[18]

BETTTY LACBAYAN V. BAYANI SAMOY Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the
company which she and respondent established.[19]
DECISION Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds,
salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.[20] He countered that the said properties were registered
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against respondent legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a
Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. heavy gambler.[21] Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as investment, with the
CV No. 67596. The CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new building. [22]
Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. [23] In
and awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioners own admission
This suit stemmed from the following facts. that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.[24]
being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of
12, 1979.[3] the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision subjected the certificates of title over
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is
were able to establish a manpower services company.[4] Five parcels of land were also acquired during the improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition. [25]
said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the following
lands are briefly described as follows: manner:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject
TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which
Lacbayan.[5] was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties itself an issue
by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant
Betty Lacbayan.[6] anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to subsequent
covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To
married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy.[7] our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the
TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L. parties name as husband and wife.
Samoy.[8] The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of reversible error against the
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action for
City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. partition and an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be
married to Betty L. Samoy.[9] co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present
petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a
City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second assuming that the plaintiff
property in Don Enrique Heights.[10] successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to be divided between
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of
1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the
executing a Partition Agreement.[11] Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in property without first making a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. Until
Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a
properties will go to respondent.[12] However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did when it discounted the
partition agreement, respondent refused.[13] Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial merit in appellants claim of co-ownership.[26]
partition[14] of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999. Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission
amounting to P15,500,000.00.[15] Respondent, in his Answer,[16] however, denied petitioners claim of cohabitation against respondents interest as to the existence of co-ownership between the
and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner. parties.
[17] III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in co-ownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive ownership of the
1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning. properties in dispute.

1
 IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by document.[34] Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership
respondents self-serving assertion to the contrary. should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint interchangeably used.[35]
contribution of money, property, or industry.[27] Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only
threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as
findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the conclusive evidence of ownership.[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any
exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction in person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be summarized named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired
into only three: interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. [37] Needless to say,
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
ownership; Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between
the action for partition; and him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the
realties. conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. [38] Admission against
We find the petition bereft of merit. interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[28] is definitive. There, we explained that the Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to
determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
partition. Thus: To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is it would be self-serving and inadmissible.[39]
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties.
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed
x properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.[40]
upon the partition directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after
parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on
second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial courts view that
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with respondents
share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x [29] (Emphasis supplied.) predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the
indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife
properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co- was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent,
ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing
properties.[30] More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does of the complaint against him.
not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties. [31] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby
realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not. declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, [32] but that rule filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in respondents favor is DELETED.
is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the No costs.
title itself.[33] The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. SO ORDERED.
In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that