4 SCRA 1 Political Law Appointing Power Midnight Appointments

Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos

Garcia during the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim
governor of the Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal
took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the
same time he appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central
Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warrantoproceeding claiming that he is qualified
to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by
the former president. Macapagal averred that the ex-presidents appointments
were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which,
and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he
would have the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified
to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can
nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcias appointments are hurried
maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the
policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his
appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment
was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not
only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.

0 SCRA 22 Law on Public Officers Ad Interim Appointment

In 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the Vice-
President for Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM).
Estebans appointment was ad interim in nature (because at that time the PLM
Board of Regents was not in session). His appointment was extended in 1975.
However, he later discovered that his name was not included among those
recommended for permanent appointment. He then requested Blanco to make
him a permanent appointee. Blanco, however, appointed Esteban as Professor
III instead and his appointment as VP for Admin was terminated. Esteban brought
the case before the Civil Service Commission where he got a favorable
judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court
reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee.
HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that
the term ad interim as used in the Philippines does not literally translate to
temporary. In this jurisdiction an ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment. This was explained in the landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta:
an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section
10, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is an
appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other
than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an acting appointment which is merely temporary, good
until another permanent appointment is issued.
In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely
nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in
session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such
appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves
them. If confirmed, the appointees term is converted into the regular term
inherent in the position. In the case at bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed
by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco however did not relay this confirmation
to Esteban. The latter was made to believe (due to souring relationship with
Blanco) that his appointment was extended but only as an extension of
temporary appointment.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta

AM No. 98-5-01-SC | November 9, 1998

FACTS:

On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo

Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it
seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
 positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety."

A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss
the constitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the
forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was in the position that election ban had no application to the CA
based on the Commissions records. This hypothesis was then submitted to the
President for consideration together with the Councils nominations for 8
vacancies in the CA.

The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from
the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of
CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement
of the ban on appointments), which implies that the Presidents Office did not
agree with the hypothesis.

The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission
of the list of final nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by
the Constitution (from Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the
JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after the
May elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view
(hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998
appointments. However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other
members of the Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This
prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter
from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where the President expressed his
view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments, the whole
article being entitled EXECUTIVE DEPT. He posited that appointments in the
Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
 within ninety days from the occurrence thereof."
Article 8 Sec 9
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall
be appointed by the President from the list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.

On May 12, CJ received from Malacanang, the appointments of the 2 Judges

of the RTC mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations
on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their
oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so
without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should be noted that the
originals of the appointments for both judges had been sent to and received by
the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latters office and had not been transmitted
yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7
Malacanang copy of his appointment.

In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential election, Art8 shall
apply where vacancies in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition
in Art7 must be considered where the President shall not make any
appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in order not
to tie the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.

ISSUE:

WON the President can fill vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to Article 8 Sec 4
and 9, during the appointment ban period stated in Article 7 Sec 15.

HELD:

Article 8 Sec 4 and 9 simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies
in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Article7
Sec15. Thus, the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts
nor allowed to do so. Likewise, the prohibition on appointments comes into
effect only once every six years. The Court also pointed out that Article8 Sec4
and 9 should prevail over Article7 Sec15 as they may be considered later
expressions of the people when they adopted the Constitution.

The Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, declared the appointments signed

by the President on March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta VOID.
They are ordered to cease and desist from discharging the office of Judge of the
Courts to which they were respectively appointed on the said date. They come
within the operation of the prohibition on appointments. While the filling of
judiciary vacancies is in the public interest, there is no compelling reason to justify
such appointment within the 2 months appointment ban.

In view of Valenzuelas oath taking, the authenticity of the letter of which was
not verified from the Office of the Court Administrator, SC reiterated the standing
practice and procedures in appointments to the Judiciary that originals of all
appointments are to be sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the
Chief Justice. The Clerk of Court of the SC, in the Chief Justices behalf, will
advice the appointee of their appointments as well as the date of
commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by
the Philippine Judicial Academy for new judges.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for
the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the
Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January
18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments,
they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written
in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political
vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that
is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume
its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five,
or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to
be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof

472 SCRA 587 Political Law Commission on Appointment Ad Interim

Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity
Law on Public Officers Modes and Kinds of Appointment
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of
their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint
against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make
such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that,
in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in
an acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an
officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not
exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting
capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided
the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that
the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a
year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was
in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments this also proves that the
president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president.
The choice is the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those
whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the
undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary
or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President
who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That
person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also
provides that the president may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity

Appointments in an Acting
Ad Interim Appointments
Capacity

It is a permanent
appointment because it
takes effect immediately Acting appointments are
and can no longer be a way of temporarily filling
withdrawn by the President important offices but, if
once the appointee has abused, they can also be
Description
qualified into office. The fact a way of circumventing
that it is subject to the need for confirmation
confirmation by the COA by the Commission on
does not alter its permanent Appointments.
character (Matibag vs
Benipayo)
 When Upon Acceptance by Upon Acceptance by
Effective Appointee Appointee

When Any time when there is

When Congress is in recess
Made vacancy

Submitted
Yes No
to the COA

208 SCRA 254 Political Law Appointment List of Appointees Requiring COA
Confirmation Cannot Be Expanded by Law
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor
Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners
and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President,
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale
et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The
appointments were however not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter
John Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the
confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted that RA 6715 is
not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in
Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President
in addition to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers
required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the
Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups
of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA
is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors,
public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions (first group). With respect to the other officers (second to fourth
group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose
appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase and other officers
required by law at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments at the end of the second sentence.
Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the
Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for
presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII,
including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and
members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government
officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those
officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when
Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or
provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are
considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law.

156 SCRA 549 Political Law Appointment of Head of Bureaus Officers

Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was
appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president
Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the
bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment
of Mison because it appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the
new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of
Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as
one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president
which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do
not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the
Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need
to be confirmed by the COA.

172 SCRA 150 Political Law Appointments Commission on Human Rights

Security of Tenure
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-
Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In
December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista
then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments
(COA) requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for
confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman,
Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her position as
chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down
in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautistas appointment with the COA,
Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA
considered Bautistas appointment as ad interim.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COAs actions. She
impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which
provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the
president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided
not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman
of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not
specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and
Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints
the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec
16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among
the officers of government whom he (the President) may be authorized by law
to appoint. The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to
the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautistas appointment to the COA for confirmation
is merely political in nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution.
Appointment to the CHR should be made without the participation of the COA.
Thus, Corys act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is
done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the
COA for the latters approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because
at the time of submission, the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is
not vacant as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was the
incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautistas appointment as ad
interim. Since the position of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject
to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are always permanent and
cannot be ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and
members of the CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same
is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163
provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7
years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at
the pleasure of the president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of
office. They can only be removed upon cause and with the observance of due
process.

177 SCRA 259 Political Law Appointment of Sectoral Representatives

Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a
sectoral representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while
Congress was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of
office but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against
Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the
COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment
does not need the concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7,
Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be
confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
VII (or the first group abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely,
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. All other appointments by the President are to be made without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments.
Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. The provision of the
Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard is Section 7,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees
by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in
paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.

21 SCRA 336 Political Law Appointments When Not Bypassed by a Law

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided
that the Board shall be composed of:
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be
designated by the Secretary of Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be
designated by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its
Chairman; and
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of
Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines.
Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made certain assessments
against Cecilio Rafael but the latter refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and
he averred that RA 3137 is unconstitutional for while Congress may create an
office it cannot specify who shall be appointed therein; that the members of the
EACIB can only be appointed by the President in accordance with Article 7, Sec.
10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act prescribes that the chairman and
members of the EACIB should come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a
declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the
constitutional power of the President to make appointments.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the appointing power of the president.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed the appointing power is
the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations maybe
imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the
concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the
limited power to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive office.
In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB are not appointed by the
Department Heads. They are merely going to be designated hence whoever
was designated was merely sitting as an ex officio member. It must also be noted
that Congress took care to specify that the representatives should come from
the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce and Industry
and the National Economic Council. The obvious reason must be because these
departments and/or bureaus perform functions which have a direct relation to
the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into embroidery and
apparel products and their subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt
in RA 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make appointments. The law
is not unconstitutional.

58 SCRA 272 Political Law Appointments Appellate Jurisdiction of the

President Rule on Next-in-Rank
Vicenta Oliveros-Torre and a certain Virginia Barros were both fighting over the
position as the Chief Drug Inspector (CDI) of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). Both are more than qualified.
Rosario Capistrano was the incumbent CDI. Barros was the next in rank as she
was the Supervising Drug Inspector and even at that point she is also contesting
the position with Capistrano. Capistrano went on leave and Torre was appointed
as the acting CDI.
When Capistranos leave expired the Secretary of Health extended Torres
appointment until Capistranos return. The said office was given due course by
the Office of the President. Barros then filed a protest before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) claiming that she has the right to the office because she was
next in rank. CSC initially declared Barros to be the rightful person to the
contested position. Torre then relinquished her office to Barros but Torre
appealed to the CSC and the CSC reversed its earlier decision. Barros appealed
to the CSC and was denied hence she went to the Executive Secretary (Office
of the President). Through Under Secretary Flores Bayot, the Executive Secretary
granted the appeal by Barros and the CSC decision was reversed. Torre
appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the Office of the President cannot
review and reverse the decision of the CSC regarding appointments; she argued
that under the Civil Service Act the decision of the CSC Commissioner shall be
final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has appellate jurisdiction to
review and reverse decisions promulgated by the CSC when it comes to
appointments.
HELD: Yes, the President can. Under Sec 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code
and Sec. 37 of Act 4007, the President as department head can review, modify
or revoke decisions or actions of the chiefs of bureaus, offices, divisions or service
under his department as well as exercise the power expressly vested by law in
such chief or head of the bureau, office, division or service. The appellate
jurisdiction of the President on disputed appointments is also expressly affirmed
by Sec. 693 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that
A disbursing officer, the head of any department, bureau, or office, or the
Auditor General, may apply for, and the Commissioner of CSC shall render, a
decision upon any question as to whether a position is in the unclassified or in the
unclassified civil service, or whether the appointment of any person to a
classified position has been made in accordance with law, which decision, when
rendered, shall be final unless reversed by the President of the Philippines on
appeal.
But even without such express statutory conferment of appellate jurisdiction on
the President, he can at any time by virtue of his power of control over executive
departments, bureaus and offices, expressly vested in him by the 1935
Constitution, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision of his
subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can
exercise this power motu propio without need of any appeal from any party.
Torre argued that the power of control granted by the Constitution to the
President over executive departments, bureaus, offices and services, should be
limited to a review of administrative acts, not to decisions of the Commissioner
of Civil Service on contested appointments; this untenable for the law makes no
distinction as to what administrative acts and the acts of the CSC where there
is no distinction made by law, the Court must not distinguish.

232 SCRA 553 Political Law Appointments Congress Cant Expand the
Appointing Power of the President
Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas by then president Fidel Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer,
opposed the said appointment and he argued that Singson cannot perform
such position without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa
invoked Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of
the BSP if appointed is subject to the confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative
powers in requiring the confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the
Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA cited in Section 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation
powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

54 SCRA 165 Political Law Appointments Residual Power to Appoint

La Carlota City (Negros Occidental) was created by Republic Act 4585 in 1965.
In 1966, Rodulfo Niere was appointed by the mayor of La Carlota as the City
Engineer.
In 1968, Jose Quiambao was appointed by the President as the City Engineer of
the same city (La Carlota). Quiambaos appointment was pursuant to the
Decentralization Act (effective January 1968). Sec 4 thereof provides that the
position of the city engineer must be filled in by the appointment of the President.
Niere relinquished the office but it was in protest and so he filed a quo
warranto case before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Niere lost
in that case and so he filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Nieri asserts that the charter of La Carlota provides that it is the City Mayor who
should appoint the City Engineer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nieri was legally appointed as the City Engineer.
HELD: No. It appears that the charter of La Carlota did not have a provision which
authorizes the mayor thereof to appoint the city engineer. In fact, the
deliberations in Congress when La Carlotas charter was being drafted revealed
that it was the intention of the lawmakers to exclude the position of city engineer
from among those local officers whom the mayor can appoint.
Since the city mayor, under La Carlotas charter, is without authority to appoint
the city engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the
Philippines, who, under Section 10(3) of Article 7 of the [1935] Constitution, shall
nominate all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for; because when a statute does not specify how
an officer is to be appointed, the appointment must be made by the President
(residual power of appointment).
The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the President.
Consequently, any diminution in its scope must be clear and unequivocal.