1.

Safety
1.1. Introduction
Safety is the state of being "safe", the condition of being protected against physical, social,
spiritual, financial, political, emotional, occupational, psychological, educational or other types
or consequences of failure, damage, error, accidents, harm or any other event which could be
considered non-desirable. Safety can also be defined to be the control of recognized hazards to
achieve an acceptable level of risk. This can take the form of being protected from the event or
from exposure to something that causes health or economical losses. It can include protection of
people or of possessions.
All businesses and projects are subject to risk. The key to success lies in how one manages risks
and what protective measures are taken to minimize the likelihood and the consequences of
undesirable events.
All workplace hazards (chemical, physical, etc.) can be controlled by a variety of methods. The
goal of controlling hazards is to prevent workers from being exposed to occupational hazards.
Some methods of hazard control are more efficient than others, but a combination of methods
usually provides a safer workplace than relying on only one method. Some methods of control
are cheaper than others but may not provide the most effective way to reduce exposures.
These methods are;
1. Elimination.
2. Substitution.
3. Engineering control.
4. Administrative control.
5. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
The most effective method of controlling hazards is to control at the source by eliminating the
hazard or by substituting a hazardous agent or work process with a less dangerous one
Although best design will usually be by achieving an inherently safe design where practicable,
this study will assess the suitability of the low pressure separator system in a natural gas plant to
handle the gas blow-by risk from an upstream higher pressure system, the designer approach
didn’t go for an inherently safe system i.e. by designing the low pressure system to handle
pressure equivalent to the high pressure upstream system, as this was considered uneconomic,
however the designer added more layers of protection to protect the system from this hazard, but
to be sure that the system is properly protected against this potential hazard some hazard analysis
techniques are implemented to make sure that the system is properly designed.
1.2. Hazard Analysis techniques
These hazard analysis studies can be either qualitative or quantitative, which are used to identify
or quantify the available hazards, of course if the study involves quantification of the hazard it
consumes more time and money, nonetheless if the study is qualitative it can usually be done in a
relatively short time frame and costs less amount of money, and as an outcome of these studies
suitable engineering solution is usually identified
Hazard Analysis techniques are either:
1.2.1. Qualitative Hazard Analysis Techniques
Usually referred as Process Hazard Analysis “PHA”, these hazard analysis techniques aims to
identify the potential hazards or identify gaps in process safety management systems, these types
of study includes but not limited to:
1. Hazard Identification (HAZID)
2. Check list Analysis
3. Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP)
4. What if analysis.

2.1.1.1 Hazard Identification (HAZID)

Usually HAZID is the first step of risk assessment verification as it is usually conducted at the
very early stage of any project, it focuses on hazardous materials and identifying the suspected
process upsets that might lead to a hazardous situation.
HAZID does not require lots of input information as it does not need a detailed design or
procedure; it can be used in conceptual design phase of a process plant, and based on its outcome
preliminary P&IDs could be issued.
HAZID identifies the possible hazardous situation, and their potential causes and their impact on
the facility, usually as an outcome of HAZID workshops corrective and/or preventative measures
can usually be suggested by the team members which could be used for other hazard analysis
technique.
2.1.1.2 Check list Analysis
Checklist Hazard analysis technique is a reasonably simple and cost effective way to identify
hazard, it is done by checking and ticking from a list of items or procedures list with either (Yes,
No or Not Applicable).
This analysis is used mainly for processes that have a national/ international standard that
governs it such as, pressure vessels that are designed to the ASME codes, storage tanks that are
designed according to API standards…etc.
However Checklists are dependent on experience of the organization/ person who developed
them against standards, industry practice and facility experience gained by time, as people who
operates the facility should know and document any hazardous situation that occurred in the
facility and consider them in the most updated checklists.
2.1.1.3 Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP)
HAZOP technique systematically reviews the plant process/ operation to determine if there
would be any deviation from design conditions that can appear during operation due to a specific
deviation .
This technique has the advantage that it can be used for all kind of process either continuous,
batch or semi batch.
HAZOP chairman typically is independent from the company that will perform the HAZOP,
usually information that is needed for HAZOP study is requested by the chairman,they usually
are: as-built piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), as-configured cause and effect
diagrams (C&E diagrams), as process flow diagrams (PFDs), as utilities flow diagrams (UFDs),
and any other sources of information about plant design conditions and current operating
conditions this could be obtained from equipment datasheets, process description and operating
envelope.
Chairman then divides the plant systems into nodes which will be assessed in the HAZOP
workshop; this workshop should have as a minimum the following attendees:
- HAZOP Chairman
- HAZOP Scribe
- Independent process and control engineer
- Independent operations engineer
- Process and control representative engineer
 - Operations representative engineer
- Process safety representative engineer
This team will review and assess all nodes that have been previously determined by the
chairman, and the chairman will go through a list of guide words and parameters (deviations) and
performs the following steps on each node to complete the HAZOP study:
1. Identify the appropriate node
2. Application of the first or next parameter
3. Application of the first or next guide word, which with the parameter gives the deviation
4. Figure out the deviation
5. Determine all possible causes for the deviation
6. Check the consequences of the deviation
7. Check the safety measurements preventing or mitigating the deviation and its associated
consequences
8. Establish instruction for action or any other considerations of the problem when applicable
9. After identifying and discussing all causes and consequences for a given deviation and the
requirements for action, the procedure returns back to step 3. This process repeats until all
guide words have been combined with a selected parameter
10. After all guide words have been considered the next parameter is selected in step 2 and this
continues until every parameter has been tested
11. The discussion moves forward to the next node and the process repeats until all nodes have
been applied
12. An action note is entered into the worksheet if the team consents that the current precautions
are inadequate or not a concern
13. Recommendations may be documented to offer a prevention or mitigation of the
consequences. An Action Sheet is made for each item for documentation and tracking
purposes.

Final HAZOP report should include the results in a table format each should include the
guide word and parameter used, the possible causes of the deviation, any corresponding
consequences that can arise due to this deviation and finally any suggested actions that could
eliminate the risk of this deviation.
2.1.1.4 What if Analysis
It is a brainstorming approach to identify hazards that might be caused if specific scenarios are to
occur, this approach is based on having an appropriate team of well experienced engineers to
look at the process and brainstorm some scenarios by asking/ answering questions starting with
What if…? Such as:
- What if shutdown valve did not close?
- What if instrumentation air system failed?
- What if liquid level is drained from the vessel?
- What if control valve stuck open
- What if pumps didn’t work…. Etc.
This process can determine hazards, accidents, and hazardous situations. The experienced team
identifies accident situations, consequences, and present safeguards in place, and then comes up
with any further suggestions to reduce risk. This approach is also used to analyze any deviations
in design, construction, and operating intent. This process needs a basic understanding of the
process and the skill to combine potential deviations with outcomes. Guideline for process safety
for engineering design outlines this as a great tool if staff are experienced, if not results are very
likely to be incomplete.
1.2.2. Quantitative Hazard Analysis Techniques
Quantitative hazard analysis technique are more reliable method to evaluate the overall impact of
a major accident in industry, usually the other techniques of hazard analysis deals with, accidents
that leads to injuries and/or a minor amount of fatalities, however for more significant accidents
a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) should take place to identify the hazard and propose solutions
for any possibilities of economic risk reduction. Event tree analysis (ETA), and fault tree
analysis (FTA) are two examples of this hazard analysis technique .
1.2.3. Semi-quantitative Hazard Analysis Techniques
These types of Hazard analysis are more focusing on quantifying the available risks however
they are not as rigorous as quantitative methods like QRAs, nonetheless they are very useful
approach to have a good numeric estimate for the available hazards, and they also can see
possible ways of reducing risks as far as reasonably and economically practicable.
These studies include:
2.1.3.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
This analysis intends to study equipment and protection systems failures and as an output of this
study increasing reliability of some equipment might be required .
FMEA consider each failure as an individual failure and not related to other failures in the
system unless it is a subsequent or can cause another failure directly.
BS 5670 illustrates the purpose, principles, procedures and application of FMEA.
Table ‎1-1 Hazard analysis techniques guidelines for process safety engineering design
Typically used in Resources Types of Results Advantages and
requirement Disadvantages
HAZID - Conceptual Design - Material physical and - Rough screening of - Provides a quick focus on big issues
- Pilot plant chemical data general hazard - Potential to miss something
- Research and development - Basic process Chemistry - Ranking of hazardous
- Process Flow Diagrams area or processes

Checklist - Conceptual design - Material physical and - Response to pre-defined - Can be used with less experienced
- Pilot plant chemical data questions personnel, if the experience was
analysis - Detailed engineering - Basic process Chemistry - Documentation of captured in the checklist
- Construction/start up - Process Flow Diagrams compliance - Quality of the analysis is only as
- Routine operation - Operating procedures good of the quality of checklist
- Decommissioning - P&IDs - Long checklists or that doesn’t quite
- Expansion or modification relate to the process that is being
- During what if or HAZOP evaluated can be completed without
studies thorough evaluation

HAZOP - Pilot plant - Material physical and - Scenario based - Provide a structural methodology to
- Detailed engineering chemical data documentation of systematically and consistently
- Routine operation - Basic process Chemistry deviation, causes, analyze hazard scenarios.
- Expansion or modification - Process Flow Diagrams consequences, - Provides input to Layers of
- Operating procedures safeguards, risk ranking protection analysis (LOPA)
- P&IDs and recommendations, if - Potential for redundancy
any.
What-If - Conceptual Design - Material physical and - Scenario based - Allows an experienced facilitator to
- Pilot plant chemical data documentation of what- efficiently address issues of
- Research and development - Basic process Chemistry if questions and their concerns
- Construction/start up - Process Flow Diagrams consequences and - Inexperienced facilitator may miss
- Routine operation - Operating procedures safeguards, risk ranking some potential process deviations.
- Decommissioning - P&IDs and recommendations, if
- Expansion or modification any.
- During HAZOP studies

FMEA - Conceptual engineering - Material physical and - Identifies failures and - Designed to analyze potential
- Detailed engineering chemical data safeguards equipment failures
- Routine operation - Basic process Chemistry - Experience of the analyst is crucial
- Expansion or modification - Process Flow Diagrams - Not a team approach
- Operating procedures
- P&IDs

LOPA - Detailed engineering - Material physical and - Scenario based - Requires less time than QRA
- Routine operation chemical data documentation of - Provide consistent basis for
- Expansion or modification - Basic process Chemistry initiating cause, determining the estimated frequency
- Operating procedures consequence, severity of consequence based on event
- P&IDs ranking, IPLs, and frequency and severity, and
- High consequence identification of whether reliability of the IPLs.
scenarios obtained from additional IPLs are - It is not a scenario identification tool
HAZOP required or not - Is not intended to replace the QRA
- Established LOPA if required.
methodology
- Cause and effect diagrams