Con Law Bellia
Con Law Bellia
I.
unconstl
ii.
Intent
a. Constl Convention of 1787- it was suggested that judges should
get veto power similar to exec power, but anti-Feds argued that
judges shouldnt get this power b/c the laws would come before
them to be evaluated for constlty.
b. Federalist No. 78- Hamilton makes case for judicial supremacy.
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the cts.
4. What makes judicial review legitimate for us today?
a. Constraints imposed upon the cts to ascertain that they will not
substitute their judgment for the judgment of the Const such as
power of exec to appoint and legis to confirm judges, power to
impeach judges, Exceptions clause, limitations on judicial power
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Const itself. This case forced Arkansas to comply with the Brown v
Board of Education desegregation ruling.
2. Judiciary- Sup Ct interpretations are also binding on lower cts due
to the hierarchical nature of our judicial system.
3. Executive and Legislative Branches- Each branch may
interpret the Const for itself w/in its own assigned sphere.
E.g. pardon power (Jefferson pardoning people convicted under
Sedition Act), power of pres to appoint and senate to confirm
judges who reject prior constl interpretations, etc.
II.
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Cases w/o a PQ
Marbury- Although delivery of
commission is exec duty, its imposed
by law, and
interpretation/enforcement of law is
province of cts.
Baker v Carr- Does apportionment of
voting districts in TN violate equal
protection? Dispute between state
and fed interpretations, not between
2 co-equal branches. Involved equal
protection, which is interpretable by
Ct.
Powell v McCormack- House refused
to seat Powell, who had been elected
but was under investigation for
crimes. The text of Article I 5
commits the issue of whether
someone is qualified to House, but it
clearly defines qualified, so not a pol
q.
Cases w/ a PQ
Luther v Borden- What is a republican
form of govt as guaranteed in Article
IV? Ct cant make this determination.
Question for political branches.
Nixon v US- Ct found that Article I of
the Const commits the entire
impeachment process to the Senate.
So the issue of whether a Senate
committee can try a judge being
impeached or whether the entire
Senate must try him is a pol q.
4. Standing
a. Constitutional Requirementsi.
Injury in fact
Warth v Seldin- Low income s claim zoning excludes them. No
injury in fact b/c desire to live there is speculative.
Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife- Endangered Species Act says any
person can sue. Ct says this doesnt take away the constl
requirement for injury inf act. No injury b/c parties didnt show
specifically that they would experience harm, just that some
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b. The party causing the injury voluntarily ceases the activity, but
could re-commence it
c. Collateral consequences
6. Non-Ripeness- Case must be ripe in order to be justiciable. Facts
must be developed in such a way that it will be useful for the ct to
review it. Also bars advisory opinions. Can be exceptions but only
w/ showing of hardship.
Federalism
I.
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Swift & Co v US- 1905- Upheld Sherman act injunction against pricefixing against meat dealers. The activity of price-fixing was entirely
interstate, but had a direct effect on the price of goods in interstate
commerce.
2. Regulation of goods moving in interstate commerce. Regulations
may be placed on the movement of goods in interstate
commerce unless the regulation is a pretext for an unconstl
end.
a. Cases upheld b/c it regulated goods at a point in the chain of
commerce
Swift v US
Stafford v Wallace- Another Sherman act meat packers case. Goods
go into interstate commerce. Law prevents meat packers who use
unfair/deceptive practices from benefiting from interstate
commerce.
Egg case- 1911. Articles that are outlaws of commerce can be
seized wherever they are found, even if they are out of interstate
commerce by the time they are seized.
b. Cases upheld b/c it directly regulated interstate commerce
Champion v Ames- 1903. Federal Lottery Act prohibited importing,
mailing or transporting lottery tickets. Upheld b/c it directly
regulated interstate traffic.
c. Cases allowed despite being a pretext. Ct makes the distinction
that C may regulate an activity that is inherently bad such as
lottery tickets, transporting immoral women.
Mann Act case- 1913.
Champion v Ames
d. Cases struck down b/c of pretexta
Hammer v Dagenhart- 1918. Struck down law prohibiting the
sending in interstate commerce of goods produced by child labor.
This was a pretext for regulating child labor.
3. New Deal cases regulating intrastate activities- C cant regulate
activities which have no direct effect on interstate
commerce and regulate purely intrastate commerce.
Schecter Poultry (Sick Chicken Case)- 1935. C cant promulgate codes
of fair competition regulating pay, hours, trade practices etc if the
commerce regulated is entirely local. No direct effect, not a good in
chain of commerce.
Carter Coal- 1936. Strikes down Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
which imposed tax on employers not following wage/hour regulations.
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C. Contemporary Limits
1. Pretext analysis is back! Ct requires an economic motive to
commerce clause laws.
Lopez- Federal crime for individual to possess gun in school zone. Not
an economic activity, and no findings to show it affects interstate
commerce.
Morrison- Violence against Women act creates a federal cause of action
for violent crimes against women. Not economic, and findings dont
justify law.
2. 10th Amendment- There are state sovereignity interests which bump
up into the C power area. C shouldnt regulate areas of
traditional state concern.
Morrison- Violence against women is an area of state concern.
3. Jurisdictional hook in law is not sufficient to make it constl.
4. 3 possible ways to justify a law under commerce clause
post-1995:
a. Regulation of the use of channels of interstate commerce
b. Regulation of an instrumentality in interstate commerce
c. Regulation of something that substantially affects
interstate commerce
III.
Other Powers
A. Tax- Article I, 8, cl. 1 gives C power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises.
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Child Labor Tax Case- 1922. Tries to coerce companies into not using child
labor by imposing taxes on them if they do. Ct makes pretext analysis- C
cannot use the tax power to impose penalties. Motive must be to
raise revenue.
B. Spending- Article I, 8, cl. 2 ... to pay the debts and provide for the
general welfare of the US.
1. Govt cant use spending power for coercion or to accomplish
an end outside their constl power.
US v Butler- 1936. Govt cant use the spending power to accomplish
an end that would be outside their constl power. Agricultural Adj Act of
1933 says dept of ag will pay money to farmers to reduce their
productive acreage. This encroaches on an area reserved to the states
and is struck down.
Steward Machine v Davis- Provision in unemployment act giving
employers tax credit for compliance gives states incentive to comply
w/ unemployment act to please employers. Ct finds this isnt coercion.
2. 4 prong test to see if using spending power to regulate is
appropriate or if it is coercion:
a. C must be regulating general welfare
b. Condition imposed on states must be clear
c. The condition must be connected to solving the general
welfare problem
d. No violation of other constl provision
SD v Dole- Law withholds 5% fo federal highway funds to states w/
drinking age under 21. Clearly, C is using the spending power w/ the
intent of regulating drinking ages. Ct rules that this is okay,
establishing the 4 prong test. There is a tension between Dole and
Lopez- is the 10th amendment a tautology?
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IV.
Limits on Power
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amendment.
1. Congress regulating individuals in areas of state autonomy is
Clause
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Separation of Powers
I.
Basic Theory
A. Both textual and structural sources for separation of power
1. Article I enumerates legis powers, Article II, exec power, Article III,
Judical Power. Textual violations take place when one branch
does an action clearly reserved to another branch- e.g. pres
declaring war.
2. Structural-Framers set up 3 distinct branches to prevent tyranny,
but system of checks and balances requires cooperation and also
comingles powers of each branch, leading to tension. A structural
violation of sep of powers occurs when the action of one
branch threatens the tripartate structure by altering the
balance of power between the branches.
B. How to analyze separation of powers problems
1. Has one branch of govt exercised a power or performed a function
that a specific clause of the Const requires to be performed by or in
conjunction with another branch?
2. Has one branch of govt usurped power that more appropriately
belongs to another branch?
3. Has one branch of govt encroached upon the functions of a
coordinate branch so as to undermine that branchs integrity or
independence?
C. Jackson concurrence in Youngstown lists 3 situations where presidential
actions can violate separation of powers.
1. Pres acts pursuant to express or implied authorization of C.
2. Pres acts in absence of congressional grant or denial of authority
3. Pres acts contrary to expressed or implied will of C
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II.
III.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co v Sawyer- 1952. Steel workers were going
to strike and a steel shortage would jeopardize natl defense. Pres issued
exec order to take control of steel mills and direct their operation. Pres
contended it was covered by commander in chief authority and his power
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, however Supreme ct
found this was a lawmaking power reserved to C in Article I 1. It is a
textual violation for President to exercise a lawmaking power.
Clinton v New York- 1996 Line-Item veto act allowed pres to cancel out
provisions of the Balanced Budget act. Ct finds this is unconstl b/c it is
essentially a legislative function. After the bill is passed, the pres can
change it, which essentially means it would become a law that wasnt
really approved by C. Note that it doesnt matter C consented by passing
the act- the passing of the act was unconstl C essentially delegated the
lawmaking power. Line-Item veto is unconstl b/c it allows pres to
exercise legislative function- structural violation.
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