Fault Tolerance PDF
Fault Tolerance PDF
Lecture 1
Youmin Zhang
Introduction to fault-tolerant control system
What is fault-tolerant control system (FTCS)?
Fault-tolerant vs. conventional control systems
Phone: 7912 7741 Office Location: FUV 0.22
Overall structure of fault tolerant control systems
Email: ymzhang@cs.aaue.dk
Methods of designing fault tolerant control systems
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Examples
4. Design of Active FTCS (AFTCS) (2) Approaches: Passive FTCS (PFTCS); Active FTCS
(AFTCS) - Reconfigurable FTCS (RFTCS).
5. Design of Passive FTCS (PFTCS)
Feature: The key to any FTCS Redundancy.
USAir Flight 427 accident UA Flight 585 accident Flight 191 accident failed case Flight 1080 successful example
Crashed on 8 Sept. 1994 Crashed on 3 March 1991 Two events that motivated the research on fault-tolerant flight control
A loss of control of the airplane resulting from A loss of control of the airplane resulting from Crashed on 25 May 1979 Safely landed on 12 April 1977
the movement of the rudder surface to its the movement of the rudder surface to its Separation of the no.1 engine and pylon The elevator became jammed at 19 degrees up
blowdown limit, which leads to an blowdown limit, the same reason as in Flight assembly procedures which led to failure and the pilot had been given no indication that
uncontrolled descent and collision with terrain 427. this malfunction had occurred.
of the pylon structure.
All 132 people on board were killed, and the
airplane was destroyed by impact forces and Injuries: 25 Fatal; The airplane was destroyed. 271 people were killed/injured. Fortunately, the pilot successfully reconfigured
fire. Source: http://aviation- the remaining control elements and landed the
Source: Source:
safety.net/database/1979/790525-2.htm aircraft safely - clever use of actuation
(more accident cases can be found in this webpage)
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/AAR9901.htm http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X16583&key=1 redundancy in the L-1011 airplane.
Lecture 1 Lecture Notes on Fault Tolerant Control Systems,
Systems, by Y. M. Zhang (AUE) 5 Lecture 1 Lecture Notes on Fault Tolerant Control Systems,
Systems, by Y. M. Zhang (AUE) 6
Permanent faults:
Total failure of a component
Caused by, for example, short-circuits or melt-down
Remains until component is repaired or replaced
Transient faults:
Temporary malfunctions of a component
Caused by magnetic or ionizing radiation, or power fluctuation f a
Intermittent faults: b
eR
Rudder
r
Left Elevator
eL
aL
Left Aileron
a. State-space model
a. State-space model
x& ( t ) = Ax ( t ) + Bu ( t )
x& ( t ) = Ax ( t ) + Bu ( t ) t < tf
y ( t ) = Cx ( t ) &
s1 0 L 0 y1 (t ) x (t ) = ( A + A) x (t ) + ( B + B )u(t ) t tf
0 s2 L 0 y 2 (t )
z ( t ) = My ( t ) = M and
M O M
y (t )
0 0 L sp p
y (t ) = C x (t ) t < tf
s i = [ s i1 si2 L s iq i ] T
y (t ) = (C + C ) x (t ) t tf
x n 1 , u m 1 , y p 1 , z q 1 , M q p
b. ARMA model
b. ARMA model
y (t ) = T
( t ) y ( t ) = T
( t ) o t < tf
o
y ( t ) = ( t ) ( o + ) t tf
T
How a FTCS is Built and Where the How a FTCS is Built and Where the
Mathematical Model Becomes Useful? Mathematical Model Becomes Useful?
Basic Ingredients in FTCS: Redundancy Basic Ingredients in FTCS: Redundancy (cont
(contd)
Hardware Redundancy Sensors Analytical Redundancy
Sensor redundancy Actuators y1
S11 z11 the mathematical model or analytical relationships among,
Multiple dissimilar sensors with
u1
S12 z12 for example, aircraft flight state variables
a voting scheme B1 S1q
1
M
z1q fault detection and diagnosis scheme
1
TMR (Triple Modular redundant control strategies
Aircraft
S21 z 21
Redundancy) u2 B2 y2 inputs outputs
S22 z
Aircraft
22
A Y.
redundant architecture
(AUE) for fault toleranceall three figures are 24 adopted
Lecture 1 Lecture Notes on Fault Tolerant Control Systems,
Systems, by Y. M. Zhang (AUE) 23 Lecture
An 1 flight control system (FCS) architecture
electronic AnTolerant
Lecture Notes on Fault primary FCS configuration
Control Systems,
Systems, by M. Zhang
from C.R. Spitzer, Digital Avionics Systems, 2nd, McGraw-Hill, 1993
Example: Redundancy in Boeing 777 Example: Redundancy in Boeing 777
ACE: Actuator Control Electronics
Primary Flight Control Surfaces ADIRU: Air Data Inertial Reference Unit
ADM: Air Data Module (Static and Total Pressure)
AFDC: Autopilot Flight Director Computer
AIMS: Airplane Information Management System
ARINC: Aeronautical Radio Inc. (Industry Standard)
CMC: Central Maintenance Computer Function in
AIMS
DCGF: Data Conversion Gateway Function of AIMS
EDIU: Engine Data Interface Unit
EICAS: Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System
ELMS: Electrical Load Management System
FBW: Fly-By-Wire
FCDC: Flight Controls Direct Current (power system)
FSEU: Flap Slat Electronic Unit
LRRA: Low Range Radio Altimeter
LRU: Line Replaceable Unit
MAT: Maintenance Access Terminal
MEL: Minimum Equipment List
MFD: Multi-Function Display
MOV: Motor-Operated Valve
PCU: Power Control Unit (hydraulic actuator)
PFC: Primary Flight Computer
PMG: Permanent Magnet Generator
PSA: Power Supply Assembly
RAT: Ram Air Turbine
SAARU: Standby Attitude and Air Data Unit
(Yeh, 1996) TAC: Thrust Asymmetry Compensation
WEU: Warning Electronics Unit
G.F. Bartley, 2001
Lecture 1 Lecture Notes on Fault Tolerant Control Systems,
Systems, by Y. M. Zhang (AUE) 25 Lecture 1 Lecture Notes on Fault Tolerant Control Systems,
Systems, by Y. M. Zhang (AUE) 26
Feedback
FDD
Elements in control systems: Properties of control systems:
System/Plant/Process Reconfiguration
Stability Mechanisms
Sensors
Performance Three/four important parts in AFTCS:
Actuators FDD schemes
Robustness against uncertainties Reconfigurable controllers
Controllers Reconfiguration mechanisms
versus faults Command/reference governor
Lecture 1 Lecture Notes on Fault Tolerant Control Systems,
Systems, by Y. M. Zhang (AUE) 31 Lecture 1 Lecture Notes on Fault Tolerant Control Systems,
Systems, by Y. M. Zhang (AUE) 32
Modules in AFTCS Modules in AFTCS
Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD) Scheme Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD) Scheme
Measurement Fault
Residual r Decision Decision
Generation Making
Parameter Estimation State Estimation Parity Space
Analytical
Model
Least Squares Extended KF Kalman Filters Observers
Main topic covered in FP8-1 in last semester. (Fault Detection) (Fault Isolation) (Fault Diagnosis)
Purpose: To make the control system insensitive/ Existing design techniques and classification
tolerant to the effects of failed components by
modifying controller structure and/or parameters,
Control Reconfiguration
based on the information from FDD module.
Function of reconfigurable control Off-line On-line
Control signals
Input signals Controller Controller pre-
pre-design On-
On-line controller redesign
On-
On-line FDD and On-
On-line FDD and
From FDD Reconfiguration controller reconfiguration controller reconfiguration
Mechanism