisting.
Issue 2.

To start with, since, as already stated, We are not now in a position to decide
whether or not appellants' pretended right of redemption herein in controversy
may still be exercised because it is not clear whether or not they have made
within one year after registration of the sale the appropriate tender to the
proper party, it follows that We cannot now also pass upon the question of
whether or not the sale of the subject property to appellee Mendoza by
appellee Bank on April 16, 1959 is null and void.

All that We can rule upon in connection with appellants' second assignment of
error just quoted is the question of how much they should pay as principal
repurchase price, on the assumption that they can still make such
repurchase.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

150

Appellants contend that the amount that they should be made to pay should
be only P6,045.00, the amount for which appellee Bank acquired the subject
property at the foreclosure sale of January 10, 1957.
On the other hand, both appellees maintain that such principal amount should
be P64,400.73, the amount stated in the writ of execution under which the
mortgaged properties of appellants' predecessor in interest were sold at the
foreclosure sale.
Appellees are right. The land herein involved was sold was not solely for the
loan and mortgage over said land but for all the other several indebtedness
and mortgage, that Francisco Quimson, predecessor of appellants, had
incurred and executed in favor of appellee bank, all of which had already
matured and had not been paid.
In other words, it is undisputed and plainly obvious from the real evidence in
the record that, contrary to the impression given by appellants in their brief,
the judgment against them or their predecessor for which the subject property
was sold, together with their other properties, was for more than P64,400.73
and that is the amount that appears in the writ of execution.
In such circumstances, We have no alternative but to apply the pertinent
provision of Section 20 of the appellee bank's charter, aforequoted, the
language of which is unmistakable and unequivocal "The mortgagor shall
have the right, ... to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the
court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at the rate specified in
the mortgage, and all the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the
Bank by reason of the execution and sale and for the custody of said
property.
That, indeed, the property in question was the subject of a separate and
distinct earlier mortgage from the others involved in the foreclosure, the said
mortgage being on a loan of only P2,500.00 and it was purchased by
appellee bank at the execution sale for only P6,045.00 and was later on sold
by it to appellee Mendoza for only P6,500.00, payable in five years, cannot
alter the fact that in the very deed of mortgage relied upon by them,
appellants' predecessor agreed to make the same property a security not only
for the P2,500.00 loan already obtained by him but for all other obligations he
may subsequently have to the appellee bank and subsequently, he did incur
other such obligations, all amounting to over P64,000.00 albeit secured by
other mortgages.
Appellee bank must have had its reasons for imposing such a condition and
from all that is extant in the records, appellants' predecessor agreed to it.
Such being the case,
We can only say that this Court is without power to alter or modify the terms
and conditions of contractual obligations freely agreed upon by the parties on
a mere plea of the obligor that he is without means to fully comply with it or
that he feels the same to be inequitable.
Besides, if it is considered that it is possible that the other collaterals given by
appellants' predecessor may not yield enough to cover the full amount of his
indebtedness secured thereby, the justification for the all-inclusive provision
can easily be perceived. After all, as long as all the properties mortgaged are
returned to appellants upon their payment of the full amount of over

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

P64,000.00 appellees are insisting upon, We cannot see any inequity in the
posture of appellee Bank.

As already stated, We are aware that the lower court made no findings,
whether of fact or of law on the point under discussion, but in instances like
the one at bar where in the appeal before Us both parties have joined issues
in their briefs on a matter not touched upon by the trial court because it is
inconsistent with the theory on which the decision is premised, but which may
be a necessary alternative in the event of reversal or modification of the trial
court's theory, and the relevant and material facts are undisputed or
indisputable, by stipulation of the parties or as found by the court from
indubitable evidence, and are incorporated in the record on appeal, We hold
that it is within the prerogative of this Court in the pursuit of substantial justice
to consider such matter and thus avoid the necessity, otherwise, of returning
the case to the trial court for further proceedings, with concomitant added
expenses and loss of time for the parties.

Accordingly, We hold that the amount which appellants should pay for the
redemption of the property in question must be the one fixed in the writ of
execution under which it was sold, which as stated above is more than
P64,000.00.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court is modified in the
sense that the appellants may be allowed to redeem the subject property after this
decision has become final, if they have taken the proper steps to enable them to
exercise their right thereto by having made within one (1) year from the registration of
the execution sale the appropriate tender to the proper party, and provided that they
pay the full amount fixed in the writ of execution of over P64,000.00, without
pronouncement as to costs.

5. RAMOS vs. MANALAC (MB)

G.R. No. L-2610 | June 16, 1951
Petitioners: CEFERINA RAMOS, ET AL.
Respondent: ANATOLIO C. MAALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPA LOPEZ
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
SUMMARY:
Petitioners seek the annulment of an order of the CFI of Pangasinan, placing one
Felipe Lopez in possession of 2 parcels of land claimed to belong to petitioners, and of
the decision rendered by the same court, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage
executed on said property to satisfy the payment of an obligation. They allege that
writs of possession issued to the mortgagee and buyer partakes of the nature of an
action and as it was issued after more than 5 years, the court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners
were not properly served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. SC
denied their petition and held that:

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

(1) The claim of the petitioners cannot be sustained for the reason that it is in the
nature of a collateral attack to a judgment which on its face is valid and
regular and has become final long ago.
(2) The issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an
execution of judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of
Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court can
undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years, provided the statute of
limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened in the meantime
(Rivera vs. Rupac).
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the CFI of
Pangasinan, placing one Felipe Lopez in possession of 2 parcels of land
claimed to belong to petitioners, and of the decision rendered by the same
court, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to
satisfy the payment of an obligation.

Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and

Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their
brother Eladio Ramos giving him authority to encumber, mortgage and
transfer in favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang,
Pangasinan.

By virtue of the power of attorney, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one

Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on the said property together with another
parcel of land, to guarantee the payment of loan of 300, with interest thereon
at the rate of 12% per annum.

When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of maturity,
Romualdo Rivera, the mortgagee, filed an action to foreclosure the mortgage,
making as parties-defendants the petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio
Ramos.

The summons was served only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the
service in his own behalf and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez,
who put in his appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in
their behalf.

Trial court --- rendered decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff
his obligation of 300, with interest, attorney's fees, and ordering the
foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment
within 90 days from the date the decision becomes final.

As Eladio Ramos failed to pay the judgment within the period therein
specified, on motion of the plaintiff, the court ordered the sale at public
auction of the mortgaged properties, which were sold to the plaintiff as the
highest bidder and the provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed of the
sale in his favor.

Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion
praying that she be placed in possession thereof. This motion was granted.

As the petitioners did not heed the order, they were summoned by the court
to explain why they should not be punished for contempt for their refusal to
comply with the writ of possession, to which they answered contending that
said writ partakes of the nature of an action and as it was issued after more

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than 5 years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale
conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly
served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit.
Trial Court --- found the explanation given by petitioners to be unsatisfactory
and insisted in its order and threatened to punish the petitioners as for
contempt of court if they failed to obey the order. Hence this petition
for certiorari.

ISSUES:
Petitioners question:
1. The validity of the decision rendered by the lower court ordering the
foreclosure of the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the properties in
question
2. The validity of the order of the court directing the issuance of a writ of
possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession to place
respondent Felipa Lopez in possession of the properties purchased by her
from the mortgagee.
HELD:

Petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.

RATIO:
1. As regards the first issue, the claim of the petitioners cannot be sustained for
the reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attack to a judgment which on its
face is valid and regular and has become final long ago.

It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular,
can only be attacked in separate action brought principally for the purpose.

Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served
with summons, the defect in the service was cured when the petitioners
voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint thru their attorney of record.

The security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and
tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor
to overcome such presumption. This is specially so when, as in the instant
case, it is only after the lapse of more than nine (9) years after the judgment
has been rendered that petitioners thought of challenging the jurisdiction of
the court.
2. The second issue is not also taken, for the simple reason that the issuance of
a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of
judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, but is
merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court can undertake even
after the lapse of five (5) years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights
of third persons have not intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac).

This is a case where the judgment involved is already final executed, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the properties
mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser thereof has transferred
them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their possession. In the
exercise of its interlocutory duty to put an end to the litigation and save
multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason is seen why the court cannot
issue a peremptory order to place the ultimate purchaser in the possession of
the property.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Rovero de Ortega vs. Natividad --- The general rule is that after a sale has
been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to
give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action
at law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a process and
place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has
power to enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous action and
vexatious litigation.
Rivera vs. Rupac --- In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party
thereto intervenes and the debtor continues in possession of the real property
mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary remedy to put an end to the
litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now
section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court) provides that the confirmation of the
sale by judicial decree operates to divest all the parties to the action of their
respective rights and vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal
provision, it is the duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that the
purchaser may be placed in the possession of the property which he
purchased at the public auction sale and become his by virtue of the final
decree confirming the sale.
American authorities --- A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction in
action for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and having decreed a sale of the
premises, RETAINS its jurisdiction and has authority to put the purchaser in
possession of the property, without compelling him to resort to an action of
law.

6. GRIMALT vs. VELASQUEZ (LL)

G.R. No. L-11721 | October 2, 1917
Plaintiff-appellee: ANDRES GRIMALT
Defendants: MACARIA V. VELAZQUEZ, and SY QUIO
Appellant: SY QUIO
FACTS:

The plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI of the city of Manila to foreclose
a mortgage executed and delivered by the defendant Macaria V. Velazquez
to the plaintiff upon a certain piece or parcel of land. Judgment was rendered
ordering the foreclosure of said mortgage.

The defendant was given time, in accordance with the provisions of the law,
in which to deposit the amount due on said mortgage with the court. The
defendant failed to make said deposit and an execution was issued in
accordance with the provisions of the judgment.

By reason of a motion of the defendant the sale of the mortgaged premises

was suspended but the mortgaged premises was sold to Francisco
Dominguez, but by reason of his failure to pay to the sheriff the amount bid
the property was again sold, after some proceedings were had, not important
here to mention (oh wow okay), to Sy Quio, the appellant herein.

The said purchaser (Sy Quio), by a motion, asked the court to confirm said
sale which the court granted on Jan 5 1916. On Jan 7 1916 the defendant

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presented a motion in court praying that said order confirming said sale be
annulled and set aside for the reason that no notice of said motion had been
given to him, it appearing at the same time that he had, on the Jan 6 1916,
deposited with the sheriff the full amount due upon said judgment of
foreclosure. Said motion was duly heard.
After hearing the respective parties the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario,
judge, found that the defendant had not been given notice of said motion, and
annulled and set aside his order theretofore made confirming the said sale,
upon condition that the defendant Macaria V. Velazquez return to the
purchaser Sy Quio the amount which he had theretofore paid to the sheriff,
together with 10 per cent interest from the date of the payment, or from the
21st day of December, 1915, until paid. From that judgment the said Sy Quio
appealed to this court.

ISSUE: W/N the debtor, in proceedings for the foreclosure of a mortgage, must be
given notice of a motion made to have the sale of the mortgaged premises confirmed
YES but defendant deposited already deposited sheriff full amount
RATIO:

The question of the necessity of giving the defendant notice of a motion to

confirm the sale of premises under foreclosure proceedings has heretofore
been discussed by this court. Section 257 of Act No. 190 provides that the
title to premises sold under foreclosure proceedings does not pass until the
sale of the same has been confirmed by the court.

In the case of Raymundo vs. Sunico, we held that, in order that a foreclosure
sale may be validly confirmed by the court, it is necessary that a hearing be
given the interested parties at which they may have an opportunity to show
cause why the sale should not be confirmed; that a failure to give notice is
good cause for setting aside the sale.

In the present case, however, in view of the fact that the defendant had,
before the sale was finally confirmed, deposited with the sheriff the full
amount of the judgment, with interest and costs, there is no occasion for
ordering a resale of the premises.
HELD: In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

7. SY vs. CA (JM)
G.R. No. 83139 | April 12, 1989
Petitioner: Arnel Sy
Respondents: Court Of Appeals, State Investment House, Inc. & Register Of Deeds
Of Rizal
Ponente: J. Cortes
Summary

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Carlos loaned P1 Million from SIHI and executed a real estate mortgage over a land in
San Juan together will all the improvements thereon as security. For failure to pay, the
property was extrajudicially foreclosed with SIHI as the only bidder, and the certificate
of sale was then registered in its favor. Meanwhile Carlos assigned to Sy the formers
right of redemption for P500,000. Before the expiration of the 1-year redemption
period, Sy offered to redeem the foreclosed property from SIHI by tendering 2
manager's checks but SIHI rejected. Thus Sy filed an action for consignation with the
RTC. SIHI on the other hand filed a MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action,
alleging that the amount sought to be consigned was insufficient for purposes of
redemption pursuant to Section 78 of the General Banking Act. RTC granted the MTD
and dismissed Sys action. Afterwards, SIHI consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed property, and caused the issuance of a new TCT in its name. Sy then
instituted another action in RTC, this time a complaint for annulment and cancellation
of title, with damages, against SIHI and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal.
But again this was dismissed because he failed to effect a valid redemption as
required under Section 78 of the General Banking Act.
The SC held that Sec. 78 the General Banking Act is the applicable law in determining
the redemption price, and not Act No. 3135, as amended, in relation to Section 30,
Rule 39 of the ROC, as contended by Sy. The General Banking Act partakes of the
nature of an amendment to Act No. 3135 insofar as the redemption price is concerned,
when the mortgagee is a bank or banking or credit institution. As certified by the
Central Bank, SIHI is a credit institution, and thus the amount to be paid by Sy must be
"the amount due under the mortgage deed ... with interest thereon at the rate specified
in the mortgage and all costs ... and other expenses incurred . . . by reason of the
execution (or foreclosure) and sale and as a result of the custody of said property less
the income received from the property . . .".
FACTS:

Carlos Coquinco executed in favor of State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) a real
estate mortgage over a 952 sq.m. parcel of land in San Juan, together with all the
improvements, covered by TCT No. 2782 issued in his name, as security for the
payment of a P1 Million loan.

For failure of Carlos to pay his outstanding balance of P1,126,220.56 (principal +

interest), the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and was sold at public auction
for P760,000.00 to SIHI as the only bidder.
o The certificate of sale in favor of SIHI was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig.
st
o 1 action: SIHI then filed before the RTC of Manila an action against Carlos
for the collection of P612,031.84, representing the deficiency. [was never
resolved in the case]

In the meantime, Arnel Sy acquired by virtue of a deed of assignment Carlos right

of redemption for a consideration of P500,000. Before the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period, he offered to redeem the foreclosed property from SIHI by
tendering 2 manager's checks (P760,000.00 representing the purchase price &
P91,200.00 representing interest at the rate of 1% per month for 12 months)
totalling P851,200.00.
o SIHI rejected.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

nd

2 action: Thus, Sy filed an action for consignation with the RTC to (1)
compel SIHI to accept the P851,200 as payment of the redemption price for
the foreclosed property, (2) order SIHI to surrender the title over the property
and (3) issue a certificate of redemption in favor of Sy.
A day before the expiration of the redemption period, Sy decided to redeem the
foreclosed property directly from the Ex-Officio Regional Sheriff of Rizal, who
accepted from him P851,200 as redemption price and P4,269.00 as percentage
fee of collection, and issued to him the corresponding certificate of redemption.
2nd action: SIHI filed a MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action, alleging
that the amount sought to be consigned was insufficient for purposes of
redemption pursuant to Section 78 of RA 337, otherwise known as the General
Banking Act.
o RTC: Granted MTD. Dimissed Sys action.
SIHI consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed property, and caused the
cancellation of TCT No. 2782 and the issuance of TCT No. 44775 covering the
same property in its name.
rd
3 action: After learning of this development, Sy instituted another action in RTC,
this time a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, with damages, against
SIHI and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal.
During the pendency of the action, SIHI sold the property to spouses Domingo Lim
and Lim Siu Keng Register of Deeds thereafter, cancelled TCT No. 44775 and
issued TCT No. 46409 in the name of the spouses.
rd
3 action: RTC dismissed Sy's complaint holding that it stated no cause of action
because he failed to effect a valid redemption as required under Section 78 of the
General Banking Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1828.
o It ordered Sy to pay (1) P10,000 temperate damages; (2) P20,000 exemplary
damages on the finding that he had instituted the case in violation of the res
judicata rule; and (3) P20,000 as attorney's fees.
o MR also denied.
CA: Affirmed RTCs judgment with the modification that the award for temperate
and exemplary damages assessed against petitioner was set aside for lack of
legal basis.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. WON Act No. 3135, as amended, in relation to Section 30, Rule 39 of the ROC is
the applicable law in determining the redemption price? NO. Sec. 78 of RA 337
(General Banking Act), as amended by PD 1828, is the applicable law in
determining the redemption price. [main]
2. WON the dismissal of the 2nd action (consignation case) had the effect of res
judicata with respect to the 3rd action. NO.
3. WON the Register of Deeds Rizal may be held liable for damages for cancelling
TCT No. 2782 and issuing TCT No. 44775 in favor of SIHI. NO.
4. WON the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation assessed against Sy
is proper. NO.
RATIO:

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

#1 THE GENERAL BANKING ACT IS THE APPLICABLE LAW IN DETERMINING THE

REDEMPTION PRICE [focus]
Sys Contention:

The present case is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended, in relation to Section
30, Rule 39 of the ROC on paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase,
with one percentum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of
redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the
purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named
amount at the same rate...

A valid redemption was made by him as assignee of the mortgagor's right of

redemption when he tendered and paid to the Sheriff of Rizal P851,000
representing the purchase price plus interest computed at the rate of 1% per
month for a period of twelve months. This was the same amount allegedly
tendered to, and refused acceptance by, SIHI.
Ruling of CA:

Applied Section 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by P. D. No. 1828.

No valid redemption was effected because the amount tendered to SIHI and
thereafter paid to the sheriff was insufficient, it being less than the amount due
under the real estate mortgage contract of Carlos or the latter's outstanding
balance, with interest as specified in the mortgage contract plus expenses
incurred by SIHI by reason of the foreclosure and sale of the subject property.
SC: CA is correct

Section 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1828, states that:
In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extra-judicially, of any
mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan granted before the
passage of this Act or under the provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or
debtor whose real property has been sold at public auction, judicially or
extra-judicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to any bank,
banking or credit institution, within the purview of this Act shall have the
right, within one year after the sale of the real estate as a result of the
foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the property by paying
the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, or the amount
due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with interest thereon
at the rate specified in the mortgage and all the costs, and judicial and
other expenses incurred by the bank or institution concerned by reason
of the execution and sale and as a result of the custody of said property
less the income received from the property.

As certified by the Central Bank, SIHI is a credit institution, i.e. financial

intermediary engaged in quasi-banking functions within the purview of Section 78,
it being an entity authorized to engage in the lending of funds or purchasing of
receivables or other obligations with funds obtained from the public as provided in
the General Banking Act under Section 2-A (a).

Moreover, Sy, by virtue of the deed of assignment of Carlos right of redemption

must be deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of his assignor, and
bound by exactly the same conditions, relative to the redemption of the property.
(merely stepped into the shoes)

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Had Carlos attempted to redeem the foreclosed property, he would have had
to pay "the amount due under the mortgage deed ... with interest thereon at
the rate specified in the mortgage and all costs ... and other expenses
incurred . . . by reason of the execution (or foreclosure] and sale and as a
result of the custody of said property less the income received from the
property . . ." pursuant to Section 78 of the General Banking Act in order to
effect a valid redemption.
The General Banking Act partakes of the nature of an amendment to Act No.
3135 insofar as the redemption price is concerned, when the mortgagee is a
bank or banking or credit institution. Although the foreclosure and sale of
the property was done by SIHI pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended
(whereby entities like SIHI are authorized to extrajudicially foreclose and sell
mortgaged properties only under a special power inserted in or annexed to the
real estate mortgage contract, and interested parties, like petitioner herein, are
given one year from the date of sale within which to redeem the foreclosed
properties), Section 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended, provides the
amount at which the subject property is redeemable from SIHI.

#2 NO RES JUDICATA

Considering that Sy failed to effect a valid redemption of the subject property (as
discussed above), it is deemed unnecessary to pass upon the merits of the
second issue.
#3 REGISTER OF DEEDS RIZAL, NOT LIABLE

Register of Deeds incurred no liability when he cancelled TCT No. 2782 and
issued in lieu thereof TCT No. 44775 in the name of SIHI, the former having acted
in fulfillment of his official functions and in accordance with law.
#4 NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ATTORNEY'S FEES & EXPENSES OF LITIGATION

The award of attorney's fees as a form of damages is the exception rather than
the general rule for it is predicated upon the existence of exceptional
circumstances, such as a "clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding" or evident
bad faith on the plaintiffs part in instituting his action.

It cannot be said that the present action instituted by Sy was clearly unfounded.
Although the theory upon which petitioner's complaint was based is untenable, he
had raised legitimate issues on the application of Section 78 of the General
Banking Act to credit institutions like SIHI.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the decision of Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
the modification that the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is set
aside.

8. TOLENTINO V. CA [RS]
G.R. Nos. L-50405-06 | 08/05/1981 | De Castro, J.
Petitioners: Sps. Vicenta and Jose Tolentino
Respondents: CA , Bank of the PI [BPI], Consuelo De la Cruz, et al.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc


SUMMARY
Ceferino died. His heirs sold the land to Sps. Tolentino, who, in turn, mortgaged said
homestead property [along with 2 other parcels of lands] to BPI and PBC. The heirs
tried to repurchase the homestead land extrajudicially, but the petitioners refused, so
they turned instead to a judicial remedy by filing an action to repurchase said land.
Meanwhile, petitioners failed to pay its BPI debt, as consequence of which BPI
became the homestead lands auction buyer. Petitioners consigned to the Office of the
Sheriff a check payable to BPI for the repurchase of the homestead land. At the same
time, it filed for a judicial action for redemption. WN tender of payment and
consignation made by the Tolentinos before the City Sheriff were valid. YES. When
the action to redeem was filed, a simultaneous deposit of the redemption money was
tendered to the Sheriff and under the last sentence of Section 31, Rule 39 [currently,
I think this is 29] of the Rules of Court, it is expressly provided that the tender of
the redemption money may be made to the Sheriff who made the sale. And the
redemption is not rendered in valid by the fact that the said officer accepted a check for
the amount necessary to make the redemption instead of requiring payment in money.
FACTS

Ceferino De la Cruz [Ceferino] died in Davao on 4/19/1960 left his widow,

Consuelo, and their children Hilario, Tarcelo and Godofredo [de la Cruzes]
o Left a parcel of land 131,705 sq. m., OCT No. P-16 in his name,
issued by virtue of a Homestead Patent No. V-1728

Deed of Sale executed by the De la Cruzes in 1962 homestead was sold to

petitioners Tolentinos, who took possession and caused the cancellation of
Ceferinos OCT and the issuance of a TCT in their names
st

1963 Tolentinos constituted a 1 mortgage over the homestead land and 2

other parcels of land that they own, in favor of BPI-Davao for a loan of P40K.
nd
A 2 mortgage was constituted over the same properties in 1964 in favor of
Phil. Banking Corp.
o Tolentinos failed to pay their mortgage indebtedness to BPI upon
maturity in the judicial foreclosure sale that followed, conducted by
the Davao City Sheriff in 7/15/1967; BPI was the sole and highest
bidder; Sheriffs Certificate of Sale in favor of BPI was registered
only in 1969 in the Registry of Deeds [RD] of Davao.
[REPURCHASE CASE] De la Cruzes v. Tolentinos

2/4/1967 De la Cruzes filed an action with the CFI-Davao against the

Tolentinos for the repurchase of the homestead land under 119 of the
Public Land Act [PLA] on the ground that they had tried to repurchase said
land extrajudicially for several times already but that the latter would not heed
their request, thus constraining the De la Cruzes to file a court action for the
repurchase thereof.
o BPI and Philippine Banking Corporation were included in the action
as formal party defendants, being the first and second mortgagees,
respectively, of the land.
o 6/1/1967 Tolentinos filed a motion for extension of 10) days "from
st
and after June 1 " to file their answer granted.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

6/14/1967 De la Cruzes filed a petition to declare the Tolentinos in default

for failure to file an answer.
o Tolentinos filed a MTD the repurchase case on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action denied: filed out of time.
Tolentinos were declared in default and the De la Cruzes were allowed to
present their evidence ex parte.
11/24/1967 Tolentinos filed their answer interposing the defense that the
complaint states no cause of action because from the face of their TCT, only
the original patentee, Ceferino, is given the right to repurchase the
homestead land and not the De la Cruzes and because the complaint does
not allege that there was a bona fide offer to repurchase or a valid tender of
payment, as well as an allegation that the De la Cruzes intended to pay not
only the purchase price but all the other expenses of the sale which includes
the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold, as required under
Article 1616 of the NCC.
CFI issued an order declaring Tolentinos as having no standing in the
nd
proceedings. MR and 2 MR both denied.
3/27/1969 CFI decision: allowed the De la Cruzes to repurchase the
homestead land.
o De la Cruzes paid P16,000 representing the repurchase price to the
BPI, who later on executed a deed of conveyance over the
homestead land on 8/25/1969
o CFI issued a writ of possession in favor of the De la Cruzes on
9/4/1969, which was served by the City Sheriff upon the Tolentinos
on 9/8/1969.
o Possession of the homestead land was delivered to the De la
Cruzes on 9/13/1969.
9/19/1969 Tolentinos filed a petition for relief from the Decision of 1969 on
the ground of excusable mistake in the counting of the reglementary period
for the filing of an answer, with a prayer that the Order declaring them in
default be lifted and that they be allowed to present their defense.
10/1/1969 Tolentinos filed a Motion to Quash the writ of possession
alleging absence of service on their counsel of a copy of the writ of
possession, as well as the decision of the lower court declaring the De la
Cruzes entitled to repurchase the homestead land.
o De la Cruzes opposed and prayed for the investigation of an alleged
tampering of records of the case particularly the page containing the
proofs of the service of a copy of the writ of possession as well as of
the decision of the lower court to the Tolentinos.
o 10/4/1969 - CFI denied the Motion to Quash. MR was denied.
3/5/1973 CFI denied for lack of merit the petition for relief from judgment;
MR also denied.
Tolentinos went up to the CA.

[REDEMPTION CASE] BPI v. Tolentinos

3/2/1970 Vicenta went to give Mr. Ramon Lopez, Branch Manager of BPI,
a letter-offer to redeem the homestead property for P16,000 covered by a
check. Upon being informed that she can no longer redeem the same for the

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

reason that it was already conveyed to the De la Cruzes pursuant to the 1969
CFI decision, Vicenta left the office of the manager, bringing with her the letter
which she later on sent to Mr. Lopez by registered mail, enclosed In another
letter dated 3/3/1970, reiterating her desire to redeem the homestead land.
o Mr. Lopez sent said letters to the BPI's legal counsel with a request
to inform the Tolentinos that they can still redeem the 2 other
properties [not the homestead land].
o But, instead of complying with BPI's advice, Vicenta consigned with
the Office of the City Sheriff a crossed PNB check drawn against
PNB-Cotabato, allegedly for the redemption of the 3 lots, including
the homestead land.
o But the next day, Vicente issued a stop-payment order against the
said crossed check purportedly to protect her rights and to prevent
BPI cashing said check without returning all the properties which BPI
had foreclosed and purchased.
Simultaneous with the consignment, the Tolentinos filed a redemption case
against BPI, amended on April 15, 1970, with the CFI-Davao for the
redemption of their 3 properties alleging bad faith on BPI in refusing to allow
them to redeem all 3 lots
o BPIs Answer with Counterclaim denied material claims, the truth
being that the Tolentinos did not have an intention to redeem their
said properties but only the homestead land.
CFI denied Tolentinos complaint. Both petitioners and BPI appealed
CA Consolidated decision
o Repurchase case [DEFAULT JUDGMENT] Tolentinos in default
o Redemption case dismissed both appeals of BPI and the
Tolentinos
o Tolentinos MR was denied.

ISSUEs:

WN Art. 1249 of the NCC applies here. NO.

WN the tender of payment and consignation made by the Tolentinos before

the City Sheriff were valid. YES.

WN the default judgment against the Tolentinos by the CA has become final
and executory. YES.
HELD: CAs consolidated decision is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered
authorizing the petitioners to redeem the properties subject matter hereof, other than
the homestead land, within thirty (30) days from entry of judgment, and ordering
private respondent BPI to execute a deed of absolute conveyance thereof in favor of
the petitioners upon payment by the latter of the purchase price up to the time of
redemption, together with the amount of any taxes or assessments which BPI may
have paid thereon after purchase, if any. In all other respects, said decision is
AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
ST
ND
1 AND 2 ISSUES

156

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Art. 1249 of the NCC deals with a mode of extinction of an obligation and
expressly provides for the medium in the "payment of debts: The payment of
debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not
possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in
the Philippines. The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of
exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment
only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor
they have been impaired. In the meantime, the action derived from the
original obligation shall be held in abeyance.
SC: Article should not be applied in the instant case, hereinafter explained,
together with the exposition on the resolution of the second issue raised in
this petition, the first two issues raised hinging ultimately on whether the
Tolentinos may redeem the properties in suit.
Tolentinos are not indebted to BPI, their mortgage indebtedness having
been extinguished with the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged
properties
After said foreclosure and sale, what remains is the right vested by law in
favor of the Tolentinos to redeem the properties within the prescribed period.
o This right of redemption is an absolute privilege, the exercise of
which is entirely dependent upon the will and discretion of the
redemptioners.
o There is no legal obligation to exercise the right of redemption.
o Said right cannot be considered an obligation for the Tolentinos are
under no compulsion to exercise the same.
o Should they choose not to exercise it, nobody can compel them
to do so nor will such choice give rise to a cause of action in
favor of the purchaser at the auction sale [BPI]
o In fact, the relationship between said purchaser and the
redemptioners is not even that of creditor and debtor.
o On the other hand, if the redemptioners choose to exercise their
right of redemption, it is the policy of the law to aid rather than to
defeat the right of redemption.
o It stands to reason therefore, that redemptions should be looked
upon with favor and where no injury is to follow, a liberal
construction will be given to our redemption laws as well as to
the exercise of the right of redemption.
Here, the ends of justice would be better served by affording the
Tolentinos the opportunity to redeem the properties in question other
than the homestead land, in line with the aforesaid policy, to which We
adhere fully notwithstanding the CAs reason in its Resolution, denying the
MR:
o We agree that the act of redeeming of a property mortgaged is not
an obligation but a privilege, in the sense that the mortgagor may or
may not redeem his property. That of course is a privilege. He may
choose to give up the property and have the mortgage foreclosed, or
redeem the property with the obligation of course to pay the loan or
indebtedness. But where he elects to redeem the property and he
has to pay the loan for which the mortgage was constituted, then Art.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

157

1249 of the Civil Code applies because it involves now the 'payment
of debts.' It is only the act of redeeming or not that is considered a
privilege, but not the act of paying the obligation once the mortgagor
has elected to redeem the property, in which case the check issued
or drawn shall produce the effect of payment only when it has been
cashed.
Under existing jurisprudence, what the redemptioner should pay, is not the
amount of the "loan for which the mortgage was constituted" as stated by the
Court of Appeals, but the auction purchase price plus 1 % interest per
month on the said amount up to the time of redemption, together with
the taxes or assessment paid by the purchaser after the purchase, if
any.
o In this connection, a formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a
bona fide tender of the redemption price, although proper, is not
essential where, as in the instant case, the right to redeem is
exercised thru the filing of judicial action, which as noted
earlier was made simultaneously with the deposit of the
redemption price with the Sheriff, within the period of
redemption.
o The formal offer to redeem, with a bona fide tender of the
redemption price within the period of redemption prescribed by law,
is only essential to preserve the right of redemption for future
enforcement even beyond such period of redemption.
o The filing of the action itself, within the period of redemption, is
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
o Should the court allow redemption, the redemptioners should then
pay the amount already adverted to.
[IMPORTANT] Moreover, when the action to redeem was filed, a
simultaneous deposit of the redemption money was tendered to the Sheriff
and under the last sentence of Section 31, Rule 39 [currently, I think this is
29] of the Rules of Court, it is expressly provided that the tender of the
redemption money may be made to the Sheriff who made the sale.
o And the redemption is not rendered in valid by the fact that the said
officer accepted a check for the amount necessary to make the
redemption instead of requiring payment in money.
o If he had seen fit to do so, the officer could have required payment to
be made in lawful money, and he undoubtedly, in accepting a check,
placed himself in a position where he could be liable to the
purchaser at the public auction if any damage had been suffered by
the latter as a result of the medium in which payment was made. But
this cannot affect the validity of the payment.
o The check as a medium of payment in commercial transactions is
too firmly established by usage to permit of any doubt upon this point
at the present day.
o No importance may thus be attached to the circumstance that a
stop-payment order was issued against said check the day
following the deposit, for the same will not militate against the
right of the Tolentinos to redeem, in the same manner that a
withdrawal of the redemption money being deposited cannot be

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

o
o

RD

deemed to have forfeited the right to redeem, such redemption

being optional and not compulsory.
Withal, it is not clearly shown that said stop payment order was
made in bad faith.
But while we uphold the right of redemption of the Tolentinos,
the same does not apply to the homestead land, for the reason
that shall be indicated in the discussion of the third issue.

ISSUE

SC can review decisions of the Court of Appeals only on errors of law, its
findings of fact being generally conclusive.

BPI argued that the default judgment by the CA has already become final and
executory

Tolentinos allege that said question is one of law; that they did not in fact
receive a copy of the default judgment; and that the only reason for the
finding of the lower court that there was a valid service of default judgment
was the sole testimony of BPI's counsel, who cannot even recall the date
when the alleged service was made, and there is no evidence as to the mode
of such service.

SC: For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the

probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.

The query here necessarily invites calibration of the evidence to determine

whether or not there was really such service. As such, the question must be
deemed to be factual in character and content, and as correctly pointed out
by BPI, the jurisprudence on the matter is that findings of facts of the lower
court are accorded the highest degree of respect.
o It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weight the evidence
all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law
that might have been committed by the lower court.
o And as already intimated earlier, appreciation of evidence is within
the domain of the respondent CA because its findings of facts, as a
general rule, are not reviewable by the SC.
o This has been the oft-repeated and well-established rule which has
been reiterated in a long line of cases and We find no circumstance
existing in this case to justify a departure from the said rule.
o More importantly, the petitioners not having appealed therefrom,
the decision had already attained the character of finality.
o The question of service cannot now be reopened or raised again in
these proceedings for, otherwise, there will be no end to a litigation.
o Public policy and sound practice demand that judgment of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by law.
o Finally, We find no abuse of discretion, much less a grave abuse
thereof, committed by the lower court in issuing an order, which was
affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, denying the Tolentinos'
petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit, the same being
supported by substantial evidence.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc


9. PONCE DE LEON V. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORP. [RT]
G.R. No. L-24571 December 18, 1970
Plaintiff-appellant:
JOSE
L.
PONCE
DE
LEON
Defendant-appellant and third-party
defendant-appellant:
REHABILITATION
FINANCE CORPORATION
Third-party plaintiffs-appellants: ROSALINA SORIANO, TEOFILA SORIANO and
REV. FR. EUGENIO R. SORIANO
Summary
Herein plaintiff Jose L. Ponce de Leon and Francisco Soriano, father of third-party
plaintiffs Teofila Soriano del Rosario, Rosalina Soriano and Rev. Fr. Eugenio Soriano,
obtained a loan for P10,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Manila,
mortgaging a parcel of land situated at Barrio Ibayo, Municipality of Paraaque, Rizal
in the name of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez, as security for the
loan. Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC for
short) Manila, his loan application for an industrial loan, for putting up a sawmill, in the
amount of P800,000.00 offering as security certain parcels of land, among which, was
the parcel which Ponce de Leon and Soriano mortgaged to the PNB. The application
was approved for P495,000.00 and the mortgage contract was executed on October 8,
1951 by Jose L. Ponce de Leon, his wife Carmelina Russel, and Francisco Soriano.
None of the amortization and interests which had become due was paid and, for this
reason, the RFC took steps for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties consisting of real estates and the sawmill and its equipments of Ponce de
Leon situated in two places in Samar. The RFC was the purchaser of all the
mortgaged properties in the ensuing sheriff's sales, with the exception of two parcels of
land situated in Bacolod City which were purchased by private individuals. Many items
of the mortgaged machineries and equipments could not be found. Previous to the
expiration of the one-year period of redemption, Francisco Soriano, through
Teofila Soriano del Rosario offered to repurchase the Soriano lot for P14,000.00
and on June 14, 1955, the last day for the redemption of the lot, Francisco
Soriano, in company with his daughter, Rosalina and Teofila, went to see Mr.
Bernardo, Chief of the assets department of the RFC, and offered to redeem said
lot for P14,000.00 but the offer was rejected and they were told to participate in
the public sale of the land to be conducted by the RFC. Jose L. Ponce de Leon
did not offer to redeem the mortgaged properties sold at anytime before the
expiration of the period of redemption. The RFC scheduled a public sale of the lot
registered in the name of Francisco Soriano and of the other lots which the RFC
acquired in the Sheriff's sale in view of the inability of Ponce de Leon or Soriano to
legally redeem the properties sold by the Sheriff within the one year period after the
sale. De Leon asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
RFC from carrying out its contemplated public sale. The Court set the petition for
injunction for hearing but no one appeared for the RFC at the hearing thereof so that
the Court had to issue the preliminary injunction prayed for. De Leon caused notice
of lis pendens to be recorded in relation with this case.
Lower court decision

158

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

The typhoons in October and November 1952 did not relieve the Ponce De
Leonfrom his obligations under the promissory note and the deed of mortgage in
favor of the RFC;
that the sheriff's sale of the mortgaged properties is valid;
that the RFC need not account for the machineries and equipment of the sawmill
in Samar or reimburse the value of such machinery and equipment as may be
unaccounted for, they having become property of the RFC, owing to plaintiff's
failure to exercise the right of redemption in accordance with law;
that neither may he recover damages from the RFC for the alleged delay in the
releases made by the same, since their contract stipulates that the proceeds of
the loan shall be released at the discretion of the Mortgagee and plaintiff's offer of
redemption came long after the expiration of the period therefor, and was not for
the full amount of plaintiff's liability, which he, moreover, asked to be reduced and
wanted to pay in installments;
and that, accordingly, Ponce De Leonhas no right to recover any damages.

Appeal of the Sorianos

(2)in ruling that the extrajudicial sale thereof to the RFC is valid as to the
aforementioned one-half of said property; (3) in not sentencing the RFC to allow the
redemption of such half of said property by the Sorianos, as heirs of the deceased
Francisco Soriano, for one-half of the sum of P10,000 for which the whole lot was sold
to the RFC, or, at least, for the whole sum of P10,000; (4) in not declaring that section
78 of Rep. Act No. 337 is unconstitutional and in holding that the same, instead of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is the law applicable to the case; (5) in
3
considering that the case of Villar v. de Paderanga is authoritative or controlling in the
case at bar
nd
2 assignment
In support of their second assignment of error, the Sorianos maintain that the sum of
P10,000, for which the Paraaque property was sold to the RFC, is ridiculously
inadequate, considering that said property had been assessed at P59,647.05. This
pretense is devoid of merit, for said property was subject to redemption and where
there is the right to redeem ... inadequacy of price should not be material,
because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to
redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price
obtained at the execution sale. Then, again, as the trial court had correctly of served:
But, mere inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff's sale unless shocking to the
conscience will not be sufficient to set aside the sale if there is no showing that, in the
event of a regular sale, a better price can be obtained. The reason is that, generally,
and, in forced sales, low prices are usually offered.
rd
th
th
3 ,4 ,5
The third, fourth and fifth assignments of error of the Sorianos refer to the amount for
which they feel entitled to redeem the aforementioned property. It will be recalled that,
before the expiration of the redemption period, Teofila Soriano del Rosario offered to
repurchase said property for P14,000; that she and her sister Rosalina reiterated the
offer on the last day of said period; and that the offer was rejected by the RFC, whose
action was upheld by the lower court, inasmuch as sec. 78 of Rep. Act 337 provides
that, "(i)n the event of foreclosure ... the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has
been sold at public auction ... for the ... payment of an obligation to any bank, banking,

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

or credit institution, ... shall have the right ... to redeem the property by paying
the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, ...," not the amount for which it
had been purchased by the buyer at public auction. We have already declared that" ...
(o)nly foreclosure of mortgages to banking institutions (including the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation) and those made extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption,
by express provision of statute, ..." and, although neither an ordinary bank nor the RFC
was involved in the case in which this pronouncement had been made, the same was
relevant to the subject-matter of said case and to the issue raised therein. At any rate,
We reiterate the aforementioned pronouncement, it being in accordance with law, for,
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 337.
Defendant's Appeals - Lower court erred in avoiding the sale to the RFC of the
Paraaque property, upon the ground that the same formed part of the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Francisco Soriano. The Sorianos have not succeeded in
proving that the Paraaque property was acquired "during the marriage" of their
parents. What is more, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Gregorio Soriano
testified that his first cousin, Francisco Soriano, had acquired said property from his
parents, long before he got married. Needless to say, had the property been acquired
by them during coverture, it would have been registered, in the name not of "Francisco
Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez," but of the spouses "Francisco Soriano and
Tomasa Rodriguez."
FACTS:
23

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Herein plaintiff Jose L. Ponce de Leon and Francisco Soriano, father of third-party
plaintiffs Teofila Soriano del Rosario, Rosalina Soriano and Rev. Fr. Eugenio
Soriano, obtained a loan for P10,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
Manila, mortgaging a parcel of land situated at Barrio Ibayo, Municipality of
Paraaque, Rizal in the name of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa
Rodriguez, as security for the loan.

August 16, 1945, Ponce de Leon gave P2,000.00 to Soriano from the proceeds of
the loan.

The loan was subsequently increased to P17,500.00 and an amendment to the

real estate mortgage,

Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC for
short) Manila, his loan application for an industrial loan, for putting up a sawmill, in
the amount of P800,000.00 offering as security certain parcels of land, among
which, was the parcel which Ponce de Leon and Soriano mortgaged to the PNB.
23

Dispositive part of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint with costs
against plaintiff; ordering plaintiff Jose Ponce de Leon to pay the defendant RFC the amount of FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY FOUR
(P529,265.54) CENTAVOS, with interest at six percent per annum from November 24, 1954 until fully paid, the
further sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P180.00) pesos per month from May 20, 1955 until plaintiff vacates
the house and lot at Taft Avenue, Pasay City, and FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as damages for the
injunction and costs.
The Court declares the mortgage of one-half of the lot covered by Original transfer certificate of title No. 8094 of
the lands records of Rizal Province belonging to the third-party plaintiffs, namely Rosalina Soriano, Rev. Fr.
Eugenio Soriano and Teofila Soriano del Rosario null and void and the sheriff's sale in favor of the RFC of said
one-half share likewise null and void.

159

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

The application was approved for P495,000.00 and the mortgage contract was
executed on October 8, 1951 by Jose L. Ponce de Leon, his wife Carmelina
Russel, and Francisco Soriano.
The same parties signed a promissory note for P495,000.00, with interest at 6%
per annum, payable on installments every month for P28,831.64 in connection
with the mortgage deed.
Before the mortgage deed was signed, the Notary Public, Felipe Cuaderno, Jr.
before whom it was acknowledged, translated it in Tagalog to Francisco Soriano,
who thereafter affixed his signature to the document.
At the time that Francisco Soriano signed the mortgage deed his spouse Tomasa
Rodriguez was already dead leaving as her heirs, her children namely, Rosalina,
Teofila and Rev. Fr. Eugenio Soriano, none of whom signed the said mortgage
deed or the promissory note.
The mortgage deed specifically stipulated that the proceeds thereof shall be used
exclusively for the purchase of machinery and equipment, construction of
buildings and the payment of obligations and that the release of the amounts
loaned shall be at the discretion of the RFC.
In view of these conditions, the RFC paid Ponce de Leon's obligations of
P100,000.00 to the PNB; P30,000.00 to Cu Unjieng Bros; and P5,000.00 to Arturo
Colmenares.
From the balance of P360,000.00, the sum of P352,000.00 was released to Jose
L. Ponce de Leon at various amounts during the period from December, 1951 to
July 1952.
The checks covering these releases were issued to Jose L. Ponce de Leon in
view of the authority given to him in writing by Francisco Soriano and Carmelina
Russel.
Jose L. Ponce de Leon and his wife Carmelina Russel executed an addendum to
the chattel mortgage for machineries and equipments.

Foreclosure

None of the amortization and interests which had become due was paid and, for
this reason, the RFC took steps for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties consisting of real estates and the sawmill and its equipments of Ponce
de Leon situated in two places in Samar.

The RFC was the purchaser of all the mortgaged properties in the ensuing
sheriff's sales, with the exception of two parcels of land situated in Bacolod City
which were purchased by private individuals. Many items of the mortgaged
machineries and equipments could not be found.

The Sheriff sold the land in the name of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa
Rodriguez, on June 15, 1954 and the deed of sale, dated April 19, 1955 was
executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser thereof, the RFC, including all the
other properties sold.

Previous to the expiration of the one-year period of redemption, Francisco

Soriano, through Teofila Soriano del Rosario offered to repurchase the Soriano lot
for P14,000.00 and on June 14, 1955, the last day for the redemption of the lot,
Francisco Soriano, in company with his daughter, Rosalina and Teofila, went to
see Mr. Bernardo, Chief of the assets department of the RFC, and offered to
redeem said lot for P14,000.00 but the offer was rejected and they were told to

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

participate in the public sale of the land to be conducted by the RFC. Jose L.
Ponce de Leon did not offer to redeem the mortgaged properties sold at anytime
before the expiration of the period of redemption.
The RFC scheduled a public sale of the lot registered in the name of Francisco
Soriano and of the other lots which the RFC acquired in the Sheriff's sale for
February 20, 1956 in view of the inability of Ponce de Leon or Soriano to legally
redeem the properties sold by the Sheriff within the one year period after the sale.

Ponce de Leons Allegations. Jose L. Ponce de Leon instituted the present action
alleging:

that there was delay in the releases of the amount of the loan;

that the RFC withheld the amount of P19,000.00 from the loan until it had verified
whether Ponce de Leon had still an unpaid indebtedness to the defunct
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, the RFC's predecessor, and this was paid only
after one year had passed;

that the typhoon in October and November, 1952 had caused destructions to his
sawmills and hampered his operations for which reason, he asks, in his complaint,
that the amortizations on his obligations which became due since October, 1952
be declared extinguished;

that the sheriff's sales be declared null and void because the properties were sold
at grossly inadequate prices and that said sales were not conducted in
accordance with law;

that the RFC be compelled to account for his machineries and equipments at his
lumber mill in Calbayog and to reimburse him for the value of the unaccounted
machineries and equipments;

that the RFC be ordered to pay him actual and moral damages for P105,000.00
and costs.

De Leon asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
RFC from carrying out its contemplated public sale. The Court set the petition for
injunction for hearing but no one appeared for the RFC at the hearing thereof so
that the Court had to issue the preliminary injunction prayed for. De Leon caused
notice of lis pendens to be recorded in relation with this case.
The RFC filed its answer sustaining the legality of the mortgage and Sheriff's
sales and counter-claimed that Ponce de Leon be ordered to pay the deficiency claim
representing the balance of the latter's indebtedness, rental of the lot and house at Taft
Avenue, Pasay City occupied by Ponce de Leon and damages.
rd

Sorianos Letter and 3 party complaint

Subsequent to the filing of Ponce de Leon's complaint against the RFC, Francisco
Soriano wrote a letter, dated February 20, 1956, to the President asking the
latter's intervention so that the projected sale on the same date to be conducted
by the RFC may be suspended insofar as the lot in his name is concerned and
that he be allowed to redeem it.

This letter was referred by the Executive Office to the RFC, which sent a letter to
Francisco Soriano informing the latter that he could redeem his former property for
not less than its appraised value of P59,647.05, payable 20% down and the

160

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

balance in ten years, with 6% interest. Soriano did not redeem the lot under the
conditions of the RFC.
He then filed a third-party complaint in this case with the RFC and Jose L. Ponce
de Leon as the third-party defendants. Due to the death of Francisco Soriano, he
was substituted as third-party plaintiff by his children, namely, Teofila Soriano del
Rosario, Rosalina Soriano and Rev. Fr. Eugenio Soriano.
The Sorianos contend:
o
that the mortgage in favor of the RFC and promissory note signed by
Francisco Soriano lacked the latter's consent and was without
consideration insofar as Francisco Soriano is concerned and hence null
and void as to him and his children;
o that the lot covered by original certificate of title No. 8094 in the name of
Francisco Soriano belonged to the conjugal partnership of the latter and
his wife, Tomasa Rodriguez, now deceased, and since the latter was
already dead when the mortgage was executed and her children who
have thus inherited her share have not signed the mortgage contract and
promissory note, at least, the one-half share of the lot belonging now to
the Soriano sisters and brothers, the Sorianos, have not been legally
included in the mortgage to the RFC so that the latter had not acquired
said one-half share in the sheriff's sale.
The Sorianos further ask that they be allowed to redeem the remaining one-half
share, that which belonged to their father, for one-half of P10,000.00 which was
the amount for which the RFC acquired the whole lot in the sheriff's sale.
The third party-plaintiffs also ask that Ponce de Leon be ordered to reimburse
them for whatever amount they may use in redeeming the lot and expenses
incident thereto and that Ponce de Leon and the RFC be made to pay them moral
damages which their father suffered and attorney's fees.

Lower court decision

The typhoons in October and November 1952 did not relieve the Ponce De Leon
from his obligations under the promissory note and the deed of mortgage in favor
of the RFC;

that the sheriff's sale of the mortgaged properties is valid;

that the RFC need not account for the machineries and equipment of the sawmill
in Samar or reimburse the value of such machinery and equipment as may be
unaccounted for, they having become property of the RFC, owing to plaintiff's
failure to exercise the right of redemption in accordance with law;

that neither may he recover damages from the RFC for the alleged delay in the
releases made by the same, since their contract stipulates that the proceeds of
the loan shall be released at the discretion of the Mortgagee and plaintiff's offer of
redemption came long after the expiration of the period therefor, and was not for
the full amount of plaintiff's liability, which he, moreover, asked to be reduced and
wanted to pay in installments;

and that, accordingly, Ponce De Leonhas no right to recover any damages.

Appeal of the Sorianos
The Sorianos maintain that the lower court erred: (1) in holding that the promissory
note and the deed of mortgage executed by Francisco Soriano in favor of the RFC are

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

valid as regards one-half of the Paraaque property; (2) in ruling that the extrajudicial
sale thereof to the RFC is valid as to the aforementioned one-half of said property; (3)
in not sentencing the RFC to allow the redemption of such half of said property by the
Sorianos, as heirs of the deceased Francisco Soriano, for one-half of the sum of
P10,000 for which the whole lot was sold to the RFC, or, at least, for the whole sum of
P10,000; (4) in not declaring that section 78 of Rep. Act No. 337 is unconstitutional
and in holding that the same, instead of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is
the law applicable to the case; (5) in considering that the case of Villar v. de
3
Paderanga is authoritative or controlling in the case at bar; (6) in not sentencing the
Ponce De Leonand the RFC to pay damages to the Sorianos; (7) in not ordering the
RFC to return OCT No. 8094, covering the Paraaque property, to the Sorianos, free
from any lien or encumbrance; and (8) in denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Sorianos.
st

1 assignment of error NOT IMPT

The latter's first assignment of error is predicated upon theory that, when the
promissory note and the deed of mortgage in question were executed by
Francisco Soriano, he was somewhat absent-minded, owing to senility, he being
then a septuagenarian, apart from illiterate, for he could write only his name; that
he was persuaded to sign said promissory note and deed of mortgage thru fraud,
deceit and undue influence, and did not know the true nature of these instruments
when he affixed his signatures thereon; and that said instruments are also null and
void for lack of cause and consideration.

The principal witness on the above allegation of the Sorianos is Rosalina Soriano,
who testified that her father, Francisco was an old man who was absent-minded;
that in 1945, Ponce de Leon merely borrowed her father's certificate of title on the
pretext that he would see if it were valid; that she gave it to Ponce de Leon who
never returned the certificate and it turned out that the latter mortgaged it to the
PNB by deceiving her father in signing the mortgage contract; that in 1951, her
father received a sheriff's notice that the land would be foreclosed; that her father
went to see Ponce de Leon in Negros but the latter assured him that nothing
would happen to his land; that in October, 1951, she and her father went to see
Ponce de Leon; that when the latter told her father that the property was
mortgaged to the RFC, her father got angry at Ponce de Leon saying that the
latter fooled him but Ponce de Leon assured him that he would redeem the land
but he failed to do so.
SC says...

The fact that Francisco Soriano may have been absent-minded could not be said
to have the effect of vitiating his consent to the mortgage deed because the
execution and signing of a contract is not a matter that concerns past events in
which absent-mindedness may be taken into account. Besides, the testimony of
Rosalina Soriano to the effect that her father told Ponce de Leon that the latter
fooled him shows that the old man Soriano could remember past events, for if truly
absent-minded, Francisco would not recollect what he claims to be what really
took place at the RFC office as testified to by Rosalina.

Neither could Francisco Soriano be considered feeble-minded if we believe the

testimony of Rosalina which shows Soriano's determination to see to it that the
wrong done him was righted and that his property may not be taken away from
him, for according to Rosalina, he even went to Negros alone to see Ponce de

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Leon he received the Sheriff's notice of foreclosure and as shown by his alleged
going to see Ponce de Leon a number of times about his land and of his enlisting
the aid of Ramon Lacson.
The Sorianos stress that, according to Felipe Cuaderno, Jr., the Notary Public,
when the latter asked Francisco Soriano, after he had translated the mortgage
deed into Tagalog if he (Francisco) understood it, it was Ponce de Leon who said
that the old man already (k)new it. But, granting that this was what happened, yet,
Francisco Soriano would certainly have protested against the statement of Ponce
de Leon if Francisco did not really know what the transaction was about or he
would have told Cuaderno that the document was not in accordance with the
agreement between him and Ponce de Leon considering that the document was
already translated to the old man by Cuaderno in the Tagalog language which
Soriano understood.
Besides, if Ponce de Leon really deceived Francisco Soriano into signing the
mortgage deed and promissory note so much so that in October, 1951, the old
man Soriano was so angry at Ponce de Leon that he told the latter that he fooled
him as testified to by Rosalina Soriano, then why was it that Ponce de Leon was
made one of the sponsors of the thanksgiving mass of the Neo-Prysbeter Rev. Fr.
Eugenio Soriano, the old man's son and one of the present third-party plaintiffs?
Moreover, the mere oral unsupported testimony of Rosalina Soriano, an interested
party and one of the plaintiffs herein, is not sufficient to overcome the legal
presumption of the regularity of the mortgage deed, a contract celebrated with all
the legal requisites under the safeguard of a notarial.
With reference to the contention that there was no consideration received by
Francisco Soriano out of the mortgage contract and the promissory note executed
in connection therewith, there is ample evidence to show that Francisco Soriano
received part of the consideration of the loan from the RFC. The facts thus relied
upon by His Honor, the Trial Judge, are borne out by the record, and We are fully
in accord with the conclusions drawn therefrom.

nd

rd

assignment of error IMPT

In support of their second assignment of error, the Sorianos maintain that the sum
of P10,000, for which the Paraaque property was sold to the RFC, is ridiculously
inadequate, considering that said property had been assessed at P59,647.05.
This pretense is devoid of merit, for said property was subject to redemption and
where there is the right to redeem ... inadequacy of price should not be
material, because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his
right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of
the price obtained at the execution sale.
Then, again, as the trial court had correctly of served: But, mere inadequacy of the
price obtained at the sheriff's sale unless shocking to the conscience will not be
sufficient to set aside the sale if there is no showing that, in the event of a regular
sale, a better price can be obtained. The reason is that, generally, and, in forced
sales, low prices are usually offered.
th

th

3 , 4 , 5 - IMPT

The third, fourth and fifth assignments of error of the Sorianos refer to the amount
for which they feel entitled to redeem the aforementioned property.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

It will be recalled that, before the expiration of the redemption period, Teofila
Soriano del Rosario offered to repurchase said property for P14,000; that she and
her sister Rosalina reiterated the offer on the last day of said period; and that the
offer was rejected by the RFC, whose action was upheld by the lower court,
inasmuch as sec. 78 of Rep. Act 337 provides that, "(i)n the event of foreclosure ...
the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold at public auction ... for
the ... payment of an obligation to any bank, banking, or credit institution, ... shall
have the right ... to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in
the order of execution, ...," not the amount for which it had been purchased by the
buyer at public auction.
We have already declared that" ... (o)nly foreclosure of mortgages to banking
institutions (including the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation) and those
made extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption, by express provision of
statute, ..." and, although neither an ordinary bank nor the RFC was involved in
the case in which this pronouncement had been made, the same was relevant to
the subject-matter of said case and to the issue raised therein. At any rate, We
reiterate the aforementioned pronouncement, it being in accordance with law, for,
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 337.

th

th

But this is contrary to the facts of record, for, during the trial, his counsel, Atty.
Jose Orozco, made the following admission:
Out of the loan of P495,000.00, the following were paid to the creditors of Jose
Ponce de Leon: P100,000.00 to the PNB, P30,000.00 to Cu Unijeng Bros.
P5,000.00 to Arturo Colmenares, P1,000.00 to Lorenzo Balagtas. The total
amount paid to the creditors is P136,000.00 which were taken out of the proceeds
of P495,000.00. The rest were all paid in the name of Jose Ponce de Leon.
At any rate RFC is authorized to fix the date of maturity of the installments therein
stipulated, which is allowed by the Negotiable Instruments Law and when a
promissory note expresses "no time for payment," it is deemed "payable on
demand."

nd

th

6 7 8

The sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of error made by the Sorianos are
mere consequences of those already disposed of. Hence, no further discussion
thereof is necessary.
Plaintiff's Appeal

Ponce De Leon alleges that the lower court has erred: (1) "in not setting aside the
foreclosure sales on the mortgage contract dated October 8, 1951"; (2) "in stating
that the proceeds of the foreclosure sales were conscionable"; (3) in not granting
Ponce de Leon's claim for adjustment and not "giving him a reasonable time to
pay whatever obligations he may have"; (4) in not granting him damages nor
directing the return of his properties; (5) "in not ordering a new trial for the purpose
of adjusting" his "obligations and determining the terms and conditions of his
obligation"; and (6) in not granting his claim against the Sorianos.
st

1 Assignment of Error NOT IMPT

With respect to his first assignment of error, Ponce De Leonmaintains that his
promissory note Exhibit A was not yet overdue when the mortgage was
foreclosed, because the installments stipulated in said promissory note have "no
fixed or determined dates of payment," so that the note is unenforceable and "the
RFC should have first asked the court to determine the terms, conditions and
period of maturity thereof."

In this connection, it should be noted that the total sum of P495,000 involved
therein shall be satisfied in quarterly installments of P28,831.64 each
representing interest and amortization and that, although the date of maturity of
the first installment was left blank, the promissory note states that the "date of
maturity (was) to be fixed as of the date of the last release," completing the
delivery to the plaintiff of the sum of P495,000 lent to him by the RFC. He now
says that this sum of P495,000 has not, as yet, been fully released by the RFC.

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- Not IMPT
Ponce De Leon maintains that the aggregate price of P112,332.00, for which the
mortgaged properties had been sold at public auction, is unconscionable, said
properties being allegedly worth P1,202,976. This premise is inaccurate.
It should be noted that Ponce De Leon and Francisco Soriano were granted a
P495,000 loan on the security, not only, of the existing properties offered as
guarantee, but, also, on that of assets appraised at P570,000 yet to be
acquired only plaintiff, partly with money thus received from the RFC and partly
with his own funds.
After obtaining said loan and receiving the amount thereof, less the sum of
P136,000 applied to the payment of outstanding obligations, Ponce De Leon failed
to purchase the machinery and equiptment he had promised to get, or to set up
the constructions he had undertaken to make.
Moreover, the RFC found that the mortgaged lots in the cities of Pasay and
Bacolod, which were originally appraised at P492,288.00, were actually worth
P172,530,00 only.

rd

3 - NOT

It is urged by the Ponce De Leon that he is entitled to a "suspension of payment,"

or a postponement of the date of maturity of obligation to pay, in view of the
typhoons that had "practically wiped out" his sawmill in Samar during the months
of October and November 1952.

Ponce De Leon was not bound to deliver the aforementioned sawmill, or any other
specific thing damaged or destroyed by typhoons, to the RFC. His obligation was
merely generic, namely, to pay certain sums of money to the RFC, at stated
intervals.
th

th

4 5 6th
Being mere corollaries to his first three assignments of error, which cannot be
sustained, Ponce De Leon's fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error must have the
same fate.
Defendant's Appeals - Lower court erred in avoiding the sale to the RFC of the
Paraaque property, upon the ground that the same formed part of the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Francisco Soriano. IMPT

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In this connection, it appears that the property was registered in the name of
"Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez," and that based upon this fact
alone without any proof establishing satisfactorily that the property had
been acquired during coverture the lower court presumed that it belongs to the
conjugal partnership of said spouses. We agree with the RFC that the lower court
has erred in applying said presumption.
We should not overlook the fact that the title to said property was not a transfer
certificate of title, but an original one, issued in accordance with a decree which,
pursuant to law, merely confirms a pre-existing title. Said original certificate of title
does not establish, therefore, the time of acquisition of the Paraaque property by
the registered owner thereof.
Then, again, the lower court applied said presumption, having in mind,
presumably, Article 160 of our Civil Code, which reads:
... All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
This provision must be construed in relation to Articles 153 to 159 of the same
Code, enumerating the properties "acquired ... during the marriage" that constitute
the conjugal partnership.
The case at bar is differently situated. The Sorianos have not succeeded in
proving that the Paraaque property was acquired "during the marriage" of their
parents. What is more, there is substantial evidence to the contrary.
Gregorio Soriano testified that his first cousin, Francisco Soriano, had acquired
said property from his parents, long before he got married. In this connection, the
lower court, however, said that the credibility of this witness is subject to doubt for
it was shown that he had an improper motive in testifying against the Sorianos
because he had a niece who was prosecuted by The Sorianos for estafa,
This observation is, to our mind, hardly justifiable. To begin with, when counsel for
the Sorianos asked the witness whether or not his grandchild or grandniece
Flordeliza Clemente had been accused of "estafa" by the Sorianos, counsel for
the RFC objected thereto, and the court sustained the objection, upon the ground
that the question was "irrelevant."
Again, this witness testified in a straightforward manner, and disclosed a good
number of details bearing the ear-marks of veracity. What is more, his
testimony was corroborated, not only by Felipe Cuaderno, Jr. and OCT No. 8094,
but, also, by the testimony of third-party plaintiff Rosalina Soriano.
Needless to say, had the property been acquired by them during coverture, it
would have been registered, in the name not of "Francisco Soriano, married to
Tomasa Rodriguez," but of the spouses "Francisco Soriano and Tomasa
Rodriguez."
It is thus clear that the lower court erred in annulling the RFC mortgage on the
Paraaque property and its sale to the RFC as regards one-half of said property.
With this modification and that of other pertinent parts of the decision appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of this
instance against plaintiff, Jose L. Ponce de Leon and third-party plaintiffs,
Rosalina Soriano, Teofila Soriano del Rosario and Father Eugenio Soriano. It is so
ordered.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

10. SPOUSES ARQUIZA V. COURT OF APPEALS (MB)

Petitioner: Spouses Godofredo V. Arquiza and Remedios D. Arquiza
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Equitable PCIBANK
G.R. No. 160479. June 8, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J
SUMMARY:
Spouses Arquiza loaned P2.5 million from Equitable PCIBANK secured by a parcel of
land in Quezon City. They failed to pay. Equitable PCIBANK foreclosed on the
mortgage, and was able to consolidate title and ownership. Spouses filed a civil
complaint assailing the validity of the mortgage. They refused to vacate the property so
Equitable PCIBANK was compelled to file an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. RTC granted the writ of possession. CA affirmed. SC affirmed CA ruling:
(1) The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or
other initiatory pleading.
(2) An ordinary action to acquire possession in favor of the purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real property is not necessary.
(3) Case cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.
(4) Proceedings being ex parte, Spouses were not deprived of their right to due
process.
(5) The judge to whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not look
into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure.
FACTS:

Spouses Godofredo V. Arquiza and Remedios D. Arquiza, obtained a loan

from Equitable PCIBANK for P2.5 million. To secure the payment, Spouses
Arquiza executed a Real Estate Mortgage over their parcel of land in Quezon
City.

When the spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan, the Equitable
PCIBANK filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage. A public auction was held where the mortgaged property, together
with all the improvements existing, was sold to the Equitable PCIBANK as the
highest bidder. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the
Equitable PCIBANK and was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City.

After the expiration of the redemption period without the Spouses Arquiza
having exercised their right to redeem the property, Equitable PCIBANK
consolidated its ownership. As a consequence, the ROD issued TCT in the
name of the Equitable PCIBANK, canceling the Spouses Arquiza former title.

The Spouses Arquiza filed a complaint against the Equitable PCIBANK and
the sheriffs with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of the nullity of
the promissory note, real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale and
damages with a plea for injunctive relief for the suspension redemption
period.

Meanwhile, the Equitable PCIBANK demanded that the Spouses Arquiza

vacate and surrender possession of the subject property, but the latter

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164

refused. This compelled the Equitable PCIBANK to file an Ex Parte Petition

for Issuance of a Writ of Possession also with the Quezon City RTC.
RTC Instead of acting on the petition and receiving the evidence of the
Equitable PCIBANK ex parte, as mandated by Act No. 3135, the RTC set the
case for hearing.
o Spouses filed their Answer praying that the trial court dismiss the
petition outright for: (1) failure to attach cert. of non-forum shopping
and (2) because the petition was abated by the pendency of their
complaint involving the non-payment of their mortgage obligation,
the validity of the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property and
their failure to redeem the same. The Spouses Arquiza
RTC granted the Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
o Spouses appealed to the CA.
CA affirmed the RTC.
o The petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was not an
initiatory pleading; hence, a certification against forum shopping was
not necessary.
o The rule requiring the highest bidder to be placed in possession of
the property is founded on the right of ownership, which becomes
absolute after title thereto has been issued in favor of the new
owner, and that the court must aid in effecting its delivery.
o Denied Spouses MR.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Spouses Arquizas arguments:
1. A certification against forum shopping was necessary in the
application for a writ of possession.
2. They are legally entitled to be protected in their possession over the
subject property pending the resolution of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the promissory note, real estate mortgage,
and foreclosure sale.
3. Equitable PCIBANK failed to substantiate (through evidence) its ex
parte petition for the issuance of the writ of possession.
Equitable PCIBANKs arguments:
1. Certificate of non-forum shopping is not necessary because the ex
parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is not an
initiatory pleading. Litis pendentia does not exist because there is no
identity of the issues and the reliefs prayed for. Hence, forum
shopping cannot likewise exist.
2. After the expiration of the redemption period and the consolidation of
ownership over the property, it had the right to be placed in
possession without the need of a separate and independent action.
It posits that the right to possess an extrajudicially foreclosed
property is not affected by the pendency of an action for annulment
of foreclosure proceedings. The Equitable PCIBANK stresses that
the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function of the
court, and should be issued as a matter of course upon the filing of
the proper ex parte motion.
3. Spouses Arquiza were not denied their right to due process.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

ISSUES:
1. Is it right, proper and just for the Court below to completely ignore and
disregard a related prior and pending action between the same parties where
the very basis of the right of possession over the subject property sought to
be enforced as a result of the foreclosure of a mortgage is being assailed in
court for being NULL AND VOID ab initio OR INEXISTENT?
2. Is it right, proper and just for the Court below to summarily close its eyes to
the patent and obvious flaw or irregularity of the mortgage in the
appreciation of the evidence offered in support of the Ex-Parte Petition For
the Issuance of a Writ of Possession?
3. Does the application of Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, as
the Court below did, exclude or preclude the effectivity or applicability of the
mandate against forum shopping, of the requirement for certification in
pleadings against forum shopping, of the principle of litis pendentia, and of
due process of law?
HELD:

Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

CA decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

RATIO:
1. The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or
other initiatory pleading.

The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the
respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although the Equitable PCIBANK
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. An
application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration
proceeding. Hence, although it was denominated as a petition, it was in
substance merely a motion.

It bears stressing that Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, specifically provides that the buyer at public auction may file a verified
petition in the form of an ex parte motion.
SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the
purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of the province or place where the property or any part
thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the
use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating
the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act.
Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex
parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the
property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of
property registered under the Mortgage Law or under Sec. 194 of
the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered
with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds
in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of
court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified

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in par. 11 of Sec. 114 of Act No. 496, and the court shall, upon the
filing of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to
the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall
execute said order immediately.
2. An ordinary action to acquire possession in favor of the purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real property is not necessary.

There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriffs sale of

real property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for
possession after the one-year period for redemption has expired and after he
has obtained the sheriffs final certificate of sale.

The basis of this right to possession is the purchasers ownership of the

property. The mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the writ of
possession would suffice, and no bond is required.
3. Case cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. And one element
of res judicata is that the judgment or order must be on the merits of the case.

The petition of the Equitable PCIBANK for a writ of possession was not an
ordinary action. Any order or decision of the RTC in the writ of possession
case is not determinative of the merits of the civil case filed by the spouses.

Well established is the rule that after the consolidation of title in the buyers
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes
a matter of right.

Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely

a ministerial function. The issuance of the writ of possession being a
ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a
judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a
separate case

When litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither can forum
shopping exist.
4. Proceedings being ex parte, Spouses were not deprived of their right to due
process.

Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, specifically provides that a petition

(for a writ of possession) is in the nature of an ex parte motion in which the
court hears only one side of the controversy. An ex parte proceeding
presupposes a right of the petitioners to which there is no adverse party.
An ex parte proceeding merely means that it is taken or granted at the
instance and for the benefit of one party, and without notice to or contestation
by any party adversely affected.

In this case, the RTC opted not to conduct an ex parte hearing. It went out of
its way and set the application for a writ of possession for hearing.

Spouses Arquiza were allowed to file an Answer and present evidence.

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5. The judge to whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not look
into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure.

In the issuance of a writ of possession, no discretion is left to the trial court.

Any question regarding the cancellation of the writ or in respect of the validity
and regularity of the public sale should be determined in a subsequent
proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135.
11. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK vs ROSEMOORE MINING
G.R. Nos. 159669 & 163521 | March 12, 2007
Petitioner: UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. (formerly WESTMONT BANK)
Respondents: ROSEMOORE MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and DRA.
LOURDES PASCUAL
Summary: Rosemoore Mining & Development Corporation (Rosemoor) in order to
secure a credit facility amounting to 80 Million executed a mortgage agreement with
United Overseas Bank Phils. (Bank) which covered six (6) parcels of land all registered
under Rosemoor. Rosemoor defaulted which caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the properties. The bank was the highest bidder in all of the properties. Hence the filing
of the case by Rosemoor before the Manila RTC and Malolos RTC. In the Manila RTC
(Personal Action), Rosemoor filed an action to receive the remaining proceeds of the
loan. However, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the case because it contends
Rosemoor is violating forum shopping, having initiated a case in Malolos RTC.
However the motion to dismiss was denied, likewise it was dismissed by the CA
holding that there was no forum shopping. In Malolos RTC (Real Action), Rosemoor
second action was filed to restrain the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to
secure the loan which was not due yet. The bank filed a motion to dismiss the case
due to violation of forum shopping but the likewise it was denied by the RTC and CA.
Hence the two petitions were consolidated by the SC. SC ruled in favor of Rosemoor
and affirmed ruling that there was no forum shopping. The Malolos case was filed for
the purpose of restraining the Bank from proceeding with the consolidation of the titles
over the foreclosed Bulacan properties because the loan secured by the mortgage had
not yet become due and demandable. While the right asserted in the Manila case is to
receive the proceeds of the loan, the right sought in the Malolos case is to restrain the
foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure a loan that was not yet due.
Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is
necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action
which should be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part
thereof lies.
FACTS:

Respondent Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (Rosemoor), a

Philippine mining corporation with offices at Quezon City, applied for and was
granted by petitioner Westmont Bank (Bank) a credit facility in the total
amount of P80 million

To secure the credit facility, a lone real estate mortgage agreement was
executed by Rosemoor and Dr. Lourdes Pascual (Dr. Pascual), Rosemoors

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president, as mortgagors in favor of the Bank as mortgagee in the City of

Manila.
The agreement, however, covered six (6) parcels of land located in San
Miguel, Bulacan (Bulacan properties), all registered under the name of
Rosemoor, and two (2) parcels of land situated in Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Nueva
Ecija properties), owned and registered under the name of Dr. Pascual.
Rosemoor subsequently opened with the Bank four (4) irrevocable Letters of
Credit (LCs) totaling US$1,943,508.11. To cover payments by the Bank under
the LCs, Rosemoor proceeded to draw against its credit facility and thereafter
executed promissory notes amounting collectively to P49,862,682.50. Two (2)
other promissory notes were also executed by Rosemoor in the amounts of
P10,000,000.00 and P3,500,000.0.
Rosemoor defaulted in the payment of its various drawings under the LCs
and promissory notes. In view of the default, the Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the Nueva Ecija properties and the Bulacan properties.
The Bank was the highest bidder on both occasions.
The Bank caused the annotation of the Notarial Certificate of Sale covering
the Nueva Ecija & Bulancan properties on the certificates of title concerned.
The foregoing facts led to Rosemoors filing of separate complaints against
the Bank, one before Manila RTC and the other Malolos RTC.

The Manila Case (G.R. No. 163521)

Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual filed a Complaint, originally captioned as one for
"Damages, Accounting and Release of Balance of Loan and Machinery and
for Injunction". The complaint was twice amended, the caption eventually
reflecting an action for "Accounting, Specific Performance and Damages."
Through the amendments, Pascual was dropped as a plaintiff while several
officers of the Bank were included as defendants.

The Bank moved for the dismissal of the original and amended complaints on
the ground that the venue had been improperly laid which motion was denied.

Rosemoors prayer included directing Westmont to render an accounting of

the loan account of Rosemoor under the Long Term Loan Facility and the
Revolving Credit Line at least up to the dates of foreclosure of Rosemoors
mortgaged properties, showing among others (a) the sums of money paid by
Rosemoor or otherwise debited from its deposit account in payment of the
loans it had obtained from Westmont to cover the cost of the machinery to be
imported under the Unpaid LCs and under LC No. 97-058 for the tiling plant,
as well as for working capital, and (b) all interests, penalties and charges
imposed on the loans; (c) the amount of import and customs duties,
demurrage, storage and other fees;

Bank filed another MTD the Second Amended Complaint on the ground of
forum-shopping since, according to it, Rosemoor had filed another petition
earlier before the Malolos RTC. Still, this was denied. This denial was
challenged in CA but CA held that no forum-shopping attended the actions
brought by Rosemoor.

The Malolos Case (G.R. No. 159669)

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

After the complaint with the Manila RTC had been lodged, Rosemoor and Dr.
Pascual filed another action against the Bank, this time before the Malolos
RTC.
In the Malolos case, Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual alleged that the redemption
period for the Bulacan properties would expire on 16 March 2002. They
claimed that the threatened consolidation of titles by the Bank is illegal,
stressing that the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage by the Bank was
fraudulent and without basis, as the Bank had made them sign two blank
forms of Real Estate Mortgage and several promissory notes also in blank
forms. It appeared later, according to Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual, that the two
Real Estate Mortgage blank forms were made as security for two loans, one
for P80 million and the other for P48 million, when the total approved loan
was only for P80 million. The Bank later released only the amount of P10
million out of the P30 million revolving credit line, to the prejudice of
Rosemoor, they added.
The petition prayed for TRO to be issued before the matter could be heard on
notice to restrain and enjoin respondent BANK from proceeding with its
threatened consolidation of its titles over the subject properties of petitioner
Rosemoor in San Miguel, Bulacan and that RD of Bulacan be enjoined from
registering any document submitted by Bank and cancelling titles of
Rosemoor
Bank filed MTD on the ground that Rosemoor had engaged in forumshopping, adverting to the pending Manila case. The Bank further alleged that
Dr. Pascual has no cause of action since the properties registered in her
name are located in Nueva Ecija. The Malolos RTC denied the MTD and
directed the Bank to file its answer to the petition which the Bank did not do.
Malolos RTC declared Bank in default for failure to file its answer as it filed
instead MR (which was also denied)
Hence, the Bank filed a second petition for certiorari before the CA. During
the pendency of this petition for certiorari, the Malolos RTC decided the
Malolos case on the merits in favor of Rosemoor.

ISSUES:
1) (same issue for 2 cases) Whether Rosemoor committed forum-shopping in filing the
two cases against the Bank - NO
Other issues pertaining to the orders issued by the Malolos RTC:
2) Whether the action to invalidate the foreclosure sale was properly laid with the
Malolos RTC even as regards the Nueva Ecija properties YES
3) Whether it was proper for the Malolos RTC to declare the Bank in default YES
4) Whether it was proper for the Malolos RTC to deny the Banks motion to dismiss
through a minute resolution. YES
Forum-Shopping

The central issue in these consolidated cases is whether Rosemoor

committed forum-shopping in filing the Malolos case during the pendency of
the Manila case.

As to the existence of identity of parties, several bank officers and employees

impleaded in the Amended Complaint in the Manila case were not included in

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the Malolos case. These bank officers and employees were sued in Manila in
their personal capacity. A finding of negligence or bad faith in their
participation in the preparation and execution of the loan agreement would
render them personally liable.
o Dr. Pascual, on the other hand, was included as petitioner only in the
Malolos case because it involved properties registered in her name.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Dr. Pascual is a
real party-in-interest in the Malolos case because she stood to
benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit. Dr. Pascual, however,
was not included as plaintiff in the Manila case because her interest
therein was not personal but merely in her capacity as officer of
Rosemoor.
As regards the identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the main
contention of Rosemoor in the Manila case is that the Bank had failed to
deliver the full amount of the loan, as a consequence of which Rosemoor
demanded the remittance of the unreleased portion of the loan and payment
of damages consequent thereto. In contrast, the Malolos case was filed for
the purpose of restraining the Bank from proceeding with the
consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties
because the loan secured by the mortgage had not yet become due and
demandable.
o While the right asserted in the Manila case is to receive the
proceeds of the loan, the right sought in the Malolos case is to
restrain the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure a
loan that was not yet due.
Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale
that is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is
therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the
province where the property or part thereof lies.
o The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action involving as
it does the enforcement of a contract between Rosemoor, whose
office is in Quezon City, and the Bank, whose principal office is in
Binondo, Manila.
o Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendants or any
of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
o It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila case that Rosemoor and
Dr. Pascual saw the need to secure a writ of injunction because the
consolidation of the titles to the mortgaged properties in favor of the
Bank was in the offing. But then, this action can only be commenced
where the properties, or a portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the
petition for injunction would be dismissed for improper venue.
Rosemoor, therefore, was warranted in filing the Malolos case and
cannot in turn be accused of forum-shopping.
Clearly it cannot be said that respondents committed forum-shopping.

Action to nullify foreclosure sale of mortgaged properties in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija
before the Malolos RTC

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The Bank challenges the Malolos RTCs jurisdiction over the action to nullify
the foreclosure sale of the Nueva Ecija properties along with the Bulacan
properties.
This question is actually a question of venue and not of jurisdiction, which if
improperly laid, could lead to the dismissal of the case.
The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is
properly laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties
together with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija.
Following the provision (Rule 4 Sec 1) of the Rules of Court, the venue
of real actions affecting properties found in different provinces is
determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving
said parcels of land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the
same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces
wherein a parcel of land is situated.
Ironically, the Bank itself correctly summarized the applicable jurisprudential
rule in one of the pleadings before the Court. Yet the Bank itself has provided
the noose on which it would be hung (huh?). Resorting to deliberate
misrepresentation, the Bank stated in the same pleading that "the Bulacan
and Nueva Ecija [p]roperties were not the subject of one single real estate
mortgage contract."
In the present case, there is only one proceeding sought to be nullified and
that is the extra-judicial mortgage foreclosure sale. And there is only one
initial transaction which served as the basis of the foreclosure sale and that is
the mortgage contract.
Indeed, Rosemoor, through Dr. Pascual, executed a lone mortgage contract
where it undertook to "mortgage the land/real property situated in Bulacan
and Nueva Ecija," with the list of mortgaged properties annexed thereto
revealing six (6) properties in Bulacan and two (2) properties in Nueva Ecija
subject of the mortgage.
This apparent deliberate misrepresentation cannot simply pass without action.
The real estate mortgage form supplied to Rosemoor is the Banks standard
pre-printed form. Yet the Bank perpetrated the misrepresentation. Blame
must be placed on its doorstep. But as the Banks pleading was obviously
prepared by its counsel, the latter should also share the blame. A lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Both the Banks
president and counsel should be made to explain why they should not be
sanctioned for contempt of court.

Propriety of Default Order

To recall, the Bank filed a MTD the Malolos case which the Malolos RTC
denied. In the same Order, the Malolos RTC directed the Bank to file its
answer to the petition within five (5) days from the receipt of the Order. The
Bank received a copy of the Order on 21 May 2002. Instead of filing an
answer, the Bank filed a motion for reconsideration but only on 5 June 2002.

The MR could not have tolled the running of the period to answer for two
reasons. One, it was filed late, nine (9) days after the due date of the answer.

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Two, it was a mere rehash of the motion to dismiss; hence, pro forma in
nature. Thus, the Malolos RTC did not err in declaring the Bank in default.
Deviation from the Prescribed Content of an Order Denying a Motion to Dismiss

Finally, the Bank questions the Malolos RTCs Order denying its MTD on the
ground that it is contrary to law and jurisprudence because it had failed to
apprise the Bank of the legal basis for the denial. The Bank adverts to the
content requirement of an order denying a MTD prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 16
of the Rules of Court. The Court in Lu Ym v. Nabua made a thorough
discussion on the matter:
o Further, it is now specifically required that the resolution on the
motion shall clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. This
proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily dismissing the
motion for "lack of merit." Such cavalier dispositions can often pose
difficulty and misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in
taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court called
upon to resolve the same, usually on certiorari.

Clearly, the subject order falls short of the content requirement as expounded
in Lu Ym v. Nabua. Despite the aberration, however, the Bank was not
misled, though it could have encountered difficulties or inconvenience
because of it. Comprehending, as it did, that the Malolos RTC did not share
its position that Rosemoor had engaged in forum-shopping, it went to great
lengths to impress upon the CA that there was indeed forum-shopping on
Rosemoors part. But the appellate court did not likewise agree with the Bank
as it soundly debunked the forum-shopping charge. In the ultimate analysis,
therefore, the trial courts blunder may be overlooked as it proved to be
harmless.
HELD: WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in G.R. 163521 dated 26 February 2004 and in G.R No. 159669 dated 20 June 2003
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Petitioner, United Overseas Bank, Phils. and
its counsel, Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices, are given ten (10) days
from notice to EXPLAIN why they should not be held in contempt of court for making a
misrepresentation before the Court as adverted to in this Decision.

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RULE 69: PARTITION

Section
1.
Complaint
in
action
for
partition
of
real
estate.
A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided
in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property.
Sec. 2. Order for partition, and partition by agreement thereunder.
If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the
partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may,
if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments
of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same,
shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated.
A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby.
Sec. 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree.
If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more
than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the
partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such
part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct.
Sec. 4. Oath and duties of commissioners.
Before making such partition, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that
they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in
court with the other proceedings in the case. In making the partition, the
commissioners shall view and examine the real estate, after due notice to the parties
to attend at such view and examination, and shall hear the parties as to their
preference in the portion of the property to be set apart to them and the comparative
value thereof, and shall set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be
most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation
and quality of the different parts thereof.
Sec. 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion
thereof, cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties, the court
may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays
to the other parties such amounts as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of
the interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in
which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale
under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine.
Sec. 6. Report of commissioners; proceedings not binding until confirmed.
The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their
proceedings as to the partition, or the assignment of real estate to one of the parties,
or the sale of the same. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall serve

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copies thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are allowed ten (10)
days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. No
proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners shall pass the title to the
property or bind the parties until the court shall have accepted the report of the
commissioners and rendered judgment thereon.
Sec. 7. Action of the court upon commissioners report.
Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section,
or even before the expiration of such period but after the interested parties have filed
their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may,
upon hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for
cause shown, recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or
set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or accept the report in part and
reject it in part; and may make such order and render such judgment as shall
effectuate a fair and just partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or sold
as above provided, between the several owners thereof.
Sec. 8. Accounting for rent and profits in action for partition.
In an action for partition in accordance with this Rule, a party shall recover from
another his just share of rents and profits received by such other party from the real
estate in question, and the judgment shall include an allowance for such rents and
profits.
Sec. 9. Power of guardian in such proceedings.
The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or person judicially declared to be
incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of
his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the partition of real estate, which the
minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in partition proceedings
if he were of age or competent.
Sec. 10. Costs and expenses to be taxed and collected.
The court shall equitably tax and apportion between or among the parties the costs
and expenses which accrue in the action, including the compensation of the
commissioners, having regard to the interests of the parties, and execution may issue
therefor as in other cases.
Sec. 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds.
If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and
bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to
each party, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in
severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him. If the whole property is
assigned to one of the parties upon his paying to the others the sum or sums ordered
by the court, the judgment shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment
of the real estate to the party making the payment, and the effect of the judgment shall
be to vest in the party making the payment the whole of the real estate free from any
interest on the part of the other parties to the action. If the property is sold and the sale
confirmed by the court, the judgment shall state the name of the purchaser or
purchasers and a definite description of the parcels of real estate sold to each
purchaser, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the

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o
o

purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free from the claims of any
of the parties to the action. A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be
recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and
the expenses of such recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action.
Sec. 12. Neither paramount rights nor amicable partition affected by this Rule.
Nothing in this Rule contained shall be construed so as to prejudice, defeat, or destroy
the right or title of any person claiming the real estate involved by title under any other
person, or by title paramount to the title of the parties among whom the partition may
have been made; nor so as to restrict or prevent persons holding real estate jointly or
in common from making an amicable partition thereof by agreement and suitable
instruments of conveyance without recourse to an action.

Sec. 13. Partition of personal property.

The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates composed of personal
property, or of both real and personal property, in so far as the same may be
applicable.

Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land in Liloan, Cebu.

The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho. Upon their death, the property was inherited by their legal
heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents.
o Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a
public document denominated "Declaration Of Heirs And Deed Of
Confirmation Of A Previous Oral Agreement Of Partition."
o By virtue of this deed, private respondents divided the property among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners.
o Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private
respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property
whatsoever had been made between the heirs.
The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order
be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.
Respondents filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the total
assessed value of the land is P5,000 which under section 33 (3) of BP 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.
RTC: Granted MTD. Dismissed petitioners complaint. MR also denied.

ISSUE: WON the RTC Mandaue City has jurisdiction. YES.

1. RUSSEL V. VESTIL [JM]

G.R. No. 119347 | March 17, 1999
Petitioners: Eulalia Russell, Ruperto Tautho, Francisco Tautho, Susana T. Reales,
Apitacio Tautho, Danilo Tautho, Juditha Pros, Gregorio Tautho, Deodita T. Judilla,
Agripino Tautho, Felix Tautho, William Tautho, & Marilyn Perales
Respondents: Honorable Augustine A. Vestil, Adriano Tagalog, Marcelo Tautho,
Juanita Mendoza, Domingo Bantilan, Raul Bataluna & Artemio Cabatingan
Ponente: J. Kapunan
FACTS: [no summary since short case]

Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated

"Declaration Of Nullity And Partition," with the RTC Mandaue City, alleging that:

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RATIO:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by CFI.
o Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific
performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment;
also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or
conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.

The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document

denominated as "Declaration Of Heirs And Deed Of Confirmation Of Previous Oral
Partition."
o The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and
void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the
only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and

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divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who

also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property.
While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just
incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the
document above-described. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dismissing

the Case as well as the Order denying the motion for reconsideration of said Order, is
SET ASIDE.
2. RUGUIAN V. RUGUIAN [RS]
G.R. No. L-3603 | January 9, 1908 | Johnson, J.
Plaintiff-appellees: Diego Ruguian, et al.
Defendant-appellant: Roman Ruguian
*no summary; short case
FACTS:

This was an action brought in the CFI-Ilocos Norte for the partition of a certain
parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint, which
action was commenced on 01 August, 1905.

The Plaintiffs allege that they [Plaintiffs] and the Defendant [Roman] are the
heirs of Calixto Ruguian and that said land constituted a part of the estate of
Calixto Ruguian, who had died some 6 months prior to the 01 August, 1905.

Roman filed a general denial, together with a special defense, in which he

alleged that he was the owner of the said land and had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the same for a period of about 40 years.

LC After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the
lower court ordered a partition of the property in accordance with the prayer of
the plaintiffs petition. From this decision the defendant appealed.
ISSUES
1. The court erred in allowing the action brought by the plaintiffs. YES.
2. The court erred in finding that the property in question is a part of the estate
of the deceased Calixto Ruguian. YES.
3. The court erred in considering the plaintiff's claim as proven, and not the
allegation on which the defendant bases his argument. YES.
HELD: Lower court decision is reversed, without any finding as to costs.
RATIO:

From the record it appears that the said Diego, Felipa, and Valeriana
Ruguian, plaintiffs, and the said Roman Ruguian were brothers and sisters,
and that Faustina and Antonio were children of two other deceased brothers

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[i.e., Faustina/Antonio niece/nephew of plaintiffs/defendant], all of which

brothers were the children of one Calixto Ruguian.
The plaintiffs claim that the land in question was a part of the estate of their
deceased father, Calixto.
Roman claims that his father had deeded the land to him nearly 40 years
before the latter's death.
o He presents no document to sustain his contention.
o There is a preponderance of evidence, however, showing that he
had been in possession of the land for a period of about 30 [yup]
years.
o Evidence also shows that if the land was deeded at all to Roman, it
must have been deeded by Calixto and Mariano Ruguian [first
appears here], the latter 2 being brothers.
o There being no documentary evidence, however, to support
Romans contention of that the land in question had been deeded to
him, SC is unable to find as a fact that the said land had actually
been conveyed to him.
rd
o And it appearing from the evidence that a 3 person, Mariano
Ruguian, had an interest in the land in question, and he not being
made a party to this suit, SC holds, for this reason, that a partition of
the land in question can not be granted.
Garcia de Lara vs. Gonzalez de Lara An action will not lie for the
partition of an undivided interest in the land without the joinder of all coowners. [thats it for this case]
Therefore, for the reason that the evidence shows that all of the parties
interested in the land in question are not parties to the suit, the lower courts
decision is reversed.

3. MIRANDA V. MIRANDA [RT]

MIRANDA v. CA
G.R. No. L-33007 June 18, 1976
Petitioner: VICENTE MIRANDA, Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Hilarion
Dydongco
Respondents: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR.,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, DY CHUN, DY SUAT HONG,
DY LEE, DY SEKO, TAN HO NOLASCO DYCOTHAY (deceased), substituted by
JOSE KOO ENG LIN DY, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of NOLASCO
DYCOTHAY, "AGUSAN COMMERCIAL", "EAST MINDANAO LUMBER CO" "HIAP
BEE", and "EAST MINDANAO LUMBER CO., INC."
SUMMARY
In the settlement of the intestate estate of Hilarion Dydongco, deceased, (a Philippine
resident who died in China sometime in 1941) petitioner Vicente Miranda was
appointed as administrator. In 1962, petitioner as such administrator filed Civil Case
No. R-7793 in the same Cebu court of first instance against the private respondents (or
their predecessors) for recovery of properties of the decedent alleged to have been
fraudulently and in bad faith and in breach of their fiduciary trust, concealed,
appropriated and converted as their own by respondents. Hon. Jose M. Mendoza (as

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presiding judge in whose court the intestate proceedings for settlement of the
decedent's estate were likewise pending) rendered a sixty-nine page decision on July
26, 1965 finding that most of petitioner- administrator's allegations had been duly
proven and sentenced respondents (as defendants) to deliver to petitioneradministrator "all properties found by the court to belong to the estate," "to render full,
accurate and correct accounting of all the fuits and proceeds of (such) properties"
during their period of possession ("from 1935 until the present date") and to pay
P60,000 exemplary damages to the two heiresses found to have been defrauded and
P30,000 attorney's fees and costs. Respondents then filed on December 21, 1965 a
petition with this Court for the issuance of writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
to annul Judge Mendoza's orders disallowing their appeal with mandatory injunction to
give due course to their appeal and this Court meanwhile enjoined the enforcement
and execution of the challenged orders. The case was docketed as Dy Chun et al. vs.
Mendoza. This Court ruled that "(A)lthough declaring that most of the properties
involved in the litigation belong to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco, the decision of
respondent Judge, dated July 30, 1965, moreover, required petitioners herein to
render a full, accurate and complete accounting of all the fuits and proceeds' of said
properties. The case was remanded to the Cebu court of first instance as the court of
origin for the rendition of "a full, accurate and complete of all the fruits and
proceeds" of the properties declared in Judge Mendoza's July 26, 1965 decision to
belong to the decedent's estate, i.e. for "the adjudications necessary for
the completion of said relief(as granted in the decision)", to use the very language of
this Court in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, supra. Respondent Judge Tantuico
altered and changed his predecessor Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26,
1965 in his amended decision of October 4, 1969 by excluding certain valuable
properties from the estate of the decedent and absolving certain respondents from the
obligation of turning over the ownership and the possession to petitioner,
reversing Judge Mendoza's judgment holding respondent Dy Suat Hong to be a builder
in bad faith, and reducing the P60,000 exemplary damages to P30,000..
The decisive issue at bar, then, is whether respondent appellate court correctly read
and applied or not this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza. NO, it did
not.
The Court holds that respondent appellate court misread and misapplied this Court's
1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza and erred in holding that respondent Judge
Tantuico could change, alter and amend his predecessor's decision on the merits for
recovery of properties with accounting as if it were a mere interlocutory order or
process. Hence, the only remaining or residual authority of respondent judge in the
premises was not to review, revise or reverse Judge Mendoza's original decision of
July 26, 1965 (by submitting his own appreciation of the evidence and impression of
the witnesses' credibility or lack thereof from a mere reading of the record for that of
Judge Mendoza who tried the case and saw and heard the witnesses first hand) but to
enforce, receive and act on the accounting as ordered in the decision for the
completion of the relief therein granted.
PARTITION PART
Fuentebella adopted instead the opposite line of conflicting decisions mostly in
partition proceedings and exemplified by Ron vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 928 that an order for
partition of real property is not final and appealable until after the actual partition of the
property as reported by the court-appointed commissioners and approved by the court
in its judgment accepting the report. It must be especially noted that such rule

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governing partitions is now so expressly provided and spelled out in Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court, with special reference to sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11, to wit, that there
must first be a preliminary order for partition of the real estate (section 2) and where
the parties co-owners cannot agree, the court-appointed commissioners make a plan
of actual partition which must first be passed upon and accepted by the trial court and
embodied in a judgment to be rendered by it (sections 6 and 11). In partition cases, it
must be further borne in mind that Rule 69, section 1 refers to "a person having
the right to compel the partition of real estate", so that the general rule of partition that
an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated will
not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property
and denies the adverse party's right to any partition, as was the ruling in Villanueva vs.
Capistrano and Africa vs. Africa, supra, Fuentebella's express reversal of these cases
must likewise be deemed now also abandoned in view of the Court's expressed
preference for the rationale of the Heacock case.
FACTS
In the settlement of the intestate estate of Hilarion Dydongco, deceased, (a
Philippine resident who died in China sometime in 1941) petitioner Vicente Miranda
was appointed as administrator.
In 1962, petitioner as such administrator filed Civil Case No. R-7793 in the same
Cebu court of first instance against the private respondents (or their predecessors)
for recovery of properties of the decedent alleged to have been fraudulently and in
bad faith and in breach of their fiduciary trust, concealed, appropriated and
converted as their own by respondents.
The suit for recovery had been filed by petitioner-administrator after the principal
respondents pursuant to Rule 88, section 6 had been cited by the intestate court to
appear and to be examined as to documents, papers, properties, funds and other
valuables deposited and left in trust with them by the decedent before his death.
In his complaint for recovery, petitioner-administrator alleged that
o "prior to and at the time of his death in China sometime in 1941, Hilarion
Dydongco, who resided in the Philippines since the beginning of the century, had,
in Butuan, Agusan and Cebu City, well-developed and established business and
commercial enterprises with substantial bank deposits and about 127 parcels of
land or property;
o that Hilarion Dydongco went to China, in 1934, and, thereafter, became seriously
ill;
o that, at that time, his children, Dy Chun and Dy Suat Hong (both defendants in
said case R-7793) as well as Dy Sick Lee (who died subsequently and is not a
defendant in case No. R-7793) and his protegees Dy Bee and Dy Seko were
working as his Manager and/or employees in the aforementioned business
establishments;
o that taking advantage of the absence and bad condition of the health of Hilarion
Dydongco, particularly of his subsequent death, the defendants therein took over
said business, including its assets, goods, merchandise, chattels, machinery,
stock-in-trade, cash on hand and in banks, amounts receivable and other
properties of the deceased, as well as his store known as "Dydongco Store," and
its branches, and organized first, a fake partnership with the business name of
"Agusan Commercial Company," and then the East Mindanao Lumber Co., which

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operated and did business, with the capital, assets, stock-in-trade, merchandise,
funds and other property of said deceased;
o that with funds belonging to the latter, the defendants therein moreover purchased
several parcels of land, on one of which a 20-door apartment building was
constructed, with funds of the same nature, and let to Chinese tenants and other
lessees;
o that the defendants therein had received and are receiving the rentals, earnings
and profits derived from said business and property of the deceased;
o and that said defendants hold, manage and operate the aforementioned business,
properties and income in trust for the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco but
have not rendered any accounting thereof."
Petitioner-administrator prayed that "judgment be rendered declaring that said
business, assets, income and other property, are in the possession and under the
management and control of said defendants as mere trustees thereof, and
sentencing them to turnover and deliver the same to him, as Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco as well as to render accounts and to execute
the corresponding deeds of conveyance, in addition to paying damages and the
costs."
(Remember this decision)After a protracted trial, Hon. Jose M. Mendoza (as
presiding judge in whose court the intestate proceedings for settlement of the
decedent's estate were likewise pending) rendered a sixty-nine page decision
on July 26, 1965 finding that most of petitioner- administrator's allegations had been
duly proven and sentenced respondents (as defendants) to deliver to petitioneradministrator "all properties found by the court to belong to the estate," "to render
full, accurate and correct accounting of all the fuits and proceeds of (such)
properties" during their period of possession ("from 1935 until the present date") and
to pay P60,000 exemplary damages to the two heiresses found to have been
defrauded and P30,000 attorney's fees and costs.
Respondents (as defendants) took steps to perfect their appeal from Judge
Mendoza's adverse decision within the reglementary thirty-day period. After
submitting their record on appeal, however, they filed a motion for reconsideration
and new trial which was heard and denied per Judge Mendoza's order of October
18, 1965, Respondents thereafter sought to revive their record on appeal and submit
additional pages thereof but Judge Mendoza held that their filing of their motion for
reconsideration was an abandonment of their proposed earlier appeal and that his
decision had become final and executory.
Dy Chun et al vs. Mendoza
Reconsideration having been denied, herein respondents then filed on December 21,
1965 a petition with this Court for the issuance of writ of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to annul Judge Mendoza's orders disallowing their appeal with mandatory
injunction to give due course to their appeal and this Court meanwhile enjoined the
enforcement and execution of the challenged orders. The case was docketed as Dy
Chun et al. vs. Mendoza.
The Court in its decision of October 4, 1968 in the said case of Dy Chun vs.
Mendoza aborted the question of timeliness of respondents' proposed appeal,
remarking that "(T)he petition herein and the answer thereto filed by respondents
discuss rather extensively the question whether or not petitioners had perfected their

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appeal in the lower court within the reglementary period. We find it, however,
unnecessary to pass upon said question, for the reason presently to be stated."
This Court therein instead ruled that "(A)lthough declaring that most of the
properties involved in the litigation belong to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco,
the decision of respondent Judge, dated July 30, 1965, moreover, required
petitioners herein to render a full, accurate and complete accounting of all the
fuits and proceeds' of said properties. After analyzing previous rulings thereon,
this Court declared, in Fuentebella v. Carrascoso that a decision of such nature
is interlocutory in character, because it does not dispose of the action in its entirety
and leaves something to be done to complete the relief sought and that, accordingly,
it is not appealable, until after the adjudications necessity the completion of said
relief shall have been made. Indeed, the very counsel for petitioners herein now
accept this view and concede that petitioners' appeal had been taken prematurely."
Hence, this Court therein ordered and adjudged that "this case should be as it is
hereby dismissed and the writ prayed for with costs against petitioners herein. The
writ of preliminary injuction issued in this case on January 1 , 1966, is,
accordingly, dissolved."
It should be noted that this Court's judgment of October 4, 1968 in Dy Chun vs.
Mendoza in dismissing herein respondents' petition and denying the writ of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus prayed for with costs against them (as petitioners therein)
on the premise that their appeal should be taken after the rendition of the
accounting of all fruits and proceeds of the properties adjudged in Judge
Mendoza's decision of July 26, 1965 to belong to the decedent's estate,
nevertheless the writ of preliminary injunction issued earlier on January 18,
1966 enjoining the enforcement and execution of Judge Mendoza's said
decision.
Remanded to court of origin
The case was remanded to the Cebu court of first instance as the court of
origin for the rendition of "a full, accurate and complete of all the fruits and
proceeds" of the properties declared in Judge Mendoza's July 26, 1965
decision to belong to the decedent's estate, i.e. for "the adjudications
necessary for the completion of said relief(as granted in the decision)", to use
the very language of this Court in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, supra.
This time around, however, Judge Mendoza (who had since been promoted as
associate justice of the Court of Appeals and thereafter retired upon reaching the
age of seventy) no longer presided the lower court, having been succeeded by
respondent Judge Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. as presiding judge of the lower court.
Back in the court of origin in 1969 after seven years (the case was first filed in 1962),
the parties filed several motions following this Court's October 4, 1968 decision in Dy
Chun vs. Mendoza.
Respondent Judge Tantuico altered and changed his predecessor Judge Mendoza's
original decision of July 26, 1965 in his amended decision of October 4, 1969
by excluding certain valuable properties from the estate of the decedent and
absolving certain respondents from the obligation of turning over the ownership and
the possession to petitioner, reversing Judge Mendoza's judgment holding
respondent Dy Suat Hong to be a builder in bad faith, and reducing the P60,000
exemplary damages to P30,000..

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Certiorari filed by petitioner

Petitioner assailed in an action for certiorari, respondent judge's authority to issue
such amended decision substantially changing his predecessor's original decision
(which merely awaited the rendition of accounting for completion of the relief therein
adjudicated of declaring the properties in possession of respondents to belong to the
decedent's estate).
Respondent appellate court in its decision correctly if not entirely accurately depicted
the parties' conflicting stands thus: "The petitioner's stand ... is that the first
decision that of Judge Mendoza, is not interlocutory in nature, but is one which is
final in character and which left nothing to be done except for the requisite matter
of accounting. ... On the other hand, the respondents herein maintain that the
original decision of the former presiding judge is merely interlocutory in nature, as
there remains something also to be done, citing therein for main support of this
contention, the decision . . . of the Supreme Court ... in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza."
Respondent appellate court, relying on Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, found for
respondents, holding that "(I)n view of this ruling of the Supreme Court, expressly
declaring that the decision in question of former Judge Jose M. Mendoza is
merely interlocutory in character, and that the same is not appealable yet the
issuance therefore of the controversial amended decision of the now respondent
Judge Francisco Tantuico, Jr. could hardly be said to have been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, much less, without or in excess of jurisdiction.
In its split resolution denying reconsideration, with Justice Andres Reyes dissenting,
respondent appellate court reiterated that as Judge Mendoza's original decision of
July 26, 1965 was "still interlocutory," respondent Judge Tantuico had authority to
change, alter or amend the decision as he did over four year later per his amended
decision of October 4, 1969, citing a court's "inherent power to amend and control
its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice."
ISSUE:
The decisive issue at bar, then, is whether respondent appellate court correctly read
and applied or not this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza. NO, it did
not.
RATIO:
The Court holds that respondent appellate court misread and misapplied this Court's
1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza and erred in holding that respondent Judge
Tantuico could change, alter and amend his predecessor's decision on the merits for
recovery of properties with accounting as if it were a mere interlocutory order or
process, when all this Court held (applying Fuentebella, supra) was that the decision
was "not appealable" until after the accounting also ordered was rendered and
approved so as to complete the relief granted whereafter respondents' "premature
appeal" could then be given due course from both aspects of the decision for
recovery of properties and accounting of the fruits.
Hence, the only remaining or residual authority of respondent judge in the premises
was not to review, revise or reverse Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26,
1965 (by submitting his own appreciation of the evidence and impression of the
witnesses' credibility or lack thereof from a mere reading of the record for that of

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Judge Mendoza who tried the case and saw and heard the witnesses first hand) but
to enforce, receive and act on the accounting as ordered in the decision for the
completion of the relief therein granted.
The Court's holding is founded and based on the controlling case of Dy Chun vs.
Mendoza, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and their mandate that they
"be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding", the very concept of final and definitive judgments as against
mere interlocutory orders, and imperative considerations of public policy, stability of
judgments, comity of judges of the same or coordinate courts, and of an impersonal
and orderly administration of justice and system of adjudication of court litigation, as
shall presently be expounded.
This Court in thus remanding the case for the rendition of the accounting "for the
completion of said relief" awarded in Judge Mendoza's judgment on the merits could
not conceivably be misconstrued, as did appellate court, to give respondent judge or
whoever presides the lower court carte blanche to exercise reviewing if not
supervisory authority over the judicial determination and findings on the merits of his
predecessor and to "promulgate another decision" in lieu thereof as if Judge
Mendoza's basic decision on the merits were a mereinterlocutory order dealing with
postponements, extensions, temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions,
or deferring action on, or denying, motions to dismiss or provisional remedies
applied for, instead of a definitive determination, of the main dispute between the
parties.
Hence, it was always been taken for granted from the lead case of Fuentebella (and
all other cases adhering to it) assuming its applicability here, that the remand of the
case to the trial court for rendition of the accounting of the fruits of the properties
adjudged in favor of the prevailing party in order to complete the relief and have a
single appeal including the accounts was for no other purpose than to render the
accounting and by no means tochange, alter, revise or reverse the basic judgment
which ordered the accounting in the first place.
In the case at bar, this Court in remanding the case for the rendition of the
accounting "for the completion of said relief' awarded in Judge Mendoza's judgment
further ordered the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it had granted against
enforcement and execution of his orders declaring his judgment final and executory.
This signified that the trial court was left free under Rule 39, section 2 to order
execution of his judgment on the merits for recovery of the properties pending
appeal.
The Court holds that there is no precedent nor justification for the course of action
sustained by respondent appellate court, since a judge who succeeds another as
presiding judge does not assume reviewing and appellate authority over his
predecessor's judgment on the merits including the credibility of the witnesses
(which is thesubject of an appeal to the appellate courts but has been remanded
merely to complete the relief of accounting so that such accounting may be threshed
out together with the principal relief of recovery in a single appeal) and it may be
added that the appellate courts on appeal are called upon to review and pass upon a
single decision and not two decisions (the original and the amended).
There is yet another more important consideration anchored on public policy. The
cause of an impersonal and orderly administration of justice and system of

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adjudication of court litigation would be greatly if not irreparably set back if parties
are subjected to the spectacle of one judge's judgment being radically altered, if not
reversed, by his successor after four years without any new trial or evidence simply
because the successor reads the record in another light than his predecessor who
tried the case and chooses to believe witnesses disbelieved by his predecessor.
The Court's reversal of respondent Court of Appeals' decision which upheld
respondent judge's amended decision changing and amending substantially his
predecessor's judgment on the merits for recovery of properties with accounting on the
main ground, inter alia, that this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza was
misread and misapplied, since the only remaining or residual authority of respondent
judge was to enforce, consider and act on the accounting ordered in the original
decision for the completion of the relief therein granted before considering private
respondents' proposed appeal, suffices to dispose of the case at bar itself.
The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench and bar to
now declare as is clearly indicated from the compelling reasons and
considerations hereinabove stated:
o that the Court considers the better rule to be that stated in H.E. Heacock Co.
vs. American Trading Co. , to wit, that where the primary purpose of a case is to
ascertain and determine who between plaintiff and defendant is the true
owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed property, "the judgment ...
rendered by the lower court [is] a judgment on the merits as to those questions,
and (that) the order of the court for an accounting was based upon, and
is incidental to the judgment on the merits. That is to say, that the judgment ... (is)
a final judgment ...; that in this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to
the judgment; that an appeal lies from the rendition of the judgment as rendered
..." (as is widely held by a great number of judges and members of the bar, as
shown by the cases so decided and filed and still pending with the Court) for the
fundamental reasons therein stated that "this is more in harmony with
the administration of justice and the spirit and intent of the [Rules]. If on appeal the
judgment of the lower court is affirmed, it would not in the least work an injustice to
any of the legal rights of [appellee]. On the other hand, if for any reason this court
should reverse the judgment of the lower court, the accounting would be a waste
of time and money, and might work a material injury to the [appellant]; and
o that accordingly, the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which
expressly reversed the Heacock case and a line of similar decisions and ruled that
such a decision for recovery of property with accounting "is not final but
merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable" and subsequent cases
adhering to the same must be now in turn be abandoned and set aside.
PARTITION PART SA WAKAS!
Fuentebella adopted instead the opposite line of conflicting decisions mostly in
partition proceedings and exemplified by Ron vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 928 that
an order for partition of real property is not final and appealable until after
the actual partition of the property as reported by the court-appointed
commissioners and approved by the court in its judgment accepting the
report.
It must be especially noted that such rule governing partitions is now
so expressly provided and spelled out in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, with special
reference to sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11, to wit, that there must first be a preliminary

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order for partition of the real estate (section 2) and where the parties co-owners
cannot agree, the court-appointed commissioners make a plan of actual partition
which must first be passed upon and accepted by the trial court and embodied in
a judgment to be rendered by it (sections 6 and 11).
In partition cases, it must be further borne in mind that Rule 69, section 1 refers to "a
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate", so that the general rule
of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are
terminated will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole
property and denies the adverse party's right to any partition, as was the ruling
in Villanueva vs. Capistrano and Africa vs. Africa, supra, Fuentebella's express
reversal of these cases must likewise be deemed now also abandoned in view of the
Court's expressed preference for the rationale of the Heacock case.
The Court's considered opinion is that imperative considerations of public policy and
of sound practice in the courts and adherence to the constitutional mandate of
simplified, just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action call for
considering such judgments for recovery of property with accounting as final
judgments which are duly appealable (and would therefore become final
and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period) with the accounting as
a mere incident of the judgment to be rendered during the course of the appeal as
provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be implemented at the execution stage upon
final affirmance on appeal of the judgment (as in Court of Industrial Relations unfair
labor practice cases ordering reinstatement of the worker with accounting,
computation and payment of his backwages less earnings elsewhere during his layoff) and that the only reason given in Fuentebella for the contrary ruling, viz, "the
general harm that would follow from throwing the door open to multiplicity of appeals
in a single case" is of lesser import and consequence.
4. MUNICIPALITY OF BIAN V. GARCIA [MB]
Petitioner: Municipality of Bian
Respondents: Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Bian,
Laguna (Branch XXXIV, Region IV), and Erlinda Francisco
G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989
Narvasa, J:
SUMMARY:
[Same case under Rule 67 on Expropriation but see Ratio for discussion]
Municipality of Bian filed for the expropriation of 11 parcels of land owned by several
defendants, one of which was Francisco. In upholding the right of the plaintiff to file an
appeal within the 30 days (not 15 days), the SC discussed the similarity of the
procedures of expropriation and partition:
1. The special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court also has 2 stages: (1) determination of whether or not a coownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, (2) when the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition.
2. Jurisprudence holds that:

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

3.

A decision or order of partition is not final because it leaves

something more to be done in the trial court for the complete
disposition of the case.

A judgement for recovery of property with account is not final, but

merely interlocutory and hence not appealable until the accounting is
made and passed upon. The Court's adjudication on the accounting
is without doubt a final one, for it would finally terminate the
proceedings thereon and leave nothing more to be done by the
Court on the merits of the issue. Any party feeling aggrieved by that
ultimate action of the Court on the accounting may seek reversal or
modification thereof by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than
two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of
condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the
ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general.

FACTS:

The expropriation suit was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of

Bian, Laguna filed in the RTC. The complaint named as defendants the
owners of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Bian.
o The land sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new
site of a modern public market and the acquisition was authorized by
a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.

One of the defendants, Francisco filed a MTD. Her motion was filed pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 67.

Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff

Municipality.

Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial. She alleged she had the special
defense of "a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing
approved Locational Clearance from the HSRC.

Court granted the motion. Judge issued order dismissing the complaint "as
against defendant FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ of Possessions as
to "exclude therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant .. and her
property ..."

The Municipality filed a MR.

Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution and/or Finality of Order,"

contending that the Order had become "final and executory for failure of the
Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the
reglementary period," i.e "fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order .. appealed from.

The Municipality contended that "multiple appeals are allowed by law" in

actions of eminent domain, and hence the period of appeal is thirty (30), not
fifteen (15) days.
ISSUES: (No partition issue. See Ratio for discussion.)
1.

176

Whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court is a case "wherein multiple appeals are allowed, 1 as regards which

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

2.

3.

'the period of appeal shall be thirty [30] days, instead of fifteen (15) days. --YES. 30 days apply.
Whether or not the Trial Court may treat the motion to dismiss" filed by one of
the defendants in the action of eminent domain as a "motion to dismiss"
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, reverse the sequence of trial in order
and hear and determine said motion to dismiss, and thereafter dismiss the
expropriation suit as against the movant. --- NO, her motion to dismiss" was
filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 and was thus actually a pleading, taking
the place of an answer in an ordinary civil action; it was not an ordinary
motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the
contemplation of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Whether or not a "locational clearance issued by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission relative to use of land is a bar to an expropriation suit
involving that land. --- NO.

HELD:

The challenged Order issued by His Honor is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE

The case is remanded to the Trial Court for the reception of the evidence of
the plaintiff Municipality of Bian as against defendant Erlinda Francisco, and
for subsequent proceedings and judgment in accordance with the Rules of
Court and the law.
RATIO:
1. There are 2 stages in every action of expropriation. The second phase of the
eminent domain action is concerned with the determination of the just compensation. A
similar two-phase feature is found in the special civil action of partition and
accounting under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition
is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally prescribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
o This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to
have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited.
o It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a coownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and
an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from
the real estate in question is in order.
o In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either
case i.e. either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting
is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby.

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable
to agree upon the partition" directed by the court.
o In that event partition shall be done for the parties by the Court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

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This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have
been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for
the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share
in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an order
is, to be sure, final and appealable.

2. This Court has settled the question of the finality and appealability of a
decision or order decreeing partition or recovery of property and/or accounting.

Miranda v. CA doctrine --- a decision or order of partition is not final because

it leaves something more to be done in the trial court for the complete
disposition of the case, i.e, the appointment of commissioners, the
proceedings for the determination by said commissioners of just
compensation, the submission of their reports, and hearing thereon, and the
approval of the partition.

Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso --- a judgement for recovery of property with

account is not final, but merely interlocutory and hence not appealable until
the accounting is made and passed upon. As pointed out in Miranda,
imperative considerations of public policy, of sound practice and adherence to
the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action require that judgments for recovery (or partition)
of property with accounting be considered as final judgments, duly
appealable. This, notwithstanding that further proceedings will still have to be
rendered by the party required to do so, it will be ventilated and discussed by
the parties, and will eventually be passed upon by the Court. It is of course
entirely possible that the Court disposition may not sit well with either the
party in whose favor the accounting is made, or the party rendering it. In
either case, the Court's adjudication on the accounting is without doubt a final
one, for it would finally terminate the proceedings thereon and leave nothing
more to be done by the Court on the merits of the issue. And it goes without
saying that any party feeling aggrieved by that ultimate action of the Court on
the accounting may seek reversal or modification thereof by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court.

The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for
partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for
appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from notice
of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions
in general.

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Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

RULE 70: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

1. QUINAGORAN v. CA [LL]
G.R. NO. 155179 | August 24, 2007

Petitioner: VICTORINO QUINAGORAN

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA CRUZ
Summary: The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and
Damages against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC Cagayan. They alleged that
they are the co-owners of a parcel of land which they inherited from the late Juan dela
Cruz.
Quinagoran started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the
property, by tolerance of the heirs. The heirs asked petitioner to remove the house as
they planned to construct a commercial building on the property but petitioner refused,
claiming ownership over the lot. Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under RA No. 7691, which expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
which does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the lot which he owns
adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730, the assessed
value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount. He
likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege
the assessed value of the property involved. Court ruled that jurisdiction lies in the
MTC. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies
with the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true.
Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve possession of real property. However, if the assessed value of
the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and
P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over
actions to recover possession of real property. In the case, Quinagoran maintains that
there should be such an allegation of the assessed value of the real property to
determine jurisdiction. However, nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of
the subject property ever mentioned. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action.
FACTS:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz (respondents),
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with
Compensation and Damages against Victorino Quinagoran (petitioner) before
the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan.

They alleged that they are the co-owners of a parcel of land containing
13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the
late Juan dela Cruz; that in the mid-70s, petitioner started occupying a house
on the north-west portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of
respondents; that in 1993, they asked petitioner to remove the house as they
planned to construct a commercial building on the property; that petitioner

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refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they suffered damages for
their failure to use the same.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all
civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the
346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an
assessed value of P1,730.00, the assessed value of the lot under controversy
would not be more than the said amount.
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in an Order: The present
action on the basis of the allegation of the complaint partakes of the nature of
action publicciana and jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial
Court, regardless of the value of the property. This is so because in
paragraph 8 of the complaint, it is alleged that the plaintiff demanded from the
defendant the removal of the house occupied by the defendant and the
possession of which is "Only due to Tolerance of herein plaintiffs".
Petitioner then went to the CA seeking the annulment of the Orders of the
RTC. CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing petitioner's action:
o It is settled that when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. In the latter
instances, jurisdiction pertains to the Regional Trial Court.
o As another legal recourse from a simple ejectment case governed by
the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, an accion publiciana is
the plenary action to recover the right of possession when
dispossession has lasted more than one year or when dispossession
was effected by means other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court.
o Where there is no allegation that there was denial of possession
through any of the methods stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, or where there is no lease contract between the parties, the
proper remedy is the plenary action of recovery of possession.
Necessarily, the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. Thus, we find that the private respondents [heirs of dela
Cruz] availed of the proper remedy when they filed the action before
the court a quo.
Petitioner now comes before this Court claiming that under R.A. No. 7691 the
jurisdiction of the MTC, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), and Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) was expanded to include exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions when the assessed value of the property does not exceed
P20,000.00 outside Metro Manila and P50,000.00 within Metro Manila.
o He likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the
complaint should allege the assessed value of the property involved.
In this case, the complaint does not allege that the assessed value
of the land in question is more than P20,000.00. There was also no
tax declaration attached to the complaint to show the assessed

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

value of the property. Respondents therefore failed to allege that the

RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case.
o The tax declaration covering Lot No. 1807 owned by respondents
and where the herein disputed property is purportedly part -- a copy
of which petitioner submitted to the CA -- also shows that the value
of the property is only P551.00.
Respondents contend that: the petition is without factual and legal bases;
nowhere in the body of their complaint before the RTC does it state that the
assessed value of the property is below P20,000.00; the contention of
petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before the RTC that the assessed value of
the disputed lot is below P20,000.00 is based on the assessed value of an
adjacent property and no documentary proof was shown to support the said
allegation; the tax declaration which petitioner presented, together with his
Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on the basis of which he claims that
the disputed property's assessed value is only P551.00, should also not be
given credence as the said tax declaration reflects the amount of P56,100.00
for the entire property.

ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved? NO
RATIO:
The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession or
accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property -- no longer holds true.

As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties

the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila;
and P50,000.00, if within.

Republic Act No. 7691 which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and which
was already in effect when respondents filed their complaint with the RTC on
October 27, 1994, expressly provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. --- Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of , real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,

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where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages or whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.
The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of
real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro
Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
Atuel v. Valdez: Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of
general jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive
original jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve possession of real
property." However, if the assessed value of the real property involved
does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of
Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over
actions to recover possession of real property.

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege
the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.

This is because the nature of the action and which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations
of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in
effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled
to some or all of the claims asserted therein.

In this case, the complaint denominated as "Recovery of Portion of

Registered Land with Compensation and Damages, nowhere in said
complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned.
There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents.

Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.

Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or
even upon agreement, waiver or acquiescence of the parties. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter
thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or
upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant.

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the

assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying
the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and
void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals's Decision in
CA-GR SP No. 60443 dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 28, 2002,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Courts Orders dated November

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

11, 1999 and May 11, 2000, and all proceedings therein are declared NULL and VOID.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 240-T is dismissed without prejudice.
2. HILARIO V. CA [JM]
G.R. No. 121865 | August 7, 1996
Doctrine: In forcible entry and unlawful detainer suits, the jurisdiction of the courts of
the first level is not lost or affected by the interjection in said cases of an issue
concerning the ownership of the real property involved.

Petitioners: Antonia Hilario and/or Heirs Of Cesar Hilario

Respondents: Court Of Appeals, Rosauro Palileo & Josefina Anastacio
Ponente: J. Regalado
Summary
Sps. Hilario purchased a house and lot from the Sps. Palileo under a deed of sale.
Another document was executed on the same day granting Sps. Palileo the right to
repurchase within 1 year. The Hilarios further allowed them to remain in possession of
the property on the verbal understanding that the Palileos would vacate the same after
2 years from the date of sale. Sps. Palileo did not comply even after demands. So a
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by the Hilarios with the MTC. On the other
hand, the Palileos alleged that the deed of sale was in fact a deed of mortgage and
that the obligation secured by such mortgage had already been extinguished. Thus,
they remained owners and their continued physical possession of the property bolsters
the assertion it was only a mortgage contract. The Palileos also questioned the MTCs
jurisdiction.
The SC held that the MTC was not deprived of jurisdiction. Section 33(2) of BP 129
provides that the MTC has the exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer and in such cases where the defendant raises the question
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only
to determine the issue of possession. Therefore, as the law now stands, inferior courts
retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be
resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject to the same
caveat that the issue posed as to ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole
purpose of determining the issue of possession. An adjudication made therein
regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and,
therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title
to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the
physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and
not possession de jure.
FACTS:

An ejectment suit filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, alleges
that the spouses Cesar Hilario (now deceased) and Antonia Hilario purchased a
house and lot in Poblacion, Guiguinto, Bulacan from the spouses Rosauro Palileo
and Josefina Anastacio under a deed of sale.

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A separate document, executed on the same day by the parties, granted the
vendors the right to repurchase the property within one year from said date.
o The Hilarios further allowed Sps. Palileo to remain in possession of the
premises on the verbal understanding that the latter would vacate the same
after 2 years from the date of the sale.
However, said period passed without them complying, even after several
demands by the Hilarios, hence a complaint for unlawful detainer was instituted.
Sps. Palileo, in their Answer alleged that the purported deed of sale between them
and the Hilarios was in fact a deed of mortgage and that their corresponding
obligation had been extinguished by payment of the sum of P165,000.
o They thus remained as owners and their continued physical possession of the
premises bolsters their assertion that it was only a mortgage contract.
o They likewise impugned the jurisdiction of the inferior court, although no
substantial argument was advanced.
MuTC: Rejected the contentions of Sps. Palileo and affirming its jurisdiction over
the case.
o It ruled that the deed of conveyance in dispute was basically a deed of sale
which vested in the Hilarios the right of ownership and, consequently, of
possession.
RTC of Malolos Bulacan: Affirmed.
CA: reversed and set aside the judgments of RTC and MuTC. Dismissed the
complaint for ejectment of the Hilarios. MR denied.

ISSUE: WON MuTC has jurisdiction in the ejectment case. YES. [my own words]
RATIO:
History of Laws [not important]

BP 129 Sec 33(2): Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases Exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in such
cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.

Interim Rules and Guidelines in the implementation of said law and, on the
Jurisdiction of inferior courts in ejectment cases Metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try
cases of forcible ontry and unlawful detainer even if the question of ownership is
raised in the pleadings and the question of possession could not be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession"

1983 Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 1 originally conferred on inferior

courts jurisdiction to try in summary proceedings cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer except where the question of ownership was involved or where
the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered exceeded P20,000.00 at
the time of the filing of the complaint, was later revised by a resolution of the Court
En Banc which took effect on November 15, 1991.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

RA 7691 on April 15, 1994, took effect and expanded the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts,
amending for the purpose the pertinent portions of BP 129. The jurisdiction of the
courts as defined in Section 33(2) of BP 129 was, however, retained by said
amendatory Act.

As the law now stands,

inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question
of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of
ownership; but this is subject to the same caveat that the issue posed as to
ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession.
o Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should
be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
o The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the
physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de
facto and not possession de jure.

SC listed the cases which should not be regarded as prejudicial to an ejectment

suit in Wilmon Auto Supply v. CA:
1) Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment
actions in the Courts of the first level do not abate the latter; and
neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals.
2) An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against
the plaintiff in the former.
3) A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the
principal issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude
nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit
where the only issue involved is the material possession or
possession de facto of the premises.
4) An action for quieting of title to property is not bar to an ejectment
suit involving the same property
5) Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment
actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease contract)/
6) An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute
sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an
ejectment suit between the same parties.
7) An action for reconveyance of property or ("accion reivindicatoria"
also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property.
8) Neither do suits for annulment or sale, or title, or document affecting
property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same
property.

However, the allegations in the complaint for ejectment should sufficiently make
out a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer; otherwise, jurisdiction would not
vest in the inferior court.
o Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the nature of the action
as pleaded in the complaint.

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In the case at bar,

the submission of Sps. Palileo could not prosper, both under the rule that the
inferior courts have the competence to resolve the issue of ownership
provisionally, and on the principle that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
in the complaint.
o The allegation in a complaint that the "plaintiff verbally asked the defendants
to remove their houses on the lot of the former but the latter refused and still
refuse to do so without just and lawful grounds" was held to be more than
sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

While they did raise the question of ownership when they asserted that the
contract of sale was in fact one of mortgage, the MuTC court could not be
divested of its jurisdiction over the case since it could very well resolve that
particular issue albeit provisionally.

Parenthetically, Sps. Palileo are not without remedy. They could still assert
ownership over the property but it should be done in the manner required by the
Rules. In fact, they did just that when they themselves initiated an action for
reconveyance involving the same property against petitioners before, be RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan.
DECISION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed judgment and resolution of
CA are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the MuTC of Guiguinto,
Bulacan and the judgment of the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan affirming said disposition of
the inferior court, are hereby REINSTATED.

3. REYES V. STA. MARIA [RS]

G.R. No. L-33213 June 29, 1979 | Teehankee, J.
Petitioners-appellants: Artemio Reyes, Hilarion Reyes [collectively, Reyeses]
Respondents-appellees: Hon. Andres Sta. Maria [Presiding Judge of CFI-BulacanBr.II], Hilaria Santos Vda. De Lopez and Pilar Santos [collectively, Santoses]
No summary; short case
FACTS

4/1/1968 Petitioners were plaintiffs in the CFI where they filed an action,
which they termed as one to quiet title to a certain residential lot in Bo. San
Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan w/ an area of 368.5 sqm. and to recover
possession thereof from respondents-defendants. Petitioners claimed:
o that they are owners pro-indiviso of the subject lot
o that through their tolerance and goodwill, thru the intervention and
entreaty of one Maximo Santos, father of the respondents, the latter
used and occupied said land free of charge, under the following
conditions: (a) that instead of paying rentals on the premises,
respondents undertook to pay the corresponding real estate taxes
on the land; and (b) that said respondents will leave and vacate the
premises anytime the plaintiffs so demand;
o that in Feb. 1968 petitioners verbally notified the respondents to
vacate the land, but the latter unreasonably refused at the same time

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

claiming ownership of the property, and alleging further that they

bought the same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo
o that to quiet title over this land, petitioners have been compelled to
institute present action
o that respondents thru their acts stated above have therefore
maliciously and unlawfully detained the land of plaintiffs since
February, 1968; and
o that for the unlawful occupation of the land, an estimate of 50 Pesos
monthly rental is claimed as reasonable damages suffered by
petitioners since February, 1968.
Respondents filed a MTD on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction
over the nature of the action or suit" and that the action embodied in
petitioners' complaint "is actually one for ejectment or unlawful detainer.
CFI granted the MTD for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petitioner for
review.

ISSUE: WN the action is an accion publiciana. YES for petitioners.

HELD: CFIs order of dismissal is set aside; case remanded to the CFI for an
expeditious trial.
RATIO

CFI was in error in issuing its dismissal order on its mistaken notion "that the
allegations of facts are only constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer"
since the complaint shows on its face that respondents' refusal to deliver the
possession of the property was due to their adverse claim of ownership of the
same property and their counter-allegation that they had bought the same
from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo, and, therefore, petitioners' action was
clearly one for recovery of their right to possess the property
(possession de jure) as well as to be declared the owners thereof as
against the contrary claim of respondents.

[IMPORTANT] Chief Justice Moran: "There are three kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession of real property, namely, (1) the summary action for
forcible entry or detainer (denominated accion interdictal under the former
law of procedure, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of
physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the
peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the recovery of the right
to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of
First Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of
ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi also
brought in the Court of First Instance.

It has been said that "(T)he only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases
is the physical possession of real property; possession de facto and not
possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior possession in himself,
he may recover such possession even from the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his
favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the

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property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by

either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Petitioners' action was not merely for recovery of possession de facto.
o Their action was clearly one of accion publiciana for recovery of
possession de jure if not one of accion reivindicatoria for declaration
of their ownership of the land.
Aguilon vs. Bohol petitioners action is at least "an accion publiciana,
which action 'some Spanish mumblings from the Court, clearly falls within
the jurisdiction of the CFI and not of the Municipal Courts.
o Further, an action for recovery of possession is an urgent matter
which must be decided promptly to forestall breaches of peace,
violence or even loss of life and, therefore, the court should act
swiftly and expeditiously in cases of that nature.
Petitioners, therefore, correctly filed their accion publiciana before the lower
court as against respondents claim that they should instead have filed a
summary action for detainer in the municipal court.
o Having been fully apprised of respondents' refusal to surrender
possession and their contrary c laim of ownership of the same
property, petitioners properly filed their accion publiciana with the
CFI to avoid getting enmeshed in what would certainly have been
another jurisdictional dispute, since they could reasonably foresee
that if indeed they had filed a summary action for illegal detainer
instead in the municipal court, respondents would then have
contended, contrary to their present claim, that the municipal court is
without jurisdiction over the detainer case by virtue of their contrary
claim of ownership of the property.

4. CONSING V. JAMANDRE [RT]

G.R. No. L-27674 May 12, 1975
Plaintiffs-petitioners: SOLEDAD T. CONSING, assisted by her husband, ANTONIO
M.
CONSING
Defendant-respondent: JOSE T. JAMANDRE, personally, and as Judicial
Administrator of the Estate of Cirilo Jamandre
Summary
Consing filed in the Municipal Court of Sagay, Negros Occidental, a Complaint for
Forcible Entry and Detainer against Jamandre for taking possession of Haciendas
"Aida" and "Fe" through force, intimidation, stealth and strategy despite the contract
of sublease (Annex "A" of the Complaint). Jamandre filed his answer and averred
that he took-over the haciendas in question on September 11, 1963, seven (7) months
after the death of his father, Cirilo Jamandre, on February 11, 1963, because of the
failure of Consing to comply with the terms and conditions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
contract of sub-lease. As justification for the take-over of the leased premises,
Jamandre cited paragraph 9 of said contract of sublease as his authority, the text of
which will be quoted hereafter.
W/N the stipulation in the contract of sub-lease between the parties authorizing the
herein respondent, as sub-lessor, to take possession of the leased premises including

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

all its improvements thereon without compensation to the sub-lessee (herein

petitioners) and without the need of judicial action is valid and binding. YES
This stipulation is in the nature of a resolutory condition, for upon the exercise by the
Sub-lessor of his right to take possession of the leased property, the contract is
deemed terminated. This kind of contractual stipulation is not illegal, there being
nothing in the law proscribing such kind of agreement. Judicial permission to cancel
the agreement was not, therefore, necessary because of the express stipulation in the
contract of sub-lease that the sub-lessor, in case of failure of the sub-lessee to comply
with the terms and conditions thereof, can take over the possession of the leased
premises, thereby cancelling the contract of sub-lease. Resort to judicial action is
necessary only in the absence of a special provision granting the power of
cancellation. On the question that the reception of evidence should have been limited
to possession de facto only, We rule that the court a quo did not err in going further by
interpreting the contract sub-lease. The court may receive evidence upon the question
of the title, or for that matter possession de jure, solely for the purpose of determining
the character and extent of possession and damages for the detention. As to the legal
question that summary judgment should have been rendered by the court a quo, We
rule that the Consings are not entitled, as a matter of right, thereto.
FACTS:
Consing filed in the Municipal Court of Sagay, Negros Occidental, a Complaint for
Forcible Entry and Detainer against Jamandre for taking possession of Haciendas
"Aida" and "Fe" through force, intimidation, stealth and strategy despite the contract
of sublease (Annex "A" of the Complaint) executed on October 19, 1962, (the
date Consing took possession and management of the leased premises) by and
between the former, as sub-lessee, and the father of the latter, Cirilo Jamandre, as
sub-lessor.
Jamandre filed his answer and averred that he took-over the haciendas in question
on September 11, 1963, seven (7) months after the death of his father, Cirilo
Jamandre, on February 11, 1963, because of the failure of Consing to comply with
24
the terms and conditions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the contract of sub-lease.

24
3. That the SUB-LESSEE Soledad T. Consing shall pay the SUB-LESSOR Cirilo Jamandre 1,000
piculs of "C" sugar every crop year and to effectuate said payment the Lopez Sugar Central is
hereby authorized to register in the name of the SUB-LESSOR Cirilo Jamandre a proportion of
10% of the weekly sugar milled by the SUB-LESSEE properly quendaned until the full amount of
1,000 piculs of "C" sugar shall have been fully paid and satisfied not later than the month of
February of every year.
4. That the SUB-LESSEE Soledad T. Consing shall pay the SUB-LESSOR the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) by way of advance payment every crop year until
the duration of the lease. For the payment therefore, the amount of 1,000 piculs of "C" sugar
referred in par. No. 3 shall be assigned and/or endorsed to the SUB-LESSEE Soledad T. Consing
and after proper liquidation of the same the surplus from the proceeds of 1,000 piculs of C sugar
shall be paid to the SUB-LESSOR Cirilo Jamandre not later than the month of February of each
crop year.

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As justification for the take-over of the leased premises, Jamandre cited paragraph 9
of said contract of sublease as his authority, the text of which will be quoted
hereafter.
Municipal court decision: After the issues had been joined, the Municipal Court of
Sagay, Negros Occidental, rendered judgment on June 5, 1964, in favor of Consing.
Appeal to the CFI of Negros Occidental.
Consing filed a Motion To Strike And For Summary Judgment.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over Forcible Entry and Detainer cases, rendered judgment in favor of
Consing.
Court of Appeals reversed.
Present petition for review on certiorari:
Consings contentions:
Summary judgment should have been rendered by the court a quo in view of the
failure of the Jamandre to file a counter affidavit or verified opposition. Besides,
Jamandre admits having taken possession of the leased premises.
Consing likewise maintains that the original case being one of forcible entry,
reception of evidence should have been limited only to that of possession de facto,
and that the contractual stipulation no. 9 of the Contract of Sublease authorizing
Jamandre to take possession of the leased premises without the need of a court
action is illegal.
Petitioners further contend that the only issue in forcible entry case is the physical
possession of the property involved which is only possession de facto and
not possession de jure; that what is needed to be proved only in forcible entry case
is prior possession, and that if one could prove prior possession of the property
under litigation, he is entitled to stay thereon until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right either by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Petitioners argue that the contractual stipulation in the contract of sub-lease with the
herein respondent, authorizing the latter to take possession of the leased premises
even without resorting to court action is illegal and violative of due process.
Respondents contentions:
That he took possession of the leased property because he is authorized to do so
under the contract.
Respondent further maintains that the appellate court did not err in proceeding with
its interpretation of the contract of sub-lease of the parties and in determining the
amount of damages because the parties so agreed during the pre-trial of the case.
Respondent also claims that the stipulation "without necessity of resorting to any
court action", in the contract of sub-lease (stipulation no. 9, Annex "A" of the
Complaint; Exh. "A") is not tainted with illegality because it does not provide for the
use of force in the taking of possession by the sub-lessor(respondent in the present
case) and, therefore, the same is not offensive to the law against forcible entry or to
public policy which, for the preservation of the public peace, does not allow taking
the law into one's own hands.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

ISSUE:
W/N the stipulation in the contract of sub-lease between the parties authorizing the
herein respondent, as sub-lessor, to take possession of the leased premises including
all its improvements thereon without compensation to the sub-lessee (herein
petitioners) and without the need of judicial action is valid and binding. YES
RATIO:
For a better understanding of the controversy, the contractual stipulation is hereunder
quoted:
9. That in case of the failure on the part of the SUB-LESSEE to comply with any of the
terms and conditions thereof, the SUB-LESSEE hereby gives an authority to the SUBLESSOR or to any of his authorized representative to take possession of the leased
premises including all its improvements thereon without compensation to the SUBLESSEE and without necessity of resorting to any court action but in which case the
SUB-LESSEE shall be duly advised in writing of her failure to comply with the terms
and conditions of the contract by way of reminder before the take-over.
This stipulation is in the nature of a resolutory condition, for upon the exercise by the
Sub-lessor of his right to take possession of the leased property, the contract is
deemed terminated. This kind of contractual stipulation is not illegal, there being
nothing in the law proscribing such kind of agreement.
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.: Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, in case
of reciprocal obligations, the power to rescind the contract where a party incurs in
default, is impliedly given to the injured party. Appellee maintains, however, that the
law contemplates of rescission of contract by judicial action and not a unilateral act
by the injured party; consequently, the action of the Shipping Administration
contravenes said provision of the law. This is not entirely correct, because there is
also nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into agreement that
violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof, even without
court intervention.In other words, it is not always necessary for the injured party to
resort to court for rescission of the contract. As already held, judicial action is
needed where there is absence of special provision in the contract granting to a
party the right of rescission.
Judicial permission to cancel the agreement was not, therefore, necessary because
of the express stipulation in the contract of sub-lease that the sub-lessor, in case of
failure of the sub-lessee to comply with the terms and conditions thereof, can take
over the possession of the leased premises, thereby cancelling the contract of sublease. Resort to judicial action is necessary only in the absence of a special
provision granting the power of cancellation.
On the question that the reception of evidence should have been limited to
possession de facto only, We rule that the court a quo did not err in going further by
interpreting the contract sub-lease.
While it is true that the only issue in forcible entry or unlawful detainer action is the
physical possession of the leased property, that is possession de facto not
possession de jure, yet the court may go beyond that if only to prove the nature of
the possession.

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The court may receive evidence upon the question of the title, or for that matter
possession de jure, solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of
possession and damages for the detention. (Sec. 88, Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by R.A. Nos. 2613 and 3828, approved June 22, 1963).
As to the legal question that summary judgment should have been rendered by the
court a quo, We rule that the Consings are not entitled, as a matter of right, thereto.
Summary judgment can only be granted where there are no questions of fact in
issue or where the material allegations of the pleadings are not disputed. Such is not
true in the case at bar.
Firstly, Jamandre maintains that Consing failed to comply with the terms and
conditions of their agreement.
Secondly, in view of such failure on the part of Consing, the Jamandre maintains
that under their contract of sub-lease he is authorized to take-over the possession of
the leased premises.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed.

5. MANINANG V. CA (MB)
Petitioner: Spouses Vicente and Ma. Rosalia Maninang, Spouses Cecilio And Ma.
Socorro Rubio, Ma. Thelma P. Mallari, Orlando F. Panday, Jr., Ma. Vivian P. Ginga,
and H.J. Ramon F. Panday
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Hon. Gregorio E. Manio, Jr., and Oscar J. Monton,
Sr.
G.R. No. 121719. September 16, 1999
Quisumbing, J.
SUMMARY:
Monton filed an unlawful detainer case against petitioners. Petitioners contend that (1)
Monton has never been in possession of the land and (2) that the MTC cannot assume
jurisdiction of the case, since another case, for annulment of sale with damages
involving the same parties, was filed by them before the RTC. SC ruled for Monton and
held that:
1. Prior physical possession in the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement
in an unlawful detainer case. Neither is it required that he be first recognized
as the true and lawful owner of the property by the person against whom he
asserts his right to possession.
2. It was proper for the courts below not to put into consideration the validity of
Montons title because the only issue for resolution in an action for unlawful
detainer is possession of the disputed property and not ownership.
FACTS:

Oscar J. Monton, Sr. filed in the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer
against petitioners.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

He alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land at Bgy. Bagong

Bayan Grande, Naga City.
o He claimed to have bought the land from Rosario Felipe Panday,
mother of petitioners Rosalia, Socorro, Ma. Thelma, Orlando, Ma.
Vivian, and Ramon.
o According to Monton, he went to the disputed property to construct a
perimeter fence around it. However, he was prevented from doing
so by petitioners. Monton demanded that petitioners vacate the
property, to no avail.
In their answer, petitioners assailed the validity of the deed of sale executed
by Rosario in favor of Monton, alleging that at the time of the sale, Rosario
was suffering from schizophrenia and was incapacitated to enter into a
contract.
o They claimed ownership of the property through succession.
o Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the MTC over the case,
since another case, for annulment of sale with damages involving
the same parties, was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
MTC ruled in favor of Monton, declaring him to be the lawful possessor and
ordering petitioners to vacate the premises and to pay back rentals.
RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
CA likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC and the MTC.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. May there be unlawful detainer when respondent has never been in
possession of the land in question and respondent has never been
recognized by petitioners as true and lawful owner of the land? --- YES.
Possession/recognition not required.
2. May the city court take jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer case and render
judgment thereon when the ownership issue and the right of possession over
the land subject of the detainer is being litigated in a case earlier filed before
the regional trial court? --- YES. Rule on the possession only.
HELD:

Petition is DISMISSED

CA decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
Rule which lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer is
pertinent:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. --- Subject to the provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such

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lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.

1. Nowhere does it appear in the abovecited rule that, in an action for unlawful
detainer, the person filing the complaint -- in this case, Monton as vendee --be in
prior physical possession of the property.

Prior physical possession in the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement

in an unlawful detainer case brought by a vendee or other person against
whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of a right to hold possession.

Neither is it required that he be first recognized as the true and lawful owner
of the property by the person against whom he asserts his right to
possession. An action for unlawful detainer may be filed by one who is not
an owner of the property in dispute.

Petitioners assert that Rule 70, Section 1, of the Rules of Court is not
applicable since it refers only to a sale where the right of the vendor is not
questioned. We fail to see that portion of the rule where this distinction may
be gleaned.
2. The only issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer is possession
of the disputed property.

Thus, contrary to petitioners belief, it was but proper for the courts below not
to put into consideration the validity of Montons title. It simply is not an issue
in this case.

The question of ownership is immaterial in an action for unlawful detainer. It

is of no moment if, at the same time that an action for unlawful detainer is
being litigated, there is another action respecting the same property and the
same parties involving the issue of ownership. The rights asserted and the
reliefs prayed for are different in the two cases.

An action for annulment of sale like the one filed by petitioners against
Monton is not prejudicial to an action for unlawful detainer.

The pendency of an action for consignation or specific performance, or

annulment of a sale, as in this case, may not be successfully pleaded in
abatement of an action for unlawful detainer.

6. AREVALO GOMEZ vs ANDERS LAO HIAN LIONG [LL]

G.R. No. 70360 March 11, 1987
Petitioner:
AREVALO
GOMEZ
CORPORATION
Respondents: ANDERS LAO HIAN LIONG, doing business in the name and style of
"TIONGSON BAZAAR" and The Honorable SALVADOR J. VALDEZ, JR.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Summary: Arevalo Gomez Corporation, through its Vice President executed a

"Contract of Lease" covering the petitioner's property in Baguio City, for a term of
fifteen years, effective September 1, 1964. The monthly rental was fixed at P2,450.00.
Prior to the expiration of the lease on August 31, 1979, and for some time thereafter,
the parties entered into negotiations to fix a new rental but could not come to any
agreement. In the end, on October 2, 1979, the petitioner served on the respondent a
written notice to vacate the leased premises in view of the termination of their contract.
When the respondent refused to comply, the petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment
against him. It is not disputed that the original lease contract between the parties was
only for fifteen years expiring on August 31, 1979. The private respondent nonetheless
continued occupying the leased premises beyond that date and it was only on October
2, 1979, that he was formally served with notice to vacate. What is in issue then is
whether such continued occupancy was with or without the implied acquiescence of
the petitioner. Court holds that the lease was not impliedly renewed. Article 1670
applies only where, before the expiration of the lease, no negotiations are held
between the lessor and the lessee resulting in its renewal. Where no such talks take
place and the lessee is not asked to vacate before the lapse of fifteen days from the
end of the lease, the implication is that the lessor is amenable to its renewal. It is a
matter of record that weeks before the deadline for the notice to vacate, the petitioner
had already communicated to the respondent its intention to increase the rental. This
increase had to be accepted by the respondent if he wanted the lease to be renewed.
As the original lease contract expired on August 31, 1979, and was not legally
renewed, it follows that the respondent has since then been in illegal possession of the
leased premises.
FACTS:

On December 1, 1964, the petitioner through its Vice-President, Renato

Arevalo, and respondent Andres Lao HIAN Liong, executed a "Contract of
Lease" covering the petitioner's property at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City,
for a term of fifteen years, effective September 1, 1964. The monthly rental
was fixed at P2,450.00 but in addition to this the respondent agreed to
construct on the interior portion of the land leased a three-story building of
strong materials without right to reimbursement from the petitioner.

Prior to the expiration of the lease on August 31, 1979, and for some time
thereafter, the parties entered into negotiations to fix a new rental but could
not come to any agreement. In the end, on October 2, 1979, the petitioner
served on the respondent a written notice to vacate the leased premises in
view of the termination of their contract. When the respondent refused to
comply, the petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against him in the City
Court of Baguio City.

Applying Article 1670 of Civil Code, the trial court held in favor of the
defendant as follows:
And it was only on October 2, 1979, or after more than 15 days after
the expiration of the original contract of lease, that defendant was
given the requisite notice to vacate. It is, therefore, abundantly clear
that under the law, an implied new lease had already set in when the
plaintiff commenced its action for ejectment on November 19, 1979.

Both parties appealed. The respondent, for his part, prayed for a longer
extension of fifteen years, considering the nature of his business (a bazaar)

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and his investment therein. He also claimed that, prior to the execution of the
contract, the petitioner had assured him he could stay indefinitely in the
disputed premises.
The RTC of Baguio City affirmed the implied renewal of the lease but
modified the appealed judgment by extending the lease for ten years from
September 1, 1979, or until August 31, 1989. The respondent judge also
increased the new rentals to P18,600.00 per month, effective September 1,
1979. MR/MNT of petitioner was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether such continued occupancy was with the implied acquiescence of the
petitioner. NO
RATIO:

It is not disputed that the original lease contract between the parties was only
for fifteen years expiring on August 31, 1979. The private respondent
nonetheless continued occupying the leased premises beyond that date and it
was only on October 2, 1979, that he was formally served with notice to
vacate. What is in issue then is whether such continued occupancy was with
or without the implied acquiescence of the petitioner.
25

The applicable provisions of Civil Code are Art 1669 & 1670. Under Art
1670, an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in if it is shown that:
(a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired; (b) the lessor has not
given the lessee a notice to vacate; and (c) the lessee continued enjoying the
thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor. This
acquiescence may be inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit.

The petitioner contends that the service of an express notice to quit is not the
only way to prevent the implied renewal of the lease. Demanding a higher
rental is also a manifestation of non-acquiescence if the lessee does not
accept the rate demanded. In other words, failure of agreement on the new
conditions of the lease results in an automatic notice to vacate upon the
expiration of the original lease.

In support of this position, the petitioner relies on the case of Roxas vs.
Alcantara, where this Court declared: (I put it here even if its long.
Naintindihan ko kasi yung doctrine nung binasa ko na to)
... Petitioner's letter of August 11, 1977 was a reminder to private
respondent of the impending expiration of the lease contract. Exh.
"A", with a statement that was in effect an offer or proposal to renew
the contract on the terms and conditions. In other words, petitioner
laid down the foregoing stipulations as conditions sine qua non for
any subsequent contract that might be negotiated with private
respondent. Thus clear from the letter, Exh. "C", is that if private
respondent were not agreeable to any or all of the new stipulations,
there would be no renewal of the lease. Private respondent was to
communicate his reply within fifteen days from receipt of Exh. "C",
25

Article 1669. If the lease was made for a determinate time, it ceases upon the day fixed,
without the need of a demand

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

187

absent which petitioner would take it to mean that his conditions

were acceptable to private respondent and their contract renewed on
the specified terms. However, private respondent's letter, Exh. "F",
evidently posted before the expiration of the period allowed within
which to decide, did not give a categorical affirmative or negative
answer to petitioner's proposition, and merely manifested the said
lessee's desire to study the matter until end of the following month of
September, 1977, or up to the termination of the then existing
contract of lease, Exh. "A". Petitioner's failure to reply to the letter,
Exh. "F", can only be taken to mean that he acceded to the request
for additional time. For the obvious reason that the lease contract
(Exh. "A") was expiring, it became more imperative for private
respondent to make a final decision within and not later than the
extended period which he asked for. Thus, when petitioner did not
hear from private respondent at the end of the aforesaid month of
September, private respondent ceased to have any legal right to
possess and occupy the premises in question commencing the first
day of the following month of October.
As we see it, Article 1670 applies only where, before the expiration of the
lease, no negotiations are held between the lessor and the lessee
resulting in its renewal. Where no such talks take place and the lessee
is not asked to vacate before the lapse of fifteen days from the end of
the lease, the implication is that the lessor is amenable to its renewal.
Where the lessor is unwilling in any event to renew the lease for
whatever reason, it will be necessary for him to serve on the lessee a
formal notice to vacate. As no talks have been held between the lessor
and the lessee concerning the renewal of the lease, there can be no
inference that the former, by his inaction, intends to discontinue it. In
such a case, no less than an express notice to vacate must be made
within the statutory 15-day period.
Applying these principles, the Court holds that the lease was not impliedly
renewed in the instant case.
It is a matter of record that weeks before the deadline for the notice to vacate,
the petitioner had already communicated to the respondent its intention to
increase the rental. This increase had to be accepted by the respondent if he
wanted the lease to be renewed. Significantly, in its letter to the respondent
on September 18, 1979, the petitioner once again rejected the latter's
counter-proposal and categorically declared that the increased rental of
P35,000.00 was "no longer negotiable." Since this was a reply to the
respondent's letter of September 14, 1979, it is obvious that the increase in
rental was notified to the respondent on an earlier date, and before the
expiration of the original lease.
As of that date, the respondent was already being informed that he would
have to vacate the leased premises on August 31, 1979, unless he was
willing to pay the increased rental demanded by the lessor. Stated otherwise,
the respondent was on that date which was clearly before the
statutory deadline being served a conditional notice to vacate.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

The formal notice to vacate sent by the petitioner to the respondent on

October 2, 1984, was thus merely areiteration of the implied demand
made to him in its previous communications. The demand was that he
vacate the leased premises if he could not accept the non-negotiable
increased rental of P35,000.00 a month. If the petitioner saw fit to write that
letter on the said date, which admittedly was beyond the 15-day statutory
period, it was merely to repeat its insistence on the new rate as an
indispensable condition to the renewal of the lease. The legal consequence of
its rejection by the respondent was its obligation to vacate the leased
premises because of the expiration of the lease.
Even if, as urged by the respondent, we should disregard the petitioner's
letter of August 31, 1979, because it was not submitted at the trial, there
nevertheless are the other letters which were formally offered in evidence by
the respondent himself. These are Exhibit "5" and "Exhibit "6", dated
September 5 and 14, 1979, respectively, in which he rejected the petitioner's
demand for the increased rental of P35,000.00. This could mean only that the
demand was made earlier as the said letters were merely a reaction to such
demand.
It should be noted that, after August 1979, the petitioner refused to accept the
respondent's payments of the old rentals, demanding, as it had the right to do,
the increased rate of P35,000.00. Such a stance negates the conclusion that
it was willing to renew the lease under the original conditions and had, by its
silence, impliedly agreed to the retention of all its provisions.
No less worthy of attention is the circumstance that in its letter of September
18, 1979, the respondent counter-proposed a monthly rental of P27,000.00,
which the petitioner rejected. It could be illogical to suppose that, having
done this, the petitioner would later agree to the implied renewal of the lease
for the original rental of only P2,450.00, thereby forfeiting the amount of
P24,550.00 every month
As the original lease contract expired on August 31, 1979, and was not
legally renewed, it follows that the respondent has since then been in
illegal possession of the leased premises. That unlawful detainer, which
has lasted more than seven years now, during which he has retained all
the rights he originally enjoyed as if the lease had been validly renewed,
must be terminated immediately.
Coming finally to the monthly rentals to be paid by the respondent, it appears
that between the rate of P35,000.00 demanded by the petitioner and the
respondent's counter-proposal of P27,000.00, there is a difference of only
P8,000.00. It is unfortunate that the disagreement could not be ironed out in
the spirit of friendship that used to characterize the relations of the parties.
We hereby rule that the rentals to be paid for the use and occupancy of the
leased premises beginning September 1, 1979, and until it is vacated by the
respondent, shall be P30,000.00 per month, with interest at the legal rate.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent judge dated August 8, 1984, is
set aside and a new decision is hereby rendered ordering respondent Andres Lao Hian
Liong to: a) vacate the leased premises immediately; b) pay the petitioner monthly
rentals in the amount of P30,000.00 plus legal interest, from September 1, 1979, until

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

the leased premises are surrendered to the petitioner; and c) pay an attorney's fee in
the sum of P30,000.00 and the costs of this suit. The deposits made by the respondent
in court shall be deducted from the total amount due from him. This decision shall be
immediately executory and no motion for reconsideration shall stay its execution. SO
ORDERED.

7. MARA INC. V. ESTRELLA [JM]

G.R. No. L-40511 | July 25, 1975

ISSUE: WON Mara, Inc. is entitled to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
recover possession of the 4 lots during the pendency of the ejectment suit? (and thus,
the City Court acted with GAD in dissolving the injunction). YES (YES).

Petitioner: Mara Inc.

Respondents: Hon. Justiniano C. Estrella (City Judge of QC Branch V) & Jose De
Leon
Ponente: J. Aquino
FACTS: [No summary since short case]

Mara, Inc. filed in the City Court of QC a complaint for forcible entry against Jose
de Leon.
o De Leon through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth occupied Lots
7, 9, 11 and 13, located at G. Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Heights
Subdivision, Barrio Santol, QC registered in the name of Mara, Inc. as shown
in TCT Nos. 127719, 127720, 127721 and 127722 of the QC Registry of
Deeds.
o It was further alleged that it had prior possession of the 4 lots.

4 days after the filing of the complaint, Mara, Inc. asked the City Court to issue a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the purpose of restoring to it the
possession of the said lots.

De Leon opposed the motion on the grounds that Mara, Inc. was never in
possession of the lots;
o Mara Inc.s titles were derived from OCT No. 735 which was allegedly void,
and that the said lots were covered by OCT No. 56 which was being
reconstituted in the CFI of Rizal, QC Branch IX and which is in the name of
the Sps. Blas Fajardo and Pantaleona Santiago.

After Judge Estrella's attention was called to the SCs decision in Benin vs.
Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason, and Pili vs. Tuason, L, which upheld the validity
and incontestability of TCT No. 735, to which the titles of Mara, Inc. to the 4 lots
could be traced, he granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on
condition that Mara, Inc. should file a bond in the sum of P10,000.

Mara, Inc. filed its bond for P10,000. Thereafter, Judge Estrella issued the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
o De Leon filed a motion for the dissolution of the injunction. He manifested that
he was willing to file a counterbond in the same amount.

Judge Estrella in his order granted the motion for the dissolution of the injunction
provided that De Leon filed "a surety bond in the sum of P10,000 to answer for all
damages which the plaintiff (Mara Inc.) may suffer".

Hence, Mara, Inc. instituted in this Court the instant special civil action of certiorari
for the purpose of annulling Judge Estrella's order dissolving the injunction.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

De Leons Contention: He had a right to occupy the four lots because of OCT
No. 56 which allegedly was issued earlier than OCT No. 735.
o NOTE that this was the same defense which he had pleaded in his answer to
the ejectment suit and which was eroded by the SCs decision in the Benin,
Alcantara and Pili cases upholding the validity of TCT No. 735 from which the
titles of Mara, Inc. were derived.

RATIO: (reasons for the ruling)

#1 THERE WAS NO COUNTER-BOND FILED

This court (the SC) first denied Mara Inc.s petition for certiorari on the assumption
that De Leon had posted the surety bond required in Judge Estrella's order. But, it
turned out that he did not file any such bond. He merely submitted a check for that
amount. Then he later filed a motion that he be allowed to substitute cash for the
said check.

Section 8, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a copy of the bond for the
dissolution of the injunction should be served on the other party. That requirement,
which is intended to enable the opposing party to object to the sufficiency of the
bond, was NOT observed in this case.
o Thus, the City Court acted with GAD in dissolving the injunction and in
suspending its implementation on the basis of De Leon's insufficient bond.
#2 WRIT OF INJUCTION DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN EJECTMENT SUIT

Art. 539 of Civil Code provides that A possessor deprived of his possession
through forcible entry may within ten days from the filing of the complaint
present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for
forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the
filing thereof.

Mara, Inc. based its petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on the
provision above which was incorporated as the Rule 70 Section 3 par. 2 of the
ROC dealing with forcible entry and detainer.
o The urgency of the remedy of injunction is underscored by the fact that the
court is given only 30 days within which to decide the motion. It is deplorable
that in this case it took the City Court more than 19 months to decide the
motion of Mara, Inc.

The injunction contemplated in article 539 is an exception to the general rule

that the writ of injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take property
out of the possession or control of one person and place it in the hands of
another whose title has not clearly been established by law.
o Therefore, if the petitioner asking for an injunction is the registered owner and
the oppositor is an interloper or squatter who has no possessory right to the
land in litigation, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may be issued
pendente lite.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

In the instant case, the Torrens titles of Mara, Inc. to the 4 lots appear to be
unassailable. De Leon merely pretended lack of knowledge of the said titles and
has not shown any indubitable right to possess the 4 lots.
It results that the City Court (after finding that OCT No. 735, from which the 4 titles
of Mara, Inc. were derived, is incontestable and after denying De Leon's MR of the
order granting the injunction) made a capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion in dissolving the injunction and in allowing De Leon to file a
counterbond.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, the City Court's order
is set aside.

8. CHUA V. CA [RS]
286 SCRA 437 (1998) | Panganiban, J.

Petitioners: Spouses Marciano Chua and Chua Cho

Respondents: CA, Sps. Mariano and Sheila Moreno
*Conflicting case title and citation; messaged the beadle; no reply. But an online copy
of SCA digests by an Atenean contains this case of Chua and not of Caiza.
SUMMARY
MTC ordered ejectment of Chuas. They received notice of the order. Next day, they
filed an appeal in the MTC. MTC forwarded the case to the RTC. Morenos moved to
execute said order 18 days after petitioners received the notice. RTC denied motion for
execution and extended the period within which petitioners may file a supersedeas
bond. Issue is whether, after the expiration of the period for perfecting said appeal, the
RTC had the authority to set the amount of and accept a supersedeas bond to stay the
immediate execution of a decision in an ejectment suit pending appeal. NO.
Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond.
They could have computed this themselves. Under 19, R70, a supersedeas bond
shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals, damages and costs which accrued before the
decision was rendered, as determined by the MTC in the said decision. The bond
should be filed before the MTC or, where the records have been forwarded to the
RTC, before the latter court. In either case, it should be done during the period of
appeal.
FACTS

3/5/1993 MTC of Batangas City rendered judgment for Sps. Moreno with
respect to 4 lots located in Galiciano St., Batangas City, ordering the
ejectment of Sps. Chua and ordering them to pay monthly rentals of
P50,000.00 from April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the lots and
surrendered their possession to petitioners and the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees.

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A of the decision was received by Sps. Chuas counsel on March 10, 1993;
that the next day, he filed a notice of appeal; and that on March 16, 1993, the
MTC ordered the records of the case transmitted to the RTC.
3/29/1993 Sps. Moreno moved for the execution of the decision in their
favor, alleging that although the Chuas had filed a notice of appeal, the latter
had not filed a supersedeas bond nor make [sic] a deposit every month of the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the properties as required by
Rule 70, Sec. 8.
Chuas opposed the motion, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots from
which they were ordered to be ejected and that to grant immediate execution
of the decision would render their appeal moot and academic.
o They later filed a supplement to their opposition, claiming that while
they were after all willing to file a supersedeas bond, but that they
had been kept busy attending to their businesses and thus unable to
secure a bond.
6/10/1993 RTC issued the first of its disputed orders in which it denied the
Morenos motion for execution on the ground that the transmission by the
MTC of the records of the ejectment case to the RTC, without waiting for the
expiration of the period of appeal, prevented the Chuas from filing a
supersedeas bond on time
6/17/1993 RTC issued another ruling giving the Chuas an extention of 5
days within which to file a supersedeas bond.
o After initially admitting a cash bond of P550,000, the RTC granted on
September 20, 1993 Chuas motion for the substitution of the cash
bond with a surety bond.
Morenos filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, questioning both orders.
CA Based on on Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, CA ruled that the
RTC erred in extending the period for filing a supersedeas bond.
Hence, this PFR. Mariano Moreno was substituted by his heirs.

ISSUE: The Chuas assigned 4 errors to the CA, but, in the main, the case hinges on
whether, after the expiration of the period for perfecting said appeal, the RTC had the
authority to set the amount of and accept a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate
execution of a decision in an ejectment suit pending appeal. NO.

This encompasses several questions regarding the nature of a

supersedeas bond: What is the amount of the bond? Who, if any,
determines the amount? Where and at what point in the litigation should
the bond be filed? We shall deal with each of these questions.
HELD: Petition denied; CA decision affirmed.
RATIO
LATE FILING OF THE SUPERSEDEAS BOND

8, R70 is now 19, R70 on immediate execution of judgment; how to

stay same.

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GR: A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss
of possession of the property in question.
o To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the
appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the
following requisites must concur:

(1) the defendant perfects his appeal;

(2) he files a supersedeas bond; and

(3) he periodically deposits the rentals, which become

due during the pendency of the appeal.
o Defendants failure to comply with any of these conditions is a
ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the
court in this respect being ministerial and imperative.
o Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but
failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution
of the judgment would automatically follow.
o Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the
execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected.
o Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed
within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
Here, the Chuas filed their notice of appeal on March 11, 1993, a day
after their receipt of the MTCs decision.
o 5 days later, the MTC transmitted the records of the case to the
RTC.
o March 29, 1993 the Morenos filed a motion for the immediate
execution of the decision.
o As noted earlier, Chuas opposed the motion on the ground that
they were co-owners of the property.
o June 10, 1993 RTC denied the motion for execution and
directed petitioners to file a supersedeas bond.
o On the authority of the RTC order, petitioners filed a cash bond,
which was later substituted with a surety bond.
SC agrees with the CA that the bond was filed out of time.
o Motion for execution was filed 18 days from the date Chuas
received a copy of the MTCs decision, after appeal has already
been perfected.
o Because no supersedeas bond had been filed within the
period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been
issued as a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to
adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the
aforecited rule.
Chuas contend that the delay should be excused because the MTC,
without fixing the amount of the bond, transmitted the records of the case
to the RTC even before the perfection of the appeal, i.e., the expiration of
the period for filing an appeal. Hence, they did not know whether to file a
bond with the RTC or with the MTC. Neither were they certain of the
amount of the bond.

Take note of the answers to the questions in the Issue part.

Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the
supersedeas bond. They could have computed this themselves.
o Aylon v. Jugo and De Pablo the supersedeas bond is equivalent
to the amount of rentals, damages and costs stated in the judgment
o Under 19, R70 supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the
unpaid rentals, damages and costs which accrued before the
decision was rendered, as determined by the MTC in the said
decision.
o The bond does not answer for amounts accruing during the
pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the
periodic deposits to be made by the defendant.
Here, the MTC clearly stated in its March 5, 1993 decision that petitioners
should pay rentals of P50,000 a month from April 7, 1992 until they shall have
vacated the lots. The amount comprising the supersedeas bond and the
periodic deposits, therefore, is evident and computable from the MTCs
decision.

Where is the Supersedeas Bond Filed?

Petitioners allege that they could not determine whether to file the
supersedeas bond with the MTC or the RTC SC: unmeritorious

There is no need for either MRC or RTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas
bond, the same being manifest in the face of the MTCs decision.
o Plus, Chuas failed to file the bond on time not because they did not
know where to file it, but because they believed that they should not
do so.
o Hence, their opposition to the motion for execution was based on
their alleged co-ownership of the property. It was only before the CA
that they claimed confusion on where the bond should be filed.

Chuas also argue that Laurel v. Abalos should be applied here.

o There, SC held: where supervening events occurring subsequent to
the judgment bring about a material change in the situation of the
parties, which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no
compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the
prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of
the judgment.
o Chuas also allege that immediate execution of judgment of the
inferior court will cause irreparable injury to the petitioners herein
who stand to lose their home, business and source of livelihood x x
x.
o Nuh-uh, SC is not persuaded.
o Here, SC found no supervening circumstance or any material
change in the situation of the parties, which would render inequitable
the immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal.

Marciano Chuas allegation that he, as a co owner of the subject property,

has filed an action for partition does not constitute a compelling reason to
further delay the execution of the judgment.

How the Amount of Supersedeas Bond is Determined

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An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of material

possession or possession de facto of the property under litigation,
not on the issue of ownership.
o 7, R70 [now 18] is clear on this Title: judgment conclusive only
on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership.
o The pendency of the action for partition, where ownership is one of
the principal issues, does not preclude the execution of the judgment
in the ejectment suit.

Such action is entirely independent of the ejectment suit.

o On the other hand, the issue of ownership is considered in an
ejectment suit only for the limited purpose of determining who
between the contending parties has the better right to
possession.
o Plus, it should be stressed that we are not being called upon here to
decide which of the parties has a better right of possession, let
alone, a better title to the property.
o The only issue in this case is whether or not a writ of execution
should be issued pending appeal of the ejectment suit.
o In any event, it is erroneous to characterize the partition suit as a
compelling reason to stay the execution of the judgment pending
appeal.
o The fact that the titles to the disputed lots are in the name of Mariano
Moreno, and not in the name of petitioners or their father Chua Hai,
justifies the transfer of possession of the said property to the
Morenos, at least during the appeal.
o The question of irreparable injury to the Chuas, on the other hand,
cannot be discussed at this forum, for this Court is not a trier of facts.
o Question of irreparable injury is, at best, speculative and
conjectural, and deserves no further disquisition.
SO, the takeaways are that the bond should be filed before the MTC or,
where the records have been forwarded to the RTC, before the latter
court. In either case, it should be done during the period of appeal.

DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS

Petitioners claim that they are the exclusive and absolute owners of
successful and profit-generating businesses located in of land in question.
o Thus, if the judgment of ejectment is to be executed, Morenos will
get possession not only of the parcel of land, but also of the
improvements thereon which are integral to the business of
petitioners.
o Further, the rights of the petitioners over the improvements located
in the land are still to be resolved in the ejectment suit on appeal and
in the partition case. All of the above claims are irrelevant.

First, the present case involves only the propriety of issuing a writ of
execution pending the appeal. It is not conclusive on the right of possession
of the landlet alone the improvements thereinwhich is the main issue in
the appealed ejectment suit.

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Second, any of the perceived injuries to their business could have been
avoided by the simple expedient of filing a supersedeas bond pursuant to 8
[19] of R70.
o Petitioners had an opportunity to file the bond, but they did not do so
on time. They cannot now complain of alleged deprivation of
property without due process.
In an action for ejectment or for recovery of possession of real property, it is
well-settled that the defendants claims for the value of the improvements on
the property or necessary expenses for its preservation should be interposed
as compulsory counterclaims

9. DE LAUREANO V. ADIL [RT]

G.R. No. L-43345 July 29, 1976
Petitioner: JOSEFINA S. DE LAUREANO
Respondents: HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and ONG CU
SUMMARY
Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of Lots 996 and 1004-B leased to Ong Cu for
fifteen year period which allegedly expired on August 31, 1974. In view of Ong Cu's
failure to vacate the lots and remove his improvements thereon. Mrs. Laureano filed
against him an ejectment suit in October, 1974 in the city court of Iloilo City. After trial,
the city court rendered a judgment ordering Ong Cu to vacate the lots, to restore their
possession to Mrs. Laureano, to remove his buildings and other improvements thereon
and to pay P12,428 monthly as compensation for the use and occupation of the lots
from September 1, 1974 up to the time he vacates them, with interest at twelve
percent per annum from the date of accrual plus P10,000 as moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. Ong Cu appealed to the Court of Fist Instance of Iloilo.
Instead of filing a supersedeas bond based on the findings of the city court in its
decision, Ong Cu asked the city court ex parte to approve his supersedeas bond in the
sum of P22,000 and to fix the rental value of the two lots at P1,200 a month. The city
court granted that ex parte motion in its order of October 8, 1975. Mrs. Laureano filed a
motion in the lower court praying for a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore her
to the possession of the said lots. Invoking article 1674 of the Civil Code and section 9,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, she alleged that Ong Cu's appeal was frivolous and
dilatory. She also asked for immediate execution of the city court's judgment on the
ground that Ong Cu's supersedeas bond was inadequate and that he had failed to
deposit the sum of P12,428 monthly as reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the lots adjudged by the city court.
Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Mrs.
Laureano's motions for execution and a mandatory injunction. YES
RE: Motion for execution. The city court found that Ong Cu's lease expired on August
31, 1974 and that the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots is
four pesos a square meter or P12,428 monthly. To stay execution, Ong Cu should
have filed, and the city court should have required, a supersedeas bond in the total
amount of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots for the period
from September 1, 1974 to September, 1975, or for thirteen months, at the rate fixed in
the city court's judgment which is P12,428. It results that Ong Cu's supersedeas bond

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was inadequate and that he did not deposit the compensation for the use and
occupation of the two lots which was fixed in the city court judgment. His supersedeas
bond and his deposits were not sufficient to stay execution.
Re: Motion for mandatory injunction. There is no question that Mrs. Laureano is the
registered owner of the two lots and that they were leased to Ong Cu for a fifteen year
period counted from September 1, 1959 and expiring on August 31, 1974. Ong Cu in
his answer to the ejectment complaint unmistakably admitted that the lease expired on
that date. He alleged that there were negotiations for his purchase of the two lots. The
rule is that if after the termination of the lease contract the lessee prolongs his
occupation of the premises, there is unlawful detainer and article 1674 applies. For the
purpose of that article, it is enough that the plaintiff is the owner of the land and that
the defendant is in temporary occupation thereof whether under a lease contract or on
mere tolerance or under a temporary permit.

Ong Cu opposed the two motions. The lower court upheld the city court's order fixing
the supersedeas bond and the amount to be deposited by Ong Cu.
After the lower court's attention was called to its failure to resolve Mrs. Laureano's
other motion for a mandatory injunction, it ruled that the writ could not be granted
because it had already sanctioned Ong Cu's supersedeas bond, the purpose of
which was to stay execution pending appeal. The lower court reasoned out that it
would be absurd to stay execution and at the same time restore possession to the
plaintiff by granting the mandatory injunction. It regarded Ong Cu as a possessor in
good faith entitled to reimbursement of his necessary and useful expenses.

FACTS:
Josefina S. de Laureano in this special civil action of certiorari assails the
interlocutory orders of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, denying her motions for
execution and for a preliminary mandatory injunction in an ejectment suit which was
decided in her favor by the city court of Iloilo City and which was appealed by the
lessee, Ong Cu.
Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of Lots 996 and 1004-B with a total area of
3,107 square meters located at the corner of Iznart and Solis Streets, Iloilo City. The
lots were leased to Ong Cu for fifteen year period which allegedly expired on August
31, 1974.
In view of Ong Cu's failure to vacate the lots and remove his improvements thereon.
Mrs. Laureano filed against him an ejectment suit in October, 1974 in the city court
of Iloilo City.
After trial, the city court rendered a judgment ordering Ong Cu to vacate the lots, to
restore their possession to Mrs. Laureano, to remove his buildings and other
improvements thereon and to pay P12,428 monthly as compensation for the use and
occupation of the lots from September 1, 1974 up to the time he vacates them, with
interest at twelve percent per annum from the date of accrual plus P10,000 as moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Ong Cu appealed to the Court of Fist Instance of Iloilo. Instead of filing a
supersedeas bond based on the findings of the city court in its decision, Ong Cu
asked the city court ex parte to approve his supersedeas bond in the sum of
P22,000 and to fix the rental value of the two lots at P1,200 a month. The city court
granted that ex parte motion in its order of October 8, 1975. The case was assigned
to the sala of respondent Judge.
Mrs. Laureano filed a motion in the lower court praying for a preliminary mandatory
injunction to restore her to the possession of the said lots. Invoking article 1674 of
the Civil Code and section 9, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, she alleged that Ong
Cu's appeal was frivolous and dilatory.
She also asked for immediate execution of the city court's judgment on the ground
that Ong Cu's supersedeas bond was inadequate and that he had failed to deposit
the sum of P12,428 monthly as reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
lots adjudged by the city court.

RATIO:
The motion for execution. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: (Rule 70 Sec 19
today)
SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the
municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of
First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the
absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with
the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is
appealed.

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ISSUE:
Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Mrs.
Laureano's motions for execution and a mandatory injunction. YES

All moneys so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited in the provincial or city
treasury, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the
court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds
of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise.
Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time
during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of
which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the
execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession,
but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final
disposition thereof on its merits.
xxx xxx xxx
As explicitly provided in section 8, the judgment of the inferior court in plaintiff's favor
in an ejectment case is immediately executory. Thus, where the city court on the day
it rendered the judgment ordered the execution thereof and the defendant did not
perfect his appeal and did not post a supersedeas bond, it was held that certiorari
would not lie to set aside the execution. Section 8 of Rule 70 is an exception to the

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general rule as to the execution of the judgment of an inferior court which is found in
section 18, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.
The defendant may stay execution by
(a) perfecting an appeal and filing a supersedeas bond and
(b) paying from time to time either to the plaintiff or to the Court of First Instance
during the pendency of the appeal the rentals or the reasonable value Of the use
and occupation of the property as fixed by the inferior in its judgment.
The reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises is that fixed by the
inferior court in its judgmentbecause the rental stipulated in the lease contract that
had expired might no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of
the premises by the reason of the change or rise in value (Aylon vs. Jugo).
The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to secure payment of the rents and
damages adjudged in the appealed judgment. In other words, the supersedeas bond
answers only for rentals in the judgment and not for those that may accrue during
the pendency of the appeal which are guaranteed by the periodical deposits to be
made by the defendant. The appeal bond answers for the costs.
In the instant case
The city court found that Ong Cu's lease expired on August 31, 1974 and that the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots is four pesos a square
meter or P12,428 monthly. To stay execution, Ong Cu should have filed, and the city
court should have required, a supersedeas bond in the total amount of the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots for the period from
September 1, 1974 to September, 1975, or for thirteen months, at the rate fixed in
the city court's judgment which is P12,428.
The supersedeas bond should be in the total sum of P161,564.00. And the amount
to be deposited monthly beginning October, 1975 is that same amount of P12,428.
The deposit should be made on or before the tenth day of the succeeding month.
The city court erred in issuing ex parte an order granting Ong Cu's motion fixing the
supersedeas bond at P22,000 and the monthly deposit at P1,200 which was the
rental stipulated in the lease contract that had already expired. The city court should
not have allowed Ong Cu to dictate the amount of the supersedeas bond and the
amount of the monthly payments to be deposited in court.
The reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots was already fixed in
its judgment. That value is the value to be deposited in court. Ong Cu's motion that it
be fixed at P1,200 was uncalled for and was in contravention of the mandatory
provisions of section 8 of Rule 70.
Also contrary to the peremptory provisions of section 8 was Ong Cu's act of fixing his
supersedas bond at P22,000 instead of at the amount equivalent to the total
compensation or rentals Is that had accumulated up to the rendition of the city
court's judgment. That is the amount of the supersedeas bond unalterably fixed in
section 8.
It results that Ong Cu's supersedeas bond was inadequate and that he did not
deposit the compensation for the use and occupation of the two lots which wits fixed
in the city court judgment. His supersedeas bond and his deposits were not sufficient
to stay execution.
If this were a case where the defendant did not file any supersedeas bond or did not
make any monthly deposit, then Mrs. Laureano would be entitled as a matter of right

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to the immediate execution of the city court's judgment both as to the restoration of
possession and the payment of the accrued rentals or compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises.
In such a case, the execution is mandatory. The only exceptions are the existence of
fraud, accident, mistake or execusable negligence which prevented the defendant
from posting the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the
occurrence of supervening events which brought about a material change in the
situation of the parties and which would make the execution inequitable.
This is a case where there was a supersedeas bond and monthly deposits were
made but the bond and the deposit were inadequate or were not in conformity with
the city court's judgment. Ong Cu committed a mistake because he followed the
erroneous order of the city court which fixed the supersedeas bond and the monthly
deposit in contravention of its own decision and, consequently, in violation of section
8 of Rule 70. Because of that mistake, immediate execution under Rule 70
would not be warranted.
The Court of First Instance has discretion to order the execution of a new
supersedeas bond to replace a defective one. Ong Cu should be given a thirty-day
period from notice within which to file a new supersedeas bond in the sum of
P161,564 and to deposit the value of the use and occupation of the two lots at the
rate of P12,428 beginning October, 1975 less the amounts already deposited by
him. Execution should issue if he fails to file a new supersedeas bond and to make
up for the deficiency in his monthly deposits.
Motion for mandatory injunction. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 1674. In ejectment cases where an appeal is taken the remedy granted in article
539, second paragraph, shall also apply, if the higher court is satisfied that the lessee's
appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that the lessor's appeal is prima facie meritorious. The
period of ten days referred to in said article shall be counted from the time the appeal
is perfected. (n)
Article 1674 is reproduced in section 9 of Rule 70. (Rule 70 Sec 20 today).
Article 1674 gives to the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case originating in the
inferior court and appealed to the Court of First Instance the remedy which article
539 gives to the plaintiff in a forcible entry case. It is designed to eliminate the
injustice of the old rule which allowed the lessee to continue in possession during an
appeal even if the owner or plaintiff has an immediate right to the premises in
litigation.
The decisive issue is whether the pleadings, the city court's decision and Ong
Cu's contentions show that his appeal is manifestly frivolous and dilatory. YES
There is no question that Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of the two lots and
that they were leased to Ong Cu for a fifteen year period counted from September 1,
1959 and expiring on August 31, 1974. Ong Cu in his answer to the ejectment
complaint unmistakably admitted that the lease expired on that date. He alleged that
there were negotiations for his purchase of the two lots.
His defenses were that the ejectment action was premature because he was still
considering Mrs. Laureano's proposal to sell the lots; that the removal of his
buildings and iniprovements allegedly worth P1,800,000 would prejudice him and
entail considerable expenses; that there is difficulty in looking for another site during

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the short period granted to him by Mrs. Laureano; that he is willing to buy the lots at
a reasonable price, and that the price fixed by Mrs. Laureano is excessive.
Those defenses cannot defeat the ejectment suit. The expiration of lease and Mrs.
Laureano's refusal to renew it made Ong Cu a deforciant or an unlawful with holder
of the possession of the lots. He has become a possessor in bad faith.
The rule is that if after the termination of the lease contract the lessee prolongs his
occupation of the premises, there is unlawful detainer and article 1674 applies. For
the purpose of that article, it is enough that the plaintiff is the owner of the land and
that the defendant is in temporary occupation thereof whether under a lease contract
or on mere tolerance or under a temporary permit.
The lower court assumed that Ong Cu in constructing his building on the leased lots
is a possessor in good faith entitled to reimbursement of the necessary and useful
expenses incurred by him and with a right of retention, as contemplated in articles
546 and 547 of the Civil Code.
That assumption is erroneous. As a lessee, who constructed a building on the
leased land, Ong Cu cannot be characterized as a builder in good faith. Under article
448 of the Civil Code the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good
faith may appropriate the building after payment of the indemnity provided in articles
546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
Article 448 applies to a case where one builds on land of which he honestly claims to
be the owner and not to lands wherein one's only interest is that of a lessee under a
rental contract. A contrary rule would place it within the power of the lessee "to
improve his landlord out of his property".
As noted by the city court, Ong Cu's rights with respect to the improvements made
by him on the leased land are governed by the following provisions of the Civil Code:
ART 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are
suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or
substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall
pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements,
even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby, He shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is
caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by
paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished. (n)
Under article 1678 it is the lessor who has the option to pay for one-half of the value
of the improvements which the lessee has made in good faith, which are suitable for
the use for which the lease is intended and which have not altered the form and
substance of the land.
Contrary to the lower courts impression, the lessee has no right of retention because
article 546 of the Civil Code does not apply to the improvements made by him. Only
the possessor in good faith has a right of retention under article 546. As already
noted, article 1671 regards an overstaying lessee as a possessor in bad faith.
The lower court discerned an absurdity or incongruency in allowing a defendant in an
ejectment case to stay execution of the inferior court's decision, by filing a
supersedeas bond and making monthly deposits, and at the same time granting a

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mandatory injunction to restore possession on the theory that the defendant's appeal is
frivolous and mandatory.
The absurdity is more apparent than real. The execution in an ejectment case has
two aspects: (a) possession and (b) the rentals or reasonable value of the use of the
premises, The mandatory injunction refers to the possession of the premises in
litigation.
On the other hand, the supersedeas bond and the monthly deposits are primarily
designed to insure that the plaintiff would be paid the back rentals or the
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises should the inferior court's
decision in his favor be affirmed on appeal. Hence, if no bond was filed or no
monthly deposit was made, the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the premises.
To allow the defendant to continue his possession without any security for the
rentals would be prejudicial to the plaintiff. He might not be able to recover the back
rentals when the judgment in his favor becomes final and executory. In that event,
his claim for rentals would be illusory or ineffectual.
If the mandatory injunction is granted, defendant's possession would cease but the
supersedeas bond and the deposits already made would subsist as security for the
accrued pecuniary liability of the defendant to the plaintiff. The execution as to the
rentals or compensation for the use of the premises would be stayed.
It results that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in not granting the writ of
mandatory injunction. Its questioned orders were predicated on erroneous
assumptions.
The immediate possession to be granted to Mrs. Laureano under the writ of
mandatory injunction would embrace the portions of the two lots not occupied by
Ong Cu's improvements.
As to the portions of the lots occupied by Ong Cu's improvements, their demolition
would be necessary in order to deliver the possession thereof to Mrs. Laureano. In
such a case, the provisions of section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court should be
observed. A special order of demolition should be issued only after notice and
hearing and after giving Ong Cu a reasonable time effect the removal.
The disposition of the appeal in the lower court should proceed in accordance. with
section 45 of the Judiciary Law as amended. The grant of the mandatory injunction
constitutes a prejudgment of the appeal with respect to the possession of the two
lots. The main point to be resolved in the lower court's disposition of the appeal is
the correctness of the city court's finding on the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the two lots after the lease expired on August 31, 1974.
In filing the ejectment suit Mrs. Laureano opted not to reimburse Ong Cu for his
improvements. Consequently, there is no issue as to the reimbursement to be made
under article 1678. What period should be given to Ong Cu for the removal of his
improvements is a matter that should be judiciously resolved by the lower court in
the light of the evidence introduced in the city court and the evidence that will be
presented during the hearing on the petition for a special order of demolition. Ong
Cu's rights under the law should be respected. Nothing oppressive or arbitrary
should be perpetrated in connection with the removal of his improvements.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of December 9, 1975 and February 12, 1976
are set aside.

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(1) The lower court is directed to require Ong Cu (a) to file within thirty (30) days from
notice a new supersedeas bond in the amount of P161,564 representing the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the two lots, at the rate found
by the city court, from September 1, 1974 to September, 1975, when the city court
rendered its judgment, and (b) to deposit in court within the same period the
compensation for the use and occupation of the lots for the period from October 1,
1975 to June, 1976 at the rate of P12,428 a month, the amount fixed in the inferior
court's judgment, less the amounts already deposited by Ong Cu at the rate of P1,200
a month.
(2) If after June, 1976 he has not restored to Mrs. Laureano the portions of the two lots
not occupied by his buildings, then h should deposit in court on or before the tenth day
of each month, as prescribed in section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the same
sum of P12,428 until he has complied with the mandatory injunction decreed herein.
(3) The lower court is further directed to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction requiring Ong Cu to vacate the two lots in question, to deliver the possession
thereof to Mrs. Laureano and to remove his buildings and improvements after the court
has passed upon the corresponding petition for demolition.
(4) After Ong Cu has complied with the mandatory injunction with respect to the
portions of the lots not occupied by his buildings and improvements, he should deposit
in court the value of the use and occupation of the portions of the two lots occupied by
his buildings at the rate of four pesos a square meter. Costs against respondent Ong
Cu.

10. VALDEZ V. CA [MB]

Petitioners: Spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Spouses Gabriel Fabella and Francisca Fabella
G.R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006
SUMMARY:
Spouses Valdez filed an unlawful detainer case against Spouses Fabella concerning a
piece of residential lot located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo,
Rizal. Spouses Fabella contend that the complaint failed to state that Spouses Valdez
had prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors of the
former. SC ruled in favor of Spouses Fabella because the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer:
(1) To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
be an improper remedy.
(2) To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide
a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must
show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony.

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(3) When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
FACTS:

Spouses Valdez filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against

Spouses Fabella in the MTC of Antipolo, Rizal.

The complaint alleges the ff. facts:

1. Spouses Valdez are the registered owners of a piece of residential
lot located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo,
Rizal which they acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. sometime in
November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, and a copy of the TCT
in their name;
2. Defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupied the lot by
building their house thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful
possession thereof;
3. Because of the unfounded refusal of the defendants to settle the
case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the
necessary Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs
in order that the necessary cause of action be taken before the
proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as
Annex C;

Spouses Fabella answered contending that the complaint failed to state that
Spouses Valdez had prior physical possession of the property or that they
were the lessors of the former. They also claimed ownership over the land on
the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession
thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

MTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Valdez, ordering Spouses Fabella to

vacate the property and to pay rent.

RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

o It held that Spouses Valdez failed to show that they had given the
Spouses Fabella the right to occupy the premises or that they had
tolerated Spouses Fabella possession of the same, which is a
requirement in unlawful detainer cases.
o It added that the allegations in Spouses Valdez complaint lack
jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation
of prior material possession.

Hence, the instant petition. Spouses Valdez contentions:

1. The averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer
having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them
the possession of the property in question, which allegation is sufficient
to establish a case for unlawful detainer.
2. The summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the
owner if another occupies the land at the formers tolerance or

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permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by
an implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case for
unlawful detainer.
2. W/N based on the allegation(s) of the complaint, the MTC of
Antipolo, Rizal, clearly has original jurisdiction over the instant
complaint filed before it.
HELD:
The petition is not meritorious.
RATIO:
1. Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are 3 kinds of actions available to
recover possession of real property:
a) Accion interdictal --- comprises 2 distinct causes of action, namely, forcible
entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).
i.
Forcible entry --- one is deprived of physical possession of real
property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth
ii.
Unlawful detainer --- one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied.

Difference --- in that in forcible entry, the possession of the

defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which
party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due
to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

Jurisdiction of these two actions --- proper MTC or MeTC; summary

in nature; must be brought within 1 year from the date of actual entry
on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer.

Issue --- right to physical possession.

b) Accion publiciana --- plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper RTC when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. If at the time of the filing of the
complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana.
c) Accion reivindicatoria --- action to recover ownership also brought in the
proper RTC in an ordinary civil proceeding.
2. To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession

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was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy.

Sarona v. Villegas --- A close assessment of the law and the concept of the
word tolerance confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance
must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry.

It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause
of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal,
then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the
case is unlawful detainer.

To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is

necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide
a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must
show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.

When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
3. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any
averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz.

This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts

constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.

The complaint contains only bare allegations that:

1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her,
an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and
2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory

that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these
arguments advance the view that respondents occupation of the
property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the
essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from
the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.

The allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact

that would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or
tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The
complaint contains only bare allegations that respondents without
any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by
building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the

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possession thereof. Nothing has been said on how respondents

entry was effected or how and when dispossession started.
No express contract existed between the parties.

11. ENCARNACION V. ARMIGO [JM]

G.R. No. 169793 | September 15, 2006

Petitioner: VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner,

Respondent: NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.
Summary: Petitioner became the owner of a parcel of land by virtue of a waiver of
rights executed by his mother-in-law, which he thereafter subdivided into two lots.
Sometime in 1985, respondent allegedly entered the premise and took possession of a
portion of the property without the permission of the predecessor-in-interest of the said
property. On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment (unlawful
detainer) with the MTC after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding
that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. The letter was received by the
respondent on February 12, 2001. Respondent alleged that he has been in actual
possession and occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968. The MTC
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but the RTC dismissed the case on appeal,
on the ground that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. Hence the latter
acquired no appellate jurisdiction over thereof. SC affirmed ruling of CA that proper
action in this case should have been accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer as
determined by the allegations in the complaint. The remedies of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building. If the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment
proceeding is proper and the proper MTC acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if
the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action to be filed is an
accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper RTC. Petitioner became the
owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a
portion thereof. From the date of the petitioners dispossession in 1995 up to his filing
of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed.

FACTS:

Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121B-1, consisting of 100 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and
Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting of 607 square meters with TCT No. T-256651,
located at District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots
originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a single 707 square meter track of land
owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on
January 18, 1982.

On March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After
the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed an
Affidavit of Waiver on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the property in

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favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter,

the latter caused the subdivision of the land into two lots and the issuance of
titles in his name on July 18, 1996.
Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took
possession of a portion of the property sometime in 1985 without the
permission of the then owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said occupation by
respondent continued even after TCTs were issued to petitioner.
Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter dated Febuary 1,
2001 demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property. As
evidenced by the registry return receipt, the demand letter was delivered by
registered mail to the respondent on February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding
receipt of the demand letter, respondent still refused to vacate the subject
property. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment, damages with
injunction and prayer for restraining order with the MTC Isabela.
In his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and
occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance
of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with
irregularities.
MTC rendered judgment ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of
the parcels of land he is now occupying and surrender it to the plaintiff;
On appeal, RTC Isabela dismissed the case on the ground that as the
Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, this Court acquired no
appellate jurisdiction thereof. CA remanded case to RTC for further
proceedings

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT UNLAWFUL
DETAINER AS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FILED
BY PETITIONER NO
RATIO:

In this jurisdiction, three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a
summary action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper
inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when
the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for
the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial
Court.

Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the
proper action to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in
this case is the length of time of dispossession.

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198

Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person.
These remedies afford the person deprived of the possession to file at any
time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an
ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On
the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper
action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the
proper Regional Trial Court.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find
that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that
the proper action in this case is accion publiciana; and in ordering the
remand of the case.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its
filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of
the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations
in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted. On its face, the complaint must show enough
ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became
the owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights
executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint for ejectment on March
2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the
latter vacate the premises remained unheeded.
While it is true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on
February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment
fall within the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful
detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of the subject
lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a portion
thereof.
From the date of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his
complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of
time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of
action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one
for accion publiciana.

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the
Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of
the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another
person was occupying his property way back in 1977 but the said owner only
filed the complaint for ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one
foraccion publiciana and not one under the summary procedure on ejectment.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:
o The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in
1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when
petitioner filed his ejectment case. The respondent should have filed
an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.
o The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case
is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer
dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover,
the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the
lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended
pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No.
Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further
proceedings, is AFFIRMED.

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RULE 71: CONTEMPT

1. Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations (JM)

April 30, 1985, November 19, 1985

nd

[This is a consolidation of 4 cases. The 2 date refers to the MR. I wont put it here
anymore because basically the ruling is the same.]
G.R. No. L-24864
FORTUNATO HALILI, doing business under the name and style HALILI TRANSIT
(substituted by Emilia de Vera de Halili), vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
and HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO)
G.R. No. L-27773
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO)
G.R. No. L-38655
FELICIDAD M. TOLENTINO, et al. vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et al.
G.R. No. L-30110
EMILIA DE VERA. VDA. DE HALILI vs, HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS
UNION (PTGWO) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Ponente: C. J. Makasiar
Summary: [I found this online & I think it pretty sums up the case]

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding claims for overtime of more than 500
bus drivers and conductors of Halilia Transit. While the case was before the Court
of Industrial Relations, the union of the workers and the employer executed an
agreement whereby Halili Transit bound itself to deliver a parcel of land and P25k
to the Union, as full settlement. So a deed of conveyance was executed
transferring the land to the union, in trust for the members therein.

The union, through Atty. Pineda filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor
requesting for the authority to sell the land. Motion was granted but the buyer was
hesitant to purchase the land because there was a law that requires an order from
a court as authority to sell properties in trust. So Atty. Pineda filed a motion with
the SC requesting authority to sell. The SC merely noted the motion in a
resolution. Nevertheless, Atty. Pineda filed and was granted an authority to sell by
the labor arbiter. So the sale was consummated resulting in the execution of an
escrow agreement wherein the purchase price was deposited with Manila Bank.
The amounts due the claimants were eventually released. This included attorneys
fees released to Atty. Pineda, and union expenses released to the union.

Now, Atty. Espinas, alleged original counsel for the union filed a motion for a
temporary mandatory restraining order to require both Atty. Pineda and the union
to deposit the amounts received by them with the NLRC. Manila Bank was
impleaded. Thereafter, the SC issued the temporary mandatory restraining order.
Later on, the SC also declared the decision of the labor arbiter to grant the

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authority to sell null and void. A day before the said declaration, Atty. Espinas filed
a motion to cite Atty. Pineda, Capuno (acting administrator of the union), and
Manila bank in contempt for non-compliance with the restraining order.
Atty. Pineda, Capuno, and Manila Bank filed a motion stating that they had
already transmitted the money to the NLRC, thereby rendering the motion to cite
them in contempt moot and academic. Apparently, the amounts delivered to the
NLRC were incomplete. So Atty. Espinas, in representation of the workers
involved, filed a comment reiterating their plea to declare the 3 parties in
contempt.

Issue: WON Atty. Pineda, Capuno, and Manila Bank should be cited for contempt?
Held and Ratio:
1. Atty. Pineda should be cited for indirect contempt under paragraphs (b), (c) and
(d) of Section 3, Rule 71, ROC.

Contempt of court is defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court

which signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience to the courts
orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner impede the due
administration of justice.

Power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. It is essential to the

preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice. Reason for this is to guarantee the stability of the
judicial institution.

The exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold aspect:

o Proper punishment for the disrespect to the court or its order; and
o To compel the guilty partys performance of some act or duty required of
him by the court.

Due to this twofold aspect, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.

o Civil Contempt

Failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for

the benefit of the opposing party therein.

Where punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the

nature of damages, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to
enforce the performance of some act for the benefit of the party or in
aid of the final judgment or decree rendered in his behalf

The contempt judgment will, if made before the final decree, be

treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made after, as
remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on appeal from the
final decree, or in such other appropriate mode.
o Criminal contempt

Conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or of a

judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or
dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.

Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or

a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity

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2.

3.

and power of the court, either by fine payable to the government or

by imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case.
o The question of whether the contempt committed is civil or criminal does
not affect the jurisdiction or the power of a court to punish the same.

For civil contempt, Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
provides that the contemner may be imprisoned by order of a superior court
until he performs the act which refuses/fails to do.
Manila Bank substantially complied with the temporary mandatory restraining
order, hence cannot be cited for contempt.

It had transmitted to the NLRC the remaining balance of P417,380.64 and

P2,022.70 for the account of the Union and Atty. Pineda, respectively.
Contempt against Capuno was withdrawn by the SC.

With regard to attorneys' fees, Atty. Pineda made the Union officers believe
that he would be the one to pay the fees of Attys. Espinas and Lopez for
which reason, the 35% increased fees was approved by the Union's board in
good faith.

FACTS:

The 4 cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than 500 bus
drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation commenced with the filing of a
complaint for overtime with the defunct Court of Industrial Relations.

The disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an
Agreement whereby:
1) the Administratrix of the Estate of Fortunato F. Halili would transfer to the
employees title to a tract of land in San Bartolome, Caloocan, and
2) pay in addition P25,000in full and final satisfaction of all the claims and
causes of action of all of the employees against the estate of Fortunato F.
Halili.

Pursuant to the Agreement, the administratrix of the estate of Fortunato F, Halili

executed a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring the land to the
Halili Bus and Conductors Union (PTGWO) in trust for the members of the union
claimants.
o The land was eventually registered in the name of the Union. Hence, the
contending parties moved for the dismissal of the 4 cases which the SC
granted.
Authority to Sell Land

The Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the
property. The motion was granted.

A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, inc. expressed its
misgivings on the authority of the Union to sell the property in view of sec. 66 of
PD 1529 which requires that an order from a court of competent jurisdiction as
authority to sell property in trust.
o So, Atty. Pineda filed a motion with the SC requesting for authority to sell the
property. The SC however merely noted the motion in a resolution.

Nevertheless, Atty. Pineda, without authority from the SC but relying on the earlier
authority given him by the MOLE, filed another urgent motion with the latter,
praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot to the Manila Memorial Park

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Cemetery, Inc. and to make arrangements with it such that payment will be
advanced for the real estate taxes inclusive of penalties, attorney's lien (35% of
the total purchase price), and home developer's fee of P69,000.00.
o Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela granted the motion.
o So, the sale was finally consummated resulting in the execution of an escrow
agreement wherein the purchase price was deposited under escrow with the
Manila Bank-Cubao Branch. The Bank then released the amounts due the
claimants in accordance with the escrow agreement.

When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the
Union) learned of the sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past Union
president Amado Lopez, he requested Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to allow him to
look into the records of the case.
o The latter however told him that the records of the case were missing.
Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to
locate the records.
Temporary Mandatory Restraining Order

Also, Atty. Espinas filed the urgent motion with prayer for a temporary mandatory
restraining order which question the legality of the orders issued by Labor Arbiter
Valenzuela before the NLRC which authorized the sale of the awarded property
and the distribution of the proceeds from such purchase.

In its resolution, the SC impleaded the Manila Bank, Cubao Branch as party
respondent and directed the issuance of a temporary mandatory restraining order:
1) enjoined Atty. Pineda or his agents or any person acting in his stead to
deposit with the NLRC the amount of P712,992.00 paid to him or deposited in
his account at Manila Bank, Cubao Branch allegedly representing 35%
attorney's fees on the sale of the lot registered in the name of Halili Drivers
and Conductors Union;
2) directed the Union thru Cabading or his agents to deposit with the NLRC 6%
alleged union expenses paid to the Union or similarly deposited to its account;
and
3) ordered the NLRC and Manila Bank, Cubao Branch, or their agents or
persons in their stead not to allow withdrawals of amounts deposited in the
name of Atty. Pineda and/or the Union or any of its officers.
Contempt Case

Sergio de Pedro, as representative of the workers and assisted by Atty. Espinas,

filed the urgent motion to cite Atty. Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank
(Cubao Branch) in contempt, alleging therein that after 2 letters to the NLRC
which inquired as to whether or not compliance with the restraining order had
been made, the Commission certified that no deposits had been effected by the
parties so

In its manifestation and motion, Manila Banking Corporation (Rustan-Cubao

Branch), in compliance with the SCs resolution, stated that it transmitted or paid
to the NLRC P417,380.64 under Cashier's Check No. 34084190 for the account of
the Union and P2,022.70 under Cashier's Check No. 34084191 for the account of
Atty. Pineda.
o And thus prayed that the aforesaid transmittals be deemed as sufficient
compliance with the resolution and that the urgent motion to cite the Bank in
contempt be considered moot and academic.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

~~~
Addl facts: a little bit of background on Atty. Espinas [SC just included it here]

Union President Amado Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates
that the general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20% contingent
fee for the law firm based on whatever amount would be awarded the Union in the
4 cases originally filed.

Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers'
claim in the main cases before the defunct CIR and the SC. When Atty. Pineda
appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his
appearance carried the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the
impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases.

Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were
pending resolution. He always held office in the firm's place at Puyat Building,
except in 1966 to 1967 when he transferred to the Lakas ng Manggagawa Offices.
During this one-year stint at the latter office, Atty. Pineda continued handling the
case with the arrangement that he would report the developments to the Espinas
firm. When he rejoined the law firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases
and using the Puyat Building office as his address in the pleadings.

When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his
partners (he was made the most senior partner) that he had a retainer's contract.
He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did not divulge the 1967 retainer's
contract. Only the officers of the Union knew of the contract.

The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears
anomalous and even illegal as well as unethical considering that:
1) The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of the
Union chosen by about 125 members only. It was not a contract with the
general membership. This violates Article 242 (d) of the Labor Code.
2) The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit
and the 45% fee for those who were no longer working worked to the
prejudice of the latter group who should and were entitled to more benefits.
Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the
Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty.
Pineda knew that all the workers would be out of work which would mean that
the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.
3) The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was executed
when Atty. Espinas was still handling the appeal of Halili Transit in the main
case before the Supreme Court.
4) When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien with
Arbiter Valenzuela on February 8, 1983, he did not attach the retainer's
contract.
5) The retainer's contract was not even notarized.
ISSUES:
1. WON Labor Arbiters Order regarding the distribution of proceeds of the sale of
the land belonging to the members-claimants is INVALID YES.
a. If yes, WON LA Valenzuela is liable for the issuance of an invalid order.
YES.

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2.

WON Atty. Pineda, Capuno, and Manila Bank should be cited for contempt.
YES, NO, NO.
NOTE: Atty. Pineda may be also held liable under 3 grounds in addition to
contempt.

RATIO:
#1 Labor Arbiter Valenzuelas Orders should be nullified for lack of due process
and for being contrary to law [not important]

In administrative proceedings, or cases coming before administrative tribunals

exercising quasi-judicial powers, due process requires not only notice and
hearing, but also the consideration by the administrative tribunal of the evidence
presented; the existence of evidence to support the decision.

Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion with the SC praying for authority to
sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to
sell the property and that this Court was the proper body which had the power to
grant such authority. He could not and did not even wait for such valid authority
but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew
was not empowered to so authorize.
#1a [not important]

LA Valenzuela should be made to answer for having acted without or beyond his
authority in proper administrative charges.

He could also be prosecuted before the Tanodbayan under the provisions of the
Anti-Graft Law.

Independently of his liabilities as a government officer, he could be the subject of

disbarment proceedings under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
#2 Contempt
A. Atty. Pineda [main]

Atty. Pineda should be cited for indirect contempt under paragraphs (b), (c) and
(d) of Section 3, Rule 71, ROC.
Sec. 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing
xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or company court, or injunction granted by a court or judge,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into
or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given
to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any interference with the process or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition

to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the
authority of 'the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of
justice.
o The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is that
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without
such guarantee said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 "the exercise of the power to
punish contempts has a twofold aspect, namely (1) the proper punishment of the
guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his
performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to
perform.
o Due to this twofold aspect, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.

A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a

court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein. A criminal
contempt on the other hand, is conduct directed against the authority and
dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.

Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a

stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power
of the court, either by fine payable to the government or by imprisonment,
or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment
is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of damages for the
wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to enforce the
performance of some act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final
judgment or decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if
made before final decree, be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory
order, or, if made after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be
reviewed only on appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is
appropriate to the review of judgments in civil cases.
The question of whether the contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not
affect the jurisdiction or the power of a court to punish the same.
For civil contempt, Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
provides Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the
omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may
be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.
o The penalty complained of is neither cruel unjust nor excessive. To order that
one be imprisoned for an indefinite period in a civil contempt is purely a
remedial measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contemner to do an act within
his or her power to perform. He must have the means by which he may purge
himself of the contempt . As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man carries
the keys to his prison in his own pocket

Other liabilities of Atty. Pineda [FYI]

1) Atty. Pineda should be subject to disbarment proceedings under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court may suspend or disbar a

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2)

3)

B.

C.

lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and
trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law
before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.
Atty. Pineda could be prosecuted for betrayal of trust by an attorney under Article
209 of the RPC. Betrayal of must by an attorney or solicitor. Revelation of
secrets.In addition of the proper administrative action , the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or
both shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial)
who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter
learned by him in his professional capacity.
Atty. Pineda could also be held liable under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act) which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly
to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in
Section 3 of said act. Section 3 enumerates the corrupt practices which public
officers may be prosecuted for. Atty. Pineda knowingly induced or caused Labor
Arbiter Valenzuela to issue the questioned orders without or beyond the latter's
authority and to which orders the former was not entitled, considering that he was
not the sole and proper representative.
Capuno
The alleged 5% donation of Atty. Pineda to the Union taken from the 35%
attorneys' fees was given to and received by then President Domingo Cabading
alone, who thereafter left for the United States.
With regard to attorneys' fees, Atty. Pineda made the Union officers believe that
he would be the one to pay the fees of Attys. Espinas and Lopez for which reason,
the 35% increased fees was approved by the Union's board in good faith.
Manila Bank
The Manila Banking Corporation (Cubao Branch) per manifestation and motion
had transmitted to the NLRC the remaining balance of P417,380.64 and
P2,022.70 for the account of the Union and Atty. Pineda, respectively. This
turnover of the aforecited amounts is a sufficient compliance with the SCs
restraining order and resolution and hence can no longer be liable for contempt of
court.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin Pineda is hereby found guilty of indirect

contempt of court for which he is hereby sentenced to imprisonment in the Manila City
jail until the orders of this court dated September 1 and September 13, 1983 are
complied with. He is also directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred
under rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

2. Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons (RS)

GR No. 39676 | 6/30/1933 | Abad Santos, J.
Petitioner: Idonah Slade Perkins [Perkins]

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Respondent: Director of Prisions [DOP]

SUMMARY:
CFI Manila adjudged Perkins guilty of contempt for disobedience of its final judgment
requiring her to render an accounting to her husband. She filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the SC. W/N CFI has jurisdiction in a contempt case. YES. W/N Perkins
has purged herself of contempt. NO. The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.
[long discussion on various and important doctrines; please read ratio]. In light
of the principles above considered, it seems clear that CFI-Manila had
jurisdiction of the offense charged against the petitioner contempt of court. In
order to purge herself of contempt, the petitioner must render a full and complete
accounting to her husband of the conjugal properties mentioned in the order above
quoted, and perform such other acts as are required under the judgment of CFI
Manila of August 4, 1930. This she has not done. Writ denied.

FACTS

Perkins was found guilty of contempt by CFI-Manila for disobedience of a final

judgment dated Aug. 4, 1930, requiring her (a) to render an accounting to her
husband, Eugene Arthur Perkins, of all the conjugal property in her
possession or under her control; (b) to convey, transfer, and deliver to her
husband all such conjugal property as might result from said accounting; and
(c) to execute in favor of her husband all deeds and documents as might be
necessary in order that her husband's title thereto might legally appear.

Court ordered her imprisonment until she complies with the orders of the
court contained in said judgment.

On appeal, the order of commitment for contempt was affirmed by this court.

Perkins now claims that her imprisonment under the order of commitment for
contempt was unlawful, and that she is, thus, entitled to be discharged by a
writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:

W/N the CFI of Manila has the jurisdiction to issue an order of commitment for
contempt. YES

W/N Perkins has purged herself of contempt. NO

HELD: The petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied, and the petitioner will
forthwith be recommitted to the respondent Director of Prisons.
RATIO:
CFI [RTC] HAS JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR CONTEMPT

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to

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the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and,

consequently, to the due administration of justice.
State vs. Magee Publishing Company "The exercise of this power is as old
as the English history itself, and has always been regarded as a necessary
incident and attribute of courts. Being a common law power, inherent in all
courts, the moment the courts of the United States were called into existence
they became vested with it. It is a power coming to us from the common law,
and, so far as we know, has been universally admitted and recognized. x x x
Our Code of Civil Procedure expressly recognizes the power of the CFIs and
the judges thereof to punish contempts of court.
o It divides contempts into two kinds, namely: (1) Direct contempts,
which may be published summarily; and (2) constructive
contempts, which may be punished only after due hearing.
o A direct contempt under the statute is "misbehavior in the presence
of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of
justice, including the refusal of a person present in court to be sworn
as a witness or to answer as a witness when lawfully required.
o Any of the ff constitutes an indirect contempt, namely:

Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,

order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction
granted by a court or judge;

Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of

his official duties, or in his official transactions;

A failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in

the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of
the court held by him.

The person defeated in a civil action concerning the

ownership or possession of real estate who, after having
been evicted by the sheriff from the realty under litigation in
compliance with the judgment rendered, shall enter or
attempt to enter upon the same for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession or who shall in
any manner disturb possession by the person whom the
sheriff placed in possession of said realty.
o As to constructive contempts, 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that "the court shall then determine whether the accused is
guilty of the contempt charged; and, if it be adjudged that he is guilty,
he may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned
not more than six months, or both. If the contempt consists in the
violation of an injunction, the person guilty of such contempt may
also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by
such violation."
o And 237 further provides that "when the contempt consists of the
omission to do an act, which is yet in power of the accused to
perform, he may be imprisoned until he performs it.
The exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold aspect:
o First, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to
the court or its order, and

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

204

Second, to compel his performance of some act or duty required of

him by the court, which he refuses to perform.
Due perhaps to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish
them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.
o Civil Contempt failure to do something ordered to be done by a
court or a judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party
therein;
o Criminal Contempt conduct that is directed against the authority
and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully
assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or
judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.
o Hammond Lumber Co. vs. Sailors' Union "The power to punish for
contempt may be exerted in either civil or criminal cases, or
independently of either, and either solely for the preservation of
the court's authority, or in aid of the rights of the litigant, or for
both those purposes combined.

By reason of this twofold attribute, proceedings in contempt

are regarded as being in their nature anomalous that is,
possessed of characteristics which render them more
or less difficult of ready or definite classification in the
realm of judicial power; and this has led to their being
aptly styled sui generis. That they are largely of a
criminal nature, by reason of the power being one to
convict and punish for wrong committed, is universally
conceded; and yet that in some respects they partake,
by reason of the ends subserved, of the nature of a
civil remedy, is likewise recognized

Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party

to the suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect
and vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either
by fine payable to the government, or by imprisonment,
or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case and
subject to review only in the manner provided for
review of judgments in criminal cases;

BUT where the punishment is by fine directed to be

paid to a party in the nature of damages for the wrong
inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to
enforce the performance of some act for the benefit of
the party, or in aid of the final judgment or decree
rendered in his behalf, in such case the contempt
judgment will, if made before final decree, be treated as
in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made after
final decree, as remedial in nature, and will be reviewed
only on appeal from the final decree, or in such other
mode as is appropriate to the review of judgments in
civil cases.

The fact that a contempt has arisen in a civil action, such as

this, in no way tends to characterize the nature of the
proceeding for its correction. While it is true that it would be

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

hard to imagine a contempt of a civil aspect arising in a

criminal case, it is equally true that acts of contempt of a
criminal aspect doand must frequentlyarise in actions
of a purely civil character.
In re Nevitt Proceedings for contempts are of two classes those
prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the courts, and
to punish for disobedience of their orders [CRIMINAL and PUNITIVE
NATURE], and those instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private
parties to suits, and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made to
enforce the rights and administer the remedies to which the court has found
them to be entitled [CIVIL, COERCIVE AND REMEDIAL NATURE].
In light of the principles above considered, it seems clear that CFI-Manila
had jurisdiction of the offense charged against the petitioner
contempt of court.
o It had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner who was properly
brought before the court.
o It had jurisdiction to hear the charge and the evidence against the
petitioner.
o It had jurisdiction to hear and to decide upon the defenses offered by
her.
The general rule is that when the court has jurisdiction by law of the
offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgments,
orders or decrees are not subject to collateral attacks by habeas
corpus. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the function of
a writ of error.

PERKINS HAS NOT PURGED HERSELF OF CONTEMPT

Her claim: she already complied with the CFI order requiring her to render an
accounting to her husband of all the conjugal property in her possession or
under her control.
o There is nothing in the record to substantiate this claim.
o Her statement, made under oath, to the effect that "there is no
conjugal property in her possession or under her control, and that,
therefore, there is now no conjugal property in her possession for
delivery to the said defendant," meaning her husband.
o This is clearly not a compliance with the order for accounting.
[findings of the CFI with regard to the compliance was en espaol]

In order to purge herself of contempt, the petitioner must render a full and
complete accounting to her husband of the conjugal properties mentioned in
the order above quoted, and perform such other acts as are required under
the judgment of CFI Manila of August 4, 1930.

3. Lim Se v. Argel (RT)

G.R. No. L-42800 April 7, 1976
Petitioners: LIM SE and BENITO LIM

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Respondents: THE HONORABLE MANUEL A. ARGEL, in his capacity as Presiding

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XXXV; JUANA
SAN PEDRO-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO SAN PEDRO, GENARO BULOTANO, and THE
SHERIFF of the City of Baguio and/or his Deputy/Deputies or DEPUTY ESTEBAN S.
PAR
SUMMARY
Atty. Homobono Adaza in his "motion to lift the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction" recklessly and sweepingly contended that its issuance "has no legal nor
factual basis" and was "unjust and constitutes a serious miscarriage of justice". Lim Se
and Benito Lim alleged that Lim Se leased from Venancia Chiombon the ground floor,
mezzanine and basement of the Venancia Building in Baguio City. Meanwhile, Genaro
Bulotano claimed to have purchased the Venancia Building from Juana San PedroOcampo (and who in turn allegedly bought it from Venancia Chiombon) and filed an
action in the CFI of Cavite City for the recovery of rentals and damages in connection
with their occupancy of the Venancia Building. The lower court, in its summary
judgment, ordered Lim Se and Benito Lim to vacate the premises. In a writ of
possession, the City Sheriff of Baguio was ordered to take possession of the premises
occupied by Lim Se and Benito Lim, to eject them and anybody claiming under them.
The writ of possession was executed "in a most cruel and oppressive manner,
according to Lim Se and Benito Lim. Instead of giving petitioners the usual period of at
least 3 days within which to vacate the premises peacefully, said deputy sheriff gave
petitioners only 2 hours to do so. And when petitioners failed to comply with said
impossible demand, Deputy Sheriff Esteban Par with the aid of able-bodied men
physically threw out of the premises into the streets some of petitioners' personal
properties forced petitioner Benito Lim, his eight-month pregnant wife, and one year
old son, out of the premises into the street, together with the petitioners' other family
members and padlocked the premises with most of petitioners' properties still inside
the same. They prayed for an injunction to restrain the lower court from further hearing
the ejectment case and to order the sheriff to restore to them the possession of the
premises in question. A temporary restraining order was issued.
Is Atty. Adaza guilty of direct contempt? Yes.
The lower court ignored the allegations of the petitioners that the ownership of the
Venancia Building was involved; that the estate of Florencio Reyes claimed to be the
owner of the building; that the City Court of Baguio refused to entertain an ejectment
suit against Chiombon because of the necessity of adjudicating first the ownership of
the building, and that the petitioners had leased the disputed premises. Also, the
ejectment was made by summary judgment. The petitioners were dispossessed of the
premises by means of a writ of possession and not by the usual writ of execution, no
basis for the issuance of the writ of possession was shown. The ejectment was
allegedly effected in a ruthless manner. Thus, the verified petition reveals that the
lower court acted without jurisdiction (as far as the venue of the action was concerned)
and that the strong arm of the law was used oppressively against the petitioners by
means of the writ of possession. Here, it was brashly and irresponsibly contended in
the oft-mentioned motion that the injunction lacked factual and legal basis and
constituted a serious miscarriage of justice. The allegations of the verified petition,
which the movants carelessly ignored, show the flagrant falsity of those contentions.
The petitioners clearly made out a strong prima facie case for the ex parte issuance of
a mandatory injunction. It is obvious that Atty. Adaza's characterization of the

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mandatory injunction as "unjust and a miscarriage of justice" and as devoid of factual

and legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He treated a resolution of this Court as
if it were a pleading of an adversary which he could assail in unrestrained and abrasive
language. His unjustified and disrespectful characterization carries with it obvious
derogatory implications or innuendos which clearly constitute direct contempt or
contempt facie curiae.
FACTS:

Atty. Homobono A. Adaza in his "motion to lift the writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction" in this case recklessly and sweepingly contended that
its issuance "has no legal nor factual basis" and was "unjust and constitutes a
serious miscarriage of justice".

To determine whether in employing such vicious abusive and disrespectful

language, he committed direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae, it
is necessary to summarize briefly the allegations of the verified petition
consisting of 209 pages.
Background of the case

Lim Se and Benito Lim alleged that from 1965 to 1970 Lim Se leased from
Venancia Chiombon through her attorney-in-fact, Francisco San Pedro, the
ground floor, mezzanine and basement of the Venancia Building located at 72
Session Road, corner Calderon Street, Baguio City.

When that lease expired in 1970, Lim Se leased the same premises from the
Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. for the period from January, 1971 to June,
1973.

Lim Se and his son Benito Lim leased from the Estate of Florencio Reyes,
Sr., through its special administrator, Florencio Reyes Jr., the same premises
for a period ending on March 31, 1971. The rental up to April, 1975 had been
paid. Benito Lim operated in the premises the New Life Cafe & Restaurant.

Meanwhile, Genaro Bulotano who claimed to have purchased on December

19, 1970 the Venancia Building from Juana San Pedro-Ocampo (and who in
turn allegedly bought it from Venancia Chiombon filed in May, 1971 an action
'in the Court of First Instance of Cavite City against Lim Se the Estate of
Florencio Reyes, Sr., Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Remedios Sarmiento for
the recovery of rentals and damages from the said defendants in connection
with their occupancy of the Venancia Building (Civil Case No. N-1647).

Without awaiting the outcome of the Cavite case, Genaro Bulotano in May,
1975 filed in the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro an action to
recover possession of the premises leased by Lim Se and Benito Lim, and
rentals and damages amounting to P94,800.

Note that the action, which is a real action to recover real property located in
Baguio City, was filed in Caloocan City instead of in Baguio City. The only
circumstance that might justify the laying of the venue in Caloocan City was
that the defendants were supposedly residents of Malabon Rizal.

Defendants Juana San Pedro and Francisco San Pedro in June, 1975 (or
about a month after the main action was brought) filed against Lim Se and
Benito Lim an unverified third party complaint (which in reality was an
ejectment suit), praying that they be ordered to vacate the ground floor,

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

mezzanine and basement of the Venancia Building and to pay rentals

amounting to P71,200.
Lim Se and Benito Lim filed a motion to dismiss the third-party, complaint on
the ground of improper venue, lis pendens and lack of jurisdiction over
the res. Defendants San Pedro opposed the motion. The lower court denied
it.
Juana S. Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro filed an urgent motion for
summary judgment.
The lower court in its summary judgment dated November 27, 1975 ordered
Lim Se and Benito Lim to vacate the premises.
Juana and Francisco filed a motion for execution on the grounds that the
appeal of Lim Se and Benito Lim would be frivolous and dilatory, that they
had been withholding possession of the premises in litigation for the last five
years without paying rentals, and that the appeals of Lim Se's co-tenants,
Jose Zabala and Remedios Sarmiento, were dismissed by the Court of
Appeals.
Lim Se and Benito Lim filed a "motion for reconsideration and to hold case in
abeyance" together with an affidavit of merits. They called the lower court's
attention to the fact that the lots on which the Venancia Building was
constructed were registered in the name of Florencio Reyes, that they had
leased up to March 31, 1977 from the administrator of the estate of Florencio
Reyes the ground floor, mezzanine and basement of the Venancia Building,
and that they had paid the rentals up to April, 1975.
The lower court or the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City in its
order of January 13, 1976 denied the motion of Lim Se and Benito Lim
for reconsideration and to hold case in abeyance.
In its ex parte order of January 29, 1976 the lower court declared its
summary judgment final and executory. It found that Lim Se and Benito
Lim should have perfected their appeal on or before January 26, 1976.
As no appeal was perfected, the lower court ordered that a writ of
possession should be issued against Lim Se and Benito Lim.
Clerk of Court of the lower court issued a "writ of possession" instead
of the usual writ of execution. In that writ of possession the City Sheriff of
Baguio was ordered to take possession of the premises occupied by Lim Se
and Benito Lim, to eject them and anybody claiming under them, and to
deliver the possession to Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San
Pedro.
Deputy Sheriff Esteban S. Par executed the writ of possession "in a most
cruel and oppressive manner" according to Lim Se and Benito Lim. (They had
stayed in the premises for more than ten years):
o Instead of giving petitioners the usual period of at least five (5) days
within which to vacate the premises peacefully, said deputy sheriff
gave petitioners only two (2) hours to do so; an impossible demand,
since the premises involved constitute petitioners' business
establishment a restaurant New Life Cafe & Restaurant as well
as their residence, so all of petitioners' possessions and properties
within the premises cannot be moved out in two (2) short hours.

And when petitioners failed to comply with said impossible demand,

Deputy Sheriff Par with the aid of able-bodied men physically threw
out of the premises into the streets some of petitioners' personal
properties forced
petitioner
Benito
Lim,
his eight-month
pregnant wife, and one year old son, out of the premises into the
street, together with the petitioners' other family members and
padlocked the premises with most of petitioners' properties still
inside the same.
The petitioners further alleged that the "Writ of possession" was
consummated even before their counsel had received a copy of the order of
execution.
The petitioners underscored that the lower court acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in rendering summary judgment in an
ejectment case, where the venue was improperly laid, and in ordering
execution pending appeal. They prayed for an injunction to restrain the lower
court from further hearing the ejectment case and to order the sheriff to
restore to them the possession of the premises in question. They asked for
the annulment of all proceedings in the lower court.
The respondents were directed to answer the petition. A temporary
restraining order was issued. After the petitioners had filed a bond in
the sum of ten thousand pesos, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was issued, directing the City Sheriff of Baguio to place
petitioners in possession of the premises from which they had been
uncremoniouly ousted.
On March 16, 1976 Atty. Antonio V. Raquiza and the law office of Adaza,
Amante & Tiu, through Atty. Adaza, filed the aforementioned motion for
the lifting of the mandatory injunction. The said lawyers, who never
appeared in the lower court, apparently acted independently of Bulotano's
counsel and of Francisco San Pedro's lawyer who, as already stated, filed an
answer for all the respondents.
Atty. Adaza set his motion for hearing on March 22. That circumstance
shows his unfamiliarity with appellate court practice. A motion filed in this
Court or in the Court of Appeals is usually not set for hearing. Oral argument
is not required in support of a motion unless expressly directed by the
Appellate Court.
Atty. Adaza, in making it appear that all the respondents had moved for
the lifting of the injunction, gave the impression that respondent Judge
had participated in that motion. That is another instance showing his
inexperience and unawareness of the practice in certiorari and
prohibition cases. Trial judges who are made respondents in those special
civil actions are only formal or nominal parties. Therefore, a judge in his
official capacity should not be made to appear as a party seeking a reversal
of an Appellate Court's unfavorable action on his order or decision.
As noted at the beginning of this resolution, it was brashly and irresponsibly
contended in the oft-mentioned motion that the injunction lacked factual and
legal basis and constituted a serious miscarriage of justice.

ISSUE:

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W/N Atty. Homobono A. Adaza committed direct contempt of court? YES.

RATIO:

The lower court ignored the allegations of the petitioners that the ownership of
the Venancia Building was involved in Civil Case No. 2817; that the estate of
Florencio Reyes claimed to be the owner of the building; that the City Court of
Baguio refused to entertain an ejectment suit against Chiombon because of
the necessity of adjudicating first the ownership of the building, and that the
petitioners had leased the disputed premises up to March, 1977.

The ejectment was made by summer judgment. The petitioners were

dispossed of the premises by means of a writ of possession and not by the
usual writ of execution, No basis for the issuance of the writ of possession
was shown. And the ejectment was allegedly effected in a ruthless manner.

Thus, the verified petition reveals that the lower court acted without
jurisdiction (as far as the venue of the action was concerned) and that the
strong arm of the law was used oppressively against the petitioners by means
of the writ of possession.

An unbiased lawyer, upon a judicious consideration of the allegations of

the verified petition, would not rashly jump to the erroneous conclusion
that the mandatory injunction was bereft of any factual and legal basis
and was a serious miscarriage of justice.

Movants-respondents invoke section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which

directs that generally a preliminary injunction should be issued upon notice
and hearing. They also invoke paragraph 17 (15) of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics adopted by tile American and Philippine Bar Associations and b tile
Secretary of Justice in his Administrative Order No. 162.

Those canons were adopted "for the guidance of and observance by

all judges under the administrative supervision of the Department of Justice
(now this Court), including, municipal judges and justices of the peace.
Obviously, they do not apply to this court, a collegiate court. Nor does section
j of the Rule 58 apply to this Court. It applies to trial judges. The purpose is to
prevent them from restoring to the arbitrary, corrupt and abusive exercise of
the power to issue injunctions.

Atty. Adaza also cites the rule that injunction operates upon unperformed acts
but
not
those
already
consummated.
That
ruling
refers
to preventive injunctions, not to mandatory injunctions which require the
performance of a particular act, such as the mandatory injunction in forcible
entry cases.

In an ejectment suit, where the petitioners had been ejected by the trial court,
this Court in a certiorari action issued ex parte a writ of mandatory injunction
to restore them to the possession of the houses from which they had been
ousted Leduna vs. Hon. Enriquez.

It is obvious that Atty. Adaza's characterization of the mandatory

injunction as "unjust and a miscarriage of justice" and as devoid of
factual and legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted.

He treated a resolution of this Court as if it were a pleading of an adversary

which he could assail in unrestrained and abrasive language. His unjustified
and disrespectful characterization carries with it obvious derogatory

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implications or innuendos which clearly constitute direct contempt or

contempt facie curiae.

We hold Atty. Adaza guilty of direct contempt. However, considering his

manifest inexperience in appellate court practice, instead of punishing him
with imprisonment or fine, he is hereby severely reprimanded and warned that
a repetition of the said act would be more drastically dealt with.
A copy of this resolution should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office.

4. Ang v. Castro (MB)

Petitioner: Armando Ang
Respondents: Hon. Judge Jose P. Castro and Hon. Judge Jose P. Arro, Branch CIII,
both of the RTC of Rizal, and Assistant Fiscal Narciso T. Atienza of Quezon City
G.R. No. L-66371
May 15, 1985
SUMMARY:
Ang filed an admin case (letter-complaint before the SC) against respondent Judge
Castro for ignorance of the law, gross negligence etc. Napikon solid si judge so he did
everything in his power to make Ang feel his wrath. Judge Castro ordered Ang to
appear before him at 8:30 in the morning, and to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court, for contemptuous attitude towards him and the court.
Judge Castro found Ang guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to 5 years
imprisonment. Judge Castro also filed a criminal complaint for libel against Ang. Ang
now prays for TROs against Judge Castro and the court trying his libel case.
W/N direct contempt charges may prosper. --- NO. The alleged malicious imputations
were not uttered in the presence or so near respondent judge as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before him.

FACTS:

Ang lodged with the SC an administrative complaint against respondent judge

for ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence,
manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering
unjust decision in a civil case and dereliction of duties in not resolving his MR
of the adverse decision in said civil case.

Upon learning of the admin case filed against him by Ang, respondent judge
ordered Ang to appear before him at 8:30 in the morning, and to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent,
inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards the court and
towards him.

Respondent judge found Ang guilty of contempt of court, sentenced him to

suffer 5 days imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite
notice, to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against
him.

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Angs notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction in the

contempt charge was denied.
Thereafter, respondent judge instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal of
Quezon City a criminal complaint for libel against Ang for using malicious,
insolent and contemptuous language against him in his letter-complaint filed
before the SC.
Hence, instant petition. Ang seeks to set aside the order of respondent Judge
Castro, denying his appeal from an order holding him in contempt of court. He
asks the SC:
o to order respondent judge Castro to forward the records a civil case
to the IAC.
o to enjoin him from enforcing his order for the arrest of Ang
o to restrain respondent Assistant Fiscal Narciso 'I'. Atienza from
conducting preliminary investigation on the libel charge filed against
him by respondent judge; and
o to prohibit respondent Judge Jose P. Arro from proceeding and or
conducting a hearing on the criminal complaint for libel against Ang.
SC issued a TRO
Upon knowing that a criminal case for libel was instituted against him by
respondent Fiscal Atienza, Ang filed a supplemental petition for prohibition
against respondent Judge Jose P. Arro, who was assigned to try and hear
said criminal case. Ang prays for a supplemental writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin Judge Arro from proceeding with the libel case.
SC SC issued a TRO enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding and/or
conducting hearing on the criminal complaint for libel.
Parties failed to file their memoranda. Thus, the case is deemed submitted for
decision.
Respondent Judge Castro, in his comment, argues that failure of Ang to
appear, despite notice, on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge for
the use of derogatory language in his two letters addressed to the Office of
the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and to this Court in an
administrative complaint against him, constitutes direct contempt as the acts
actually impeded, embarrassed and obstructed him in the administration of
justice.
o

ISSUE:
W/N direct contempt charges may prosper. --- NO
HELD:

Action against respondent Judge Jose P. Castro is granted

Respondent judge is ordered to elevate the records to the IAC
Respondent trial judge is ordered to dismiss the libel case
TRO issued enjoining respondent Judge Jose P. Castro from enforcing or
carrying out the warrant of arrest issued is made permanent.

RATIO:
1. The alleged malicious imputations were not uttered in the presence or so near
respondent judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before him.

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They were contained in the pleadings and/or letters-complaint filed by Ang

before the Office of the Presidential Assistant on legal Affairs and before this
Court in the aforementioned administrative case filed by Ang against him.
The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge
in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
If the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is
submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it
is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice.
Considering the ROC, Ang's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt
and, if found guilty he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the
ROC (same as in appeal of criminal cases).

2. Angs letter is exempted from libel charges.

A communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the
party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has
a duty is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or
duty, although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which without the
privilege would be libelous and actionable ... that parties, counsel and
witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise
defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the
statements are pertinent or relevant to the case.

Records show that the libel case had already been instituted in court when
the restraining order was issued by the SC.

Nonetheless, considering the privileged character of Ang's communication to

the Chief Justice barring a prosecution for libel, it is proper that the injunction
be made permanent pursuant to the restraining order and established
doctrine against the use of the strong arm of the law as an instrument of
arbitrary and oppressive prosecution.

5. In Re: Kelly (LL)

In re AMZI B. KELLY
G.R. No. 11715 December 21, 1916
Summary: Ramon Avancea, Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands, presented a
petition in the Supreme Court and prayed that an order against the said Amzi B. Kelly
be issued requiring him to appear before the court, and show cause, why he should
not be punished for a contempt of the court, in respect of a publication of a certain
letter or communication published in "The Independent," on the 24th of February,
1916. This letter was published while a proceeding for contempt was pending. That
said letter was intended to obstruct or interfere with and tends directly to obstruct and
interfere with and impede the administration of justice in the above-mentioned
proceeding for contempt; that said Amzi B. Kelly, by the publication of said letter
intended and said publication tends directly to affect and influence the action of this

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court in the said pending matter. The respondent attacks the jurisdiction of SC to
punish him for the alleged contempt as the statutes in force in the Philippine Islands
contain no provisions authorizing the Supreme Court to punish him. SC found
respondent guilty of contempt. It ruled that the power to fine for contempt, imprison for
contumacy, or enforce the observance of order, are powers which cannot be
dispensed with in the courts, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.
The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending to obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the
execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, is a part of the law
of the land. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the
parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending
to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
FACTS:

Ramon Avancea, Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands, presented a

petition in the Supreme Court and prayed that an order against the said Amzi
B. Kelly be issued requiring him to appear before the court, and show cause,
why he should not be punished for a contempt of the court, in respect of a
publication of a certain letter or communication published in "The
Independent," on the 24th of February, 1916.

Said petition alleged:

1. That on February 12, 1916, an information was filed in this court charging
the said defendant, Amzi B. Kelly, with a contempt of this court.
2. That, after due notice and hearing, this court found the said Amzi B. Kelly
guilty of contempt of this court and sentenced him to be imprisoned and that
the said Amzi B. Kelly was duly imprisoned under said order.
3. That on February 24, 1916, the said Amzi B. Kelly, by his counsel W. H.
Lawrence, amend a motion in the Supreme Court for a rehearing of the said
proceeding for contempt and of the order of this court finding the said Amzi B.
Kelly guilty of contempt; that said motion was fully heard and submitted to this
court for determination and is still pending in this court for determination and
still under advisement by this court and was so pending and under
consideration at the time the letter hereinafter referred to was composed,
written, and published.
4. That on or about February 24, 1916, while said proceeding or contempt
and the said motion made therein were pending in this court, the said Amzi B.
Kelly wrote, composed, and caused to be published in a weekly newspaper
regularly published once each week in the city of Manila, P. I., and circulated
in the said city of Manila and in the Philippine Islands, in its issue of the 4th
day of March, 1916, of an concerning this court and its supposed action with
reference to said proceeding for contempt and the said pending motion made
26
therein, a certain letter
26

"MANILA, P. I., February 24, 1916.

"Mr. VICENTE SOTTO,
"Editor of "The Independent.
"SIR: I was very much amused at your cartoon displaying me as attacking a rock wall. The men
against me are many but man, Don Vicente, is not made of rock but of mud; and it appears that

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5. That said letter was intended to obstruct or interfere with and tends directly
to obstruct and interfere with and impede the administration of justice in the
above-mentioned proceeding for contempt and the said motion made therein;
that said Amzi B. Kelly, by the publication of said letter intended and said
publication tends directly to affect and influence the action of this court in the
said pending matter.
Upon a consideration of said petition, the court, issued the following order:

some of the men who have been so arrogantly misusing imaginary judicial powers are made of a
very poor quality of this substance. Keep up the fight and tell the people, the Filipino people, for
whom I am laboring, that at liberty or in prison, I shall never discontinue until the innocence of
General Noriel and his companions is vindicated and the infamous system that murdered Dr. Jose
Rizal and murdered General Noriel and his companions is completely eliminated from the
Philippine Islands.
"Do not hesitate to condemn the individuals whom I accused for criminal careless neglect of duty
and then, cowardly shielding themselves behind contempt proceedings, imprisoned me in Bilibid.
Truth cannot be dishonored; right cannot be imprisoned. Them may temporarily restrain counsel;
but his great cause, firmly established in the heart of the people American and Filipino will
move on with a steady substantial unerring step and all those in ignorance will gradually see the
right, change and march with us; and the criminals espousing wrong, will go down before the host
of right, like frail leaves before the autumn wind.
"The people do not really understand the great wrong committed by. . . . Taking this decision in
my case as a basis, if you should criticize or espouse the crime, or charge him with it, the same
judge could mount the bench and imprison you for six months without the right of appeal; or if you
should happen to see an individual on the street committing a crime; having charged him with it
if he be a citizen like you or me you might be saved; but, if he should happen to be a judge
according to this decision he could imprison you without the right to appeal.
"Of course, nothing of this kind is the law. It is no more contempt of court to criticize the acts of a
judge or charge with a crime the janitor of the court. Nevertheless, as long as this infamous law
remains in the statute books and . . . the liberty of no man is safe and this law should be
immediately repealed. One day in jail, victim of the arrogance of an individual, is too long for a
freeman to suffer.
"As soon as the Supreme Court of the United States sees this case, they will reverse it; and when
the Senate sees it, even without the Noriel case, they will remove the judges responsible for it; for
their actions in my case is really worse and more atrocious than their actions in the Noriel case.
For in the Noriel case, they were only careless, but in my case, they were both arbitrary and
arrogant and knowingly and maliciously perpetrated a wrong for the purpose of terrorizing the
people and intimidating the press. They may have frightened some faint hearts, but their actions
have only spurred me on to a tenfold greater activity in order to rid the country of them; and I shall
never cease my labor until . . . and I say this with the positive assurance to you that under no
conceivable condition would I accept, even if offered, a position on said bench made vacant by
any of the men against whom I am, and shall continue to labor.
"Hand in hand with the vindication of Noriel and companions, is the elimination of these men and
their ideas, and in the end, both shall be accomplished and we will have no more judicial
arrogance, but begin in these Islands the system hinted at in the book: "The Trained Judiciary."
"Very respectfully,
"AMZI B. KELLY."

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

It is ordered that the said Amzi B. Kelly show cause to the Supreme Court, at
the court house in the city of Manila, on Saturday the 25th of March, 1916, at
nine o'clock a. m, in open court, why he should not be punished as and for
contempt of this court for the publication referred to.
On the 25th of March, 1916, the said Amzi B. Kelly appeared and filed a
written answer to said order. He also presented an oral argument.

ISSUE: W/N there are provisions of law in force in the Philippine Islands authorizing
the Supreme Court to punish him for the alleged contempt committed. YES
RATIO:

The respondent attacks the jurisdiction of this court to punish him for the
alleged contempt charged in the petition of the Attorney-General. He alleges
that the statutes in force in the Philippine Islands contain no provisions
authorizing the Supreme Court to punish him.

The power to fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, or enforce the
observance of order, are powers which cannot be dispensed with in the
courts, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.

The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending to obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to
the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, is a
part of the law of the land.

Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very

creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in the presence
and submission to their lawful mandates, and as corollary to this provision, to
preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and
pollution.

The existence of the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is

essential to the observance of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently
to the due administration of justice.

Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties,
the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending
to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is
punishable.

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,

respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice and subjects such persons to contempt
proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal right to have justice
administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from
outside coercion or interference.

Considering that the said Amzi B. Kelly did, by said publication, thereby
willfully, maliciously, and deliberately intend and attempt to bring the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands and the members thereof into contempt and
ridicule and to lower the dignity, standing, and prestige of the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands and to hinder and delay the due administration of

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justice in the Philippine Islands; and considering that the said Amzi B. Kelly
admitted in open court the authorship of said publication; and considering that
said publication was intended to obstruct and interfere with, and tends directly
to obstruct and interfere with and impede the administration of justice in said
pending proceedings in the Supreme Court; and considering that the said
Amzi B. Kelly, by means of said publication intended the action of the
Supreme Court in the said pending proceedings, and to bring the Supreme
Court into contempt and to destroy its usefulness in the Philippine Islands,
and the confidence of the people therein, and to hinder and prevent the due
administration of justice; it is hereby ordered and decreed:
HELD:

That be reason of said false, malicious, and defamatory charges contained in

said publication, that the said Amzi B. Kelly is hereby found guilty of contempt
of this court, by virtue of said publication, and he is hereby sentenced to be in
Bilibid, for a period of six months, and that he pay a fine of P1,000, and stand
committed until said fine is paid, not exceeding two months. Said
imprisonment in lieu of fine shall be in addition to the imprisonment of six
months heretofore imposed.

The delay in the promulgation of the foregoing sentence has been for the
reason that this court desired to give the said respondent a full, free, and
complete opportunity to defend himself in a certain against him in the CFI
Manila. That action having been finally disposed of, the foregoing decision
and sentence is hereby promulgated.

It is further ordered and decreed that the sentence of imprisonment

hereinbefore imposed, shall commence to be served immediately upon the
termination, by expiration, suspension, or otherwise, of the period of
imprisonment heretofore imposed by this court in cause R. F. No. 12109,
entitled, The United States, plaintiff and appellee, vs.Amzi B. Kelly, defendant
and appellant, which sentence was promulgated on the 1st of December,
1916, and in which a final sentence was rendered upon the 13th of
December, 1916.

6. In Re: Lozano and Quevedo (JM)

54 Phil 801, 805 | July 24, 1930
In re SEVERINO LOZANO and ANASTASIO QUEVEDO
Ponente: J. Malcolm
Summary:
Ex-attorney Jose Y. Torres filed an administrative complaint against Judge Garduo of
CFI Capiz. The Sol-Gen was then designated to conduct the investigation of the
charges, and pursuant to said designation, proceeded to Capiz, Capiz, to take the
testimony of certain witnesses. The investigation was conducted secretly, as is
customary. BUT notwithstanding, El Pueblo, a newspaper published in Iloilo and edited
by Severino Lozano, printed an account of the investigation written by Anastacio
Quevedo, an employee in the office of the Judge under investigation. Alleging that the

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facts contained in the report are "false, malicious, and untrue", the Attorney General
files this petition for the SC to punish Lozano & Quevedo for contempt.
The SC punished them for contempt for publishing and inaccurate account of the
investigation of a Judge of First Instance notwithstanding the investigation was
conducted behind closed doors, and notwithstanding a resolution of this court which
makes such proceedings confidential in nature. The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in the Supreme Court. The rule is that newspaper publications tending to
impede, obstruct, embarass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable
by the courts.
FACTS:

The complaint of an attorney against a Judge of First Instance was by resolution

of this court referred to the Attorney-General for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
o The Solicitor-General was designated to conduct the investigation of the
charges, and pursuant to said designation, proceeded to Capiz, Capiz, to take
the testimony of certain witnesses.

The investigation was conducted secretly, as is customary. BUT notwithstanding,

El Pueblo, a newspaper published in Iloilo and edited by Severino Lozano, printed
an account of the investigation written by Anastacio Quevedo, said to be an
employee in the office of the Judge under investigation.

The opening portion of this article, as translated from Spanish to English, reads:
INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES AGAINST JUDGE GARDUO
The announced investigation of the administrative charges filed in
the Supreme Court by ex-attorney Jose Y. Torres against Judge
Garduo was commenced on the 22nd instant in the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The Solicitor-General, Alexander Reyes, was
designated to investigate the charges in behalf of the Attorney-General,
to whom they were indorsed for investigation.
It appears that it was some three months ago that the investigation
was begun in the office of the Solicitor-General in Manila, and that,
therefore, the proceedings taken here were but its continuation. The
hearing was held behind closed doors, notwithstanding my desire to
attend the same in order to take notes and send them, for publication, to
the newspaper El Pueblo, which I represent as correspondent.
However, behind the screen which shut the door of the investigation
room, something could be heard of what transpired within, and to this
circumstance, together with the comments offered gratis et amore in
social circles, are due the present notes of the hearing.

The remaining portion of the article purports to give an account of the evidence of
the different witnesses.

Regarding this account, the complainant attorney alleges that the facts therein
contained are "false, malicious, and untrue" and that "said report took sides with
the respondent judge . . . and expressed an opinion as to the merits of the same,
with the object undoubtedly, to influence the action of the investigator and the

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public in general and to obstruct, embarrass or impede the course of the present
investigation."
o Moreover, the newspaper report "does not contain a fair and true account of
the facts disclosed at the investigation, . . . creating a wrong impression in the
mind of the public and tending to influence improperly the action of this court
in the said pending matter."
Thus, this petition of the Attorney-General praying the court to require the editor
and the reporter to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt.
o The answer of the editor pleads good faith, while the answer of the reporter
relies on no less than ten reasons, some material and some puerile, why the
petition should be dismissed.

ISSUE: WON the SC should punish for contempt, the editor and the reporter of a
newspaper, for publishing and inaccurate account of the investigation of a Judge of
First Instance notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind closed doors,
and notwithstanding a resolution of this court which makes such proceedings
confidential in nature. YES.
RATIO:

At the time of publication of the article, there was in force a SC resolution of this
court which provided "That all proceedings looking to the suspension or
disbarment of lawyers, and all proceedings looking to the suspension or removal
of judges of first instance, shall be considered confidential in nature until the final
disposition of the matter."
o In so far as this resolution relates to the suspension or removal of Judges of
First Instance, it finds support in section 173 of the Administrative Code,
authorizing the SC to conduct inquiries into the conduct of Judges of First
Instance "and to adopt such rules of procedure in that regard as it may deem
proper."
o Reason: consists in the practice of litigants and others making vindictive and
malicious charges against lawyers and Judges of First Instance, which are
ruinous to the reputations of the respondent lawyers and judges. It was
accordingly thought best to keep such matters secret for the good of the
administration of justice until the final outcome of the proceedings could be
ascertained.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the Supreme Court. This
power extends to administrative proceedings as well as to suits at law.
o It is as necessary to maintain respect for the courts, to safeguard their very
existence, in administrative cases concerning the removal and suspension of
judges as it is in any other class of judicial proceedings.

The rule is that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct,

embarass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit
or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable
by the courts.
o It is also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish
any matters which their policy requires should be kept private, as for example
the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Burns vs. State: where, in referring to the

commendation meted out to the courts of England, it was said: "Judicial
proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the
proper administration of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial.
The Organic Act guarantees freedom of speech and press. The court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under to Libel Law
which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen
path.
o BUT license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be
confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of
the Judiciary.
o Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a
resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to
be permitted by subterranean means of diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the
courts.given publicity by the press.
Judge Holmes: This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its
constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial
court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it
will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
The parties plead ignorance in extenuation of their offense. Also other
newspapers, particularly in the metropolis, have been guilty of similar acts. But
that fact does not purge the respondents of their contempt. All facts considered,
we desire on the one hand to proceed on the corrective and not true retaliatory
idea of punishment, while on the other giving due notice that practices of which
the respondents are guilty must stop.

DECISION: Severino Lazano and Anastacio Quevedo are guilty of contempt of court.
They will be punished by payment of (P20) each, to be turned into the office of the
clerk of court within fifteen days from receipt of notice, with the admonition that if they
fail to comply, further and more drastic action by the court will be necessary.

7. People v. Godoy (RS)

3/29/1995 | Regalado, J.
GR Nos. 115908
Plaintiff-appelle: People
Respondents: Danny Godoy [GODOY]
GR Nos. 115909
Complainant: Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. [JUDGE GACOTT]
Respondents: Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. [REYNOSO] and Eva Ponce DE LEON [DE
LEON]
SUMMARY:

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Reynoso and De Leon were defendants in a complaint for indirect contempt filed by
Judge Gacott in relation to a rape case tried by the latter. Judge avers that the article
tends to impede, obstruct, belittle and downgrade the administration of justice because
of the disrespectful and insulting averments made.
1. W/N Reynoso and De Leon should be cited for contempt. NO. Snide
remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level
of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Neither do we believe that the publication in question was intended to
influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so
2. Whether or not post-litigation Publications can be the subject of contempt
proceedings. YES [Philippine rule is qualified American rule]. One may still
be cited for contempt of court even after a case has ended, where such
punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to
vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade,
ridicule or bring the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy
public confidence in that court.
3. Which court has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged
contumely is committed against a lower court while the case is pending in the
appellate or higher court. APPELLATE COURT. However, where the entire
case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt
rests with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the
proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect the status
quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court
FACTS:

This is related to the Godoy rape case in our Evidence class.

This case stems from a complaint filed by Judge Gacott of RTC Palawan for
indirect contempt against a columnist named Reynoso and De Leon, the
publisher of Palawan Times.

Reynoso, on his column On the Beat, wrote that Judge Gacott was claiming
that he received death threats from Wilmar Godoy, whose criminal case was
being tried by said judge.

Godoy, in the article however, denied that he made threats.

There is also a statement there saying Pero isang warning din sa may mga
nobya, na magingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka
mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung
kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid ang laban diyan.

Judge Gacott avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle and
downgrade the administration of justice because of the disrespectful and
insulting averments made. It casts doubt on the integrity and honesty of
Judge Gacott and on his ability to administer justice objectively.

Reynoso however contends that his article did not intend to impede nor
obstruct administration of justice because the article was published after
Judge Gacott had promulgated his decision.
o He also contends that it will not affect the appeal to SC because
Palawan Times was being circulated in Puerto Princesa only.
o He also claims it as an exercise of freedom of expression and press.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Also, he claims that he was just giving a reaction to the INTERVIEW

given by Judge Gacott in the show Magandang Gabi Bayan where
he defended his decision in the said case.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Reynoso and De Leon should be cited for contempt. NO.
2. Whether or not post-litigation Publications can be the subject of contempt
proceedings. YES [Philippine rule].
3. Which court has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged
contumely is committed against a lower court while the case is pending in the
appellate or higher court. APPELLATE COURT.
HELD: Complaint for indirect contempt dismissed. What is involved here is a situation
where the statements have been taken out of context. No reason for contempt
proceedings. Constitutes mere fair criticisms.
RATIO:
RESPONDENDS SHOULD NOT BE CITED FOR CONTEMPT.

The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect,
primarily, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the
court, and, secondarily, his compulsory performance of some act or duty
required of him by the court and which he refuses to perform.
o Due perhaps to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to
punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.
o However, the line of demarcation between acts constituting criminal
contempt, as distinguished from civil contempt, is quite indistinct.
The confusion in attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts is
due to the fact that there are contempts in which both elements
appear; or there are contempts which are neither wholly civil nor
altogether criminal, but partake of the characteristics of both; or it is
also possible that the same act may constitute both a civil and
criminal contempt.

As to nature of offense:
o Criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity
and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and

authority of the court, is an offense against organized
society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense
against public justice which raises an issue between the
public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it
are punitive.

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Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that

no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
o Civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be
done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party
therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose
behalf the violated order is made.

Proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for

the purpose of the preservation of the right of private
persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a
felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

There is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil

contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendants intent in
committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or
the absence of intent to violate the courts order is not a
defense in civil contempt.
As to purpose for which power is exercised:
o Where the primary purpose is to preserve the courts authority and to
punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal.
o Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured
suitor and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil.
As to character of the contempt proceeding
o Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the
nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in
nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are
interested in their prosecution.

Strictly speaking, the proceeding has been characterized as

sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a
civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither.
o Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and
civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement
of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do
the thing required.
Here, snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume
that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in question was
intended to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable
of doing so. The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial
comment and criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists
a substantive evil which is extremely serious and that the degree of its
imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for
contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of
free speech and press.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

The article written by Reynoso does not deal with the merits of the case but
rather, with the public accusations being made by Judge Gacott that he is
receiving death threats from Godoy. It is a report of rumors, not presented as
facts. He merely gave a reaction, not to the decision made in the case, but to
the interview given by J. Gacott to Magandang Gabi Bayan.

W/N POST-LITIGATION PUBLICATIONS CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF CONTEMPT

PROCEEDINGS [IMPT!]

A person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or

publishing writings which are clearly opprobrious may not, ordinarily, escape
liability therefor by merely invoking the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
speech and press.

Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with an abuse of such
liberties.

Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of

justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of speech
or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of
court.

Different Schools of Thought:

o English doctrine There can be contempt of court even after the
case has been terminated.
o American doctrine GR: defamatory comments on the conduct of a
judge with respect to past cases or matters finally disposed of do not
constitute contempt, even though libelous and reflecting on the
integrity of the judge and the court.

Philippine doctrine After a discussion of various Philippine cases,

Regalado, J. concluded that the Philippines adhere to the a qualified
American doctrine, thus:
o One may still be cited for contempt of court even after a case
has ended, where such punitive action is necessary to protect
the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct
intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the court
into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in
that court.

The SC cited the cases of Brillantes and Almacen

o It appears, thus, that in the two latest cases decided by this Court,
the general rule that there can be no contempt in post-litigation
publications is not necessarily all- embracing under certain
situations.
o From the shift in judicial approach in Brillantes to the position
announced in Almacen, it can inevitably be concluded that the
termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a
contempt charge for publications or utterances which are

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defamatory or libelous, depending on the purpose and effects

thereof.
In other words, one may still be cited for contempt of court even
after a case has ended, where such punitive action is necessary
to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts
or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring
the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public
confidence in that court. [rephrasing of the Phil. Doctrine]

JURISDICTION IN CONTEMPT CASES ALREADY APPEALED RESTS IN THE

APPELLATE COURT.

As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt

properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given
controversy.

Partly because of administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full

personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no
other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt.

[IMPT!!!] However, where the entire case has already been appealed,
jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where
the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there
is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the
jurisdiction of the appellate court.
o Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint for indirect contempt against De Leon and Reynoso, it has
taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the
same.
8. In Re: Sotto (RT)
In Re: Vicente Sotto
VICENTE SOTTO
January 21, 1949
In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.
Summary
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente
Sotto for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court
in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court. The respondent does not deny having
published the above quoted threat, and intimidation as well as false and calumnious
charges against this Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no
power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court
can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated
by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive."And he also alleges in his
answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution,
the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high
Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not
attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.'
W/N respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto is guilty of contempt of this Court? YES
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a
doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the
United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts
of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence.The Supreme Court
of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.
FACTS:

This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente
Sotto, who was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written
statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for
contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other
daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has
to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news
published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many blunders of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I
believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.
As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said
loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of
today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned
jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.

Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five
originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the
expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted.

This Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after considering his
answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been
published. But, in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to defend
himself or justify the publication of such libelous statement, the case was set for

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hearing or oral argument on January 4, the hearing being later postponed to

January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing,
the case was submitted for decision.
Respondents Answer

The respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat, and
intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court.

But he therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose
correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can
only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be
promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive."

And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement
in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending
any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in
his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked,
or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.'
ISSUE:
W/N respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto is guilty of contempt of this Court? YES

Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of
court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent
powers of the court to punish for contempt.
The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of
section 231 and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended, in
connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent power if the
superior courts to punish for contempt is several cases, among them In
re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944.
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is
a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort
in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution
and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence.
In reKelly:
o The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending
cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as
misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and
subjects such persons to contempt proceedings.
o Parties have a constitutional right to have their fairly in court, by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor.
o Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference.
o Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the upon court, the
parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the

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suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt

of court and is punishable.
o The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all court. The summary
power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstructed or
degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to
the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is
a part of the law of the land.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and
obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or
modifying its decision.
Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to a statement that our
decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct,
because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill which became
a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the
press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court
upon petition of Angel Parazo.
He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as
to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice.
But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration of justice.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the
law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on
a very shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press
with the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of
the honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt
him from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied by his acts and statements
during the pendency of this proceeding.

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The respondent in his petition of December 11, alleges that Justice

Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for
contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case
through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must
be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of
the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense.
As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of
the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.
U. S vs Sullens (1929): "The administration of justice and the freedom of the
press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be
violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties
and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from
which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. xxx"
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may
be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of
flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594).
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of
contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby
sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this
judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and
show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an
attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the
following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel
Parazo for contempt of Court.
In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of
December 9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail,
but it cannot close my mouth; " and in his other statement published on December
10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated among others: "It is not the imprisonment
that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment."
In his Rizal day speech at the Abellana High School in Cebu, published on
January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was
more freedom of speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now
when it is composed of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in
placing him behind bars, the court can not close his mouth," and added: "I would
consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me
because the cause is noble and lofty."
And the Manila Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of the respondent
in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with malice" in citing him to appear
before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court know that I came
here on vacation."
In all said statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the
charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for criticizing
the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the
press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and

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influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false
accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.

3.

9. Macrohon v. Ibay (MB)

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1970, November 30, 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Complainants: Allan Macrohon, Rodrigo Gonzales and Redeem Ongtinco
Respondent: Judge Francisco B. Ibay, RTC Branch 135, Makati City
SUMMARY:
Complainants are laborers of HIS Construction which was engaged to paint the Gusali
ng Katarungan in Makati. While they were removing scaffoldings, a small amount of
water flowed to a closed window jalousie. They were approached by a policeman and
were brought to respondent Judge Ibays sala. Complainants apologized and offered to
help in cleaning up the floor but Judge Ibay replied, "Huwag na, baka sampalin pa kita"
[taray ni atih]. Judge Ibay cited the complainants for contempt and sentenced them to
imprisonment of 5 days. Executive Judge Leticia Morales asked Judge Ibay to
reconsider who then ordered the complainants release within the same day. In Judge
Ibays defense, he says that contempt was justified because he would not be able to
write down his decisions as expediently as when he has the full use of his computer
and meet on time the requirements of decision-making. Investigating Justice found
Judge Ibay administratively liable. SC affirmed:
(1) The acts of the complainants hardly fit into any of the circumstances
described in Sections 1 (Direct) and 3 (Indirect) of Rule 71 (Contempt) only
underscores the vindictiveness of its exercise.
(2) The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised
on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish
for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended
as a safeguard not for judges as persons but for the functions that they
exercise.
(3) A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act
which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so
that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or
thing is forbidden or required.
FACTS:

A "Pinagsanib na Salaysay" was filed by the complainants Allan Macrohon

and others, before the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Ibay
Francisco D. Ibay charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority.
1. The complainants alleged that they are laborers of HIS Construction
which was engaged to paint the Gusali ng Katarungan in Makati.
2. While they were removing scaffoldings, a small amount of water
(collected water from the rain the night before) flowed to a closed
window jalousie. Considering that said window jalousie was closed,
they did not bother so much about the water and they continued with
their work.

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Several minutes later, a policeman arrived and took their names and
when they asked him why, the policeman replied that they will be
informed of the reason when they reach the sala of Judge Ibay.
4. When they reached the chamber of Judge Ibay at around 9:30 in the
morning, the latter who was then "galit na galit," met them and
showed to them the flooring of his chamber which was drenched
with water. They apologized as they did not intend to cause such
damage and complainant Redeem Ongtinco even volunteered to
clean the wet floor, but Judge Ibay replied, "Huwag na, baka
sampalin pa kita;"
5. They were surprised when a charge was read to them in English
which they did not understand, except the portion that they will be
imprisoned for 5 days, and they were detained at the police precinct.
Judge Ibays comment/answers:
1. He felt that what the complainants did was contemptuous as the
incident in question occurred while he was typing one of his
decisions. The careless attitude of the 3 complainants in carrying out
their tasks and their obvious indifference to the safety and well-being
of others, resulted in the damage of his computer. He was not able
to use the same computer for at least a week and was forced to
handwrite his decisions, draft them and have them typed by his staff.
2. He set the hearing and when the complainants appeared before him,
he informed them that they were being charged with contempt of
court. He gave the complainants an opportunity to explain what
happened, but not being satisfied with their explanation, he cited
them in contempt of court and issued an Order sentencing all the
complainants with imprisonment up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day.
3. Before noontime of the same day, Executive Judge Leticia Morales
called him up by telephone and requested him to reconsider his
decision. Hence, he dictated an Order immediately after lunch,
releasing the complainants. This Order was delivered to the jail
before 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. He did not,
however, inquire anymore whether the complainants were released
on the same day.
4. He admitted that he does not have any record of the proceedings
and he cannot even remember the date of the subject incident which
transpired four 4 years ago.
5. The belated filing of the instant complaint about an incident which
occurred in August 2002, together with other complaints against him
involving other complainants, are indications that an invisible hand is
orchestrating these actions against him.
Order issued complainants and Judge Ibay to appear for a preliminary
conference and initial presentation of evidence.
o A copy of the said Order was duly served on Judge Ibay, but the
copies intended for the complainants were not delivered as the said
Process Server was not able to find the given address which was
insufficient.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

Acting Division Clerk of Court caused the sending of the copies of

the Order to the complainants by Express Mail Services but the
envelopes containing these copies were also returned with the
notation "No longer connected."
Hearing only Judge Ibay with his counsel, Atty. Apolonio A. Padua, Jr.,
appeared, while the complainants were absent.
o Atty. Padua moved for the dismissal of the case for failure of the
complainants to inform the Court of their latest address, but the
Investigating Justice proceeded with the investigation.
o Investigating Justice observed that complainants Pinagsanib na
Salaysay on the circumstances surrounding their incarceration upon
the order of Judge Ibay, are substantially correct and true even if
they did not appear.
o In the Motion for Leave To Admit Herein Supplement to the June 30,
2006 Memorandum of the Respondent and Manifestation, Judge
Ibay admits that he erred in citing the complainants in contempt but
insists that it was "a mistake of judgment" and "an innocent error."
Investigating Justice (subscribed view by SC) found Judge Ibay
administratively liable for abusing his contempt powers.
o Nothing on the records substantiates Judge Ibay's claim that the
subject incident is not an accident and that the complainant's
manner in carrying out their duties is contemptuous.
o Clearly, Judge Ibay used his contempt power in a vindictive and
retaliatory manner. The fact that "he would not be able to write down
his decisions as expediently as when he has the full use of his
computer and meet on time the requirements of decision-making" is
no excuse nor justification for utilizing such power for retaliation and
vindication.
o The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must
exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for
judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. The court
must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost self-restraint.
o Judge Ibay had no legitimate basis to hold the complainants liable
thereto and cite them in contempt based on the flimsy reason that he
was not satisfied with their explanation about the said incident.
o The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner
which smacks of retaliation as, in this case, is appalling and violative
of Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary which mandates that "the behavior and conduct of judges
must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Ibay abused his authority in citing the complainants in contempt
and ordering their incarceration. --- YES

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HELD:

For improperly citing complainants in contempt and ordering their detention,

Judge Ibay Francisco B. Ibay of the RTC, Branch 135, is FINED P25,000 for
gravely abusing his authority.

He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar

acts shall be dealt with more severely.
RATIO:
1. Contempt (Rule 71) defined; Direct (Sec. 1) and Indirect (Sec. 3)

Contempt --- defined as "[a] disobedience to the court by setting up an

opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. Under the Rules of Court,
contempt may either be direct or indirect.

Direct contempt --- consists of or is characterized by "misbehavior committed

in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings
before the same" within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71, ROC:
o A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the
court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward
others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so,
may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished
by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both,
if it be a lower court.

Indirect contempt --- is one committed out of or not in the presence of the
court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and
justice. Section 3, Rule 71 of the ROC provides for the mode of commencing
proceedings for and enumerates the particular acts which constitute indirect
contempt:
(1) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official
duties or in his official transactions;
(2) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real properly, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
emit led thereto;
(3) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section
1 of this Rule;
(4) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(5) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

(6) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(7) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held
by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
issuing process to bring the respondent into court or from holding him in
custody pending such proceedings.
2. The acts of the complainants hardly fit into any of the circumstances
described in Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 71 only underscores the vindictiveness of
its exercise.

A judges image of sanctity and dignity is evoked by the acts of Judge Ibay as
underscored by the heavy-handed use of the contempt powers against
complainants. Certainly Judge Ibay should not take advantage of his public
office to oppress or abuse others.

Judge Ibay needs to be reminded that government service is people oriented.

Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of
culture and good breeding.

The present case is not respondent's first offense because only recently, he
had been similarly administratively sanctioned for Grave Abuse of Authority.
o Panaligan v. Ibay --- respondent was fined for improperly citing in
contempt the complainant and sending him to jail because the latter
switched off the electric power on the floor where respondent's sala
is located during the latter's tour of duty the night before. The Court
said:

A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for

contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be
done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no
reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or
thing is forbidden or required.

Obviously his previous chastisement has not reformed the respondent

because in addition to the instant administrative complaint, he has two other
pending cases for the same charges.

10. Regalado v. Go (LL)

G.R. No. 167988 | February 6, 2007
Petitioner:
MA.
Respondent: ANTONIO S. GO

CONCEPCION

L.

REGALADO

Summary: The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal
filed before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech
Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose
E. Barin, represented by petitioner Atty. Regalado. After the promulgation of the Court
of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the
parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the

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approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on
the same day, issued an Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice.
The execution of the compromise agreement was attended by the counsel for EHSI,
Kunack and Barin, petitioner Atty. Regalado, and respondent Go, but in the absence
and without the knowledge of respondent Go's lawyer. However, after the receipt of a
copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and
Quitclaim on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the same motion,
respondent Go, through counsel, moved that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to
explain her unethical conduct for directly negotiating with respondent Go without the
knowledge of his counsel. The Court held that the acts of petitioner Atty. Regalado
constitute indirect contempt. However, the proceedings conducted in convicting
petitioner were not done in accordance with law. In all other cases, charges for indirect
contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance
with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition
shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion
orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint
hearing and decision. In this case, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of
petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to
which this Court cannot close its eyes without offending the fundamental principles
enunciated in the Rules that we, ourselves, had promulgated.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution of the Court of

Appeals, finding petitioner Ma. Concepcion L. Regalado (Atty. Regalado)
guilty of indirect contempt and is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
27
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed
before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against
Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and
General Manager Jose E. Barin.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally dismissed from
employment and considering that reinstatement would not be feasible
because of strained relations, [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] are ordered to pay
[herein respondent Go] backwages, separation pay; plus moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees

On appeal to the NLRC, EHSI, Kunack and Barin employed the legal services
of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices where
herein petitioner Atty. Regalado worked as an associate
27

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant (sic), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for investigation and possible administrative sanction

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220

NLRC rendered a Decision reversing the Labor Arbiters decision and

declaring that respondent Gos separation from employment was legal for it
was attended by a just cause and was validly effected by EHSI, Kunack and
Barin.
Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the adverse decision to the CA. CA set
aside the ruling of the NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter
adjudging EHSI, Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal dismissal. The appellate
court thus ordered EHSI, Kunack and Barin to pay respondent Go full
backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages. The award of
attorneys fees is DELETED.
After the promulgation of the CA decision but prior to the receipt of the parties
of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a
10
Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor Arbiter,
therefore dismissing the illegal dismissal case but WITH PREJUDICE.
The execution of the compromise agreement was attended by the counsel for
EHSI, Kunack and Barin, petitioner Atty. Regalado, and respondent Go, but in
the absence and without the knowledge of respondent Gos lawyer.
After the receipt of a copy of the CA decision, respondent Go, through
counsel, filed, a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the
Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue
influence. In the same motion, respondent Go, through counsel, moved that
petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her unethical conduct for directly
negotiating with respondent Go without the knowledge of his counsel. The
motion thus prays:
It is likewise prayed for [EHSI, Kunack and Barins] counsel, particularly
Atty. Ma. Concepcion Regalado, to be required to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them (sic) for their (sic), unethical conduct of
directly negotiating with [respondent Go] without the presence of undersigned
counsel, and for submitting the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim before Labor
Arbiter Waldo Emerson Gan knowing fully well that the controversy between
[respondent Go] and [EHSI] is still pending before this Honorable Court.
CA issued a Resolution annulling the Order of the Labor Arbiter for lack of
jurisdiction. In the same resolution, petitioner Atty. Regalado was ordered to
explain why she should not be cited for contempt of court for violating Canon
9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. The decretal portion of the Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Manifestation with Omnibus Motion
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The order of Labor Arbiter Gan dismissing the
case with prejudice is hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
[EHSI, Kunack and Barins] counsel, [herein petitioner] Atty. Ma. Concepcion
Regalado is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from receipt of this
Resolution why she should not be cited for contempt of court for directly
negotiating with [herein respondent Go] in violation of Canon 9 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics. On the other hand, the Motion for Reconsideration Ad
Cautelam is hereby denied for lack of merit.
For her part, petitioner Atty. Regalado submitted a Compliance and explained
that she never took part in the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the
illegal dismissal case. EHSI, Kunack and Barin, through a Mr. Ragay, a

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

former EHSI employee and a close ally of respondent Go, were the ones who
negotiated the settlement.
Further, petitioner Atty. Regalado maintained that she never met personally
respondent Go, not until 16 July 2003, when the latter appeared before the
Labor Arbiter for the execution of the Release Waiver and Quitclaim.
Petitioner Atty. Regalado claimed that she was in fact apprehensive to
release the money to respondent Go because the latter cannot present any
valid identification card to prove his identity. It was only upon the assurance of
Labor Arbiter Gan that Antonio S. Go and the person representing himself as
such were one and the same, that the execution of the agreement was
consummated.
Considering the circumstances, petitioner Atty. Regalado firmly stood that
there was no way that she had directly dealt with respondent Go, to the
latters damage and prejudice, and misled him to enter into an amicable
settlement with her client.
CA disregarded petitioner Atty. Regalados defenses and adjudging her guilty
of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. As declared
by the appellate court, even granting arguendo that petitioner Atty. Regalado
did not participate in the negotiation process, she was nonetheless under the
obligation to restrain her clients from doing acts that she herself was
prohibited to perform as mandated by Canon 16 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics. However, instead of preventing her clients from
negotiating with respondent Go who was unassisted by his counsel, Atty.
Regalado actively participated in the consummation of the compromise
agreement by dealing directly with respondent Go and allowing him to sign
the Release Waiver and Quitclaim without his lawyer.
Petitioner Atty. Regalado filed a MR which was also denied.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE
MANDATORY PROVISION OF RULE 71 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE. YES
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MANIFEST
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM
CHALLENGING ITS AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN THE CONTEMPT CHARGES
AGAINST HER. YES
RATIO:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation

It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its

authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice

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The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice
Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual function: (1) vindication of public
interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion to compel
the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the power of the
Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit awarded by the
Court

In our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely direct
contempt and indirect contempt.

Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to

obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal
to be sworn or answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so

Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which

constitute indirect contempt. Section 4 provides how proceedings for indirect
contempt should be commenced.
o In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced
by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true
copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for
civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose
out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the
petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.

Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance
with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as
outlined must be complied with.

There is no doubt that the complained acts of Atty. Regalado would fall under
paragraphs (a) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71, as in fact, she was adjudged
guilty of indirect contempt. But were the proceedings conducted in convicting
petitioner done in accordance with law?
The instant case was not initiated by the court motu proprio necessitates us to look into
the second mode of filing indirect contempt proceedings

In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by

respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion. It was based
on the aforesaid Motion that the appellate court issued a Resolution requiring
petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt.

Clearly, respondent Gos Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst
which set everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty.

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Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to the attention of the appellate

court the alleged misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without
such positive act on the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge
could have been initiated at all.
Indeed, the appellate court itself, in its Resolution dated 30 August 2004,
made categorical findings as to how the contempt charge was initiated, to wit:
In the present case, [respondents Go] Manifestation With Omnibus Motion
which led to our 19 November 2003 Resolution requiring Atty. Regalado to
explain why she should not be cited for contempt,
We cannot argue that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect
contempt charge without contradicting the factual findings made by the very
same court which rendered the questioned resolution.
It is true in Leonidas v. Judge Supnet this Court ruled that the contempt
proceedings was considered commenced by the court motu proprio even if
the show cause order came after the filing of the motions to cite for contempt
filed by the adverse party. The Decision thus reads:
o It is true that the Tamondong Spouses did file a Motion To Cite
Plaintiff For Contempt Of Court, dated May 17, 2000. In this pleading
they prayed that Union Bank be declared in indirect contempt of
court for its disobedience to the Pasay MTCs Order dated May 9,
2000. This Order dated May 9, 2000 specifically directed Union Bank
to "return immediately to the defendants the replevied motor
vehicle." However, the Tamondong Spouses unverified motion
dated May 17, 2000 cannot invalidate the contempt proceedings
because these proceedings were initiated by respondent judge motu
proprio.
This above-cited case, however, has no application in the case at bar for the
factual milieu of the cases are different from each other. In Leonidas, there
was an order of the court that was utterly violated by Union Bank. Thus, even
in the absence of the motion of spouses Tamondong to cite Union Bank in
contempt, the court a quo on its own can verily initiate the action. In the
present case, the appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of
petitioner Atty. Regalados misbehavior without respondent Gos
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct
committed by the former.

Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court
already acquired jurisdiction, the Rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated
independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for
the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a
certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees,
must be faithfully observed

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules
prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the requirements of
initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second
paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.
o The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in
contravention with the categorical mandate of the Rules. Respondent Go filed

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222

a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any
supporting particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding,
the appellate court granted the motion and directed petitioner Atty. Regalado
to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty.
Regalados compliance with the appellate courts directive, the tribunal
proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty
of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the commencement of
the indirect contempt action.
It bears to stress that the power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must
be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due
regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the
individual.
The limitations in the exercise of the power to punish for indirect contempt are
delineated by the procedural guidelines specified under Section 4, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with such procedural guidelines is
mandatory considering that proceedings against person alleged to be guilty of
contempt are commonly treated as criminal in nature
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that
has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is
mandatory, and thus states:
o This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper
procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such
proceeding has been classified as special civil action under the
former Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the courts, has
been for any party to file a motion without paying any docket or
lawful fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second
paragraph of this amended section.
o Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu
propio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all
charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full
compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in
accordance with the second paragraph of this section.
Time and again we rule that the use of the word "shall" underscores the
mandatory character of the Rule. The term "shall" is a word of command, and
one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it
is generally imperative or mandatory.
In Enriquez v. Enriquez, this Court applied the word "shall" by giving it
mandatory and imperative import and ruled that non-compliance with the
mandatory requirements of the Rules goes into the very authority of the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, thus:
o "However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
took effect on July 1, 1997, now require that appellate docket and
other lawful fees must be paid within the same period for taking an
appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of Section 4, Rule
41 of the same rules that, "(W)ithin the period for taking an appeal,
the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees."

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that payment of
docket fee within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court
does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final
and executory.
In United States v. de la Santa, which bears parallelism in the instant case,
we held: The objection in this case is not, strictly speaking, to the sufficiency
of the complaint, but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court over the
crime with which the accused was charged. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Atty. Regalado have not actively participated in the contempt proceedings. But such
proceedings suffer procedural defect which the Court cannot ignore.
o We now proceed to the issue of estoppel raised by the Court of Appeals.
When petitioner Atty. Regalado brought to the attention of the appellate
court through a Motion for Reconsideration the remedial defect attendant to
her conviction, the Court of Appeals, instead of rectifying the palpable and
patent procedural error it earlier committed, altogether disregarded the glaring
mistake by interposing the doctrine of estoppel.
o The appellate court ruled that having actively participated in the contempt
proceedings, petitioner Atty. Regalado is now barred from impugning the
Court of Appeals jurisdiction over her contempt case citing the case of People
v. Regalario. We do not agree.
o The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel
is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to
bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have
been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it.
o Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty
of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said
courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her
compliance with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should
not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect
could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings
so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the
natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire
consequences that impelled her to comply.
o Truly, prior to the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere
motion without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was
51
tolerated by the courts. At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be countenanced.
o Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty.
Regalado for indirect contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which
this Court cannot close its eyes without offending the fundamental principles
enunciated in the Rules that we, ourselves, had promulgated.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswindas name was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons.
However, when the Sharcons workers tried to fence and take possession of the
lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of Spouses Mapua.
o The caretaker claimed that Spouses Mapua are the owners of the land.
o Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT No. T-107163 was
indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as 1979.
Sharcons filed with RTC Dasmarias, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title.
Impleaded as defendants were Spouses Mapua, Evanswinda, and the Register of
Deeds of Trece Martires City.
o In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the
documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
Judge Espaol issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly See, president
and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso,
have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when Sharcons filed
with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title.
o Consequently, they were guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their
confinement for 10 days in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.
o Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT
No. T-511462 being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived
from another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to
Evanswinda C.
o The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for
being spurious.
o The complaint for quieting of title was also dismissed.
IMPORTANT: Acc. to Judge Espaol, in determining the merits of Sharcons'
complaint for quieting of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for
cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite,
presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle. She then took judicial notice of the
judges Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents
are falsified and that Spouses See and Atty. Formoso (respondents) are
responsible therefor.
Judge Espaol issued warrants of arrest against respondents pursuant to which
they were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.
o That same day, they filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of
arrest. But they were denied outright by Judge Espaol.
Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which
was granted.
o CA ruled that Judge Espaol erred in taking cognizance of the Decision
rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not
offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title.
o Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, Judge Espaol
should have conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether
respondents are guilty as charged.
o

HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The

indirect contempt proceedings before the Court of Appeals is DECLARED null and
void.

11. Judge Dolores Espaol v. Atty. Formoso (JM)

G.R. No. 150949 | June 21, 2007

Petitioner: Judge Dolores L. Espaol (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, Dasmarias, Cavite)
Respondent: Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso & Spouses Benito See and Marly See
Ponente: J. Sandoval-Gutierrez

Summary:
Sharcons bought from Evanswinda land in Dasmarias, Cavite as a consequence of
which a new TCT was issued in the name of the former. However, when Sharcons
tried to take possession of the property, they were prevented by Spouses Mapua who
also claim ownership over the land. Thus, Sharcons filed with RTC Dasmarias, Cavite
a complaint for quieting of title against Spouses Mapua, Evanswinda, and the Register
of Deeds of Trece Martires City. Judge Espaol stumbled upon Civil Case No. 623-92
for cancellation of title and damages filed with RTC Imus, Cavite, presided by Judge
Tagle. She then took judicial notice of the decision therein declaring that Sharcons'
TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that Spouses See (president &
treasurer) and Atty. Formoso (counsel) are responsible therefor. Thereafter, Judge
Espaol issued an Order (1) convicting the 3 of direct contempt for having used a
spurious certificate of title and tax declaration in the complaint for quieting of title, (2)
ordering their confinement for 10 days in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite, (3)
cancelling TCT No. T-511462 under the name of Sharcons, being spurious, and (4)
dismissing the complaint for quieting of title. Pursuant to the Order, warrants of arrest
were issued and the 3 were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite. They
filed for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which the CA granted.

The SC held that it was incorrect for Judge Espaol to convict them of direct contempt.
First, the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the
document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, not direct
contempt. Second, under Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be
heard. Consequently, Judge Espaol erred in declaring summarily that respondents
are guilty of direct contempt, without even conducting a hearing. And third, courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even
when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, it was incorrect
for Judge Espaol took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch
and on the basis thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified documents.
FACTS:

In 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda

Morales a piece of land in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite.

223

Special Civil Action: CALDONA

ISSUE: WON Judge Espaol erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct
contempt of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for
quieting of title. YES.

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

o
RATIO:

In re Jones contempt of court as "some act or conduct which tends to

interfere with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of
the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some way
tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus
lessens the general efficiency of the same."
o Also "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct
as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during
litigation."
o Simply put, it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the
court.

In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to
punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the very
stability of the judicial institution.
o Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and,
consequently, to the very administration of justice.

Direct contempt is one done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as
to obstruct the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae
and may be punished summarily without hearing. (Narcida v. Bowen)

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the

sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference
with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any
improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.

Consequently, Judge Espaol erred in declaring summarily that

respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration.
She should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.
Moreover, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the
same court. (Gener v. De Leon)
o Hence, it was incorrect for Judge Espaol took judicial notice of the Decision
rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis thereof, concluded that
respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and tax declaration)
when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting.
o Verily, the CA did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct
contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the CA granting the writ
of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has become moot.
o Respondents were released after posting the required bail as ordered by the
CA.
o A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually
restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of
his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and

Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.

In the case at bar,

The use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it

constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Such act is an improper conduct
which degrades the administration of justice.
o Santos v. CFI of Cebu: the imputed use of a falsified document, more so
where the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely
constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses as the
accused may raise in the proper proceedings.

Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused
to be heard by himself and counsel.
o Moreover, a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate
proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited
jurisdiction.
o Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt
proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal
prosecutions.

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Special Civil Action: CALDONA

Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc