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Chapter Four Risk Assessment of NLNG

The document describes the design of a 200,000 cubic meter storage tank at NLNG Bonny Island, including details of the inner and outer tanks, as well as 7 independent protective layers incorporated into standard chemical plant design. These protective layers include: 1) engineering process design and inherently safer design features; 2) basic process control systems; 3) critical alarms and operator response; 4) safety instrumented systems; 5) physical protection mechanisms like relief valves and rupture discs; 6) post-release protections like dikes and blast walls; and 7) plant and community emergency response. Each protective layer is intended to prevent accidents and mitigate consequences.

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152 views8 pages

Chapter Four Risk Assessment of NLNG

The document describes the design of a 200,000 cubic meter storage tank at NLNG Bonny Island, including details of the inner and outer tanks, as well as 7 independent protective layers incorporated into standard chemical plant design. These protective layers include: 1) engineering process design and inherently safer design features; 2) basic process control systems; 3) critical alarms and operator response; 4) safety instrumented systems; 5) physical protection mechanisms like relief valves and rupture discs; 6) post-release protections like dikes and blast walls; and 7) plant and community emergency response. Each protective layer is intended to prevent accidents and mitigate consequences.

Uploaded by

OkePreciousEmmanuel
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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ASSIGNMENT ON DETAILED DESIGN OF A STORAGE TANK , PART OF

THE DETAILED PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM OF NLNG BONNY ISLAND


AND SEVEN INDEPENDENT PROTECTIVE LAYERS INCORPORATED
INTO STANDARD CHEMICAL PLANT.

Figure 2.0 SECTIONAL VIEW OF THE 200,000m FULL CONTAINMENT OF NLNG


STORAGE TANK.
DESIGN DETAILS
Type of tank: above ground full containment
Gross capacity :200,000m3
Diameter of inner tank: 84.0m
Diameter of the outer tank: 86.4m
Height of the inner tank :37.61m
Height of the outer tank :52.4m

Maximum operating level: 35.92m


Design liquid level :36.22m
Thickness of shell insulation: 1200mm
DESIGN OF INNER TANK
Type of tank: 9% nickel steel full containment
Gross capacity: 200,00m3
Design pressure: 29kpa
Design temperature: 1700C
Specific gravity of LNG: 0.48
Design boil off rate: 0.05 vol%/day
Design vacuum: 0.5kpa
Maximum liquid feed rate: 11000m3/hr
Number of shell courses: 10
Horizontal SSE: 0.2g
Horizontal OBE: 0.1g
Vertical sesmic response: 23 of horizontal values
INDEPENDENT

PROTECTIVE

LAYERS

CHEMICAL ENGINEERING PLANT


Engineering process design.

INCOPORATED

INTO

STANDARD

Basic process control system.


Alarms and operator response
Safety instrumented system.
Physical protection
Plant emargency response (fire fighting equipment)
Community emergency response

ENGINEERING PROCESS DESIGN In many companies, it is assumed that some scenarios


cannot occur because of the inherently safer design of the process equipment. For example, the
equipment might be designed to withstand the maximum pressure for a particular scenario, batch
size might be limited, inventory lowered, chemistry modified, etc.; i.e., scenarios are eliminated
by the inherently safer design. All IPLs are safeguards, but not all safeguards are IPLs. In other
companies, some inherently safer process design features are considered to have a nonzero PFD
that is, they do have possible failure modes that have been observed in industry. These
companies consider such inherently safer process design features as IPLs. The design of the IPL
is
intended to prevent the consequence from occurring. For example, a pump may have an impeller
that is too small to generate high pressure in a downstream vessel. The latter approach allows a
company to compare the risk between plants designed using different equipment standards; the
analysis can result in different failure rates for similar pieces of equipment which in turn
might require additional IPLs for the equipment with higher failure rates. The LOPA analyst
should be aware that inherently safer process design features may have a PFD and appropriate
inspection and maintenance (auditing) might be required (e.g., a small impeller may be replaced
with a larger impeller during repair or maintenance, batch size may be changed, etc.). Whether
process design should be credited as an IPL, or considered as a method of eliminating a scenario,
depends upon the method employed within a particular organization. (CCPS, 1998b).

BASIC PROCESS CONTROL SYSTEM The basic process control system (BPCS), including
normal manual controls, is the first level of protection during normal operation. The BPCS is
designed to maintain the process in the safe operating region. The normal operation of a BPCS
control loop may be credited as an IPL if it meets the appropriate criteria. The failure of the
BPCS can be an initiating event. When considering using the BPCS as an IPL, the analyst must
evaluate the effectiveness of the access control and security systems as human error can degrade
the performance of the BPCS (CCPS, 1998b).
CRITICAL ALARMS AND HUMAN INTERVENTION These systems are the second level
of protection during normal operation and should be activated by the BPCS. Operator action,
initiated by alarms or observation, can be credited as an IPL when various criteria are satisfied to
assure the effectiveness of the action. Company procedures and training may improve the
performance of humans in the system, but procedures themselves are not an IPL. Inherently safer
process design features are encouraged to eliminate possible scenarios Inherently Safer Chemical
Processes: A Life Cycle Approach (CCPS, 1998a).
SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTION (SIF) A SIF is a combination of sensors, logic
solver, and final elements with a specified safety integrity level that detects an out-of-limit
(abnormal) condition and brings the process to a functionally safe state. A SIF is functionally
independent of the BPCS. A SIF is normally considered to be an IPL and the design of the
system, the level of redundancy, and the amount and type of testing will determine the PFD the
SIF receives in LOPA. (CCPS, 1996b).

PHYSICAL PROTECTION (RELIEF VALVES, RUPTURE DISCS, ETC.) These devices,


when appropriately sized, designed and maintained, are IPLs which can provide a high degree of
protection against overpressure in clean services. However, their effectiveness can be impaired in
fouling or corrosive
services, if block valves are installed under the relief valves, or if the inspection and maintenance
activities are of poor quality. If the flow from the relief valves is discharged to the atmosphere,
additional consequences may occur which will require examination. This could involve the
examination of the effectiveness of flares, quench tanks, scrubbers, etc. (CCPS, 1996b).
POSTRELEASE PROTECTION (DIKES, BLAST WALLS, ETC.) These IPLs are passive
devices which provide a high level of protection if designed and maintained correctly. Although
their failure rates are low, possibility of failure should be included in the scenarios. Also, if
automatic deluge systems, foam systems, or gas detection systems, etc(CCPS, 1998a).
PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE These features (fire brigade, manual deluge systems,
facility evacuation, etc.) are not normally considered as IPLs since they are activated after the
initial release and there are too many variables (e.g., time delays) affecting their overall
effectiveness in mitigating a scenario. (CCPS, 1998b).
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE These measures, which include community
evacuation and shelter-in-place, are not normally considered as IPLs since they are activated
after the initial release and there are too many variables affecting their effectiveness in mitigating
a scenario. They provide no protection for plant personnel. (CCPS, 1996b).

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