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The Capability Approach

The document discusses the capability approach as a framework for social justice. It covers: 1) Capabilities as a metric for justice, focusing on what people are able to do and be rather than the means of well-being. 2) Differences between the capability approach and Rawls' primary goods approach, which focuses on institutional arrangements rather than individual freedoms. 3) Challenges in selecting which specific capabilities are relevant for justice assessments and providing objective lists of essential capabilities.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
125 views3 pages

The Capability Approach

The document discusses the capability approach as a framework for social justice. It covers: 1) Capabilities as a metric for justice, focusing on what people are able to do and be rather than the means of well-being. 2) Differences between the capability approach and Rawls' primary goods approach, which focuses on institutional arrangements rather than individual freedoms. 3) Challenges in selecting which specific capabilities are relevant for justice assessments and providing objective lists of essential capabilities.

Uploaded by

Raul Martin
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The Capability Approach (And Social Justice)

Ingrid Robeyns

The capability approach is a normative framework which consist two core normative claims: first, that
the freedom to achieve well-being is of moral importance, and second that freedom to achieve well-
being is to be understood in terms of peoples capabilities, that is, their real opportunity to do and be
what they have reason to value. This approach prioritizes peoples beings and doings and their
opportunities to realize those beings and doings.

1. Capabilities as a Metric of Justice

A capability is the ability and opportunity that a person has to convert resources into a means to
promote his/her needs and interests. Capability approach focuses on peoples functionings and
capabilities. Functionings are beings (the various states of human beings) and doings (activities that a
person can undertake). Examples of doings are voting in an election, caring for a child, taking drugs,
killing animals, eating animals, etc. Examples of beings are being well-nourished, being undernourished,
being educated, being illiterate, etc. To every functioning corresponds a capability, being the real
opportunity one has to achieve that functioning. It means that capabilities stand to functionings as an
opportunity stands to outcome, or the potential stands to be realized. The capability approach
emphasizes that judgment of justice should focus on what really matters to people, which is their
freedom to achieve well-being. It means that we should focus on the ends rather than the means of
well-being, and these ends are what people are able to be and to do. Thus, on capability approach the
metric of justice is the ends.

2. Capabilities versus Social Primary Goods

The primary difference between these approaches is that in capability approach the metric of justice is
the ends while in primary goods approach the metric of justice is the opposite of ends which is the
means. On the primary goods approach, pioneered by John Rawls, the metric of justice is the goods that
one receives from the particular arrangement of social, political, and economic institutions. This
approach is the opposite of the capability approach which established that the measure of justice is the
means. This theory of Rawls is strongly opposed by Sen arguing that the primary goods approach fails to
consider the diversity of human beings. It cannot adequately deal with the differences among
individuals in their abilities to convert primary goods into what people are able to do and to be in their
lives. Instead, Sen proposes that we should focus on the extent of substantive freedom that a person
effectively has, for instance, his capabilities. Moreover, Sen argued that Rawls theory is inflexible
because it excluded persons with disability from the scope of his theory. Rawls focuses only on the
theory of justice for normal cases. The scope of Rawls theory of justice is limited to the basic structures
of the society, to liberal democratic societies rather than also to nondemocratic and illiberal societies,
and to the principles of justice insofar as they apply to people in their capacity as citizens. On the other
hand, the scope of capability approach can be summarized as justice applies everywhere, that is, it
applies to all human beings, and not only to social institutions but also to the social ethos and to social
practices.
Rawlsians have criticized the capability approach too. Rawls avoid a perfectionist account of justice.
First, the capability approach is seen to be endorsing a particular comprehensive moral view, which
Rawlsians find objectionable. Another main objection to capability approach is that it fails to meet the
publicity criterion. Concept of justice must be public and the necessary information to make a claim of
injustice must be verifiable by all, and easily accessible. Rawlsians argue that a theory of justice needs a
public standard of interpersonal comparisons because if there is no public standard the obtained
principles of justice among citizens with diverse conception of good life will not prove stable.

3. Which Capabilities are Relevant for Justice?

The selection of relevant capabilities is one major challenge for the capability approach to justice.
Defenders of this approach often overlook the specific account of deliberative processes that is required
in selecting the relevant capabilities, they also fail to provide specific account of well-being in terms of
an objective lists and most importantly they neglect to give complete lists of which capabilities are
meeting these criteria. However, Martha Nussbaum is an exemption. Nussbaum succeeds to provide us
objective lists of well-being to justify capability approach to justice. There are three ways to select the
relevant capabilities for the purpose of justice. First, through the democratic route proposed by
Amartya Sen. Sen argued that processes of public reasons and democratic deliberation should lead to
the selection of relevant capabilities. Yet the specific account of deliberative processes need to selecting
the relevant capabilities has not been provided by Sen. Second, through criteria route, defended by
Elizabeth Anderson. The criteria that the selected capabilities should meet are proposed and defended
by criteria route. Example of criteria route is Andersons theory of democratic equality. Anderson argued
that people should be entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary to enable them to avoid or escape
entanglement in oppressive social relationships and to the capabilities necessary for functioning as an
equal citizen in a democratic state. But Anderson neglects to give a complete list of which capabilities
are meeting these criteria. Finally, through objective-list route which is effectively justified by Martha
Nussbaum. Her minimal theory of justice is the most well-known version of capability approach which
relies on objective list of well-being. Nussbaums theory of social justice is comprehensive in the sense
that it is not limited to an account of political justice, or to liberal democracies. Rather, her account
holds for all human beings, independently whether they are living in a liberal democratic regime, or of
whether they are severely disabled. The only limit of Nussbaums theory is that it provides only a partial
and minimal account of justice by specifying thresholds of a list of capabilities that government in all
nations should guarantee to their citizens. The list contains capabilities that grouped together under ten
fundamental human capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought,
emotions practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, and control over ones environment.
Nussbaum justifies her list by arguing that each of these capabilities is needed in order for a human life
to be not so impoverish that it is not worthy of the dignity of a human being. These ten essential human
capabilities are moral rights of every human being.

4. Aggregating Capabilities

Another challenge to capability approach is the question of how to aggregate the different capabilities
that are judge to be relevant for issues of justice. This question is essential since the capability approach
endorses a multidimensional metric of justice. But unfortunately theorists of capability approach fail to
solve this problem. Even the aggregation mechanism available in Dworkins or Rawls theory neglects to
provide a satisfactory solution to the aggregation problem. In Rawls theory of justice, aggregation
problem is unsolved because the primary goods are noncommensurable or it ignores to have a common
measure. In addition, Dworkins envy test to make comparisons between the resources- which includes
not only their material possessions, but also their skills, talents, and handicaps, that people hold also
provide no solution to this problem because it offers little to political leaders or policy makers who
cannot make these envy tests on behalf of all the citizens. Thus, the problem of aggregation would be
the problem for the capability approach to justice.

But, theorists of capability approach find ways to circumvent the need for aggregation. A capability
theory of justice that endorses sufficiency as the distributive rule, such as Nussbaums theory, can avoid
the problem of aggregation, since such a theory specifies that justice requires only that all people meet
a certain threshold-level for each capability. Yet even such theory has two major problems to solve.
First, the question on which persons or which foundational principles decide on the threshold. Second,
in an unjust world, which capability should we prioritize if not all people are entitled of the thresholds of
all relevant capabilities listed by Nussbaum.

5. A Family of Capability Theories of Justice

The open nature of the capability approach allows for the development of a family of capability theories
of justice. The works of Nussbaum, Sen and other proponent of capability approach are needed to be
added to other theoretical modules for a complete capability theory of justice including, Rawls theory
of justice which justifies its principles and claim of justice through the thought-experiment and
Dworkins egalitarian justice theory which develops meta-principle of equal respect and concern.

Even if capability theorists develop answers to the questions on which capabilities are relevant for
issues of justice and how to aggregate these capabilities have been addressed, a number of theoretical
choices remain to be made and defended. First, a theory of justice needs to explain on what basis it
justifies its principles or claims of justice. Second, a capability theory of justice needs to take a
proposition on the distributive rule that it will endorse. Third, when developing a capability theory of
justice we must decide whether we want it to be an outcome or an opportunity theory, that is, whether
we should assess injustices in terms of functionings or in terms of capabilities, or a mixture. Finally, a
capability theory of justice needs to specify where the line between individual and collective
responsibility is drawn, or how it will be decided, and by whom, where this line will be drawn. This list of
theoretical choices which a complete capability theory of justice needs to entail brings scholars to
conclude that a capability theory of justice is theoretically demanding and requires much philosophical
work to turn the open-ended capability approach into a specific theory of justice.

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