TORTS & DAMAGES CASES

[G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005]

YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE
McLOUGHLIN, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The primary question of interest before this Court is the only legal issue in the case: It is whether a hotel may evade liability for
the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or
its employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers.
Before this Court is a Rule 45 petition for review of the Decision[1] dated 19 October 1995 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the Decision[2] dated 16 December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, of Manila, finding YHT Realty Corporation,
Brunhilda Mata-Tan (Tan), Erlinda Lainez (Lainez) and Anicia Payam (Payam) jointly and solidarily liable for damages in an action
filed by Maurice McLoughlin (McLoughlin) for the loss of his American and Australian dollars deposited in the safety deposit box of
Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel, owned and operated by YHT Realty Corporation.
The factual backdrop of the case follow.
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the
Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important
people, accompanying him in visiting impoverished street children and assisting him in buying gifts for the children and in
distributing the same to charitable institutions for poor children. Tan convinced McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to
Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had
custody of the keys for the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlins booking at the Tropicana where he
started staying during his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 to September 1987.[3]
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it was
his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of
the procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the
use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the
hotel. When a registered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management who then
would assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety deposit box with the two keys.[4]
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00) which he placed
in two envelopes, one envelope containing Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) and the other envelope Five Thousand US
Dollars (US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00) which he also placed in another envelope; two (2) other
envelopes containing letters and credit cards; two (2) bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit
box.[5]
On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin opened his safety deposit box with his key and
with the key of the management and took therefrom the envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the envelope
containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and his credit cards. [6] McLoughlin left the other items in
the box as he did not check out of his room at the Tropicana during his short visit to Hongkong. When he arrived in Hongkong, he
opened the envelope which contained Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00) and discovered upon counting that only Three
Thousand US Dollars (US$3,000.00) were enclosed therein.[7] Since he had no idea whether somebody else had tampered with his
safety deposit box, he thought that it was just a result of bad accounting since he did not spend anything from that envelope.[8]
After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana on 18 December 1987 and left for Australia. When he arrived in Australia,
he discovered that the envelope with Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) was short of Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000). He
also noticed that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was
likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.[9]
When McLoughlin came back to the Philippines on 4 April 1988, he asked Lainez if some money and/or jewelry which he had lost
were found and returned to her or to the management. However, Lainez told him that no one in the hotel found such things and none
were turned over to the management. He again registered at Tropicana and rented a safety deposit box. He placed therein one (1)
envelope containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), another envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars
(AUS$10,000.00) and other envelopes containing his traveling papers/documents. On 16 April 1988, McLoughlin requested Lainez
and Payam to open his safety deposit box. He noticed that in the envelope containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00),
Two Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00) were missing and in the envelope previously containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars
(AUS$10,000.00), Four Thousand Five Hundred Australian Dollars (AUS$4,500.00) were missing.[10]
When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety
deposit box with the key assigned to him.[11] McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan
admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and
Lainez.[12] Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.[13]
McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident. Lopez got in touch with Tan and arranged for a
meeting with the police and McLoughlin. When the police did not arrive, Lopez and Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at Tropicana
and thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note dated 21 April 1988. The promissory note reads as follows:
I promise to pay Mr. Maurice McLoughlin the amount of AUS$4,000.00 and US$2,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency on or
before May 5, 1988.[14]
Lopez requested Tan to sign the promissory note which the latter did and Lopez also signed as a witness. Despite the execution of
promissory note by Tan, McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered.
However, Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box entitled Undertaking
For the Use Of Safety Deposit Box,[15] specifically paragraphs (2) and (4) thereof, to wit:
2. To release and hold free and blameless TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any liability arising from any loss in the
contents and/or use of the said deposit box for any cause whatsoever, including but not limited to the presentation or use
thereof by any other person should the key be lost;
...
4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE in favor of TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL upon giving up the use of the
box.[16]
On 17 May 1988, McLoughlin went back to Australia and he consulted his lawyers as to the validity of the abovementioned
stipulations. They opined that the stipulations are void for being violative of universal hotel practices and customs. His lawyers
prepared a letter dated 30 May 1988 which was signed by McLoughlin and sent to President Corazon Aquino. [17] The Office of the
President referred the letter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which forwarded the same to the Western Police District (WPD).[18]
After receiving a copy of the indorsement in Australia, McLoughlin came to the Philippines and registered again as a hotel guest
of Tropicana. McLoughlin went to Malacaang to follow up on his letter but he was instructed to go to the DOJ. The DOJ directed him
to proceed to the WPD for documentation. But McLoughlin went back to Australia as he had an urgent business matter to attend to.
For several times, McLoughlin left for Australia to attend to his business and came back to the Philippines to follow up on his
letter to the President but he failed to obtain any concrete assistance.[19]
McLoughlin left again for Australia and upon his return to the Philippines on 25 August 1989 to pursue his claims against
petitioners, the WPD conducted an investigation which resulted in the preparation of an affidavit which was forwarded to the Manila
City Fiscals Office. Said affidavit became the basis of preliminary investigation. However, McLoughlin left again for Australia without
receiving the notice of the hearing on 24 November 1989. Thus, the case at the Fiscals Office was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Mcloughlin requested the reinstatement of the criminal charge for theft. In the meantime, McLoughlin and his lawyers wrote letters of
demand to those having responsibility to pay the damage. Then he left again for Australia.
Upon his return on 22 October 1990, he registered at the Echelon Towers at Malate, Manila. Meetings were held between
McLoughlin and his lawyer which resulted to the filing of a complaint for damages on 3 December 1990 against YHT Realty
Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan (defendants) for the loss of McLoughlins money which was discovered on 16 April 1988.
After filing the complaint, McLoughlin left again for Australia to attend to an urgent business matter. Tan and Lopez, however, were
not served with summons, and trial proceeded with only Lainez, Payam and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.
After defendants had filed their Pre-Trial Brief admitting that they had previously allowed and assisted Tan to open the safety
deposit box, McLoughlin filed an Amended/Supplemental Complaint[20] dated 10 June 1991 which included another incident of loss of
money and jewelry in the safety deposit box rented by McLoughlin in the same hotel which took place prior to 16 April 1988. [21] The
trial court admitted the Amended/Supplemental Complaint.
 During the trial of the case, McLoughlin had been in and out of the country to attend to urgent business in Australia, and while
staying in the Philippines to attend the hearing, he incurred expenses for hotel bills, airfare and other transportation expenses, long
distance calls to Australia, Meralco power expenses, and expenses for food and maintenance, among others.[22]
After trial, the RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants,
to wit:
1. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of US$11,400.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency
of P342,000.00, more or less, and the sum of AUS$4,500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of P99,000.00, or a
total of P441,000.00, more or less, with 12% interest from April 16 1988 until said amount has been paid to plaintiff
(Item 1, Exhibit CC);
2. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,674,238.00 as actual and consequential damages
arising from the loss of his Australian and American dollars and jewelries complained against and in prosecuting his
claim and rights administratively and judicially (Items II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, Exh. CC);
3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages (Item X, Exh. CC);
4. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P350,000.00 as exemplary damages (Item XI, Exh.
CC);
5. And ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay litigation expenses in the sum of P200,000.00 (Item XII, Exh. CC);
6. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and a fee of P3,000.00
for every appearance; and
7. Plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The trial court found that McLoughlins allegations as to the fact of loss and as to the amount of money he lost were sufficiently
shown by his direct and straightforward manner of testifying in court and found him to be credible and worthy of belief as it was
established that McLoughlins money, kept in Tropicanas safety deposit box, was taken by Tan without McLoughlins consent. The
taking was effected through the use of the master key which was in the possession of the management. Payam and Lainez allowed
Tan to use the master key without authority from McLoughlin. The trial court added that if McLoughlin had not lost his dollars, he
would not have gone through the trouble and personal inconvenience of seeking aid and assistance from the Office of the President,
DOJ, police authorities and the City Fiscals Office in his desire to recover his losses from the hotel management and Tan.[24]
As regards the loss of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000.00) and jewelry worth approximately One Thousand Two Hundred
US Dollars (US$1,200.00) which allegedly occurred during his stay at Tropicana previous to 4 April 1988, no claim was made by
McLoughlin for such losses in his complaint dated 21 November 1990 because he was not sure how they were lost and who the
responsible persons were. But considering the admission of the defendants in their pre-trial brief that on three previous occasions
they allowed Tan to open the box, the trial court opined that it was logical and reasonable to presume that his personal assets
consisting of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000.00) and jewelry were taken by Tan from the safety deposit box without
McLoughlins consent through the cooperation of Payam and Lainez.[25]
The trial court also found that defendants acted with gross negligence in the performance and exercise of their duties and
obligations as innkeepers and were therefore liable to answer for the losses incurred by McLoughlin.[26]
Moreover, the trial court ruled that paragraphs (2) and (4) of the Undertaking For The Use Of Safety Deposit Box are not valid for
being contrary to the express mandate of Article 2003 of the New Civil Code and against public policy. [27] Thus, there being fraud or
wanton conduct on the part of defendants, they should be responsible for all damages which may be attributed to the non-
performance of their contractual obligations.[28]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower court except as to the amount of damages awarded. The
decretal text of the appellate courts decision reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED but modified as follows:
The appellants are directed jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff/appellee the following amounts:
1) P153,200.00 representing the peso equivalent of US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00;
2) P308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sidney [sic] to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11)
trips;
3) One-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana Apartment Hotel;
4) One-half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon Tower;
5) One-half of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for the taxi xxx transportation from the residence to Sidney [sic] Airport and from
MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven (11) trips;
6) One-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 representing Meralco power expenses;
7) One-half of P356,400.00 or P178,000.00 representing expenses for food and maintenance;
8) P50,000.00 for moral damages;
9) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
10) P200,000 representing attorneys fees.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Unperturbed, YHT Realty Corporation, Lainez and Payam went to this Court in this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioners submit for resolution by this Court the following issues: (a) whether the appellate courts conclusion on the alleged
prior existence and subsequent loss of the subject money and jewelry is supported by the evidence on record; (b) whether the finding
of gross negligence on the part of petitioners in the performance of their duties as innkeepers is supported by the evidence on record;
(c) whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box admittedly executed by private respondent is null and void; and (d)
whether the damages awarded to private respondent, as well as the amounts thereof, are proper under the circumstances.[30]
The petition is devoid of merit.
It is worthy of note that the thrust of Rule 45 is the resolution only of questions of law and any peripheral factual question
addressed to this Court is beyond the bounds of this mode of review.
Petitioners point out that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove the fact of prior existence of the dollars and the jewelry
which had been lost while deposited in the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana, the basis of the trial court and the appellate court being
the sole testimony of McLoughlin as to the contents thereof. Likewise, petitioners dispute the finding of gross negligence on their part
as not supported by the evidence on record.
We are not persuaded. We adhere to the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court that the fact of loss was
established by the credible testimony in open court by McLoughlin. Such findings are factual and therefore beyond the ambit of the
present petition.
The trial court had the occasion to observe the demeanor of McLoughlin while testifying which reflected the veracity of the facts
testified to by him. On this score, we give full credence to the appreciation of testimonial evidence by the trial court especially if what
is at issue is the credibility of the witness. The oft-repeated principle is that where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the
established rule is that great respect is accorded to the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court. [31] The trial court is
in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.[32]
We are also not impressed by petitioners argument that the finding of gross negligence by the lower court as affirmed by the
appellate court is not supported by evidence. The evidence reveals that two keys are required to open the safety deposit boxes of
Tropicana. One key is assigned to the guest while the other remains in the possession of the management. If the guest desires to open
his safety deposit box, he must request the management for the other key to open the same. In other words, the guest alone cannot
open the safety deposit box without the assistance of the management or its employees. With more reason that access to the safety
deposit box should be denied if the one requesting for the opening of the safety deposit box is a stranger. Thus, in case of loss of any
item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable to conclude that the management had at least a hand in the consummation of
the taking, unless the reason for the loss is force majeure.
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the
management when the loss took place. In fact, they even admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening
McLoughlins safety deposit box.[33] This only proves that Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person aside from the registered
guest had access to the safety deposit box. Yet the management failed to notify McLoughlin of the incident and waited for him to
discover the taking before it disclosed the matter to him. Therefore, Tropicana should be held responsible for the damage suffered by
McLoughlin by reason of the negligence of its employees.
 The management should have guarded against the occurrence of this incident considering that Payam admitted in open court
that she assisted Tan three times in opening the safety deposit box of McLoughlin at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the latter
was still asleep.[34] In light of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is undeniable that without the acquiescence of the employees
of Tropicana to the opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of McLoughlins money could and should have been avoided.
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was
always with him most of the time. The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the
management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of McLoughlin will not exculpate the petitioners from liability in the absence
of any showing that he made the management believe that Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have access to the safety
deposit box. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant such conclusion considering that what is involved in
the instant case is the very safety of McLoughlins deposit. If only petitioners exercised due diligence in taking care of McLoughlins
safety deposit box, they should have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan considering that the latter had been observed
opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a number of times at the early hours of the morning. Tans acts should have prompted the
management to investigate her relationship with McLoughlin. Then, petitioners would have exercised due diligence required of them.
Failure to do so warrants the conclusion that the management had been remiss in complying with the obligations imposed upon
hotel-keepers under the law.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable
for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that
the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an
employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the
victim to prove the negligence of such employer.[35] Thus, given the fact that the loss of McLoughlins money was consummated
through the negligence of Tropicanas employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guests consent, both the
assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant
to Article 2193.[36]
The issue of whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box executed by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a
legal question appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and the appellate court found the same to be
null and void. We find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus:
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles
brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in
Articles 1998 to 2001[37] is suppressed or diminished shall be void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that
presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any
contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their
signature.
In an early case,[38] the Court of Appeals through its then Presiding Justice (later Associate Justice of the Court) Jose P. Bengzon,
ruled that to hold hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not necessary that they be actually delivered to
the innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such effects are within the hotel or inn.[39] With greater reason should the liability
of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing items are taken without the guests knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box
provided by the hotel itself, as in this case.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for they allow Tropicana to
be released from liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause
whatsoever.[40] Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety
deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the
responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by servants or
employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from any force majeure.[41] It is the loss
through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or
robber was done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify the same as force majeure.[42]
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article 2002[43] which exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the
acts of his guest, his family, or visitors. Even a cursory reading of the provision would lead us to reject petitioners contention. The
justification they raise would render nugatory the public interest sought to be protected by the provision. What if the negligence of
the employer or its employees facilitated the consummation of a crime committed by the registered guests relatives or visitor? Should
the law exculpate the hotel from liability since the loss was due to the act of the visitor of the registered guest of the hotel? Hence, this
provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the
occurrence of the loss. A depositary is not responsible for the loss of goods by theft, unless his actionable negligence contributes to
the loss.[44]
In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the safety deposit box was shared not only by the guest himself but also by the
management since two keys are necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without the assistance of hotel employees, the loss would
not have occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurrent negligence in allowing Tan, who was not the registered guest, to open
the safety deposit box of McLoughlin, even assuming that the latter was also guilty of negligence in allowing another person to use his
key. To rule otherwise would result in undermining the safety of the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the management will be given
imprimatur to allow any person, under the pretense of being a family member or a visitor of the guest, to have access to the safety
deposit box without fear of any liability that will attach thereafter in case such person turns out to be a complete stranger. This will
allow the hotel to evade responsibility for any liability incurred by its employees in conspiracy with the guests relatives and visitors.
Petitioners contend that McLoughlins case was mounted on the theory of contract, but the trial court and the appellate court
upheld the grant of the claims of the latter on the basis of tort.[45] There is nothing anomalous in how the lower courts decided the
controversy for this Court has pronounced a jurisprudential rule that tort liability can exist even if there are already contractual
relations. The act that breaks the contract may also be tort.[46]
As to damages awarded to McLoughlin, we see no reason to modify the amounts awarded by the appellate court for the same
were based on facts and law. It is within the province of lower courts to settle factual issues such as the proper amount of damages
awarded and such finding is binding upon this Court especially if sufficiently proven by evidence and not unconscionable or
excessive. Thus, the appellate court correctly awarded McLoughlin Two Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00) and Four Thousand Five
Hundred Australian dollars (AUS$4,500.00) or their peso equivalent at the time of payment, [47] being the amounts duly proven by
evidence.[48] The alleged loss that took place prior to 16 April 1988 was not considered since the amounts alleged to have been taken
were not sufficiently established by evidence. The appellate court also correctly awarded the sum of P308,880.80, representing the
peso value for the air fares from Sydney to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) trips; [49] one-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52
representing payment to Tropicana;[50] one-half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon Tower;[51] one-half
of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation expenses from McLoughlins residence to Sydney Airport and from MIA to
the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven (11) trips;[52] one-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 representing Meralco power
expenses;[53] one-half of P356,400.00 or P178,000.00 representing expenses for food and maintenance.[54]
The amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages is reasonable. Although trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount
of moral damages, the appellate court may modify or change the amount awarded when it is palpably and scandalously excessive.
Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of
defendants culpable action.[55]
The awards of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P200,000.00 representing attorneys fees are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 October 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioners are directed, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent the following amounts:
(1) US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment;
(2) P308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sydney to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) trips;
(3) One-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel;
(4) One-half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon Tower;
(5) One-half of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation expense from McLoughlins residence to Sydney Airport
and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven (11) trips;
(6) One-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 representing Meralco power expenses;
(7) One-half of P356,400.00 or P178,200.00 representing expenses for food and maintenance;
(8) P50,000.00 for moral damages;
(9) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
 (10) P200,000 representing attorneys fees.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et
al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was
living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining
the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
 WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the
above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of
errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally
in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was
not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of
the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision.
And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of
their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability,
was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that
at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was
already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and
civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607.
In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in
relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the
works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under
the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of
a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It
is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code
has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even
the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
 law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which
has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by
virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the
Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations
and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the
concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain,
in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)"
And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e
will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is
to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law,"
thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal
law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162,
simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p.
162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about
construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from
the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation
by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and
be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent
on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does
not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp.
766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not
relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Costs against appellees.

[G.R. No. 121413. January 29, 2001]

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (formerly INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA), petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and FORD PHILIPPINES, INC. and CITIBANK, N.A., respondents.
[G.R. No. 121479. January 29, 2001]
FORD PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-plaintiff, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CITIBANK, N.A. and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128604. January 29, 2001]
FORD PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. CITIBANK, N.A., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
These consolidated petitions involve several fraudulently negotiated checks.
The original actions a quo were instituted by Ford Philippines to recover from the drawee bank, CITIBANK, N.A. (Citibank) and
collecting bank, Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) [formerly Insular Bank of Asia and America], the value of
several checks payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which were embezzled allegedly by an organized syndicate.
G.R. Nos. 121413 and 121479 are twin petitions for review of the March 27, 1995 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 25017, entitled Ford Philippines, Inc. vs. Citibank, N.A. and Insular Bank of Asia and America (now Philippine Commercial
International Bank), and the August 8, 1995 Resolution,[2] ordering the collecting bank, Philippine Commercial International Bank, to
pay the amount of Citibank Check No. SN-04867.
In G.R. No. 128604, petitioner Ford Philippines assails the October 15, 1996 Decision [3] of the Court of Appeals and its March 5,
1997 Resolution[4] in CA-G.R. No. 28430 entitled Ford Philippines, Inc. vs. Citibank, N.A. and Philippine Commercial International
Bank, affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court holding the defendant drawee bank, Citibank, N.A., solely liable to pay the
amount of P12,163,298.10 as damages for the misapplied proceeds of the plaintiffs Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508.
I. G.R. Nos. 121413 and 121479

The stipulated facts submitted by the parties as accepted by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On October 19, 1977, the plaintiff Ford drew and issued its Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41, in favor of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as payment of plaintiffs percentage or manufacturers sales taxes for the third quarter of 1977.
The aforesaid check was deposited with the defendant IBAA (now PCIBank) and was subsequently cleared at the Central Bank. Upon
presentment with the defendant Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid to IBAA as collecting or depository bank.
The proceeds of the same Citibank check of the plaintiff was never paid to or received by the payee thereof, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
As a consequence, upon demand of the Bureau and/or Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the plaintiff was compelled to make a
second payment to the Bureau of Internal Revenue of its percentage/manufacturers sales taxes for the third quarter of 1977 and that
said second payment of plaintiff in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was duly received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
It is further admitted by defendant Citibank that during the time of the transactions in question, plaintiff had been maintaining a
checking account with defendant Citibank; that Citibank Check No. SN-04867 which was drawn and issued by the plaintiff in favor of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was a crossed check in that, on its face were two parallel lines and written in between said
lines was the phrase Payees Account Only; and that defendant Citibank paid the full face value of the check in the amount of
P4,746,114.41 to the defendant IBAA.
It has been duly established that for the payment of plaintiffs percentage tax for the last quarter of 1977, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue issued Revenue Tax Receipt No. 18747002, dated October 20, 1977, designating therein in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, as the
authorized agent bank of Metrobank, Alabang Branch to receive the tax payment of the plaintiff.
On December 19, 1977, plaintiffs Citibank Check No. SN-04867, together with the Revenue Tax Receipt No. 18747002, was deposited
with defendant IBAA, through its Ermita Branch. The latter accepted the check and sent it to the Central Clearing House for clearing
on the same day, with the indorsement at the back all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed. Thereafter,
defendant IBAA presented the check for payment to defendant Citibank on same date, December 19, 1977, and the latter paid the face
value of the check in the amount of P4,746,114.41. Consequently, the amount of P4,746,114.41 was debited in plaintiffs account with
the defendant Citibank and the check was returned to the plaintiff.
Upon verification, plaintiff discovered that its Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was not paid to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.Hence, in separate letters dated October 26, 1979, addressed to the defendants, the plaintiff
notified the latter that in case it will be re-assessed by the BIR for the payment of the taxes covered by the said checks, then plaintiff
shall hold the defendants liable for reimbursement of the face value of the same. Both defendants denied liability and refused to pay.
In a letter dated February 28, 1980 by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue addressed to the plaintiff - supposed to be
Exhibit D, the latter was officially informed, among others, that its check in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was not paid to the
government or its authorized agent and instead encashed by unauthorized persons, hence, plaintiff has to pay the said amount within
fifteen days from receipt of the letter. Upon advice of the plaintiffs lawyers, plaintiff on March 11, 1982, paid to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the amount of P4,746,114.41, representing payment of plaintiffs percentage tax for the third quarter of 1977.
As a consequence of defendants refusal to reimburse plaintiff of the payment it had made for the second time to the BIR of its
percentage taxes, plaintiff filed on January 20, 1983 its original complaint before this Court.
On December 24, 1985, defendant IBAA was merged with the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) with the latter as
the surviving entity.
Defendant Citibank maintains that; the payment it made of plaintiffs Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41
was in due course; it merely relied on the clearing stamp of the depository/collecting bank, the defendant IBAA that all prior
indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed; and the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury is the gross negligence of
defendant IBAA in indorsing the plaintiffs Citibank check in question.
It is admitted that on December 19, 1977 when the proceeds of plaintiffs Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was paid to defendant IBAA as
collecting bank, plaintiff was maintaining a checking account with defendant Citibank.[5]
Although it was not among the stipulated facts, an investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) revealed that Citibank
Check No. SN-04867 was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the General Ledger Accountant of Ford. He purportedly needed to hold back
the check because there was an error in the computation of the tax due to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). With Riveras
instruction, PCIBank replaced the check with two of its own Managers Checks (MCs). Alleged members of a syndicate later deposited
the two MCs with the Pacific Banking Corporation.
Ford, with leave of court, filed a third-party complaint before the trial court impleading Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) and
Godofredo Rivera, as third party defendants. But the court dismissed the complaint against PBC for lack of cause of action. The court
likewise dismissed the third-party complaint against Godofredo Rivera because he could not be served with summons as the NBI
declared him as a fugitive from justice.
On June 15, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, as follows:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants Citibank and IBAA (now PCI Bank), jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P4,746,114.41 representing the face value of plaintiffs Citibank Check No. SN-04867, with interest thereon at the legal rate
starting January 20, 1983, the date when the original complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid, plus costs;
2. On defendant Citibanks cross-claim: ordering the cross-defendant IBAA (now PCI BANK) to reimburse defendant Citibank
for whatever amount the latter has paid or may pay to the plaintiff in accordance with the next preceding paragraph;
3. The counterclaims asserted by the defendants against the plaintiff, as well as that asserted by the cross-defendant against
the cross-claimant are dismissed, for lack of merits; and
4. With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Not satisfied with the said decision, both defendants, Citibank and PCIBank, elevated their respective petitions for review on
certiorari to the Court of Appeals. On March 27, 1995, the appellate court issued its judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court AFFIRMS the appealed decision with modifications.
The court hereby renders judgment:
1. Dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 49287 insofar as defendant Citibank N.A. is concerned;
 2. Ordering the defendant IBAA now PCI Bank to pay the plaintiff the amount of P4,746,114.41 representing the face value of
plaintiffs Citibank Check No. SN-04867, with interest thereon at the legal rate starting January 20, 1983. the date when the
original complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid;
3. Dismissing the counterclaims asserted by the defendants against the plaintiff as well as that asserted by the cross-
defendant against the cross-claimant, for lack of merits.
Costs against the defendant IBAA (now PCI Bank).
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
PCIBank moved to reconsider the above-quoted decision of the Court of Appeals, while Ford filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. Both motions were denied for lack of merit.
Separately, PCIBank and Ford filed before this Court, petitions for review by certiorari under Rule 45.
In G.R. No. 121413, PCIBank seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals
contending that it merely acted on the instruction of Ford and such cause of action had already prescribed.
PCIBank sets forth the following issues for consideration:
I. Did the respondent court err when, after finding that the petitioner acted on the check drawn by respondent Ford on the
said respondents instructions, it nevertheless found the petitioner liable to the said respondent for the full amount of the
said check.
II. Did the respondent court err when it did not find prescription in favor of the petitioner.[8]
In a counter move, Ford filed its petition docketed as G.R. No. 121479, questioning the same decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals, and praying for the reinstatement in toto of the decision of the trial court which found both PCIBank and Citibank jointly
and severally liable for the loss.
In G.R. No. 121479, appellant Ford presents the following propositions for consideration:
I. Respondent Citibank is liable to petitioner Ford considering that:
1. As drawee bank, respondent Citibank owes to petitioner Ford, as the drawer of the subject check and a depositor of
respondent Citibank, an absolute and contractual duty to pay the proceeds of the subject check only to the payee thereof,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
2. Respondent Citibank failed to observe its duty as banker with respect to the subject check, which was crossed and payable
to Payees Account Only.
3. Respondent Citibank raises an issue for the first time on appeal; thus the same should not be considered by the Honorable
Court.
4. As correctly held by the trial court, there is no evidence of gross negligence on the part of petitioner Ford.[9]
II. PCIBank is liable to petitioner Ford considering that:
1. There were no instructions from petitioner Ford to deliver the proceeds of the subject check to a person other than the
payee named therein, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; thus, PCIBanks only obligation is to deliver the
proceeds to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[10]
2. PCIBank which affixed its indorsement on the subject check (All prior indorsement and/or lack of indorsement
guaranteed), is liable as collecting bank.[11]
3. PCIBank is barred from raising issues of fact in the instant proceedings.[12]
4. Petitioner Fords cause of action had not prescribed.[13]
II. G.R. No. 128604

The same syndicate apparently embezzled the proceeds of checks intended, this time, to settle Fords percentage taxes
appertaining to the second quarter of 1978 and the first quarter of 1979.
The facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Ford drew Citibank Check No. SN-10597 on July 19, 1978 in the amount of P5,851,706.37 representing the percentage tax due for
the second quarter of 1978 payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. A BIR Revenue Tax Receipt No. 28645385 was issued
for the said purpose.
On April 20, 1979, Ford drew another Citibank Check No. SN-16508 in the amount of P6,311,591.73, representing the payment of
percentage tax for the first quarter of 1979 and payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Again a BIR Revenue Tax Receipt
No. A-1697160 was issued for the said purpose.
Both checks were crossed checks and contain two diagonal lines on its upper left corner between which were written the words
payable to the payees account only.
The checks never reached the payee, CIR. Thus, in a letter dated February 28, 1980, the BIR, Region 4-B, demanded for the said
tax payments the corresponding periods above-mentioned.
As far as the BIR is concerned, the said two BIR Revenue Tax Receipts were considered fake and spurious. This anomaly was
confirmed by the NBI upon the initiative of the BIR. The findings forced Ford to pay the BIR anew, while an action was filed against
Citibank and PCIBank for the recovery of the amount of Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, which tried the case, made its findings on the modus operandi of the syndicate, as
follows:
A certain Mr. Godofredo Rivera was employed by the plaintiff FORD as its General Ledger Accountant. As such, he prepared the
plaintiffs check marked Ex. A [Citibank Check No. SN-10597] for payment to the BIR. Instead, however, of delivering the same to the
payee, he passed on the check to a co-conspirator named Remberto Castro who was a pro-manager of the San Andres Branch of
PCIB.* In connivance with one Winston Dulay, Castro himself subsequently opened a Checking Account in the name of a fictitious
person denominated as Reynaldo Reyes in the Meralco Branch of PCIBank where Dulay works as Assistant Manager.
After an initial deposit of P100.00 to validate the account, Castro deposited a worthless Bank of America Check in exactly the same
amount as the first FORD check (Exh. A, P5,851,706.37) while this worthless check was coursed through PCIBs main office enroute to
the Central Bank for clearing, replaced this worthless check with FORDs Exhibit A and accordingly tampered the accompanying
documents to cover the replacement. As a result, Exhibit A was cleared by defendant CITIBANK, and the fictitious deposit account of
Reynaldo Reyes was credited at the PCIB Meralco Branch with the total amount of the FORD check Exhibit A. The same method was
again utilized by the syndicate in profiting from Exh. B [Citibank Check No. SN-16508] which was subsequently pilfered by Alexis
Marindo, Riveras Assistant at FORD.
From this Reynaldo Reyes account, Castro drew various checks distributing the shares of the other participating conspirators namely
(1) CRISANTO BERNABE, the mastermind who formulated the method for the embezzlement; (2) RODOLFO R. DE LEON a customs
broker who negotiated the initial contact between Bernabe, FORDs Godofredo Rivera and PCIBs Remberto Castro; (3) JUAN
CASTILLO who assisted de Leon in the initial arrangements; (4) GODOFREDO RIVERA, FORDs accountant who passed on the first
check (Exhibit A) to Castro; (5) REMBERTO CASTRO, PCIBs pro-manager at San Andres who performed the switching of checks in the
clearing process and opened the fictitious Reynaldo Reyes account at the PCIB Meralco Branch; (6) WINSTON DULAY, PCIBs Assistant
Manager at its Meralco Branch, who assisted Castro in switching the checks in the clearing process and facilitated the opening of the
fictitious Reynaldo Reyes bank account; (7) ALEXIS MARINDO, Riveras Assistant at FORD, who gave the second check (Exh. B) to
Castro; (8) ELEUTERIO JIMENEZ, BIR Collection Agent who provided the fake and spurious revenue tax receipts to make it appear
that the BIR had received FORDs tax payments.
Several other persons and entities were utilized by the syndicate as conduits in the disbursements of the proceeds of the two checks,
but like the aforementioned participants in the conspiracy, have not been impleaded in the present case. The manner by which the
said funds were distributed among them are traceable from the record of checks drawn against the original Reynaldo Reyes account
and indubitably identify the parties who illegally benefited therefrom and readily indicate in what amounts they did so. [14]
On December 9, 1988, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, held drawee-bank, Citibank, liable for the value of the two
checks while absolving PCIBank from any liability, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant CITIBANK to reimburse plaintiff FORD the total amount of
P12,163,298.10 prayed for in its complaint, with 6% interest thereon from date of first written demand until full payment, plus
P300,000.00 attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, and to pay the defendant, PCIB (on its counterclaim to crossclaim) the sum of
P300,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of litigation, and pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Both Ford and Citibank appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed, in toto, the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
 Petitioner Ford prays that judgment be rendered setting aside the portion of the Court of Appeals decision and its resolution
dated March 5, 1997, with respect to the dismissal of the complaint against PCIBank and holding Citibank solely responsible for the
proceeds of Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508 for P5,851,706.73 and P6,311,591.73 respectively.
Ford avers that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint against defendant PCIBank considering that:
I. Defendant PCIBank was clearly negligent when it failed to exercise the diligence required to be exercised by it as a banking
institution.
II. Defendant PCIBank clearly failed to observe the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its officers and
employees.
III. Defendant PCIBank was, due to its negligence, clearly liable for the loss or damage resulting to the plaintiff Ford as a
consequence of the substitution of the check consistent with Section 5 of Central Bank Circular No. 580 series of 1977.
IV. Assuming arguendo that defendant PCIBank did not accept, endorse or negotiate in due course the subject checks, it is
liable, under Article 2154 of the Civil Code, to return the money which it admits having received, and which was credited
to it in its Central Bank account.[16]
The main issue presented for our consideration by these petitions could be simplified as follows: Has petitioner Ford the right to
recover from the collecting bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks intended as payment to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue? Or has Fords cause of action already prescribed?
Note that in these cases, the checks were drawn against the drawee bank, but the title of the person negotiating the same was
allegedly defective because the instrument was obtained by fraud and unlawful means, and the proceeds of the checks were not
remitted to the payee. It was established that instead of paying the checks to the CIR, for the settlement of the appropriate quarterly
percentage taxes of Ford, the checks were diverted and encashed for the eventual distribution among the members of the
syndicate. As to the unlawful negotiation of the check the applicable law is Section 55 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), which
provides:
When title defective -- The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this Act when he
obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal
consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud.
Pursuant to this provision, it is vital to show that the negotiation is made by the perpetrator in breach of faith amounting to
fraud. The person negotiating the checks must have gone beyond the authority given by his principal. If the principal could prove that
there was no negligence in the performance of his duties, he may set up the personal defense to escape liability and recover from
other parties who, through their own negligence, allowed the commission of the crime.
In this case, we note that the direct perpetrators of the offense, namely the embezzlers belonging to a syndicate, are now fugitives
from justice. They have, even if temporarily, escaped liability for the embezzlement of millions of pesos. We are thus left only with the
task of determining who of the present parties before us must bear the burden of loss of these millions. It all boils down to the
question of liability based on the degree of negligence among the parties concerned.
Foremost, we must resolve whether the injured party, Ford, is guilty of the imputed contributory negligence that would defeat its
claim for reimbursement, bearing in mind that its employees, Godofredo Rivera and Alexis Marindo, were among the members of the
syndicate.
Citibank points out that Ford allowed its very own employee, Godofredo Rivera, to negotiate the checks to his co-conspirators,
instead of delivering them to the designated authorized collecting bank (Metrobank-Alabang) of the payee, CIR. Citibank bewails the
fact that Ford was remiss in the supervision and control of its own employees, inasmuch as it only discovered the syndicates activities
through the information given by the payee of the checks after an unreasonable period of time.
PCIBank also blames Ford of negligence when it allegedly authorized Godofredo Rivera to divert the proceeds of Citibank Check
No. SN-04867, instead of using it to pay the BIR. As to the subsequent run-around of funds of Citibank Check Nos. SN-10597 and
16508, PCIBank claims that the proximate cause of the damage to Ford lies in its own officers and employees who carried out the
fraudulent schemes and the transactions. These circumstances were not checked by other officers of the company, including its
comptroller or internal auditor. PCIBank contends that the inaction of Ford despite the enormity of the amount involved was a sheer
negligence and stated that, as between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the one
who made it possible, by his act of negligence, must bear the loss.
For its part, Ford denies any negligence in the performance of its duties. It avers that there was no evidence presented before the
trial court showing lack of diligence on the part of Ford. And, citing the case of Gempesaw vs. Court of Appeals,[17] Ford argues that
even if there was a finding therein that the drawer was negligent, the drawee bank was still ordered to pay damages.
Furthermore, Ford contends that Godofredo Rivera was not authorized to make any representation in its behalf, specifically, to
divert the proceeds of the checks. It adds that Citibank raised the issue of imputed negligence against Ford for the first time on
appeal. Thus, it should not be considered by this Court.
On this point, jurisprudence regarding the imputed negligence of employer in a master-servant relationship is instructive. Since a
master may be held for his servants wrongful act, the law imputes to the master the act of the servant, and if that act is negligent or
wrongful and proximately results in injury to a third person, the negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or wrongful
conduct of the master, for which he is liable.[18] The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and
by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made.[19]
Accordingly, we need to determine whether or not the action of Godofredo Rivera, Fords General Ledger Accountant, and/or
Alexis Marindo, his assistant, was the proximate cause of the loss or damage. As defined, proximate cause is that which, in the natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.[20]
 It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our view, their
actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Fords negligence, if any, could not be
characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties.
The Board of Directors of Ford, we note, did not confirm the request of Godofredo Rivera to recall Citibank Check No. SN-
04867. Riveras instruction to replace the said check with PCIBanks Managers Check was not in the ordinary course of business which
could have prompted PCIBank to validate the same.
As to the preparation of Citibank Checks Nos. SN-10597 and 16508, it was established that these checks were made payable to
the CIR. Both were crossed checks.These checks were apparently turned around by Fords employees, who were acting on their own
personal capacity.
Given these circumstances, the mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payors confidential employee or agent,
who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does not
entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the
drawer.[21] This rule likewise applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold them
in their possession.
With respect to the negligence of PCIBank in the payment of the three checks involved, separately, the trial courts found
variations between the negotiation of Citibank Check No. SN-04867 and the misapplication of total proceeds of Checks SN-10597 and
16508. Therefore, we have to scrutinize, separately, PCIBanks share of negligence when the syndicate achieved its ultimate agenda of
stealing the proceeds of these checks.
G.R. Nos. 121413 and 121479

Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was deposited at PCIBank through its Ermita Branch. It was coursed through the ordinary banking
transaction, sent to Central Clearing with the indorsement at the back all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements
guaranteed, and was presented to Citibank for payment. Thereafter PCIBank, instead of remitting the proceeds to the CIR, prepared
two of its Managers checks and enabled the syndicate to encash the same.
On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect of PCIBank employees to verify
whether his letter requesting for the replacement of the Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of care and
prudence required in the circumstances.
Furthermore, it was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an agent of
BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal regarding the unwarranted instructions given by the payor or its agent. As aptly
stated by the trial court, to wit:
x x x. Since the questioned crossed check was deposited with IBAA [now PCIBank], which claimed to be a depository/collecting bank
of the BIR, it has the responsibility to make sure that the check in question is deposited in Payees account only.
xxxxxxxxx
As agent of the BIR (the payee of the check), defendant IBAA should receive instructions only from its principal BIR and not from any
other person especially so when that person is not known to the defendant. It is very imprudent on the part of the defendant IBAA to
just rely on the alleged telephone call of one Godofredo Rivera and in his signature to the authenticity of such signature considering
that the plaintiff is not a client of the defendant IBAA.
It is a well-settled rule that the relationship between the payee or holder of commercial paper and the bank to which it is sent for
collection is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, that of principal and agent. [22] A bank which receives such paper for
collection is the agent of the payee or holder.[23]
Even considering arguendo, that the diversion of the amount of a check payable to the collecting bank in behalf of the designated
payee may be allowed, still such diversion must be properly authorized by the payor. Otherwise stated, the diversion can be justified
only by proof of authority from the drawer, or that the drawer has clothed his agent with apparent authority to receive the proceeds
of such check.
Citibank further argues that PCI Banks clearing stamp appearing at the back of the questioned checks stating that ALL PRIOR
INDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF INDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED should render PCIBank liable because it made it pass through the
clearing house and therefore Citibank had no other option but to pay it. Thus, Citibank asserts that the proximate cause of Fords
injury is the gross negligence of PCIBank. Since the questioned crossed check was deposited with PCIBank, which claimed to be a
depository/collecting bank of the BIR, it had the responsibility to make sure that the check in question is deposited in Payees account
only.
Indeed, the crossing of the check with the phrase Payees Account Only, is a warning that the check should be deposited only in
the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payees account
only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it could
make the clearing indorsement all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed.
In Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Equitable Banking Corporation,[24] we ruled:
Anent petitioners liability on said instruments, this court is in full accord with the ruling of the PCHCs Board of Directors that:
In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the defendant made an express guarantee on the validity of all prior
endorsements. Thus, stamped at the back of the checks are the defendants clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR
LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, plaintiff would not have paid on the checks.
No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendants warranty. As the warranty has proven to be false and
inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.[25]
Lastly, banking business requires that the one who first cashes and negotiates the check must take some precautions to learn
whether or not it is genuine. And if the one cashing the check through indifference or other circumstance assists the forger in
committing the fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds of the check from the drawee whose sole fault was that it did
not discover the forgery or the defect in the title of the person negotiating the instrument before paying the check. For this reason, a
bank which cashes a check drawn upon another bank, without requiring proof as to the identity of persons presenting it, or making
inquiries with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against the drawee when the proceeds of the checks were afterwards
diverted to the hands of a third party. In such cases the drawee bank has a right to believe that the cashing bank (or the collecting
bank) had, by the usual proper investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of the negotiation of the checks.Thus, one who
encashed a check which had been forged or diverted and in turn received payment thereon from the drawee, is guilty of negligence
which proximately contributed to the success of the fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter may recover from the holder the
money paid on the check.[26]
Having established that the collecting banks negligence is the proximate cause of the loss, we conclude that PCIBank is liable in
the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN-04867.
G.R. No. 128604

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that PCIBank had no official act in the ordinary course of business that would
attribute to it the case of the embezzlement of Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508, because PCIBank did not actually
receive nor hold the two Ford checks at all. The trial court held, thus:
Neither is there any proof that defendant PCIBank contributed any official or conscious participation in the process of the
embezzlement. This Court is convinced that the switching operation (involving the checks while in transit for clearing) were the
clandestine or hidden actuations performed by the members of the syndicate in their own personal, covert and private capacity and
done without the knowledge of the defendant PCIBank.[27]
In this case, there was no evidence presented confirming the conscious participation of PCIBank in the embezzlement. As a
general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents
within the course and scope of their employment.[28] A bank will be held liable for the negligence of its officers or agents when acting
within the course and scope of their employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that species of
tort of which malice is an essential element. In this case, we find a situation where the PCIBank appears also to be the victim of the
scheme hatched by a syndicate in which its own management employees had participated.
The pro-manager of San Andres Branch of PCIBank, Remberto Castro, received Citibank Check Numbers SN 10597 and 16508. He
passed the checks to a co-conspirator, an Assistant Manager of PCIBanks Meralco Branch, who helped Castro open a Checking account
of a fictitious person named Reynaldo Reyes. Castro deposited a worthless Bank of America Check in exactly the same amount of Ford
checks. The syndicate tampered with the checks and succeeded in replacing the worthless checks and the eventual encashment of
Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 and 16508. The PCIBank Pro-manager, Castro, and his co-conspirator Assistant Manager apparently
performed their activities using facilities in their official capacity or authority but for their personal and private gain or benefit.
A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds these officers or
agents were enabled to perpetrate in the apparent course of their employment; nor will it be permitted to shirk its responsibility for
such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. For the general rule is that a bank is liable for the fraudulent
acts or representations of an officer or agent acting within the course and apparent scope of his employment or authority.[29] And if an
officer or employee of a bank, in his official capacity, receives money to satisfy an evidence of indebtedness lodged with his bank for
collection, the bank is liable for his misappropriation of such sum.[30]
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by Ford, Section 5[31] of Central Bank Circular No. 580, Series of 1977 provides that any theft
affecting items in transit for clearing, shall be for the account of sending bank, which in this case is PCIBank.
But in this case, responsibility for negligence does not lie on PCIBanks shoulders alone.
The evidence on record shows that Citibank as drawee bank was likewise negligent in the performance of its duties. Citibank
failed to establish that its payment of Fords checks were made in due course and legally in order. In its defense, Citibank claims the
genuineness and due execution of said checks, considering that Citibank (1) has no knowledge of any infirmity in the issuance of the
checks in question (2) coupled by the fact that said checks were sufficiently funded and (3) the endorsement of the Payee or lack
thereof was guaranteed by PCI Bank (formerly IBAA), thus, it has the obligation to honor and pay the same.
For its part, Ford contends that Citibank as the drawee bank owes to Ford an absolute and contractual duty to pay the proceeds
of the subject check only to the payee thereof, the CIR. Citing Section 62[32] of the Negotiable Instruments Law, Ford argues that by
accepting the instrument, the acceptor which is Citibank engages that it will pay according to the tenor of its acceptance, and that it
will pay only to the payee, (the CIR), considering the fact that here the check was crossed with annotation Payees Account Only.
As ruled by the Court of Appeals, Citibank must likewise answer for the damages incurred by Ford on Citibank Checks Numbers
SN 10597 and 16508, because of the contractual relationship existing between the two. Citibank, as the drawee bank breached its
contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability contributed to the damage caused to the latter. On this score, we agree
with the respondent courts ruling.
Citibank should have scrutinized Citibank Check Numbers SN 10597 and 16508 before paying the amount of the proceeds thereof
to the collecting bank of the BIR.One thing is clear from the record: the clearing stamps at the back of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597
and 16508 do not bear any initials. Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of the clearing stamps. Had this been duly
examined, the switching of the worthless checks to Citibank Check Nos. 10597 and 16508 would have been discovered in time. For
this reason, Citibank had indeed failed to perform what was incumbent upon it, which is to ensure that the amount of the checks
should be paid only to its designated payee. The fact that the drawee bank did not discover the irregularity seasonably, in our view,
constitutes negligence in carrying out the banks duty to its depositors. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and
because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.[33]
Thus, invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their
respective obligations and both were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of
Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 and 16508. Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of said
checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR.
Time and again, we have stressed that banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and confidence of
the public in general is of paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest,
degree of diligence.[34] A banks liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but primary, wherein the defense of exercise of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees is of no moment.[35]
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos.[36] By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care
and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. [37] Banks are
expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.[38]
On the issue of prescription, PCIBank claims that the action of Ford had prescribed because of its inability to seek judicial relief
seasonably, considering that the alleged negligent act took place prior to December 19, 1977 but the relief was sought only in 1983,
or seven years thereafter.
The statute of limitations begins to run when the bank gives the depositor notice of the payment, which is ordinarily when the
check is returned to the alleged drawer as a voucher with a statement of his account, [39] and an action upon a check is ordinarily
governed by the statutory period applicable to instruments in writing.[40]
Our laws on the matter provide that the action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues.[41] Hence, the reckoning time for the prescriptive period begins when the instrument was issued and the
corresponding check was returned by the bank to its depositor (normally a month thereafter). Applying the same rule, the cause of
action for the recovery of the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN 04867 would normally be a month after December 19, 1977, when
Citibank paid the face value of the check in the amount of P4,746,114.41. Since the original complaint for the cause of action was filed
on January 20, 1983, barely six years had lapsed. Thus, we conclude that Fords cause of action to recover the amount of Citibank
Check No. SN 04867 was seasonably filed within the period provided by law.
Finally, we also find that Ford is not completely blameless in its failure to detect the fraud. Failure on the part of the depositor to
examine its passbook, statements of account, and cancelled checks and to give notice within a reasonable time (or as required by
statute) of any discrepancy which it may in the exercise of due care and diligence find therein, serves to mitigate the banks liability by
reducing the award of interest from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. As provided in Article 1172 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but
such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.[42]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25017, are AFFIRMED. PCIBank,
known formerly as Insular Bank of Asia and America, is declared solely responsible for the loss of the proceeds of Citibank Check No.
SN 04867 in the amount P4,746,114.41, which shall be paid together with six percent (6%) interest thereon to Ford Philippines Inc.
from the date when the original complaint was filed until said amount is fully paid.
However, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28430 are MODIFIED as follows: PCIBank and
Citibank are adjudged liable for and must share the loss, (concerning the proceeds of Citibank Check Numbers SN 10597 and 16508
totalling P12,163,298.10) on a fifty-fifty ratio, and each bank is ORDERED to pay Ford Philippines Inc. P6,081,649.05, with six percent
(6%) interest thereon, from the date the complaint was filed until full payment of said amount.
 Costs against Philippine Commercial International Bank and Citibank, N.A.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO
SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his
Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway,
Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo
Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said
mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and
Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No.
SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion
thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the
amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya,
swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified
that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by
the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on
the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn
left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was
at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which
then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a
fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de
oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision
between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by
Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and
sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their
vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in
solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is
barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by
petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in
the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to
which petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former.
Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took
effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same
would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated
February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of
the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we
required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner
Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by
the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by
petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that
the Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver
Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it
must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of
subject matter and Identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of
cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver
Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in
said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie
Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the
criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant- petitioner is
primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to
wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar
suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by
the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same
direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to
P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the
two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz,
and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either
of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with
petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he
dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation
in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section
2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the
latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal
writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the
proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general
rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the
reservation required in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the
Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being
substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but
adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of
1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner
failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture
altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpacriminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action
for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminalunder section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously
instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in
the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until
its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his
action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal
case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for
having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo
Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves
that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for
the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly,
inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court 10 which provides:
 Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules
shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ...
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it
being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil
action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence
of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to
that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30,
1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set
aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated
January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are
hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40486 August 29, 1975

PAULINO PADUA and LUCENA BEBIN PADUA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIO N. ROBLES and BAY TAXI CAB, defendants-appellees.
Alberto R. de Joya for plaintiffs-appellants.
Cardenas & Peralta Law Office for defendants-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:
Resolving this appeal by the spouses Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua, we set aside the order dated October 25, 1972 of the Court of
First Instance of Zambales dismissing their complaint, in civil case 1079-O, and remand this case for further proceedings.
In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab (bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and driven by Romeo N. Punzalan but
operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio N. Robles) struck ten-year old Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio
Barretto, Olongapo City. The impact hurled Normandy about forty meters away from the point where the taxicab struck him, as a
result of which he died.
Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Zambales
(civil case 427-O), sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by information filed
with the same court (criminal case 1158-O), charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence.
On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case 427-O, adjudged for the Paduas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Romeo Punzalan to pay the plaintiffs the sums of
P12,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and dismissing the complaint insofar as the Bay Taxicab Company is concerned. With costs against the defendant Romeo
Punzalan. (Emphasis supplied)
Almost a year later, on October 5, 1970, the court a quo, in criminal case 1158-O, convicted Punzalan, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide through reckless imprudence, as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended
by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the cost. The civil liability of the accused has already been determined
and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled Paulino Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.' (Emphasis supplied)
After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final, the Paduas sought execution thereof. This proved futile; the corresponding court
officer returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.
Unable to collect the amount of P27,000 awarded in their favor, the Paduas instituted action in the same court against Gregorio N.
Robles to enforce the latter's subsidiary responsibility under the provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a
motion to dismiss based on (1) bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action.
Thereafter, the court a quo, in an order dated October 25, 1972, granted Robles' motion to dismiss on the ground that the Paduas'
complaint states no cause of action. This order the Paduas questioned in the Court of Appeals which, by resolution dated March 5,
1975, certified the case to this Court for the reason that the appeal involves only questions of law.
The Paduas predicate their appeal on eighteen errors allegedly committed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, however, raise
only one substantial issue: whether the judgment dated October 5, 1970 in criminal case 1158-O includes a determination and
adjudication of Punzalan's civil liability arising from his criminal act upon which Robles' subsidiary civil responsibility may be based.
The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal
effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used govern. Also, its
meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention
of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances.
It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily
results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said judgment no civil liability arising from the offense charged
against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant
circumstances, would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the
civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor.
Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an
action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery
of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived
or reserved for a separate application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages
twice for the same negligent act or omission.
In the case at bar, the Court finds it immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action for recovery of damages based
on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code, which action proved ineffectual. The Court also takes note of
the absence of any inconsistency between the aforementioned action priorly availed of by the Paduas and their subsequent
application for enforcement of civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and consequently, for exaction of Robles'
subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the latter application involves no violation of the proscription against double recovery of
damages for the same negligent act or omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo returned
unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-
O. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. Finally, the Court
notes that the same judge * tried, heard, and determined both civil case 427-O and criminal case 115-O. Knowledge of an familiarity
with all the facts and circumstances relevant and relative to the civil liability of Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the judge
when he rendered judgment in the criminal action.
In view of the above considerations, it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case
1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged
guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the
statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of
Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or "gobbledygook" and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect
whatever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances,
makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the civil liability arising from the
judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by including such statement in the decretal portion of the said judgment,
the court intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as Punzalan's civil liability in criminal case
1158-O.
There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal
case 1158-O referring to the civil liability of Punzalan resulting from his criminal conviction. The judge could have been forthright and
direct instead of circuitous and ambiguous. But, as we have explained, the statement on the civil liability of Punzalan must surely have
a meaning and even if the statement were reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that which achieves moral justice
should be adopted, eschewing the other interpretations which in effect would negate moral justice.
It is not amiss at this juncture to emphasize to all magistrates in all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should
be exercise in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision
becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and
instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly
and unequivocally, leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation.
We therefore hold that the Paduas' complaint in civil case 1079-O states a cause of action against Robles whose concommitant
subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, subsists.
ACCORDINGLY, the order a quo dated October 25, 1972 dismissing the complaint in civil case 1079-O is set aside, and this case is
hereby remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings conformably with this decision and with law. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs and submits a brief opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs with a separate opinion.
Muoz Palma, J., took no part.
Antonio, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918

AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellee.
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to
have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La
Union absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San
Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had
gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or
twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that
the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant
guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then
no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape
hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to
the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on
the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood
between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the
horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several
days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was
guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As
the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side;
but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a
moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this
change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons
on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing
this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the
horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When
the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in
the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much
value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or
known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when
there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to
be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man,
placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself
on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is
to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps be mentioned in this connection.
This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could
be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The
defendant company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to
the company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain
spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road
bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in evidence that
the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the
defendant company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of the
accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while
the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the
amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's
negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous
condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile
which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to
apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in
this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote
factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's answer, to the effect that the
subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that
soon after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace
charging the defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the defendant was
discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the
merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from
negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the
criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the
plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is
estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel,
and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of
such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. 137775. March 31, 2005]
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, and ESTATE OF ANG
GUI, represented by LUCIO, JULIAN, and JAIME, all surnamed ANG, and CO TO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 140704. March 31, 2005]
ESTATE OF ANG GUI, Represented by LUCIO, JULIAN and JAIME, all surnamed ANG, and CO TO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SAN MIGUEL CORP., and FGU INSURANCE CORP., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us are two separate Petitions for review assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49624 entitled,
San Miguel Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee versus Estate of Ang Gui, represented by Lucio, Julian and Jaime, all surnamed Ang, and Co
To, Defendants-Appellants, ThirdParty Plaintiffs versus FGU Insurance Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant, which
affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 22. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P1,346,197.00 and an interest of 6% per annum to
be reckoned from the filing of this case on October 2, 1990;
2) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 for attorneys fees and an additional
sum of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
3) With cost against defendants.
For the Third-Party Complaint:
1) Ordering third-party defendant FGU Insurance Company to pay and reimburse defendants the amount of P632,700.00.[3]
The Facts
Evidence shows that Anco Enterprises Company (ANCO), a partnership between Ang Gui and Co To, was engaged in the shipping
business. It owned the M/T ANCO tugboat and the D/B Lucio barge which were operated as common carriers. Since the D/B Lucio
had no engine of its own, it could not maneuver by itself and had to be towed by a tugboat for it to move from one place to another.
On 23 September 1979, San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shipped from Mandaue City, Cebu, on board the D/B Lucio, for towage by
M/T ANCO, the following cargoes:
Bill of Lading No. Shipment Destination
1 25,000 cases Pale Pilsen Estancia, Iloilo
350 cases Cerveza Negra Estancia, Iloilo
 2 15,000 cases Pale Pilsen San Jose, Antique
200 cases Cerveza Negra San Jose, Antique
The consignee for the cargoes covered by Bill of Lading No. 1 was SMCs Beer Marketing Division (BMD)-Estancia Beer Sales
Office, Estancia, Iloilo, while the consignee for the cargoes covered by Bill of Lading No. 2 was SMCs BMD-San Jose Beer Sales Office,
San Jose, Antique.
The D/B Lucio was towed by the M/T ANCO all the way from Mandaue City to San Jose, Antique. The vessels arrived at San Jose,
Antique, at about one oclock in the afternoon of 30 September 1979. The tugboat M/T ANCO left the barge immediately after reaching
San Jose, Antique.
When the barge and tugboat arrived at San Jose, Antique, in the afternoon of 30 September 1979, the clouds over the area were
dark and the waves were already big. The arrastre workers unloading the cargoes of SMC on board the D/B Lucio began to complain
about their difficulty in unloading the cargoes. SMCs District Sales Supervisor, Fernando Macabuag, requested ANCOs representative
to transfer the barge to a safer place because the vessel might not be able to withstand the big waves.
ANCOs representative did not heed the request because he was confident that the barge could withstand the waves. This,
notwithstanding the fact that at that time, only the M/T ANCO was left at the wharf of San Jose, Antique, as all other vessels already
left the wharf to seek shelter. With the waves growing bigger and bigger, only Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety (10,790) cases of
beer were discharged into the custody of the arrastre operator.
At about ten to eleven oclock in the evening of 01 October 1979, the crew of D/B Lucio abandoned the vessel because the barges
rope attached to the wharf was cut off by the big waves. At around midnight, the barge run aground and was broken and the cargoes
of beer in the barge were swept away.
As a result, ANCO failed to deliver to SMCs consignee Twenty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ten (29,210) cases of Pale Pilsen and
Five Hundred Fifty (550) cases of Cerveza Negra. The value per case of Pale Pilsen was Forty-Five Pesos and Twenty Centavos
(P45.20). The value of a case of Cerveza Negra was Forty-Seven Pesos and Ten Centavos (P47.10), hence, SMCs claim against ANCO
amounted to One Million Three Hundred Forty-Six Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos (P1,346,197.00).
As a consequence of the incident, SMC filed a complaint for Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages against ANCO for the
amount of One Million Three Hundred Forty-Six Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos (P1,346,197.00) plus interest, litigation
expenses and Twenty-Five Percent (25%) of the total claim as attorneys fees.
Upon Ang Guis death, ANCO, as a partnership, was dissolved hence, on 26 January 1993, SMC filed a second amended complaint
which was admitted by the Court impleading the surviving partner, Co To and the Estate of Ang Gui represented by Lucio, Julian and
Jaime, all surnamed Ang. The substituted defendants adopted the original answer with counterclaim of ANCO since the substantial
allegations of the original complaint and the amended complaint are practically the same.
ANCO admitted that the cases of beer Pale Pilsen and Cerveza Negra mentioned in the complaint were indeed loaded on the
vessel belonging to ANCO. It claimed however that it had an agreement with SMC that ANCO would not be liable for any losses or
damages resulting to the cargoes by reason of fortuitous event. Since the cases of beer Pale Pilsen and Cerveza Negra were lost by
reason of a storm, a fortuitous event which battered and sunk the vessel in which they were loaded, they should not be held liable.
ANCO further asserted that there was an agreement between them and SMC to insure the cargoes in order to recover indemnity in
case of loss. Pursuant to that agreement, the cargoes to the extent of Twenty Thousand (20,000) cases was insured with FGU
Insurance Corporation (FGU) for the total amount of Eight Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P858,500.00) per
Marine Insurance Policy No. 29591.
Subsequently, ANCO, with leave of court, filed a Third-Party Complaint against FGU, alleging that before the vessel of ANCO left
for San Jose, Antique with the cargoes owned by SMC, the cargoes, to the extent of Twenty Thousand (20,000) cases, were insured
with FGU for a total amount of Eight Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P858,500.00) under Marine Insurance
Policy No. 29591. ANCO further alleged that on or about 02 October 1979, by reason of very strong winds and heavy waves brought
about by a passing typhoon, the vessel run aground near the vicinity of San Jose, Antique, as a result of which, the vessel was totally
wrecked and its cargoes owned by SMC were lost and/or destroyed. According to ANCO, the loss of said cargoes occurred as a result
of risks insured against in the insurance policy and during the existence and lifetime of said insurance policy. ANCO went on to assert
that in the remote possibility that the court will order ANCO to pay SMCs claim, the third-party defendant corporation should be held
liable to indemnify or reimburse ANCO whatever amounts, or damages, it may be required to pay to SMC.
In its answer to the Third-Party complaint, third-party defendant FGU admitted the existence of the Insurance Policy under
Marine Cover Note No. 29591 but maintained that the alleged loss of the cargoes covered by the said insurance policy cannot be
attributed directly or indirectly to any of the risks insured against in the said insurance policy. According to FGU, it is only liable
under the policy to Third-party Plaintiff ANCO and/or Plaintiff SMC in case of any of the following:
a) total loss of the entire shipment;
b) loss of any case as a result of the sinking of the vessel; or
c) loss as a result of the vessel being on fire.
Furthermore, FGU alleged that the Third-Party Plaintiff ANCO and Plaintiff SMC failed to exercise ordinary diligence or the
diligence of a good father of the family in the care and supervision of the cargoes insured to prevent its loss and/or destruction.
Third-Party defendant FGU prayed for the dismissal of the Third-Party Complaint and asked for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.[1]
The trial court found that while the cargoes were indeed lost due to fortuitous event, there was failure on ANCOs part, through
their representatives, to observe the degree of diligence required that would exonerate them from liability. The trial court thus held
the Estate of Ang Gui and Co To liable to SMC for the amount of the lost shipment. With respect to the Third-Party complaint, the
court a quo found FGU liable to bear Fifty-Three Percent (53%) of the amount of the lost cargoes. According to the trial court:
. . . Evidence is to the effect that the D/B Lucio, on which the cargo insured, run-aground and was broken and the beer cargoes on the
said barge were swept away. It is the sense of this Court that the risk insured against was the cause of the loss.
...
Since the total cargo was 40,550 cases which had a total amount of P1,833,905.00 and the amount of the policy was only for
P858,500.00, defendants as assured, therefore, were considered co-insurers of third-party defendant FGU Insurance Corporation to the
extent of 975,405.00 value of the cargo. Consequently, inasmuch as there was partial loss of only P1,346,197.00, the assured shall bear
53% of the loss[4] [Emphasis ours]
The appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court and denied the motion for reconsideration and the
supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the petitions.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 137775, the grounds for review raised by petitioner FGU can be summarized into two: 1) Whether or not respondent
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in holding FGU liable under the insurance contract considering the
circumstances surrounding the loss of the cargoes; and 2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in holding
that the doctrine of res judicata applies in the instant case.
In G.R. No. 140704, petitioner Estate of Ang Gui and Co To assail the decision of the appellate court based on the following
assignments of error: 1) The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the findings of the lower court that
the negligence of the crewmembers of the D/B Lucio was the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes; and 2) The respondent court
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the appeal was without merit despite the fact that said court had accepted the
decision in Civil Case No. R-19341, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, as res judicata.
Ruling of the Court
First, we shall endeavor to dispose of the common issue raised by both petitioners in their respective petitions for review, that is,
whether or not the doctrine of res judicata applies in the instant case.
It is ANCOs contention that the decision in Civil Case No. R-19341,[5] which was decided in its favor, constitutes res judicata with
respect to the issues raised in the case at bar.
The contention is without merit. There can be no res judicata as between Civil Case No. R-19341 and the case at bar. In order
for res judicata to be made applicable in a case, the following essential requisites must be present: 1) the former judgment must be
final; 2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) the
former judgment must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be between the first and second action identity of
parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.[6]
There is no question that the first three elements of res judicata as enumerated above are indeed satisfied by the decision in Civil
Case No. R-19341. However, the doctrine is still inapplicable due to the absence of the last essential requisite of identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action.
 The parties in Civil Case No. R-19341 were ANCO as plaintiff and FGU as defendant while in the instant case, SMC is the plaintiff
and the Estate of Ang Gui represented by Lucio, Julian and Jaime, all surnamed Ang and Co To as defendants, with the latter merely
impleading FGU as third-party defendant.
The subject matter of Civil Case No. R-19341 was the insurance contract entered into by ANCO, the owner of the vessel, with FGU
covering the vessel D/B Lucio, while in the instant case, the subject matter of litigation is the loss of the cargoes of SMC, as shipper,
loaded in the D/B Lucio and the resulting failure of ANCO to deliver to SMCs consignees the lost cargo. Otherwise stated, the
controversy in the first case involved the rights and liabilities of the shipowner vis--vis that of the insurer, while the present case
involves the rights and liabilities of the shipper vis--vis that of the shipowner. Specifically, Civil Case No. R-19341 was an action for
Specific Performance and Damages based on FGU Marine Hull Insurance Policy No. VMF-MH-13519 covering the vessel D/B Lucio,
while the instant case is an action for Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages filed by SMC against ANCO based on Bill of Lading
No. 1 and No. 2, with defendant ANCO seeking reimbursement from FGU under Insurance Policy No. MA-58486, should the former be
held liable to pay SMC.
Moreover, the subject matter of the third-party complaint against FGU in this case is different from that in Civil Case No. R-19341.
In the latter, ANCO was suing FGU for the insurance contract over the vessel while in the former, the third-party complaint arose from
the insurance contract covering the cargoes on board the D/B Lucio.
The doctrine of res judicata precludes the re-litigation of a particular fact or issue already passed upon by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a former judgment, in another action between the same parties based on a different claim or cause of action. The
judgment in the prior action operates as estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of
which the finding or judgment was rendered.[7] If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will
depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.[8]
Since the case at bar arose from the same incident as that involved in Civil Case No. R-19341, only findings with respect to
matters passed upon by the court in the former judgment are conclusive in the disposition of the instant case. A careful perusal of the
decision in Civil Case No. R-19341 will reveal that the pivotal issues resolved by the lower court, as affirmed by both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, can be summarized into three legal conclusions: 1) that the D/B Lucio before and during the voyage
was seaworthy; 2) that there was proper notice of loss made by ANCO within the reglementary period; and 3) that the vessel D/B
Lucio was a constructive total loss.
Said decision, however, did not pass upon the issues raised in the instant case. Absent therein was any discussion regarding the
liability of ANCO for the loss of the cargoes. Neither did the lower court pass upon the issue of the alleged negligence of the
crewmembers of the D/B Lucio being the cause of the loss of the cargoes owned by SMC.
Therefore, based on the foregoing discussion, we are reversing the findings of the Court of Appeals that there is res judicata.
Anent ANCOs first assignment of error, i.e., the appellate court committed error in concluding that the negligence of ANCOs
representatives was the proximate cause of the loss, said issue is a question of fact assailing the lower courts appreciation of evidence
on the negligence or lack thereof of the crewmembers of the D/B Lucio. As a rule, findings of fact of lower courts, particularly when
affirmed by the appellate court, are deemed final and conclusive. The Supreme Court cannot review such findings on appeal,
especially when they are borne out by the records or are based on substantial evidence. [9] As held in the case of Donato v. Court of
Appeals,[10] in this jurisdiction, it is a fundamental and settled rule that findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on
appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case.[11]
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the
lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.[12]
A careful study of the records shows no cogent reason to fault the findings of the lower court, as sustained by the appellate court,
that ANCOs representatives failed to exercise the extraordinary degree of diligence required by the law to exculpate them from
liability for the loss of the cargoes.
First, ANCO admitted that they failed to deliver to the designated consignee the Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ten
(29,210) cases of Pale Pilsen and Five Hundred Fifty (550) cases of Cerveza Negra.
Second, it is borne out in the testimony of the witnesses on record that the barge D/B Lucio had no engine of its own and could
not maneuver by itself. Yet, the patron of ANCOs tugboat M/T ANCO left it to fend for itself notwithstanding the fact that as the two
vessels arrived at the port of San Jose, Antique, signs of the impending storm were already manifest. As stated by the lower court,
witness Mr. Anastacio Manilag testified that the captain or patron of the tugboat M/T ANCO left the barge D/B Lucio immediately
after it reached San Jose, Antique, despite the fact that there were already big waves and the area was already dark. This is
corroborated by defendants own witness, Mr. Fernando Macabueg.[13]
The trial court continued:
At that precise moment, since it is the duty of the defendant to exercise and observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
cargo of the plaintiff, the patron or captain of M/T ANCO, representing the defendant could have placed D/B Lucio in a very safe
location before they left knowing or sensing at that time the coming of a typhoon. The presence of big waves and dark clouds could
have warned the patron or captain of M/T ANCO to insure the safety of D/B Lucio including its cargo. D/B Lucio being a barge,
without its engine, as the patron or captain of M/T ANCO knew, could not possibly maneuver by itself. Had the patron or captain of
M/T ANCO, the representative of the defendants observed extraordinary diligence in placing the D/B Lucio in a safe place, the loss to
the cargo of the plaintiff could not have occurred. In short, therefore, defendants through their representatives, failed to observe the
degree of diligence required of them under the provision of Art. 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. [14]
Petitioners Estate of Ang Gui and Co To, in their Memorandum, asserted that the contention of respondents SMC and FGU that the
crewmembers of D/B Lucio should have left port at the onset of the typhoon is like advising the fish to jump from the frying pan into
the fire and an advice that borders on madness.[15]
The argument does not persuade. The records show that the D/B Lucio was the only vessel left at San Jose, Antique, during the
time in question. The other vessels were transferred and temporarily moved to Malandong, 5 kilometers from wharf where the barge
remained.[16] Clearly, the transferred vessels were definitely safer in Malandong than at the port of San Jose, Antique, at that
particular time, a fact which petitioners failed to dispute
ANCOs arguments boil down to the claim that the loss of the cargoes was caused by the typhoon Sisang, a fortuitous event (caso
fortuito), and there was no fault or negligence on their part. In fact, ANCO claims that their crewmembers exercised due diligence to
prevent or minimize the loss of the cargoes but their efforts proved no match to the forces unleashed by the typhoon which, in
petitioners own words was, by any yardstick, a natural calamity, a fortuitous event, an act of God, the consequences of which
petitioners could not be held liable for.[17]
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and 1745 Nos. 5, 6, and 7 . . .
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of
the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
...
Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster must have been the
proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize loss before,
during and after the occurrence of flood, storm, or other natural disaster in order that the common carrier may be exempted from
liability for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical insofar as they exempt an obligor from liability)[18] by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable. It is
therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid.[19]
In this case, the calamity which caused the loss of the cargoes was not unforeseen nor was it unavoidable. In fact, the other
vessels in the port of San Jose, Antique, managed to transfer to another place, a circumstance which prompted SMCs District Sales
Supervisor to request that the D/B Lucio be likewise transferred, but to no avail. The D/B Lucio had no engine and could not
maneuver by itself. Even if ANCOs representatives wanted to transfer it, they no longer had any means to do so as the tugboat M/T
ANCO had already departed, leaving the barge to its own devices. The captain of the tugboat should have had the foresight not to
leave the barge alone considering the pending storm.
While the loss of the cargoes was admittedly caused by the typhoon Sisang, a natural disaster, ANCO could not escape liability to
respondent SMC. The records clearly show the failure of petitioners representatives to exercise the extraordinary degree of diligence
mandated by law. To be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster should have been the proximate and only cause of the
loss.[20] There must have been no contributory negligence on the part of the common carrier. As held in the case of Limpangco Sons v.
Yangco Steamship Co.:[21]
. . . To be exempt from liability because of an act of God, the tug must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which
that loss or damage may have been occasioned. For, although the immediate or proximate cause of the loss in any given instance may
have been what is termed an act of God, yet, if the tug unnecessarily exposed the two to such accident by any culpable act or omission
of its own, it is not excused.[22]
Therefore, as correctly pointed out by the appellate court, there was blatant negligence on the part of M/T ANCOs crewmembers,
first in leaving the engine-less barge D/B Lucio at the mercy of the storm without the assistance of the tugboat, and again in failing to
heed the request of SMCs representatives to have the barge transferred to a safer place, as was done by the other vessels in the port;
thus, making said blatant negligence the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes.
We now come to the issue of whether or not FGU can be held liable under the insurance policy to reimburse ANCO for the loss of
the cargoes despite the findings of the respondent court that such loss was occasioned by the blatant negligence of the latters
employees.
One of the purposes for taking out insurance is to protect the insured against the consequences of his own negligence and that of
his agents. Thus, it is a basic rule in insurance that the carelessness and negligence of the insured or his agents constitute no defense
on the part of the insurer.[23] This rule however presupposes that the loss has occurred due to causes which could not have been
prevented by the insured, despite the exercise of due diligence.
The question now is whether there is a certain degree of negligence on the part of the insured or his agents that will deprive him
the right to recover under the insurance contract. We say there is. However, to what extent such negligence must go in order to
exonerate the insurer from liability must be evaluated in light of the circumstances surrounding each case. When evidence show that
the insureds negligence or recklessness is so gross as to be sufficient to constitute a willful act, the insurer must be exonerated.
In the case of Standard Marine Ins. Co. v. Nome Beach L. & T. Co.,[24] the United States Supreme Court held that:
The ordinary negligence of the insured and his agents has long been held as a part of the risk which the insurer takes upon himself,
and the existence of which, where it is the proximate cause of the loss, does not absolve the insurer from liability. But willful exposure,
gross negligence, negligence amounting to misconduct, etc., have often been held to release the insurer from such liability.[25] [Emphasis
ours]
...
In the case of Williams v. New England Insurance Co., 3 Cliff. 244, Fed. Cas. No. 17,731, the owners of an insured vessel attempted to
put her across the bar at Hatteras Inlet. She struck on the bar and was wrecked. The master knew that the depth of water on the bar
was such as to make the attempted passage dangerous. Judge Clifford held that, under the circumstances, the loss was not within the
protection of the policy, saying:
Authorities to prove that persons insured cannot recover for a loss occasioned by their own wrongful acts are hardly necessary, as
the proposition involves an elementary principle of universal application. Losses may be recovered by the insured, though remotely
occasioned by the negligence or misconduct of the master or crew, if proximately caused by the perils insured against, because such
mistakes and negligence are incident to navigation and constitute a part of the perils which those who engage in such adventures are
obliged to incur; but it was never supposed that the insured could recover indemnity for a loss occasioned by his own wrongful act or by
that of any agent for whose conduct he was responsible.[26] [Emphasis ours]
From the above-mentioned decision, the United States Supreme Court has made a distinction between ordinary negligence and
gross negligence or negligence amounting to misconduct and its effect on the insureds right to recover under the insurance contract.
According to the Court, while mistake and negligence of the master or crew are incident to navigation and constitute a part of the
perils that the insurer is obliged to incur, such negligence or recklessness must not be of such gross character as to amount to
misconduct or wrongful acts; otherwise, such negligence shall release the insurer from liability under the insurance contract.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court had concluded from the evidence that the crewmembers of both the
D/B Lucio and the M/T ANCO were blatantly negligent. To wit:
There was blatant negligence on the part of the employees of defendants-appellants when the patron (operator) of the tug boat
immediately left the barge at the San Jose, Antique wharf despite the looming bad weather. Negligence was likewise exhibited by the
defendants-appellants representative who did not heed Macabuags request that the barge be moved to a more secure place. The
prudent thing to do, as was done by the other sea vessels at San Jose, Antique during the time in question, was to transfer the vessel to
a safer wharf. The negligence of the defendants-appellants is proved by the fact that on 01 October 1979, the only simple vessel left at the
wharf in San Jose was the D/B Lucio.[27] [Emphasis ours]
As stated earlier, this Court does not find any reason to deviate from the conclusion drawn by the lower court, as sustained by the
Court of Appeals, that ANCOs representatives had failed to exercise extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in the
shipment of SMCs cargoes. Such blatant negligence being the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes amounting to One Million
Three Hundred Forty-Six Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos (P1,346,197.00)
This Court, taking into account the circumstances present in the instant case, concludes that the blatant negligence of ANCOs
employees is of such gross character that it amounts to a wrongful act which must exonerate FGU from liability under the insurance
contract.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 February 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION dismissing the third-party complaint.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1949

MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants-appellees.
Nicolas P. Nonato for appellant.
Gellada, Mirasol and Ravena for appellees.
REYES, J.:
This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda,
was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he
was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his
own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.
Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of action, and the motion having
been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should
escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.
The question presented is whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker.
The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for
damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had
been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. Claiming that the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff
contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or
not he has been negligent or at fault. For authority counsel cites the following opinion which Manresa quotes from a decision of the
Spanish Supreme Court:
El articulo 1905 del codigo Civil no consienta otra interpretacion que la que, clara y evidentemente, se deriva de sus terminos
literales, bastando, segun el mismo, que un animal cause perjuicio para que nasca la responsibilidad del dueno, aun no
imputandose a este ninguna clase de culpa o negligencia, habida,sin duda, cuenta por el lgislador de que tal concepto de dueno
es suficiente para que arrastre las consecuencias favorables o adversas de esta clase de propiedad, salvo la exception en el
mismo contenida. (12 Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish CivilCode, 573.)
This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It is
therefore no authority for a case like the present where the person injured was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is
important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for
the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to
prevent it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it
was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being
injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.
In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578), the death of an employee who
was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be "a veritable
accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present action,
however, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there being no allegation that, among other things, defendant's
business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of P20,000. As already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article
1905 of the Civil Code. but action under that article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be
based on article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the
animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.
There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without costs in view of the financial
situation of the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.
Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.
Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the
plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod
City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises.
While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their
hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At
that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed
the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related
the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July
20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum
of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another under the
specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there
being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the
father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article
2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph
of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is
the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor
child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously
calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage,"
it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such
diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or
the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the
right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which
would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all
obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of
good conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA,petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO
DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and
ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the
stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16,
1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending
all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal,
the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The
complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable
to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved . 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found
that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester
had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the
necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium
was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he
was then under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already
ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident
which they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the
respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later
returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking any further action . 6 As Gumban was one of the companions of
Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been
confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say,
however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both
parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v.
Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better
resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that
it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence.
In the separate civil action flied against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now
Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a
party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and
Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule, he said,
was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of
establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time
at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice
Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued that the school was not liable because it
was not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a
situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede
those of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated
on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory
of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer who was already of age was not boarding in the school, the head
thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they
are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the
lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set
aside by the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting
opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and
subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado
and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco
parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school
involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will
have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under
Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein have
also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts
and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be
held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the
word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic
ones. What substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vice over their
pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils
do not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and
Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in
Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments." The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the
Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem
clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent,
should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is
not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while
the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would
make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that
same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances
being the same, the teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-
academic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature
of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able
to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable
if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on
the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer
tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head
of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
school was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of
his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the
consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to
its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to
enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the
students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term,
as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does
not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the control
and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such,
custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the
time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that
before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended
upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such
as submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary
authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way
that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are
assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody
does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over
him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability
by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does
not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the
teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case,
liability attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article
2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school
may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause
violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under
the present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it
is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over
them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.
In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher
physically enforce those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent
any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage
caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is
disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is
not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is
greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the
students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a
greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for
the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age and therefore less tractable than the minor then
there should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove
reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the
teacher's responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As
previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that
would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora
had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino
Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that
day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically
absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the
student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the
school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he
deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither
can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been
charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium
of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son
under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to
their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-27760 May 29, 1974

CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II; and GERONIMO
CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIA GURREA, PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA NEMEN0, respondents.
Prud. V. Villafuerte for petitioners.
Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p
This petition for certiorari is characterized by a rather vigorous insistence on the part of petitioners Crispin Abellana and Francisco
Abellana that an order of respondent Judge was issued with grave abuse of discretion. It is their contention that he ought to have
dismissed an independent civil action filed in his court, considering that the plaintiffs, as offended parties, private respondents
here, 1 failed to reserve their right to institute it separately in the City Court of Ozamis City, when the criminal case for physical
injuries through reckless imprudence was commenced. Such a stand of petitioners was sought to be bolstered by a literal reading of
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111. 2 It does not take into account, however, the rule as to a trial de novo found in Section 7 of Rule
123. 3 What is worse, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the principle that if such an interpretation were to be accorded the
applicable Rules of Court provisions, it would give rise to a grave constitutional question in view of the constitutional grant of power
to this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure being limited in the sense that they "shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 4 It thus appears clear that the petition for certiorari is without merit.
The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted in the answer. The dispute had its origins in a prosecution of petitioner
Francisco Abellana of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized
pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and
Estelita Nemeo. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found the accused Francisco Abellana guilty as
charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded. The accused, now petitioner, Francisco Abellana appealed
such decision to the Court of First Instance. 5 At this stage, the private respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge, a separate and independent civil action for
damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of the aforesaid Francisco Abellana. 6 In such complaint, the other
petitioner, Crispin Abellana, as the alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such
action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them
that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was already on appeal. 7
Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he issued the following order: "This is a motion to dismiss this case on the
ground that in Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which was decided by the City Court and appealed to this Court, the offended parties failed
to expressly waive the civil action or reserve their right to institute it separately in said City Court, as required in Section 1, Rule 111,
Rules of Court. From the Records of Criminal Case No. OZ-342, it appears that the City Court convicted the accused. On appeal to this
Court, the judgment of the City Court was vacated and a trial de novo will have to be conducted. This Court has not as yet begun trying
said criminal case. In the meantime, the offended parties expressly waived in this Court the civil action impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, and reserve their right to institute a separate action as in fact, they did file. The Court is of the opinion that at this
stage, the offended parties may still waive the civil action because the judgment of the City Court is vacated and a trial de novo will
have to be had. In view of this waiver and reservation, this Court would be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused
and in favor of the offended parties. [Wherefore], the motion to dismiss is hereby denied. ..." 8 There was a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. Hence this petition.
The only basis of petitioners for the imputation that in the issuance of the challenged order there was a grave abuse of discretion, is
their reading of the cited Rules of Court provision to the effect that upon the institution of a criminal action "the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
...reserves his right to institute it
separately." 9 Such an interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts. 10 It does likewise, as
mentioned, give rise to a constitutional question to the extent that it could yield a meaning to a rule of court that may trench on a
substantive right. Such an interpretation is to be rejected. Certiorari, to repeat, clearly does not lie.
1. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition submitted for the consideration of this Court : "That a separate civil
action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at the institution, or the right to file such separate civil action reserved or
waived, at such institution of the criminal action, and never on appeal to the next higher court." 11 It admits of no doubt that an
independent civil action was filed by private respondents only at the stage of appeal. Nor was there any reservation to that effect
when the criminal case was instituted in the city court of Ozamis. Petitioners would then take comfort from the language of the
aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 111 for the unwarranted conclusion that absent such a reservation, an independent civil action is barred.
In the first place, such an inference does not per searise from the wording of the cited rule. It could be looked upon plausibly as a non-
sequitur. Moreover, it is vitiated by the grievous fault of ignoring what is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule 123: "An appealed
case shall be tried in all respects anew in the Court of First Instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court." 12 Unlike
petitioners, respondent Judge was duly mindful of such a norm. This Court has made clear that its observance in appealed criminal
cases is mandatory. 13 In a 1962 decision, People v. Carreon, 14 Justice Barrera, as ponente, could trace such a rule to a 1905
decision, Andres v. Wolfe. 15 Another case cited by him is Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons, 16 where Justice Malcolm emphasized how
deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal history is such a rule. In the latest case in point, People v. Jamisola, 17 this Court, through Justice
Dizon, reiterated such a doctrine in these words: "The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment
of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case 'shall be tried in all respects anew in the
court of first instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court.'" 18 So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. 19 Again,
there is a host of decisions attesting to its observance. 20 It cannot be said then that there was an error committed by respondent
Judge, much less a grave abuse of discretion, which is indispensable if this petition were to prosper.
2. Nor is the above the only ground for rejecting the contention of petitioners. The restrictive interpretation they would place on the
applicable rule does not only result in its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil
Code is quite clear: "In cases of ... physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence." 21 That is a substantive right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if
through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. As referred to earlier, the
grant of power to this Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution,
increase or modification of substantive right. 22 It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm
in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Unfortunately, petitioners, unlike respondent Judge, appeared to lack
awareness of the undesirable consequence of their submission. Thus is discernible another insuperable obstacle to the success of this
suit.
3. Nor is this all that needs to be said. It is understandable for any counsel to invoke legal propositions impressed with a certain
degree of plausibility if thereby the interest of his client would be served. That is though, merely one aspect of the matter. There is
this other consideration. He is not to ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law. He is
not to fall prey, as admonished by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice of literalness. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in
its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed
an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. 23 The commitment of this Court to such a
primordial objective has been manifested time and time again. 24
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed.

G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.
Magno T. Bueser for appellant.
Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and Vencedor A. Alimario for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina
and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the
accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision.
Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for
damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperia. Defendants set up the defense that if any one
should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the
accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court
and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed
to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School
situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to
run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and
two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperia, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to
know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son
Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperia caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live
with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because
at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with
his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower
court erred in relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of
arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed.,
p. 557). Here Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he
attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that
parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear
that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was
not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may
be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise
over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and
instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in
moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish
Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
After mature consideration I believe we should affirm the judgement relieving the father of liability. I can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them in so far as, concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a
position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments". The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptors y artesanos" used in the Italian and
French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the
parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent
places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school
nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
In the case before us, there is no question that the pupil, Dante Capuno, was instructed by the City School Supervisor to attend the
Rizal parade. His father could not properly refuse to allow the child to attend, in defiance of the school authorities. The father had
every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with other children, the school authorities would provide
adequate supervision over them. If a teacher or scout master was present, then he should be the one responsible for allowing the
minor to drive the jeep without being qualified to do so. On the other hand, if no teacher or master was at hand to watch over the
pupils, the school authorities are the ones answerable for that negligence, and not the father.
At any rate, I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every
right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that he trusted his child to the custody of school authorities that
were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted
to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable.
Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN,
represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were
Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently
from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver,
and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while
the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into
a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they
could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the
Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after
they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara,
who said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from
the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped
inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men,
one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from
the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it,
and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Juan
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the
present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the
value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the
defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the
claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For purposes of
reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6,
and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order
of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having
undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the
part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including
that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there
was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell
into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court
was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though
he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the
physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if
through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after
looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death
was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the
coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of
its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back
and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline
when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor
would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on
the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased, as well as the other elements
entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory
compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees,
and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and
not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the
loss of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of the passengers who, because
of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in
the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus
changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said
tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had
not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new
ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not have
occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four
of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case against
him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose
testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case
before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said
driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of
justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased from ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the
death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a
"loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a
jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his
eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital,
where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-
patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required
further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint which was,
subsequently, amended for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief
of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University of the
East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co.,
the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with several civic
organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the
Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days.
Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to
humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under
constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case,
plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the
City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta
Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the
same catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the
Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not covered between
January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation,
repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a
catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the
 catchbasin with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin
covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers;
that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by
constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these
changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the
defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned,
which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the
provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other
law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce
said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities
and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other
words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189
governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a
national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico
alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is
"under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes
thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and
is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in
issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate
court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore,
a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under
Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and to regulate the
use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting,
cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the
openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains,
and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and
regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to
provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction
and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop
rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other
animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of
the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location, grade, and
crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and
to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to
persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the
natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955,
upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces,
chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order
No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway
funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and
national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the
supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the
Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and
whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of
Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so
ordered.1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades,
known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .

TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila
Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the death on
March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to
his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; 1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof;
the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a
fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2,
1962, it was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and
the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they,
together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes
were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly
Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the
stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to
him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. The
foregoing is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a
classmate of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of
any party" and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death:
shock due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage
and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that these internal injuries of the deceased were caused
"probably by strong fist blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. 3 It held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured
his internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code." 4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 2180. ... .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the
situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and
actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: The clause "so long as they remain
in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil
lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In those circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil as well
 as the responsibilities for their sort would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco L.
Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-
14862, May 30, 1960). 5
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the
school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a)
P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for
moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power, considering that the deceased was only between sixteen and
seventeen years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action. .
2. Absolving the other defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review,
the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors,
with defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be
meritorious. .
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly
hold "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody," are not applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the accused Daffon
[who inflicted the fatal fistblows] 6 lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 7 that "(I)t would seem that
the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence
over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for
the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go
back to their homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein petitioner father's
contention that his minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was not a party to the case] should be
held responsible, rather than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the physical injury inflicted
by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat
and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after all set aside by the Court on the ground that none of the
specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been established, petitioner's son being only nine
years old and not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs. Capuno, 8 where the only issue involved
as expressly stated in the decision, was whether the therein defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages resulting from a
death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved
adversely against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but
this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" was expressly cited
and quoted in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of
schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school
premises. Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of
the tragic incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved is a non-academic school, 9 the Manila Technical Institute
being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants
Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's
minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere
member of the school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded
as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single
proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus
incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-
defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C.
Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a corporation and is not owned by any
individual person." 10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain
in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." 11 This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil
Code. 12 In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper
supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as
to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be
anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence
of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of
their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent,
should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction."
The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article. 14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have
been set aside by the present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally
liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased
Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had
said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds
them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the
lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to
P12,000.00 as set by the Court in People vs. Pantoja, 15 and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court,
in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its "considered opinion that the
amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court thereby
adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code,
from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal
interest on the total damages awarded, besides increasing the award of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such discretion on the part of the
trial court. 16 Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to
warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown
in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's
fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing
defendants' counterclaims. .
Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. .
Dizon, J., took no part. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .
I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect
that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors (below the age
of majority) is not in accord with the plain text of the law. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: .
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. .
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company. .
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live
in their company. .
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. .
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. .
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused
by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable. .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observe all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article
expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly
restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would have expressly so stated. The fact
that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it is not without
significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly establishments are not grouped with parents and guardians but ranged with
owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as to whom no reason is discernible to imply that they should answer
only for minors. .
Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho Moderno", Volume 5, page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting the
split among commentators on the point it issue, observes with considerable cogency that
272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de las cuales se funds en argumentos merecedores de seria ponderacion,
no es facil tomar un partido. Esto no obstante, debiendo manisfestar nuestra opinion, nos acercamos a la de los que no
estiman necesaria la menor edad del discipulo o del aprendiz; porque si el aforismo ubi voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, no
es siempre argumento seguro para interpreter la ley, es infalible cuanto se refiere a una misma disposicion relative a
varios casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo que haya establecido important poco si, elevandones a los principios de razon,
puede dudarse de la oportunidad de semajante diferencia; porque la voluntad cierta del legislador prevalece in iure
condito a cualquier otra consideracion. Por otra parte, si bien se considera, no puede parecer extrano o absurdo el
suponer que un discipulo y un aprendiz, aunque mayores de edad, acepten voluntariamente la entera vigilancia de su
preceptor mientras dura la educacion. Ni parece dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los preceptores deben,
al par de los padres, responder civilmente de los daos comitidos por sus discipulos, aun cuando estos esten faltos de
discernimiento.
Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, No. 635 (Spanish version), say that
635. Personas de quien responde. Si bien la responsibilidad del maestro es originalmente una estension de la de los
padres (1), el art. 1384 no especifica que los alumnos y aprendices han de ser menores de edad, por lo que la
presuncion de culpa funcionara aun cuando sean mayores (2); pero, la vigilancia no tendra que ser ejercida en iguales
terminos. Aun respecto a los menores variara segun la edad, extremo que tendra que ternese en ceunta a los fines de
apreciar si el maestro ha podido impedir el acto nocivo o no. .
I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by
law upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter.
A student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary
authority of the school authorities, which is the basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while under
such authority. Of course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as when the student is a minor; but that circumstance can only affect
the decree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or
not the defendant has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as prescribed in the last paragraph of Article
2180. .
Barredo, J., concurs.