FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately
from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce.Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate
of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to
as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of
Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal,
which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the
six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court
required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being
submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreedafter the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," [2]disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
judicial approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of
Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two
intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that
the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15

February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other
half.[7]Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records
of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in
violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of
the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. [8] On 18 April
1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there
is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the
Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the
issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law
which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; [10] nor as to their respective hereditary
shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court,
after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of
the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring
the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. [12] Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have
prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.

[13]

that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. [14] Petitioner
opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. [15] The trial court did not
grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." [16] It maintained that
their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time
of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the
time of theirdivorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce
was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; [17] it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
court.When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.
[19]
Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the
time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently,
respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to
the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. [20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, [21] the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. [22] The
present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3)
trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging
to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the
Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis,
all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary
rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping isDENIED.

SO ORDERED.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a.

RECIO,respondent.

GRACE

J.

GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.

REDERICK

A.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch
28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987.[4]They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian
Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married
on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. [7] In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. [8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996,
in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. [9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage [10] in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; [12] thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. [13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. [15] The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they submitted their respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect
in an essential element of the marriage; that is,respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second
marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity
to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two,
there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other
foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the
foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent
miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of
the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. [28] Therefore, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity
and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. [30] A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. [32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court. [35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
[39]
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don
the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to
the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she

had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
[42]
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [43] Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [44] The power of judicial notice must
be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of
a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45] There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. [46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage.Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence,
we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this
matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of the Rules of Court, for the
simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under
Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was
not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof
that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented
before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; [51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d) Exhibit D
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; [54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; [56] (b) Exhibit 2
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; [57] (c) Exhibit
3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. [60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show
the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to
the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity
to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as
above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154380

Present:

- versus -

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

(Chairman),
Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
October 5, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5]Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG
posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. [6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. [7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while
in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his
capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised
is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts
into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case
of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and
what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case
at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1.
The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2.

This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad
will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose
that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[10]The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way

of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph
2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner; and

2.

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to
file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties
appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient
remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. [13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.[14]Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of

foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. [15] Furthermore, respondent must
also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the

petition

by

the

Republic

of

the

Philippines

is GRANTED.

The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 152577

Present:

PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus-

CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:

CRASUS L. IYOY,

September 21, 2005

R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, [1] affirming the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for declaration of nullity of
marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus
married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result
of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of

legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hottempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from
her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with
her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk
to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him.
Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus,
Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname
of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself
had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was
filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim [4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted
therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen
Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children
with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She

explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of
their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for
basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and
what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their
family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial
support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children
to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file
for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus,
Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage
to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself
was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus
of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of
their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage
to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely
the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, [5] the RTC afforded both
parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; [7] (2)
the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage
celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus. [9]

Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely
and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the
Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders [12] and
Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take
the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted
to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05
October 1998,[14]considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus
deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable

consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love,
respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established
that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the
United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another family
of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is
already married to another man in another country.

Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the
marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided
that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this
instance.

Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very
low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of
human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is
bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity
was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological

incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the
time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that
the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity
to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material
things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the
time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage
of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30
July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered

additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to
wit

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is

now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this
as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A

FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to

avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he
or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien
as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be
extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and
thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would
still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital
covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in
truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to
discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates
that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, [17] denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per

se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with
law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of
law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at
bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity
was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of
the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the
latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner
Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court
finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this
Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus

. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated [21]

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a)

Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying

out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b)

Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the

marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c)

Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be

beyond the means of the party involved.[22]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[24]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during
the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that
the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering
the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere

refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. [26] Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. [27]

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and
her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration
of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and

Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31] No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]

II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case
at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in
her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the
same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article

15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,

the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. [33] His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any

litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing
in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions
on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court
or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on
behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this
Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still
being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and
control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection
of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized
as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down
the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of
which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated
its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State[37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any
other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene
and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC
and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition
on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum
if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be
submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case
will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent
summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the
decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to
the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial,
or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from
the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At
most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for

being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. [39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

EDGAR SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 134029

Petitioner,
- versus Promulgated:

FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent. February 6, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 [2] and
January 31, 1996[3] Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M3708; and itsMay 15, 1998 Resolution[4] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children,

namely:

Rodolfo,

Mila,

Edgar,

Linda,

Emilita

and

Manuel.

On August

11,

1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias.However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce[5] before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.[6]

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California,U.S.A.[7] He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration[8] before theRegional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which
was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son
by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed
that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal[10] of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order [11] denying
the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition[12]thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage
of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, [13]Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[14]

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. [15] They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 [16] of the
Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order [17] denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic[18] because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition [19] against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration [20] from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration
arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order [21] granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995,[22] the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested[23]that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14,
[24]

and June 20,[25] 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of

the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not
in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration [26] and for the disqualification[27] of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied.[28]

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24,
1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.[29]

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term place of
residence of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil v. IbaySomera.[31] It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus

With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that Article 26, par.
2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any
form whatsoever. Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts
should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,[32] the Filipino
divorcee, shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws. For this reason, the
marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as a
bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x[33]

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration [34] which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
[35]

Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. [36]
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject

petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident

of

Sta.

Cruz,

Laguna. They

contend

that

pursuant

to

our

rulings

in Nuval

v.

Guray[37] and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,Tacloban City,[38] residence is synonymous with domicile which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a
person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the
void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo;
hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides at the
time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile.Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.[41] (Emphasis
supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement

of

the

estate

in Nuval and Romualdez are

of

Felicisimo,

inapplicable

to

the

is

synonymous

instant

case

with

because

domicile. The
they

involve

rulings
election

cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and
residence for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of
a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may

not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.[43]Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to
the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale [44] dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements[45] from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association[46] and Ayala Country Club, Inc., [47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards [49] stating that his
home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial
address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court [50] which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which
had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative

Order

No.

3.[51] Thus,

the

subject

petition

was

validly

filed

before

the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of

matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status
or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either.A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty,
that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other,
is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.[53]

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties
and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner

has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[54] (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55] where the Court recognized the validity of
a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.[56]

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[57] the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.[58] Although decided on December 22, 1998,
the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in
thePhilippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence
of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dornstating that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. [59] In Garcia v. Recio,[60] the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.[61]

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62] the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case

of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.[63] (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26
thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.[64]Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it.Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15[65] and 17[66] of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases

discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.[67] In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent,
in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and
the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law, so
we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them.

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due. That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is
always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. [69]

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation

solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.[71]

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text [72] of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
inGarcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.[73]

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to
the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.

An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.[75]

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 [76]of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven.[77]

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of
the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79] we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.[80] The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties

who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of
co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an

adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the

acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on
the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents
defense. x x x[81]

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss and itsOctober 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration
is AFFIRMED. Let this case beREMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

ORLANDO G. TONGOL, G.R. NO. 157610

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Promulgated:
Respondent. October 19, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its
Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision
affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which
dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27, 1967. Out of
their union, they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born
in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.

On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, which was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.

In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of the latter's
family; their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to
break up their union; greatly influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early stages of their
marriage, already treated Orlando with contempt and without the love and respect due him as her
husband; when Orlando started a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him

encouragement; later on, his business became successful and he was able to embark upon another
business venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company which also became profitable; Filipinas then
became interested and began to interfere in the operation of the business; however, because of her bad
attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her husband got along well with the
employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing the latter embarrassment; she even
suspected that the income of the business was being given to her husband's relatives; their continued
fighting persisted and affected their children; efforts at reconciliation proved futile because their
differences hadbecome irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to live
separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of their property
relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.

In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless
and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando
who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol,
and of AnnalizaGuevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol.
Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of
both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of their four children, the
RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written
evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand, record
shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.

On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.

On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

1.

WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE

TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA.
CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S

INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND

INCURABLE (par. 12, p. 3, Annex A, hereof).

2.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE APPEAL (p. 7,ibid.).

3.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING

THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Annex B, hereof).[2]

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented
in the present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[3] the term psychological incapacity was defined as:

[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x[4]

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.[5]

While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
and Molina,[6] wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 [7] of the Family Code
was laid down, this Court finds it significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The

illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or

difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in thePhilippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[8]

Under

the

Rule

on

Declaration

of

Absolute

Nullity

of

Void

Marriages

and

Annulment

of Voidable Marriages,[9]which took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been
modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.-

xxxx

(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege
the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.

The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to the petition is also dispensed
with.

In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining psychiatrist,
Dr. Villegas, that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder. However, both courts
ruled that the behavior exhibited by respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA for the following
reasons:

First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following written evaluation
regarding respondent's psychological makeup:
xxxx

On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family

where the mother assumed a more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of
her aunt and developed a basic feeling a (sic) rejection.

The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is lowaverage. Sudden change overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to
give way, even minor pressures upset her and when this happens, emotional control
could not be relied upon.

In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially
with females, she became (sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to
her basic feelings of rejection in early life. She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable

feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a replica of her

mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.

At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further
rejection. Additionally, she is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for
which she is consulting a neurologist.

Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr.
Orlando Tongol is suffering from some depressive features, which seems to be a recent
development as a result of marital problems. On the other hand, Mrs.Tongol is suffering
from an Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders her
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She
is unable to cope with the sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her,
due to insufficient psychological inner resources.[10]

In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise:

ATTY. VILLAREAL -

xxxx

Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?

A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her
life, she could not function in the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always
been very much in doubt of her own capabilities, Sir.

Q- What about hysterical coloring?

A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological

reactions to any stresses, Sir.

Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?

A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the
husband talking to some employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present
some tantrums. In short, she cannot control her emotion at the moment of
stresses circulations, Sir.[11]

When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:

ATTY. RENDOR -

xxxx

Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?

A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a
feeling of rejection from the start of her development and this was carried on into her
adult life. When the husband started having some good relationship with his employees,
then she started to get jealous and she would embarrass him in front of their employees
and insulted him and would go into tantrums and this was very much resented by
Mr. Tongol, Sir.

ATTY. RENDOR -

Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in
such a way?

A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was
already rejecting her as a wife and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of
how Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.

xxxx

Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder,

Mrs. Tongol rendered her psychological (sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the marriage. What is your basis in saying that?

A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always
gets what she wanted in the house. In short, she was the authority in the house and
during her growing up stage, she was given up to the aunt, for the aunt to take care of
her. She only came back to the family when she was already a sort of an early teenager.
With this, there has always been a feeling of rejection during her personality
development. Besides, she feels that she is one of those not favor (sic) by the mother
during her growing up stage, Sir.

Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the
marriage is concerned, considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?

A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is
more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.[12]

The

Court

can

only

gather

from

the

foregoing

explanations of

Dr.

Villegas

that

as

child, Filipinas had always felt rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings
of rejection even when she became an adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy and temper
tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good interaction with their employees, are ways of
coping up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr. Villegas failed to link respondent's personality
disorder to her conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her obligations as
wife and mother. The Court cannot see how respondent's personality disorder which, according to Dr.
Villegas, is inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential
marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. What has
been established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection,
respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations
towards her husband, such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has ruled that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations.[13] As held inSantos:

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. [14]

Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent
is grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner
contends that respondent's exaggerated reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of
rejection brought about by her dysfunctional upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her
psychological condition. Even granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact
remains that there is no evidence to prove that such condition is of such nature as to render respondent
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.

Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her
testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's inadequate personality
disorder as permanent or incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the permanence or incurability of
respondent's illness as shown by her following statement:

I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that
is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.
[15]
(Emphasis supplied)

Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. [16] The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the
psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. In the present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and respondent
as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve
around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business. In fact,
respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed that their quarrels arose
solely from their disagreement on how to run their business. [17] This is confirmed by the testimony of
petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a considerable period of time. [18] However, a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.[19]

In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the Family Code
include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide support for the
family, which means that compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the management of the
income and expenses of the household. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect
the other aspects ofone's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to
declare a marriage null and void. In the present case, respondent's disagreement with her husband's
handling of the family's business and finances and her propensity to start a fight with petitioner spouse
regarding these matters can hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological
incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence
between husbands and wives.

Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's
obligation toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent
had been remiss in performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the
Family Code.[20]

It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.[21] It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. [22] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.[23] In the instant case, the Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
that the aversive behavior of petitioner and respondent towards each other is a mere indication of
incompatibility brought about by their different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which
developed after their marriage.

In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder. However, the totality
of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically
incapacitated orincapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition
of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.[24] Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19, 2003
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.