Theology and Science, Vol. 5, No.

1, 2007

Matter, Mathematics, and God

JOHN BYL
Abstract This paper contrasts materialism and theism in their ability to give a plausible account of
mathematics. The ideal, abstract entities of mathematics do not fit readily within a materialist world.
Truth, logic, and mathematics require the existence of universal norms. However, materialism has no
place for abstract entities or universal norms. How can such ideal norms, inert in themselves,
influence our minds? The indispensability of mathematics to physics is a strong argument for
realism. Theism posits that God upholds mathematical truths, which reside in the divine
mind. Classical mathematics presumes the existence of an Ideal Mathematicianan all-powerful,
all-knowing and infinite God. Since theism holds that man is created in Gods image and that God
can communicate truth to us, humans may be expected to have access to mathematical knowledge.
Since God has created the world according to a rational plan, the world may be expected to have a
mathematical structure.
Key words: Mathematics; Materialism; Theism; Realism; Platonism; Universals; Norms;
Constructivism

Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine and contrast the abilities of materialism and
theism to account for mathematics. A key question is whether mathematics is a
mere human invention or an exploration of an already existent realm.
Historically, most mathematicians believe that mathematical truths (e.g. 2 5
7) exist independently of human minds, being universally and eternally true. Most
mathematicians believe they are discovering properties of, say, prime numbers,
rather than merely inventing them. This view of mathematics dates back to
Pythagoras (ca 569 475 BC) and Plato (427 347 BC). It is often called Platonism
or mathematical realism.
Mathematics has led to some profound philosophical speculation. Bertrand
Russell, certainly no friend of theism, concluded from his study of the history of
Greek philosophy that Mathematics is . . . the chief source of the belief in eternal
and exact truth, as well as in a supersensible intelligible world.1 This is so,
Russell argues, because of the abstract nature of mathematical concepts. For
example, geometry deals with exact circles, but no physical object is exactly
ISSN 1474-6700 print/ISSN 1474-6719 online/07/010073-14
2007 Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences
DOI: 10.1080/14746700601159598

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circular. This suggests that exact reasoning applies to ideal, rather than physical,
objects. Furthermore, numbers appear to be time-independent. Hence, mathematics seems to deal with an ideal, eternal world of pure thought.
However, where and how do such mathematical entities exist? The existence of
eternal, ideal mathematical thoughts seems to require the existence of something
actual in which they exist.
The early theistic philosophers Philo (ca 20 BC 50 AD) and Augustine (354
430) placed the ideal world of eternal truths in the mind of God. Augustine argued
that mathematics implied the existence of an eternal, necessary, infinite Mind in
which all necessary truths exist. He asserted that we all know time-independent
truths about logic (e.g. A A) and mathematics (e.g. 2 2 4). However,
changing, material things cannot cause fixed, eternal truths. Nor can finite human
minds, since our thinking does not make them true but rather, it is judged by
them. Thus, truth must derive from something non-material that is superior to the
human mind. Mathematical truths must depend on a universal and unchanging
source that embraces all truth in its unity. Such a Truth, Augustine argued, must
exist and is by definition God.2
Thus arose the classical Christian view that mathematics exists in the mind of
God, that God created the universe according to a rational plan (Proverbs 8), and
that mans creation in the image of God (Genesis 1:26) entailed that man could
discern mathematical patterns in creation. Mathematics was held to be true
because of its supposed divine origin. The notion of a rational Creator was
vigorously espoused by Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and many other early scientists.
It was a major factor in motivating the scientific revolution.

The rise of materialism

Ironically, the very success of mathematical models in physics led to the demise of
the classical Christian view. First, the clockwork universe of Newtonian physics no
longer seemed to need a God to run it. Moreover, a world entirely explicable in
terms of natural laws contradicted the supernatural events related in the Bible, thus
undermining biblical authority. Thus, Christianity was gradually replaced with
naturalism, which tried to explain everything in terms of purely natural processes.
The natural sciences came to be seen by many as the only means of acquiring truth
about the world. God was either denied outright or banished to insignificance.
Most naturalists are materialists, believing that everythingeven consciousness
and mindis just a form of matter. Materialists assume that everything in the
universe is ultimately explicable in terms of material properties and interactions.
Materialism has a very long history, dating back to Democritus of Abdera (ca
460 370 BC). He held that the world consisted only of atoms, emptiness, and
motion. Everything else was formed through random interactions between the
atoms moving through infinite empty space. Asserting that the universe had
existed since eternity, Democritus tried to banish both creator and designer.
The notion that all causes are physical causes leads to empiricism, which limits
our knowledge to what we learn through our physical senses. Empiricism rules

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75

out all non-sensory experience, such as innate knowledge, intuition, extra-sensory

perception, or divine revelation.
Materialists believe that mathematical objects exist only materially, in our
brains.3 Mathematical objects are believed to correspond to physical states of our
brain and, as such, should ultimately be explicable by neuroscience in terms of
biochemical laws. Stanislas Dehaene suggests that human brains come equipped
at birth with an innate, wired-in ability for mathematics.4 He postulates that,
through evolution, the smallest integers (1, 2, 3 . . .) became hard-wired into the
human nervous system, along with a crude ability to add and subtract. A similar
position is defended by George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez, who seek to explain
mathematics as a system of metaphors that ultimately derive from neural
processes.5 Penelope Maddy conjectures that our nervous system contains higherorder assemblies that correspond to thoughts of particular sets.6 She posits that
our beliefs about sets and other mathematical entities come, not from Platonic
ideal forms, but, rather, from certain physical events, such as the development of
pathways in neural systems. Such evolutionary explanations seek to derive all our
mathematical thoughts from purely physical connections between neurons.

Problems with materialist mathematics

(1) Can materialism account for mathematical ability?
Thus far, such proposals for simple arithmetic are entirely hypothetical: no actual
mathematical mechanisms have as yet been found in the brain. Yet, even if the
evolutionary mechanism of random mutation and natural selection could account
for an innate ability for simple arithmetic, it is hard to see where more advanced
mathematics comes from. An ability for simple arithmetic might be useful for
survival. However, our capacity for advanced mathematics seems to be well in
advance of mere survival skills. Paul Davies comments:
One of the oddities of human intelligence is that its level of advancement seems
like a case of overkill. While a modicum of intelligence does have a good survival
value, it is far from clear how such qualities as the ability to do advanced
mathematics . . . ever evolved by natural selection. These higher intellectual
functions are a world away from survival in the jungle. . .. Most biologists believe
the . . . human brain has changed little over tens of thousands of years, which
suggests that higher mental functions have lain largely dormant until recently. Yet
if these functions were not explicitly manifested at the time they were selected,
why were they selected? How can natural selection operate on a hidden ability?
Attempts to explain this by supposing that, say, mathematical ability simply piggybacks on a more obvious useful trait are unconvincing in my view.7

(2) Why should materialist mathematics be true?

If our mathematical ideas are just the result of the physics of neural connections,
why should they be true? Such accounts of mathematics cannot distinguish true

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results from false ones. Nor can they yield any explanation for correctness, a basic
issue in mathematics. Indeed, if all knowledge is based on neural connections, so
is the idea that all knowledge is based on neural connections. Hence, if true, we
have no basis for believing it to be true.
David Ray Griffin notes that, according to materialism, all causation is efficient
causation, meaning that each event is completely caused by previous events.8
Rational thought, however, is guided by goals and norms, such as the rules of
logic. As such, rational activity reflects final causationcausation in terms of a
norm or goalwhich is quite different from efficient causation. Since materialism
equates the mind with the brain, whose activities are presumed to be completely
determined by the physical activities of its parts (e.g. brain neurons), materialism
has no room for final causation.
This raises the question: If everything can be explained in terms of physics,
where do logical norms enter into our thinking? Note that it is possible for a
physical mechanism to do logical operations. In a computer, for example, there is an
exact correlation between the flow of physical states of the computer and the
corresponding flow of logical operations. Here the correspondence is specifically
designed by an intelligent agent. However, if the origin of the brain is attributed
to a purposeless process then we have no grounds for believing in a perfect
correspondence between the brains physical flow and the minds logical thinking.
Further, in the case of the computer, the output is meaningless unless it is
interpreted by an intelligent observer. In a purely material brain, where is there
room for an intelligent interpreter?

(3) Does materialism have room for truth?

Central to mathematics (and rationality) are the notions of truth and logic. The
common sense correspondence view of truth is that a proposition or belief is true if
and only if it corresponds with what is actually the case.
Knowing something about reality involves the capacity to represent some aspect
of reality as a thought in our mind. Our beliefs are tentative representations of
reality. Our beliefs are judged either true or false depending on how well they
represent reality.
Truth and falsity are objective properties of our representations, not of the
external world itself. In themselves, physical objects do not represent anything.
They do not refer to anything beyond themselves. Of course, they can be
interpreted by us as representing something other than themselves, but the actual
representation is then our mental interpretation. Dallas Willard argues that no
physical property or combination of properties can constitute a representation of
anything.9 Hence, truth cannot be reduced to a physical property. It follows that
truth cannot be explained by materialism.
Closely related to truth is logic. Logical propositions are either true or false.
Logical laws and relations connect the truth-values of different propositions.
Since truth is not a physical property, it follows that neither is logic. Moreover,
logical laws are quite different from laws of physical or psychological fact.

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77

Logical laws are neither hypothetical nor inductive but, rather, necessary and
universal. They remain valid, regardless of the state of the physical world.
Hence, they cannot be proven from any physical laws or state of affairs.
Logical laws, like truth, are abstractions. As such, they belong to the realm of
ideas, not matter. J. P. Moreland contends that consistent materialistic
naturalism must reject abstract objects of any kind (including sets, numbers,
propositions, and properties), if we take these in the traditional sense of being
non-physical.10
These considerations raise particular problems for a materialist view of
mathematics. Most mathematicians believe that numbers, equations, perfect
circles, and so on, exist in some ideal, abstract sense. Such non-physical objects
must be rejected by consistent materialists. However, if ideal entities do not exist,
this means that any propositions concerning them cannot be true in the sense of
corresponding to anything. As Griffin points out, one is then forced either to
reduce mathematics to a mere game with meaningless symbols or to think of
mathematical objects as part of the physical world, which is clearly not the case.11
Consequently, few mathematicians are materialists.

(4) Can we eliminate universals?

If materialism has no place for ideal entities, then it must deny also the existence of
universal norms. This affects not just mathematics but rationality in general.
Rationality concerns the rightness or wrongness of our reasoning. It assumes the
existence of objective, rational oughts that prescribe how we are to reason.
Given certain arguments and evidence, a rational person ought to accept the
conclusions they entail. This implies the existence of objective laws of logic and
rules of evidence.
John L. Mackie denied the truth-value of moral claims because he thought that
objective moral values must then exist in some ideal world. How, he asked,
could such non-physical norms affect our mind so that we could come to know
them? Mackie was convinced that one would have to appeal to some occult
faculty of intuition, which he rejected. Mackies naturalism committed him to
the belief that the world consists solely of the physical and psychological
phenomena that are the objects of natural science. His facts were limited to the
way things are and what we think or do. They did not include how we ought to
think or act. Consequently, Mackie concluded that postulating objective moral
values is incoherent, at least within a naturalist worldview.12 Later, Mackie
judged that even subjective moral properties are difficult to fit into a naturalist
world. How can is ever give rise to ought? Mackie contended: Moral
properties constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are
most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events without an allpowerful god to create them.13 This conclusion led Mackie to reject all moral
properties.
Charles Larmore notes that moral oughts are similar in nature to rational
oughts. Both are ideal and abstract. The notion of moral truth is no more

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dubious than the idea of there being a truth or falsity to any claim that
something ought to be believed.14 Hence, Mackies argumentation can just as
well be applied to rational norms. Mackie must then conclude that objective
rational norms, too, are inconsistent with naturalism. This destroys the very idea
of rationality.
Larmore asserts that, whereas natural facts are found by observation and
experiment, normative facts involve reasons, which are found by reflection. He
writes:
The inadequacy of naturalism is in the end its inability to account for normative
truth in general. Thus, the minute we suppose it is true that we ought to believe
something, we have broken with the naturalistic perspective. Acknowledging that
there are indeed reasons for belief and action is enough to dispel the mystery. . .. By
leaving no room for there being reasons for belief, naturalism contradicts itself. Or it
does if it presents itself as the truth regarding what we ought to believe about the
world . . .15

In sum, materialism has no place for non-physical, universal norms. There can
be no absolute standards of right or wrong mathematics. Even if there were,
empiricism denies that we can acquire knowledge of such norms. After all, we can
only observe what is, not what ought to be. Hence, naturalism, must postulate that
all normswhether rational, mathematical, or moralare purely human
inventions. Truth and falsity, right and wrong, and good and evil are thus
reduced to mere human opinion or convention.
Thus, for example, Michael Ruse argues that human rationality is determined
solely by genetic traits developed via the evolutionary struggle for survival.16
However, such a claim undermines any claim of Ruse that his thinking is rational.
As Hilary Putnam notes, if rationality were measured by survival value, then the
proto-beliefs of the cockroach . . . would have a far higher claim to rationality than
the sum total of human knowledge.17 Putnam, who had earlier denied the
existence of any ideal truths, concedes that the law of non-contradiction, at least, is
an absolutely unrevisable ideal truth.

Constructivism
The rejection of theism, with the consequent concerns for the soundness of
mathematics, had implications also for the actual content of mathematics. Classical
mathematics was based on the concept of an Ideal Mathematician. It assumed the
existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful, and infinite God. The operations and
proofs allowed in classical mathematics were those that could in principle be
performed by such a God.
Some naturalist mathematicians, considering mathematics to be no more than
the free creation of the human mind, felt that the methods of mathematics should
be adjusted accordingly. Only those mathematical concepts and proofs were to be
considered valid that could be (mentally) constructed in a finite number of explicit
steps. The there exists of classical mathematics was to be replaced by we can

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79

construct. Accordingly, this came to be known as constructive mathematics. As

the constructionist mathematician Errett Bishop notes:
Classical mathematics concerns itself with operations that can be carried out by
God . . . . You may think that I am making a joke . . . by bringing God into the discussion.
This is not true. I am doing my best to develop a secure philosophical foundation . . . for
current mathematical practice. The most solid foundation available at present seems to
me to involve the consideration of a being with non-finite powerscall him God or
whatever you willin addition to the powers possessed by finite beings.18

Bishop himself rejected classical mathematics and urged a constructive

approach to mathematics. He writes,
Mathematics belongs to man, not to God. We are not interested in properties of the
positive integers that have no descriptive meaning for finite man. When a man
proves a positive integer to exist, he should show how to find it. If God has
mathematics of his own that needs to be done, let him do it himself.19

Constructive mathematics entailed a new approach to both logic and proofs.

Consider, first, the implications for logic. Classical mathematics is based on what
is called two-valued logic. Any well-posed mathematical proposition is either true
or false; there is no third option. Thus, for example, Goldbachs Conjecture is
either true or false, even though we do not yet know which it is. This follows from
the logical Law of Excluded Middle, which asserts that any proposition is either
true or false. Any other possibility is excluded.
Constructionists, however, object to the Law of Excluded Middle. They insist that
there is a third possibility: a proposition is neither true nor false until we can construct
an actual, finite proof. This radical view of logic places severe restrictions on what
constructionists accept as valid proofs. For example, constructionists object to proofs
by contradiction since these rely on the Law of Excluded Middle.
Constructionism entails the rejection of many results of classical mathematics.
Modern physics, however, relies heavily on advanced mathematical concepts such
as, for example, infinite Hilbert spaces in quantum mechanics, the HawkingPenrose singularity theorems in general relativity, and renormalization in
quantum electrodynamics. These are beyond the range of current constructive
mathematics. Indeed, Geoffrey Hellman contends that it is impossible to reformulate quantum theory without resorting to the Law of Excluded Middle.20 Thus,
if one is to believe in the truth of these theories in modern physics, then one must
accept the truth also of the advanced classical mathematics that these theories
presume. This, in turn, entails the truth of mathematical realism and the Ideal
Mathematician.

The indispensability of mathematics for science

This brings us to a deeper problem. Mathematics is indispensable to physics,
which is essential to materialism. Willard Quine, who is otherwise a materialist,

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has argued that the indispensability of mathematics to science gives us good

grounds to believe in the objective existence of mathematical entities, such as sets
and functions.21 Since we ought to be ontologically committed to those entities
that are indispensable to our best scientific theories, and since these include
mathematical entities, he concludes that we should thus be ontologically
committed to mathematical entities. Further, since belief in other theoretical
entities is justified by empirical evidence that confirms the theory as a whole, that
same evidence similarly justifies belief in mathematical entities. If a scientific
theory is confirmed by empirical data, then the whole theory is confirmed,
including whatever mathematics the theory uses. A recent defense of realism
based on the indispensability argument is given by Mark Colyvan.22
Since science deals with real objects, it would seem that mathematics must also
deal with real objects. This applies even more so for those embracing a realist view
of scientific theories. How can scientific theories be true unless the underlying
mathematics is also true?
Hartry Field, an anti-realist, considers Quines indispensability argument to be
the strongest argument for realism. To defeat it, Field has tried to prove that
mathematics is not essential to physics.23 He has had some success with
Newtonian mechanics. Nevertheless, it seems very unlikely that mathematics
can be removed from more sophisticated theories, such as general relativity and
quantum mechanics.

The applicability of mathematics

If mathematics is merely a human invention, why do relatively simple
mathematical theories yield such accurate representations of the physical world?
Sophisticated theories, such as relativity or quantum mechanics, can be aptly
summarized in just a few small mathematical equations and their logical
implications. The amazing success of physics is largely due to its basic
mathematical nature. This suggests that the physical world reflects the same
mathematical structure that mathematicians explore. Eugene Wigner commented
on the amazing applicability of complex analysis to quantum mechanics:
It is difficult to avoid the impression that a miracle confronts us here, quite
comparable to the . . . miracles of the existence of laws of nature and of the human
minds capacity to divine them.24
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the
formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand
nor deserve.25

Mark Steiner notes that Wigners mystery is open to various objections.26

First, Wigner ignores the failures, those instances where appropriate mathematical
descriptions could not be found. In addition, many mathematical concepts have
not yet been shown to have any practical applications.

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81

Nevertheless, Steiner believes that Wigner is on to something. He contends that

the applicability of mathematics concerns not just a few isolated successes in
physics. Rather, it pertains to the much broader applicability of mathematics as a
global research strategy. Physicists, from Kepler and Galileo onwards, have been
gripped by the conviction that mathematics is the ultimate language of the universe.
Physicists probe nature with an eye for mathematical structures and analogies.
However, such a mathematical research strategy for making discoveries is
essentially an anthropocentric (i.e. man-centered) strategy. It presumes that humans
have a special place in nature. This is because mathematics relies on human
standards such as simplicity, elegance, beauty, and convenience. Anthropocentrism is most blatant in those cases where even the notation of mathematics plays a
major role in scientific discovery. Steiner gives various historical examples, such as
Paul Diracs discovery of positrons and the formalism of quantum mechanics.
The philosophical problem is not just the applicability of mathematics to our
descriptions of physical reality but, even more, the major role of human
mathematics in the discovery of new phenomena. Steiner concludes that our
universe appears to be intellectually user friendly to humans. This presents
naturalism with a perplexing problem. If we are mere accidents in a purposeless
world of matter then we cannot expect the universe to reflect our standards of
beauty and convenience. How, then, are naturalists to account for the fact that the
universes mathematical structure is just simple enough for humans to discern?
Steiners examples of the amazing use of mathematics, in both scientific
description and discovery, argue strongly against the notion that mathematics is
merely a human invention.
In sum, the applicability of mathematics favors realism. Further evidence can be
given for realism. This includes the universality of mathematics, the fact that
mathematicians widely separated in space, time, and culture find the same
mathematical theorems and ideas. The evidence includes also the strong sense of
discovery mathematicians have when finding new theorems, mathematical
intuition, and the fact that realism is the working philosophy of most
mathematicians. In the last century, realism has been explicitly defended by a
number of outstanding mathematicians, including Georg Cantor, Kurt Godel,
G. H. Hardy, and Roger Penrose. For example, Roger Penrose writes that like
Everest, the Mandelbrot set is just there and there is something absolute and
God given about mathematical truth.27 Likewise, Hardy believed that
mathematical reality lies outside us . . . our function is to discover or observe
it . . . the theorems which we prove, and which we describe grandiloquently as our
creations, are simply our notes of our observations.28

Problems with naturalist realism

Realism, however, does raise some difficult questions. First, there is the question
of where and how such mathematical entities exist. Second, Colin Cheyne and
Charles Pigden note that in realism mathematical objects are causally inert.29

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How, then, they ask, can mathematics be responsible for the worlds being the
way it is? Further, if mathematical entities are inert, how do they influence our
minds? Paul Benacerraf contends true beliefs may be considered genuine
knowledge only if their truth is causally responsible for our belief.30 Since
mathematical entities are causally inert, they cannot give rise to our mathematical
knowledge.
It is clear that realism requires an active agent. In the theistic worldview this
poses no problem, for mathematical objects can be causally effective in the world,
and in our minds, by virtue of being in the mind of God. God can always cause the
required connections to be made. Those who reject theism, however, are faced
with a daunting problem. Griffin comments:
The implication of Benacerrafs insight . . . is that atheism renders unintelligible the
idea that we can have knowledge of a Platonic realm of numbers. Several
philosophers of mathematics, including Hersch himself, use Benacerrafs insight as
the basis for rejecting a Platonic realm. As Quine points out, however, such a realm
is presupposed by physics. Benacerrafs insight, plus Quines observation, implies
that atheism makes an adequate philosophy of mathematics impossible.31

For example, Reuben Hersch finds that Recent troubles in philosophy of

mathematics are ultimately a consequence of the banishment of religion from
science.32 He concedes that Platonism . . . was tenable with belief in a Divine
Mind . . . The trouble with todays Platonism is that it gives up God, but wants to
keep mathematics a thought in the mind of God.33 Once mysticism is left
behind . . . Platonism is hard to maintain.34 Hersch argues that believing in eternal
mathematical objects existing independently of human minds is possible only if
one believes that God exists, which, he says, no one does anymore.
Similarly, Yehua Rav comments:
Whereas the quarrel about universals and ontology had its meaning and
significance within the context of medieval Christianity, it is an intellectual scandal
that some philosophers of mathematics can still discuss whether whole numbers
exist or not.35
There are no preordained, predetermined mathematical truths that just lie
out . . . there. Evolutionary thinking teaches us otherwise.36

Once theism is dropped, it is difficult for realism to explain where objective

mathematical truths exist and how we have access to them. Mathematical realism
is plausible, it seems, only within a theistic worldview.
As R. G. Collingwood has noted, pure Platonism holds no hope for applied
mathematics because it views the physical world as merely a rough copy of the
ideal. Collingwood finds that, historically, the possibility of applied mathematics
comes only with the Christian belief of a rational, omnipotent God who created
the world according to a purposeful plan.37 Similarly, C. F. von Weizsacker
observes that precise mathematical structure in matter requires an omnipotent
Creator rather than crass Platonism. He concludes, In this sense I called modern
science a legacy . . . of Christianity.38

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Mathematics in a theistic worldview

How does mathematics fit within a theistic worldview? We note first that the
biblical God has a logical aspect (the spirit of truth [John 15:26]), as well as a
numerical aspect (the tri-une God of Father, Son and Holy Spirit). Since God is
eternal, so are logic and number. God is also infinite, omnipotent, and omniscient;
His knowledge encompasses all events, thoughts and possibilities, including all
possible mathematical propositions. Gods upholds all truths, including truths
about mathematics. Hence, a mathematical entity need not be explicitly
constructed in order to exist.
As the omnipotent ground of all being, God upholds everything, even all
possibilities, establishing what is possible and what is necessary. Rather than
necessary truths diminishing Gods sovereignty, the omnipotence of God is most
dramatically illustrated by the fact that God establishes and upholds even
whatever is possible and whatever is necessary.
How do humans come to know eternal mathematical truths? The Bible tells us
that man was made in the image of God (Gen.1:26 30; I Cor.11:7), with the
ability to rule Gods creation (Gen.1:28). This image includes rationality and
creativity. The ability to do mathematics seems to be innate in human minds.
This involves the capacity for abstract thought, as well as the ability to discern
and symbolize. God has formed our minds so that they can readily handle
abstract thought, symbolic representation, and logical manipulation. Alvin
Plantinga comments:
God has . . . created us with cognitive faculties designed to enable us to achieve true
beliefs with respect to a wide variety of propositionspropositions about our
immediate environment, about our own interior lives, about the thoughts and
experiences of other persons, about our universe at large, about right and wrong,
about the whole realm of abstractanumbers, properties, propositions. . . and
about himself.39

Since God has created the physical world according to a rational plan, the world
may be expected to exhibit mathematical structure. Since God has created man in
Gods image, humans may be expected to discern this mathematical structure.
This accounts for the applicability of human mathematics to the physical world.
As we noted earlier, classical mathematics is based on the notion of an infinite,
omniscient, and omnipotent God. Thus, theism provides a basis for classical
mathematics. Georg Cantor (1845 1918), the founder of modern set theory,
justified his belief in infinite sets by his belief in an infinite God.40 He thought of
sets in terms of what God could do with them. An infinite God would have no
difficulty forming the power set of any given infinite set. Even today, almost every
attempt to motivate the principles of combinatorial set theory relies on some
notion of idealized manipulative capacities of the Omnipotent Mathematician.
Constructionists, however, reject Cantors transfinite cardinal numbers since these
cannot be constructed by finite methods.
Alvin Plantinga notes that theists have a distinct advantage when it comes to
explaining sets and their properties. The existence of sets depends upon a certain

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sort of intellectual activitya collecting or thinking together. According to

Plantinga,
If the collecting or thinking together had to be done by human thinkers, or any finite
thinkers, there wouldnt be nearly enough setsnot nearly as many as we think in
fact there are. From a theistic point of view, the natural conclusion is that sets owe
their existence to Gods thinking things together . . . Christians, theists, ought to
understand sets from a Christian and theistic point of view. What they believe as
theists affords a resource for understanding sets not available to the non-theist . . .41

A detailed theistic justification of set theory has been developed by Christopher

Menzel.42 Ultimately, the consistency and certainty of mathematics can be
grounded upon the multi-faceted nature of God Himself. Trust in God generates
confidence in mathematics.

Conclusions
In summary, mathematics is not plausibly explained by materialism. A materialist
view of origins does not account for the ability of the human mind to do advanced
mathematics. If mathematics is generated by a brain operating purely by physical
causes, then there is no reason why such mathematics should be true. Indeed, the
very notions of truth and logic do not fit well with materialism, which has no
place for universals norms.
Classical mathematics is based on the notion of an infinite, omnipotent, and
omniscient God. The rejection of such a being leads to constructivism. However,
constructivism fails to support the sophisticated mathematics needed for physics.
The indispensability of mathematics for physics is a strong argument for realism. The
universality of mathematics, as well as its applicability to the physical universe, are
further evidence that mathematics cannot be reduced to a mere human invention.
Realism is faced with the problems of where to place ideal mathematical entities
and how humans can access such an ideal realm. These problems are difficult to
solve without theism. Theism posits that God upholds mathematical truths, which
reside in the divine mind. Classical mathematics presumes the existence of an Ideal
Mathematicianan all-powerful, all-knowing and infinite God. Theism holds that
man is created in Gods image and that God can communicate truth to us. Hence,
humans may be expected to have access to mathematical knowledge. Since God is a
rational Creator, the physical universe may be expected to have a physical structure.
Finally, theism provides the resources to justify the soundness of mathematics.

Endnotes
1 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1945), 37.
2 Norman Geisler and Winfred Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Baker, 1988), 154.

Matter, Mathematics, and God

85

3 Cf. Jean-Pierre Changeux and Alain Connes, Conversations on Mind, Matter, and
Mathematics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 13.
4 Stanislas Dehaene, The Number Sense: How the Mind Creates Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
5 George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez, Where Mathematics Comes From (New York: Basic
Books, 2000).
6 Penelope Maddy, Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
7 Paul Davies, Are We Alone? (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 85 86.
8 David R. Griffin, Naturalism: Scientific and Religious, Zygon, vol. 37, no. 2 (2002): 372.
9 Dallas Willard, Knowledge and Naturalism, in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, eds.
William L. Craig and James P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000), 39.
10 James P. Moreland, Naturalism and the Ontological Status of Properties, in
Naturalism, eds. Craig and Moreland, 67.
11 Griffin, Naturalism: Scientific and Religious, 369.
12 John L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 38 41.
13 John L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 115.
14 Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 99.
15 Ibid., 115 116.
16 Michael Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998), 206.
17 Hilary Putnam, Realism and Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 232.
18 Errett Bishop, Schizophrenia in Contemporary Mathematics, in Errett Bishop:
Reflections on Him and His Research, ed. Murray Rosenblatt (Providence, R.I.: American
Mathematical Society, 1985), 9.
19 Errett Bishop, Foundations of Constructive Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 2.
20 Geoffrey Hellman, Constructive Mathematics and Quantum Mechanics: Unbounded
Operators and the Spectral Theorem, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 23 (1993): 221 228;
idem, Quantum Mechanical Unbounded Operators and Constructive MathematicsA
Rejoinder to Bridges, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26 (1997): 121 127.
21 Willard V. O. Quine, Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1982), 14 15.
22 Mark Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001).
23 Hartry Field, Science Without Numbers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
24 Eugene Wigner, The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics, Communications on
Pure and Applied Mathematics, 13 (1960): 8.
25 Ibid., 14.
26 Mark Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).
27 Roger Penrose, The Emperors New Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 95, 112.
28 G. H. Hardy, A Mathematicians Apology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967),
123 124.
29 Colin Cheyen and Charles R. Pigden, Pythagorean Powers or a Challenge to
Platonism, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1996): 639 645.
30 Paul Benacerraf, Mathematical Truth, in Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd ed., eds. Paul
Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 412.
31 Griffin, Naturalism: Scientific and Religious, 373.
32 Reuben Hersch, What Is Mathematics, Really? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
122.
33 Ibid., 135.
34 Ibid., 42.
35 Yehuda Rav, Philosophical problems in the light of Evolutionary Epistemology,
in Math Worlds, ed. Sal Restivo (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press,
1993), 81.

86

Theology and Science

36 Ibid., 100.
37 R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America,
1984), 250 257.
38 C. F. von Weizsacker, The Relevance of Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 163.
39 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
201.
40 See Joseph W. Dauben, Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 229.
41 Alvin Plantinga, Prologue: Advice to Christian Philosophers, in Christian Theism and
the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael D. Beaty (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1990), 35.
42 Christopher Menzel, An Activist Model of the Metaphysics of Mathematics, in A Sixth
Conference On Mathematics From A Christian Perspective, ed. Robert L. Brabenec
(Wheaton, Ill.: Wheaton College Mathematics Department, 1987), 55 72; idem,
Theism, Platonism, and the Metaphysics of Mathematics, in Christian Theism and the
Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael D. Beaty (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1990).

Biographical Notes
John Byl is Professor of Mathematics and Chair of the Department of
Mathematical Sciences at Trinity Western University (Langley, BC, Canada). He
has authored numerous publications, including the book The Divine Challenge: On
Matter, Mind, Math & Meaning (Banner of Truth, 2004).