SECOND DIVISION

DOLORES PINTIANO-ANNO, G.R. No. 163743

Petitioner,
- versus -

ALBERT ANNO (deceased) and Promulgated:

PATENIO SUANDING,
Respondents. January 27, 2006
x-----------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated January 23, 2004 and May
24, 2004, respectively, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, which
dismissed the complaint for cancellation of transfer documents and damages, with prayer for preliminary
injunction, filed by petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
First, the facts. Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno and respondent Albert Anno (spouses Anno) were married on
January 23, 1963. No children were born out of their marriage.Petitioner contends that during their marriage,
they acquired a 4-hectare public, unregistered, virgin, agricultural land in Lamut, Becket, La Trinidad, Benguet. In
1974, the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert Anno,
under tax declaration no. 12242. Petitioner contends that she and her spouse had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land; that they both worked on the land, and,
that they also hired a caretaker to oversee it. The 1985 tax declaration described the land as camotal and
decreased its area to 2.6735 hectares as a result of tax mapping.

Petitioner contends that without her knowledge, respondent Albert executed two documents of transfer covering
the subject land. In an Affidavit of Waiver, dated January 30, 1996, respondent Albert waived and quitclaimed in
favor of petitioners first cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights over a portion of the subject land. More
than a year later, respondent Albert conveyed to respondent Suanding the remainder of the land in a Deed
of Sale, dated November 29, 1997. In both documents, respondent Albert declared that he is the lawful owner
and possessor of the subject land. Thus, the documents of transfer did not bear the signature and written consent
of petitioner as the wife of the vendor, respondent Albert. Thereafter, the subject land was transferred by
respondent Suanding to third persons, Myrna Nazarro and Silardo Bested.

Petitioner filed a case against respondents Albert Anno and Suanding with the MTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for
Cancellation of the Waiver of Rights, Deed of Sale and Transfer Tax Declarations, and Damages, with a prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In her complaint,[1] petitioner alleged that the subject land belongs
to the conjugal partnership of spouses Anno, and thus could not have been validly conveyed by respondent
Albert to respondent Suanding without her written consent as spouse.

Respondent Albert did not file an Answer.[2] For his part, respondent Suanding took the stand. He testified that
respondent Albert represented to him that the land was his exclusive property as the land was part of his
inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior to his marriage to petitioner. He likewise presented a
1997 Certificate[3]from the Office of the Municipal Assessor of La Trinidad, Benguet, stating that no
improvements were listed in their records as introduced by respondent Anno on the subject land.

After trial, the MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. It found that both parties failed to sufficiently prove by convincing
evidence the nature of ownership of the subject land. However, the MTC applied Article 116 of the Family Code
and ruled that the subject land is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Anno. It held that
the conveyance of the land to respondent Suanding was void as it was done without the marital consent of
petitioner, the wife of vendor-respondent Albert.[4]

Respondent Suanding appealed to the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. He maintained that the subject land is the
exclusive property of respondent Albert Anno. The RTC found for respondent Suanding.[5] It ruled that as
petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the subject land was acquired by the spouses during their marriage, the
presumption that the property belongs to their conjugal partnership could not be made to apply. The RTC thus
declared the land to be the exclusive property of the vendor, respondent Albert Anno, which he could validly sell
without the consent of petitioner-spouse.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.[6] It likewise found petitioners evidence insufficient to
prove that the subject land was acquired by spouses Annoduring their marriage.

Hence, this petition.

The issue in the case at bar is whether the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of
spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the consent of the other.

We find no merit in the petition.

Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature.[7] However, for this presumption to
apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.[8]
To prove that spouses Anno acquired the subject land during their marriage, petitioner presented her 1963
marriage contract with respondent Albert and the initial 1974 tax declaration over the property. She likewise
testified that she and her husband diligently paid the taxes thereon and worked on the land.

However, a careful examination of the records shows that petitioners evidence failed to prove that the subject
land belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Anno.
It is a basic rule in evidence that he who alleges the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proof. The plaintiff
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon
the weakness of the defendants.[9]

In the case at bar, we find that petitioner failed to substantiate by preponderance of evidence her claim that the
subject land was conjugal in nature. Petitioner did not identify when she and her husband, respondent Albert,
first occupied and possessed the land. Neither did she present any witness to prove that they first occupied the
land during their marriage and that they both worked on the land. While petitioner claimed that they also hired a
caretaker to oversee the land, the records show that the caretaker was appointed only in 1989. Indeed, even the
documentary evidence adduced by petitioner failed to show when exactly the spouses Anno first took possession
of the land. While the initial tax declaration she presented was dated 1974, it cannot be automatically
deduced therefrom that occupation of the subject land was likewise done in the same year. To so conclude will
amount to speculation or conjecture on the part of the court. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court,
declaration of a land for taxation purposes cannot be equated with its acquisition for, in the ordinary course of
things, occupation of a piece of land usually comes prior to the act of declaring it for tax purposes. More
importantly, the 1974 tax declaration presented by petitioner cannot be made a basis to prove its conjugal nature
as the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert, who sold the
land as his exclusive property. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that tax declarations, especially of
untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership [10] and are good indicia of possession in the concept of
an owner.[11]

The foregoing circumstances do not show when the property was acquired by spouses Anno. The presumption
of the conjugal nature of the property allegedly acquired by the spouses Anno during the subsistence of their
marriage cannot be applied.[12] Consequently, we uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals that the subject
land is the exclusive property of respondent Albert Anno which he could validly dispose of without the consent
of his wife.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice [1] CA Rollo, pp. 95-100.
[2] Respondent Albert died during the pendency of the
WE CONCUR: case.
[3] Original Records, p. 150.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ [4] Decision, dated May 30, 2000; Rollo, pp. 39-44.
Associate Justice [5] CA Rollo, pp. 59-64.
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA [6] Decision, dated January 23, 2004, penned by
Associate Justice Associate Justice Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arturo
Associate Justice D. Brion; Rollo, pp. 33-38.
[7] Article 160, Civil Code.
ATTESTATION [8] Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 577
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were (1997); Torela v. Torela, 93 SCRA 391 (1979); Ponce De
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to Leon v. Rehabilitation Finances Corporation, 36 SCRA
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. 289 (1970).
[9] Spouses Aspi v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 94
REYNATO S. PUNO (1994), citing Jison v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 495
Associate Justice (1998).
Chairman, Second Division [10] Manongsong v. Estimo, 404 SCRA 683
(2003); Ranola v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 1
CERTIFICATION (2000); Director of Lands v. IAC, 209 SCRA 214 (1992).
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, [11] Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, 362
and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby SCRA 531 (2001).
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision [12] Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 520 (1998).
were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice