Article VI: The Legislative Department

Section 1. Legislative Power; Non-Delegation

Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 PHIL 328 (1957)

The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of
authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former necessary involves a
discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its
execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made

Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 PHIL 660 (1918-1919)

An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities

People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)

The grant of rule-making power of administrative agencies is an exception to the non-delegation

of legislative powers. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

Two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)

Medical Board of Education can give test for medical school entrance exam. The necessary
standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation
of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself,
and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle.

Cebu Oxygen Acetylene Co. v. Drilon, 176 SCRA 24 (1989)

A regulation cannot expand a law. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add
or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement.

Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703

There was no undue delegation of legislative power in the authority granted by legislature to the
Energy Regulatory Board to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund.
 To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which
implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy.

Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
constitution, it is a power, which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate
the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found
in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in RA 5435 of the power to reorganize
the Executive Department

Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan, 309 SCRA 661

What Congress delegated to the DBM is the administration of the Compensatory and Position
Classification System and not the determination of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

People v. Vera, 65 PHIL 56 (1937-1938)

The test of the propriety of delegation lies on the completeness of the statute in its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of legislature so much so that nothing is left to judgment of the
appointee or delegate of the legislature. The general rule is that an act of legislature is incomplete
and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standards by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of discretionary powers.

Solicitor General v. MMA, 204 SCRA 837 (1991)

In order for a delegation of power to be valid, the requisites of delegation must be present. These
are: 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient
standard, both of which was exemplified. However, the exercise of the delegated power was not
valid because it does not conform to existing law and violates another statute which is PD 1605.

Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251

Two tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:

o (1) COMPLETENESS TEST a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
o (2) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot (e.g. "public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and
welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare")
POWER OF OVERSIGHT

It embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence
over the implementation of legislation it has enacted
o It is INTRINSIC in the grant of legislative power and INTEGRAL to the checks and balance
in democracy
HOWEVER, it is subject to LIMITATIONS, namely:
o It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or
judicial power.
 o Its exercise must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of
laws and presentment
Kinds of Oversight Power:
o SCRUTINY
(Passive) lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative
operations
o INVESTIGATION
involves a more intense digging of facts (contained in Sec 21, Art VI,
Constitution)
o SUPERVISION
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area
allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority,
and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority
LEGISLATIVE VETO it grants the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law which is presented to Congress for
its approval
LEGISLATIVE POWER

Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress
which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives
o A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers.

HOW A BILL IS MADE INTO LAW (Steps 1 to 7 BICAMERALISM; 8 PRESENTMENT)

1. A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for
some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
2. The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral
by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
3. The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or
without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other
bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common
authorship or as a committee bill.
4. Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill
is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second
reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
5. The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members
merely register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate
is allowed.
6. Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the
three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a
conference committee representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if
ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President
for his consideration.
 7. The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated
with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective
chambers
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication

United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1

The Philippine Organic Act prohibited the delegation of legislative power which happened in this
case when the contents of Act 2868 were incomplete
o The power granted to the Governor-General to define the terms cause, extraordinary
rise and temporary amounted to a delegation of legislative power
The power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislature, which is elected by
a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands

Employers Confederation v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, GR No. 9619

While it is true that wage-fixing, like rate, constitutes an act Congress, such act may be
delegated PROVIDED it passes the tests of valid delegation
o RA 6727 meant to rationalize wages by having permanent boards to decide wages
rather than leaving wage determination to Congress year after year and law after law
o Such delegation was not meant to pass the bucket but to leave the question of wages
to the expertise of experts
With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the power
of subordinate legislation

People v. Rosenthal, 68 PHIL 328

In this case, the Law furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in
reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit
o "Public interest" in this case (and as stated in Act 2581) is a sufficient standard to guide
the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or
cancellation of certificates or permits
The OLD rule that legislative power must be exercised only by the legislative department must
give way to the NEW rule of subordinate legislation due to the increasing complexities of
modern government
o One thing is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and
that is that the maximum of delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non
potest delegare

Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 1

LOI 229 requiring all motor vehicles to have an Early Warning Device was a valid exercise of
police power, valid subordinate legislation.
 The Court noted of the provision in the LOI mentioning the Vienna Convention on Road Signs &
Signals and the UN itself as cognizant of the hazards posed by a stalled vehicle
o Since the Philippines ratified that Convention, it cannot repudiate a commitment to
which it had pledged its word because, the concept of pacta sunt servanda stands in the
way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international
morality

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, there is no limitations that the
said officers must observe when they make their distribution. Their options are apparently
boundless.

United States v. Panlilio, 28 PHIL 608

The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of
law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal
offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, 567 SCRA 354

The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a
reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. Absence of any constitutional or
statutory infirmity the provisions are legal and binding. Since, every law has in its favour the
presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and
unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.

Gerochi v. DENR, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007

All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements
are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

PSL Inc., v. LLDA 608 SCRA 442

The grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties did not violate the rule on non-delegation
of legislative powers. LLDAs power to impose fines is not unrestricted. In this case, LLDA
investigated the pollution complaint against petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of
petitioners effluent. It was only after the investigation result showing petitioners failure to meet
the established water and effluent quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner.
People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640

Circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents
and its penalties.

People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)

Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional. Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing
duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department of
the government.

Carbonilla v. Board of Airlines Representatives, 657 SCRA 775

Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce
it. The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Section 3506 of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines complied with these requirements. The law is complete in itself that it leaves
nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the Collector to assign customs employees
to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the
payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other persons served. Section 3506 also
fixed the standard to be followed by the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the
rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.

Section 2. Senate Composition

Section 3. Qualifications of Senator

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, March 8, 2016

Section 4. Senator: Term of Office; Voluntary Renunciation

Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives; Apportionment; Party List

Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)

Article VI, Section 5(1), shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
 than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter
clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment

Mariano v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)

The reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment of the law.

Sema v. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008

A province cannot be created without a legislative district. The power to create a province or
city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008

RA 9371 on its face is purely a reapportionment legislation. Thus, there is no need for a
plebiscite.
The Constitution and LGC expressly requires a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of a boundary of LGU (Art. X, Sec. 10). In contrast, no plebiscite
requirement exists under apportionment or reapportionment provision (Art. VI, Sec. 5)
The basis for districting shall be the number of inhabitants of a city/province, not the number of
registered voters therein.
Apportionment - the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or
other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body
in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population
and voting power among the districts.
Reapportionment - realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Aquino III v. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 17, 2010

While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.

Aldaba v. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010

The Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a
population of at least 250,000.
A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in
the immediately following election after the attainment of the 250,000 population

Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466, June 15, 2004

 Congressional elections are different from local government elections. In Congressional
elections, the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner

Party List

Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001)

The Supreme Court said that even if major political parties are allowed by the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must show, however, that they represent the interests
of the marginalized and underrepresented.
The following guidelines should be followed in order that a political party registered under the
party-list system may be entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives: [a] must represent
marginalized and under-represented sectors; [b] major political parties must comply with this
statutory policy; [c] must be subject to the express constitutional prohibition against religious
sects; [d] the party must not be disqualified under RA 7941; [e] the party must not be an adjunct
of an entity or project funded by the government; [f] the party and its nominees must comply
with the requirements of the law; [g] the nominee must also represent a marginalized or under-
represented sector; and [h] the nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation

VC Cadangen, et al v. COMELEC, GR No. 177179, June 5, 2009

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244 (2000)

Partido v. COMELEC, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006

Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

PGBI v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,2010

ANAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC, G.R. 206844-45, July 23, 2013

Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7,2010

ABC v. COMELEC, GR. No. 193256, March 22, 2011

Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013

Cocofed-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013

Milagros Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010

Section 6. Qualifications of Representatives

Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400 (1995)

A persons domicile is his domicile of origin. If a person never loses his or her domicile, the one
year requirement of Section 6 is not relevant because he or she is deemed never to have left the
place. If, however, a person loses his or her domicile either by voluntary abandonment for a new
one or by marriage to a husband who under the Civil Code dictates the wifes domicile, one must
be domiciled in the new place for at least one year immediately preceding the election if one
wants to represent the place in Congress. Similarly, if a person, having once lost his or her
domicile, should decide to re-establish herself or himself in his former domicile, the one year
requirement would also apply.

Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)

Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establish a new one and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.

Domino v. COMELEC, GR 134015 (July 19, 1999)

The term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed
place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

Maquera v. Borra, 15 SCRA 7

Not included in the qualifications of Congressman, which RA 4421 is a surety bond equivalent to
the one- year salary of the position to which he is a candidate. If it puts a real barrier that would
stop many suitable men and women from presenting themselves as prospective candidates, it
becomes unjustifiable, for it would defeat its very objective of securing the right of honest
candidates to run for public office.

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008

Legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects
of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and
other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, prescribing the qualifications of
candidates for senators.

Section 7. Term of Representatives

Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779

 When an elective official files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have
voluntarily cut short his tenure not his term. the filing of the certificate of candidacy is already
an overt act of an intention to relinquish the office currently held. Once the certificate is filed,
the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the
ousted official.

Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR 147387 (Dec. 10, 2003)

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Quinto v. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, December 1, 2009

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon
the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass
the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

Section 8.Regular Elections

Codilla v. De Venecia GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002

Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second
Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested
of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of
the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the
motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the
assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte. Second, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no
jurisdiction in the instant case.
Section 9. Special Elections

Tolentino v. COMELEC, GR 148334, January 21, 2004

Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some
authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory
provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the
election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of
the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of
voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill
vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.

Section 10. Salaries

Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

An increase in legislators salary requires expiration of term of both the approving Senators
and Congressmen.

Section 11. Privilege from Arrest; Parliamentary Freedom of Speech

People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689

While it is true that election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The
immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and Congressmen arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense (limited in scope)

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966)

Only utterances and acts made or performed by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, are covered by the protection of privileged communication of
legislators

Antonino v. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70

The press release is covered by qualified privilege to excuse defendant-appellant from

conviction of libel. He did not overcome the presumption of malice, not having shown the truth
thereof, or that they were published with good intentions and with justifiable motive or even
from the most liberal standpoint that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair
comment on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials

Pobre v. Defensor Santiago, AC No. 7399, August 25, 2009

The Court has not lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government,
 investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being
served
o Hence, Sen. Santiago, claiming to have made the utterance with the view to future
remedial legislation, was covered by parliamentary immunity
o It must be noted, however, that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege,
but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents
them

Section 12. Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests

Section 13. Prohibitions on Members of Congress

Liban v. Gordon, GR No. 175352, July 15, 2009

Section 13, Article VI clearly provides No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality, thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. This only refers to the Government
owned-controlled corporations/organizations which PNRC is clearly not.

Section 14. Prohibitions Related to the Practice of Profession

Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31

An assemblyman cannot indirectly fail to follow the Constitutional prohibition not to appear as
counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying a nominal amount of share of
one of the shareholders after his appearance as counsel therein was contested.

Section 15. Regular Session; Special Session

Section 16. Officers of Congress; Quorom; Discipline; Journal/Records

(par. 1) Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, GR 134577 November 18, 1998

The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

(par. 1) Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 PHIL 17 (1949)

(par. 2) People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689

The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for
the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.

(par. 3) Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997)

The Constitution does not require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every
time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third
 readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over
the veto of the President.

(par. 3) Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 PHIL 863 (1960)

That the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and
white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

(par. 3) Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636

(par. 4) US v. Pons, 34 PHIL 729 (1916)

(par. 4) Casco Phil Commercial Co. v. Giminez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)

(par. 4) Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974)

(par. 4) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

(par. 4) Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1

Pimentel v. Senate Committeee of the Whole, 644 SCRA 741

Section 17. Electoral Tribunal

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 PHIL 134 (1936)

Confirmation by the National Assembly cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", and to fix
time for the filing of said election protests.
When a defeated candidate challenges the qualification and claims the seat of a proclaimed
winner, the respective Electoral Tribunal of each House is the sole judge, and neither the
Supreme Court nor each House of Congress nor the Commission on Elections can interfere

Vera v. Avelino, 77 PHIL 192 (1946)

The Court could not order one branch of the Legislative to reinstate a member thereof. To do so
would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and
balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.

Chavez v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 315 (1992)

Petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of manifest errors in the certificates of
canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein. Indeed,
petitioner has not even pointed to any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election
returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a
regular election protest which, under the constitution and the Omnibus Election code,
exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400 (1995)

The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home where he
eventually intends to return and remain his domicile is what the Constitution speaks of
residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote
or to be voted upon.

Abbas v. SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution
of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution. In the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its
entire membership Senators and that no amendment of its rules can confer on the three
Justices-members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest

Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991)

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office,
devoid of partisan consideration.

Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990)

The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts,
without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its
jurisdiction over the case. It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost
at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.

Arroyo v. HRET, 246 SCRA 384 (1995)

The Supreme Court has invalidated a final vote tally made by the electoral tribunal without
supporting documents.

Pimentel v. HRET, GR 141489 May 29, 2002

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House
fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political
parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court
under its power of judicial review.

Aggabao v. COMELEC, GR No. 163756, January 26, 2005

Limkaichong v. COMELEC, GR No. 178831, April 2009

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
 It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation.

Banat v. COMELEC, GR No. 177508, August 7, 2009

The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
president or vice president. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET
can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates
have been proclaimed.
On the other hand, Congress and the Comelec En Banc shall determine only the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass. They shall exercise this power before the
proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.

Drilon, et al v. Speaker, GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009

The Constitution gives to the Senate and Congress the primary jurisdiction over who should sit in
the CA. This includes the determination of party affiliation and number of party members for the
purpose of determining proportional representation.

Guerrero v. COMELEC, GR No. 137004, July 26, 2000

The word qualification should not be read as qualified by the term constitutional, as in
constitutional qualifications. Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Where the validity of the
proclamation of a winning candidate who has been proclaimed as the winner is raised, the issue
is best addressed to the HRET.

Garcia v. HRET, GR No. 134792, August 12, 1999

As long as the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this
case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.
Party litigants appearing before the HRET and their lawyers, are duty bound to know and are
expected to properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal
without being formally ordered to do so. They cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to
the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance of those requirements it decides to dismiss their
petition. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed
to ensure its proper and swift dispensation.

Lazatin v. HET, GR No. 84297, December 8, 1988

Congress may not prescribe for the HRET a period for filing cases before it. The HRET is the sole
judge of election contests involving members of the House of Representatives, and this power
includes rule-making power which Congress may not interfere with.

Section 18. Commission on Appointments

Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)

 The House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in the Commission
on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership
o It must be understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or
formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another

Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 (1990)

Based on the composition of the House, the Commission on Appointments membership was
based on proportional representation

o Of the 160 Congressmen, 80% belonged to the LDP entitling them to 10 seats
o Meanwhile, the next two largest parties, LP and KBL were properly granted 1 seats each
o Furthermore, as a member of the House Majority, KAIBA is bound by the majoritys
choices
Even if KAIBA is to be considered an opposition party, its 0.4% representation in the House
cannot entitle it to a seat in the CA

Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992); MR, 219 SCRA 326 (1993)

A political party must have at least 2 Senators in the Senate to be able to have a representative
in the Commission on Appointments
Where there are more than 2 political parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the
Commission
Commission on Appointments may function without the full 24 membership present. The
overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation
of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to
constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under
the Constitution

Drilon, et al v. Speaker, GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to each chamber of Congress is
necessary before she may bring her petition to court
o Each chamber exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who
among their members would occupy the allotted 12 seats of each chambers
representative to the Commission on Appointments

Section 19. Constitutions of the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments

Section 20. Records and Books of Accounts

Section 21. Inquiries in Aid of Legislation

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

The contemplated inquiry by the Committee is not really in aid of legislation

o It is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out criminal liability, if any, of Lopa or Marcos in the sale of the
39 corporations

Standard Charter v. Senate, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007

The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial

body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would
be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 PHIL 25 (1990)

The question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate
is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. The contention is not that the question is impertinent
to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation.
We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every
question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is
required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to
its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 October 17, 2006

The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes
It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class. Certainly,
a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence
of any constitutional basis.

Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon, GR 136760 July 29, 2003

Where the senate conducts legislative inquiries in aid of legislation, and persons were
subpoenaed and invited thereto, the latter cannot go to the court of justice because it has no
authority to prohibit (issue a writ of injunction) the committee from requiring that person from
appearing and testifying before it; otherwise it will be inconsistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers as the same is an encroachment to ones prerogatives.

Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1, GR 169777, April 20, 2006

EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it deprives it of the
information in possession of these officials.
 The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the Constitution.
This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry with process to
enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which fall under the rubric of executive privilege.
o Executive privilege the power of the government to withhold information from the
public, the courts and the Congress
Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation (Section 21) vs. Question Hour (Section 22)

While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in
aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related
does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of Congress may
only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the president on whom the
executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of
impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of
separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

Neri v. Senate, 549 SCRA 771

The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot
be equated with the peoples right to public information.
Even if Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information. The members of respondent Committees should not invoke
as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general.
This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of
Congress.

Neri v. Senate, 564 SCRA 152

Garcillano v. House of Representatives, GR No. 170338, December 23, 2008

 Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: the Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure.

Negros O II Elec. Coop v. Sangguniang Panlungsod, 155 SCRA 421 (1991)

There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting
local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-
members for contempt. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative
bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners for contempt.

Section 22. Appearance of Heads of Departments in Congress

Section 23. Declaration of a State of War; Emergency Powers

Section 24. Bills Originating in the House of Representatives

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)

What the Constitution simply means, is that the initiative must come from the House of
Representatives. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its
own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted

Alvarez v. Guingona, GR No. 118303, January 31, 1996

A bill of local application, such as one asking for the conversion of a municipality into a city, is
deemed to have originated from the House provided that the bill of the House was filed prior to
the filing of the bill in the Senate even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own version.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until
it receives the House bill.

Guingona Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)

The existing presidential decrees were laws and not bills still to be enacted into law. Thus, there
is no need for them to originate in the House of Representatives
Section 25. Limits on Power to Appropriate

(par. 2) Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975)

If a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the
provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of
reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect. It confers no right and
affords no protection. (RIDERS)

Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under Section
25, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

DPWH v. Quirino, GR No. 183444, October 12, 2011

There is no novelty regarding the question of satisfying a claim for construction contracts
entered into by the government, where there was no appropriation and where the contracts
were considered void due to technical reasons. It has been settled in several cases that payment
for services done on account of the government, but based on a void contract, cannot be
avoided.

(par. 5) Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994)

Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment. Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually
savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which
said transfer to be made.

(par. 5) Sanchez v. COA, 552 SCRA 471

Art VI of the Constitution pertains exclusively to the President, President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the Hose of Representatives, the Chief Justice, and the Heads of ConComs and no
other. Thus, there was no valid transfer of funds as the power was not exercised by the
President but only on the instance of the Deputy Executive Secretary, not the Executive
Secretary himself.

(par. 5) Goh v. COMELEC GR No. 212584, November 25, 2014

To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. However,
the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the
same nature. For example, the purpose can be to '"conduct elections," which even if not
 expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall elections. The purpose of the
appropriation is still specific - to fund elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not
expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall elections.

Section 26. Subject and Title of Bills; Three Readings

(par. 1) Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962)

The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all
parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the
bill.The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case,
has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, will be regarded as valid.

(par. 1) Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965)

It is to be observed that under RA No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12,
subsection c of CA No. 186, retirement benefits are granted to members of GSIS. This paragraph
is related and germane to the subject of CA No. 186. The succeeding paragraph of RA. No 3836
refers to members of Congress and elective in any manner to the subject of CA. No. 186
establishing the GSIS and which provides both retirement and issuance benefits to its members.

(par. 1) Insular Lumber Company v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710 (1981)

Even if Sec 5 is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increase tax, said provision still
has reference to the specific tax on oil and fuel. IT IS NOT A DEVIATION FROM THE GENERAL
SUBJECT OF THE LAW. The purpose of the constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in
legislation which would fail to apprise the public of the NATURE, SCOPE, AND CONSEQUENCES
of law.

(par. 1) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993)

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings
as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 (1968)

 The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the
bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation.

Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987)

It is not necessary that the title of a bill/act express each and every end that the statute wishes
to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject and title.

(par. 2) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)

Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)

Banat v. COMELEC, GR No. 177508, August 7, 2009

The jurisdiction of the pet and the set can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice
presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. on the other hand, under section
37, congress and the comelec en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution
of the certificates of canvass. congress and the comelec en banc shall exercise this power
before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates

Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. In the present case, the
records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify
the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.

Section 27. Passage of bills; Item Veto

CIR v. CTA, 185 SCRA 329 (1990)

An item in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but
rather to the subject of tax and the tax rate.

Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 (1964)

Since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencias department they are in fact in violation of the law and they
cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this
 provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition
attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

(par. 2) Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990)

The power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does
not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the
same item

(par. 2) Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994)

DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION

General appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, but included in the GAA are deemed INAPPRORIATE PROVISIONS which must be
treated as item and which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto
power, OR
Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation
beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision"

EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT

Refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress
It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type
SOURCES:
o implied powers granted by Congress to the President
o power of President as Commander-in-Chief
o Faithful Execution Clause of the Constitution

POWER OF ITEM-VETO

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually part of the legislative process
o GENERAL RULE: President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (Art. VI,
Sec. 27[1], Constitution)
EXCEPTION: the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general
appropriations bill (Art. VI, Sec. 27[2], Constitution)

(par. 2) Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133

Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)

Section 28. Power of Taxation; Limitations; Exemptions

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc, 164 SCRA 27

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 27

Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR 101273, July 3, 1992

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates
and other duties or imposts.

CIR v. Santos, GR No. 119252, August 18, 1997

It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it
has been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation.

Southern Cross v. Philippine Cement GR No. 158540, July 8, 2004

Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA [Safeguard
Measure Act] by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue
delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation
from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative
power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power.
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority
attain primordial consideration: (1) there must be a law; (2) there must be specified limits; and
(3) Congress may impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority.

(par. 3) Abra Valley College v. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988)

In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of
education while the second floor was being used as incidental to education (residence of the
director).

Lladoc v. CIR, 14 SCRA 292

Tax exemption granted to churches does not imply total exemption. Cash donation to the
church is not tax exempt. The exemption provided is limited only to property tax which is
different from excise tax imposed on the donation. The Court noted that the tax applied to the
act of donation, not the property itself rendering the tax assessment of the Commissioner valid
and correct.

Central Mindanao University v. DAR, GR 100091, October 22, 1992

The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question
of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for
resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court stated that
the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively
exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its
present student population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of
growth of the university in the years to come.

Commissioner v. CA, GR 124043, October 14, 1998

 Income of whatever kind and character of non-stock non-profit organizations from any of their
properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under the NIRC.
Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict
in interpretation in construing tax exemptions (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18, 1997). Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from
taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based.
Thus, the claimed exemption must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too
clear to be mistaken
Verba legis non est recedendum. The law does not make a distinction. The rental income is
taxable regardless of whence such income is derived and how it is used or disposed of. Where
the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

John Hay v. Lim, GR 19775, October 24, 2003

The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of
the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges
to the John Hay SEZ find support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No.
420, which laws were already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment
of R.A. No. 7227.

Systems Plus Computer College v. Caloocan City, GR No. 146382, August 7, 2003

Parcels of land that was later donated to the Petitioner is exempted from tax is not exempt.
There is no showing that the same are actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes.

Lung Center v. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004

The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes
only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be
entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution
and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose.
Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real
property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Planters Products Inc v. Fertiphil Corp, GR No. 166006, March 14, 2008

One of the inherent limitations is that a tax may be levied only for public purposes.
Public purpose should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only pertain to those
purposes which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, but also includes
those purposes designed to promote social justice.
Public purpose is the heart of a tax law. When a tax law is only a mask to exact funds from the
public when its true intent is to give undue benefit and advantage to a private enterprise, that
law will not satisfy the requirement of public purpose.

Section 29. Fiscal Powers of Congress; Limitations; Special Funds

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 PHIL. 331, 1960-61

The appropriation of the road is not valid because it is not for a public purpose. The subsequent
donation of the road did not validate the law because the validity of a statute depends upon the
powers of Congress at the time of its approval, and not upon events occurring or acts performed
subsequently.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the
public.

Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, 1991

The appropriation is valid if the decrees are complete in all their essential terms and conditions
and sufficient standards are indicated therein, and amounts are made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the decrees.

Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626, 1988

The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters and
producers for a special purpose that of "financing the growth and development of the sugar
industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign
market. The fact that the State has taken possession of money pursuant to law is sufficient to
constitute them state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose. Having been
levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in
the language of the statute, "administered in trust for the purpose intended. Once the purpose
has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of
the Government.

Araullo v. Aquino III, GR No. 209287 (2014)

It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or
realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other
non-Executive agencies.

Section 30. Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519, 1994

Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code (EO 226), by providing for direct appeals to the
Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of
the Supreme Court, this provision never became effective. This also could not be deemed to
have amended BP 129 which provides for appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
decisions of BOI.
Section 32. Initiative and Referendum

Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279, 1994

There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole
and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did
not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. What the
Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress
deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the
former mode of initiation by direct action of the people.