THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 154391-92. September 30, 2004]

Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners, vs. Spouses

VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The present case involves a dispute between parents and children. The
children were invited by the parents to occupy the latters two lots, out of
parental love and a desire to foster family solidarity. Unfortunately, an
unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of pique, the parents asked
them to vacate the premises. Thus, the children lost their right to remain on
the property. They have the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful
improvements that they constructed thereon in good faith and with the
consent of the parents. In short, Article 448 of the Civil Code applies.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 22, 2002 Decision and the June 26, 2002 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP Nos. 56205 & 56467. The challenged
Decision disposed as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the

following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Vicente and Rosario should reimburse Ismael and Teresita one-half of the
value of the useful improvements introduced in the premises prior to
demand, which is equivalent to P475,000.00. In case the former refuse to
reimburse the said amount, the latter may remove the improvements, even
though the land may suffer damage thereby. They shall not, however, cause
any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

2. The award of attorneys fees is DELETED.

3. The records of these consolidated cases are REMANDED to the Court of
origin for further proceedings to determine the option to be taken by Vicente
and Rosario and to implement the same with dispatch.
[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and
Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents,
and Teresita is his wife.
[5]

[6]

On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the children.
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141,
situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement,
Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their
residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite
repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per
week.
[7]

[8]

Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease

agreement. They claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their
residence and business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near
one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the
problems of the family. They added that it was the policy of respondents to
allot the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their
children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T-103141 had
been allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance. On the other hand, the lot
covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to petitioners as payment
for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents house.
[9]

[10]

The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to

vacate the premises. It opined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots,
[11]

not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and

Rosario. As their stay was by mere tolerance, petitioners were necessarily
bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand. The MTCC
dismissed their contention that one lot had been allotted as an advance
inheritance, on the ground that successional rights were inchoate. Moreover, it
disbelieved petitioners allegation that the other parcel had been given as
payment for construction materials.
[12]

[13]

[14]

On appeal, the regional trial court (RTC) upheld the findings of the
MTCC. However, the RTC allowed respondents to appropriate the building
and other improvements introduced by petitioners, after payment of the
indemnity provided for by Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the
Civil Code. It added that respondents could oblige petitioners to purchase
the land, unless its value was considerably more than the building. In the latter
situation, petitioners should pay rent if respondents would not choose to
appropriate the building.
[15]

[16]

[17]

Upon denial of their individual Motions for Reconsideration, the parties

filed with the CA separate Petitions for Review, which were later consolidated.
[18]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and
Teresita had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente
and Rosario. Thus, possession of the subject lots by petitioners became
illegal upon their receipt of respondents letter to vacate it.
[19]

[20]

Citing Calubayan v. Pascual, the CA further ruled that petitioners status

was analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had
expired, but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
Consequently, in ascertaining the right of petitioners to be reimbursed for
the improvements they had introduced on respondents properties, the
appellate court applied the Civil Codes provisions on lease. The CA modified
the RTC Decision by declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code was
inapplicable. The CA opined that under Article 1678 of the same Code, Ismael
[21]

[22]

[23]

and Teresita had the right to be reimbursed for one half of the value of the
improvements made.
[24]

Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioners brought this recourse to this
Court.
[25]

The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
1. a) Whether or not Section 17[,] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on Judgment should
apply in the rendition of the decision in this case;
b) Whether or not the Complaint should have been dismissed;
c) Whether or not damages including attorneys fees should have been awarded
to herein petitioners;
2. a) Whether or not the rule on appearance of parties during the Pretrial should apply
on appearance of parties during Preliminary Conference in an unlawful detainer suit;
b) Whether or not the case of Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals (230 SCRA 164) is applicable to appearance of parties in an
unlawful detainer suit;
3. Whether or not Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the case on the
matters of improvements, or is it Article 447 of the Civil Code in relation to the
Article 453 and 454 thereof that should apply, if ever to apply the Civil Code;
4. Whether or not the [D]ecision of the Court of Appeals is supported by evidence,
appropriate laws, rules and jurisprudence;
5. Whether or not Assisting Judge Norberto Mercado of the MTCC Lipa City should
be held accountable in rendering the MTCC [D]ecision;
6. Whether or not Atty. Glenn Mendoza and Atty. Andrew Linatoc of the same [l]aw
office should be held accountable for pursuing the [e]jectment case[.]
[26]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Ejectment
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises? At
the outset, we stress that this is the main issue in ejectment proceedings. In
the present case, petitioners failed to justify their right to retain possession of
the subject lots, which respondents own. Since possession is one of the
attributes of ownership, respondents clearly are entitled to physical or
material possession.
[27]

[28]

Allegations of the Complaint

Petitioners allege that they cannot be ejected from the lots, because
respondents based their Complaint regarding the nonpayment of rentals on a
verbal lease agreement, which the latter failed to prove. Petitioners contend
that the lower courts erred in using another ground (tolerance of possession)
to eject them.
[29]

In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful

becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the defendants right to
possess, arising from an express or implied contract. In other words, the
plaintiffs cause of action comes from the expiration or termination of the
defendants right to continue possession. The case resulting therefrom must
be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
[30]

[31]

To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the

defendant is illegally withholding possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. The
complaint may lie even if it does not employ the terminology of the law,
provided the said pleading is couched in a language adequately stating that
the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate has become unlawful.
It is equally settled that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of
the action, is determined from the averments of the complaint.
[32]

[33]

In the present case, the Complaint alleged that despite demands,

petitioners refused to pay the accrued rentals and [to] vacate the leased

premises. It prayed that judgment be rendered [o]rdering [petitioners] and all

those claiming rights under them to vacate the properties x x x and remove
the structures x x x constructed thereon. Effectively then, respondents
averred that petitioners original lawful occupation of the subject lots had
become unlawful.
[34]

[35]

The MTCC found sufficient cause to eject petitioners. While it disbelieved

the existence of a verbal lease agreement, it nevertheless concluded that
petitioners occupation of the subject lots was by mere tolerance of
respondents. Basing its conclusion on the fact that the parties were close
relatives, the MTCC ruled thus:
x x x [T]he parties herein are first degree relatives. Because of this relationship, this
Court takes judicial notice of the love, care, concern and protection imbued upon the
parents towards their [children], i.e., in the instant case, the love, care, concern and
protection of the [respondents] to the [petitioners]. With this in mind, this Court is
inclined to believe the position of the [petitioners] that there was no such verbal lease
agreement between the parties herein that took place in 1992. x x x.
From the allegations of the [petitioners], this Court is convinced that their stay and
occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of the [respondents], and not
by virtue of a verbal lease agreement between them.
[36]

Having found a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the MTCC (as well
as the RTC and the CA) did not err in ordering the ejectment of petitioners as
prayed for by respondents. There was no violation of Section 17 of Rule
70 of the Rules of Court. As earlier explained, unlawful detainer was
sufficiently alleged in the Complaint and duly proven during the
trial. Significantly, the issue of whether there was enough ground to eject
petitioners was raised during the preliminary conference.
[37]

[38]

Not Merely Tolerated

Possession
Petitioners dispute the lower courts finding that they occupied the subject
lots on the basis of mere tolerance. They argue that their occupation was not

under such condition, since respondents had invited, offered and persuaded
them to use those properties.
[39]

This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another
at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are
necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the
property upon demand. A summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
to enforce this implied obligation. The unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
[40]

[41]

[42]

Toleration is defined as the act or practice of permitting or enduring

something not wholly approved of. Sarona v. Villegas described
what tolerated acts means, in this language:
[43]

[44]

Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are those which by
reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or
benefits which ones property can give to another without material injury or prejudice
to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. x x x. And, Tolentino
continues, even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by
prescription. x x x. Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: There is tacit
consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case
of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere
tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or
license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the
existence or non-existence of the permission.
[45]

We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of
possession by mere tolerance. Petitioners were able to establish that
respondents had invited them to occupy the subject lots in order that they
could all live near one other and help in resolving family problems. By
occupying those lots, petitioners demonstrated their acceptance of the
invitation. Hence, there was a meeting of minds, and an agreement regarding
possession of the lots impliedly arose between the parties.
[46]

The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely something
not wholly approved of by respondents. Neither did it arise from what Tolentino

refers to as neighborliness or familiarity. In point of fact, their possession was

upon the invitation of and with the complete approval of respondents, who
desired that their children would occupy the premises. It arose from familial
love and a desire for family solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits.
Right to Use the Lots Terminated
That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore
clear. The issue is the duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation
on this point, Article 1197 of the Civil Code allows the courts to fix the duration
or the period.
Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the
duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of
the debtor.
In every case the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances
have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period
cannot be changed by them.
Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a
period. Such qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present
case.
To repeat, when Vicente and Rosario invited their children to use the lots,
they did so out of parental love and a desire for solidarity expected from
Filipino parents. No period was intended by the parties. Their mere failure to
fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or authorize the
courts to do so.
[47]

Based on respondents reasons for gratuitously allowing petitioners to use

the lots, it can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as
the
parents
and
the
children
mutually
benefited
from
the
arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.
Thus, when a change in the condition existing between the parties occurs -[48]

like a change of ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved

conflict or animosity -- the agreement may be deemed terminated. Having
been based on parental love, the agreement would end upon the dissipation
of the affection.
When persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity
between the parents and the children, the purpose of the agreement ceased.
Thus, petitioners no longer had any cause for continued possession of the
lots. Their right to use the properties became untenable. It ceased upon their
receipt of the notice to vacate. And because they refused to heed the
demand, ejectment was the proper remedy against them. Their possession,
which was originally lawful, became unlawful when the reason therefor -- love
and solidarity -- ceased to exist between them.
[49]

No Right to Retain
Possession
Petitioners have not given this Court adequate reasons to reverse the
lower courts dismissal of their contention that Lots T-78521 and T-103141,
respectively, were allegedly allotted to them as part of their inheritance and
given in consideration for past debts.
The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and
is vested only upon the latters demise. Indisputably, rights of succession are
transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent. Assuming that
there was an allotment of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained with
respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons in the
future is not inconsistent with the owners taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. Other than their self-serving
testimonies and their affidavits, petitioners offered no credible evidence to
support their outlandish claim of inheritance allocation.
[50]

[51]

We also agree with the lower courts that petitioners failed to prove the
allegation that, through a dation in payment, Lot T-78521 had been transferred
to the latter as payment for respondents debts. The evidence presented by
petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the parents arising from
[52]

the latters purported purchases and advances. There was no sufficient proof
that respondents had entered into a contract of dation to settle the alleged
debt.Petitioners even stated that there was a disagreement in the accounting
of the purported debt, a fact that disproves a meeting of the minds with the
parents.
[53]

[54]

Petitioners also admitted that a portion of the alleged debt is the subject
matter of a collection case against respondents (Civil Case No. 0594-96).
Thus, the formers allegation that the indebtedness has been paid through a
dation cannot be given credence, inconsistent as it is with their action to
recover the same debt.
[55]

Despite their protestations, petitioners recognized the right of the parents

to recover the premises when they admitted in their Position Paper filed with
the MTCC that respondents had a title to the lots.
The [respondents] want to get their property because the title is theirs, the [petitioners]
do not object but what is due the [petitioners] including the reparation for the tarnish
of their dignity and honor must be given the [petitioners] for the benefits of their
children before the premises will be turned over.
[56]

As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.

Second Issue:
Appearance at the Preliminary Conference
Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the appearance of the
plaintiff and the defendant during the preliminary conference. On the basis of
this provision, petitioners claim that the MTCC should have dismissed the
case upon the failure of respondents to attend the conference. However,
petitioners do not dispute that an attorney-in-fact with a written authorization
from respondents appeared during the preliminary conference. The issue
then is whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for
a partys personal appearance.
[57]

Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial

applies to the preliminary conference. Under Section 4 of this Rule, the
[58]

nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause; or

by the appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents.
[59]

Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit
behind the exception to personal appearance under the rules on pretrial is
applicable to the preliminary conference. If there are valid reasons or if a
representative has a special authority, a partys appearance may be
waived. As petitioners are challenging only the applicability of the rules on
pretrial to the rule on preliminary conference, the written authorization from
respondents can indeed be readily considered as a special authorization.
Third Issue:
Rights of a Builder in Good Faith
As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of the owner
to everything that is incorporated or attached to the property. Accession
industrial -- building, planting and sowing on an immovable -- is governed by
Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code.
[60]

Articles 447 and 1678 of the

Civil Code Inapplicable
To buttress their claim of reimbursement for the improvements introduced
on the property, petitioners cite Article 447. They allege that the CA erred in
applying Article 1678, since they had no lease agreement with respondents.
[61]

We clarify. Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that
apply when the owner of the property uses the materials of another. It does
not refer to the instance when a possessor builds on the property of another,
which is the factual milieu here.
In view of the unique factual setting of the instant case, the contention of
petitioners regarding the inapplicability of Article 1678 deserves attention. The

CA applied the provisions on lease, because it found their possession by mere

tolerance comparable with that of a lessee, per the pronouncement
in Calubayan v. Pascual, from which we quote:
[62]

x x x. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous
to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
(Emphasis in the original.)
[63]

As explained earlier, Ismael and Teresitas possession of the two lots was not
by mere tolerance, a circumstance that negates the applicability of Calubayan.
Article 448 Applicable
On the other hand, when a person builds in good faith on the land of
another, the applicable provision is Article 448, which reads:
[64]

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the
builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at
least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does not apply when the interest is
merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. From
these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land is
[65]

[66]

owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow
thereon.
[67]

However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by
recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v.
Abesia, this provision was applied to one whose house -- despite having
been built at the time he was still co-owner -- overlapped with the land of
another. This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder had
constructed improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that
the law deemed the builder to be in good faith. In Sarmiento v. Agana, the
builders were found to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent of
another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.
[68]

[69]

[70]

[71]

[72]

Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present
factual milieu. The established facts of this case show that respondents fully
consented to the improvements introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the
children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and
approved of the construction of the improvements introduced thereon. Thus,
petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when they built the
structures on those lots.
[73]

The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier. In that case, this
Court deemed the son to be in good faith for building the improvement (the
house) with the knowledge and consent of his father, to whom belonged the
land upon which it was built. Thus, Article 448 was applied.
[74]

[75]

Rule on Useful Expenses

The structures built by petitioners were useful improvements, because
they augmented the value or income of the bare lots. Thus, the indemnity to
be paid by respondents under Article 448 is provided for by Article 546, which
we quote:
[76]

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own -the building and other improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1)
refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value
acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more
than that of the structures -- in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable
rent.
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, this case must be remanded to the
trial court to determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article
448 in relation to Article 546. Such matters include the option that respondents
would take and the amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they
decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots. We disagree with the CAs
computation of useful expenses, which were based only on petitioners bare
allegations in their Answer.
[77]

[78]

Ruling on Improvement Justified

While, ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the MTCC on ejectment proceedings is
limited to the issue of physical or material possession of the property in
question, this Court finds it necessary to abbreviate the issue on the
improvements in relation to Article 448. First, the determination of the parties
right to those improvements is intimately connected with the MTCC
proceedings in the light of the ejectment of petitioners. Second, there is no
dispute that while they constructed the improvements, respondents owned the
land. Third, both parties raised no objection when the RTC and the CA ruled
accordingly on this matter.
Equitable considerations compel us to settle this point immediately, pro
hoc vice, to avoid needless delay. Both parties have already been heard on
this issue; to dillydally or equivocate would not serve the cause of substantial
justice.

Other Issues Raised

Given the foregoing rulings, it is no longer necessary to address
petitioners allegation that the MTCC judge and respondents lawyers should
be respectively held personally accountable for the Decision and for filing the
case. The insinuation of petitioners that the lawyers manipulated the
issuance of a false barangay certification is unavailing. Their contention that
respondents did not attend the barangay conciliation proceedings was based
solely on hearsay, which has little or no probative value.
[79]

[80]

[81]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to
reimburse one half of the value of the useful improvements, amounting
to P475,000, and the right of Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to remove
those improvements (if the former refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.
2. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings to
determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546
of the Civil Code, specifically to the following matters:
a. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets option to appropriate -- as their own -- the
improvements on the lots, after paying the indemnity, as provided under Article 546 in
relation to Article 448 of the Civil Code; or in requiring Spouses Ismael and Rosita
Macasaet to pay for the value of the lots, unless it is considerably more than that of
the improvements, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent based upon the
terms provided under the Civil Code
b. The value of the useful expenses incurred by Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet
in the construction of the improvements on the lots
c. The increase in value acquired by the lots by reason of the useful improvements
d. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets choice of type of indemnity to be paid
(whether b or c)

e. Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the improvements
built thereon
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57288 April 30, 1984
LEONILA SARMINETO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ENRIQUE A. AGANA, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial
District, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City, and SPOUSES ERNESTO VALENTINO and REBECCA
LORENZO-VALENTINO,respondents.
Mercedes M. Respicio for petitioner.
Romulo R. Bobadilla for private respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

+.wph!1

This Petition for certiorari questions a March 29, 1979 Decision rendered by the then Court of First
Instance of Pasay City. The Decision was one made on memoranda, pursuant to the provisions of
RA 6031, and it modified, on October 17, 1977, a judgment of the then Municipal Court of
Paranaque, Rizal, in an Ejectment suit instituted by herein petitioner Leonila SARMIENTO against
private respondents, the spouses ERNESTO Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo. For the facts,
therefore, we have to look to the evidence presented by the parties at the original level.
It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the couple
could build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on a lot of 145 sq. ms., being Lot D of a subdivision in
Paranaque (the LAND, for short). In 1967, ERNESTO did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the
LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. It was probably assumed that the wife's mother was the
owner of the LAND and that, eventually, it would somehow be transferred to the spouses.

It subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr.
who, on September 7 , 1974, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO. The following January 6,
1975, SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and wife to vacate and, on April 21, 1975, filed an Ejectment
suit against them. In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court, SARMIENTO submitted
the deed of sale of the LAND in her favor, which showed the price to be P15,000.00. On the other
hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The figures were not questioned by SARMIENTO.
The Municipal Court found that private respondents had built the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE in good
faith, and, disregarding the testimony of ERNESTO, that it had a value of P20,000.00. It then
ordered ERNESTO and wife to vacate the LAND after SARMIENTO has paid them the mentioned
sum of P20,000.00.
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Pasay where, after the submission
of memoranda, said Court rendered a modifying Decision under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
SARMIENTO was required, within 60 days, to exercise the option to reimburse ERNESTO and wife
the sum of 40,000.00 as the value of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or the option to allow them to
purchase the LAND for P25,000.00. SARMIENTO did not exercise any of the two options within the
indicated period, and ERNESTO was then allowed to deposit the sum of P25,000.00 with the Court
as the purchase price for the LAND. This is the hub of the controversy. SARMIENTO then instituted
the instant certiorari proceedings.
We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in view of the peculiar circumstances
under which they had constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they knew, the LAND was
owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having stated they could build on the property, could
reasonably be expected to later on give them the LAND.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code provides:

t.hqw

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith,
shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building
or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Paragraphing
supplied)

The value of the LAND, purchased for P15,000.00 on September 7, 1974, could not have been very
much more than that amount during the following January when ERNESTO and wife were asked to
vacate. However, ERNESTO and wife have not questioned the P25,000.00 valuation determined by
the Court of First Instance.
In regards to the valuation of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, the only evidence presented was the
testimony of ERNESTO that its worth at the time of the trial should be from P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00. The Municipal Court chose to assess its value at P20,000.00, or below the minimum
testified by ERNESTO, while the Court of First Instance chose the maximum of P40,000.00. In the
latter case, it cannot be said that the Court of First Instance had abused its discretion.
The challenged decision of respondent Court, based on valuations of P25,000.00 for the LAND and
P40,000.00 for the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, cannot be viewed as not supported by the evidence. The
provision for the exercise by petitioner SARMIENTO of either the option to indemnify private
respondents in the amount of P40,000.00, or the option to allow private respondents to purchase the
LAND at P25,000.00, in our opinion, was a correct decision.
t.hqw

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building,
under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner, of the land. upon, the other hand, has
the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell
his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse
both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building
to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
(Emphasis ours)
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendantspetitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents
only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is
null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is,
furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of
the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946]).
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby ordered dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

1wph1.t

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.