NMIOTC LNG-David Incertis
NMIOTC LNG-David Incertis
Interdependencies
in the LNG Supply
Chain
A methodology for Risk Assessment
6th NMIOTC
Annual Conference 2015
4th June 2015
PIPELINE
GHISLENGHIEN (BELGIUM), 30 JULY 2004, 24 KILLED, 150 INJURED
PROCESSING PLANT
LOADING PORT
SKIKDA LNG PLANT (ALGERIA), 19 JANUARY 2004 , 30 KILLED, 72 INJURED
STORAGE TANK
STORAGE TANK
STORAGE TANK
PROCESSING PLANT
PIPELINE
GAS FIELD
LNG TANKER
NEVER
WHY?
LNG TANKER
NO BLEVE
NO FLOATING BOMB
LNG DOES NOT EXPLODE OR BURN
LNG CARRIERS ARE ROBUST
Collision
Terrorist attack
Supply chain
actors / nodes
Link/actor
Liquefaction plant
Seller/carrier/shipper
Local Agent
Ship agent
Insurance company
Loading port
Shipowner/ ship agent
Sea Transportation
Port Services
Unloading port
Customs
Port Authority
Buyer/importer
Regasification
Storage
Distribution
Bank
Flow Model
Physical
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Physical
Cyber
Physical
Cyber
Physical
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Physical
Physical
Physical
Cyber
Design criteria
Methodology Steps
STEP 0
STEP 1
STEP 2
STEP 3
STEP 4
STEP 5
STEP 6
STEP 7
https://youtu.be/h-EY82cVKuA
Categorization of threats
Liquefaction plant
Unloading
Regasification (vaporization)
Storage
Distribution
Seller/Carrier/Shipper
Exportation formalities
through local agent
Modeling Interdependencies
A
A
23
4
23
4
23
23
12
12
12
34
12
34
23
4
12
23
4
23
12
34
2
3
2
12
2
2
1 - Access to cyber-systems
2 - Interaction with cyber-systems
3 - Access to physical facilities
4 - Usage of physical facilities
Node i .
Directed edge i j.
Dependency: D(i, j) = 1, 2, 3 or 4
Order: order(i, j) = min( {|path(i, j)|} )
= LIQUEFACTION PLANT
= LOCAL AGENT
= CUSTOMS
= PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS
Applying standards
ISO 28000
ISO 27001
ISPS CODE
0 = 1
1 = 1
2 = 1
3 = 0,5
4 = 0,25
5 = 0,5
6 = 0,25
j =
D(0, 1) = 1
D(1, 2) = 1, 2, 3, 4
D(2, 3) =
D(3, 4) = 2
D(1, 0) = 2, 3, 4
D(2, 1) = 2
D(2, 0) = 2, 3, 4
Selection of
security
controls
Likelihood of
threats
6
3
Risk of
cascading
threats
Consequences