SUBJECT : CRIMINAL LAW

1. People vs Hilario et al GR 128083, March 16, 2001

Topic : Aggravating Circumstances

FACTS:

Carlo Reyes, the victim in this case, lost his life. One quiet evening, while relaxing with his friend named
Berong in front of a store, he was subjected to a treacherous assault by two brothers and their
cumpadre. It turned out the three mistakenly bent their terror on him. The one they really planned to
kill was Berong.

On the trial court, based on the strong testimony of a witness, it was found out that the three accused
were seen that they had planned and intended to kill Berong, but, only the brothers knew Berong very
well. The three accused waited for the nighttime to come, and when it came prior to the
commencement of the attack, they established vision on Berong and Carlo Reyes. The brothers
instructed their cumpadre that their target is wearing a white shirt. On the process, however, Berong
removed his shirt. This small act of removing his shirt had tremendously saved his life. It causes
confusion to the cumpadre and in effect, mistakenly stabbed a knife to Carlo Reyes. The mistake was
evidently expressed by the cumpadre by asking the brothers, eto ba?

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the killing constitutes evident premeditation even if that the person killed was mistaken to
another person.

(2) Whether treachery is present at this case.

HELD:

(1) No, there is no evident premeditation. It may not properly be taken into account when the person
whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim. When the
person decided to kill a different person and premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when he
carried out his plan he actually killed another person, it cannot properly be said that he premeditated on
the killing of the actual victim. Thus premeditation was not aggravating in the case of People vs.
Guillen, where the accused had deliberately intended to assassinate former President Manuel Roxas but
he killed instead Simeon Varela and wounded others. This doctrinal rule applies here.

(2) There is trachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault on the part of the person attacked. he
manner of attack employed by the appellant together with his co-accused was deliberate and
unexpected. It never gave Carlos Reyes, the victim, an opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. In fact,
Carlos was sitting when he was stabbed. He was just relaxing in front of a store. So too, the accused
purposely sought the cover of darkness (nighttime, which is absorbed by treachery) in finally effecting
their plan.

On the absence of the other accused, Rodrigo Hilario y Martinez GUILTY of MURDER qualified
by treachery. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with all
the accessory penalties imposed by law.

2. SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

Topic: Breach of promise to marry

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided
to get married.

On August 23, 1954, they applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.

Preparations for the big day were been set. Bride-to-bes trousseau or dresses, invitations
printed and distributed, a matrimonial bed, bridal showers were given and gifts received,
dresses for maid of honor and flower girls all of these were been prepared.

And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,
simply left a note for Beatriz Velez stating:

Dear Bet, Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... "

He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he
wired plaintiff:

"Nothing changed rest assured returning soon."

But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Issue: Whether or not there is an answerable damage for the defendant due to his mere
breach of promise to marry.

Held: Yes. A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But surely this is
not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a wedding and go through all
the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21, which stated:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
 Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.

Therefore, the Courts decision was to order the defendant to pay the plaintiff P15,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages.

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000

Topic: Regalarian Doctrine

SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks.

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount
to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.