Disaster Management

Uttarakhand Failure
Violation of Nature as the Cause
1. There is ample scientific evidence that the Himalayan watersheds have witnessed
unprecedented deforestation. Vegetative cover slows the speed of falling rain and
prevents soil erosion and gully formation. Besides forests and soil soak water from
the rain, release it slowly and prevent water flowing as run-off.
2. There is mounting evidence that global warming is fast catching up with the
Himalaya.
3. While it is important to appreciate the aspirations of locals and economic
activities, there cannot be a lack of enforcement of land use laws. Such laws were
violated with impunity in Uttarakhand as construction activity came up on the
river banks.
4. Hydel activities cause slope weakening and destabilisation. Similarly sand mining
and stone industries also weaken the river system.
Role of Ecological Neglect by the State
1. It is not as if the state government wasn't unaware of the looming threat.
Government reports had warned of the unchecked dangers of urbanisation and
from hydel projects. The authorities have always treated environment with scant
regard.
2. The Centre had declared a stretch of 100 km between Gomukh and Uttarkashi
along the Bhagirathi river as an eco-sensitive zone. However, the state
government is opposing the move, saying this would adversely affect the
development in the region.
3. The fact is that the dams, barrages and embankments on one hand, magnify the
enormity of high floods when they come and on the other, instil a false sense of
security in minds of those who come to occupy the erstwhile khadar lands that all
is well. The truth is the opposite. Only normal and periodic climatic events have
been converted into man-made disasters, with man coming to
colonise khadar land.
Role of Dams
1. Big dams, like the one at Tehri, disturb the highly fragile Himalayan tectonic
system.
2. But this time the dam managed to protect big towns like Rishikesh and Haridwar
through regulation of the Bhagirathi river waters, most of which were held back
in the 42-km long reservoir. Experts have now recommended a big dam across the
Alaknanda river also to further manage the flow of water.
3. Being a hill state, Uttarakhand is ecologically sensitive but its two main sources of
income are tourism and hydel energy. The state cannot look away from these two
sources.
4. Construction of hydel dams require rivers to be diverted through tunnels to
generate power. The construction of these tunnels unsettles the mountainous
terrain and contributes to a greater quantity of rocks and sediment crashing
down.
CAG Report on Uttarakhand's Preparedness
1. It pointed out that the SDMA had remained virtually non-functional.
 2. The state had also failed to incorporate disaster prevention into the development
planning.
1. No thought was given to the fragile ecosystem of the state in the
developmental planning process.
2. Buildings were permitted on floodplains of the rivers.
3. Such unsafe construction is linked to the religious tourism. Why can't we
adopt policies of Bhutan where tourism is regulated to bring it in harmony
with the environment?
4. Construction of hydel dams require rivers to be diverted through tunnels to
generate power. The construction of these tunnels unsettles the
mountainous terrain and contributes to a greater quantity of rocks and
sediment crashing down.
3. Vulnerability assessment at local level and identification of necessary mitigative
action had not been done. Buildings were permitted on floodplains of the rivers.
4. The disaster management plan was in place but its implementation was
absolutely poor.
1. The communication system was also inadequate, with the delay in sharing of
disaster information.
2. Absence of any guidelines meant the preparedness was almost nil. The
disaster struck on June 16 and rescue and relief operations could begin only
on June 24 when the Army was called in.
3. Until then the government had no clue. It had no idea about the magnitude
of what had struck the state.
5. Restoration work undertaken under the Calamity Relief Fund were delayed and
violated the guidelines.
6. Some warning system had been in place, such as radars and climate prediction.
1. The reports of IMD have always been very imprecise like "heave to very
heavy rainfall in some areas in Uttarakhand". No one has any idea of what
heavy to very heavy means.
2. The prediction accuracy and forewarning capabilities of IMD need to be
increased. Apart from quantifying the amount of rainfall, spatial distribution
information should also be given.
3. World over such systems are in place and even in our country such systems
are in place for cyclones.
National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSDCP)
The idea is to mitigate the impact of all oil spills on the environment by -
Setting specific standards for oil spill equipment stockpiles
Establishing time frames for oil spill response
Increasing collaboration among partner agencies.
Types of Crises
1. Crises caused by acts of nature. These can further be divided into the
following sub-categories:
1. Climatic events: cyclones and storms (associated sea erosion), floods
and drought
2. Geological events: earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides and avalanches;
2. Crises caused by environmental degradation and disturbance of the
ecological balance;
 3. Crises caused by accidents. These, again, can be further classified into:
industrial and nuclear mishaps and fire related accidents;
4. Crises caused by biological activities: public health crises, epidemics etc;
5. Crises caused by hostile elements: war, terrorism, extremism, insurgency etc;
6. Crises caused by disruption/failure of major infrastructure facilities
including communication systems, large-scale strikes etc; and
7. Crises caused by large crowds getting out of control.
Life Cycle Approach to Crisis Management
1. A crisis does not emerge suddenly; it has a life cycle, which may take days, months
or even decades to develop. A crisis, therefore, needs to be examined in terms of
its management cycle. This life cycle of crisis management may be divided
broadly in three phases - pre-crisis, during crisis and post crisis.
World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, Yokohama, 1994
1. Risk assessment is an important initial step.
2. Disaster prevention and preparedness are next important steps and should be
included at the planning level itself.
3. Capacity development is next important step.
4. Early warning systems should be installed and steps taken for fast and wide
warning information dissemination.
5. Local community involvement is important.
6. Education and training to the whole community is important.
7. International sharing of technology is important.
8. Environmental protection is important and poverty alleviation is imperative.
9. Needs of developing countries should be kept in mind in disaster management
efforts.
Yogyakarta Declaration
1. Hoyogo Framework for Action: This is the agreement reached in 2005 between
countries on disaster management. It runs form 2005 to 2015. It was a roadmap
for the government and other players.
2. Yogyakarta declaration includes calls to integrated local knowledge and climate
change into disaster management plans, political commitment, accountability,
awareness and education, and to build local capacity.
Disaster Risk Reduction Framework
1. A policy framework has to be drawn up backed by the legal and
institutional mechanisms that focuses on risk reduction as the major priority in
disaster management.
2. Assessment of risk including hazard analysis and community vulnerability.
3. Risk Awareness and Preparation of Plans for Risk Mitigation.
4. Implementation of the Plan.
5. Early Warning Systems.
6. Development of systems for processing and sharing of disaster related
information.
INDIAS KEY HAZARDS, VULNERABILITIES AND THE CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM:
1. Almost 85% of the country is vulnerable to single or multiple disasters and about
57% of its area lies in high seismic zones. Approximately 40 million hectares of the
countrys land area is prone to flood, about 8% of the total land mass is vulnerable
to cyclone and 68% of the area is susceptible to drought.
 2. There is no reason why so much loss happens in India whereas earthquakes of
similar measurements in USA or Japan have had relatively little impact.
3. Post monsoon cyclones are usually more intense both in numbers and intensity.
Cyclone Shelters
1. In densely populated coastal areas, where large scale evacuations are not always
feasible, public buildings can be used as cyclone shelters.
2. These buildings can be so designed, so as to provide a blank face with a minimum
number of apertures in the direction of the prevailing winds. The shorter side of
the building should face the storm, so as to impart least wind resistance.
3. Green belts can be used in front of these buildings to reduce the impact of the
storm.
Traditional Knowledge for Disaster Management
1. If tribals in the Andamans could survive the tsunami, it was because their existing
warning systems worked well in comparison to our non-existent modern systems.
2. The fact that traditional houses of wood and stone survived the Uttarkashi
earthquake not so long ago while modern buildings collapsed offered a similar
lesson.
3. In the flood-prone rural North-East, one can find houses on bamboo stilts that
allow flood waters to flow under them rather than through or over!
Flood Control and Management
1. There should be a master plan for flood control and management for each flood
prone basin.
2. Adequate flood-cushion should be provided in water storage projects. In highly
flood prone areas, flood control should be given overriding consideration
in reservoir policy even at the cost of sacrificing some irrigation or power benefits.
3. While physical flood protection works like embankments and dykes will continue
to be necessary, increased emphasis should be laid on non-structural measures
such as flood forecasting, flood plain zoning and flood proofing.
4. There should be strict regulation of settlements in the flood plain zones along
with flood proofing.
Landslides and Avalanches
1. The Himalayas comprise of tectonically unstable younger formations and often
the slides are huge, and in most cases, the overburden along with the underlying
lithology is displaced during sliding. In contrast, the Western Ghats
are geologically stable and the slides are usually confined to the over
burden without affecting the bedrock beneath.
2. Structural measures:
1. Planting (Avalanche Prevention Forest)
2. Stepped Terraces
3. Avalanche Control Fence
4. Other protection structures
3. Non-structural measures - removing snow deposits on slopes by blasting,
predicting avalanches and evacuating people from vulnerable areas.
Industrial Disasters
1. In the pre-Bhopal Gas Tragedy era, industrial safety was governed by legislations
like the Factories Act, 1948 and the Explosives Act, 1884. These laws proved to be
inadequate to provide safety to workers as well as to the people living in the
 surrounding areas. After the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, a new chapter was inserted in
the Factories Act, 1948 dealing with hazardous processes. The Environment
Protection Act, 1986 was enacted. More importantly, several Rules were
promulgated under the Act.
Rail Disaster Management
It is an integral part of railway safety. However, earlier the disaster management was
confined to reacting to the railway accidents. After the NDMA, 2005 the Railway
ministry has developed an integrated disaster management plan. As per this plan,
1. The railway zones and railway divisions have been made the nodal agencies
for planning, mitigation and relief within their zones.
2. The Plan is not focused towards reacting to the accidents only, but it also
includes, terrorist attacks, natural disasters affecting the railways, crowd
management during festivals or natural calamities. It heavily relies on
modern technology like CCTVs, ACDs, satellite communications, upgraded
signaling systems, self propelled accident relief vans, modern cranes,
luggage scanners.
3. It emphasizes in relief during golden hours (first hour of the accident) i.e.
reach the spot within 1 hour. Training is done at Bangalore in the disaster
relief operations.
4. The Railway Protection Force is developing a rapid action team to be trained
by NSG to respond to the terrorist attacks on railway trains and assets.
5. Railway officials to maintain contact with the general administrative
authorities in their areas for prompt relief in case of the disasters.
Creeping Emergencies
1. Disasters can also be classified as slow onset disasters and rapid onset
disasters. Earthquakes, cyclones, floods, tsunamis would fall under the category of
rapid onset disasters; climate change (global warming), desertification, soil
degradation, and droughts, would fall under the category of slow onset disasters.
Slow onset disasters are also termed as Creeping Emergencies.
Sea Erosion
1. The landward displacement of the shoreline caused by the forces of waves
and currents is termed as erosion.
2. The impact of the event is not always seen immediately, but it is equally
important when we consider loss of property that it causes. It takes months or
years to note the impact. So, this is generally classified as a long term coastal
hazard.
3. Anthropological effects that trigger beach erosion are: construction of artificial
structures, mining of beach sand, offshore dredging, or building of dams.
Traditional Disaster Management Architecture in India
The Response Mechanism
1. Field level response
1. The community is the first responder in a disaster. Field level response in
rural areas is by the nearest police station and the revenue functionary; in
urban areas the response is by agencies like the civic authorities, the fire
brigade and the local police station.
2. At present, panchayats do not have the capacity to react in any
effective manner and it is the district administration with the Collector
 playing a pivotal role. He has the authority to mobilize the response
machinery and has been given financial powers to draw money.
3. All departments including the police, fire services, public works, irrigation
etc. work under the leadership of the Collector during a disaster, except in
metropolitan areas where the municipal body plays a major role.
4. The District Collector also enjoys the authority to request for assistance from
the Armed Forces if circumstances so demand.
2. Role of state government
1. The basic responsibility to undertake response measures rests with the
State Governments.
2. The entire structure of crisis administration in the State Governments
has been oriented towards post disaster relief and rehabilitation.
3. Most of the states have Relief Commissioners. The Relief Commissionerate is
usually an adjunct of the Revenue Department. In some states, the Revenue
Secretary is also the ex-officio Relief Commissioner.
4. This has the advantage of providing a direct chain of command to the district
Collectors and the Tehsildars, but the focus on crisis prevention and
mitigation or even of preparedness is missing.
5. Every state has a Crisis Management Committee under the Chief Secretary,
consisting of secretaries of concerned departments, which reviews crisis
situations on a day-to-day basis, coordinates the activities of all departments
and provides support to the district administration.
6. At the ministers level, a Cabinet Committee on Natural Calamities under the
Chief Minister takes stock of situations and is responsible for all important
policy decisions.
3. Role of Union Government
1. It plays a key supportive role with resources and providing complementary
measures such as early warning and co-ordination of efforts of all Union
ministries, departments and organizations.
2. At the apex level, a Cabinet Committee on Natural Calamities reviews
the crisis situations.
3. A High Level Committee of Ministers under the chairmanship of Minister of
Agriculture deals with the issue of financial support to be provided to
the State Governments.
4. Matters relating to nuclear, biological and chemical emergencies are looked
after by the Cabinet Committee on Security.
5. The Cabinet Secretary heads the National Crisis Management Committee.
Secretaries of ministries and departments concerned and heads of other
organizations are members, which reviews and monitors crisis situations on
a regular basis and gives directions to the Crisis Management Group.
6. The Central Relief Commissioner in the Ministry of Home Affairs is the
Chairman of the Crisis Management Group (CMG) consisting of nodal
officers from various concerned ministries. The CMGs functions are to
review annual contingency plans formulated by various ministries,
measures required for dealing with a natural disaster, coordinate the
activities of the Union Ministries and State Governments. In the event of a
 disaster, the CMG meets frequently to review relief operations and extends
assistance required by the affected states.
The Finance Mechanism
1. Schemes for financing expenditure on disaster management are governed by the
recommendations of the Finance Commission.
2. Under the existing scheme, each state has a Calamity Relief Fund (CRF)
administered by the Chief Secretary. The size of the corpus is determined with
reference to the expenditure normally incurred by the state on relief and
rehabilitation over the past ten years.
3. In case the funds under CRF are not sufficient, State Governments can
seek assistance from the National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF) - the
approval for which is granted by the High Level Committee of Ministers.
4. Both these funds, as the names suggest, are meant for relief and rehabilitation
and do not cover either mitigation or reconstruction works, which have to
be funded separately.
Evolution of Disaster Management Architecture
Following the Gujarat earthquake, the Government of India took important policy steps
for revamping the disaster management system in the country. These
1. Disaster management with reference to rapid onset disasters was moved from the
purview of the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The
Ministry of Agriculture retains the responsibility for droughts, pest attacks and
hailstorms.
2. State Governments were advised to reorganize their Relief &
Rehabilitation Department into a separate Disaster Management Department.
3. State Governments were further advised to constitute State
Disaster Management Authority under the Chairmanship of State Chief Ministers
and the District Disaster Management Committee under the Chairmanship
of District Collectors.
4. National Disaster Response Force to be constituted.
5. A fail-proof disaster communication network to be set up.
6. The National Institute of Disaster Management was set up for training, capacity
building, research and documentation.
7. Disaster management to be included in education system at all levels starting
from schools.
The Disaster Management Act, 2005
The National Disaster Management Authority (PM Level Body)
1. To lay down policies on disaster management.
2. Lay down guidelines to be followed by the states in drawing up the State Plan and
the union ministries to draw up their plans.
3. Approve the National Plan and plans prepared by various union ministries.
4. Coordinate the implementation of the plans for disaster management.
5. Recommend provision of funds for the purpose of mitigation.
6. Provide support to other countries.
7. Lay down broad policies and guidelines for the functioning of the
National Institute of Disaster Management.
The National Executive Committee (Secretary Level Body)
 1. Act as the national level coordinating and monitoring body for disaster
management.
2. Prepare the National Plan to be approved by the NDMA.
3. Monitor and evaluate the preparedness level, the implementation of the national
policy, guidelines laid down by NDMA, national plan, plans of various union
ministries.
4. Provide necessary technical assistance to the states for preparing their disaster
management plans and carry out other functions under this Act.
5. Promote general education and organize special training programmes in relation
to disaster management.
6. Coordinate response in the event of any disaster. Require any department or
agency to make available men or material resources for emergency response.
7. Lay down guidelines for, or give directions to union ministries and
states regarding measures to be taken by them in response to any threatening
disaster situation or disaster.
The State Disaster Management Authority (CM Level Body)
1. Lay down the State disaster management policy.
2. Lay down guidelines to be followed by the state ministries.
3. Approve the State Plan and plans prepared by various state ministries.
4. Coordinate the implementation of the state plan and other state ministries' plans.
5. Recommend provision of funds for mitigation and preparedness measures.
The State Executive Committee (Chief Secretary Level Body)
1. Lay down guidelines for preparation of plans by the various state ministries and
the DDMAs.
2. Monitor the implementation of the national policy, the national plan, the state
plan and the plans prepared by various state ministries and the DDMAs. Also
monitor the implementation of guidelines laid down by the SDMA and evaluate
the level of preparedness.
3. Provide necessary technical assistance or give advice to DDMAs and state
ministries.
4. Coordinate response in the event of any disaster. Give directions to any
Department or agency regarding response actions to be taken.
5. Promote general education and community training.
6. Advise the State Government regarding all financial matters in relation to
disaster management.
7. Examine the vulnerability of different parts of the state and specify measures to
be taken.
8. Examine the construction in any area and if it is of the opinion that the standards
for the prevention of disaster have not been followed, may direct the DDMA to
take needed action.
9. Ensure that communication systems are in order and the disaster
management drills are carried out periodically.
The District Disaster Management Authority (Collector Level Body)
1. Collector as ex officio Chairperson, elected representative of the local authority as
the ex officio co-Chairperson, the Superintendent of Police, Chief Medical Officer
and maximum two other district level officers to be appointed by the State
Government, as members.
 2. It acts as the district planning, coordinating and implementing body for disaster
management and takes all measures according to the guidelines laid down by the
NDMA and the SDMA.
The National Disaster Management Plan (Prepared by NEC and approved by NDMA)
1. Measures to be taken for the prevention and mitigation.
2. Measures to be taken for integration of mitigation measures in the
development plans.
3. Measures to be taken for preparedness and capacity building to effectively
respond.
4. Roles and responsibilities of different ministries.
The State Disaster Management Plan (Prepared by SEC and approved by SDMA)
1. The vulnerability of different parts of the State to different forms of disasters.
2. The measures to be adopted for prevention and mitigation of disasters.
3. Measures to be taken for integration of mitigation measures in the development
plans.
4. Measures to be taken for preparedness and capacity building to effectively
respond.
5. The roles and responsibilities of different state ministries.
The District Disaster Management Plan (Prepared by DDMA)
1. Every office of the government having office at district level shall prepare a
disaster management plan in accordance with the district plan and submit a copy
of the plan to the DDMA.
2. The areas in the district vulnerable to different forms of disasters.
3. The measures to be taken, for prevention and mitigation of disaster.
4. The capacity-building and preparedness measures to effectively respond.
5. The response plans and procedures, in the event of a disaster, providing for-
1. Allocation of responsibilities to the departments and the local authorities in
the district.
2. Prompt response to disaster and relief.
3. Procurement of essential resources.
4. Establishment of communication links.
5. Dissemination of information to the public.
The National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM)
1. It will function within the broad policies and guidelines laid down by the NDMA.
2. It will be responsible for promoting research in the area of disaster management.
3. It will be responsible for documentation of the disasters and their management
cases.
4. It will be responsible for the development of a national level information base.
The National Disaster Response Force
1. The general superintendence, direction and control of the Force shall vest in the
NDMA
The National Disaster Response Fund & The National Disaster Mitigation Fund
1. The response fund will be made available to the NEC and the mitigation fund to
the NDMA.
2. Besides, every ministry shall make provisions in its annual budget, for funds for
actions set out in its disaster management plans.
Other Salient Features of the Act
 1. The Central Government can issue directions to any authority (union or
state) to assist in disaster management.
2. Any officer or authority shall have to make available such manpower as requested
by NEC, SEC or DDMA.
3. If it appears to the NEC, SEC or DDMA that provisions of any rule regulation etc.
need to be made or amended for purposes of prevention and mitigation of
disasters, it may require to do so.
4. The NDMA, the SDMA or a DDMA may recommend to the Government to give
direction to any person in control of any media or means of communication to
carry out any warnings or advisories regarding disasters.
5. The NDMA shall prepare an annual report to the Central Government which shall
cause it to be laid before Parliament.
6. Actions taken under this law will be immune from court challenges.
India's Disaster Preparedness
Analytical Issues in Disaster Management in India
Constitutional Provision - is there need for a separate entry for Disaster Management in
the 3 Lists?
1. Disaster management doesn't figure in any of the 3 lists. So the parliament has
the competence to legislate on this subject. However, by practice and
convention the primary responsibility for managing disasters rests with the State
Governments
2. The Disaster Management Act, 2005 was enacted by invoking entry 23 namely
Social security and social insurance, employment and unemployment in
the Concurrent List even though all aspects of crisis management cannot be said
to be covered by this entry.
3. There are already various entries in the three lists, which deal with some aspect or
other of disaster management. Public order finds a place in the State List, as
does Public Health. Entries 14 and 17 in the State List deal with Agriculture and
Water respectively. Environment and Social Security are included in the
Concurrent List. Atomic energy and Railways are part of the Union List.
4. Due to the cross cutting nature of activities that constitute disaster
management and linkages required which involve coordination between
the Union, State and local governments on the one hand and a host of
government departments and agencies on the other; setting up of a broadly
uniform institutional framework at all levels is of paramount importance.
5. There is need to ensure congruence and coherence with regard to the division of
labor among the agencies at the Union, State and other levels. This could best be
achieved if the subject of Disaster Management is placed in the Concurrent List of
the Constitution.
What should a law on crisis management provide?
1. Centralization versus decentralization
1. A totally centralized or totally decentralized mechanism would be ineffective
because while the response should be made from the local level, the level of
coordination required necessitates involvement of the central government.
It is best if certain functions of disaster management are centralized while
others are decentralized down to the lowest level.
2. Immediate rescue, relief and then rehabilitation should be the responsibility
of the level of government closest to the affected population. This logically
has to be the district administration and the local self-governments.
3. The district administration is part of the State Government and the primary
responsibility for managing any disaster is with the State Governments.
4. The resources of states being limited they seek and get assistance from the
Union Government. This arrangement of bottom-up responsibilities
regarding implementation is appropriate and has worked well in the past
and should not be disturbed.
5. On the other hand, disaster management planning requires wider
perspective and expertise. Developments in science and technology,
specialized manpower and equipment, repository of best practices, early
warning systems, standard capacity building and awareness generation
programmes call for an agency to coordinate efforts at the state and the
national levels.
6. Thus, the legislation needs to create agencies at all levels. The responsibility
and the authority assigned to each one of these have to be distinct. National
level planning, research, analysis and adoption of best practices,
development of standard operating procedures (national level),
development of training and capacity building programmes, administration
of early warning systems and formulating policy on disaster management
are best entrusted to a national body. Local planning and the actual work of
implementation are better left with State Governments, local governments
and the district administration with support from the Union Governments
implementing agencies.
2. Mobilization of resources: The law needs to empower authorities handling
disasters to requisition such resources for specified periods and the issue of
compensation should not be a hindrance in crisis management efforts.
3. Information dissemination: Even with good early warning technologies, the
human element involved in the transmission process is crucial. Prompt
transmission of information should be made a statutory duty of each concerned
functionary and SoPs devised. Responsibilities of citizens should also be defined in
the process.
4. Misutilization of funds: Funds meant for disaster relief often tend to get misused
as normal procedures are not followed because of urgency. While
enforcing stringent procurement procedures may become a hurdle in the disaster
management effort, the penalty for misutilization of funds meant for disaster
relief should be stringent and could form part of the law itself.

Analysis of the Disaster Management Act, 2005

 1. It defines disaster as natural or man made event that causes substantial loss to
life, property and environment. The scope of this definition does not cover a
variety of other crisis situations that may or may not culminate in a disaster.
2. It concentrates very comprehensive powers at the national level for dealing with
disasters.
1. The NDMA as well as the NEC have been given the role not just of
planning, coordinating, monitoring and providing assistance during a
disaster but also executive functions related to implementation of the
emergency relief and disaster response.
2. What, in fact, is however needed is further empowerment and delegation to
the front-end functionaries. In any crisis situation the field functionaries and
the State Governments being aware of the field situation would be in the
best position to provide timely and effective response.
3. International practices also do not normally involve setting up
centralized authorities with command and control functions to deal with
disasters.
3. The integration of the institutional structure prescribed under the Act with the
existing administrative framework of the country may pose several problems.
1. The NDMA and the NEC will also lay down guidelines for the state
authorities, coordinate the enforcement and implementation of these
policies and ensure timely response.
2. All these functions traditionally have been performed by State
Governments.
4. Cabinet Secretary at the union level is more appropriate authority for the
coordination of disaster management efforts rather than the NEC under
department secretary.
Recommendations on the DMA, 2005
1. Disaster Management should continue to be the primary responsibility of the
State Governments and the Union Government should play a supportive role.
1. The functions of the NDMA should be: to recommend policies, to lay down
guidelines, to promote research, to advise on parameters of categorization
of disasters, documentation and dissemination of knowledge, capacity
building, early warning systems, to deploy resources in support of
local/State Governments, and to give recommendations to the government.
2. The task of implementation of mitigation/prevention and
response measures may be left to the State Governments and the district
and local authorities with the line ministries of the union playing a
supportive role.
3. The role of the local governments should be brought to the forefront
for disaster management.
2. The Act should provide categorization of disasters (say, local, district, state or
national level). This categorization along with intensity of each type of disaster
will help in determining the level of authority primarily responsible for dealing
with the disaster as well as the scale of response.
3. The law should cast a duty on every public functionary, to promptly inform the
concerned authority about any crisis.
 4. The law should make provisions for stringent punishment for misutilization of
funds meant for disaster management.
5. The NEC as stipulated under the Disaster Management Act need not
be constituted, and the NCMC should continue to be the apex coordination body.
At the state level, the existing coordination mechanism under the Chief Secretary
should continue.
Is There a Case for a Separate Ministry/Department of Disaster/Crisis Management?
1. The functions expected of the ministry were networking and coordination
of national resources while the concerned functional ministries would continue
to discharge their responsibilities and functions in accordance with their
respective disaster management plans.
2. Given the multi-disciplinary nature of activities in crisis management, creation of a
separate ministry is likely to lead to conflict and delays rather than coordination.
For planning, research, capacity building and coordination of national resources;
such a coordination mechanism is now available with the formation of the
NDMA. And for the purposes of implementation, a coordination mechanism
headed by the Cabinet Secretary would be more effective.
NCMC vs NEC
1. The National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) headed by the
Cabinet Secretary coordinates and guides the work of different departments of
Government of India in times of crisis. The NEC would be duplicating the role of
NCMC to a great extent.
2. The NCMC has inherent advantages of ensuring quick decisions and immediate
implementation. If parallel bodies are created the possibility of the pre-existing
and newly formed committees trespassing on each other and creating confusion
cannot be ruled out.
NDRF vs Army
1. NDRF would be a highly trained quick response agency to respond to the needs of
disaster response. To a large extent, this role has been filled by the Army.
2. The lessons learnt from the devastating disasters around the world is that
extraordinarily severe disasters could overwhelm specialized agencies and that in
such situations the Armed Forces remain the measure of last resort.
3. It is imperative that even after the NDRF becomes fully functional, the enabling
role of the Armed Forces in assisting the civil authorities be retained and
the Armed Forces continue to maintain capabilities.
Role of Local Self-Governments
1. Local bodies are closest to the people but too small in their reach and capabilities
to lead the response operations on their own. They thus need to play an
important role in crisis management under the overall leadership of the District
Administration.
2. State Governments may examine the need to incorporate provisions in the state
disaster management law and also the state laws governing local bodies to
provide for a well defined role to the PRIs.
3. In major cities, Municipal Corporations have a large administrative system
including departments like engineering, public health and revenue, and
sometimes fire services. These should provide a good response.
Need for Holistic Water Management to Reduce Water Disasters
 1. Water related disasters can't be addressed unless larger issues like water
management through a National Water Policy are properly addressed.
2. Central Water Commission
1. A major impediment is the segmented policy attention from a number
of departments and there are multiple union departments involved with
different aspects of water management. This leads to time-consuming
repeated consultations, constant inter-departmental references and
meetings and weak coordination and lack of a holistic approach.
2. So the CWC should be restructured into a statutory autonomous inter-
disciplinary Commission, with maximum powers, in order to deal with policy
and reforms, center - state and inter-state issues.
3. Using powers under Entry 56 in the Union List, a Law may be enacted to set up
mechanisms for collection of data, managing flow in rivers and release of water
from reservoirs, so as to prevent disasters, with interstate ramifications.
Steps to Improve Education and Awareness in Disaster Management
1. Strengthening of National Institute of Disaster Management.
2. Disaster Management should be introduced as a subject in Management and
Public Administration.
3. Professionalisation of disaster management is a desirable objective.
Improving Disaster Management Plans by Better Information and Practices
1. It has been noticed that the district plans are usually not based on proper hazard
and vulnerability analysis of the district.
2. Preparing Seismic Micro Maps
1. The seismic zone based categorization of the entire country on 1:1.25
million scale is a good indication of the seismic hazards at a macro level, but
is inadequate for undertaking seismic activities at the city level. This requires
advanced micro maps in 1:1000 scale, based on local geological, soil and
ground water surveys.
2. The preparation of such maps was taken up on a pilot basis for the selected
cities, but none of the studies has been completed with common
standards and protocols that can be accepted at national level.
3. Use of GIS and GPS: It is also possible to use GIS tools to integrate various spatial
data such as topography, hydrology, land use, land cover, settlement
pattern, built up structures etc and non-spatial data such as demography, socio-
economic conditions and infrastructure like road, rail network, communication
system, hospital etc. on a common platform. This can be further integrated with
GPS for real time monitoring of crisis.
4. Enforcement of Plans
1. Normally, it is understood that plans incorporate only
developmental measures such as construction of shelters, construction
of embankments etc.
2. But disaster mitigation plans should also incorporate a schedule
of enforcement measures and the functionaries who will be
held responsible for these.
3. Such enforcement measures being unpleasant and unpopular are
very often not contemplated leave aside acted upon.
 4. These measures could include enforcement of building regulations in urban
areas, removal of encroachments from natural watercourses or
environmentally fragile areas, and strict enforcement of environmental,
safety and public health regulations.
5. Integration of Disaster and Developmental Planning
1. The activities in the disaster management plans should be included in the
development plans of the line agencies and local bodies.
2. The supervisory level of each agency should ensure that the annual plan of
that agency incorporates the activities listed out in the disaster management
plan.
3. Incorporation of disaster mitigation plans into the development plans should
be specially monitored at the five year and annual plan discussions at State
and Planning Commission levels.
6. Environment management should be made an integral part of all plans.
7. National Building Code of India 2005
1. Its guidelines are seldom used. The main reason for this is ignorance about
them and escalation of the costs if they are followed.
2. A balance has to be struck between safety and cost.
3. As a pre-requisite, it should be in public domain and freely available
on Internet.
4. Simplified versions should be made available. The BIS should convert the
norms (at least for small dwelling units) into commonly understood
principles, which could be followed and enforced even by village
panchayats.
1. The approach of drafting model rules and circulating them to the states
for incorporation by the local bodies has not produced the desired results.
Adoption of these model regulations would require periodic monitoring. Targets
should be fixed each year and financial incentives should be used.
2. For retrofitting old buildings, a suitable financial package may be worked out by
the state governments along with banks and insurance agencies. Even non-
financial incentives like relaxation on extent of built up areas could act as an
incentive to motivate private owners to take up retrofitting.
3. Zoning regulations
1. They could be used to prevent settlements in hazard prone areas like the
riverbanks or areas near coasts or ecologically sensitive areas. They could
also be used to spread out the population so that impact of any hazard is
limited.
2. However, at present zoning regulations exist only in big cities. In small towns
and rural areas the concept of zoning regulations is almost non-existent.
3. Even in bigger cities, they are often not prepared with an intention to
mitigate hazards.
4. Another weakness of these zoning regulations is their poor enforcement.
4. Communications networks, with sufficient redundancies should be established.
5. Undertaking location specific training programmes for the community should be a
part of the disaster management plan right from the PRI level.
Emergency Plan at the District Level
 1. Emergency Response Plans should be up-to-date and should lay down the trigger
points in unambiguous terms.
2. The district emergency response plan should be prepared in consultation with all
concerned. The plan should be known and accepted by all the role players.
3. SoPs should be developed. Handbooks, checklists, manuals etc should be
developed and disseminated.
4. Unity of command should be the underlying principle.
5. Mock drills and capability building efforts must be regularly carried out.
6. It must be remembered that plans are no substitute for sound judgement at the
time of crisis.
7. Handling of crisis should be made a parameter for evaluating the performance of
officers.
8. Institutions such as civil defense, home guards must be revived and integrated
with disaster response at field level.
Gender Issues in Disaster Management
1. More women are affected in disasters they have little say in decision making, are
comparatively less literate, have lesser mobility and are dependent on men
folk. This disadvantaged situation obviously gets aggravated in crisis situation.
So the special needs and concerns of women need to be kept in mind.
2. The vulnerability analysis should bring out the specific vulnerabilities of women
and these should be addressed in any mitigation effort. Disaster mitigation plans
should be prepared, in consultation with womens groups.
3. Rescue and relief operations should focus on the most vulnerable groups -
women, children, the elderly and the physically challenged.
4. In the recovery phase, efforts should focus on making women economically
independent.
5. Camp managing committees should have adequate number of
women representatives.
Epidemics
1. The complex nature of control of epidemics is evident from the fact that in
the Constitution of India all the three legislative lists of the Seventh Schedule
enumerate some aspects of the matter as follows: List-I; entry 28 quarantine
and entry 81 inter-State quarantine; List-II; entry 6 Public health and
sanitation; List-III; entry 29 prevention of the extension from one State to
another of infectious or contagious diseases.
2. The Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 continues to deal with management of epidemic
related diseases. It is an omnibus legislation which essentially supercedes all laws
in force in the event of outbreak or a threatened outbreak of a dangerous
epidemic disease and authorizes the Union and State Governments (when
authorized by the Union), to resort to all necessary measures to deal with the
emergency. The Act also empowers search of vessels and other means of
transport and detention and segregation of any persons suspected to be suffering
from an epidemic disease.
3. The Public Health Emergency Bill
1. It enables the Union or State Governments to declare a particular area as
epidemic or bio-terrorism affected.
 2. Upon such declaration, action can be initiated which apart from measures
like inspection and quarantine etc., also empowers government to prohibit
activities which lead to or are likely to lead to epidemics or bio-terrorism.
4. The manner in which the Disaster Management Act, 2005 defines the term
disaster leaves no doubt that an epidemic of extraordinary severity spreading
rapidly is covered by it. The Act also overrides the provision of any other law
(Section 72). As such, it is clear that management of epidemics-related crisis
would also fall within the jurisdiction of the NDMA. NDRF needs to be equipped to
handle the cases of bio-terrorism.
Civil Defence in Disaster Management
Civil Defence (Amendment) Act, 2010
1. It was amended to cater to the needs of disaster management so as to utilize the
Civil Defence volunteers effectively for greater public participation in disaster
management related activities.
2. The CD organisation is raised only in such areas which are considered vulnerable.
This is reviewed periodically.
3. CD Setup at national level: Three tier structure as given below has been created
to formulate and implement CD policy.
1. Civil Defence Advisory Committee under the Chairmanship of Union Home
Minister.
2. Civil Defence Committee under the Chairmanship of Home Secretary.
3. Civil Defence Joint Planning Staff Committee under the Chairmanship of
Director General Civil Defence.
4. Civil Defence Setup in the States: The state government appoints a Director of
Civil Defence and also may constitute, for any area within the state a body of a
person to be called the Civil Defence Corps.
1. However, often such organizations remain deactivated. Out of 225 towns
from 35 states notified as CD towns, currently the CD organisations at only
130 towns have been activated.
5. Civil defence setup at district level: Each town has nucleus of four
Permanent Staff along with 400 CD Volunteers for a two lakh population.
1. But current strength is < 50% of the target.
6. CD Training: It is expected that each state will have one CD Training Institute.
Home Guard
1. Role: The role of Home Guards is to serve as an auxiliary to the police in the
maintenance of law and order, internal security and help the community in any
kind of emergency.
2. Statutory Mechanisms and Service Condition: They are recruited from a cross
section of the population such as doctors, engineers, lawyers, private sector
organisations, college and university students, agricultural and industrial workers,
etc. Home Guards are provided free uniform, duty allowances and awards for
gallantry, distinguished and meritorious services. Members of Home Guards with
three year service in the organisation are trained to assist police.
National Cyclone Risk Mitigation Project (NCRMP)ox 4.2: National Cyclone Risk
Mitigation Project
Aim: The scheme aims to upgrade cyclone forecasting, tracking and warning systems,
build capacity in multi-hazard risk management and to construct major infrastructures
including multi-purpose cyclone shelters and embankments.
Execution Authority: The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has been
designated the implementing agency. The scheme is regularly monitored by NDMA and
MHA.
Principal Components: The major components under the scheme are as follows;
Community mobilisation and training,
Cyclone Risk Mitigation Infrastructure (construction of cyclone shelters, roads/missing
links and construction/repair of Saline Embankments etc.),
Technical assistance for capacity building on Disaster Risk Management (risk
assessment, damage and need assessment),
Capacity Building and knowledge creation along with project management and
implementation support.

Security Challenges - Role of Media

Security Challenges - Role of Social Media
Mumbai Police's Social Media Laboratory
1. In December 2012, as television sets beamed images of outrage from the streets
of Delhi, one could see that the crowd was young, the emotions displayed were
"real", and, most importantly, the police couldn't control the crowd. The crowd
had first gathered on the social media. They came to the streets much later.
2. The youth of the country are not reading the papers or watching the panel
discussions on television. They are on the Internetreading, forming opinions,
tweeting, sharing. A tweet is open to the whole world.
3. Special Branch officers trawl through social media sites, looking for hints of
trouble. An officer begins with surfing for important news feeds and coding the
reactions into positive, negative and neutral. On days the intelligence officers fear
that a particular subject that is trending on a social media site could lead to public
tension, the tweets are saved and revisited to track the number of times these
have traveled and places where the information has reached. Data mining
techniques are used and concern is just with numbers.
4. Apart from traditional intelligence briefs, a new file now reaches the table of the
Police Commissioner, revealing the day's top five trends on social media. On
crucial days, the file is updated every two hours.
5. This does not intrude upon people's privacy. Activities include "befriending" rogue
elements through social networks and routinely looking for those who boast
online after an episode. Tools like geotagging are used to understand the
geographical location of online troublemakers.
Security Challenges - Role of Communication Networks
PRISM
1. NSA has obtained direct access to the systems of Google, Facebook, Apple and
other U.S. internet giants. The NSA access is part a programme called PRISM,
which allows officials to collect material including search history, the content of
emails, file transfers and live chats. Unlike the collection of those call records, this
surveillance can include the content of communications and not just the
metadata.
2. The NSA access was enabled by a US surveillance law which allows for the
targeting of any customers of participating firms who live outside the US, or those
Americans whose communications include people outside the US. The
law indemnifies internet companies against any actions arising as a result of
cooperating with authorities requests.
3. The PRISM programme allows the NSA to obtain targeted communications
without having to request them from the service providers and without having to
obtain individual court orders.
4. US has a home-field advantage due to housing much of the internets
architecture.
5. Iran was where the highest amount of data was gathered and India was fifth in
the leaked list.
6. Metadata is enough to construct behavioral and interest patterns among internet
users, so claims that the metadata does not carry much informational value are
spurious. Unlike in the telephone era, meta-data in the Internet age makes it
possible to construct a detailed profile of a person, including not only information
on their network of contacts and details on the length of their conversations or
their locations during those conversations, but also, for example, their sexual
orientation, medical history or information that might be relevant to insurance
claims
7. The claims that the programme has been used only for surveillance of foreign
subjects makes a mockery of the trust shown by consumers across the world who
sign up for services offered by the internet companies (which claim to operate on
the basis of elaborate privacy policies) and shows scant regard for the sovereignty
of foreign nations.

Central Monitoring System (CMS)

1. It is an Indian government move to implement blanket eavesdropping of online
activities, telephone calls and text messages. The Central Monitoring System is a
so-called single window allowing Indian state bodies to monitor
communications.
2. In April 2013, the India began rolling out the CMS which will enable the
government to monitor all phone and the internet communications. The CMS will
facilitate direct monitoring of phone calls, text messages, and the internet use by
government agencies, bypassing service providers.
3. It draws its legislative backing from the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 which allows
the government to snoop any information in the interest of "sovereignty or
 integrity of India, defence of India, security of the state, friendly relations with
foreign states, or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of
any cognizable offence or for investigation of any offence.
National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC)
1. It would carry out real-time assessment of cyber security threats and generate
actionable reports for proactive actions by law enforcement agencies. This will
give law enforcement agencies direct access to all Internet accounts.

Principles Guiding Surveillance in a Democracy

1. Surveillance should be targeted as narrowly as possible and only carried out if it is
both necessary and proportionate to the crime under investigation.
2. The surveillance regime should be transparent. This does not mean that every
order should be made public the moment it is issued. However, it does mean that
there should be basic clarity, no arbitrariness and that decisions are made public
as soon as circumstances allow, so that they can be subject to public scrutiny.
3. An appropriate system of checks and balances is in place to avoid misuse of
surveillance powers. A strong privacy bill is not in place. In addition, intelligence
agencies in India are not under parliamentary oversight.

International Internet Governance

Current Governing Structure
1. Currently it is done by a US NGO called ICANN. The 2 main resources of internet
control are root zone servers and DNS servers. ICANN controls both and is
governed by US law.
2. All important databases and servers are in USA.
3. All nations use the same internet but its service is monopolized by USA only.
4. Barriers to entry and exit in using the internet are very low. Language is no
barrier.
India's Proposal
1. India has proposed creation of a UN Committee on Internet Related Policies (CIRP)
accountable to the General Assembly to govern internet.
Weaknesses in Current Governing Structure
1. Issues of unilateral control and accountability
1. Unilateral control of the root zone systems and lack of accountability of root
zone operators.
2. Inconsistent application of privacy and data-protection rights and freedom
of expression.
3. Lack of multilateral mechanisms.
2. Issues of intellectual property
1. Concerns over allocation policies for IP addresses and domain names.
2. Confusion about application of intellectual property rights in cyberspace.
3. Developing countries
1. Substantially higher connectivity costs in developing countries.
 2. Insufficient capacity building efforts in such countries.
3. Insufficient progress towards multilingualism.
4. Consumer rights
1. Absence of global standards for consumer rights.
Indian Interests
1. India is asked to ratify the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, in the negotiation
of which India played no part, in order for us to be eligible to be qualified as a
data-secure country.
2. Warning that Indian IT companies are heavily dependent on global internet
majors and that they will suffer by Indias championing of the cause of
democratisation of internet governance. However this fear is misleading for the
following reasons:
1. First, there has been no evidence of any such impact.
2. Second, independent of Indias proposal, Indian IT companies have more or
less reached the maximum of the current models of their growth.
3. Third, we need next generation of googles and facebooks from India which
cannot come under the present architecture.
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Conference in Dubai
1. It has been called to decide on internet governance issues. US doesn't want to
give it any extra authority.
2. Another issue is whether the telecom companies (the ISPs) should be able to
charge some users differentially (so as to get a share of the huge profits made by
leading web firms). If they don't pay up, their access can be slowed down.
Security Challenges - Cyber Security Basics

Role of the IT Act in Cyber Security

Weaknesses of the IT Act
1. Most of the cyber crimes have been made bailable offences which make the law
weak.
2. The implementation of the Act is feeble in tier-two cities as awareness of the law
by enforcement agencies remains a big challenge
3. Controversies surrounding Section 66A.
Strengthening the IT Act
1. The 2008 amendments reduced the quantum of punishment for a majority of
cyber crimes. This needs to be rectified. More cyber crimes need to be made non-
bailable offences.
2. Cyber war needs to be made an offence under the Act.
3. The Act does not cover a majority of crimes committed through mobiles. This
needs to be rectified.
4. The Act should have a comprehensive data protection regime defined in it.
5. The Act should have a comprehensive privacy regime defined in it.
6. Section 66A should be amended to bring it in consonance with the reasonable
restrictions mentioned in the Constitution.
IT Guidelines, 2011
1. IT (Amendment) Act provides immunity to intermediaries for the content they
provide because it recognizes that they don't have editorial power over it.
However such an immunity is subject to due diligence and observing government
guidelines. Intermediaries are ISPs, search engines, DNS providers, facebook,
twitter etc.
2. As per new guidelines, once the intermediary has knowledge that a content it
hosts violates the guidelines it has to remove it within 36 hours. The aggrieved
person will not be heard and this gives the power of a court to the ISP.
3. The guidelines have ambiguous terms like "grossly harmful" and "blasphemous"
to include acts of violation.
IT Act Section 66A
1. It provides for imprisonment and a fine, for any person who sends information
that is offensive, has a menacing character or causes annoyance, inconvenience,
insults or promotes hatred or ill-will.
2. Critics argue this Section is beyond the scope of reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of free speech, provided under Article 19(2).
3. Another criticism is that it criminalises conduct, in excess of what constitutes an
offence under the Indian Penal Code. It's argued that a verbal insult or annoyance
is not an offence, then why should the same thing, if done using an electronic
medium, be deemed a crime?
4. Actions such as spreading blasphemous content is not a crime in print media.
Then why internet?
National Cyber Security Policy, 2013
Salient Features
1. It ropes in the private sector and envisages an investment of $1 billion from
it. Their help will be sought in research and training of manpower.
2. It will also lay grounds for international cooperation with countries such as the US
and Israel.
3. It clarifies the role of various government agencies engaged in cyber
security. CERT-In will function as an umbrella organization.
4. The policy proposes an agency and a contingency plan to handle cyber attacks on
vital installations and critical infrastructure.
5. It provides for government monitoring of internet communications.
6. It calls to promote awareness, information sharing and capacity building.
7. Cyber security policy 2013 sets up National Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection Agency.

Weaknesses in India's Cyber Security Architecture

1. Lack of Human Resources
1. India's trained manpower involved in cyber security is a minuscule 500
compared to over 1 lakh in countries such as China and USA.
2. The biggest reason for this is non involvement of private sector in the
government's cyber security architecture.
3. The National Cyber Security Policy, 2013 aims to increase private sector
participation and thus address this.
4. Special courses need to be included in the university curriculum as well.

Security Challenges - Money Laundering

Money Laundering vs Terror Funding
1. 2 features distinguish money laundering from terror funding. These are:
1. In money laundering, the activity begins with the generation of
proceeds from unlawful activities and ends with conversion into legal assets.
On the other hand, terror funding could be from legal or illegal funds and it
culminates when it reaches the perpetrators of a terrorist act. Even if it
involves money laundering in between, the money trail has to continue to its
final destination. This widens the scope of investigation in cases involving
terrorist finance.
2. In the case of money laundering, even if the proceeds of unlawful
activities get laundered, enforcement authorities could undo the effect on
the basis of post-facto investigation. In case of terrorist finance, once the
finance chain is completed and an act of terrorism has taken place, post
facto investigation is limited; loss of life and damage to property and public
confidence is already done.
 2. It follows from the above that the law enforcement and investigation regime has
to be wider in scope while dealing with terrorist finance as compared to money
laundering operations. Further, in terror funding, the emphasis has to be more
on obstructing such activities while in progress.
Prevention of Money-Laundering (Amendment) Bill, 2011
1. It links the provisions of Indian law with the laws of foreign countries and provides
for harsher punishment.
2. It expands the definition of offence under money laundering to include activities
like concealment, acquisition, possession and use of proceeds of crime.
3. It provides for attachment and confiscation of property for a period not exceeding
180 days if the authority has reason to believe that the offense of money
laundering has taken place.
4. It proposes to confer powers upon the directors of financial intermediaries to call
for records of transactions or any additional information.
5. It seeks to make the financial intermediary, its designated directors and
employees responsible for omissions or commissions in relation to the reporting
obligations.
6. In the proceedings relating to money laundering, the funds shall be presumed to
be involved in the offence, unless proven otherwise.
7. It provides for appeal against the orders of the Appellate Tribunal directly to the
Supreme Court.
Security - Role of External States and Non State Actors
Emerging Threats
1. Global cooperation amongst terrorist networks
1. Terrorist networks have taken advantage of the communications revolution
to develop transnational links, making terrorism a global threat.
2. Al Quaeda is a global terror network which is a loose federation of terror-
cells spread across the world but operating autonomously with very little
operational linkages among them other than adherence to a particular form
of extremist ideology.
3. Another feature is the ability of many terrorist outfits to cooperate with
each other and build operational links in the form of supply of
arms, logistical and even operational support without necessarily sharing
ideological bonds.
4. Such networks are also able to obtain support from organized crime outfits
to further their destructive objective.
2. The existence of a large migrant population and porous borders in an increasingly
multi-cultural world has increased sleeper cells.
3. Terrorists are using money laundering and banking networks for movement of
money across borders fund their activities easily.
4. Piracy threat from non state actors.
5. Tribal chiefs in Pakistan and Afghanistan posing a threat.
6. Crime syndicates like Dawood also pose a threat.
United Jehad Council
1. It is an umbrella organisation of 14 militant groups led by the Hizbul Mujahideen
along with the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed.
Strategy to Counter Terrorism
 1. Socio-economic development: Much of the discourse has been based on the
premise that security can be achieved by ensuring protection of life and property
for all. However, it needs to be understood that socio-economic development has
to go hand-in hand. So eradication of poverty is essential for tackling
terrorism. Vulnerable sections should not fall prey to the propaganda of terrorists.
2. Political consensus: Political parties must arrive at a national consensus on the
need for the broad contours of the anti-terror strategy. Parties should rise above
their sectarian and petty electoral compulsions.
3. Respect for rule of law: Governmental agencies must not be allowed to transgress
law even in dealing with critical situations since it only creates more ill will.
4. Countering the subversive activities of terrorists: The emphasis should be on
civil as opposed to military measures to counter terrorism and insurgency.
Psychological warfare or management of information services and the media, in
conjunction with the intelligence wing of the police, can play an important role in
achieving this objective.
5. Providing the appropriate legal framework: Terrorism is an extraordinary crime.
The ordinary laws of the land may not be adequate to book a terrorist. This may
require special laws and effective enforcement mechanisms, but with sufficient
safeguards to prevent its misuse.
6. Building capacity: The capacity building exercise should extend to the
intelligence gathering machinery, security agencies, civil administration and the
society at large.
7. Proactive approach: Any form of extremism with faith in a dogma ending
in violence has the potential of escalating from hate campaign,
violent hooliganism and murders of perceived enemies to terrorist activities.
Definition
1. While the laws of other countries speak of the intention behind the terrorist act
being for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, the
Indian laws have avoided any such intention or purpose being incorporated to
define or describe a terrorist act.
Balancing Counter-Terrorism Efforts and Human Rights
1. The conflict stems from entrusting the law-enforcement agencies with
extraordinary powers to meet an extraordinary situation.
2. The irony is that the first and foremost impact of such measures is felt by law-
abiding citizens on account of inroads they make into individual liberties.
3. But human rights violation cannot be tolerated because such a violation by
security forces reduces the public support for the state and leads to more
terrorism.
Role of Civil Society in Combatting Terrorism
1. NGOs have been instrumental highlighting the human rights violations by the
security forces. But this should not be seen as adversary because rights violations
by security forces cannot be allowed and will only fuel terrorism in the first place.
2. Given the proximity of these groups to the grassroots, they could also be used in
providing local intelligence, fostering social inclusion (to undercut the roots of
terrorism), act as interlocutors, spreading awareness of the basic precautions to
be taken and being the first responders in any crisis.
Role of Media in Combatting Terrorism
 1. Misuse of media by terrorists
1. Terrorists want to use media to spread their propaganda. Terrorists thrive
on publicity. The media does not intend to promote terrorism, but it can be
exploited by the terrorists as the news coverage may serve the expectations
of the terrorists.
2. Government wants the media to depend on the official version. In fact,
when it comes to acts of terrorism, both the media and the government
have a common interest. Therefore government should work towards
harnessing the power of the media as a part of its strategy to defeat
terrorism.
3. Induction of media professionals from outside and imparting of media
education should should be encouraged through the governmental
apparatus.
2. Reporting without verification of facts.
3. Reporting in a manner which hampers counter terrorist operations.
National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)
Provisions
1. Its aim will be to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence data, coordinate
between various national and state counter terrorism bodies, to plan and carry
out counter terrorist operations. It can search, seize property, arrest, demand
information from any other agency while carrying out its tasks. The legal basis for
its powers is UAPA provision where the central government can permit an officer
to make arrest etc. if he has got a "reason to believe" that a person committed an
unlawful activity.
New Consensus
1. DGPs of states to be on NCTC board.
2. Arrest / search / seizure to be done by state police only except in exceptional
circumstances with approval of director. Thus effectively, the operations part has
been taken out of NCTC.
3. NCTC will not be located under IB.
Advantages
1. Currently India has RAW, IB, NTRO, Defence Research Agency and Aviation
Research Centre etc. working on terrorism. There is no coordination between
them.
2. NCTC is unavoidable because, at present, the Union Government cannot deploy
its military and para-military forces suo motu to deal with internal security
problems in the States and often the States are unwilling to accept these Central
forces due to dubious political compulsions.
3. State police forces are not professional and lack capabilities to deal with terror.
State forces are also used to serve political ends. Unfortunately, the record of the
Union Government is equally questionable.
Limitations
1. Unlike the American NCTC which deals only with planning and integration of
intelligence without any operational involvement, the Indian agency will have not
only intelligence functions but also powers to conduct operations. It is this
concentration of powers that has had the states objecting to the NCTC .
 2. Current agencies are not willing to submit their autonomy. Different agencies also
report to different ministries which are not willing to part with them.
3. NCTC is also an arm of IB which doesn't have arrest / search powers right now.
But NCTC has been given such powers.
1. Being an IB wing, there is a likelihood of these powers being misused for
political gains. Also with such powers, IB would be busy defending its arrests
in courts and this would compromise its efficacy.
2. NCTC would also get embroiled in IBs running battle with the Research
and Analysis Wing (R&AW), which is responsible for external intelligence.
Terrorism has both international and national aspects; hence, the NCTC
must be separated from the IB to maintain equidistance from the IB and the
R&AW.
4. Instead of NCTC, the law and order machinery in the States should be fully
assisted by the Centre with equipment, technology and training. This would be
more relevant to meeting the threat since they have local knowledge of the
terrain, language and culture.
5. Inadequate consultations with the states and a top-heavy attitude of the central
government is what brought about its downfall. It tried to put it under IB, outside
parliamentary oversight. It also was trying to create NCTC via an executive order
and not a legislation.
Multi Agency Centre
1. Its the nodal centre in IB for all intelligence activities related to terrorism. It
collects, analyses and then disseminates such information to all parties including
state administrations. Subsidiaries of MAC (S-MACs) are established in every state
capital.
2. It was setup on the recommendations of the GoM after the Kargil War (same GoM
also suggested NatGrid and National Memory Bank).
NatGrid
1. NatGrid links databases from 21 departments and ministries like registration
of records, bank transactions, insurance, tax, driver license, internet and phone lo
gs etc. This way security agencies can have virtually all information about any
person in India.
2. This project was put on hold due to privacy issues but with CCS approval in place,
it would be established by 2014.
National Investigation Agency (NIA)
1. It is the agency setup after the Mumbai terror attacks to probe and investigate
forensics of terror attacks without taking state permission.
2. Apart
from terror strikes, it is empowered to investigate hijacking, attack on nuclear inst
allation, weapon of mass destruction attacks, organized crime, human trafficking
etc.
3. The staff would be derived from existing local staff on permanent deputation.
4. But so far it has played second fiddle to local police forces in terror case
investigations. It has never directly investigated a case, it gets cases only by
referral from state police and then too it assists only in an informal way. NIA is
suffering from massive staff shortage and hence is unable to discharge its duties
properly.
Issues Surrounding an Anti Terrorist Legislation
Need for a Comprehensive Anti Terrorist Legislation
1. Law Commission of India had recommended in 2000 a separate legislation to deal
with the menace of terrorism. The draft bill as recommended by the Law
Commission of India included provisions such as definition of terrorist acts,
enhanced punishment for such acts, possession of certain unauthorized arms,
special powers of investigating officers regarding seizure and attachment of
property representing proceeds of terrorism, constitution of special courts,
protection of witnesses, confessions made to police officers to be taken into
consideration, enhanced police custody, constitution of review committees,
protection of action taken in good faith.
2. The IPC was not designed to fight or to check organised crime of the nature we
are faced with now. It is difficult to get any witnesses because people are afraid of
their own safety and safety of their families. It is well known that during the worst
days in Punjab, even the judges and prosecutors were gripped with such fear
and terror that they were not prepared to try or prosecute the cases against the
terrorists. There is enormous delay in going on with the trials against the
terrorists.
3. In such a situation, insisting upon independent evidence or applying the normal
peace-time standards of criminal prosecution, may be impracticable. It is
necessary to have a special law to deal with a special situation.
4. It is one thing to say that we must create and provide internal structures and
safeguards against possible abuse and misuse of the Act and altogether a different
thing to say that because the law is liable to be misused, we should not have such
an Act at all. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that mere possibility of
abuse cannot be a ground for denying the vesting of powers or for declaring a
statute unconstitutional.
Which is a Better Place for the Anti Terror Law - UAPA or National Security Act, 1980?
1. The UAPA deals primarily with the prevention of certain unlawful activities of
individuals and associations, whereas the National Security Act deals with
prevention of those activities which are prejudicial to national security and also
contains provisions for preventive detention which do not find place in normal
laws. Hence the National Security Act is a more appropriate place.
Bail Provisions
1. Pro-bail lobbies have argued that even in the most heinous cases, the general
position is bail but not jail, which should also be the case in terrorism related
matters. POTA had the stipulation that the court has to be satisfied that
the accused has not committed any offence before granting the bail. One of the
main reasons cited for the repeal of POTA was the prolonged periods of detention
as the accused were not able to get bail.
2. Investigation agencies have put forward the argument that persons accused of
terrorism are not ordinary criminals and witnesses are afraid to depose against
such persons. Therefore gathering evidence against them is difficult and time
consuming, and if such persons are let out on bail they are bound to adversely
influence the investigation.
 3. A pragmatic approach would be to classify the cases on the basis of the gravity of
the involvement of the undertrial, nature of case against him and the period
already served in jail.
Confession before a Police Officer
1. All confessions made to a police officer are inadmissible in a court of law.
2. Law Commission recommended that confessions made before the police could be
admissible in case of grave offences like terrorism. The inadmissibility of evidence
of a confession made to a police officer remains a weak link, the logic being that
given the widespread reluctance of witnesses to tender evidence in terrorist
cases, this will remain a major handicap for the prosecution.
3. Those opposing the admissibility of confessions before the police have argued
that if an accused is willing to make a voluntary confession, then he could easily
be produced before a Magistrate rather than being produced before a senior
police officer. It is also argued that police may resort to coercive methods in order
to extract confessions.
4. Confessions made before the police should be admissible. All such statements
should be video-recorded and the tapes produced before the court. The
witness/accused should be warned on video tape that any statement he makes
is liable to be used against him in a court of law, and he is entitled to the presence
of his lawyer or a family member while making such a statement.
5. The accused should be produced before a magistrate immediately thereafter, who
shall confirm by examining the accused whether the confession was obtained
voluntarily or under duress.
6. Such statements can be made admissible if proper police reforms are carried out
and an independent complaints authority against the police is setup.
Presumptions under the Law
1. According to one school of thought, shifting the burden of proof to the accused
is violative of the basic principles of jurisprudence. Another viewpoint is that there
are certain facts which are only within the knowledge of the accused and
establishing such facts by the prosecution becomes difficult and the benefit
generally passes on to the accused.
2. But because of the nature of the crime and the potential it has to threaten the
security and integrity of the country, it is necessary that the person who has
indulged in the terrorist act is not able to make use of the protection which is
provided to an accused person under the normal laws.
Witness Protection
1. Implementing a US type witness protection program in India may not be feasible
because an individual Indians identity is so inextricably linked with his social
milieu and place of origin that it may be practically impossible to extricate him
from the same and relocate him with a fresh identity somewhere else in the
country. It is also extremely costly. It can be made available if the witness himself
requests for it.
2. Measures such as holding of proceedings in camera, empowering the Court to
take appropriate measures for keeping the identity of the witness secret,
disallowing the accused to see and cross examine the witness (the court can itself
cross examine the witness on the request of the accused instead of allowing him
to directly do so) can still go a long way in witness protection.
 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Amendment) Bill, 2011
1. This Bill has been brought to comply with the requirements of India signing FATF
(against money laundering and terrorism finance activities) and to strengthen anti
terror provisions.
2. Definition of terror
1. It includes terrorist acts to include counterfeit currency, demanding bombs
and other weapons, violent acts with the intention of compelling the
government.
3. Terror property
1. It also clarifies that the proceeds of terrorism include property intended to
be used for terrorism (even if derived from legitimate sources) and by an
individual terrorist as well (earlier it had only gangs and organizations).
2. Under the Bill, raising funds likely to be used (in full or in part) to commit a
terrorist act or for the benefit of terrorists shall be punishable irrespective of
whether the funds have been raised from legitimate or illegitimate sources.
3. It also states that participating, organising or directing fund raising
activities shall constitute an offence.
4. The property of the accused can be attached merely on suspicion. If the
person "dies" at any stage before trial is over (including custodial death), the
property will be permanently confiscated.
4. Scope of legislation
1. The earlier Act was applicable against individuals and group associations, the
Bill is applicable against NGOs, HUF, companies also.
5. The sweep of the Bill criminalizes association with suspected organization. In case
of association, the burden of proof for showing "innocence / lack of knowledge"
falls on the accused. He can be arrested for 180 days merely on suspicion. To seek
extension of the arrest period, the police merely needs to show that investigation
is proceeding as against showing evidence against the accused.
6. It extends the period of banning organizations from 2 to 5 years before a judicial
review.
1. Even those organizations working lawfully for human rights can be labeled
as Naxalites by the government and banned for 5 years.
Security Challenges - Management in Border Areas

1. International border is a line which separates two sovereign nations and both the
nations have agreed that this is the line separating them. Maps are exchanged and
features are marked on the ground.
2. The rule is that no armed forces shall be posted on the international borders. So the
police forces from either sides are posted. Police forces come under MIA and thus
maintaining the tranquility along the international borders is the sole responsibility of
MIA and not MoD.

Complexity in Indian Borders

1. China: We don't have an international border but a LAC. The central zone has
been recognized by China but not ratified by them.
1. LAC
 Johnson line is the line which was marked as the boundary between
the kingdom of J&K and Tibet. Indian maps show Johnson line.
McCartney & McDonald line was drawn between the British and Tibet
passing through the Aksai Chin region. After acquisition of Tibet, China
constructed a road connecting Xinjiang to Tibet towards the right of
this line.
India wants this line to be the international borders (the road will
remain in China). But China doesn't agree to the sanctity of this line
since Tibet had no authority to draw any international line (it was
never a free country). China wants the entire Aksai Chin plateau.
Line of Actual Control is towards the left of McCartney line and gives
most of the Aksai Chin plateau to the Chinese.
In 1996 it was agreed that none sides will cross the LAC. In 2005, it was
reiterated that both the sides will maintain peace and tranquility along
the LAC. If the two patrols meet, they will avoid confrontation.
LAC is maintained jointly by the army and ITBP (doesn't work under
army). ITBP is under MIA and it refused to hand over the control to the
army. If we keep ITBP at the border, we send a signal to China that we
are willing to accept it as an international border because ITBP is a
police force. A police force mans only internationally agreed borders.
Also army is better equipped to maintain the border. China's border
police is also there but functions under the Chinese army command. So
ITBP can be maintained there but command given under army.
2. McMahon Line
Runs from Bhutan to end of Arunachal Pradesh (Siang).
Concept of watershed: The watershed area serves as the border i.e.
drainage system on either side of the watershed flows to either
directions. This concept is used in the hilly areas to draw the
international boundaries between the two nations.
However McMahon line doesn't really follow the watershed concept. It
also doesn't define very clearly the geographical locations through
which it passes. GoI's stand is that McMahon line is the guiding
principle to draw the international border. The vaguely drawn line
needs to be correctly drawn. India considers the watershed line to be
the LAC.
Chinese stand is entire Arunachal Pradesh as its own (extension and
part of Tibet). China considers that culturally as well Arunachal Pradesh
is Tibetan. India believes culture alone cannot be the reason for
drawing international boundaries. China also cites old historical ties
with the Arunachal to claim it. India's views is old historical claims
cannot be the guiding factor in drawing international lines. Asoka and
Cholas cannot be used to draw international boundaries today. Finally
China doesn't have any written document to support its historical
claims.
3. Sikkhim Border
 When Sikkhim joined India, China didn't recognize it. In 2003, it de
facto (not de jure) recognized Sikkhim as a part of India. So Sikkhim is
an international border now. But it is still manned by the army.
To defend the Sikkhim border, the Cabinet Committee on Security, has
approved to raise a force called Sikkhim Scouts. They will guard the
Sikkhim - China border. It will be under the army and will be trained
and equipped in mountain warfare.
4. Some border agreements with China
Panchsheel.
Sino-Indian Agreement, 1993: Calls for both armies to maintain peace
and tranquility at the border.
Sino-Indian Agreement, 1996: Confidence building measures were
instituted along LAC - to maintain pace, promote border openings at 2
points (Nathula in Sikkhim and Chusul in Laddakh) for people to people
contact and periodical meetings at senior army level.
Sino-Indian Agreement, 2005: Maintaining restraint along the LAC.
Border Defence Cooperation Agreement: Recently India and China
have started exchanging documents for border cooperation. Aim is to
develop a new mechanism for border security.
Hand in Hand Agreement: This is for jointly countering terrorism.
Currently there are plans to increase the person to person contact at 2
more points @ Lipulekh and Manna in Uttarakhand.
2. Pakistan: Sir Creek is disputed. From there till Jammu we have an international
border. From Jammu to NJ9842 is the LoC. From NJ9842 to Sia Chin is the Actual
Position Line.
1. Sir Creek
East portion of Sir Creek is called the Green line. Pakistan considers this
line to be the international border. Red line is the western border of
the Creek and India claims it to be the international border (?).
India and Pakistan have carried out many joint surveys of the Sir Creek
area. These surveys were carried out by the surveyor generals of both
nations. The countries also have a Joint Working Commission on the
issue and already have had 4 rounds of talks on it.
At one stage, an agreement appeared imminent when India agreed to
the use of the Thalweg Doctrine. Thalweg Doctrine is an internationally
recognized procedure for the demarcation of international borders
where a line is drawn through the greatest depth of the water. One of
its biggest shortfalls is that water bodies may change their course. Also
the deepest portion may not be the central portion.
Later on India went back and opposed Thalweg Doctrine as it is
applicable to water bodies having a flow. India says it is closed from
one end and doesn't have a flow. So Thalweg Doctrine is not
applicable.
This area is infested by illegal arms dealers, smugglers and drug
traffickers. If given to Pakistan, it may give easy access to India to such
elements from Pakistan. Pressure of smugglers is higher in this area as
the international border has been fenced and lighted.
 Another importance is the potential oil and gas reserves in the vast
additional EEZ as per the UNCLOS if Sir Creek comes to either nation.
Responsibility of defending Rann of Kutch goes to BSF and not the
army although it is not an international border. Responsibility to
safeguard the waters along the coast goes to the Coast Guard.
Currently BSF is holding complete Sir Creek.
2. International border
This border is also looked after by the BSF and BSF mans all the border
outposts along the international border. Army is positioned in
cantonments at least 50 km away from the borders. Border fencing has
already been done. Fencing is done 150 meters away from the border.
Drug trafficking through the international crossings is a major issue.
3. LoC
Since it is not an international border, it is controlled by the army.
Major portion has got fencing, lighting, thermo imaging instruments,
high powered telescopes and electronic surveillance.
Currently the status between the two countries is that of a ceasefire.
Both have to maintain tranquility and not open fire.
Major issue here is terrorist infiltration.
4. Sia Chin glacier
Its strategic importance is that it goes up to the Karakoram pas and
thus overlooks the Karakoram highway.
3. Bangladesh
1. The major issue is the porosity of the border and the associated illegal
migration into India. Other issues are smuggling, cross border crimes, terror
sanctuaries on the other side of the border, drug trafficking.
2. Both countries have come up with a Border Management Plan.
As per this plan, the BSF and the Border Guards of Bangladesh agreed
to reduce the killing of people crossing the border.
They have agreed to refrain from firing at civilians. Troops will not fire
at each other.
Both sides will periodically exchange information. A Joint Consultation
Commission has been formed to increase the cooperation.
In vulnerable points, coordinated patrolling will be carried out.
3. Recently both countries have agreed to develop the following on the border:
Land customs stations.
Land ports.
Integrated check posts.
4. Bhutan
1. It has been a peaceful and open border. There is a Joint Group to assess the
threats to Bhutan and India from various organizations. It also discusses
ways and means to maintain security of the open border. To achieve this,
the local officials on both the sides have been directed to conduct regular
meetings.
2. The threat is that because the border is open and the topography of Bhutan
is difficult, it was a safe hideout for terrorists. This threat has reduced
 considerably after the Bhutanese army with the help of the Indian Army
cleared out the terrorist camps in Bhutan (Operation All Clear).
3. This border is maintained by Sashakt Seema Border (along with Indo-Nepal
border).
5. Myanmar
1. This is a completely porous border. The tribes are on both sides of the
border like the Nagas, the Mizos, the Kukis. This is also a hilly and thickly
forested area.
2. Assam Rifles does the policing of the border. However the policing is not as
effective as the other borders. This is so because of a strong opposition from
all tribal groups in the region on both sides. The policing from the Myanmar
side too is very weak. Crime flourishes all along this border including
smuggling, counterfeit currency notes, drug trafficking, insurgency. Although
the government has approved border fencing, but because of the objection
from the locals, fencing operations have not made much headway. The
opposition is so much that even the border pillars have been removed by
the tribals. But currently some fencing near Moreh and Zawkhatar is coming
up.
3. India and Myanmar have a border trade agreement. There are border haats
at 2 points - Moreh in Manipur and Zawkhatar in Mizoram. There is also a
border trade committee to facilitate the trade.
4. Because the same tribes stay on both sides, there is an understanding
between the two governments to facilitate the movement of such tribes.
This understanding features a permit system instead of the normal visa
route and a person with the permit can come up to 16 km inside the other
country's territory and can stay for up to 3 days.
6. Nepal
1. It is an open border. People can cross the border without permit. Nepal
became a hub of anti-Indian activities by proxy mainly encouraged by ISI. It
also serves as a transit point for such people. Terrorists, arms, drugs and
counterfeit currency notes are smuggled from Nepal into India through this
open border.
2. So to police the border, both countries have developed a joint mechanism
which includes meetings up to the home secretary level. There is also a
Border District Coordination Committee which is a coordination mechanism
between the district administrations on both sides.
Reasons for Complexity of Indian Borders
1. Past history: Historical colonial era treaties.
2. Geography: Sir Creek issue, Palk Straits with Sri Lanka.
3. Ethnic / cultural relations with our neighbors: People speak speak same language,
of same ethnic origins across the borders. There is no well demarcated distinct
cultures across the two sides of the border.
4. Overpopulation near the border: This creates pressures and complications in the
border demarcation process. It makes the borders porous.
Challenges in Indian Maritime Security
1. We have unresolved maritime borders with our neighbors. This leads to issues like
fishermen getting imprisoned and clash over fishing rights.
 2. Sometimes spies and terrorists cross the boundaries in the guise of fishermen.
Fishing is mostly unorganized and so surveillance becomes very difficult.
3. Counter the growing influence of radical elements, foreign powers in the other
island states like Maldives.
4. Extra-regional powers like US, Russia, China, France have their naval presence
here.
5. Piracy, terrorism, smuggling, narcotics, human trafficking, unregulated sea traffic.
The non state actors acting in the Arabian Sea are technologically advanced
making it an even bigger challenge.
Changes Post 26/11 in Maritime Security
1. Overall responsibility of securing Indian coasts lies with Navy. Before 26/11, coast
guard, navy and police were independent of each other and coordination was
poor. Post 26/11 a coherent organizational structure was built. The apex body is
navy and all other come under it.
2. Maritime police
1. Territorial waters are to be secured by the maritime police. Maritime police
is a new concept post 26/11. Coastal police stations would be setup.
2. The overall work was scheduled to be completed in 2 phases. Phase 1
includes raising the coastal police and setting up 73 coastal police stations.
3. The coastal police stations are a part of the maritime police (which comes
under the state police) and their task has been well defined to include
protection of coastal regions. They are trained by the coast guards.
3. Coast Guard
1. EEZ is to be secured by the coast guard.
4. Sagar Prahri Bal
1. It is a fighting force which has been constituted to look after physical coastal
security.
2. All its members come from the navy.
5. Electronic tier
1. The 4th tier of coastal security is the electronic security. This includes the
use of satellites such as RISAT, OceanSat 1 and 2, coastal radars.
2. All data from all radars will be processed centrally on a real time basis. These
radars can pick up boats 30 - 50 nautical miles away.
3. All merchant ships arriving in Indian waters must give mandatory 96 hours of
notice before entering Indian waters.
4. AIDs will be installed even on fishing boats (merchant ships already have
them). If any vessel's Automatic Identification System doesn't get triggered
then the vessel will be intercepted by the security forces.
6. Local community involvement
1. Fishermen will be sensitized towards coastal security.
2. Their boats will be equipped with electronic identification systems and they
themselves will be given biometric identity cards.
7. The mandate of the department of border management has been extended to
include all coastal border regions as well.
8. Phase 2
 1. This includes installation of coastal radars, other electronic surveillance
systems, setting up of new coast guard stations, creation of NSG hubs in the
coastal metros.
Weaknesses in Current Maritime Security Architecture
1. No port in India has the Container Security Initiative compliance i.e. to see what is
there in the container since it is impractical to open all containers and look in
manually. When the containers are transferred from the ship to the port, the CSI
system scans them immediately before they are placed on the inland transport.
This is a very big threat to our security.
2. We don't have strict laws to deal with some illegal activities in Indian waters. For
instance, India is a big destination of dismantling of old ships - a ship drifted on to
the Juhu beach recently.
3. Currently we don't have procedure to electronically identify every ship.
4. The real time coordination between the navy, the coast guard and the marine
police is still weak.

Role of Interlocutors
1. They are people who have no formal position in the government or any formal
authority to speak on behalf of the government. Whatever they speak are their
personal views. However, communications via interlocutors are very useful in
conveying information and ideas. They generally don't include active politicians or
serving government servants.
2. They try to find out what are the views of the other parties and gives the feedback
to the government. Such a feedback is not binding on the government, it is only
an additional information in the decision making.
3. They are people generally on who both the parties have confidence.
4. They are different from the negotiators in the sense that the negotiators have
more powers and official backing to make concessions and convey the official line.

Border Area Development Programme

Evolution
1. It was launched in 1988 initially for the Pakistan border areas. Its aim is integrated
development of the border areas. It falls under the Department of Border
management (check website) under the MIA.
2. It includes developing schools, water supply, health, sports. It is 100% centrally
funded.
3. If there are any remote border locations and they have any specific needs, then to
address those.
4. Funds are provided to the States for development of border areas on the basis
of (i) length of international border (ii) population of border blocks and (iii) area of
border blocks. Weightage of 15% over and above the total allocation is also given
to States having hilly/desert/Kutchh areas.
The border block will be the spatial unit within which the State
Government shall arrange to utilize the BADP funds only in those villages of
the blocks, which are located within 0-10 km from the international border.
Those villages, which are located nearer to the international border will get first
priority. After saturating these villages with basic infrastructure, the next set of
villages located within 0-15 km and 0-20 km need to be taken up.
Planning and
1
implementation of BADP schemes should be on participatory and decentralized
basis thorough the Panchayati Raj Institutions/Autonomous Councils/Other
Local Bodies/Councils.
Projects not
exceeding Rs.5.00 lakh should strictly be implemented through local bodies
such as village committees/panchayats only.

The State Governments may consider creating/nominating a Nodal

Department/Cell with in the existing administrative arrangement for
implementation of the Border Area Development Programme (BADP). The Nodal
Department dealing with the BADP in the State shall hold individual meetings
with line departments of the States such as Power, Rural Development,
Electricity, Roads & Buildings, Water Supply, Social Welfare, Public
Distribution, Civil Supplies etc. in order to ensure the implementation of the
respective State/Central schemes in the identified border blocks. Utilization of
funds under the Centrally Sponsored Schemes/Flagship Schemes of Govt. of
India and the State plan schemes to the maximum possible extent in the border
blocks should be ensured.
A baseline survey shall be carried out in border villages in order to assess
the gaps in basic physical and social infrastructure
State Governments, may keep a provision not exceeding 15% of the
allocation made to the State for the maintenance of assets created under the
BADP subject to the condition that such expenditure can be made only after
three (3) years from the date of issue of completion certificate in respect of the
asset.
The State Governments can reserve 1.5% (one and half percent) of the
2
allocation made to the State subject to a maximum of Rs. 40 lakh for the
purpose of monitoring, training of staff at block level and for the evaluation of
the BADP, administrative expenditure for preparing the perspective plans, if
any, survey, logistic support (excluding purchase of vehicles), media publicity
etc.
The policy matters such as the guidelines of BADP, the geographical
areas within which the BADP is implemented, allocation of funds, modalities of
execution of schemes etc. will be laid down by an Empowered Committee
constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary (Border Management) in
the Ministry of Home Affairs.
schemes for each State will be approved by a State
Level Screening Committee chaired by the Chief Secretary of the State.
Each border block should be assigned
to a high-ranking State Government Nodal Officer who should regularly visit
the block and take responsibility for BADP schemes.
Land Ports Authority of India (LPAI) Act
Aims
1. To establish check points in the designated entry and exit points on the
international borders.
2. To provide the customs, immigration etc. with infrastructure at these designated
points.
Provisions
1. Land Port is a designated entry/exit point located on land borders.
2. Private sector can be hired by LPAI to perform the non-sovereign functions of
maintenance and management.
3. The Integrated Check Post will be developed as a sanitized zone with state of art
facilities to handle the flow of goods.
The 6th Schedule
Legislative Powers of District and Regional Councils
1. With the assent of the Governor, they can make laws with respect to:
1. Use of land other than a reserved forest.
2. Management of any forest not being a reserved forest.
3. Use of water resources for irrigation.
4. Regulation of shifting cultivation.
5. Establishment of village or town committees or councils and their powers.
6. Any other matter relating to village or town administration, including
village or town police and public health and sanitation.
7. Appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen.
8. Inheritance of property.
9. Marriage and divorce.
10. Social customs.
11. Control of money-lending and trading by non-tribals.
12. The governor can vest them with additional criminal powers.
13. Any act of state legislature in matters pertaining to councils' affairs will have
no effect unless assented to by the councils.
The Governor's and the President's Additional Powers
1. The Governor may declare that a state law is not applicable (or applicable in a
modified form) to a tribal area in affairs not under tribal councils' domain.
2. The president may declare that a central law is not applicable (or applicable in a
modified form) to a tribal area in affairs not under tribal councils' domain.
Judicial Powers of District and Regional Councils
1. Constitute courts and appoint their personnel for the trial of cases between
Scheduled Tribes within such areas.
2. The Regional and District Councils are also empowered to act as Courts of Appeal.
Financial Powers of District and Regional Councils
1. Constitution of District and Regional Funds
 1. Each council will have its own fund. All moneys due to such councils from
various sources including the state and the central governments shall be
credited to these funds to be used by the councils at their discretion.
2. Estimated receipts and expenditure pertaining to the council by the
state shall be first placed before the Council for discussion and then shown
separately in the budget of the state.
3. The accounts are to be maintained as prescribed by the CAG, who is also
entrusted with their audit.
2. Powers to Collect Taxes and Fees
1. Councils can collect land revenue and impose taxes within their jurisdictions
such as on lands and buildings, on professions, trades, callings and
employments, animals, vehicles and boats, on the entry of goods into a
market, tolls on passengers and goods carried in ferries and for the
maintenance of schools, dispensaries or roads.
2. They are entitled to royalties from the extraction of minerals from their
area.
Issues with the 6th Schedule (Art 244)
Vesting the Councils with the Executive Powers
1. Due to historical reasons and lack of proper understanding, a notion prevails that
the role of the Councils is confined to passing laws, establishing and administering
justice through local courts and generally taking up a few regulatory
functions. They are not expected to have any role in development matters.
2. Even though some subjects stand formally transferred to the Councils under the
Sixth Schedule, the State Governments have been slow in transferring
related executive powers and control over the corresponding departments to
them.
3. The State Governments have continued to retain parallel development and
administrative apparatus under their own command. This has led to functional
overlap and conflicts between the States and the District Councils.
4. The Indian Constitution provides that the executive power of the Union extends
to matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws and states
have the executive powers in the matters where their legislatures are competent
to make laws. The powers given to Autonomous Councils also need to be
interpreted in the same light: the legislative powers of the Councils should also be
their executive powers.
Issue of Village Self Governance in the Sixth Schedule Areas
1. When the 6th Schedule was formulated, tribal customs reigned supreme and thus
there was no thought of elections at the village level. So the 6th Schedule doesn't
pay any attention to the village self governance.
2. The idea of a two / three tier elected panchayat structure came only with the
Mehta Committee Report in 1957. With various rural development schemes and
programmes becoming village centric and with Panchayats increasingly becoming
involved in implementation of such programmes, the issue of village governance
in scheduled areas came to the fore.
3. All the Councils should now pass legislation for establishing village self governance
with well defined powers and allocate them resources preferably like the State
 Finance Commission. Such village self governments should be empowered to
implement the various developmental schemes and also local planning.
4. In this they can be encouraged by tying the additional funding with the level of
empowerment they do of the village self governance bodies.
5. Apart from the elected members, the traditional village functionaries will also
need to be included in these Village self governments as ex-officio members.
However, it needs to be ensured that the majority of the members and the head
are elected.
Part IX and 6th Schedule of the Constitution
1. The Councils are at the mercy of the State Governments for budgetary support
and elections and are not covered by the State Finance Commissions and the
State Election Commissions. This anomaly needs to be corrected and appropriate
parts of the Part IX should be extended to the Schedule 6 areas also. Currently the
part 9 explicitly is not applicable at all to the 6th Schedule areas.
2. Apart from SFC, the release of the council funds should be single window, untied
and hassle free.
Governor's Special Powers - Discretion vs Advise of CoM
1. The idea of 6th Schedule was to protect the autonomy of the tribal areas and to
save them from the decisions of the overwhelming majority of the state.
2. The Governor enjoys these special powers as a custodian of tribal interests and
hence he needs to exercise these on his discretion and not on the advise of the
state council of minister.
Conditions in North East
Poor Economic Conditions
1. Per capita income is increasingly falling significantly behind the rest of the
country. At the time of Independence per capita income in the undivided State of
Assam was higher than the national average while today it is lower by almost 40%
in Assam. With the economic reforms, the difference in the growth rates
increased still further.
2. Much of the income generated is on account of government spending. The share
of income generated by public administration is 10.6% and significantly higher
than in the rest of the country. This underlines the overwhelming dependence of
the population on the government and a lack of productive economic activities.
Issues in Assam
1. Migration
1. Its population more than doubled in the first half of the last century largely
due to migrations.
2. Land pressure
1. The dependence of the State on agriculture is given from the fact that the
rate of urbanization is way below the national average and even below rest
of NE.
3. Minorities
1. The situation is further compounded by a significant presence of religious
and linguistic minorities, approximately 18% and 30% respectively.
4. Rivalry among the 6th Schedule Councils
 1. Bodoland Territorial Council has been given greater administrative and
financial powers compared to the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council
(KAAC) and the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (NHAC).
2. Its funds are significantly larger than those available to the other councils.
Control of line departments in the area have also been transferred to the
Council.
3. However, it is the only Council with a few seats exclusively reserved for non-
tribals. Also, it is the only Sixth Schedule Council which does not have
judicial powers. The judiciary as existent in other parts of the country was
fully functional in these areas by the time the BTC was born.
4. There is a growing demand that there should be full parity among the three
Councils in terms of legislative and executive powers.
5. 6 Tribe Specific Councils (created under State enactment spread over 12 districts)
1. These have fragmented the state administration and also given rise to other
issues.
2. In order to cover the largest possible numbers of the relevant tribe, a
further innovation has been made to identify satellite areas i.e. isolated
pockets with significant population of the target group.
3. Such areas are kept within the purview of the Council despite the fact that
they are cut off from the core areas and may be in other districts.
4. Such districts may be under the purview of the 73rd
Constitutional amendment with the regular Panchayat institutions and thus
a clash with the Tribal council.
5. The Constitutional pattern needs to be respected and Panchayats be
strengthened in these areas, rather than to create councils on the basis of
ethnic identity.
Issues with North East Council
1. In the wake of the reorganization of the States of the region in 1972, the North
East Council was set up to provide a forum for inter-state coordination, regional
planning and integrated development.
2. The Council is chaired by the Union Minister for the Department of North-East
with the Governors and Chief Ministers of North-East States and Sikkim as its
Members.
3. The Council has not been able to live up to its expectations. The most important
reasons are inadequate availability of funds and absence of professional planning
and implementation capacity.
4. Also, the increasing State Plan outlays along with enhanced central allocations
through CSS and ad hoc allocations have resulted in a shift of attention from the
Council to the Planning Commission.
Issues with North East Ministry
1. Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region coordinates with various
Ministries/Department primarily. But the respective Ministries/Departments are
responsible in respect of subjects allocated to them.
2. The formation of the DONER Ministry has added to the confusion. Ironically,
therefore, a region which requires a focused attention on many key issues has
been made the responsibility of several organizations with blurred
responsibilities.
Linkages Between Development and Extremism

6th schedule and 5th schedule

Moving governance of tribal areas in central India from the Fifth to the Sixth Schedule
will help address the demand for autonomy

Bastar district in Chhattisgarh is governed by the Fifth Schedule, but it wants to move
into the Sixth Schedule. The Fifth Schedule on the other hand fails because it has never
been applied.

PESA was considered the most logical step in the Fifth Schedule areas to ensure tribal
welfare and accountability. But, alas, it has not been properly implemented.

Tribal communities have progressively been denied self-government and rights to their
communities natural resources that should have been provided under the legislation.

In its 1997 Samatha decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Schedule enjoined
Governors to bar purchase of tribal land for mining activity by any entity that was not
state-owned. This judgment however, led to an opposite reaction from the Ministry of
Mines, and subsequent appeals from the Andhra Pradesh government claiming that
Samatha would have an adverse effect not only on the mining sector but also on non-
agricultural activities especially industrial activity and hence would impact the
economic development throughout the country. In response, the Governors were then
given unfettered authority in the transfer of Scheduled Tribe land to the government
and allotment to non-tribals, altering the balance of power and undermining the stated
goal of tribal autonomy.

Other examples abound, including the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest
Rights Act of December 2006, which ostensibly recognises the right of communities to
protect and manage their forests (as does PESA), but only if the state decides whether a
certain region is denoted as Village Forest or Reserved Forest. In this process, many
communities are evicted without a proper channel of rehabilitation.
Evolution and Current Status of LWE
1. Various groups of Naxalites started resurfacing in various parts of India during the
early 1980s. The naxalites of Andhra Pradesh regrouped as the CPI-ML
(Peoples War Group/ PWG); likewise the Bihar Naxalites rechristened themselves
as the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC).
2. PWG of Andhra Pradesh
1. It turned out to be the most active not only in Andhra Pradesh but also in
Orissa, in the tribal belt (Bastar-Dandakaranya) of Madhya Pradesh (now
mostly in the State of Chhattisgarh) and Maharashtra, causing considerable
violence in these States.
2. It succeeded in mobilising a fairly large section of the rural population in the
outlying districts and also in the urban areas. It also succeeded in enlisting
the support of a vocal section of the civil society. It openly started holding
Praja Courts in which complaints against land-owners, money-lenders and
even against government officials were being entertained and swift justice
meted out. Even elected representatives were being given directives by
such courts, which were generally obeyed.
3. When police action started, it created a sense of insecurity among sections
of the Maoist cadres which prompted them to resort to brutal murders and
tortures of villagers on the slightest suspicion of being police informers. This
created alienation among the local villagers.
4. At a later stage, Greyhounds operations were launched and PWG pushed
out of Andhra.
3. Chattisgarh
1. Here they developed expertise in the use of landmines and IEDs which
caused significant casualties.
2. Another significant development was the creation of Salwa Judum and its
subsequent dismantling.
4. MCC of Bihar
1. Here the naxalites found that their greatest adversary was not so much the
administration and the police but the armed gangs (senas ) of the landlord
class - the Ranbir Sena. Here instead of assuming the characteristics of class
struggle as propagated by Maoist ideologues, the skirmishes took the shape
of caste warfare.
5. West Bengal
1. Here the Naxalites seem to be repeating some of their tactics of the 1969-72
period. Thus they have started targeting specific CPM party functionaries at
local levels. Their targets are not confined to the known Naxalite affected
districts of West Midnapore, Purulia and Bankura only. A number of CPM
 party functionaries have been attacked and killed in the districts of Nadia,
Burdwan, Birbhum, Murshidabad etc.
6. Consolidation
1. It was completed with the formation of the CPI (Maoist) on 21 September
2004. This was followed by their increasing militarisation and acquisition of
sophisticated firearms and ammunitions.
2. Their arsenal now boasts of self loading rifles (SLRs), AK series of rifles and
INSAS rifles. It is believed that currently the Maoists have also gained access
to the technology of fabricating rockets and rocket launchers. The threat
from the Maoists has increased on account of their developing expertise
in fabricating and detonating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Unlike in
J&K where landmines are detonated with remote-controlled device, the
Naxalites so far have been using wire-controlled detonations which cannot
be neutralised electronically.
Recent Strategy Decisions to Counter Naxalism
1. Security response
1. To enhance the level of central forces and focus on surgical operations to
take out the top leadership. State police to continue taking the lead role.
2. Good thing is that LWE is gaining importance in the policy circles and recent
years have witnessed more than tripling of the numbers in central forces
deployed in the naxalite areas.
3. To follow the Andhra Pradesh model.
4. To increase inter state cooperation and conduct cross-border raids.
2. Administrative response
1. Development funds are often diverted to the Naxalites. The political parties/
political leaderships too pay protection money to the Naxalites. Poor
governance has led to increase in Naxalite activities. The states delivery
mechanism has to be revamped. The state has to penetrate into remote
tribal areas.
2. The only way forward is to build infrastructure and add to the manpower.
Teachers, nurses, doctors should want to go there.
The Andhra Model
1. Security response
1. Use of specialized and dedicated police force called the Greyhounds.
2. Strengthening the intelligence gathering and intelligence based operations.
3. Enhancing the role of local police stations in operations.
4. Making efforts to infiltrate the Maoist hierarchy.
5. Effective surrender and rehabilitation policy.
6. Victim reassurance policy including civil and police rehabilitation.
2. Political response
1. The political leadership was initially not sensitive enough to the impending
Naxalite challenge. This changed and a consensus had emerged among the
political formations by about 1996-97 that the rebels had to be taken
headlong, in all possible ways.
2. Thus a consensus was evolved over the counter naxalism strategy.
3. Developmental response
 1. Twice development programmes have been launched in the State with the
particular objective of bringing in rapid socio-economic development in
Naxalite-affected areas. The first initiative was known as Remote Areas
Development Programme; and the second is known as Remote and Interior
Areas Development Programme.
The Greyhounds
1. They are an elite commando force in Andhra Pradesh created to combat left wing
extremists. Only the best policemen make it to the Greyhound squad, which is
one of the highest paid in the country.
2. The force, which numbers around 2,000 in the state, moves around in small bands
of 15-25 commandos. They are specially trained for deep forest pursuit and
combat.
3. Greyhounds is maintained as a youthful force by drawing personnel from various
departments of AP police for a fixed tenure
Roshni
1. A new skill development scheme for rural youth from 24 most critical LWE
affected districts. It aims at skilling and placement of 50,000 youth from
these districts. It will be implemented at a cost of Rs 100 crore over the next
three years. At least 50% of the candidates shall be women and special
efforts will be made to proactively cover tribals.
2. Projects shall be funded jointly by the central and state governments in the
ratio of 75:25. Training will be imparted through public-private and public-
public partnerships.
3. National level agencies shall be designated to act as monitoring and
coordinating agencies.

Factors Behind Worsening of the Situation

1. Fear instilled by Naxalite violence
1. They want to make security situation bad so that no developmental activity
takes place, no teacher or doctor works in that area and the villagers will
continue to remain backward. They are not interested in improving the
situation as it suits their ends. They will blame their backwardness on the
government and get popular sympathy.
2. They are driving the political parties out. They kill the government officials
and politicians. They did it in AP and are doing it in Chattisgarh, Jharkhand
and Odisha.
3. They also kill the tribals on the presumption they were police informers.
Thus a situation has emerged that people dont come out against them out
of fear of being killed and intelligence gathering suffers.
2. Harassment of tribals by the state
1. Issue of land rights and forest rights of the tribals. It is very important to
properly implement PESA in tribal areas. They must be given rights over
minor forest produce.
2. The retaliatory cases registered by the forest department and the police
against the tribals to harass them. Orders passed from the top to drop such
cases are not implemented.
3. Groups such as Salwa Judum.
 3. Policing and Security challenges
1. Originally, the Bastar district was much larger than Kerala and still had only
1,000 odd policemen. Even today entire Chattisgarh has only 48,000
policemen compared to Delhi's 95,000. The silver lining is the rapid increase
in the deployment of central forces in LWE areas. It takes a lot of time (over
a decade) and money to raise and train a large police force.
2. Whatever little police presence is there is demoralized. In other parts of the
country, the role of the beat constable is to look into petty crimes. However,
the policemen in places like Bastar are required to be like commandos.
Genuine Grievances of Tribals
Land Related Factors
1. Evasion of land ceiling laws.
2. Existence of special land tenures (enjoying exemptions under ceiling laws).
3. Encroachment and occupation of Government and Community lands (even
the water-bodies) by powerful sections of society.
4. Lack of title to public land cultivated by the landless poor.
5. Poor implementation of laws prohibiting transfer of tribal land to non-tribals
in the Fifth Schedule areas.
6. Non-regularization of traditional land rights.
Displacement and Forced Evictions
1. The Forest Act, 1927 and the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 along with stringent
Supreme Court orders have turned forests into prohibited areas for the tribals.
2. Eviction from lands traditionally used by tribals.
3. Displacements caused by irrigation and power projects without
adequate arrangements for rehabilitation.
4. Large scale land acquisition for public purposes without appropriate
compensation or rehabilitation. Compensation, if paid, is a pity as the 'official'
land values are hopelessly out of touch with reality.
Livelihood Related Causes
1. Lack of food security corruption in the Public Distribution System (which
are often non-functional).
2. Disruption of traditional occupations and lack of alternative work opportunities.
3. Deprivation of traditional rights in common property resources.
Social Exclusion
1. Denial of dignity.
2. Continued practice, in some areas, of untouchability in various forms.
3. Poor implementation of special laws on prevention of atrocities, protection of
civil rights and abolition of bonded labor.
Governance Related Factors
1. Corruption and poor provision/non-provision of essential public services
including primary health care and education.
2. Incompetent, ill trained and poorly motivated public personnel who are
mostly absent from their place of posting.
3. Misuse of powers by the police and violations of the norms of law.
4. Perversion of electoral politics and unsatisfactory working of local
government institutions.
What Needs to be Done
 1. Police action vs Negotiations
1. They are alienated sections of society rather than perpetrators of high
treason they have to be treated as such.
2. Police action over a long period is counter-productive.
3. Negotiations have a definite positive role, this is the experience the world
over.
4. But negotiations alone can't succeed. Negotiations are likely to
succeed when the good intentions of the State are visible along with its will
to restore order. Thus security forces have an essential role in handling the
situation.
5. Security forces also have a role in protecting the development infrastructure
in these areas.
2. Police action vs Human Rights
1. Even in the most difficult situations, the operation of security forces must be
strictly within the framework of the law. It is necessary that SoPs and
protocols are laid down in specific terms and detail.
2. Training including sensitizing police and paramilitary personnel to the root
causes are needed.
3. Police force comprising primarily of local people is of inestimable value.
Local police forces have a huge advantage in intelligence gathering capacity.
Local police force is far more cost effective and more viable in the long run
than inducting central forces. Scrupulously enforcing the prescribed
reservations from the relevant areas, launching special recruitment drives
and raising tribal battalions of the Police are some of the measures that
require urgent attention.
3. Developmental Response
1. Faithful, fair and just implementation of laws and programmes for social
justice like MGNREGS.
2. Sustained, professionally sound and sincere development initiatives suitable
to local conditions along with democratic methods are needed.
3. Personal safety of senior functionalities needs to be assured so that they can
go into the disturbed areas and government machinery returns.
Role of Civil Society
1. Opinions vary about the role of civil society organisations in cases of left
extremism because many such organisations are alleged to have a leftist
ideological orientation and, in some cases, the NGO may even be a front for
the extremists themselves.
2. Votaries of the law and order approach hold that such associations are no better
than proxies for militant extremists with demoralisation of security forces as their
primary aim and that they shift the focus from the violence, killing and extortion
by the extremists by highlighting the police violence only.
3. On the other hand, there is a growing realisation that such organisations have a
major role to play as interlocutors, and act as a bulwark against abuse of power by
the police and other state functionaries in other words their activities
strengthen the rule of law.
4. While there may be some black sheep among these organisations, there is little
doubt that they have the potential to act as a bridge and in educating the people
 and preventing aggravation of the situation by ventilating public grievances within
the legal-democratic framework.
Cutting the Source of Finances for Naxalites
1. One way to ensure that development funds do not reach the extremists is by
entrusting developmental works temporarily to organisations like BRO and other
governmental agencies which can execute these works directly instead of going
via contractors who then pay extortion money to the naxalites.
2. Activities such as illegal mining and collection of forest produce yield a huge
volume of funds for the extremists. This needs to be checked.
The 5th Schedule (Art 244)
SC/ST schedules
1. He may amend the schedules of notified STs in union or any state. If the state list
is amended, he has to consult the governor of the state.
Administration
1. Presidential powers: He can declare / modify / delete the list of scheduled areas
(5th schedule) subject to laws made by parliament. He can give directions to the
respective states regarding the administration of scheduled areas. All regulations
made by the governor of state for the scheduled areas have to be submitted to
the president and failing his assent shall not have any effect. He may ask the
governor to submit an annual report on the administration of scheduled areas
and instruct him on administrative manners.
2. Governor's powers: Tribal advisory councils may be constituted by him in
scheduled areas to give advice to the governor on such manners as may be
referred to them by the governor. The governor can direct that a particular act
(central or state) or a part thereof is not applicable to the scheduled area or only
applicable with certain modifications. The governor can also regulate the transfer
of land by or among STs and regulate the business of money lending in scheduled
areas.
3. Parliament's powers: Parliament can amend any provisions in schedule 5 with an
ordinary majority.
The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest
Rights) Act, 2006
1. It vests land rights to each tribal family provided they have been the user of
forest land for 3 generations or 75 years. This right is heritable but not
alienable and transferable. Vested land can be used only for livelihood purposes.
2. Rights under this also include access to minor forest produce, community rights to
intellectual property and traditional knowledge related to forest biodiversity and
cultural diversity.
3. The dwellers are duty bound to protect the forests, biodiversity and wildlife in the
area.
The Act holds promise of realising claims of tribal and other forest dwellers2 over the
dwelling and cultivation lands under their occupation. They are also to benefit from
complete ownership rights on non-timber forest produce (NTFP)/minor forest produce
(MFP), and management and protection rights over forest resources, including
community rights.
Implementation Process
The process of implementation of this Act begins right from the gram sabha (GS) level,
where Forest Rights Committees (FRCs)3 are constituted and authorised to assist the
GS collate, verify and approve claims to rights as required. As per the Act, the GS in the
scheduled areas (SAs)4 must be convened at the hamlet level, while in the traditional
villages it has to be at the village level. As per the Act, the FDs have only a negligent role
in the implementation process of the FRA. They are required merely to be present with
the FRCs during the verification stage. Even this presence is not mandatory according to
the rules, and will not imply on the decision of the FRC.

However, in total disregard to the Act, the FD is seen to be functioning as veto in

denying rights to the people, and by rejecting their claims at the screening stage itself
(CSD 2010; GoI 2010; Writ Petition 2011). Hence, it could be said that though,
ostensibly, this Act appears to be people-oriented, the final shots are called by
committees of bureaucrats, elected representatives, and the FD, which incidentally was
never in favour of this Act.
With regard to representation of women in the FRCs, there appears to be complete
overlooking of their share in most of the states, the usual story being inadequate or
complete absence of women. Moreover, the GSs are also being convened without their
attendance (GoI 2010). All this is happening when the fact is now well-established that
women (about 60-70% (Gera 2002)) are the main contributors to the tribal economy
through MFP collection and sale

Community rights were expected to be equally in demand as individual rights because

these rights would provide secure livelihood avenues to the FDP through forest
resources (Kothari 2011). However, the ground reports suggest otherwise because
people failed to take advantage of this provision to the fullest, besides their fallacy of
seeing land first before other rights. he reasons for the poor implementation were:
the FD threatened the communities with losing out on Joint Forest Management (JFM)
funds if they claimed rights on forest resources; the FDs indifferent approach in
facilitating community claims. More glaringly, the community also appeared to not
own the responsibility for community resources because, in many cases, they have
open access to it. Moreover, they saw management of community resources as the
governments responsibility and not theirs
The laws most often overlap with the objectives of the FRA when the national and the
state governments use their authority to issue lands for development projects,
overlooking the possible claims on such lands (Kothari 2011). Such overriding authority
gains strength because the Act remains subject to the states eminent domain in the
acquisition of lands in the name of development projects (Bose 2010).
Lack of awareness among the main stakeholders of the FRA is now a well-
acknowledged fact, especially in the wildlife protection areas where the extremely poor
implementation was obvious because of the vulnerability and poor awareness levels, .
In the case of Other Traditional Forest Dwellers, having to prove their residency for
three generations, or their using the forest for 75 years, appears to discourage them
from their rights through this pungent criterion.
Amendment to ST (Recognition of Rights) Rules, 2012
1. Lay down a procedure for identification or hamlets or settlements and process of
consolidation of their lists.
2. Increase the mandatory tribal membership of Forest Rights Committees from the
present one-thirds to two-thirds.
3. Reduce the present requirement of quorum of two-thirds in the gram sabha
meetings to one-half.
4. Clarify that the term sustenance includes fulfillment of livelihood needs of self
and family, including the sale of any produce.
5. Allow transportation of minor forest produce within and outside forest area.
6. Lay down process for recognition of rights, including community rights.
Niyamgiri
Affirming the decision-making power of the village councils of Rayagada and Kalahandi
under the Forest Rights Act (FRA), the court directed these gram sabhas to take a
decision...within three months on any claims of cultural, religious, community and
individual rights that the forest dwellers of the region may have. the question whether
STs [Scheduled Tribes] and other TFDs [traditional forest dwellers], like Dongria Kondh,
Kutia Kandha and others, have got any religious rights i.e. rights of worship over the
Niyamgiri hills, known as Nimagiri, near Hundaljali, which is the hill top known as
Niyam-Raja, have to be considered by the Gram Sabha,. Gram Sabha can also examine
whether the proposed mining area Niyama Danger, 10 km away from the peak, would
in any way affect the abode of Niyam-Raja. Needless to say, if the BMP [bauxite mining
project], in any way, affects their religious rights...that right has to be preserved and
protected. Once the gram sabhas have made their decision, the court gave the Ministry
of Environment and Forests (MoEF) a further two months to take a final decision on
granting a forest clearance for the bauxite mining project.
In particular, by sending the matter back to the gram sabha because a key matter has
not been placed before it for its active consideration the court is treating the gram
sabha as a statutory, legal authority at the same rank as, say, the forest advisory
committee or MoEF. The Bench also made it clear that the FRA protects a wide range
of rights of forest dwellers and STs including the customary rights to use forest land as a
community forest resource and not restricted merely to property rights or to areas of
habitation.
The Supreme Court's decision to let gram sabhas decide the fate of Vedanta's Niyamgiri
mining project will make it difficult for the government to divert forest land for industry
without the consent of tribals and local population. The apex court's ruling on Thursday
puts gram sabhas or village assemblies virtually at par with statutory and regulatory
bodies, and gives a broader prism of rights to indigenous communities by defining the
Forest Rights Act as more than just heritable property rights.
This will make it difficult for the government to move ahead with its plans to limit the
say of gram sabhas in diversion of forestland for industrial use. In an effort to speed up
industrial projects, a panel headed by the Prime Minister's Office in December last year
had recommended that the rights of gram sabhas under the Forest Rights Act, making
their prior consent mandatory, should be watered down to operate only in cases of
exception.
The ruling linked the constitutional provision for the protection of Scheduled Tribes as
enshrined in Article 224 with protection of religious rights under Articles 25 and 26 and
the Forest Rights Act.
The Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Area) Act, 1996
1. It is very important because it seeks to strengthen local self-governing
institutions. It brings the Gram Sabha at the centre-stage.
2. Gram Sabha has the power to manage community assets like water bodies,
wastelands, and minor forest produce.
3. It vests with the Gram Sabha the power to approve implementation
of development plans and to verify their implementation. It gives the Gram
Sabhas the power to ratify the decisions of the Panchayats. The Gram Sabha will
have control over institutions and functionaries connected with local area
planning.
4. The Gram Sabha is made the custodian of traditions,
culture,identity and customary mode of dispute resolution.
5. Reservation for the STs shall not be less than 50% and that all seats of
Chairpersons of Panchayats at all levels will be reserved.
6. The powers of the Gram Sabha could be divided into the following three
categories:-
1. Functions and responsibilities where the approval of the Village Gram Sabha
is compulsory: (i) Approval of plans, programmes and projects for social and
economic development (before they are taken up for implementation). (ii)
Identification/selection of beneficiaries under anti-poverty/other
programmes. (iii) Grant of certification of utilization of funds to Panchayats.
2. Functions and responsibilities which require compulsory consultation with
the Gram Sabha: (i) acquisition of land for development projects, (ii)
resettlement/rehabilitation of displaced persons.
3. Functions where prior recommendation of the Gram Sabha is necessary: (i)
grant of exploration license and mining lease for minor minerals, (ii) grant of
concession for the exploitation of minor minerals by auction.
7. Gram Sabha has powers with regard to enforcement of prohibition, ownership of
minor forest produce, preventing land alienation, management of village markets,
money lending.
8. Provision of any law relating to Panchayats which is inconsistent with PESA will
cease to operate after one year of its enactment.
9. The higher level Panchayats in Scheduled Areas in no case should marginalize the
Gram Sabhas by assuming their power and authority
Issues with PESA
1. PESA is an indicative legislation.
1. It lays down certain guidelines whose implementation depends on the
States which has been generally tardy.
2. The provisions of PESA have been highly diluted in the process of ratification
by the States and most of the powers of the Gram Sabha have been given to
the district administration or to the Zilla Parishad.
3. It may be useful to link performance in this regard with allocation of untied
grants to the states.
 4. If any State does not implement the provisions of PESA in letter and spirit,
the GoI should issue specific directions to it under the constitution.
2. Poor awareness.
1. The tribal population is not aware of the provisions of the Act. If they are
made aware of the provisions of PESA, it would result in greater
participation.
3. Land related provisions.
1. PESA had specifically provided for prevention of alienation of land. It asked
the State Legislatures not to make any law which is inconsistent with the
objective of preventing alienation of tribal land.
2. It had empowered every Gram Sabha to prevent alienation of land in the
Scheduled Areas and to take appropriate action to restore any unlawfully
alienated land of the Scheduled Tribe.
3. Paradoxically it has been indiscriminately used to promote industrial
development at the expense of tribals via fraudulent gram sabha hearings
and manipulation by local power lobbies.
4. A forum should be established at the central level to monitor its
implementation at the ground level.
4. The 5th Schedule requires the Governor of every State to send an annual report,
but this requirement is not being met regularly. This should be given due
importance. Such reports should be published and placed in the public domain.
5. PESA required all conflicting laws to become invalid after 1 year of its notification.
But in practice these laws are being still followed by the state government
machinery. Similarly there are large number of union legislations and schemes
which need to be harmonised with the provision of PESA.
6. In tribal areas, though, the society and economy is closely woven around
womenfolk, their involvement at the Gram Sabha level is minimal. There is need
to make suitable provisions in the Rules making it mandatory that the quorum of
a Gram Sabha meeting would be acceptable only when out of the members
present, at least 33% are women.
The Tribal Sub-plan (TSP)
1. TSP has been around for many decades but its planning and implementation have
been weak.
2. A major reason is that qualified personnel are reluctant to work in tribal areas. For
government employees, a posting in these areas is considered to be a
punishment.
3. The situation is further compounded by lack of data; there has been little attempt
in the past to have an impact assessment made.
4. Then there is the issue of extremism.
Rehabilitation Issues
New National Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) Policy, 2007
1. Land-for-land, to the extent Government land would be available in the
resettlement areas. Preference in land-for-land for STs followed by SCs.
2. Preference for employment in the project to at least one person from each
nuclear family, subject to the availability of vacancies and suitability of the
affected persons.
3. Training and capacity building for self-employment.
 4. Scholarships for education of eligible persons.
5. Preference to groups of the affected persons in the allotment of contracts and
other economic opportunities in or around the project site.
6. Wage employment to the willing in the construction work in the project.
7. Housing benefits.
8. Tribal Development Plan will include a programme for development for alternate
fuel and also for minor forest produce resources.
9. Consultations with Gram Sabhas and Tribal Councils.
10. A grievance redressal mechanism to be established.
11. Land acquired for a public purpose cannot be transferred to any other purpose
but a public purpose.
Recommendations for Improvement in Rehabilitation in India
1. There is a need to introduce the concept of benefit-sharing in India.
2. The Land Acquisition Act is still based on the concept of cash compensation. The
old concept of paying compensation based on the market value of land should be
replaced with assessing the true value of land for all those who depend on it and
then compensating them adequately.
3. A new legislation must be brought that apart from laying down norms of fair
compensation also incorporates the principles of income-sharing and creation of a
resettlement development fund.
4. Compensation should not be confined only to the title holders of land but should
include all those who derived sustenance from the land.
Special Economic Zones
1. SEZs are land grabs only.
1. SEZ policy in India has led to displacement, loss of agricultural land and real
estate speculation. It has led to a scramble among developers to grab cheap
agricultural land and little attention has been paid to achieving the real
objective of promoting industrial activities.
2. While China had permitted a limited number of very large sized SEZs, in
India hundreds of SEZs have been approved including some that are only
10 hectares in size. These are essentially for real estate speculation only.
3. The 25% requirement on processing activity in SEZs has also been criticised
as too little since it would lead to speculative real estate activity rather than
job creating manufacturing activities.
4. The tax breaks in SEZs which can continue for 15 years will lead to revenue
loss and not create much extra capacity as the existing industries will simply
relocate to the SEZs.
5. Acquiring land for SEZs cannot be termed as a public purpose.
6. Compensation must follow income sharing approach.
Linkages Between Organized Crime and Terrorism
Various Security Forces and Agencies

The Defence Procurement Policy, 2013

1. Lays down the preferred order for defence procurement
1. Buy (Indian): The buy (Indian) mode is the one in which procurement is
done directly from a domestic firm and is expected to boost local
production.
 2. Buy and make (Indian): Make means making in the public sector. Its
procedures have been simplified and cases would be cleared quickly.
3. Make.
4. Buy, make with transfer of technology.
5. Buy (global): This is the hitherto prevalent mode and means purchasing in
entirety from a global original equipment manufacturer. It would now be the
least preferred.
2. Level playing field between DPSUs and the private defense companies
1. An advantage that DPSUs have over private sector has been the MoDs
nomination of selected DPSUs as the recipients of Maintenance Transfer of
Technology from foreign vendors in major acquisitions.
2. Now this system of nomination will be done away with and the winning
vendor will have a free choice to tie up with a firm of its own choice
private or public for the MToT.
3. Clear definition of Indigenous Content: The Indigenous Content has now been
defined in more specific terms, providing requisite clarity. Self certification by
vendors will be accepted.
4. Expediting defence procurements: The proposed amendments now stipulate that
the SQR will be frozen before the AON has been granted the stage at which the
government gives a service the go ahead to start a procurement project. Further,
the validity period of AON has also been reduced from two years to one year. This
has been done to reduce the time gap that large defense procurements generally
suffer from. Together, these measures are expected to expedite the acquisition
process and increase transparency.
5. Enhanced delegation of financial powers: The financial powers of the service
chiefs and the defence procurement board have been increased.
6. Advance consultations with the industry: Indian defense companies will get access
to the militarys long-term equipment road map, providing them with the time
needed for developing the equipment that the military needs in the
future. Militarys 15-year Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) will be
shared with them.
7. It explicitly defines items which need a defense items. Dual use items will not
require license.
SWOT Analysis for Indian Private Sector
The Indian private sector needs to work a lot to achieve the desirable quality and scale.
But there exist many obstacles for it.
1. Adverse policy and regulatory environment.
2. Lack of level playing field with DPSUs.
3. Lack of a manufacturing ecosystem.
4. Distorted monopsonistic defence market.
5. An ambiguous defence offset policy.
6. Poor investment in R&D.
7. Large capex requirements coupled with long gestation periods.
A positive for the private sector is the large market size available to it.
Next Steps for Government
1. Encouraging defence production ecosystems within the upcoming NIMZ,
especially for dual use technologies.
 2. Using the defence offset policy to encourage joint ventures by offering additional
multipliers on their discharge of offset obligations.

FDI in Defence
1. Opposing the FDI
1. Defence sector must be the monopoly of the defence public sector
undertakings.
2. Relaxing the ceiling would make the Indian defence sector hostage to
foreign companies, jeopardising our national security.
2. Supporting the FDI
1. No large nation is so dependent on imports as India is. The so called
indigenous defence industry is non existent, has been non existent for the
past 60 years. Any continuation of the same policies based on above
arguments given by FDI opposition will keep our country perpetually
dependent on imports.
2. Higher imports hurt our security more than higher foreign equity of some
defence companies may.
3. To develop even the indigenous private sector capabilities an ecosystem
needs to be created. The technology and competition accompanying the
higher FDI will only help in creating such ecosystem. The JVs will give
requisite experience to the domestic players to develop their own
capabilities as well. Brazil has done this successfully through liberalization of
its defence sector.
4. 26% FDI is too small to attract major players. 26% equity holding only lets
them block special resolutions. It does not give them the freedom to appoint
directors. It also limits the profit of such companies. Why then should a
company transfer technology and create competition for the parent
companies?
3. What needs to be done?
1. Have no limit on FDI. Vary the limit on a case-to-case basis depending on
what a company may be proposing to establish in India. If the technology is
necessary to fill critical gaps in Indian technology, allow even 100% and
impose conditions such as the hiring of Indian engineers and sourcing
components indigenously. This would help the development of ancillary
industries.
2. Assure continuing orders for a decade or so in the form of repeat orders.
Impose conditions necessitating technology upgradation when they are
available with the parent company.
3. Encourage the firms to gradually transfer their holdings to Indian firms.

Aircraft Carriers Launch Technologies

Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL)
1. It uses aircrafts which are capable of landing and taking off just like helicopters.
Currently being used in INS Virat and an old technology.
Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR)
 1. Used in Admiral Gorshkov and INS Vikrant (planned 1st indigenous aircraft
carrier). Aircrafts will fly off an inclined ramp and land with the help of arrester
wires like a hook on the fighters tail.
Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR)
1. To be used in INS Vishal (which will follow the Vikrant). This has a steam-driven
piston system catapulting the aircraft to get airborne. With greater steam
pressure, significantly heavier aircraft can be launched.
Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS)
1. It uses a new-generation catapult which has a powerful electro-magnetic field
instead of steam. It can launch still heavier aircrafts, AEWs and drones. EMALS
causes less wear and tear on carrier-launched aircraft since electric power can be
delivered more accurately than steam.
2. It also launches aircraft quicker; requires less personnel to operate; and its high
acceleration allows launches in still conditions, when STOBAR aircraft carriers
must sail at 20-30 knots to generate wind-over-deck, needed to create the lift
required for take off.

Cabinet Committee on Security

1. It is chaired by the PM and the members are ministers of defence, home, finance
and external affairs.
National Security Council (created in 1998)
1. It is the highest body that deals with country's political, economic, energy
and strategic security.
2. It has the National Security Advisor (NSA) who is its functional head. He
directly reports to the PM and advises on internal and external security
issues.
3. RAW and IB give their reports to the NSA who then briefs the PM.
4. Its other members are defence minister, external affairs minister, internal
affairs minister, finance minister, deputy chairman of PC and any other
minister as per the requirement is called.
5. It is divided into 3 parts
1. Strategic Policy Group: It has a large number of members and is the
main nucleus of those who deliberate and develop the policies on
security matters. Cabinet Secretary, Chairman of CBDT, chief of the 3
forces, home secretary, defence secretary, governor RBI, heads of all
intelligence agencies are all members of it.
2. National Security Advisory Board: These are the people who are
experts in various fields. They may not be government servants but can
analyze various threats and provide input to the NSA.
3. Joint Intelligence Committee: It receives all information inputs from IB,
RAW and the 3 armed forces intelligence.
Army Structure
1. Command (based on geographical regions) --> Corps --> Division --> Brigade -->
Battalion --> Company --> Platoon (30 soldiers) --> Sections.
Naval Structure
1. Vizag is an important naval base because our submarines are located there.
Strategic Force Command
 1. Nuclear assets and delivery mechanisms are managed by the Nuclear Command
Authority under which the Strategic Force Command comes under.
2. Nuclear Command Authority is the policy directive arm (civil authorities) of the
SFC.
3. SFC is headed by an Airforce officer but may come under rotation system.
Space Command
Cyber Command
Special Force Command
Civilian Control on Defence Forces
1. Top structure is civilian.
2. All the ordnance depots are manned and controlled by the civilians.
3. DRDO is controlled by civilians.
4. Defence production is also headed by civilian authorities.
5. Defence budget is also decided by the civilian authorities. Defence accounts are
also headed by the civilian authorities. Defence land is also controlled by the
civilian authorities (Defence Forces Estates Services). Armed Forces Headquarters
Service is also a civilian bureaucracy.
6. The highest level where the 3 defence chiefs meet without any civilian
representation is the CoSC level. Beyond this all committees have civilian
representation.
7. Power of the civil authorities to call defence forces for help under certain
circumstances.
Role of Defence Forces in Aid to Civil Power
1. This is a statutory power given to civilian authorities (to call defence forces for
help). But once called in, all operations are commanded by the defence forces
only.
2. Civilian authority can seek any help from the troops under following
circumstances:
1. To maintain law and order.
2. To maintain essential services.
3. To assist the civilian authority during natural calamities.
4. Any other assistance that may be asked for by the competent civilian
authority.
3. Principles governing calling the defence forces by the civilian authorities:
1. Principle of necessity. The necessity should be such that it demands calling
of the armed forces.
2. Principle of minimal force. In case there is a threat and a force has to be
applied, then minimum sufficient force should be used.
3. Principle of impartiality. When the troops are called in, they shall function in
an impartial manner. Can't be called to quell political protests as the
Egyptian army demonstrated.
4. Principle of good faith. No malafide intention in calling the defence forces.
Role of Defence Forces in UN Peace Keeping Force
Role of Defence Forces in Internal Security
AFSPA, 1958
Provisions
1. AFSPA provides armed forces extensive powers including:
 1. Shooting to kill merely on grounds of suspicion and search and arrest
without warrant on suspicion only.
2. Destroying the arms stores, hideouts, shelters, training camps on suspicion
only.
3. Any person arrested and taken into custody shall be handed over to the
officer in-charge of the nearest police station at the soonest.
2. It was intended to give immunity to armed forces during their operations against
any genuine mistakes. However it has been misused extensively in Kashmir even
outside their duty.
3. Criminal proceedings against Armed Forces personnel can only be carried out on
the permission of Defence Ministry and that against the para-military personnel
can be carried out on the permission of the Home Ministry.
Disturbed Areas Act (DAA)
1. Only the parliament has the power to declare any territory as "disturbed" though
in Kashmir both the Governor and the President have this power. The
constitutionality of the act was challenged before the SC in a Nagaland case. SC
rejected the contention of arbitrariness by saying that for declaring any area as
"disturbed area", there must exist a grave situation of law and order. The other
conditions under which it is invoked are:
1. The scale of unrest is to big and the local administration and the police force
must have failed to tackle the issue.
2. A withdrawal of the central forces from the disturbed area will lead to the
return of the miscreants.
2. Disturbed Areas Act (DAA) was enacted in
1990 was initially extended to Kashmir valley. AFSPA was also extended to fight mi
litancy. Later various districts of Jammu were brought under it too.
3. The extension of this Act is subject to judicial review. But the acts done by Army
under the AFSPA remain immune even if DAA is revoked.
Proposed Amendments
1. Establishing a proper grievance redressal mechanism to investigate genuine
complaints.
2. Power to arrest without warrant to be taken away.
3. Immunity can't be invoked if death was due to armed forces opening fire first.
SC Judgement on AFSPA
1. It addressed the issue of need for sanction to prosecute Army officers under
AFSPA. CBI claimed that the people who were killed were indeed victims of fake
encounters. The CBI moved the court to initiate prosecution against the accused
Army officers. The officers claimed that they could only be prosecuted with the
prior sanction (permission) of the central government. It must be noted that Army
officers can be tried either before criminal courts or through court-martial. The
Army officers had appealed that both procedures require prior sanction of the
government.
2. The judgment reiterated an earlier ruling. It held that sanction would not be
required in all cases to prosecute an official. The officer only enjoys immunity
from prosecution in cases when he has acted in exercise of powers conferred
under the Act. There should be reasonable nexus between the action and the
duties of the official. The Court cited the following example to highlight this
 point: If in a raid, an officer is attacked and he retaliates, his actions can be linked
to a lawful discharge of duty. Even if there were some miscalculations in the
retaliation, his actions cannot be labeled to have some personal motive. The Court
held that the AFSPA empowers the central government to ascertain if an action is
reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty and is not a misuse of
authority.
3. At what stage is sanction required? The Court ruled that under the AFSPA sanction
is mandatory. But, the need to seek sanction would only arise at the time of
cognizance of the offence. Cognizance is the stage when the prosecution begins.
Sanction is therefore not required during investigation.
4. The Court ruled that there is no requirement of sanction for court-martial. If the
Army decides on proceedings before the criminal court, the government will have
three months to determine to grant or withhold sanction.
Para-military Forces
The Assam Rifles
1. It is under the MoIA but functionally it is under the Indian Army. Its headquarters
is in Shillong.
2. Their mandate is to manage the border in Myanmar, anti - drug trafficking and
intelligence gathering.
Special Frontier Force
1. It was created after the Chinese aggression in 1962. It is a special force based in
Uttarakhand (HQ at Chakrata). It was earlier under IB and later on shifted under
RAW. For day to day functioning, it is a part of the army.
2. The complete SFF is specialized in para-trooping activities. Their area of
specialization is parachutes, jungle warfare, unconventional warfare, mountain
and arctic warfare, amphibious warfare. The entire force is airborne.
3. Its mandate is:
1. Spatial reconnaissance i.e. going deep behind the enemy lines to gather
intelligence.
2. They can fight directly against aggression.
3. They are trained in rescue operations and hostage situations.
4. Counter terrorism.
Indian Coast Guard
1. Although it falls under MIA, it functions under the Indian Navy. It is tasked with
safety of the coasts, guarding our EEZ, controlling marine pollution, illegal
immigration, human and narcotics trafficking, controlling illegal movement of
foreign vessels. It is commanded by a naval officer.
Central Police Forces
NSA
Few Terms
Few Current Topics
Mandate
Issues