G.R. No.

L-2662 March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO
TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO
ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for
respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General
of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 comes
before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the
prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents
from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision
of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is
not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and
international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this commission has been
empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try
herein petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port
who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a
diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a
violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not
being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th
days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including
the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in
chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off.
Gaz., 664) 1 when we said
 War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities
incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel
and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their
attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317
U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period
of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend
beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar
Association Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished
aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not
a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation
of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted
principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent
nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is
not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was
under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United
States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our
emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who
committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we
have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth
because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert
Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in
Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is
violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law
and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive
Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and constitutional
law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission
must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts
it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither
attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only
fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government
and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.
If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United
State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could
do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the personality of
attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people
have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before
the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should
submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes
charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody,
this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for Violation
of the laws and customs of land warfare.
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to practice
law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.
The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds. Petitioner has also
challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as prosecutors before the commission.
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the
Philippines as accusers.
We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It
appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law there
could not be any question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner case as with such
appearance they would be practicing law against the law.
Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question involved in the
challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged on several constitutional
ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read the whole context of said order
which is reproduced as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATION GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINAL.
I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes Office charged with the
responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of war crimes committed in
the Philippines and prescribe the rules and regulation such trial.
The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision and control of the Judge
Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect from all available sources evidence of war crimes
committed in the Philippines from the commencement of hostilities by Japan in December 1941,
maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial maintain a record thereof and bring about
the prompt trial of the accused.
The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section General
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said Office
information and evidence of war crimes.
The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war criminals:
ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
(a) General. person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to be
convened by or under the authority of the Philippines.
II. JURISDICTION
(a) Over Person. Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all
persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening authority at the time of
the trial.
(b) Over Offenses. The military commission established hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all
offenses including but not limited to the following:
(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of
international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be limited to murder
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or person on the seas or elsewhere;
improper treatment of hostage; plunder of public or private property wanton destruction of cities
towns or village; or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed against
civilian population before or during the war or persecution on political racial or religion ground in
executive of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the local
laws.
III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS
(a) Appointment. The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the President
of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be appointed by the
convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the commission, and in case of illness or other
incapacity of any principal member, an alternate shall take the place of that member. Any vacancy
among the members or alternates, occurring after a trial has begun, may be filled by the convening
authority but the substance of all proceeding had evidence taken in that case shall be made known
to the said new member or alternate. This facts shall be announced by the president of the
commission in open court.
(b) Number of Members. Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3) members.
(c) Qualifications. The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons whom he
determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified by personal interest
or prejudice, provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a case in which he personally
investigated or wherein his presence as a witness is required. One specially qualified member
whose ruling is final in so far as concerns the commission on an objection to the admissibility of
evidence offered during the trial.
(d) Voting. Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the Commission
shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not
less than conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2\3) of
the member present.
(e) Presiding Member. In the event that the convening authority does not name one of the
member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the Commission present
shall preside.
IV. PROSECUTORS
(a) Appointment. The convening authority shall designate one or more person to conduct the
prosecution before each commission.
(b) Duties. The duties of the prosecutor are:
(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.
(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all cases
referred for trial.
V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION
(a) Conduct of the Trial. A Commission shall:
(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the charges,
excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or interference.
(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate punishment
therefor.
(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.
(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by the
convening authority.
(b) Rights of the Accused. The accused shall be entitled:
(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so as to
apprise the accused of each offense charged.
(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening authority or
counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in support
of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally appears before the
commission.
(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any documentary
evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.
(c) Witnesses. The Commission shall have power:
(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths or
affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.
(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.
(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and duties set
forth in (1) and (2) above.
(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.
(d) Evidence.
(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in proving or
disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have probative value in the
mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of evidence and pleading set forth
herein with the greatest liberality to achieve expeditious procedure. In particular, and without limiting
in any way the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be admitted:
(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to have been
signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of any
Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the document.
(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the International
Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any investigator or intelligence
officer, or by any other person whom commission considers as possessing knowledge of the
matters contained in the report.
(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.
(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the commission to
contain information relating to the charge.
(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is not
immediately available.
(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official government
documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of military or other agencies of
any of the United Nation.
(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer of proof
whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be considered in
mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the accused's superior, or of his
Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if
the commission determines that justice so requires.
(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in evidence without
any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such confession or statement was
procured by mean which the commission believe to have been of such a character that may have
caused the accused to make a false statement the commission may strike out or disregard any
such portion thereof as was so procured.
(e) Trial Procedure. The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as follows
unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:
(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.
(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not guilty."
(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at this or any
other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit to the commission
and the commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At the close
of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense for a finding of not
guilty, consider and rule whether he evidence before the commission may defer action on any such
motion and permit or require the prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further available
evidence.
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The presiding
member may, at this any other time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes to
submit to the commission where upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of such
evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented. Thereafter, the
prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the commission may rule as
being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.
(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless otherwise
directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and sentence if any. The
commission may state the reason on which judgment is based.
( f ) Record of Proceedings. Each commission shall make a separate record of its proceeding in
the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the prosecutor under the
direction of the commission and submitted to the defense counsel. The commission shall be
 responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified by the presiding member of the commission or
his successor, shall be delivered to the convening authority as soon as possible after the trial.
(g) Sentence. The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by hanging
or shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other punishment as the
commission shall determine to be proper.
(h) Approval of Sentence. No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into effect until
approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be
carried into execution until confirmed by the President of the Philippines. For the purpose of his
review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board of Review to be composed of not more than three
officers none of whom shall be on duty with or assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office.
The Chief of Staff shall have authority to approve, mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute,
suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused)
remand the case for rehearing before a new military commission; but he shall not have authority to
increase the severity of the sentence. Except as herein otherwise provided the judgment and
sentence of a commission shall final and not subject to review by any other tribunal.
VI. RULE-MAKING POWER
Supplementary Rule and Forms. Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to govern its
procedure, not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules and forms as may be
prescribed by the convening authority]or by the President of the Philippines.
VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the
appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in the
accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in accordance with
the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General as approved by the President. The buildings,
fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting equipment and other property herefore used by then
Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Power, which will be turned over by the United States Army to the Philippines Government through
the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the Surplus Property Commission are hereby specification
reserved for use off the National War Crimes Office.
Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-
seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.

MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines

By the President:
EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of congressional
enactment.
The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important question, is
whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly vested in
Congress by the Constitution. .
The Constitution provides:
The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)
While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by
agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as
to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject
only to the veto power of the President of the President of the Philippines, to the specific provision which
allow the president of the Philippines to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place
any part of the Philippines under martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court.
There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in the
tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by Montequieu and
accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of America, whose
Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has allocated the three power of government
legislative, executive, judicial to distinct and separate department of government.
Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in the
nature of grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may exercise any
power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue express authority of the
Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish government
office is essentially legislative.
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions. Whether
such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon military
commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to define and allocate
jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in
Congress. .
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural subject constitutes
a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.
It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the Philippines
cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with
more reason, delegate that power to military commission.
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office established by the
said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote
appropriations belongs to Congress.
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the Philippines
usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued Executive Order
No. 68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, however, to suggest that the
President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency power granted to him by
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No.
671, both of which are transcribed below:

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT
TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY OF ITS INHABITANTS.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national emergency
which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with extraordinary power in
order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by
suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all subversive to the people adequate shelter and
clothing and sufficient food supply, and by providing means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian
population the establishment of an air protective service and the organization of volunteer guard
units, and to adopt such other measures as he may deem necessary for the interest of the public.
To carry out this policy the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall
have the force and effect off law until the date of adjournment of the next regulation which shall
have the force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First
Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of Philippines.
Such rules and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress espionage and other
subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when not engaged in any lawful
occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform such services as
may bee necessary in the public interest; (3) to take over farm lands in order to prevent or shortage
of crops and hunger and destitution; (4) to take over industrial establishment in order to insure
adequate production, controlling wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes
whenever necessary to prevent the unwarranted suspension of work in productive enterprises or in
the interest of national security; (6) to regulate the normal hours of work for wage-earning and
salaried employees in industrial or business undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even
distribution of labor among the productive enterprises; (8) to commandership and other means of
transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued transportation
facilities; (9) to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for use or operation by the
Government;(10) to regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime necessity, both
imported and locally produced or manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity,
monopolization, hoarding injurious speculations, and private control affecting the supply, distribution
and movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical, building, material, implements,
machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, with power to requisition these
commodities subject to the payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com. Act No. 620.)
SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the President may
designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any department, bureau, office, or
instrumentality of the National Government.
SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this Act or of
this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President under the authority of
section one of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine of
not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such violation is committed by a firm or
corporation, the manager, managing director, or person charge with the management of the
business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible therefor.
SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from the date of
the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him under the authority
herein granted.
SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such amounts as
may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five Commonwealth Act Numbered four
hundred and ninety-eight.
SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to be
unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the remainder of this Act.
SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.
Approved, August 19, 1940.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR
INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE
RULE AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;
 SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe and Asia,
which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulation
as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof.
Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or
any of its subdivisions, branches, department, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to
reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of
precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivision, branches,
departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already
existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriation which would lapse or otherwise became
inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative
character; (e) to imposed new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence;
(f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of the
proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in
overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of
credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may deem necessary to
enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by
him under the power herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations. promulgated
hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Approved December 16, 1941.
The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts
had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the
surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct part in
their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative body as chairman of
the Committee on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate." We are, therefore in a position to
state that said measures were enacted by the second national Assembly for the purpose of facing the
emergency of impending war and of the Pacific War that finally broke out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941. We approved said extraordinary measures, by which under the exceptional
circumstances then prevailing legislative power were delegated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the following provisions of the Constitution:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI, section 26.)
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the emergency
created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of the Constitution. We
are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there could still be any the same should be
resolved in favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental
law.
The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the surrender of
Japan can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the surrender of Japan, or
since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the hypothesis that the contention
can prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four years ago, even after the Commonwealth was already replaced
by the Republic of the Philippines with the proclamation of our Independence, two district, separate and
independence legislative organs, Congress and the President of the Philippines would have been and
would continue enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every nature including those of emergency
character, and the latter to enact laws, in the form of executive orders, under the so-called emergency
powers. The situation would be pregnant with dangers to peace and order to the rights and liberties of the
people and to Philippines democracy.
Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a possibility
that no one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long recess of Congress
(two-thirds of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a
veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental
guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permit the
admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it
is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.
The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation governing the
trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief of the United State
Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among other, General Yamashita and Homma.
What we said in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945,
in the Yamashita case, L-129, and in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23,
1946 in disposing the Homma case, L-244, are perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in
Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can
expected.
For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote to declare
Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.