Manufacturing Recession 20160111
Manufacturing Recession 20160111
Economics Group
Special Commentary
Tim Quinlan, Economist
The combined effects of a strong U.S. dollar, tepid foreign demand and plunging commodity
prices have the U.S. manufacturing sector up against the ropes. The one-two punch of back-toback contractionary readings from the ISM manufacturing index sets back that bellwether of the
factory sector to its worst reading since the recession. It is not just the ISM. Many of the regional
purchasing manager surveys have been in contraction territory for the better part of the past year.
The soft data from these surveys are underscored by hard data, which has revealed an outright
decline in factory orders and a string of weak industrial production figures in recent months.
Manufacturing is in recession! we hear repeatedly these days. Against the backdrop just
described, that is a claim that generally goes unchallenged.
There is no doubt the manufacturing sector is struggling. Tepid growth overseas and the sharp
appreciation of the dollar over the past year and have sapped demand for exports. The plunge in
oil prices over the same period has led to a sharp decline in machinery and other mining related
equipment. Both of these headwinds have emerged against a backdrop of a historically weak U.S.
expansion, which has left limited impetus for robust capital spending in the domestic economy.
Manufacturing is a major driver of economic cycles in the United States, so the question of
whether or not the sector is in recession merits serious consideration. In this report, we take the
criteria used by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) when determining economywide recessions and adapt it specifically to the manufacturing sector. By this method, factory
activity is clearly in a rough patch, but we would stop short of declaring a manufacturing
recession. As manufacturing recessions have historically led economy-wide recessions, this
should allay fears that the recent weakness in the industrial sector has the broader economy on
the precipice of recession.
Defining a recession could be considered more art than science. Back-to-back declines in GDP
growth is one oft-cited guideline but most economists take a wider range of measures into
account. The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee is the arbiter of U.S. recessions. It bases
business cycle turning points not only on GDP, but also four key variables: employment,
industrial production, real sales and real income. 1 The 2001 recession makes a good case for
taking a broader scope; GDP did not fall in consecutive quarters, but employment and production
clearly contracted.
To evaluate whether the manufacturing sector is indeed in a recession, we extend the NBERs
approach to the industry level. Quarterly GDP data by industry is published with about a four
month lag, with data only going back to 2005. The other four variables, however, can be found or
constructed for the manufacturing industry at a monthly frequency with up to only about a one
month lag. This provides, in our view, a timely and more thorough look at the state of the
manufacturing sector beyond the widely watched ISM manufacturing report.
We would stop
short of
declaring a
manufacturing
recession.
Manufacturing
production hit a
fresh cycle high
in November.
Figure 2
Index 2012=100
110
110
105
105
100
100
95
95
90
90
85
85
80
80
75
75
70
70
65
65
Economy-Wide Recession
60
55
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
15%
10%
10%
5%
5%
0%
0%
-5%
-5%
-10%
-10%
-15%
-15%
60
15%
16
55
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
-20%
Figure 4
Manufacturing Employment Growth
Employment: Manufacturing
Index 2012=100
155
155
145
145
135
135
125
125
115
115
105
105
Economy-Wide Recession
Manufacturing Employment: Dec @ 103.4
95
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
95
10%
10%
5%
5%
0%
0%
-5%
-5%
-10%
-10%
-15%
-15%
-20%
-25%
74
78
82
86
90
94
98
02
06
10
14
-20%
-25%
Figure 6
Figure 5
Real Income: Manufacturing
Index 2012=100
150
150
Index 2012=100
115
115
Economy-Wide Recession
Real Income: Nov @ 105.0
140
140
130
130
120
120
110
110
100
100
110
110
105
105
100
100
95
95
90
90
85
85
Economy-Wide Recession
80
80
90
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
90
75
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
75
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Real Sales: Looks More Like Mid- to Late-Cycle Slowdown Rather Than Recession
Factory orders and shipments have been some of the bleakest readings on manufacturing activity
over the past year. Shipments, the industrys sales measure, have fallen in four out of the past five
months and are down nearly four percent year-over-year. Values, however, are reported in
nominal terms and have gotten crushed by falling commodity prices. Adjusting for inflation
shows sales activity is not nearly as dire. Using the BEAs price deflator for manufacturing sales,
real sales continue to trend higher and are up 2.0 percent over the past year. The BEAs deflator,
however, has a relatively short history. Adjusting sales using the Producer Price Index (PPI) for
finished goods looks a bit more troubling. Real sales deflated by the PPI peaked in July of 2014
and have since trended lower. Splitting the difference between the two deflated measures, real
sales are consistent with a mid-cycle slowdown, but not an outright decline in real activity.
To determine an industry recession based on these figures, we average the four manufacturing
indices on production, employment, real income and real sales with equal weighting (all indexed
to 2012). Like any measure of activity, there can be small volatility in the short term, so we look
for prolonged periods of declining activity before declaring a manufacturing recession. Even
using the more severe PPI-adjusted measure for real sales, industry activity has stalled but not
declined (Figure 7). Periods of flat manufacturing activity have not always been followed by an
industry recession. As we saw in 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2012-13, growth resumed after pausing
mid-cycle.
Manufacturing
activity has
stalled by our
measure but not
recessed.
Manufacturing recessions have led the previous two national recessions by eleven and four
months, respectively. The fact that real manufacturing activity is not at this point in decline
should allay concerns over an imminent U.S. recession. It is also worth noting that there have
been previous episodes of manufacturing recessions that have not led to a broad recession in the
economy. Manufacturing experienced a double-dip recession in 2003, and, while real sales figures
are not available pre-1992, an average of the three remaining indices shows an industry recession
in 1985-1986 (Figure 8). These two manufacturing recessions were driven in large part by
pronounced weakness in employment and labor income. Manufacturing production, however, did
not fall thanks to advances in productivity. As such, further weakness in real sales or a sustained
drop in manufacturing production would be a more worrisome sign in our view that the current
softness in manufacturing could portend of a broader recession.
We value the insight provided by the ISM index and other surveys of purchasing managers, but it
would be a mistake to read too much into a contractionary reading. The ISM manufacturing index
often slips into contraction territory even when the economy is doing fine. We looked at ISM
readings back to 1980, excluding all recession periods and looking only at expansions. What we
found is that the ISM manufacturing index is contraction territory 21.4 percent of the time.
Figure 7
Figure 8
125
130
120
120
125
125
115
115
120
120
110
110
115
115
105
105
110
110
100
100
105
105
95
100
100
90
95
125
95
90
85
Economy-Wide Recession
Recession Indicator Average: Nov @ 103.9
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
130
95
Economy-Wide Recession
Avg. of Production, Employment & Income: Nov @ 105.1
08
10
12
14
85
90
72
75
78
81
84
87
90
93
96
99
02
05
08
11
14
90
Source: Federal Reserve Board, U.S. Department of Labor & Commerce and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
As we have mentioned, the industrial sector historically has been a key driver of the economic
cycle. A broader look at the industrial sector would need to include the mining industry. Mining
was a key driver of broader industrial production growth from 2010 to 2014, but has been a
significant drag since about the time that oil prices turned south in the middle of 2014. While
even the weak levels of manufacturing activity are not consistent with an industry recession, the
mining sector is a different story. Employment is down 15 percent since peaking a year ago and is
back to levels last seen in 2011. Real income from the mining sector is down 19 percent over the
past year, and production is off 10 percent from the all-time high set last December.
Importantly, the size and influence of the mining sector on the broader economy are much more
muted than the manufacturing industry. In 2014, the mining industry accounted for 2.6 percent
of value added in the U.S. economy compared to 12.1 percent for the manufacturing sector. The
fairly concentrated geographic footprint of the mining industry means that the industrys
recession has been devastating to some parts of the country. However, the small size relative to
the overall U.S. economy means that the mining industry can fall into a recession without taking
down the rest of the economy with it, as we saw in the mid-1980s and again in the late 1990s.
Periods of flat
manufacturing
activity have not
always been
followed by an
industry
recession.
There is an old joke about the economist who correctly predicted five out of the prior three
recessions. Something similar can be said about slowdowns in the manufacturing sector.
Recessions in manufacturing (using the definition we establish in this paper) have offered an
early warning ahead of the recessions for the broader economy in 2001 and 2009. However, a
manufacturing recession can also be a head-fake as it was in the manufacturing recessions of the
mid-1980s and in 2003. In each of these occasions, the broader economy continued to expand
despite the headwinds confronting the manufacturing sector.
Moreover, despite the litany of negative news for manufacturing, our analysis of the four key
variables makes clear that these challenges do not amount to a manufacturing recession. On that
basis the rampant concerns about a manufacturing led recession are overblown, at least at this
point, in our view.
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