III.

Municipal Liability
A. Sec. 24 RA 7160
Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their
officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or
damage to property.
B. Liablity for violation of Law, Contract, tort
C. Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability

A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the

reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it
has the general power to contract.

Applies to all cases where money and other property of a party is received
under such circumstances that the general law, independent of an express
contract, implies an obligation to do justice with respect to the same.
IV. Local Officials
A. Provisions applicable to Elective and Appointive Local Officials

1.

Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution

Local Government Code (RA 7619)
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards (RA 6713)
Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest
A. Sec. 89, LGC
B. Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions, RA 6713
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not: (1) Own, control, manage or
accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent,
trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by
their office unless expressly allowed by law;

B. Practice of Profession
A. Sec. 90, LGC
B. Sec. 7, RA 6713
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not: (2) Engage in the private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; or or pending official transaction with their office
Cases:

1.

REPUBLIC V RAMBUYONG GR 167810 | DEL CASTILLO, J. | conflict

of interest
Facts:
Alfredo Y. Chu (Chu) filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/or damages
against the National Power Corporation (NPC). Appearing as counsel for Chu is
Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong (Atty. Rambuyong) who was then the incumbent ViceMayor of Ipil, ZamboangaSibugay. Thereafter, NPC filed a Motion for
Inhibition[3] of Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under Section 90 (b), (1) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, sanggunian members are prohibited "to appear as counsel before any court
wherein x xx any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party." NPC contended that being a government-owned or controlled corporation, it
is embraced within the term "instrumentality." RTC ruled that Sec. 90 of R.A. 7160
does not include government-owned or controlled corporations as among the
political units against which lawyer members of the Sanggunian cannot appear as
counsel of the adverse party; That Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong, who is the
incumbent Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Ipil, ZamboangaSibugay, is not
disqualified to continue acting as counsel for the plaintiff in this case. CA; denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such that Atty. Rambuyong, as a
sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against it
Held:
Yes. Sec. 90.[10] Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation, other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
or teach in schools except during session hours:
Provided, Thatsanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY. PASCASIO

within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by

law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Rules of Interpretation)
Case at bar, thus, pursuant to Sec. 90 (b), (1) of the Local Government Code, Atty.
Rambuyong, as sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to
the NPC, which is an instrumentality of government.

2. CATU VS RELLOSA AC NO 5738 | CORONA, J.

Facts:
Atty. Rellosa, was the punong barangay of Barangay 723, who summoned
the parties to conciliation meetings due to a lot dispute. [5] When the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the
appropriate action in court. Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for
ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor. Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.

Case:
FLORES V DRILON | BELLOSILLO, J.
Facts:
Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) under Sec. 13,
par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992: Paragraph (d) reads
(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager
as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the
Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex
oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.

Issue:
WON AttyRellosa as Punong Barangay is prohibited to act as a counsel for Elizabeth
Pastor.

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic,
Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association
in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that theproviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13
herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional and statutory
provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that
"[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," 3 because the City
Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public
officesamong others.

Held:

Issue:

No. Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to

practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations. A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require
his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private
practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department:
Note: Applicable Law: RA 6713 (Code of Ethics and Ethical Standards)
3.

Prohibition Against Appointment

WON the appointment of Mayor Gordon is valid

Held: (qualify)
Yes.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout
his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective
post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment.
Case at bar, As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY. PASCASIO

appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of

SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes
the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City,
and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer,
the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve
the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were
exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the
officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under
color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law,
before the same is adjudged to be such
B. Elective Local Officials
1. Qualifications and Disqualifications:
Cases:
1. JALOSJOS VS COMELEC (OCTOBER 9, 2012) | CARPIO, J
Facts:
Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboangadel
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino
filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino
asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos
had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisin
mayor. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. the COMELEC
First Division granted Cardinos petition and cancelled Jalosjos certificate of
candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed
committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when
in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of
which he has not yet served.
Issue: WON Jalosjos possesses the qualifications under the LGC to run as a mayor
Held:
NO. A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the

Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a

candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person
can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either
Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions
read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40.Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
((((a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,15 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the
temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On
the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these
ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to
so run.
2. JALOSJOS VS COMELEC (JUNE 18, 2013) | PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Facts:
petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his
previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer
of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for
Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1 (MTCC).9 Pending
resolution of the same, he filed a CoC10 on October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor
for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013
(May 2013 Elections). In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for
the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election.

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY. PASCASIO

Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14
(RTC) in its October 31, 2012 Order12 which, pursuant to Section 13813 of Batas
PambansaBilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election
Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.

the dilg as to whether he was legally required to assume office of mayor in view of
Lonzanidas DQ. (DQ due to his criminal conviction hence, the post was deemed
permanently vacant.) Aratea was allowed to take oath as permanent mayor.
On Aug 25, 2010, Antipolo intervened claiming her right to be proclaimed as
mayor because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the comelec ordered
the cancellation of Lonzanida. Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be
proclaimed as winning candidate bcLonzaidas DQ was not yet final during
election day, votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray.

It is petitioners submission that Article 30 of the RPC was partially amended by

Section 40(a) of the LGC and thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification
had already been removed.
Issue:
whether petitioners perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had
already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC).
Held:

Issue:
WON Antipolo could be proclaimed as a winning candidat
Held:
Yes, the second placer should be proclaimed as winning candidate because
Lonzanidas COC is void ab initio; never a candidate at all. Thus, Antipolo, the
only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of mayor. Rule of succession cannot be applied.

The argument is untenable.

Accordingly, Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general
application and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line
with the principle of lexspecialisderogatgenerali general legislation must give way
to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to
embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other
words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the
one specially designed therefor should prevail.32
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC,
carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in
turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As
discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal
provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the
convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years
from petitioners service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to
suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
3. ARATEA VS COMELEC
Facts:
Lonzanida and Antipolo were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales on
May 2010 elections. Lonzanidas COC was cancelled due to violation of the threeterm rule. His motion for recon remained pending during May 2010 elections.
Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest votes and were proclaimed mayor and
vm. Aratea took his oath as an acting mayor. Thereafter, he requested an opinion to

4.

JAPZON VS COMELEC | CHICO-NAZARIO, J | RESIDENCY

Facts:
Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates
for the Office of Mayor of theMunicipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in
the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
On 15 June 2007, Japzon filed a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or cancel Tys Certificate
of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred that Ty
was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was
then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General
Macarthur,

Easter

Samar)

to

spouses

AngChim

Ty

(a

Chinese)

and

CrisantaAranasSumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of

America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for
the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he
falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY. PASCASIO

permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied
for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided

The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the

in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one

qualifications required by the Constitution and existing laws.

year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of

Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In
fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship,
Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October
2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an
American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his
foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon
prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of the latters Certificate of Candidacy.

Tys

intent

to

establish

new

domicile

of

choice

in

the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent

when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005,
he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in
the Philippines was

at A.

Mabini

St., Barangay 6,

Poblacion,

General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted
himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said
municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a
voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General

Issue: won TY complied with the one-year residency requirement for running for
public

Macarthur,Eastern Samar.

office

Held:
Yes.
for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he
personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had
already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine

In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably,
just a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon maintains
that Tys trips abroad during said period, i.e., toBangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18
July 2006), and to the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that
Ty had no intention to permanently reside in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines. The COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as
this Court, however, view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back to
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is
a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.

citizenship.

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY. PASCASIO

There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period
prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident
thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence
to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the

office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis
M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions questioning petitioners eligibility before the RTC on the ground
that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. [24] The Court also
notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in

Issue:

theMunicipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine

of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual
stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does
strongly support and is only consistent with Tys avowed intent in the instant case to
establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar.
5. SOBEJANA-CONDON VS COMELEC | REYES, J.
Facts:
Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on
August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous
Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27,
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. 6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10,
2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of

Held:
No. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5 (2) to wit;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly reacquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual
citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office,
she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly,
however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2)
that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.
6. CORODORA VS COMELEC | CARPIO, J.
Facts:
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY. PASCASIO

To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora

presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the
Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17
June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2
December 2000. Cordora concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC):
[sic] Re: CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the
declarant/affiant to state, among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6),
No. 9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was] naturalized as
an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly
and willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the above basic
requirements under No. 12 that he is indeed eligible for the office to which he
seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably
established by his own statementsbefore the Philippine Bureau of Immigration
COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint
against Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against
Tambunting. Cordoras reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration
that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that
Tambunting is an American citizen; Comelec En Banc, agreed.
Issue: WON Tambunting qualified to run for councilor (re: Residency and
Citizenship Requirements)

Held:
Yes.
Tambuntings residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement
because of Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails
because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the
purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed
place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent upon
citizenship.

was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to

acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served
to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino.
Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of
candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship
did not disqualify him from running for public office.7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Tambuntings Dual Citizenship

Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY. PASCASIO

Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition
is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain

synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with
the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent
indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following
elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should
be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

2. Manner and Date of Election

KIDA VS SENATE OF THE PHILS
FACTS:

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

3. Term of Office
Cases:
1. ABUNDO VS COMELEC 2013 | Three-term limit | involuntary
interruption
****
2. BORJA VS COMELEC 2008 * | Three-term limit; Interruption
AFacts:

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE:
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?
HELD:
YES. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco
was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March
27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for
mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already
served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be
ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared
Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared
Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as
mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of
law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that
office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:

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No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as
mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the
first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he
served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death,
of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event
of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that
office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
3. ALDOVINO VS COMELEC | Three-term limit; Interruption
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005,
during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day
preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension
order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of
the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His
disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term
Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the preventive suspension interrupts the three-term limitation rule of
COMELEC?

suspension has been imposed.

4. ADORMEO VS COMELEC * | Recall election
Facts:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However,
before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May
2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001.
When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground
that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the
three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga
filed a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected
Mayor.
Issue:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served
two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.
Held:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply.

RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code (RA 7160).

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term
and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive
terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the
2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of
the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive
suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of
service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat
more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to
evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was
defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a
continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby
barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not
the voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law.
5.

SOCRATES VS COMELEC | Recall Election

***
6. LATASA VS COMELEC * | Conversion of a Municipality to City; whether
three term limit will be applicable
Facts:

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Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in
the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive
terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for
the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been
elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact
does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since
this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However,
his motion for reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before
election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the
Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for
mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be
counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality
to a city, it attained a different juridical personality separate from the municipality of
Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be
construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the
newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms
as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Held:
No.. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of
applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of
the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the
same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality
are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who
elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their
chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples

freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive
over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution,
if not abhorred by it
7. ONG V ALEGRE *
Facts:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong
(Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the
incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy3 of Francis. The
petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis
having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001
mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties
thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the
office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently
proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an
election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected
mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, 4 albeit the decision came out only on July 4,
2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact
already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of
San Vicente
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor for the
mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of
the three-term limit rule.
Held:
YES. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, service for the
full term, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the threeterm limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring
local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte
ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis opponent (Alegre) who

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won in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of
San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and
legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office
has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a presumptive winner in
the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him
less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect
of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre
would under the three-term rule be considered as having served a term by
virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually
served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
8. MENDOZA V COMELEC *
Facts:
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a
number
of
times:
a) 1986 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and
served
up
to
1988
b) 1988 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office
on
28
June
1994
and
served
up
to
1995
d) 1995 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same
post in the May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was
proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent
Romans election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary
to Art. X, 8 of the Constitution.
Issue: WON Mendoza has served for three consecutive terms
Held: No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local
official merely serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term.
The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can

apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up
the office. If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbents
being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall
proceedings negates one term for purposes of applying the three-term limit, it
stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local
official in a recall election should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the
three-term limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term
nor the elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted
local official following the recall election could be considered to have served a full
three-year term set by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than
three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit
interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to
the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from
June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served
as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be
counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of
Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on
that day was actually only his third term for the same position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary
interpretation would in effect cut short the elected officials service to less than nine
years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political
power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters obvious preference
who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.
9. RIVERA III VS COMELEC *
Facts:
In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for
mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner Dee filed with
the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of
Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third term), but he served the second term
from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was
also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January to

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July 1999.
Issue:
WON Morales already served his 3 consecutive term
Held:
Yes. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position.
He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as mayor
(because the trial courts ruling was promulgated only after the expiry of the 19982001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor
of Mabalacat continuously without any break since 1995. In just over a month, by
June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous
years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted service for the full
term and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term
limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective
officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the
same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish
some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of
consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his
Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a
candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be
considered stray votes.
10. DIZON VS COMELEC *
Facts:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with
the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat
on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous
consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon
alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus,
Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on
March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as
mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998

elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998
elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His
term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for
his second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It
took judicial notice of SCs ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007
where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and
2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then
proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated
the three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered
not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections
is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.
Issues:
WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term
Held:
NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during
his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003.
This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004
elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for
four consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We
disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the
three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales proclamation
for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of

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Morales service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial courts ruling
was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length
of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May
2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayors
office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May
2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the
mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of
service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June
2007. (4th term)
11. BOLOS, JR VS COMELEC * |Voluntary renunciation
Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis,
Bohol for 3 consecutive terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his
incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office
on July 1, 2004 leaving his post as Punong Barangay. After serving his term as a
councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the October
29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same
office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already
served the maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the
position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991. Cinconiegue contended that Bolos
relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on
his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal
councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner
knew that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary
renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang
Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it
must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of
service. Pending the resolution of the case before the Comelec, Bolos Jr. won in the
election.
The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has
already served the maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus
disqualified to run for the same office. It further ordered that the proclamation of
Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the
Local Government Code.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay
by Bolos when he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to
have served for three consecutive terms.
Held:
The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
Socrates vs. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the threeterm limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that
involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. What is to be
determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his
position as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as
Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office.
The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioners relinquishment of the office of
Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to
office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a
voluntary renunciation.
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang
Bayan, he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit
of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up
his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was
very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote
for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former
position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment
of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like

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resignation, is voluntary.
12. COMELEC VS CRUZ *
Notes: October 6, 2016
Rationale of three-term limit rule:
Appointment of mayor vs senator (Flores vs Drilon)
Lgu resign first from their local position; if natl position, he will terminate his tenure
as a natl legislator
Kida vs senate
- di sabay cause of the experience in the armm elections; special case
Options:
1. Hold over til synchronization is allowed (gen rule it is allowed to prevent hiatus
until another peeson is elected in order to succeed him; prevent abamdonment of
public office
Xpn of the law expressly disallows holdover
- Local Govt Code disallpws hold over
2. Appointment of OIC
Legally permissible by law. Allowed because it is in a temporary manner and the
next officials will be assu!ingoffice

Assignment next meeting:

Up to doctrine of condonation

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GAMBOA VS AGUIRRE
SUMMARY: Negros Oriental Governor went on an official trip abroad and
designated Vice-Governor Gamboa as Acting Governor. When the SP held session,
SP Members Aguirre and Araneta (AA) questioned Gamboas authority to preside
over the SP, conisdering that he was the Acting Governor. Gamboa refused to vacate
the Chair. Later, SP voted 7-4-1 to allow Gamboa to continue presiding. AA filed a
declaratory relief and prohibition action against Gamboa. RTC ruled that Gamboa
cannot preside over the SP while he is Acting Governor. ISSUE: W/N an incumbent
Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, can continue to preside over
the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On appeal by Gamboa, SC upheld
RTC, holding that when the Vice-Governor becomes Acting Governor, he does not
relinquish his original post and thus, only a temporary vacancy is created in the ViceGovernorship because there is no person legally authorized to discharge the
functions of Vice-Governor. LGC did not provide for this situation where a
temporary vacancy is created in the Vice-Governorship, so SC used the rule on
permanent vacancies and the SP must elect an Acting Presiding Officer. VG cannot
preside over the SP because under the LGC, the executive and legislative functions
have been separated at the provincial level. The office of the Governor is purely
executive in nature [not like in the old LGC, where the Governor also presides over
the SP], while the SP is purely legislative in nature. Thus the Vice-Governor who
becomes Acting Governor cannot preside over the SP, since he would be performing
executive and legislative functions simultaneously, contrary to the separation policy
of the LGC, which is intended to promote better service delivery and provide a
system of checks and balances. SC resolved the issue despite its mootness [terms of
everyone involved expired in 1998] because of its novelty, and being capable of
repetition yet evading review.
DOCTRINE: The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor
creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor
whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event
constitutes an "inability" on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor)
to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set
in LGC 49(b) - concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The
continuity of the Acting Governor's (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of
the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under LGC 49(b), "(i)n the
event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian
session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer.".
Effective absence is one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time
being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.
NATURE: Petition for review. Original action for declaratory relief and prohibition.

FACTS
Trouble in hacendero paradise, i.e., Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of
Negros Occidental. 1995-1998 term.
PARTIES INVOLVED
o Rafael COSCOLLUELA Governor
o Romeo GAMBOA, Jr. Vice Governor and Presiding Officer of
SP
o Marcelo AGUIRRE and Juan ARANETA (AA) SP members
Aug. 1995 Coscolluela went on an official trip abroad. He designated
Gamboa as Acting Governor for the duration of his trip..
Sep. 6, 1995 SP held its regular session, with Gamboa presiding.
o AA questioned Gamboas authority to preside over the session in
view of his designation as Acting Governor. Alis ka diyan. Gamboa
refused to vacate the Chair.
Another SP Session Gamboa was allowed to continue presiding by a vote
of 7-4-1.
Sep. 22. 1995 AA filed an action for declaratory relief and prohibition.
Oct. 2, 1995 Coscolluela reassumed office.
RTC DECISION
o Gamboa temporarily incapacitated to preside over SP sessions for
the period that he Acting Governor.
Gamboa filed the present petition for review.
Although mooted by the expiry of the officials terms, SC resolved to
dispose of the issues in light of their controversy and novelty.
ISSUE (HELD): W/N an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting
Governor, can continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (NO)
RATIO
Under LGC 49(a) and 466(a)(1), the Vice-Governor is the Presiding Officer
of the SP.
Vice-Governor also assumes the Governorship for the unexpired term of his
predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy.
When the vacancy is temporary, the Vice-Governor "shall automatically
exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties
and functions" of the Governor.
RA 7160 does not supply a rule of succession in case of a temporary
vacancy in the Vice-Governorship (unlike its predecessor law, BP 337).
When the Vice-Governor fills a temporary vacancy in the
Governorship, he does not assume the office; but simply acts as
Governor. Kaya Acting Governor. He does not relinquish his position
and title as Vice-Governor.

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This temporary assumption of governor duties by the vice-governor does

not create a permanent vacancy in the vice-governorship.
The crux of the matter: When the Vice-Governor acts as Governor, does
he temporarily relinquish the powers, functions, duties, and
responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to preside
over SP sessions? RA 7160 is silent on the matter, but SC says YES.
A Vice-Governor who is concurrently Acting Governor is actually a quasiGovernor, meaning that, for the purposes of of exercising his legislative
prerogative and power, he is deemed a non-member of the SP for the time
being.
Governor and Vice-Governor are executive offices by nature while SP is
legislative in nature, because the authority vested in the SP is a
Congressional delegation of legislative power.
RA 7160 separated the executive and legislative functions at the local level,
except in the Barangay. Thus, while under BP 337, the Governor presided
over the SP and was considered a member thereof, that is no longer true
under RA 7160.
This is clear from the law, which states that local legislative power shall be
vested in the SP; and enumerates who are members of the SP [When the
law enumerates, it necessarily excludes.]:
o Vice-Governor (as Presiding Officer)
o Regular elected members
o 3 elected sectoral representatives
o Ex officio members [Provincial Liga President, Provincial SK Liga
President, and Provincial ULAP President (municipalities and
component cities)]
En contrario, the provincial executive power is vested in the Governor
alone.
Consequently, the union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the
local chief executive under the former Code has been disbanded, so that
either department now comprises different and non-intermingling official
personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public
service and provide a system of check and balance between the two.
Paredes v. Antillon: If the Mayor is out of the country and thus effectively
absent, the Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the
latters absence

This rule applies to the Vice-Governor as well, because he is similarly

situated with the Vice-Mayor.
"Effective" absence: one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for
the time being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.
There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified
incumbent. A vacancy occurs when there is no person lawfully authorized to
assume the powers and duties of the office. Thus, the designation,
appointment or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor
creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the ViceGovernor during such contingency.
Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession
provided for permanent vacancies, under RA 7160, in the office of the ViceGovernor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy
occurring in the same office
REASON: in the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was
left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of
the Vice-Governor.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the
duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge
them. Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear
rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions
in both offices has already been abandoned.
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a
corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor
whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy.
This event constitutes an "inability" on the part of the regular presiding
officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls
for the operation of the remedy set in LGC 49(b) - concerning the election
of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor's
(Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long
as he is in such capacity. Under LGC 49(b), "(i)n the event of the inability
of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the
members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer.".

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