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NMIOTC LNG-David Incertis

The document outlines a methodology for assessing risks in liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply chains that involves identifying threat scenarios, analyzing interdependencies between supply chain actors, and evaluating the likelihood and consequences of risks to select appropriate security controls. It provides examples of threat scenarios, models interdependencies between nodes like liquefaction plants and shipping agents, and describes applying standards to the risk assessment process.

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100% found this document useful (1 vote)
143 views30 pages

NMIOTC LNG-David Incertis

The document outlines a methodology for assessing risks in liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply chains that involves identifying threat scenarios, analyzing interdependencies between supply chain actors, and evaluating the likelihood and consequences of risks to select appropriate security controls. It provides examples of threat scenarios, models interdependencies between nodes like liquefaction plants and shipping agents, and describes applying standards to the risk assessment process.

Uploaded by

lebenikos
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Risks and

Interdependencies
in the LNG Supply
Chain
A methodology for Risk Assessment

6th NMIOTC
Annual Conference 2015
4th June 2015

LNG compresses 1/600 of its volume

NATURAL GAS FIELD


CHONGQING (CHINA), 23 DECEMBER 2003, 234 KILLED, 500 INJURED

PIPELINE
GHISLENGHIEN (BELGIUM), 30 JULY 2004, 24 KILLED, 150 INJURED
PROCESSING PLANT

VARANUS ISLAND (AUSTRALIA), 0 KILLED, 0 INJURED, AUSTRALIAN GAS CRISIS


STORAGE TANK
EAST OHIO GAS COMPANY (USA), 20 OCTOBER 1944, 128 KILLED, 400
INJURED

LOADING PORT
SKIKDA LNG PLANT (ALGERIA), 19 JANUARY 2004 , 30 KILLED, 72 INJURED

STORAGE TANK

STORAGE TANK

STORAGE TANK

LIQUEFCTION PLANT (LOADING PORT)

LIQUEFCTION PLANT (LOADING PORT)

PROCESSING PLANT

PIPELINE

GAS FIELD

LNG TANKER

NEVER
WHY?

LNG TANKER

NO BLEVE

NO FLOATING BOMB
LNG DOES NOT EXPLODE OR BURN
LNG CARRIERS ARE ROBUST

Collision

Terrorist attack

Supply chain
actors / nodes

Link/actor
Liquefaction plant
Seller/carrier/shipper
Local Agent
Ship agent
Insurance company
Loading port
Shipowner/ ship agent
Sea Transportation
Port Services
Unloading port
Customs
Port Authority
Buyer/importer
Regasification
Storage
Distribution
Bank

Flow Model
Physical
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Physical
Cyber
Physical
Cyber
Physical
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Physical
Physical
Physical
Cyber

Design criteria

HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN


COLLABORATIVE METHODOLOGY
COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS

Methodology Steps
STEP 0

STEP 1

STEP 2

STEP 3

STEP 4

STEP 5

STEP 6

STEP 7

Scope of the SC Risk Assessment


Analysis of the Supply Chain Service (SCS)
Supply Chain Threat Scenario Identification
Assess the expected likelihood for all Threat Scenarios

Assess the consequence of each Threat Scenario for each node


Assess the risk for each examined Threat Scenario
Assess the risk of cascading threats for all Threat Scenarios
Selection of appropriate security controls

Threat Scenarios for LNG suply chain


SCENARIO 1: Berth unavailability and stop of operations
due to coordinated bombing of docks, bridges and
other important infrastructure at the loading port while
loading a LNG tanker.

Threat Scenarios for LNG suply chain


SCENARIO 2: LNG tanker is hijacked by pirates during its
voyage producing a long delay in the supply,
compromising the LNG stock at the destination in the
middle of several cold waves which have increased
the demand.

Threat Scenarios for LNG suply chain


SCENARIO 3: A delay occurs during the vaporization

process phase at the unloading port due to damage


to critical infrastructure in vaporization/storage
terminal area (sabotage?).

https://youtu.be/h-EY82cVKuA

Threat Scenarios for LNG suply chain


SCENARIO 4: A hacker enters in the PCS in order to

steal bank accounting information and other sensitive


information from the importer.

Categorization of threats
Liquefaction plant

TC-1: Infrastructure Threats


TC-2: Information & ICT Threats
TC-3: Personnel Security & Safety
Threats
TS4-1: Intrude and/or take control
of an asset
TS4-3: Cargo Integrity
TS4-4: Unauthorized use

Loading in LNG tankers

TC-1: Infrastructure Threats


TC-2: Information & ICT Threats
TC-3: Personnel Security & Safety
Threats
TC-4: Goods and Conveyance
Security Threats

Unloading

TC-1: Infrastructure Threats


TC-3: Personnel Security &
Safety Threats
TC-4: Goods and Conveyance
Security Threats

Regasification (vaporization)

TC-1: Infrastructure Threats


TC-2: Information & ICT
Threats
TC-3: Personnel Security &
Safety Threats
TS4-1: Intrude and/or take
control of an asset
TS4-3: Cargo Integrity
TS4-4: Unauthorized use

Storage

Distribution

TC-1: Infrastructure Threats


TC-2: Information & ICT Threats
TC-3: Personnel Security &
Safety Threats
TS4-1: Intrude and/or take
control of an asset
TS4-3: Cargo Integrity
TS4-4: Unauthorized use
TC-1: Infrastructure Threats
TC-2: Information & ICT Threats
TC-3: Personnel Security &
Safety Threats
TS4-1: Intrude and/or take
control of an asset
TS4-3: Cargo Integrity
TS4-4: Unauthorized use
TS4-5: Goods and Conveyance
misuse

Seller/Carrier/Shipper

TS1-1: Destroy critical SC


Infrastructure
TS1-2: Unauthorized access to
SC Infrastructures
TC-3: Personnel Security &
Safety Threats
TS4-4: Unauthorized use

Exportation formalities
through local agent

TS3-1: People under attack


TC-2: Information & ICT Threats
TC-4: Goods and Conveyance
Security Threats

Bill of lading and cargo manifest


to ship agent

TC-2: Information & ICT Threats


TC-4: Goods and Conveyance
Security Threats

Modeling Interdependencies
A
A

23
4

23
4

23

23

12

12

12
34

12
34

23
4

12

23
4

23

12
34

2
3

2
12

2
2

A = Gas trading Company/ shipper/ importer


B = Gas producer/ liquefaction plant
C = Ship agent/ owner
D = Public Administrations
E = Port Authority / port services
F = Customs Authority
G = Regasification /Distr. Company
H = Local Agent
I = Insurance Company
J = Banks

1 - Access to cyber-systems
2 - Interaction with cyber-systems
3 - Access to physical facilities
4 - Usage of physical facilities

Node i .
Directed edge i j.
Dependency: D(i, j) = 1, 2, 3 or 4
Order: order(i, j) = min( {|path(i, j)|} )

Applying the methodology


0

= LIQUEFACTION PLANT

= SHIP AGENT / OWNER

= PORT AUTHORITY / PORT SERVICES

= TRADING COMPANY / IMPORTER

= LOCAL AGENT

= CUSTOMS

= PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS

Applying standards
ISO 28000
ISO 27001
ISPS CODE

0 = 1
1 = 1
2 = 1
3 = 0,5
4 = 0,25
5 = 0,5
6 = 0,25
j =

D(0, 1) = 1
D(1, 2) = 1, 2, 3, 4
D(2, 3) =
D(3, 4) = 2

D(1, 0) = 2, 3, 4
D(2, 1) = 2
D(2, 0) = 2, 3, 4

Applying the methodology


1
Threat
secenarios

Selection of
security
controls

Likelihood of
threats

6
3
Risk of
cascading
threats

Consequences

Risk values for


each scenario

LNG supply chain hazards focused on terrorist attacks, systems


hacking, etc

LNG carriers are not prone to ignite or explode accidentally

LNG supply chain model proposed


SC RA Methodology addressed to assess risks in supply chains
SC RA Methodology considers cascading effects

Graph analysis and establishment of interdependencies


Availability of a computer tool for assessing supply chain risks:

Identifies the critical path of interdependencies

Visualizes critical risk levels and probabilities


Proposes security controls

David Incertis Jarillo


Project Manager: Port /Maritime Security and Safety Issues
FEPORTS Port Institute for Studies and Cooperation
dincertis@feports-cv.org
Rafael Company Peris
Project Manager: Research, Development & Innovation
Valenciaport Foundation
rcompany@fundacion.valenciaport.com

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